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So it would appear that both prophets
reject our disciplined ways because our ways
disrupt their
politics.
Smith (1994) is preoc-
cupied with saving us from the so-called
postmodern assault on our values. But the
sky isn't falling. The center may very well
hold. Gergen (1994) is more concerned with
saving us from ourselves, our so-called "satu-
ration," than with providing an empirical
account for this presumed phenomenon. He
may claim "empiricism dead," and
so
it
is,
as
a theory of truth, but not as a method of
discovery and obtaining evidence (Davidson,
1985).
One wonders who unleased the beast?
Aren't these prophets just trying to save us
from their own demons? Are they not sacri-
ficing our discipline out of liberal guilt, a
Nietzschean bad conscience?
REFERENCES
Bell, D. (1993). Communitarianism and its
critics. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Davidson, D. (1985). Inquiries into truth and
interpretation. Oxford, England: Clarendon
Press.
Denner, B. (1992). Is social constructionism
more than fashionable talk? A defense of
scientific value-neutrality. Unpublished
manuscript.
Gergen, K. (1994). Exploring the postmodern:
Perils or potentials? American Psycholo-
gist,
49, 412-416.
Smith, M. (1994). Selfhood at risk: Postmodern
perils and the perils of postmodernism.
American Psychologist, 49, 405-411.
Wittgenstein, L. (1963). Philosophical inves-
tigations (G. Anscombe, Trans.). New York:
Macmillan.
Whose Truth? Whose
Goodness? Whose Beaut/?
David Mente
Western Psychiatric Institute and
Clinic,
Pittsburgh, PA
Smith (May 1994) and Gergen (May 1994)
presented opposing views regarding the per-
ils or rewards of a postmodern psychology
while seeming to agree on many of the
substantive issues at hand, including the
importance of having the ghost of Henry
Murray on your side. Smith delineated a
number of positives regarding the social
constructionist point of view. However, he
turned away from this stance, rejecting the
position that truth claims can "be reduced to
rhetoric and politics" (p. 409) while resort-
ing often to little more than the rhetorical
device of name calling and fear mongering.
Smith (1994), in his most dismissive
moments, charged Gergen with "radical rela-
tivism" and "antiscientific relativism"
(p.
408). The charge of relativism is often
invoked in this fashion in the conversations
surrounding these issues (Geertz, 1984) and
merits further exploration. For Smith, rela-
tivism appears
to
denote an "anything goes,"
all points of view are equal with no basis for
choice position. This point of view is not
readily found in the postmodern, social con-
structionist literature. Goodman (1984) de-
scribed his own position as a "radical rela-
tivism under rigorous restraints" (p. 39).
This position "holds that there are many
right world-versions, some of them conflict-
ing with each other, but insists on the dis-
tinction of right and wrong versions"
(p.
53).
Feyerabend (1987) noted that relativ-
ism has a long history, existing in many
versions and in many societies. He delin-
eated at least seven versions that are useful
for some purposes in certain situations.
Gergen's relativism in The Saturated Self
(1991) and in his 1994 reply to Smith is
most akin to a pragmatic version explicated
by Rorty (1991), who stated that "there is
nothing to be said about either truth or ratio-
nality apart from descriptions of the familiar
procedures of justification which a given
society—ours—uses in one or another area
of inquiry" (p. 23). Rorty took issue with
the notion that this is a relativist position.
His and Gergen's social contextualist posi-
tions are not founded on a new positive
theory of truth but rather entail a letting go
of the idea that truth has an essence. What
Goodman, Feyerabend, Rorty, and Gergen's
positions have in common is that they are
therapeutic, having more to do with coping,
or what Goodman called "judicious vacilla-
tion" (p. 32) than with attempting to build
the new grand theory of truth, goodness, and
beauty.
Smith (1994) made it clear that he does
not find the postmodern position of Gergen
to be therapeutic. His characterizations of
Gergen (1991) and unnamed others as grim
and gloomy are difficult to reconcile with
the relevant literature. Gergen, in The Satu-
rated Self (1991) and in his reply to Smith
(1994),
certainly strove to present the posi-
tive potentials of the postmodern movement.
The philosophers I have cited above—Rorty
(1991),
Goodman (1984), and Feyerabend
(1987)—have also been upbeat about this
movement's potential. In addition to
Gergen's advocacy for the postmodern
movement, others working specifically in
psychology have used postmodern ideas that
open up new possibilities rather than focus
on gloom and doom. Two examples of this
are Shweder's (1991) attempts to articulate
a cultural psychology and Anderson and
Goolishian's (1988) work in family therapy.
Smith interpreted the postmodern position
as one in which "the flow of discourse leaves
us bereft of anchors to stabilize a view of
self and world"
(p.
408).
However, the meta-
phorical anchor aptly describes what the
postmodern position does give us. An an-
chor is a human artifact that serves a useful
and practical purpose by holding a ship
steady in a particular place for a particular
period of
time.
When it is time for the ship
to move, the anchor is pulled up and used
again when the ship needs to be stationary.
Smith seems to be hoping for an anchor that
does not move—a universal, ahistorical,
decontextualized anchor. The postmodern
position notes that the only anchors of which
we are aware were made and dropped by
particular people, in specific historical con-
texts.
Finally, Smith (1994) wants to "retain
some toehold to sustain the old human
struggle toward truth, goodness, and beauty
as meaningful ideals" (p. 409). If he means
universal, ahistorical, and decontextualized
truth, goodness, and beauty, then he is right
that the postmodern position advocates giv-
ing up these ideals. Surely, at this point in
time,
Smith must realize that the inevitable
questions asked about truth, goodness, and
beauty are the questions Whose truth? Whose
goodness? Whose beauty?
REFERENCES
Anderson, H., & Goolishian, H. A. (1988). Hu-
man systems as linguistic systems: Prelimi-
nary and evolving ideas about the implications
for clinical theory. Family Process, 27, 371—
393.
Feyerabend, P. (1987). Farewell to reason. Lon-
don: Verso.
Geertz, C. (1984). Anti anti-relativism. American
Anthropologist, 86, 263-278.
Gergen, K. J. (1991).
The
saturated
self:
Dilem-
mas
of identity
in contemporary
life.
New York:
Basic Books.
Gergen, K. J. (1994). Exploring the postmodern:
Perils or potentials? American Psychologist,
49, 412-416.
Goodman, N. (1984). Of
mind
and other matters.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rorty, R.
(1991).
Objectivity,
relativism
and
truth:
Philosophical papers
volume
one.
Cambridge,
MA: Cambridge University Press.
Shweder, R. A. (1991). Thinking through cul-
tures:
Expeditions in
cultural psychology. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Smith,
M.
B.
(1994). Selfhood at risk: Postmodern
perils and the perils of postmodernism. Ameri-
can Psychologist, 49, 405-411.
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