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Contents
Hoshmand on Jones 540
Cox on Jones 541
Aguinis and Aguinis on Jones 541
Ward on Jones 542
Weiss on Jones 543
Jones Replies 545
Wiederman on Shapiro and Wiggins... 546
Wynkoop on Shapiro and Wiggins 546
Balderston on Shapiro and Wiggins .... 547
Bost on Shapiro and Wiggins 547
Altman on Shapiro and Wiggins 547
Taylor on Shapiro and Wiggins 548
Shapiro and Wiggins Reply 548
Psychology's Ethics of Belief
Lisa Tsoi Hoshmand
Department of Counseling,
California State University
Jones (March 1994) attempted to steer our
professional discourse toward a discussion
of metaphysical and moral issues in general
and of the relationship between religion and
psychology in particular. He argued on the
basis of contemporary philosophy of sci-
ence that there are modes and realms of
human knowing that are neglected by scien-
tific psychology. Furthermore, he pointed
out the insufficient attention theorists and
therapeutic practitioners have paid to the
metaphysical and the transcendental in hu-
man experience, suggesting that we share
an incomplete ontological understanding of
humans. The boldness of Jones's proposal
consisted in his breaking away from con-
ventional habits of discourse and calling
into question the fundamental ways by which
we define our scientific and professional
ways of being. Through careful analysis
and argumentation, Jones attempted to
conflate the scientific text of psychological
discourse with the metaphysical and the re-
ligious, apparently in the hope of promoting
an interpenetration of the respective related
modes of thought. To achieve
this,
he had to
rely not only on our willingness to modify
the usual standards of discourse but also on
our openness to a pluralistic epistemology
that grants a continuity in all forms of hu-
man knowing.
Inasmuch as Jones's (1994) thesis has
found a public forum in the American Psy-
chologist,
it likely will be met with consid-
erable skepticism. This is because Jones has
challenged the very foundations of faith on
which most of us base our beliefs and
self-
identification as scientists-professionals.
Even in open debates on the criteria of psy-
chological knowledge, we seldom acknowl-
edge the nonepistemic factors associated
with
deep,
personal attachment to those stan-
dards of intersubjectivity promoted in psy-
chology as an objective science of behavior,
or find ourselves in a position of having to
justify our conviction in such standards. This
valuing of particular modes of creating
knowledge and verifying knowledge claims,
which constitutes one's ethic of belief
(McCarthy,
1986),
is closely linked for many
to one's self-identification as a scientist-
professional. It is consistent with this role to
uphold the intellectual integrity of our schol-
arly and professional practices. Acting on
such an ethic of belief is a way of being
morally responsible, not only to the science
and profession in which one claims mem-
bership, but also to society as served by the
special knowledge we hope to create and
apply. This ethic of belief
is
part of the faith
that many of us share in the discipline and
in the science-based profession. One would
not expect to question one's own ethics of
belief unless one were in some form of
crisis of faith.
As Jones (1994) asserted, matters of
faith are not only highly personal but often
not held accountable as part of a rigorous
examination of human experience. This is
indirectly the consequence of individualism
and relativism. Society reacts either with
indifference or unwelcome intrusiveness to
personal matters of faith. In such a climate,
religious faith is in danger of being swept
under the rug of political correctness
as
just
another aspect of pluralism. However, if
each held his or her own faith without com-
municative effort or accountability, there
would be minimal basis for human commu-
nity or any prospect for evaluating the sound-
ness (moral and intellectual) of
intersubjectivity. Community, of course, rep-
resents another transcendental principle by
which some of us define social existence.
What, then, are the options for psycholo-
gists? It seems that only a willing reflexive
study of metaphysical and moral commit-
ments will allow the assumptive base of our
beliefs and practices to be open to reflection
and revision. The moral certitude with which
many of us maintain convictions about the
nature of our scientific and professional en-
terprise may be tempered by the kind of
humility Jones advocated. The spirit of good
science and a skeptical attitude toward one's
own beliefs and their basis of justification,
both epistemic and nonepistemic, may coun-
teract the tendency toward absolute certainty.
What Jones (1994) did not address fully
are individual differences in epistemic styles,
and personal-developmental and cultural in-
fluences on our ethics of
belief.
Our tem-
peraments and epistemic styles may incline
us
toward particular modes of knowing (from
the objectivist to the highly subjective) and
sources of faith (be they rational or
nonrational). These factors interact with their
ontological beliefs in the creation and vali-
dation of knowledge. Epistemic orientations
are shaped by developmental experiences in
one's social and cultural milieu, including
the academic or professional culture.
Nonepistemic considerations of an ideologi-
cal nature are especially evident in profes-
sions.
Other moral goods and meanings may
also be appropriated from the shared
world views of one's reference groups, to
constitute the axiological or metaphysical
base of one's intellectual convictions. The
processes by which people arrive at and
justify their beliefs are open to naturalistic
inquiry. They should be the subject of psy-
chological study.
Given the varied personal histories and
the presence of different subcultures within
the profession, it is only to be expected that
both similarities and differences in ethics of
belief will be found among us. Two impor-
tant questions to ask will be (a) what are the
pragmatic consequences of our own ethics
of belief for living as far as achieving
540 July 1995 • American Psychologist
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