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The philosophy of dreaming and self-consciousness: What happens to the experiential subject during the dream state?
Abstract
Today, based on a more differentiated understanding of both the phenomenological and neurophysiological features of dreaming, it is possible to give a relatively straightforward and affirmative answer to the question of whether dreams are conscious experiences occurring in sleep. At the same time, these new insights into the nature of dreaming require a more nuanced perspective that is capable of explaining the subtle differences between dreaming and waking consciousness as well. In this chapter, we will argue that these differences mainly concern the subjective quality of the dreaming experience. The interesting question, from a philosophical point of view, is not so much whether or not dreams are conscious experiences at all. Rather, one must ask in what sense dreams can be considered as conscious experiences, and what happens to the experiential subject during the dream state. Finally, in order to arrive at a more differentiated understanding of dream consciousness, we will contrast our analysis of ordinary dreams with lucid dreams, as well as with the varying degrees of lucidity and cognitive clarity seen in semi-lucid and prelucid dreams. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
... p LLvsOO = .051, which could be related to the nature of the dream world and meta-references expected in lucid experiences (Baird et al., 2019;Mallett & Ashokkumar, 2022;Mallett et al., 2021;Stumbrys et al., 2014;Voss et al., 2013;Windt & Metzinger, 2007). It is important to highlight that the three conditions had similar total WC, NNs: 217.3 + 53.2 words, LLs: 327.5 + 97.38 words, OOs: 274.3 + 92.1 words; F(2, 44) = 1.63, p = .202; ...
... Next, we created two categories related to dream awareness and dream control, named "insight" and "agency," respectively, two cognitive notions that are widely accepted as typical components of LD (Baird et al., 2019;Mallett & Ashokkumar, 2022;Mallett et al., 2021;Stumbrys et al., 2014;Voss et al., 2013;Windt & Metzinger, 2007). Thus, to analyze dream reports based on these categories, we used the KH Coder 3 category-level analysis (similar to Mallett & Ashokkumar, 2022). ...
... Agency and insight are crucial elements of lucid dreaming as they indicate dream control and awareness, respectively. These concepts are commonly found in the literature on lucid dreaming and are considered necessary components of such dreams (Baird et al., 2019;Mallett & Ashokkumar, 2022;Mallett et al., 2021;Stumbrys et al., 2014;Voss et al., 2013;Windt & Metzinger, 2007). This result suggests that OBE experiences may involve even greater control and selfawareness than LD. ...
Lucid dreams (LDs) and out-of-body experiences (OBEs) initiated from sleep paralysis both involve heightened cognitive abilities during sleep. Some researchers suggest that OBEs, specifically originating from sleep paralysis, are closely related to LDs or even considered variations of the same phenomenon. Our study compared non-LDs, LDs, and sleep paralysis-induced OBEs from 60 participants over 2 months (916 dream reports). We used Lexicons like National Research Council Canada Emotion Lexicon and Empath, along with Hall and Van de Castle’s scoring system (Domhoff, 1996) with variations and additional measures. The results showed that OBE were characterized by higher occurrences of negative emotions compared to both lucid and non-LDs as measured by automatic and manual scoring systems. Also, more OBE reports contained words related to agency and insight; higher manual scoring of dream control-related expressions; and more total sensations, dream activities, reference to prospective memory evocations, spatial and body references, and more difficulties with movement within the dream environment, than LDs. The findings support the idea that sleep paralysis-induced OBEs represent unique experiences distinguished from LDs.
... non-pathological − waking state, extended consciousness is not a question of all or nothing, but of degree. Now, it seems that the same applies to the dream state − with lucid dreamers sometimes regaining an almost fully functioning autobiographical self (Levitan & LaBerge, 1993;Windt & Metzinger, 2007). ...
... It is manifested, according to Klein (2019), when a person (a) remembers a past event as if he or she were ex- 19 As opposed to lucid. 20 In the same vein, Metzinger (2004) proposed that, at the rare exception of some phases of lucidity, the dreaming mind fails to integrate waking autobiographic memory sources to create the equivalent of a full and stable waking extended self (see also Windt & Metzinger, 2007). ...
... (2) Laws of 'Nature', in which visual aspects of laws of nature (e.g., gravity, passage of time) are altered. Changes in the experience of natural physics are common during dreaming 57,58 , and are a defining feature of psychedelic and mystical experiences 59-61 . (3) Changes of 'Self", in which the participants' sense of self is manipulated through conflicts between visual signals and self-related information (e.g., sensorimotor conflicts, changes in first person perspective) 34,35,62 . ...
An intriguing aspect of the human mind is our knowledge that our perceptions may be false. Our frequent exposure to non-veridical perceptions such as those found in dreams, illusions and hallucinations cause us to examine the actuality of our sensory experiences. As such humans continuously monitor the veridicality of their perceptions in a process termed the Sense of Reality (SoR). Moreover, the Sense of Reality is a central criterion in the assessment of neurological and psychiatric health. The scientific study of hallucinatory experiences has been hindered by their transitory, subjective, ineffable nature and by the fact that they typically co-occur with psychiatric, medical or psychedelic states. Despite the critical role of SoR in daily life and in pathologies little is known regarding its cognitive, physiological and computational underpinnings. Here we employed a novel immersive virtual reality paradigm to induce Virtual Hallucinations (VH) simulating the phenomenology of visual hallucinations found in psychiatric, neurological, and pharmacological conditions. Combining psychophysics, physiological recordings and computational modeling in one exploratory (n = 31) and one preregistered experiment (n = 32) we examined responses to VH of varying magnitudes and domains. Judgments of SoR varied depending on the magnitude and domain of VH. These were accompanied by distinct motor, pupillometric and cardiac responses. Finally, sense of reality can be well explained by a computational model in which decisions of reality are based on comparison of current sensory experience to an internal model of the world. Our results shed some light on the age-old question ‘how do we know what is real’?
... A commonly studied instance of "lucid sleep" is that of lucid dreaming: to be aware of the fact that one is currently dreaming (Noreika et al., 2010;Van Eeden, 1913;Windt & Metzinger, 2007). In the past few years, the practice of lucid dreaming has become increasingly popular because it offers an extensive range of possibilities to the practitioners. ...
The scientific study of lucid sleep, defined as the ability to retain critical self-awareness during ongoing sleep, has traditionally focused on lucid dreaming and induction techniques that specifically target REM sleep. Recently, interest has grown to include other forms of lucid sleep, such as out-of-body experiences, sleep paralysis, and "witnessing-sleep" episodes described in Indian philosophical traditions. Empirical data on these states remain limited, primarily due to the lack of specific induction techniques designed for their study. In this case series study, we examine four individuals who reported lucid sleep episodes in a controlled laboratory setting, using a novel induction method combining pre-sleep meditation and visual stimulation. While this method requires future validation, we captured five lucid sleep episodes, including one instance of lucid dreamless sleep, one out-of-body-like experience, and three different types of lucid dreams. Sleep was monitored using wearable EEGs and submental EMGs. A detailed phenomenological analysis provided further context for these experiences, which were reported during both REM and non-REM sleep. Together, the induction protocol and findings described here may inform future research on lucid sleep and altered states of consciousness during sleep.
... 18 Incorporating and potentially adapting elements of MPI could help empirically address open research questions. For instance, while some definitions assume a sharp distinction between lucid and non-lucid dreams, theoretical considerations (Windt & Metzinger, 2007;Noreika et al., 2010) as well as recent evidence suggest that lucidity, rather than presenting an all-or-nothing phenomenon, might be better described on a continuum with non-lucid dreaming, and that it might make sense to distinguish between various degrees and subtypes of lucidity (Voss et al., 2013). Similarly, in a recent review, Baird et al. (2019) point out that advancing the cognitive neuroscience of lucid dreaming could benefit from a more careful phenomenological characterization of experiences related to at least two target "neural signatures" of lucid dreaming: one, the "'moment of lucidity'-that 17 The only two existing fMRI studies of lucid dreaming rely on just two signal-verified lucid dreaming episodes (Dresler et al., 2011(Dresler et al., , 2012. ...
In this chapter, we focus on the problem of dream reports at the intersection of dream research, the philosophy of dreaming, and first-person methods in consciousness science. We advance three proposals: (1) that the variability of methods and measures used in dream research influences research results; (2) that best-practice guidelines for the report-based study of experience in sleep (as well as in waking) can nonetheless be identified; and (3) that certain areas of dream research could benefit from more explicitly focusing on phenomenal (vs content or formal) features of dreaming. Drawing from the shared conceptual and methodological ground of dream research and consciousness science, we suggest that investigating the phenomenal features of dreaming could profit from the application of elements of first-person methods in consciousness research. We consider two specific interview methods: descriptive research sampling and micro-phenomenological interviews, discuss their applicability in dream research, and outline promising directions for future research.
... This is known as lucid dreaming (LaBerge, 1985). During lucid dreams, our ability to remember the conditions of our waking life, to deliberately act, reflect, and influence oneiric content is often increased 6 (Noreika et al., 2010;Windt & Metzinger, 2007). Lucid dreaming can result from the occurrence of PEs. ...
It is widely known that dreams can be strongly affected by traumatic events, but there may be other ways in which dreams relate to trauma. In this paper, we argue that different types of dreams could both contribute to trauma and alleviate it according to the prediction errors that occur either in dreams or in response to them after waking. A prediction error occurs when an experience contradicts one’s expectation and it is often accompanied by surprise. Prediction errors are involved in memory updating processes that can be long-lasting. Not only nightmares but also unpleasant, and surprisingly, even neutral and pleasant dreams have the potential to contribute to trauma, affecting our waking lives in a similar way to waking traumatic experiences. We postulate that certain dreams can also be beneficial for trauma alleviation. Further, clinical evidence suggests that working with prediction errors that occurred in dreams and during our response to dreams after waking can assist in alleviating the negative effects of trauma.
... This is known as lucid dreaming (LaBerge, 1985). During lucid dreams, our ability to remember the conditions of our waking life, to deliberately act, reflect, and influence oneiric content is often increased 6 (Noreika et al., 2010; Windt & Metzinger, 2007). Lucid dreaming can result from the occurrence of PEs. ...
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Germán Bonanni: Y después de la guerra... ¿Qué?
Why is dream memory so good? This loaded question appears to be based on an incorrect assumption, considering that bad memory of dreaming is, after all, well documented. However, whether dream memory is good or bad depends on what we compare these recollections to. Dream recollection is usually compared to memory of waking perceptual experiences, yet there is disagreement about whether this comparison is appropriate. Preliminary evidence suggests that dream memory is not bad compared to imagination memory and this may have implications for what it means to dream. Here we consider exactly how bad – or good – dream memory is compared to imagination that occurs while mindwandering and argue that while, prima facie, dream memory appears to provide an argument for the imagination model, this argument turns out to be unconvincing. There are many adverse conditions that would explain why memory of dreaming is worse than memory of waking events or hallucinations under the hallucination model. Further, if, as preliminary evidence might suggest, dream memory turns out to be somewhat better than imagination memory, this currently has no explanation under the imagination model. However, NREM dreams display the type of memory one might expect from imaginative dreaming. While the goodness or badness of memory in dreams should not be seen as a definitive argument for a particular model of dreaming, it should instead be taken as a piece of the broader landscape of abductive reasoning in this debate.
During most dreams, the dreamer does not realize that they are in a dream. In contrast, lucid dreaming allows to become aware of the current state of mind, often accompanied by considerable control over the ongoing dream episode. Lucid dreams can happen spontaneously or be induced through diverse behavioural, cognitive or technological strategies. Such induction techniques have spurred research into the potential therapeutic aspects of lucid dreams. In this review, we gather evidence on the link between lucid dreams and conditions like nightmare disorder, depression, anxiety, psychosis, and dissociative states, and explore the possible neurobiological basis of these associations. Furthermore, we delve into contemplative sleep practices that train lucid states during sleep, such as Dream/Sleep Yoga and Yoga Nidrâ. The potential drawbacks of lucid dreaming interventions are outlined, accompanied by an examination of the impacts of lucid dreams on individuals without clinical conditions. By shedding light on these intricate relationships, the review contributes to a deeper understanding of the therapeutic possibilities and implications of lucid dreaming.
This is a short sketch of some central ideas developed in my recent book Being No One (BNO hereafter). A more systematic summary, which focuses on short answers to a set of specific, individual questions is already contained in the book, namely as BNO section 8.2. Here, I deliberately and completely exclude all work related to semantically differentiating and empirically constraining the philosophical concept of a "quale" (mostly Chapter 2, 3 & 8), all proposals regarding conceptual foundations for the overall theory (2 & 5), all of the neurophenomenological case-studies used to test and refine it (4 & 7), and all remarks of a more general or methodological character (1 & 8). In particular, the present Précis does not follow the structure of the book. Instead, it simply sums up what the theory has to say about its three major epistemic targets, namely about consciousness (Section 2), the phenomenal self (Section 3), and the emergence of a first-person perspective (Section 4). The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (SMT hereafter) develops a constraint-satisfaction approach to phenomenal experience. It offers a catalogue of 10 constraints for conscious representations. I have here picked 6 out of the original 10 constraints and will go through them, in order to illustrate the general approach. Before doing so, I will now (Section 1) very briefly sketch what the present theory has to say about consciousness, the phenomenal self and the first-person perspective. We will then go into slightly more detail, by describing the relevant constraints (Sections 2, 3 & 4).
We hypothesized that counterfactual (CF) thought occurs in dreams and that cognitive operations in dreams function to identify a norm violation or novel outcome (recorded in episodic memory) and then to integrate this new content into memory by generating counterfactuals to the violation. In study 1 we compared counterfactual content in 50 dream reports, 50 pain memory reports and 50 pleasant memory reports (equated for word length) and found a significantly greater number of CFs in dream and in pain memory reports relative to pleasant memory reports. In study 2 we used a more liberal method for scoring CF content and analyzed 34 dream reports obtained from elderly individuals engaged in an ongoing study of neuropsychologic, health and religiosity variables. Study 2 also examined neuropsychologic associations to CF content variables. In the elderly sample and with our more liberal scoring procedures we found that norm violations along with counterfactual-like attempts to correct the violations occurred in 97% of reports. In 47% of these cases (roughly half of all reports), attempts to undo the violation obeyed at least one constraint on mutability typically observed in laboratory studies of CF processing. Cognitive operations associated with attempts to undo the norm violation (e.g. transforming focal actors or the most recent causal antecedent of the violation) were significantly correlated with measures of right frontal function. We conclude that dreaming may involve a process of learning from novel outcomes (particularly negative outcomes) by simulating alternative ways of handling these outcomes through counterfactual cognitive processes.
Counterfactual cognitive simulations are considerations of what might have been if what actually happened could be undone. I hypothesize that counterfactual thought is characteristic of dreams and that cognitive operations in dreams function to identify a norm violation recorded in autobiographical memory and then to re-instate normality in memory by generating counterfactuals to the violation. Dream counterfactuals therefore obey the same constraints on mutability as waking counterfactuals. Both dreaming and counterfactuals typically focus on the self, involve negative affect, and narrative form, promote problem solving and learning by running mental simulations and variations on a given problem theme, employ memory fragments in these various mental scenarios, plausibly rely on neural networks in right limbic and orbitofrontal cortices, and are largely automatic and pre-conscious operations.
We present evidence disputing the hypothesis that memories are processed or consolidated in REM sleep. A review of REM deprivation (REMD) studies in animals shows these reports to be about equally divided in showing that REMD does, or does not, disrupt learning/memory. The studies supporting a relationship between REM sleep and memory have been strongly criticized for the confounding effects of very stressful REM deprivation techniques. The three major classes of antidepressant drugs, monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs), tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs), and selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), profoundly suppress REM sleep. The MAOIs virtually abolish REM sleep, and the TCAs and SSRIs have been shown to produce immediate (40-85%) and sustained (30-50%) reductions in REM sleep. Despite marked suppression of REM sleep, these classes of antidepressants on the whole do not disrupt learning/memory. There have been a few reports of patients who have survived bilateral lesions of the pons with few lingering complications. Although these lesions essentially abolished REM sleep, the patients reportedly led normal lives. Recent functional imaging studies in humans have revealed patterns of brain activity in REM sleep that are consistent with dream processes but not with memory consolidation. We propose that the primary function of REM sleep is to provide periodic endogenous stimulation to the brain which serves to maintain requisite levels of central nervous system (CNS) activity throughout sleep. REM is the mechanism used by the brain to promote recovery from sleep. We believe that the cumulative evidence indicates that REM sleep serves no role in the processing or consolidation of memory.
Sleep can be addressed across the entire hierarchy of biological organization. We discuss neuronal-network and regional forebrain activity during sleep, and its consequences for consciousness and cognition. Complex interactions in thalamocortical circuits maintain the electroencephalographic oscillations of non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep. Functional neuroimaging affords views of the human brain in both NREM and REM sleep, and has informed new concepts of the neural basis of dreaming during REM sleep -- a state that is characterized by illogic, hallucinosis and emotionality compared with waking. Replay of waking neuronal activity during sleep in the rodent hippocampus and in functional images of human brains indicates possible roles for sleep in neuroplasticity. Different forms and stages of learning and memory might benefit from different stages of sleep and be subserved by different forebrain regions.
The activity that takes place in memory systems during sleep is likely to be related to the role of sleep in memory consolidation and learning, as well as to the generation of dream hallucinations. This study addressed the often-stated hypothesis that replay of whole episodic memories contributes to the multimodal hallucinations of sleep. Over a period of 14 days, 29 subjects kept a log of daytime activities, events, and concerns, wrote down any recalled dreams, and scored the dreams for incorporation of any waking experiences. While 65% of a total of 299 sleep mentation reports were judged to reflect aspects of recent waking life experiences, the episodic replay of waking events was found in no more than 1–2% of the dream reports. This finding has implications for understanding the unique memory processing that takes place during the night and is consistent with evidence that sleep has no role in episodic memory consolidation.
We live in a meaningful world. Our capacity to deal with the external world is constituted by the possibility of modifying the world by means of our actions; by the possibility of representing the world as an objective reality; and by the possibility of experiencing phenomenally this same objective reality, from a situated, self-conscious perspective. It is tempting to address these different articulations of the sense of being related to the world', of our intentional relation to the world, by using different languages, different methods of investigations, perhaps even different ontologies. In the present paper I will start to explore the possibility of reconciling some of these different articulations of intentionality from a neurobiological perspective
Several theories claim that dreaming is a random by-product of REM sleep physiology and that it does not serve any natural function. Phenomenal dream content, however, is not as disorganized as such views imply. The form and content of dreams is not random but organized and selective: during dreaming, the brain constructs a complex model of the world in which certain types of elements, when compared to waking life, are underrepresented whereas others are over represented. Furthermore, dream content is consistently and powerfully modulated by certain types of waking experiences. On the basis of this evidence, I put forward the hypothesis that the biological function of dreaming is to simulate threatening events, and to rehearse threat perception and threat avoidance. To evaluate this hypothesis, we need to consider the original evolutionary context of dreaming and the possible traces it has left in the dream content of the present human population. In the ancestral environment human life was short and full of threats. Any behavioral advantage in dealing with highly dangerous events would have increased the probability of reproductive success. A dream-production mechanism that tends to select threatening waking events and simulate them over and over again in various combinations would have been valuable for the development and maintenance of threat-avoidance skills. Empirical evidence from normative dream content, children's dreams, recurrent dreams, nightmares, post traumatic dreams, and the dreams of hunter-gatherers indicates that our dream-production mechanisms are in fact specialized in the simulation of threatening events, and thus provides support to the threat simulation hypothesis of the function of dreaming.
Recent neuroimaging studies show that human rapid-eye-movement (REM) sleep is characterized by a specific pattern of regional brain activity. Although this is usually interpreted in relation to physiological and cellular mechanisms, the specific regional distribution of brain activity during REM sleep might also be linked to specific dream features. Remarkably, several bizarre features of normal dreams have similarities with well-known neuropsychological syndromes after brain damage, such as delusional misidentifications for faces and places. We propose that neuropsychological analysis of dream content might offer new ways of interpreting neuroimaging maps of sleep, and make specific predictions for future neuroimaging studies.
Experimental data indicate a role for the prefrontal cortex in mediating normal sleep physiology, dreaming and sleep-deprivation phenomena. During nonrandom-eye-movement (NREM) sleep, frontal cortical activity is characterized by the highest voltage and the slowest brain waves compared to other cortical regions. The differences between the self-awareness experienced in waking and its diminution in dreaming can be explained by deactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during REM sleep. Here, we propose that this deactivation results from a direct inhibition of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortical neurons by acetylcholine, the release of which is enhanced during REM sleep. Sleep deprivation influences frontal executive functions in particular, which further emphasizes the sensitivity of the prefrontal cortex to sleep.