Preserving Integrity in the Face of Performance Threat: Self-Affirmation Enhances Neurophysiological Responsiveness to Errors

Abstract

Self-affirmation produces large effects: Even a simple reminder of one's core values reduces defensiveness against threatening information. But how, exactly, does self-affirmation work? We explored this question by examining the impact of self-affirmation on neurophysiological responses to threatening events. We hypothesized that because self-affirmation increases openness to threat and enhances approachability of unfavorable feedback, it should augment attention and emotional receptivity to performance errors. We further hypothesized that this augmentation could be assessed directly, at the level of the brain. We measured self-affirmed and nonaffirmed participants' electrophysiological responses to making errors on a task. As we anticipated, self-affirmation elicited greater error responsiveness than did nonaffirmation, as indexed by the error-related negativity, a neural signal of error monitoring. Self-affirmed participants also performed better on the task than did nonaffirmed participants. We offer novel brain evidence that self-affirmation increases openness to threat and discuss the role of error detection in the link between self-affirmation and performance.

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Psychological Science
http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/10/18/0956797612448483
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DOI: 10.1177/0956797612448483
published online 22 October 2012Psychological Science
Lisa Legault, Timour Al-Khindi and Michael Inzlicht
Responsiveness to Errors
Preserving Integrity in the Face of Performance Threat : Self-Affirmation Enhances Neurophysiological
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Life is seasoned with failure. From the mistakes people make
at work or school, to their missteps with friends, or blunders in
romantic relationships, people are met with an abundance of
information reminding them that they could be better than they
are. When confronted with the stark reality of their shortcom-
ings, individuals become motivated to preserve their self-
worth. One way they might do so is to underscore alternative
sources of their personal value. For instance, when faced with
a threat to their athletic competence, they might remind them-
selves of their intellectual aptitude or strong family ties. This
process of preserving self-worth minimizes the anxiety, stress,
and defensiveness associated with threats to self-integrity
while keeping individuals attuned to the possibility of self-
improvement. But how, exactly, is this adaptive response to
threat achieved? Although it is well documented that self-
affirmation increases openness to threat, very few studies have
addressed the basic mechanisms of this effect. In the current
research, we examined the direct impact of self-affirmation
on the neurophysiological reaction to integrity-threatening
events.
Self-Affirmation Theory
Self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) proposes that individuals
are motivated to protect the perceived integrity and worth of the
self (D. K. Sherman & Cohen, 2006; D. K. Sherman & Hartson,
2011). Although self-integrity can vary across cultures, groups,
and situations, it generally refers to the sense that one is a moral
and socially suitable person (e.g., that one is intelligent, rational,
competent, a good parent, a good American). When one’s sense
of self-goodness in an important life domain is undermined,
self-integrity is threatened. Many responses to threats to self-
integrity involve defensive psychological alterations aimed at
denying, rejecting, or transforming the threat in order to restore
self-worth (D. K. Sherman & Cohen, 2002; D. K. Sherman &
Hartson, 2011). These defensive reactions might include self-
serving attributions (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999), out-group
Corresponding Author:
Lisa Legault , Clarkson University, Department of Psychology, 8 Clarkson
Ave., Potsdam, NY 13699
E-mail: llegault @clarkson.edu
Preserving Integrity in the Face of
Performance Threat: Self-Affirmation
Enhances Neurophysiological
Responsiveness to Errors
Lisa Legault1, Timour Al-Khindi2, and Michael Inzlicht3
1Department of Psychology, Clarkson University; 2School of Medicine, Johns Hopkins University; and
3Depar tment of Psychology, University of Toronto Scarborough
Abstract
Self-affirmation produces large effects: Even a simple reminder of one’s core values reduces defensiveness against threatening
information. But how, exactly, does self-affirmation work? We explored this question by examining the impact of self-
affirmation on neurophysiological responses to threatening events. We hypothesized that because self-affirmation increases
openness to threat and enhances approachability of unfavorable feedback, it should augment attention and emotional
receptivity to performance errors. We further hypothesized that this augmentation could be assessed directly, at the level
of the brain. We measured self-affirmed and nonaffirmed participants’ electrophysiological responses to making errors on
a task. As we anticipated, self-affirmation elicited greater error responsiveness than did nonaffirmation, as indexed by the
error-related negativity, a neural signal of error monitoring. Self-affirmed participants also performed better on the task than
did nonaffirmed participants. We offer novel brain evidence that self-affirmation increases openness to threat and discuss
the role of error detection in the link between self-affirmation and performance.
Keywords
self-esteem, threat
Received 12/22 /11; Revision accepted 4 /18/12
Research Report
Psychological Science OnlineFirst, published on October 22, 2012 as doi:10.1177/0956797612448483
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2 Legault et al.
derogation (Fein & Spencer, 1997), or overzealous beliefs
(McGregor, Nash, & Inzlicht, 2009). However, because the
function of defensiveness is to selectively attend to those aspects
of a situation or event that support self-esteem and to reject
threatening aspects, it distorts one’s perception of reality and
thereby undermines the ability to learn from the experience.
Of course, not every threatening situation produces biased
perception and cognition. Threats to integrity can be managed
in an adaptive way that not only promotes accurate respon-
siveness to threats but also preserves self-worth. Through self-
affirmation, individuals can adapt to and learn from stressors,
as well as maintain their sense of being competent, good, reli-
able, and the like. These self-affirmations typically involve
the capacity to recall essential aspects of self and identity,
which are independent of the threat itself and thereby invul-
nerable to it. So, whereas defensive behavior directly alters
the meaning of threatening information, self-affirmation
allows individuals to focus on domains of self-integrity unre-
lated to the evaluative implications of the immediate threat.
By reaffirming integrity in this way, people can anchor their
sense of self in their broader view of the self as good, and
there is less need to defend against the threat. Rather, they can
focus on the demands of the situation, setting aside the need to
protect their ego.
Not surprisingly, this strategy affords substantial benefits in
various domains. For instance, self-affirmation has been
shown to increase the acceptance of threatening health infor-
mation (Howell & Shepperd, 2012; D. A. K. Sherman, Nelson,
& Steele, 2000), augment openness to counterattitudinal views
(Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000), reduce the racial achieve-
ment gap among African American students (Cohen, Garcia,
Apfel, & Master, 2006), improve self-control (Schmeichel &
Vohs, 2009), and even reduce the severity of the biological
markers of stress (Creswell et al., 2005; D. K. Sherman, Bun-
yan, Creswell, & Jaremka, 2009). But how are these effects
achieved? Although the behavioral outcomes of self-affirmation
have been extensively examined, only a few studies have
investigated their basic underlying mechanisms. In particular,
past work has shown that self-affirmation reduces defensive-
ness by increasing implicit responsiveness and attentional
bias toward self-relevant threat (Klein & Harris, 2009; van
Koningsbruggen, Das, & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2009).
In the study presented here, we aimed to take these cognitive
findings a step further by investigating neurophysiological
responsiveness to self-threat. We suggest that the attentiveness
to threat that characterizes self-affirmation should be reflected
in complementary threat awareness at the level of the brain.
Neurophysiological Responding to
Self-Integrity Threat
Just as an academic failure can threaten one’s identity as
a student, the commission of errors on a performance task
is likely to induce threat to perceptions of personal efficacy.
Indeed, research in affective neuroscience suggests that indi-
viduals demonstrate distinct neurophysiological responses to
performance errors, which are perceived to be arousing and
threatening (Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Hajcak, McDonald, &
Simons, 2003).
One of the best known neural correlates of performance
error is the error-related negativity (ERN; Gehring, Goss,
Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). The ERN is a pronounced
negative deflection on the electroencephalogram (EEG) that
occurs within 100 ms of making an error on a task and is
thought to be generated by the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC;
Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994). Holroyd and Coles (2002)
suggested that the ERN reflects an error-detection system that
serves reinforcement learning; when people make errors,
dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain that project to the ACC
temporarily cease firing, which results in an ERN. According
to this view, the ERN reflects a discrepancy between an
expected outcome (e.g., a correct response) and an actual out-
come (e.g., an incorrect response; see also Yeung, Botvinick,
& Cohen, 2004).
Another view of the ERN links it with motivational and
affective responses to errors (Inzlicht & Al-Khindi, 2012; Luu,
Collins, & Tucker, 2000) and indicates the possibility that it
may partially reflect a “distress signal” when performance is
worse than expected (Bartholow et al., 2005, p. 41). This per-
spective suggests that ERN magnitude is associated with the
value placed on errors and that increased motivation or task
engagement in response to self-regulation failures elicits larger
ERNs (Legault & Inzlicht, in press). Despite their differences,
both views of the ERN suggest that it signals the monitoring of
performance, which serves to increase attention, cognitive
control, and readiness for action (Weinberg, Riesel, & Hajcak,
in press).
Self-Affirmation and the ERN
Much like the ERN, self-affirmation attunes people to self-
relevant threat in the service of promoting adaptive respond-
ing. Given that performance errors are a type of self-relevant
threat, we expected that self-affirmation should increase emo-
tional responsiveness to performance error, as demonstrated
by an increased ERN. Supporting this idea, past work has
shown that self-affirmed individuals are more likely to attend
to and accept their mistakes and flaws than are defensive indi-
viduals (Hodgins et al., 2010; D. K. Sherman & Cohen, 2006).
Moreover, because self-affirmation assuages any ego-protective
alarm and allows people to attend to the demands of the task at
hand, we also expected it would bolster task performance.
Conversely, compared with self-affirmed individuals, nonaf-
firmed individuals are more likely to reject or dismiss personal
threat (e.g., D. A. K. Sherman et al., 2000), and such defen-
siveness is related to the ignoring of personal errors (Hodgins
et al., 2010); therefore, we expected that undermining self-
affirmation would promote defensiveness and thus reduce
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Self-Aff irmation Improves Error Responsiveness 3
error sensitivity. These negative consequences should be
evinced by a blunted ERN, as well as reduced performance.
Thus, in a novel examination of the neuroaffective underpin-
nings of self-affirmation, we assessed people’s neurophysio-
logical reactions to performance errors in order to test the
protective effect of self-affirmation on threat defensiveness at
the level of the brain.
Method
Participants
Thirty-eight introductory psychology students at the Univer-
sity of Toronto Scarborough participated for course credit.
Three participants were excluded because of equipment mal-
function, leaving a final sample of 35 (21 females, 14 males;
mean age = 19.4 years, SD = 2.2).
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to either a self-affirmation
or a nonaffirmation condition before completing a self-control
task. In the self-affirmation condition, they were asked to rank
six values (aesthetic, social, political, religious, economic, and
theoretical values; Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960) from most
important to least important. They were then given 5 min to
write about why their highest-ranked value was important to
them. In the nonaffirmation condition, participants were simi-
larly asked to rank the six values, but they were then asked to
write about why their highest-ranked value was not very impor-
tant to them. This was done to undermine self-affirmation.1
Behavioral task. After the writing task, participants per-
formed a go/no-go task. Stimuli consisted of the letter “M”
(the go stimulus) and the letter “W” (the no-go stimulus). Par-
ticipants were required to press a button on a box when the go
stimulus appeared and to refrain from pressing the button
when the no-go stimulus appeared. Each trial consisted of a
fixation cross (“+”) presented for 500 ms, followed by a go or
no-go stimulus presented for 100 ms. The maximum time
allowed for a response was 500 ms. The intertrial interval was
50 ms. To increase threat, we gave participants negative visual
feedback for 500 ms (“Wrong!”) if they committed an error.
Participants completed six experimental blocks, each consist-
ing of 40 go trials and 20 no-go trials.
Neurophysiological recording. Continuous EEG was re-
corded during the go/no-go task using a Lycra cap embedded
with 32 tin electrodes. EEG was recorded at a sampling rate
of 512 Hz using ASA acquisition software (Advanced Neuro
Technology, Enschede, The Netherlands) with average-ear
reference and forehead ground. Frequencies were digitally
filtered off-line between 0.1 and 15 Hz (fast Fourier trans-
form implemented, 24-dB zero-phase-shift Butterworth
filter). The response epoch was defined as the period between
200 ms prior to and 800 ms subsequent to the button press.
The EEG signal was baseline-corrected by subtracting the
average voltage during the period 400 to 200 ms prior to the
button press. Waves that exceeded threshold values of +50
and −50 µV were rejected. Each EEG signal was response-
locked, and average waveforms for correct- and incorrect-
response trials were created for each participant. These were
averaged across participants within conditions to yield grand-
average waveforms. The ERN was defined as the minimum
deflection occurring at the frontocentral midline electrode
FCz between 50 ms before and 150 ms after the key press
(Hajcak & Foti, 2008).
Results
Task performance
A 2 (condition: self-affirmation vs. nonaffirmation) × 2 (response
type: correct vs. incorrect) mixed-factor analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with reaction time as the dependent measure showed
that reaction time on incorrect-response trials (M = 147.58 ms,
SD = 35.82) was significantly faster than reaction time on
correct-response trials (M = 211.26 ms, SD = 33.77), F(1, 33) =
196.01, p < .001, ηp
2 = .83. The main effect of condition and the
Condition × Response Interaction did not reach significance.
A 2 (condition: self-affirmation vs. nonaffirmation) × 2
(error type: commission vs. omission) mixed-factor ANOVA
with error rate as the dependent measure revealed that partici-
pants in both conditions made significantly more errors of com-
mission (M = 9.44%, SD = 8.42%) than errors of omission (M =
1.25%, SD = 1.82%), F(1, 33) = 49.40, p < .001, ηp
2 = .55. The
Condition × Error Type interaction was significant, F(1, 33) =
5.15, p < .03, ηp
2 = .11. That is, participants in the self-affirmation
condition made significantly fewer errors of commission (M =
6.99%, SD = 6.11%) than did those in the nonaffirmation condi-
tion (M = 12.41%, SD = 9.93%), F(1, 33) = 4.71, p < .04, ηp
2 =
.10. This finding suggests that self-affirmation improved perfor-
mance. There were no group differences for errors of omission
(i.e., the error rates for self-affirmed and nonaffirmed partici-
pants were 1.27% and 1.23%, respectively), likely because of a
floor effect.
ERN
To examine the effect of self-affirmation on ERN amplitude,
we performed a 2 (condition: self-affirmation vs. nonaffirma-
tion) × 2 (response type: incorrect vs. correct) mixed-factor
ANOVA with waveform amplitude as the dependent measure.
Unsurprisingly, there was a significant main effect of response
type on waveform amplitude, F(1, 33) = 29.30, p < .001,
ηp
2 = .47; errors generated larger ERNs (M = −7.13 µV, SD =
4.44) than did correct responses (M = −3.74 µV, SD = 2.60).
This main effect, however, was qualified by a significant
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4 Legault et al.
interaction between condition and response type, F(1, 33) =
7.11, p < .01, ηp
2 = .18 (see Fig. 1).
Analysis of simple main effects revealed that, although the
self-affirmation and nonaffirmation groups showed comparable
waveform amplitudes on correct-response trials (M = −4.06 µV,
SD = 2.66, and M = −3.40 µV, SD = 2.57, respectively; see Figs.
1a and 1b), self-affirmed participants displayed significantly
higher waveform amplitude on incorrect-response trials (M =
−9.05 µV, SD = 5.23) than did nonaffirmed participants (M =
−5.10 µV, SD = 2.09), F(1, 33) = 8.44, p < .01, ηp
2 = .20; see
Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c. Furthermore, this simple effect remained
significant after controlling for rates of commission errors and
omission errors and for reaction time, F(1, 30) = 7.71, p < .01,
ηp
2 = .20. This suggests that self-affirmation enhanced the ERN,
independently of any cognitive effect.
Dipole source localization (Fig. 1d) confirmed that the
ERNs were generated in an area approximately consistent
with the ACC. Pre-auricular-nasion coordinates of this area
were as follows: x = 0.1 mm, y = 0.1 mm, z = 60.0 mm; dipole
strength was 86.58 nAm. This source accounted for 86.6% of
the variance of the signal.
Correlations between the ERN and
performance
When we assessed the association between the two dependent
variables, an interesting dissociation between self-affirmed
and nonaffirmed participants emerged. That is, there was a
stronger (negative) association between the ERN and perfor-
mance (i.e., error rate) for the self-affirmed participants, r(18) =
.46, p = .06, than for the nonaffirmed participants, r(17) = .21,
p = .40. This finding suggests that self-affirmation enhanced
ERN amplitude, which was related to task performance. Pre-
sumably, the increased receptivity to errors among affirmed
individuals allowed them to better correct for their mistakes.
In sum, our findings suggest that self-affirmation increased
error responsiveness, including error-related distress, which
allowed for adaptive adjustment in self-control.
–200 –50 100 250 400
Time (ms)
–200 –50 100 250 400
Time (ms)
–8
–6
–4
–2
0
4
6
2
–8
–6
–4
–2
0
4
6
2
Nonaffirmation Self-Affirmation Incorrect Trials
–200 –50 100 250 400
Time (ms)
–8
–6
–4
–2
0
4
6
2
ERN Amplitude (
µ
V)
Correct
Incorrect
Correct
Incorrect Self-Affirmed
Nonaffirmed
a
d
bc
Fig. 1. Error-related negativity ( ERN) amplitude and dipole source localization. Response-locked waveform amplitude at FCz
following correct and incorrect responses on the go /no-go t ask is shown separately for par ticipants in the (a) nonaffirmation and
(b) self-affirmation conditions. The waveforms in (c) illustrate group differences in ERN amplitude (i.e., waveforms for incorrect-
response trials only) . The br ain maps (d) show the results of dipole source localization, which identified the source of the ERN
(indicated by the arrows) as being in an area approximately consistent with the anterior cingulate cortex.
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Self-Aff irmation Improves Error Responsiveness 5
Discussion
Our results reveal that self-affirmation improves performance
and increases neuroaffective sensitivity to task errors. When
people assert their core values, thereby affirming who they
are, they become more emotionally responsive to lapses in
performance and thus more receptive to the demands of the
task at hand. In line with self-affirmation theory, this finding
suggests that construal of the self in terms of one’s broad val-
ues and self-concept reduces defensiveness against immediate
threats to self-integrity (in this case, the commission of errors)
and allows one to respond openly to the situation.
Our data are the first to indicate a direct neurophysiological
link between self-affirmation and error monitoring. This
finding complements and extends past work. Whereas van
Koningsbruggen et al. (2009) showed that self-affirmation
heightens implicit responsiveness to threat, we have provided
direct neural evidence of this association by identifying a
brain-mediated mechanism through which self-affirmation
alerts people to the reality of self-relevant threats (i.e., their
own errors). Following the recent finding that self-affirmation
increases attentional bias toward threat (Klein & Harris, 2009),
we suggest that such threat awareness improves functioning—
including task performance—by boosting attention to sources
of threat in order to inform future behavior. Self-affirmation,
in other words, improves cognitive control because it orients
people to their errors, thereby allowing them to improve their
subsequent performance.
By revealing self-affirmation’s neuroaffective impact,
we have provided a possible explanation for its various posi-
tive effects. For instance, self-affirmation not only boosts
performance in threatened domains (e.g., Martens, Johns,
Greenberg, & Schimel, 2006) but also offsets the ill effects
of depletion and boosts self-control (Schmeichel & Vohs,
2009). Given that depletion has been shown to lower the ERN
(Inzlicht & Gutsell, 2007), our data complement and extend
this past work by showing that self-affirmation may protect
against depletion because it increases automatic detection of,
and sensitivity to, errors. Moreover, in light of a recently
observed link between intrinsic motivational engagement and
error detection (Legault & Inzlicht, in press), we suggest the
possibility that, by putting people in sync with that which is
personally significant and meaningful, self-affirmation
reduces defensiveness and energizes motivational engagement
(thus mobilizing self-regulatory resources).
Finally, given the association between the ERN and nega-
tive affect (Inzlicht & Al-Khindi, 2012), the current results
suggest that self-affirmation increases error-related distress.
Although this might seem paradoxical at first, our data suggest
that the type of negative affect fostered by self-affirmation is
adaptive; that is, it orients people to their failings and thereby
helps them improve. Indeed, when individuals are faced with
negative or distressing personal information, self-affirmation
seems to promote awareness and approach, rather than mini-
mization and defense.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with
respect to their authorship or the publication of this article.
Note
1. Evidence from our lab (e.g., Al-Khindi, 2010) indicates that the
error monitoring of participants given the type of nonaffirmation
manipulation we used here does not differ from the error monitoring
of true control participants who are not exposed to any affirmation or
nonaffirmation information prior to EEG recording.
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