Content uploaded by Kate Sweeny
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Kate Sweeny on Aug 31, 2015
Content may be subject to copyright.
Information Avoidance: Who, What, When, and Why
Kate Sweeny
University of California, Riverside
Darya Melnyk, Wendi Miller, and
James A. Shepperd
University of Florida
Although acquiring information can provide numerous benefits, people often opt to remain ignorant. We
define information avoidance as any behavior designed to prevent or delay the acquisition of available
but potentially unwanted information. We review the various literatures that examine information
avoidance and provide a unique framework to integrate the contributions of these disparate areas of
research. We first define information avoidance and distinguish it from related phenomena. We then
discuss the motivations that prompt information avoidance and the factors that moderate the likelihood
of avoidance. Finally, we discuss individual differences that predict preferences for information avoid-
ance. We conclude by evaluating the current state of research on information avoidance and discussing
directions for future research.
Keywords: information avoidance, decision-making, information seeking
Almost four centuries have passed since Francis Bacon fa-
mously argued that “knowledge is power,” yet the statement re-
mains as true today as it was in the 1600s. Moreover, Francis
Bacon arguably did not go far enough in his assertion; power is
just one reward of knowledge. Greater knowledge can also trans-
late into wealth, enlightenment, comfort, and even survival. For
example, social scientists have long noted the link between edu-
cation and income. People with advanced degrees earn far more on
average than people without such degrees (Day & Newburger,
2002; Pfeffer, 1977; Ronan & Organt, 1973). In addition, people
sometimes pursue knowledge for knowledge’s sake in search of
enlightenment and to quench curiosity (Loewenstein, 1994).
Knowledge can also be a precursor to comfort by helping people
prepare for future circumstances. Knowing the weather leads peo-
ple to wisely choose a warm sweater on a cold morning or a pair
of sunglasses when it is sunny. Finally, knowledge is necessary for
survival. Without knowledge of how to make fire, build shelter,
farm, hunt, and distinguish edible foods from poisonous ones, our
ancestors would not have survived (Baumeister, 2005).
As valuable and important as knowledge is, people do not
always seek it and sometimes appear to take great pains to avoid
it. There are countless situations in which people prefer ignorance
over knowledge. Thus, in contrast to the maxim that knowledge is
power is the equally enticing maxim that “ignorance is bliss.”
Examples can range from the mundane to the extraordinary. For
example, people often do not want to learn that someone else got
a better deal on a recent, expensive purchase (Vohs, Baumeister, &
Chin, 2006), or that they gained weight after the holiday season, or
that their sports hero used steroids. Of importance, health research-
ers have documented a consistent tendency for people to avoid
information about their HIV status. For example, anywhere from
12% to 55% of people who undergo testing for HIV fail to return
to learn whether they were infected (Centers for Disease Control &
Prevention, 1997; Hightow et al., 2003; Molitor, Bell, & Truax,
1999; Rugg, Higgins, & Schnell, 1989; Tao, Branson, Kassler, &
Cohen, 1999; Valdiserri et al., 1993). Likewise, a large percentage
of people opt not to learn their genetic risk for colon cancer and
breast cancer when provided an opportunity (Keogh et al., 2004;
Lerman et al., 1996; Ropka, Wenzel, Phillips, Siadaty, &
Philbrick, 2006).
In this article, we examine the who,what,when, and why of
information avoidance, and Figure 1 depicts a broad framework for
our review. We begin with the what question by defining infor-
mation avoidance and providing a brief overview of the major
literatures that address the phenomenon. Next we explore the why
question, discussing the motivations that lead to information
avoidance. We then move to the when question by summarizing
the conditions under which information avoidance is most likely to
occur. Finally, we address the who question by briefly reviewing
several literatures that point to individual differences in the ten-
dency to avoid information. We conclude with a discussion of how
our approach can instigate new and productive lines of research.
We have taken this particular approach for several reasons.
First, although researchers in medicine, communication, organiza-
tional behavior, and psychology have studied aspects of informa-
tion avoidance, their lines of research are quite disconnected. As a
result, it is unclear what research efforts in these different disci-
plines share in common and how they differ. More important, there
exists no systematic review of what is known about information
avoidance from these divergent literatures. Our review reveals that
many researchers are examining the topic of information avoid-
ance, albeit haphazardly, but none appear to communicate with
each other or even appear aware that others exist. Not surprisingly
given these circumstances, the current state of research in the field
is disjointed, unsystematic, and disorganized.
Kate Sweeny, Department of Psychology, University of California,
Riverside, Riverside, California; Darya Melnyk, Wendi Miller, and James
A. Shepperd, Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gain-
seville, Florida.
We thank Mark Leary, Barry Schlenker, Kathleen Vohs, and several
anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kate
Sweeny, Department of Psychology, 900 University Avenue, University of
California, Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521. E-mail: ksweeny@ucr.edu
Review of General Psychology © 2010 American Psychological Association
2010, Vol. 14, No. 4, 340–353 1089-2680/10/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0021288
340
Our article attempts to provide organization to a previously
disorganized literature and to offer a review of what has been done
in this area and what gaps remain. To this end, we present an
organization of the research that casts light on both the common
themes and unique contributions of a number of disparate litera-
tures that speak to the motivational, situational, and dispositional
influences on information avoidance. Furthermore, our examina-
tion of these literatures revealed that systematic review would be
most appropriate in light of the current state of research on infor-
mation avoidance. The widely varying approaches to the topic
render a meta-analysis unfeasible, and the many gaps in our
current knowledge about information avoidance render a formal
theoretical model premature. In fact, the disconnected nature of
investigations into the phenomenon of information avoidance
prompt hesitation in claiming that our review is exhaustive, but we
attempted to gather and discuss as much relevant literature as
possible. Thus, the goals of our review are to organize the litera-
ture on information avoidance, to reveal aspects of information
that are better versus less understood, and to suggest directions for
future research and thus promote a more cohesive research effort
as we move forward.
What Is Information Avoidance?
We define information avoidance as any behavior intended to
prevent or delay the acquisition of available but potentially un-
wanted information. Information avoidance can entail asking
someone not to reveal information, physically leaving a situation
to avoid learning information, or simply failing to take the neces-
sary steps to reveal the content of information. That is, information
avoidance can be active (e.g., by asking someone not to reveal
information) or passive (e.g., by failing to ask someone a question
that would reveal the information). Furthermore, information
avoidance is not limited to information about the self. For exam-
ple, over half of participants in one study reported that they would
not want to know if their partner or spouse had a genetic vulner-
ability (Yaniv, Benador, & Sagi, 2004). In addition, a study of
spouses of men with prostate cancer revealed evidence that
spouses coped by avoiding information about prostate cancer
(Feltwell & Rees, 2004). To be sure, the avoided information has
implications for the self, but the character most central to the
information may be someone else. Finally, information avoidance
can be temporary or permanent. People may avoid information
with the intention of learning the information later, or they may
decide to avoid the information altogether.
Given the ubiquity and potential consequences of information
avoidance, it is not surprising that researchers in several fields have
delved into the topic. The primary work on information avoidance
in psychology is the research on selective exposure, which finds
that people are sometimes particular about the information they
seek, especially when evaluating their attitudes, judgments, and
decisions (see Smith, Fabrigar, & Norris, 2008 for a review).
Research on selective exposure primarily is grounded in disso-
nance theory and proposes that people typically avoid information
that challenges their beliefs because such information creates cog-
nitive dissonance (Festinger, 1954; Hart, Albarracı´n, Eagly, Bre-
chan, Lindberg, & Merrill, 2009; Smith et al., 2008). The research
on selective exposure reveals a pervasive (albeit not universal)
tendency for people to seek information that is consistent with
their beliefs, attitudes, and decisions, and to steer away from
inconsistent information. For example, following a choice between
two options, studies find that research participants sought both
positive and negative information about the chosen alternative, but
only negative information about the nonchosen alternative (Mills,
Aronson, & Robinson, 1959).
Although our review will draw from the selective exposure
literature where relevant, this literature, as well as a related liter-
ature on preferences for positive versus negative feedback (e.g.,
Trope, Garvey, & Bolger, 2003; Trope & Neter, 1994), addresses
information with known content. That is, selective exposure stud-
ies typically examine whether people prefer information known to
be consistent or inconsistent with their attitudes, beliefs, or deci-
sions (Hart et al., 2009), and feedback preference studies examine
whether people prefer information known to diagnose either their
strengths or weaknesses. This type of information avoidance, in
which the content is known, is common and reflects a rich and
productive research tradition. However, we are most interested in
understanding what drives people to avoid information under
conditions of uncertainty or ignorance about the content of that
information. People frequently face the choice between learning
information and remaining ignorant, and these choices often have
critical implications for health, relationships, careers, and well-
being.
Although there are important similarities between selective ex-
posure and information avoidance (i.e., both involve decisions
about information exposure, and both can serve a self-protective
function), reviews and meta-analyses of selective exposure leave
out the vast majority of research on the phenomenon we define as
information avoidance. For example, a recent meta-analysis of
almost three hundred selective exposure studies explicitly disqual-
SITUATIONAL FACTORS
(e.g., control, coping
resources, ease,
expectaons)
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
(e.g., uncertainty
orientaon, coping style)
MOTIVATIONS
• Regulang emoons
• Obligaons to act
• Threats to beliefs
INFORMATION
AVOIDANCE / SEEKING
DECISION
Figure 1. A framework for understanding information avoidance decisions.
341INFORMATION AVOIDANCE
ified studies that did not present a choice between “consonant” and
“dissonant” information (Hart et al., 2009). This selection criterion
leaves out numerous studies that examine decisions about a single,
uncertain piece of information, including decisions to seek or
avoid information about health risks, medical diagnoses, genetic
markers, and so forth. Thus, our review integrates evidence from
selective exposure studies where appropriate but focuses on deci-
sions about information with unknown content, a topic that has not
yet been the subject of review. Of note, we applied the same
approach to several related literatures, namely the literatures on
biased information seeking (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Fischer, & Frey,
2006), stereotype confirmation and disconfirmation (Johnston,
1996; Johnston & Macrae, 1994; Wyer, 2004), and information
preferences in close relationships (Afifi, Dillow, & Morse, 2004;
Ickes, Dugosh, Simpson, & Wilson, 2003).
In addition to research on selective exposure, researchers in
communication and information sciences have developed a variety
of theoretical models to describe how people deal with information
and manage uncertainty (e.g., Afifi & Weiner, 2004; Babrow,
2001; Berger & Calabrese, 1975; Brashers, 2001; Johnson, 1997;
Wilson, 1999a). These models examine how and when people
decide to seek information following awareness of an area of
ignorance or uncertainty. Although these models differ somewhat
in the moderators and processes they describe, they each provide
insight into when and why people seek information versus choose
to remain ignorant. For example, Afifi and Weiner’s (2004) theory
of motivated information management focuses on interpersonal
factors in information seeking and delineates different types of
efficacy that contribute to the decision to seek information. As
another illustration, Babrow’s (2001) problematic integration the-
ory addresses the problems that arise when the information people
expect to gain from a search diverges from the information they
wish to gain. These models focus nearly all their effort toward
understanding when and why people seek information, and we will
draw from this research to the extent it speaks to information
avoidance as well.
Finally, a growing number of studies relevant to information
avoidance have appeared in medical journals, particularly with
regard to genetic testing. These studies have explored factors
predicting the decision to undergo genetic or other medical tests
predictive of various diseases such as breast cancer, Huntington’s
disease, or Alzheimer’s disease (e.g., Cutler & Hodgson, 2003;
Lerman et al., 1999; Ropka et al., 2006; van der Steenstraten et al.,
1994). Of course, different motivations might predict avoidance of
different types of medical information, such as the results of
screening tests for health risk information, tests for predictive
versus determinant genetic markers, and diagnostic tests, but all
involve the avoidance of potentially unwanted information. Al-
though the literature on genetic and diagnostic testing decisions
currently lacks theoretical coherence, these studies are clearly
relevant to our inquiry and are cited throughout our review.
It is important to note that not all forms of information seeking
and avoidance are relevant to the goals of this article. By our
definition, information avoidance is also distinct from knowledge
dismissal. With knowledge dismissal, people reject information
they have already encountered rather than avoid information (Jem-
mott, Ditto, & Croyle, 1986; Shepperd, 1993). Indeed, with knowl-
edge dismissal people may actively pursue the information only to
reject it later because they believe it to be inaccurate or threaten-
ing. Information avoidance is also distinct from inference avoid-
ance. When engaging in inference avoidance, people comprehend
available information yet fail to draw the appropriate interpretation
from the information (Greenwald, 1997; Paulus & Seudfeld,
1988). In contrast, information avoidance involves failing to ac-
quire the information altogether. Although knowledge dismissal
and inference avoidance likely serve as alternatives to information
avoidance when avoidance is not an option, our review targets the
predictors of decisions about exposure to information, not reac-
tions to information that cannot be avoided.
Finally, our definition of information avoidance involves avoid-
ing potentially unwanted information, not necessarily undesirable
information. Although people generally are motivated to avoid
unpleasant information and seek pleasant information, in some
instances they may opt to avoid information that has little or no
potential to be negative. For example, people may choose to avoid
learning the sex of a forthcoming child (Shipp et al., 2004), the
outcome of a video-recorded sports event, what happens at the end
of a much anticipated novel, or whether friends are planning a
surprise party for them. In all these instances, the avoided infor-
mation can be quite pleasurable. However, avoiding (at least
temporarily) the information can serve to heighten the pleasure,
whereas gaining the information prematurely can spoil it.
In summary, our review examines instances in which people
have choice between avoiding and seeking information that is not
yet known and potentially unwanted. It is not ignoring information
out of a simple lack of interest in the information or a lack of time
and energy required to obtain it. Information avoidance is also
distinct from dismissing or failing to draw inferences from infor-
mation already obtained. Although these forms of “avoidance” are
certainly interesting and potentially important, they invoke a very
different set of answers to the who, when, and why questions that
are the goals of our review.
Why Do People Avoid Information?
In light of the myriad benefits of possessing information, why
might people avoid information? Although information can bring
wealth, power, enlightenment, comfort, and opportunity, informa-
tion can also lead to unpleasant or undesired outcomes. We suggest
three reasons why people may choose to avoid information: (a) the
information may demand a change in beliefs, (b) the information
may demand undesired action, and (c) the information itself or the
decision to learn information may cause unpleasant emotions or
diminish pleasant emotions (Figure 1). Of course, all three moti-
vations are not at play in all instances of information avoidance.
For example, a man who avoids information that might reveal
something negative about a favorite politician is likely uncon-
cerned with whether that information could demand undesired
action. In contrast, a young woman who delays taking a pregnancy
test is likely unconcerned with whether she may be forced to
change a cherished belief. We suggest that these three motivations
collectively capture the various reasons people avoid information,
but each motivation is likely to be more important in some cir-
cumstances than others. Similarly, these three motivations can
operate independently or in tandem. That is, people may avoid
information for more than one reason in a given situation. We
suspect that most cases of information avoidance are motivated in
part by concerns about unpleasant emotions, even if people are
342 SWEENY, MELNYK, MILLER, AND SHEPPERD
simultaneously concerned about a threat to cherished beliefs or
undesired action.
Information May Demand a Change in Beliefs
Sometimes people avoid information because the information
might force them to give up or adjust cherished beliefs. One
purpose information serves is to provide evidence either in support
of or in opposition to a belief, and people may be reluctant or
unwilling to face the possibility of learning information that chal-
lenges an important belief. As demonstrated in myriad studies of
selective exposure, people tend to seek information that confirms
their attitudes, beliefs, and decisions, and avoid information that
disconfirms their attitudes, beliefs, and decisions (see Smith et al.,
2008, for a review; see also Kunda, 1990; Nickerson, 1998).
People might avoid information that challenges any of three
types of beliefs: beliefs about the self, beliefs about other people,
and beliefs about their world. Regarding beliefs about the self,
people have two motivations that might be threatened by learning
potentially unwanted information. First, people are motivated to
establish and maintain positive self-views, such as the belief that
they are kind, talented, likable, capable of good judgment, and so
forth (Hart et al., 2009; Snyder, Stephan, & Rosenfield, 1976).
Second, people are motivated to maintain consistency in their
self-views. New information should line up with both positive and
negative beliefs they have about themselves (de la Ronde &
Swann, 1993). To the extent people anticipate that information
might challenge either the positivity or consistency of their self-
views, they are more likely to avoid the information.
In support of this possibility are several studies examining the
extent to which women avoided learning how others rated their
physical attractiveness. These studies manipulated the self-
relevance of the attractiveness ratings by indicating that the raters
were peers at the same university (i.e., who would provide highly
relevant feedback about their attractive) or students at a different
university (i.e., whose feedback would be less personally relevant).
Consistent with predictions, more women opted to avoid learning
their attractiveness ratings when the raters were peers at their own
university, which would pose more of a threat to self-beliefs, than
when the raters were at a different university (Malone, Shepperd,
& Sweeny, 2010).
The same two motives (self-enhancement and consistency)
likely factor in decisions to approach versus avoid information
about other people. That is, people are likely motivated to maintain
consistent beliefs about important others and inclined to avoid
information that is inconsistent with existing beliefs about those
others. For example, several studies find that people tend to avoid
information that disconfirms their stereotypes about people from
other racial and cultural groups (Johnston, 1996; Johnston &
Macrae, 1994), but this tendency is reversed in people who are
very low in prejudice (i.e., people who hold stereotype disconfirm-
ing beliefs; Wyer, 2004). People might also avoid information that
implies something negative about their leaders or heroes. During
the Watergate hearings of 1973, a study of Nixon supporters,
McGovern supporters, and undecided voters found that Nixon
supporters paid less attention to and were less knowledgeable
about the hearings compared with McGovern supporters and un-
decided voters (Sweeney & Gruber, 1984). That is, Nixon sup-
porters avoided information that might have revealed that their
preferred political candidate participated in illegal or immoral
activities.
Finally, regarding beliefs about the world, people tend to seek
information consistent with their worldview and avoid information
that might challenge their worldview. For our purposes, a world-
view can be as complex as a religion or as simple as the belief that
good things happen to good people (Lerner & Miller, 1978). To the
extent that people endorse a particular worldview, they may be
motivated to avoid information inconsistent with that worldview.
For example, one study from the selective exposure literature
found that people generally avoided information that challenged
their worldview and were particularly inclined to do so when they
were most motivated to defend their worldview (Jonas, Greenberg,
& Frey, 2003).
Information May Demand Undesired Action
The second reason people may wish to avoid information is that
the information might obligate action or behavior that they would
rather not undertake. Put another way, information often serves the
purpose of providing an update about the state of the world, the
state of one’s health, the state of one’s life, and so forth, and this
update might make the person feel obligated to take action. Not
only is change or action difficult in its own right, the action
prompted by learning information might lead to a multitude of
negative outcomes. For example, learning that a toothache requires
a root canal is not only a hassle, but also expensive and painful. To
the extent that people anticipate that information will demand
changes or action that might be difficult, inconvenient, demanding,
expensive, or unpleasant, they may be motivated to avoid the
information.
Several health studies provide evidence that people avoid infor-
mation when they believe that the information may obligate them
to engage in some undesired behavior. For example, a study of
commercial sex workers and their clients in South Africa revealed
that one reason given for not getting tested for AIDS was recog-
nition that a positive test result would demand a change in behav-
ior (Vargas, 2001). Likewise, research reveals that the primary
reason women in Nigeria gave for delaying a visit to their physi-
cian about a suspicious lump in the breast was a concern that they
may have to undergo a mastectomy (Ajekigbe, 1991).
People are also motivated to avoid information about relation-
ship partners that might obligate unpleasant action. For example,
one study of homosexual partners found that people who were
highly interdependent with their partner but also uncertain of the
relationship’s stability were the most likely to avoid relationship
threatening information (Simpson, Ickes, & Blackstone, 1995).
These findings suggest that people who were most concerned
about an obligation to undesired action (in this case, breaking up
with a close relationship partner) were most likely to avoid poten-
tially unwanted information.
Of course, people can always decide not to take action or not to
make changes, even if the information they learn suggests that
changes may be wise or beneficial. That having been said, avoid-
ing information likewise avoids the potentially difficult decision of
whether or not to take action. Moreover, people may feel account-
able to take action or make changes when they learn information,
even if the actions or changes are difficult or unpleasant. For
example, a physician might require a follow-up appointment to
343INFORMATION AVOIDANCE
encourage a patient to make suggested health changes, or a pro-
fessor might require a failing student to come in for tutoring.
Under some circumstances people might feel that avoiding the
information is the only way to avoid costly or unpleasant changes
in their behavior.
Information May Cause Unpleasant Emotions or
Diminish Pleasant Emotions
The third reason people might want to avoid information is
because of the potential emotional consequences of the informa-
tion or of the decision to learn information. Research suggests that
people employ a variety of strategies to avoid or mitigate the
experience of negative emotions (Carroll, Sweeny, & Shepperd,
2006; Gross, 1998; van Dijk, Zeelenberg, & van der Pligt, 2003)
and to heighten or prolong positive emotions (Wilson, Centerbar,
Kermer, & Gilbert, 2005), and we suggest that information avoid-
ance may be yet another strategy to this end. In a study of gay and
bisexual men given the opportunity to learn their HIV status,
almost 80% of men who declined to learn their status reported
concern over the psychological impact of a positive test result
(Lyter, Valdiserri, Kingsley, Amoroso, & Rinaldo, 1987; see also
Vargas, 2001; Zapka, Stoddard, Zorn, McCuster, & Mayer, 1991).
That is, these men avoided information in an effort to avoid an
unpleasant experience. Other studies find that concerns with ex-
periencing unpleasant emotions account for information avoidance
for a host of other medical conditions including Alzheimer’s
disease (Cutler & Hodgson, 2003), Huntington’s disease (van der
Steenstraten, Tibben, Roos, van de Kamp, & Niermeijer, 1994),
breast and ovarian cancer (Thompson, Valdimarsdottir, Duteau-
Buck, et al., 2002), as well as other cancers (Friis, Elverdam, &
Schmidt, 2003; Leydon et al., 2000).
Outside of health, one study found that soccer fans in Belgium
and in the Netherlands were less likely to visit team websites
following a team loss than following a team victory (Boen, Van-
beselaere, & Feys, 2002). Obviously, visiting a team Web site is
unlikely to obligate behavior. Nor is the visiting the website going
to force a change in belief—participants most certainly already
knew the outcome of the game. Most likely fans avoided the team
websites after a team loss because reading about the loss would do
little more than perpetuate the unhappiness associated with the
team’s poor performance.
Of course, in the case of potentially positive information, people
may be more concerned with enhancing or prolonging positive
emotions than with avoiding or mitigating negative emotions (Wil-
son et al., 2005). For example, one study of pregnant couples
found that 42% of soon-to-be parents did not want to know the
gender of their child before the birth, and of these couples 73%
gave as their reason that they didn’t want to ruin the surprise
(Shipp et al., 2004). In fact, we suspect that avoiding positive
information arises primarily (if not entirely) from the motivation to
prolong or bolster positive emotions.
Regarding negative emotions, people may judge information to
be potentially unwanted because of the information’s potential to
cause emotions such as sadness, disappointment, fear, anger, em-
barrassment, guilt, and shame. For example, avoiding information
that might suggest or confirm a health problem circumvents the
emotion of fear. Avoiding information about a relationship part-
ner’s indiscretions circumvents the emotions of anger and shame.
Avoiding information that would reveal a personal failure circum-
vents the emotions of disappointment and embarrassment. Avoid-
ing information about the suffering of others circumvents the
emotions of anguish and guilt.
The emotions just described result from the information itself. It
is noteworthy that people are also motivated to avoid regret over a
poor decision, and we distinguish between the motivation to avoid
information that might lead to negative emotions and the motiva-
tion to avoid a decision that might lead to the negative emotion of
regret. Regret is a reflection of people’s wish or desire to have
made a choice different from the one they made (Zeelenberg &
Pieters, 2007; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt,
1998). Regret is an aversive emotional experience, and people are
motivated to minimize or avoid regret when possible by making
decisions that they believe will be least “regrettable” (Connolly &
Zeelenberg, 2002; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2007; Zeelenberg,
1999; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). In fact, a growing number of
studies find that people make decisions based in part on their
expectations of regret in the contexts of exercise (Abraham &
Sheeran, 2003), flu vaccination (Chapman & Coups, 2006), child-
hood vaccination (Wroe, Turner, & Salkovskis, 2004), and sexual
behavior (Richard, de Vries, & van der Pligt, 1998).
It is likely that two types of anticipated regret play into decisions
to avoid or seek information: anticipated regret over seeking the
information and anticipated regret over avoiding the information.
Regret theorists contend that people making decisions mentally
compute the potential for regret for each of their options and then
choose the option with the least potential for regret (Acker, 1997;
Lee, 1971; Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). In
the case of information avoidance, we suggest that people deter-
mine how likely they are to experience regret if they learn the
information and then balance this judgment against the likelihood
that they will experience regret if they avoid the information. In
fact, several studies confirm that people who avoid information
anticipate that they will experience greater regret over learning the
information than they would if they avoided it (Melnyk & Shep-
perd, 2010; Sweeny & Malone, 2010).
Summary
In sum, people may be motivated to avoid information for three
reasons: (1) the information might threaten cherished beliefs about
the self, others, or the world, (2) the information might demand
undesired change or action, and (3) the information or the decision
to learn information might lead to unpleasant emotions. Although
these concerns may not be equally important or equally relevant in
all cases, people are more likely to avoid information to the extent
that they anticipate these outcomes. Of course, it is noteworthy that
the three motivations to avoid information that we discuss are
not the sole motivations at play when people face available but
potentially unwanted information. Instead, people almost certainly
balance their desire to avoid information against the various mo-
tivations to learn information. People might be motivated to learn
information for a number of reasons. They may be motivated to
satisfy their curiosity simply for the sake of reducing uncertainty
(Loewenstein, 1994). Similarly, people might hope to learn some-
thing that brings them happiness, relief, or pride, or that reduces
negative feelings of worry or fear or provides a sense of closure to
an uncertain situation (Meissen, Mastromauro, Kiely, McNamara,
344 SWEENY, MELNYK, MILLER, AND SHEPPERD
& Myers, 1991). Consistent with this idea, evidence suggests that
emotional reassurance (e.g., a desire to reduce worries about breast
cancer) was strongly correlated with interest in undergoing genetic
testing for breast cancer (Shiloh & Ilan, 2005). We restrict our
focus to the reasons people avoid information, but we acknowl-
edge that these considerations are balanced against the opposing
motivation to learn information.
When Do People Avoid Information?
People are not equally likely to avoid information across all
circumstances. Rather, there are situational factors that make in-
formation avoidance more or less likely to occur. Although this list
may not prove to be exhaustive as research on information avoid-
ance moves forward, we identify the following moderators of
information avoidance: (a) control over of the consequences of
information, (b) resources to cope with the information, (c) ease
of obtaining or interpreting the information, and (d) expectations
about the content of information. These moderators have received
varying amounts of empirical attention, and some are more
straightforward than others. Regarding the first three moderators, it
is important to note that perceptions are more important than
reality. Thus, perceived control, coping resources, and ease are
more influential in the decision to avoid information than actual
control, coping resources, and ease.
We begin with the moderators that are both well supported and
straightforward in their prediction of information avoidance, then
turn to the moderators that have received less attention. We include
the latter group of moderators in the interest of thoroughness and
to stimulate research that might clarify their precise role in infor-
mation avoidance. As depicted in Figure 1, we suspect that the
moderators described in this section influence the motivations to
avoid or seek information, although the specific nature of these
relationships has received little empirical attention.
Perceived Control
The first moderator of information avoidance is people’s per-
ception of their control over the consequences of the information.
The less control people perceive, the more inclined they are to
avoid the information. Conversely, if people believe that the in-
formation will provide an opportunity to improve the situation,
they are less inclined to avoid the information. Several studies
illustrate the important role of perceived control in avoiding versus
seeking information. For instance, participants in one study re-
ported that one of the most important reasons for wanting to know
whether they will develop Alzheimer’s disease is the control they
will gain in terms of preparing for the future and identifying the
best course of treatment (Cutler & Hodgson, 2003). Participants in
another study learned about a genetic test for a serious disease that
manifests in adulthood and produces a painful death within 10 –20
years of diagnosis. Eighty-seven percent of participants reported
strong interest in taking the genetic test if the disease was treatable,
yet only 42% reported interest if the disease was untreatable
(Yaniv et al., 2004; see also Shiloh, Ben-Sinai, & Keinan, 1999).
Similarly, participants in another study who were told about a
severe disease were more interested in being tested for the disease
when it was described as treatable than when it was described as
untreatable (Dawson, Savitsky, & Dunning, 2006).
In addition, studies from the selective exposure literature reveal
that people are more likely to avoid information that suggests they
recently made a poor judgment if they believe they cannot change
or reverse their prior decision than if they believe they can change
it (Frey, 1981; Frey & Rosch, 1984). Likewise, women were more
likely to choose to learn their breast cancer risk after reading about
ways in which women can reduce their breast cancer risk than after
reading about the uncontrollable aspects of breast cancer risk
(Melnyk & Shepperd, 2010). Finally, a study of feedback prefer-
ences found that people were more open to potentially negative
feedback about their social abilities when they perceived these
abilities to be controllable (Trope et al., 2003). In sum, numerous
studies confirm that people are less likely to avoid information
when they perceive that they can control information’s potential
consequences.
Coping Resources
The second moderator of information avoidance is the extent to
which people believe they can cope with the information. When
contemplating potentially unwanted information, people may ask
themselves, “Can I handle this information right now?” For ex-
ample, one study found that women who avoided information
about their breast cancer risk reported less ability to cope with the
information than did women who sought the risk information
(Melnyk & Shepperd, 2010). Further evidence for the role of
coping resources comes from a study of dental patients. Dental
patients who believed they could handle dental pain (i.e., a poten-
tial consequence of a dental diagnosis) were less likely to avoid
dental exams than were patients who believed they could not
handle dental pain (Klepac, Dowling, & Hauge, 1982). Likewise,
a primary reason given for not wanting to be tested for Hunting-
ton’s disease was a concern that one would be unable to cope with
the bad news of positive test results (van der Steenstraten et al.,
1994).
Coping resources are not one-dimensional. People can draw
from multiple sources of strength when facing unpleasant infor-
mation, and likewise they may have multiple sources of weakness.
One resource that can influence coping ability is social support
(Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989). For example, a woman
awaiting the results of a breast biopsy might consider whether she
has friends and family who will help her through possibly learning
that she has cancer before returning to the physician’s office for the
biopsy results. In fact, studies find that receiving helpful emotional
support is consistently related to positive health outcomes in breast
cancer patients (Arora, Finney Rutten, Gustafson, Moser, &
Hawkins, 2007), which might imply that perceptions of social
support can facilitate coping with unwanted information (e.g., that
one has breast cancer).
Another resource that influences coping ability is stability in
other life domains. People may be better prepared to cope with
unwanted information in one domain when other areas of their
lives are going well. Research suggests that the presence of mul-
tiple life stressors, even positive stressors such as marriage, having
a child, and so forth, can lead to health problems such as depres-
sion (Fountoulakis, Iacovides, Kaprinis, & Kaprinis, 2006), which
may then make it difficult to cope with new unwanted information.
Similarly, research on ego depletion suggests that self-control is
a limited resource, such that dealing with one challenging situa-
345INFORMATION AVOIDANCE
tion makes it more difficult to successfully respond to another
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). On the other hand, people who
have many domains in their lives may be better prepared to cope
with threatening information than people with few domains. Re-
search on self-complexity finds that people who report a greater
number of self-aspects (e.g., social roles, activities, goals, etc.) are
less likely to experience adverse outcomes from life stress (Lin-
ville, 1987). Presumably, stress in one domain causes fewer prob-
lems overall when people perceive success in many other life
domains, but can cause many problems overall when people per-
ceive success in few or no other life domains.
In sum, people with few coping resources should display greater
avoidance of unwanted information than people with more coping
resources. The absence of coping resources may arise from deficits
in perceived social support, stress in other life domains, or a lack
of self-complexity.
Ease of Obtaining and Interpreting Information
The third moderator of information avoidance is the ease with
which people can obtain and interpret the information. This mod-
erator includes perceptions about the availability and accessibility
of information, as well as considerations about the likelihood that
people will be able to interpret and understand the information if
they learn it. Many communication models emphasize the role of
information’s availability in decisions to seek or avoid informa-
tion. For instance, Johnson’s comprehensive model of information
seeking includes an evaluation of whether the information is easily
accessible and suggests that people are more likely to avoid
information if it is difficult to obtain (Johnson, 1997). In addition,
if people perceive that the information comes from a source they
cannot trust or if the information is too difficult for them to
interpret, they are likely to forego obtaining it (Afifi & Weiner,
2004, 2006; Johnson, 1997; Wilson, 1999b). For example, one
study found that people were less interested in information about
their romantic partner’s sexual health to the extent that they felt
their partner would be unable to provide accurate, complete infor-
mation (Afifi & Weiner, 2006). Finally, the theory of motivated
information management suggests that people are less likely to
seek information if they feel that are unable to properly interpret
the information (Afifi & Weiner, 2004).
Thus, we suggest that people are more likely to avoid informa-
tion when they expect that the information will be difficult to
obtain, or to interpret once they obtain it. Of course, not all
instances in which people avoid the hassle of acquiring or inter-
preting information reflect information avoidance. When informa-
tion is difficult to obtain people may view the information as not
worth their effort. In such instances, people are not avoiding
information; rather they are just choosing not to seek it. On the
other hand, we suspect that people often use barriers to attaining
information as an excuse to avoid information they do not wish to
learn. For example, a woman who claims that she cannot find the
time to get a suspicious mole looked at may in fact be avoiding a
potentially scary diagnosis.
Expectations
The final and perhaps most obvious moderator of information
avoidance is people’s expectations about the content of informa-
tion. When considering whether to avoid unknown information,
people almost certainly consider the likelihood that the informa-
tion reveals something negative versus positive. In essence, people
make a risk judgment regarding the likely content of the informa-
tion. For instance, people deciding whether to learn the results of
a recent sporting event may consider the likelihood that they will
have an unpleasant reaction to the information, or a less pleasant
reaction than they would by waiting to watch a replay of the event.
Although it seems obvious that expectations about the content of
information should predict information avoidance, how expecta-
tions influence decisions to avoid or seek information is less clear.
As one might imagine, people are often motivated to seek infor-
mation when they believe there is a high likelihood that the
information will be positive. For example, people are more in-
clined to seek feedback about a relationship they are in if they
anticipate the feedback will be positive (Afifi & Lucas, 2006) and
are more likely to actively avoid relationship information if they
anticipate it will be negative or unpleasant (Afifi et al., 2004).
However, people sometimes seek information precisely when
they think there is a high likelihood that it will be bad. For
example, several studies find that women who reported feeling at
high risk for breast cancer were also more likely to have regular
mammograms (Aiken, West, Woodward, & Reno, 1994; McCaul,
Branstetter, Schroeder, & Glasgow, 1996), and studies of genetic
testing decisions find that high perceived risk is one of the most
consistent predictors of the decision to undergo testing (Bosompra
et al., 2000; Croyle & Lerman, 1993; Glanz, Grove, Lerman,
Gotay, & Le Marchand, 1999; Gooding, Organista, Burack, &
Biesecker, 2006; Graham et al., 1998; Lerman, Croyle, Tercyak, &
Hamann, 2002; Meiser, 2005; Yanushka Bunn, Bosompra, Ash-
ikaga, Flynn, & Worden, 2002). In addition, a recent meta-analysis
of the selective exposure literature concluded that people seek
information that they expect to be both consistent and inconsistent
with their attitudes, beliefs, and decisions, depending on the cir-
cumstances (Hart et al., 2009). For example, people are more
willing to learn information inconsistent with their attitudes, be-
liefs, and decisions when the inconsistent information is relevant to
accomplishing a currently held goal (Hart et al., 2009). Of course,
in selective exposure studies participants have knowledge of the
content of information (or at least the valence), so their expecta-
tions are actually near certainties. Nonetheless, these findings
combined with findings for information with uncertain content
suggest that people consider their expectations about the content of
information when they face potentially unwanted information, but
the role of expectations is complex and may interact with other
considerations. For example, people who feel unable to cope with
bad news may be more likely to avoid information if they believe
it will be negative. Similarly, people may be more likely to avoid
information they believe to be negative when the outcome linked
to the information is also uncontrollable.
In sum, we propose four moderators of information avoidance
that vary in their degree of empirical attention. The literatures
on medical avoidance, selective exposure, and communication
strongly suggest that people are more likely to avoid information
when the consequences of information are uncontrollable, when
they feel unable to cope with the information, and when the
information is difficult to obtain or interpret. However, the litera-
ture is less clear in regards to the relationship between expectations
346 SWEENY, MELNYK, MILLER, AND SHEPPERD
and information avoidance. Sometimes people avoid information
they expect might be bad, but other times they seek it.
Who Engages in Information Avoidance?
At one level, the answer to the question of who engages in
information avoidance is “everyone.” It is difficult to imagine a
person who has not stopped in the middle of reading a tragic news
item, chosen not to inquire of a spouse or child, or avoided health
information with the thought, “I just don’t want to know.” How-
ever, certain people are more likely than others to make this choice
across situations, and this section identifies two individual differ-
ence variables that predict a general tendency toward information
avoidance: coping style and uncertainty orientation. As Figure 1
depicts, we suspect that coping styles and uncertainty orientation
influence avoidance decisions by increasing or decreasing the three
motivations described earlier.
Coping Style
Researchers measure coping styles in a variety of ways, but the
most relevant coping styles for our purposes are the information-
seeking styles of monitoring versus blunting. Health researchers
have found that high “monitors” and low “blunters” prefer more
information in the face of a threat. In contrast, high blunters and
low monitors prefer less information in the face of threat (Miller,
1987, 1995; Miller & Mangan, 1983). For example, one study
found that low monitors and high blunters were more likely to
avoid information that indicated how well they performed on a test
of intelligence, and a related study found that these same people
avoided information about an upcoming electric shock (Miller,
1987). Similarly, research on genetic testing found that low mon-
itors were less interested in a hypothetical genetic test than high
monitors (Shiloh et al., 1999). Other studies find that low monitors/
high blunters are less likely to undergo regular Pap tests and breast
self-examinations (Steptoe & O’Sullivan, 1986) and less likely to
undergo chorionic villus sampling for prenatal diagnosis (a more
dangerous but earlier procedure than amniocentesis; van Zuuren,
1993).
Uncertainty Orientation
Sorrentino and Short (1986) describe people along a continuum
of uncertainty orientation. Although the labels they use to describe
the ends of the continuum are counterintuitive, they find that
uncertainty-oriented people prefer situations that provide new in-
formation about themselves or the environment that have the
potential to reduce some uncertainty. In contrast, certainty-
oriented people tend to avoid situations that provide new informa-
tion, even if this information has the potential to reduce uncertainty
(Sorrentino & Hewitt, 1984; Sorrentino, Hewitt, & Raso-Knott,
1992). In one study, certainty-oriented participants were more
likely than uncertainty-oriented participants to avoid undergoing a
diagnostic test for a serious disease (Brouwers & Sorrentino,
1993). In another study, certainty-oriented people were more likely
than uncertainty-oriented people to avoid information that would
be most diagnostic of their conceptual ability (Sorrentino &
Hewitt, 1984). Thus, uncertainty orientation may play a role in
avoidance behavior, with certainty-oriented individuals engaging
in greater avoidance than uncertainty-oriented individuals.
Other Potential Individual Difference Variables
It seems quite likely that myriad other personality traits can
influence decisions to seek or avoid information. In fact, some
individual differences map on to the situational moderators we
described earlier. For example, we noted earlier that people are
more likely to avoid unwanted information to the extent that they
lack resources to cope with the information. Presumably, any
individual difference variable that reflects some form of coping
resource should distinguish between people who seek versus avoid
information. For example, people who are dysphoric or depressed
or have low self-esteem may display greater information avoid-
ance because they feel that they lack the ego resources to cope
should the information be bad (Lerman et al., 1999; Northcraft &
Ashford, 1990). Similarly, people who naturally have few coping
resources (e.g., people with few friends or family they can turn to
in times of need) may be more inclined to avoid potentially
unwanted information than people who have ample coping re-
sources.
We also noted earlier that people are more likely to avoid
unwanted information to the extent that the consequences of the
information are uncontrollable. Some people are more likely to
feel that they can control the outcomes of information. People high
in self-efficacy perceive themselves as capable of exercising con-
trol over events in their lives (Bandura, 1994), and this general
sense of efficacy may reduce the likelihood of information avoid-
ance. Likewise, dispositional optimism may tap a sense of personal
control over one’s outcomes, and thus people high in dispositional
optimism might be less inclined to display information avoidance
than people low in dispositional optimism.
There are also several individual difference constructs that are
likely relevant to information decisions, but that have not been
examined in that context. For example, people high in the need for
closure experience greater discomfort over ambiguity than their
low need for closure counterparts (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994),
and thus may be less likely to avoid information that could reduce
ambiguity. Although no research on need for closure specifically
examines information avoidance, several studies demonstrate that
people who are high in need for closure are more likely to pursue
information prior to making a decision and less likely to pursue
information after making a decision (Kruglanski, Peri, & Zakai,
1991; Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993; Van Hiel & Mervielde,
2002). These findings suggest that people high in need for closure
might also avoid decision-relevant information once a decision is
made. Similarly, people high in intolerance of uncertainty (IU)
react more negatively to uncertain or ambiguous situations (Dugas,
Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001), and one study found that people
high in IU were more likely to seek information about their health
in the face of uncertainty (Rosen & Kna¨uper, 2009). The obvious
implication is that people high in IU would be less likely to avoid
information, even when the information is threatening. Need for
closure and intolerance of uncertainty may be merely two in a long
list of individual differences that have the potential to predict
information avoidance, but that have not been empirically exam-
ined in that context.
347INFORMATION AVOIDANCE
Evaluation of the Literature
Given the importance of the topic, it is no surprise that research-
ers from a number of disciplines have explored information avoid-
ance. Yet researchers exploring the topic seem largely unaware of
each other. Our paper is the first to provide a review and organi-
zation of the vast and somewhat disjointed research on the who,
what, when, and why of information avoidance. Aside from re-
viewing and organizing the current state of knowledge on infor-
mation avoidance, perhaps the most important contribution of this
review is that it reveals gaps in the literature and directions for
future research. We will turn next to future research directions, but
first it seems that an evaluation of the current state of the literature
is in order.
Although our review is intended to be thorough in its approach
to the frequently occurring phenomenon of information avoidance,
it is limited by the fact that researchers have devoted a great deal
of effort examining certain aspects of the phenomenon and little or
no effort examining other aspects. Beginning with the motivations
for information avoidance (the “why” question), the selective
exposure literature and related research on stereotype confirmation
and disconfirmation provide vast and nuanced evidence for one
motivation for information avoidance: to avoid threats to cherished
beliefs, attitudes, and decisions. However, far less research has
addressed the other motivations to avoid information. The medical
literature and the literature on close relationships provide indirect
evidence of the motivation to avoid an obligation toward undesired
action, but no research directly addresses this motivation. As a
result, little is known about the pervasiveness or moderators of the
motivation to avoid information that might obligate people to take
action. Similarly, the medical literature provides indirect evidence
for emotion regulation as a motivation to avoid information, but it
remains unclear exactly which emotions are most likely to prompt
information avoidance, or how people balance the desire to pursue
positive emotions against the desire to avoid negative emotions in
the context of information decisions. Furthermore, because no
research has attempted to examine the three motivations in a single
study, there is little evidence to clarify which of motivations are
most versus least common, when people are most likely to expe-
rience each motivation, or which elements of the situation predict
the motivations that are most likely to come into play.
In addition, our list of situational moderators of information (the
“when” question) is almost certainly incomplete, and the moder-
ators we discussed have received uneven empirical attention across
literatures. Perceptions of control are the best-supported of the
moderators, with support from the literatures on health, selective
exposure, and feedback preferences. In contrast, the medical liter-
ature provides the clearest evidence for the role of coping re-
sources, and the communication literature most clearly speaks to
the role of ease of attaining information in information avoidance
decisions (e.g., Johnson, 1997). Support for the role of self-control
resources largely comes from a single set of studies on various
domains of information avoidance (Kruger & Evans, 2009), al-
though research on the effect of cognitive load on selective expo-
sure provides additional support (Fischer, Jonas, Frey, & Schulz-
Hardt, 2005). Lastly, the literatures on health, selective exposure,
and close relationships reveal a complicated relationship between
expectations on information avoidance that certainly deserves fur-
ther attention.
Finally, although researchers from a variety of fields have ex-
plored topics relevant to information avoidance, there is no over-
arching theoretical model for conceptualizing when and why peo-
ple choose to avoid information. However, we find the absence of
an overarching model neither surprising nor problematic. As a
phenomenon, information avoidance is broad (covering both pos-
itive and negative events, short-term and long-term decisions,
active and passive responses, conscious and nonconscious behav-
ior, and information about self and others), complex (this paper
alone identifies five moderators and numerous individual differ-
ence variables), and multidetermined (arising from at least three
different motivations). In short, the topic of information avoidance
is so diverse and multifaceted that it does not lend itself to a
simple, one-size-fits-all theoretical framework. Indeed, informa-
tion avoidance is similar to complex phenomena such as prejudice,
altruism, self-concept, and many health outcomes, all of which
defy simple, single theory explanations.
This is not to say that information avoidance is devoid of theory.
Numerous theories from psychology and communication inform
aspects of information avoidance. For example, self-verification
strivings (de la Ronde & Swann, 1993) provide a theoretical basis
for understanding why people may avoid information that chal-
lenges a cherished self-belief (see also self-enhancement theory
and dissonance theory; Festinger, 1954; Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Likewise, the theory of motivated information management (Afifi
& Weiner, 2004) provides insights into how self-efficacy concerns
influence information seeking, and problematic integration theory
(Babrow, 2001) speaks to the problems that arise when the infor-
mation people expect to gain from a search diverges from the
information they wish to gain. We hope that our review of the
literature will provide the impetus for more research in the area
and further theoretical development.
In sum, our review points to vast inconsistencies in both the total
attention paid to various aspects of information avoidance and the
attention to each aspect across different and disconnected litera-
tures. We argue that these inconsistencies are self-perpetuating,
such that researchers in a given field would likely fail to consider
predictors of information avoidance that are addressed outside
their area of research. To illustrate, imagine that a health re-
searcher, a selective exposure researcher, and a communication
researcher each investigate women’s avoidance of information
about their risk for breast cancer. If each researcher examines only
field-specific literature, they likely would examine certain aspects
of information avoidance while excluding others. The health re-
searcher might focus on women’s concerns about required fol-
low-up procedures should they learn their risk is high, or on their
concerns about negative emotions that might result from learning
unpleasant risk information. In contrast, the selective exposure
researcher might consider only women’s motivation to avoid a
change in beliefs (e.g., that they are healthy, will have long lives,
etc.). Finally, the communication researcher might look past mo-
tivations to examine the ease with which women can obtain such
information, or perhaps their feelings of efficacy to cope with risk
information. Although these different approaches can be comple-
mentary, they are only productive to the extent that researchers are
aware of related findings in other fields. We hope that our review
prompts a much greater awareness of what different fields have to
offer toward understanding decisions to avoid potentially un-
wanted information.
348 SWEENY, MELNYK, MILLER, AND SHEPPERD
Unanswered Questions
Given the inconsistencies in knowledge about information
avoidance, the list of potentially productive research directions
may be nearly infinite. Thus, the following discussion of unan-
swered questions represents merely a sample of future directions.
First, we attempted to cover the moderators that have received
noteworthy empirical attention, but other potential moderators
deserve attention. For example, no research we know of examines
the social aspects of information avoidance. Research on the
motivations to seek genetic testing often mention family obliga-
tions as a key motivator (e.g., Etchegary, 2004; Warner et al.,
2005), but there is little discussion of when and how social context
is likely to influence decisions. Moreover, the presence of others
may increase information avoidance to the extent that people are
concerned that information may be embarrassing or reflect poorly
on them, or if they feel that they will have to manage both their
external and internal reactions to the information. Conversely, the
presence of others may decrease information avoidance to the
extent that people perceive those others as a source of social
support or feel that they will appear childish or irresponsible to
others should they opt to avoid the information. The social context
is merely one of potentially many moderators of information
avoidance that merit future study.
Another potential moderator that is worthy of empirical atten-
tion is the availability of self-control resources, particularly in
relation to the amount of curiosity people feel regarding the
information. Although this review is more concerned with people’s
motivations to avoid information than to seek it, curiosity affects
the likelihood of motivated information avoidance by providing a
countermotivation. We suggest that in some situations even people
who are highly motivated to avoid unwanted information may
nevertheless respond to the strong pull of curiosity. Information is
not always immediately available, and some evidence suggests that
people are less likely to succumb to sheer curiosity when the
information is not available until sometime in the future. For
example, participants in one study indicated that they would be
less likely to take a magical pill that would reveal unpleasant
information about a romantic partner (i.e., they would avoid the
information) when they would learn the information 10 months in
the future versus immediately (Kruger & Evans, 2009). This study
further found that curiosity mediated the effect of timing on
information avoidance, suggesting that information that was im-
mediately available evoked greater curiosity than information that
was not available until later, and the greater curiosity prompted
people to seek information they might otherwise avoid (Kruger &
Evans, 2009). This finding suggests that people might make dif-
ferent decisions in the face of potentially unwanted information
depending on whether they possess sufficient self-control re-
sources to overcome their curiosity. If the information is immedi-
ately available, curiosity can overwhelm any effort to avoid the
information, but distant information seems not to prompt the same
degree of overwhelming curiosity. Although these findings are
suggestive of the role of self-control resources in information
avoidance, further research should clarify the nature of the rela-
tionships between curiosity, self-control, and information avoid-
ance.
Another issue that can be addressed by future research is the
distinction between temporary and permanent avoidance. In some
instances, people may permanently avoid unwanted information.
Indeed, some situations naturally permit permanent information
avoidance when the information is only available for a limited
window of time. For example, a person may choose not to ask a
dying spouse whether s/he was ever unfaithful. However, infor-
mation avoidance need not be permanent. We suspect that people
more commonly wish to delay information acquisition until a later
time. For example, a woman awaiting the results of a medical test
may merely postpone picking up the results for a few days or
weeks rather than forego picking up the results altogether. Like-
wise, a person may wait until after lunch to return a dreaded call
from the boss. In both cases, the person intends to learn the
information eventually, but not immediately. Although our ap-
proach to information avoidance focuses on initial decisions about
information (i.e., seek now or avoid now), the distinction between
temporary and permanent information avoidance may reflect dif-
ferent antecedent conditions or underlying motivations.
Finally, future research can examine the distinction between
active versus passive information avoidance. At the active end of
the continuum, people may avoid unwanted information through
verbal or physical acts: by looking in the other direction, by
turning off the TV or radio, or by asking a person with unwanted
information not to disclose it. At the passive end of the continuum,
people may fail to exert the effort necessary to reveal information,
thus avoiding the information through inaction. For example,
people can fail to pick up their medical test results or decline
testing altogether (Centers for Disease Control & Prevention,
1997; Molitor et al., 1999; Tao et al., 1999; Valdiserri et al., 1993),
neglect to retrieve their final grade in a class, or refuse to expose
themselves to unwanted views or opinions (Sweeney & Gruber,
1984). We have little reason to believe that the conclusions of our
review should differ for passive versus active information avoid-
ance, but the ease with which people can avoid information is
worthy of further empirical attention.
Broader Considerations
We close by speculating on two final questions. First, how
pervasive is information avoidance? Throughout this paper we
have demonstrated the breadth of information avoidance by draw-
ing examples from medicine, business, relationships, academics,
and mundane daily activities. We believe that people avoid infor-
mation about trivial issues such as whether they gained weight, the
size of a credit card bill, and whether they paid too much for a
purchase. But people also avoid information about more important
issues such as their health, their job security, and the behavior of
their elected officials. We suspect that everyone avoids informa-
tion at some point, and perhaps with some frequency. People
engage in information avoidance every time they delay reading an
email that might bring bad news, choose not to step on a scale for
fear of what it might reveal, or avoid asking a question because
they fear the answer.
Second, when is information avoidance most likely to be harm-
ful? One factor that might predict the effect of information avoid-
ance is control over the information’s consequences. Presumably,
the greater the control, the less information avoidance is beneficial.
For example, people who avoid a diagnosis of a treatable disease
may face serious health consequences that they could otherwise
have avoided. However, people who avoid learning the results of
349INFORMATION AVOIDANCE
a genetic test may face fewer consequences of their choice. Al-
though even uncontrollable information might provide an oppor-
tunity to take action to mitigate certain consequences (e.g., by
writing a will, telling loved ones, etc.), the consequences of avoid-
ing information about an uncontrollable outcome may be less dire
than the consequences of avoiding information about a controlla-
ble outcome. A second factor that might predict consequences of
information avoidance is the duration of the avoidance. Informa-
tion avoidance is often not harmful when temporary. For example,
pausing for a few minutes to gather strength before reading an
email that might contain bad news is unlikely to lead to negative
consequences. However, never reading the email might lead to lost
opportunities or escalating costs. Similarly, students may lose the
chance to change a mistaken grade if they wait too long to find out
about the problem, and many diseases are treatable only in their
early stages. Although we do not advocate either information
avoidance or information seeking across the board, we suspect that
at times knowing less is better, and at other times knowing less can
be quite hazardous.
Conclusion
Information avoidance is a paradoxical behavior among a spe-
cies with complex brains capable of acquiring and handling mas-
sive amounts of information. To avoid information, from this
perspective, is a perplexing and seemingly unnecessary choice.
However, when one considers humans’ unique ability to mentally
time travel (Suddendorf & Cordalis, 2007; Wilson & Gilbert,
2005), and hence anticipate what the information may mean for the
future, information avoidance becomes perfectly understandable.
That said, the phenomenon of information avoidance as we define
it is not well understood, and the time has come to study it in a
theoretical and systematic way.
References
Abraham, C., & Sheeran, P. (2003). Acting on intentions: The role of
anticipated regret. British Journal of Social Psychology, 42, 495–511.
Acker, M. (1997). Tempered regrets under total ignorance. Theory and
Decision, 42, 207–213.
Afifi, W. A., Dillow, M. R., & Morse, C. (2004). Examining predictors and
consequences of information seeking in close relationships. Personal
Relationships, 11, 429 – 449.
Afifi, W. A., & Lucas, A. (2006). Is ignorance really sometimes bliss? The
role of outcome expectancies in individuals’ information seeking deci-
sions. Unpublished manuscript.
Afifi, W. A., & Weiner, J. L. (2004). Toward a theory of motivated
information management. Communication Theory, 14, 167–190.
Aiken, L., West, S., Woodward, C., & Reno, R. (1994). Health beliefs and
compliance with mammography-screening recommendations in asymp-
tomatic women. Health Psychology, 13, 122–129.
Ajekigbe, A. T. (1991). Fear of mastectomy: The most common factor
responsible for late presentation of carcinoma of the breast in Nigeria.
Clinical Oncology, 3. 78 – 80.
Arora, N. K., Finney Rutten, L. J., Gustafson, D. H., Moser, R., &
Hawkins, R. P. (2007). Perceived helpfulness and impact of social
support provided by family, friends, and health-care providers to women
newly diagnosed with breast cancer. Psycho-Oncology, 16, 474 – 486.
Babrow, A. S. (2001). Uncertainty, value, communication, and problematic
integration. Journal of Communication, 51, 553–573.
Bandura, A. (1994). Self-efficacy. In V. S. Ramachaudran (Ed.), Encyclo-
pedia of human behavior (Vol. 4, pp. 71– 81). New York: Academic
Press.
Baumeister, R. F. (2005). The cultural animal: Human nature, meaning,
and social life. New York: Oxford University Press.
Berger, C. R., & Calabrese, R. (1975). Some explorations in initial inter-
action and beyond: Toward a developmental theory of interpersonal
communication. Human Communication Research, 1, 99 –112.
Boen, F., Vanbeselaere, & Feys, J. (2002). Behavioral consequences of
fluctuating group success: An internet study of soccer-team fans. Journal
of Social Psychology, 142, 769 –781.
Bosompra, K., Flynn, B. S., Ashikaga, T., Rairikar, C. J., Worden, J. K., &
Solomon, L. J. (2000). Likelihood of undergoing genetic testing for
cancer risk: A population-based study. Preventive Medicine: An Inter-
national Journal Devoted to Practice and Theory, 30, 155–166.
Brashers, D. E. (2001). Communication and uncertainty management.
Journal of Communication, 51, 477– 497.
Brouwers, M., & Sorrentino, R. (1993). Uncertainty orientation and pro-
tection motivation theory: The role of individual differences in health
compliance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 102–112.
Carroll, P., Sweeny, K., & Shepperd, J. (2006). Forsaking optimism.
Review of General Psychology, 10, 56 –73.
Carver, C., Scheier, M., & Weintraub, J. (1989). Assessing coping strate-
gies: A theoretically based approach. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 56, 267–283.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (1997). HIV counseling and
testing in publicly funded sites: 1995 summary report. Atlanta, GA: U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, CDC.
Chapman, G. B., & Coups, E. J. (2006). Emotions and preventive health
behavior: Worry, regret, and influenza vaccination. Health Psychology,
255, 82–90.
Connolly, T., & Zeelenberg, M. (2002). Regret in decision making. Cur-
rent Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 212–216.
Croyle, R. T., & Lerman, C. (1993). Interest in genetic testing for colon
cancer susceptibility: Cognitive and emotional correlates. Preventive
Medicine: An International Journal Devoted to Practice and Theory, 22,
284 –292.
Cutler, S. J., & Hodgson, L. G. (2003). To test or not to test: Interest in
genetic testing for Alzheimer’s disease among middle-aged adults.
American Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease and Other Dementias, 18,
9 –20.
Dawson, E., Savitsky, K., & Dunning, D. (2006). “Don’t tell me, I don’t
want to know”: Understanding people’s reluctance to obtain medical
diagnostic information. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 36, 751–
768.
Day, J. C., & Newburger, E. C. (2002). Current population reports.
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Sta-
tistics Administration, U.S. Census Bureau.
de la Ronde, C., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (1993). Caught in the crossfire:
Positivity and self-verification strivings among people with low self-
esteem. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), Self-esteem: The puzzle of low
self-regard. (pp. 147–165). New York: Plenum Press.
Dugas, M. J., Gosselin, P., & Ladouceur, R. (2001). Intolerance of uncer-
tainty and worry: Investigating specificity in a non clinical sample.
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 25(5), 551–558.
Etchegary, H. (2004). Psychological aspects of predictive genetic-test
decisions: What do we know so far? Analyses of Social Issues and
Public Policy, 4, 13–31.
Feltwell, A. K., & Rees, C. E. (2004). The information-seeking behaviours
of partners of men with prostate cancer: A qualitative pilot study. Patient
Education & Counseling, 54, 179 –185.
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human
Relations, 7, 117–140.
350 SWEENY, MELNYK, MILLER, AND SHEPPERD
Fischer, P., Jonas, E., Frey, D., & Schulz-Hardt, S. (2005). Selective
exposure to information: The impact of information limits. European
Journal of Social Psychology, 35, 469 – 492.
Fountoulakis, K., Iacovides, A., Kaprinis, S., & Kaprinis, G. (2006). Life
events and clinical subtypes of major depression: A cross-sectional
study. Psychiatry Research, 143, 235–244.
Frey, D. (1981). Reversible and irreversible decisions: Preference for
consonant information as a function of attractiveness of decision alter-
natives. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 7, 621– 626.
Frey, D., & Rosch, M. (1984). Information seeking after decisions: The
role of novelty of information and decision reversibility. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 10, 91–98.
Friis, L. S., Elverdam, B., & Schmidt, K. G. (2003). The patient’s per-
spective: A qualitative study of acute myeloid leukaemia patients’ need
for information and their information-seeking behaviour. Supportive
Care in Cancer, 11, 162–170.
Glanz, K., Grove, J., Lerman, C., Gotay, C., & Le Marchand, L. (1999).
Correlates of intentions to obtain genetic counseling and colorectal
cancer gene testing among at-risk relatives from three ethnic groups.
Cancer Epidemiology, Biomarkers & Prevention, 8, 329 –336.
Gooding, H. C., Organista, K., Burack, J., & Biesecker, B. B. (2006).
Genetic susceptibility testing from a stress and coping perspective.
Social Science & Medicine, 62, 1880 –1890.
Graham, I. D., Logan, D. M., Hughes-Benzie, R., Evans, W. K., Perras, H.,
McAuley, L. M., Laupacis, A., & Stern, H. (1998). How interested is the
public in genetic testing for colon cancer susceptibility? Report of a
cross-sectional population survey. Cancer Prevention & Control, 2,
167–172.
Greenwald, A. G. (1997). Self-knowledge and self-deception: Further
consideration. The mythomanias: The nature of deception and self-
deception (pp. 51–72). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, Inc.
Gross, J. (1998). The emerging field of emotion regulation: An integrative
review. Review of General Psychology, 2, 271–299.
Hart, W., Albarracin, D., Eagly, A. H., Brechan, I., Lindberg, M., &
Merrill, M. (2009). Feeling validated versus being correct? A meta-
analysis of selective exposure to information. Psychological Bulletin,
135, 555–588.
Hightow, L. B., Miller, W. C., Leone, P. A., Wohl, D., Smurzynski, M., &
Kaplan, A. H. (2003). Failure to return for HIV posttest counseling in an
STD clinic population. AIDS Education and Prevention, 15, 282–290.
Ickes, W., Dugosh, J. W., Simpson, J. A., & Wilson, C. L. (2003).
Suspicious minds: The motive to acquire relationship-threatening infor-
mation. Personal Relationships, 10, 131–148.
Jemmott III, J. B., Ditto, P. H., & Croyle, R. T. (1986). Judging health
status: Effects of perceived prevalence and personal relevance. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 899 –905.
Johnson, J. D. (1997). Cancer-related information seeking. Cresskill, NJ:
Hampton Press.
Johnston, L. (1996). Resisting change: Information-seeking and stereotype
change. European Journal of Social Psychology, 26, 799 – 825.
Johnston, L. C., & Macrae, C. N. (1994). Changing social stereotypes: The
case of the information seeker. European Journal of Social Psychol-
ogy, 24, 581–592.
Jonas, E., Greenberg, J., & Frey, D. (2003). Connecting terror management
and dissonance theory: Evidence that mortality salience increases the
preference for supporting information after decisions. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 1181–1189.
Jonas, E., Schulz-Hardt, S., Fischer, P., & Frey, D. (2006). Biased infor-
mation seeking after decisions: Cognitive and motivational bases. In D.
Frey, H. Mandl, & L. von Rosenstiel (Eds.), Knowledge and action (pp.
23–51). Ashland, OH: Hogrefe & Huber Publishers.
Keogh, L. A., Southey, M. C., Maskiell, J., Young, M., Gaff, C. L., Kirk,
J., Tucker, K. M., et al.. (2004). Uptake of offer to receive genetic
information about BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations in an Australian
population-based study. Cancer Epidemiology Biomarkers Preven-
tion, 13, 2258 –2263.
Klepac, R., Dowling, J., & Hauge, G. (1982). Characteristics of clients
seeking therapy for the reduction of dental avoidance: Reactions to pain.
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 13, 293–
300.
Kruger, J., & Evans, M. (2009). The paradox of Alypius and the pursuit of
unwanted information. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45,
1173–1179.
Kruglanski, A. W., Webster, D. M., & Klem, A. (1993). Motivated resis-
tance and openness to persuasion in the presence or absence of prior
information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 861–
876.
Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bul-
letin, 108, 480 – 498.
Lee, W. (1971). Preference strength, expected value difference and ex-
pected regret ratio. Psychological Bulletin, 75, 186 –191.
Lerman, C., Croyle, R. T., Tercyak, K. P., & Hamann, H. (2002). Genetic
testing: Psychological aspects and implications. Journal of Consulting
and Clinical Psychology, Special Issue: Behavioral Medicine and Clin-
ical Health Psychology, 70, 784 –797.
Lerman, C., Hughes, C., Trock, B. J., Myers, R. E., Main, D., Bonney, A.,
Abbaszadegan, M. R., et al. (1999). Genetic testing in with hereditary
nonpolyposis colon cancer. Journal of American Medical Association,
281, 1618 –1622.
Lerman, C., Narod, S., Schulman, K., Hughes, C., Gomez-Caminero, A.,
Bonney, G., Gold, K., Trock, B., et al. (1996). BRCA 1 testing in
families with hereditary breast-ovarian cancer: A prospective study of
patient decision making and outcomes. Journal of the American Medical
Association, 275, 1885–1892.
Lerner, M. J., & Miller, D. T. (1978). Just world research and the attribu-
tion process: Looking back and ahead. Psychological Bulletin, 85,
1030 –1051.
Leydon, G. M., Boulton, M., Moynihan, C., Jones, A., Mossman, J.,
Boudioni, M., & McPherson, K. (2000). Cancer patients’ information
needs and information seeking behaviour: In depth interview study.
British Medical Journal, 320, 909 –913.
Linville, P. W. (1987). Self-complexity as a cognitive buffer against
stress-related illness and depression. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 52, 663– 676.
Loewenstein, G. (1994). The psychology of curiosity: A review and rein-
terpretation. Psychological Bulletin, 116, 75–98.
Luce, R., & Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and decisions: Introduction and
critical survey. Oxford, England: Wiley.
Lyter, D. W., Valdiserri, R. O., Kingsley, L. A., Amoroso, W. P., &
Rinaldo Jr., C. R. (1987). The HIV antibody test: Why gay and bisexual
men want or do not want to know their results. Public Health Reports,
102, 468 – 474.
Malone, W., Shepperd, J. A., & Sweeny, K. (2009). Unpublished data,
University of Florida, Gainesville.
McCaul, K., Branstetter, A., Schroeder, D., & Glasgow, R. (1996). What is
the relationship between breast cancer risk and mammography screen-
ing? A meta-analytic review. Health Psychology, 15, 423– 429.
Meiser, B. (2005). Psychological impact of genetic testing for cancer
susceptibility: An update of the literature. Psycho-Oncology, 14, 1060 –
1074.
Meissen, G. J., Mastromauro, C. A., Kiely, D. K., McNamara, D. S., &
Myers, R. H. (1991). Understanding the decision to take the predictive
test for Huntington disease. American Journal of Medical Genetics, 39,
404 – 410.
Melnyk, D., & Shepperd, J. A. (2009). Information avoidance and breast
cancer risk. Unpublished manuscript, University of Florida.
351INFORMATION AVOIDANCE
Miller, S. M. (1987). Monitoring and blunting: Validation of a question-
naire to assess styles of information seeking under threat. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 345–353.
Miller, S. M. (1995). Monitoring versus blunting styles of coping with
cancer influence the information patients want and need about their
disease: Implications for cancer screening and management. Cancer, 76,
167–177.
Miller, S. M., & Mangan, C. E. (1983). The interacting effects of infor-
mation and coping style in adapting to gynecoligic stress: Should the
doctor tell all? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 223–
236.
Mills, J., Aronson, E., & Robinson, H. (1959). Selectivity in exposure to
information. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59, 250 –
253.
Molitor, F., Bell, R. A., & Truax, S. R. (1999). Predictors of failure to
return for HIV test result and counseling by test site type. AIDS Edu-
cation and Prevention, 11, 1–13.
Muraven, M., & Baumeister, R. (2000). Self-regulation and depletion of
limited resources: Does self-control resemble a muscle? Psychological
Bulletin, 126, 247–259.
Nickerson, R. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in
many guises. Review of General Psychology, 2, 175–220.
Northcraft, G., & Ashford, S. (1990). The preservation of self in everyday
life: The effects of performance expectations and feedback context on
feedback inquiry. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Pro-
cesses, 47, 42– 64.
Paulhus, D. L., & Suedfeld, P. (1988). A dynamic complexity model of
self-deception. In J. S. Lockard & D. L. Paulhus (Eds.), Self-deception:
An adaptive mechanism? (pp. 132–145). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
Pfeffer, J. (1977). Effects of an MBA and socioeconomic origins on
business school graduates’ salaries. Journal of Applied Psychology, 62,
698 –705.
Richard, R., de Vries, N. K., & van der Pligt, J. (1998). Anticipated regret
and precautionary sexual behavior. Journal of Applied Social Psychol-
ogy, 28, 1411–1428.
Ronan, W. W., & Organt, G. J. (1973). Determinants of pay and pay
satisfaction. Personnel Psychology, 26, 503–520.
Ropka, M. E., Wenzel., J., Phillips, E. K., Siadaty, M., & Philbrick, J. T.
(2006). Uptake rates for breast cancer genetic testing: A systematic
review. Cancer Epidemiology Biomarkers & Prevention, 15, 840 – 855.
Rosen, N. O., & Kna¨uper, B. (2009). A little uncertainty goes a long way:
State and trait differences in uncertainty interact to increase information
seeking but also increase worry. Health Communication, 24, 228 –238.
Rugg, D., Higgins, D., & Schnell, D. (1989, June). Failure to return for
HIV test results: A second look at determinants. Poster session presented
at the International Conference on AIDS, Montreal, GA.
Shepperd, J. A. (1993). Student derogation of the Scholastic Aptitude Test:
Biases in perceptions and presentations of college board scores. Basic
and Applied Social Psychology, 14, 455– 473.
Shiloh, S., Ben-Sinai, R., & Keinan, G. (1999). Effects of controllability,
predictability, and information-seeking style on interest in predictive
genetic testing, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1187–
1195.
Shiloh, S., & Ilan, S. (2005). To test of not to test? Moderators of the
relationship between risk perceptions and interest in predictive genetic
testing. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 28, 467– 479.
Shipp, T. D., Shipp, D. Z., Bromley, B., Sheahan, R., Cohen, A., Lieber-
man, E., & Benacerraf, B. (2004). What factors are associated with
parents’ desire to know the sex of their unborn child? Birth: Issues in
Perinatal Care, 31, 272–279.
Simpson, J. A., Ickes, W., & Blackstone, T. (1995). When the head protects
the heart: Empathic accuracy in dating relationships. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 69(4), 629 – 641.
Smith, S. M., Fabrigar, L. R., & Norris, M. E. (2008). Reflecting on six
decades of selective exposure research: Progress, challenges, and oppor-
tunities. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2, 464 – 493.
Snyder, M., Stephan, W., & Rosenfield, D. (1976). Egotism and attribution.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33, 435– 441.
Sorrentino, R., & Hewitt, E. (1984). The uncertainty-reducing properties of
achievement tasks revisited. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 47, 884 – 899.
Sorrentino, R., Hewitt, E., & Raso-Knott, P. (1992). Risk-taking in games
of chance and skill: Informational and affective influences on choice
behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 522–533.
Sorrentino, R., & Short, J. (1986). Uncertainty orientation, motivation, and
cognition. Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social
behavior (pp. 379 –403). New York: Guilford Press.
Steptoe, A., & O’Sullivan, J. (1986). Monitoring and blunting coping styles
in women prior to surgery. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 25,
143–144.
Suddendorf, T., & Corballis, M. (2007). The evolution of foresight: What
is mental time travel, and is it unique to humans? Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 30, 299 –313.
Sweeney, P. D., & Gruber, K. L. (1984). Selective exposure: Voter infor-
mation preferences and the Watergate affair. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 46, 1208 –1221.
Sweeny, K., & Malone, W. (2009). Predictors of information avoidance:
When does ignorance seem blissful? Unpublished manuscript.
Tao, G., Branson, B. M., Kassler, W. J., & Cohen, R. A. (1999). Rates of
receiving HIV test results: Data from the U.S. national health interview
survey for 1994 and 1995. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndromes, 22, 395– 400.
Taylor, S., & Brown, J. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psycho-
logical perspective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193–
210.
Thompson, H. S., Valdimarsdottir, H. B., Duteau-Buck, C., Guevarra, J.,
Bovbjerg, D. H., Richmond-Avellaneda, C., Amarel, D., et al. (2002).
Psychosocial predictors of BRCA counseling and testing decisions
among urban African-American women. Cancer Epidemiology Biomar-
kers and Prevention, 11, 1579 –1585.
Trope, Y., Gervey, B., & Bolger, N. (2003). The role of perceived control
in overcoming defensive self-evaluation. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 39, 407– 419.
Trope, Y., & Neter, E. (1994). Reconciling competing motives in self-
evaluation: The role of self-control in feedback seeking. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 646 – 657.
Valdiserri, R. O., Moore, M., Gerber, A. R., Campbell, C. H., Dillon, B. A.,
& West, G. R. (1993). A study of clients returning for counseling after
HIV testing: Implications for improving rates of return. Public Health
Reports, 108, 12–18.
Van der Steenstraten, I. M., Tibben, A., Roos, R. A. C., van de Kamp,
J. J. P., & Niermeijer, M. F. (1994). Predictive testing for Huntington
disease: Nonparticipants compared with participants in the Dutch pro-
gram. American Journal of Human Genetics, 55, 618 – 625.
van Dijk, E., & Zeelenberg, M. (2007). When curiosity killed regret:
Avoiding or seeking the unknown in decision-making under uncertainty.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 656 – 662.
van Dijk, W., Zeelenberg, M., & van der Pligt, J. (2003). Blessed are those
who expect nothing: Lowering expectations as a way of avoiding dis-
appointment. Journal of Economic Psychology, 24, 505–516.
Van Hiel, A., & Mervielde, I. (2002). Effects of ambiguity and need for
closure on the acquisition of information. Social Cognition, 20, 380 –
408.
Van Zuuren, F. J. (1993). Coping style and anxiety during prenatal diag-
nosis. Journal of Reproductive and Infant Psychology, Special Issue:
Psychological Aspects of Fetal Screening and the New Genetics, 11,
57–59.
352 SWEENY, MELNYK, MILLER, AND SHEPPERD
Vargas, C. A. (2001). Coping with HIV/AIDS in Durban’s commercial sex
industry. AIDS Care, 13, 351–365.
Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., & Chin, J. (2006). Feeling duped: Emo-
tional, motivational, and cognitive aspects of being exploited by others.
Review of General Psychology, 11, 127–141.
Warner, B. J., Curnow, L. J., Polglase, A. L., & Debinski, H. S. (2005).
Factors influencing uptake of genetic testing for colorectal cancer risk in
an Australian Jewish population. Journal of Genetic Counseling, 14,
387–394.
Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in
need for cognitive closure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 67, 1049 –1062.
Wilson, T., Centerbar, D., Kermer, D., & Gilbert, D. (2005). The pleasures
of uncertainty: Prolonging positive moods in ways people do not antic-
ipate. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 5–21.
Wilson, T., & Gilbert, D. (2005). Affective forecasting: Knowing what to
want. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14, 131–134.
Wilson, T. D. (1999a). Exploring models of information behaviour: The
“uncertainty” project. Information Processing and Management, 35,
839 – 849.
Wilson, T. D. (1999b). Models in information behaviour research. Journal
of Documentation, 55, 249 –270.
Wroe, A. L., Turner, N., & Salkovskis, P. M. (2004). Understanding and
predicting parental decisions about early childhood immunizations.
Health Psychology, 23, 33– 41.
Wyer, N. A. (2004). Not all stereotypic biases are created equal: Evidence
for a stereotype-disconfirming bias. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 30, 706 –720.
Yaniv, I., Benador, D., Sagi, M. (2004). On not wanting to know and not
wanting to inform others: Choices regarding predictive genetic testing,
Risk, Decision & Policy, 9, 317–336.
Yanushka Bunn, J., Bosompra, K., Ashikaga, T., Flynn, B. S., & Worden,
J. K. (2002). Factors influencing intention to obtain a genetic test for
colon cancer risk: A population-based study. Preventive Medicine: An
International Journal Devoted to Practice and Theory, 34, 567–577.
Zapka, J. G., Stoddard, A. M., Zorn, M., McCusker, J., & Mayer, K. H.
(1991). HIV antibody test result knowledge, risk perceptions, and be-
havior among homosexual active men. Patient Education and Counsel-
ing, 18, 9 –17.
Zeelenberg, M. (1999). Anticipated regret, expected feedback and behav-
ioral decision-making. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12,
93–106.
Zeelenberg, M., & Pieters, R. (2007). A theory of regret regulation 1.0.
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 17, 3–18.
Zeelenberg, M., van Dijk, W., Manstead, A., & van der Pligt, J. (1998).
The experience of regret and disappointment. Cognition & Emotion, 12,
221–230.
Received July 13, 2010
Revision received August 23, 2010
Accepted August 23, 2010 䡲
Call for Nominations: Psychology of Men and Masculinity
The Publications and Communications (P&C) Board of the American Psychological Association
has opened nominations for the editorship of Psychology of Men and Masculinity. The editorial
search is co-chaired by Glenn Good, PhD and Lillian Comas-Diaz, PhD.
Psychology of Men and Masculinity, official journal of APA Division 51 (Society for the
Psychological Study of Men and Masculinity), is devoted to the dissemination of research, theory,
and clinical scholarship that advances the psychology of men and masculinity. This discipline is
defined broadly as the study of how boys’ and men’s psychology is influenced and shaped by both
sex and gender, and encompasses both the study of biological sex differences and similarities as
well as of the social construction of gender.
Editorial candidates should be available to start receiving manuscripts in January 2011 to prepare
for issues published in 2012. Please note that the P&C Board encourages participation by members
of underrepresented groups in the publication process and would particularly welcome such
nominees. Self-nominations are also encouraged.
Candidates should be nominated by accessing APA’s EditorQuest site on the Web. Using your
Web browser, go to http://editorquest.apa.org. On the Home menu on the left, find “Guests.” Next,
click on the link “Submit a Nomination,” enter your nominee’s information, and click “Submit.”
Prepared statements of one page or less in support of a nominee can also be submitted by e-mail
to Molly Douglas-Fujimoto, Managing Director, Education Publishing Foundation, at mdouglas-
fujimoto@apa.org.
Deadline for accepting nominations is January 31, 2010, when reviews will begin.
353INFORMATION AVOIDANCE
