Central to the theoretical model I have presented is the idea that altruistic
behavior is causally influenced by feelings of moral obligation to act on one's
personally held norms. Research supporting this central tenet of the model has demonstrated associations between personal norms and behavior, rather than
causal relations. I have argued that these associations are at least partly causal,
however, because: (1) the associations appear primarily in the presence of
personality conditions conducive to norm activation and are absent when personality
conditions are conducive to deactivation; and (2) attributes of personal
norms (e.g., centrality, ·stability, intensity) relate to altruism singly and' in
combination in ways predicted when we assume the causal impact of anticipated
moral costs on behavior.
A third critical link in this argument would be forged by studies showing
that variations in situational conditions conducive to activation of moral obligation
also influence the relationship between personal norms and behavior. There
is ample evidence that variables which foster movement through the activation
process, according to the theoretical model, are themselves related to altruistic
behavior (e.g., seriousness of need, uniqueness of responsibility). What remains
to be determined is whether the impact of these variables on altruism is
mediated by personal norms.
Evidence relevant to the sequential nature of the steps in the theoretical
model is sparse. Both the ·distinctiveness and ordering of the postulated steps
rests largely on logical rather than empirical grounds. The role of feedback
among the steps, with new input of information from later redefinitions or overt
actions in a chain of decisions, also merits investigation.
It is worth noting that study of how personal norms are related to altruism is
part of a larger enterprise, the investigation of attitude-behavior relations in
general. Personal norms are a subtype of attitudinal variable, i.e., evaluations of
acts in terms of their moral worth to the self. Techniques developed to discover
whether the impact of personal norms on altruism is causal might profitably be
imported into general attitude-behavior research. Reasoning like that employed
to identify personality and situational moderators of the impact of personal
norms on altruism might be used to track down the elusive moderators of other
attitudinal variables. Characteristics of personal norms and the normative structure
which influence their impact (e.g., centrality, stability) might also suggest
characteristics of attitudes which warrant consideration. Equally important, the
extensive research on attitude-behavior relations may yield leads for understanding
the workings of personal norms.
Next steps in developing the theory will have to address three issues given
cursory treatment here. First, how do emotional arousal and feelings of moral
obligation jointly influence altruism? Under what conditions and in what ways
do they enhance 9r blunt each other's effects? How might emotional arousal
modify the perception and processing of need-relevant information, for example?
And how might rapidity of onset and deterioration in need cues affect
shifting between empathic and morally mediated responsiveness?
Second, how do perceived social norms and personal norms complement or
supplement each other in their impact on altruistic behavior? Under what
conditions do social norms have any influence? And do these effects ever
interact with those of personal norms? Finally, how, if at all, do personal norms
mediate boomerang effects on helping? What are the differences between conditions
which elicit feelings of moral obligation and those which induce a sense of
undue pressure or manipulation? Speculations and hypotheses regarding some of
these questions, offered in my discussion of past research, may suggest directions
for approaching these three issues.
Experimental social psychologists, with their chariness toward individual
differences, have conducted most of the research on prosocial behavior. Attention
to internalized norms and values has consequently been restricted, and
normative explanations have received short shrift (Darley & Latane, 1970;
Krebs, 1970). I hope that the theory and research presented here will strengthen
the credibility of normative approaches. Altruism-in contrast to the more
inclusive "prosocial behavior" -implies purposes based in the person's value
system. Hence altruism cannot be understood fully in the absence of studies
which consider individual differences in values and norms as they interact with
situational variables.
