Mental Contrasting of Future and Reality: Managing the Demands of Everyday Life in Health Care Professionals

Abstract

Mental contrasting of a desired future with present reality leads to expectancy-dependent goal commitments, whereas focusing on the desired future only makes people commit to goals regardless of their high or low expectations for success. In the present brief intervention we randomly assigned middle-level managers (
N = 52) to two conditions. Participants in one condition were taught to use mental contrasting regarding their everyday concerns, while participants in the other condition were taught to indulge. Two weeks later, participants in the mental-contrasting condition reported to have fared better in managing their time and decision making during everyday life than those in the indulging condition. By helping people to set expectancy-dependent goals, teaching the metacognitive strategy of mental contrasting can be a cost- and time-effective tool to help people manage the demands of their everyday life. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Full text

Original Article
Mental Contrasting of Future
and Reality
Managing the Demands of Everyday Life
in Health Care Professionals
Gabriele Oettingen,
1,2
Doris Mayer,
2
and Babette Brinkmann
3
1
Department of Psychology, New York University, NY, USA,
2
Department of Psychology, University of
Hamburg, Germany,
3
Department of Psychology, University of Heidelberg, Germany
Abstract. Mental contrasting of a desired future with present reality leads to expectancy-dependent goal commitments, whereas focusing on the
desired future only makes people commit to goals regardless of their high or low expectations for success. In the present brief intervention we
randomly assigned middle-level managers (N= 52) to two conditions. Participants in one condition were taught to use mental contrasting
regarding their everyday concerns, while participants in the other condition were taught to indulge. Two weeks later, participants in the mental-
contrasting condition reported to have fared better in managing their time and decision making during everyday life than those in the indulging
condition. By helping people to set expectancy-dependent goals, teaching the metacognitive strategy of mental contrasting can be a cost- and
time-effective tool to help people manage the demands of their everyday life.
Keywords: motivation, mental contrasting, goals, self-regulation, time management, health care professionals, thinking about the future
People commit to goals that are feasible and desirable
(Ajzen, 1991; Atkinson, 1957; Bandura, 1997; Gollwitzer,
1990; Locke & Latham, 2002; meta-analysis by Klein,
Wesson, Hollenbeck, & Alge, 1999). Whether or not a goal
is desirable in turn depends on its short- and long-term con-
sequences, whether or not a goal is feasible relies on judg-
ments about future events and behaviors (Heckhausen,
1977). These judgments may refer to being able to perform
goal-directed behaviors (i.e., self-efficacy expectations;
Bandura, 1997), to outcomes of goal-directed behaviors
(i.e., outcome expectations; Bandura, 1997; instrumentality
beliefs, Vroom, 1964), and to specific outcomes (i.e., gen-
eral expectations; Oettingen & Mayer, 2002). Desirability
and feasibility not only affect the strength of goal commit-
ment, but also the strength of subsequent goal striving
(Bandura, 1997; Klinger, 1975; Latham & Locke, 2007).
Self-regulation approaches to goal pursuit (summary by
Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2001) examine the processes by
which desirability and feasibility translate into goal attain-
ment. These processes explain why high desirability and
feasibility beliefs do not guarantee the emergence of strong
goal commitments, and why strong goal commitments do
not guarantee effective goal striving. They differentiate
between self-regulation strategies that create strong goal
commitments versus those that translate strong goal commit-
ments into effective goal striving. Well-researched strategies
of effective goal striving include shielding a desirable goal
from competing goal pursuits (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994),
planning the implementation of goal-directed actions by
if-then plans (Gollwitzer, 1999) or mental simulations
(Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998), preventing overex-
tension (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998),
and controlling relevant emotions (Koole & Jostmann,
2004). Heckhausen and Kuhl (1985) postulate five criteria
for desirability and feasibility before people commit to a
goal: Is there an Opportunity to act, Time to act, is goal
attainment Important and Urgent, and are there Means for
goal attainment (OTIUM)? In addition, people feel more
committed when they have chosen their own goals and
when they adopt assigned goals as their own (Locke &
Latham, 2002). In the same vein, falsely ascribing assigned
goals to oneself fosters goal commitment (Kuhl & Kaze´n,
1994). Still, people do not freely commit to every goal that
meets these criteria.
Thus Oettingen (2000) has pointed out that mental con-
trasting of future and reality rather than indulging in the
future is an effective strategy to regulate one’s goal commit-
ments. The present brief intervention study analyzes whether
health care professionals can be taught mental contrasting
versus indulging as metacognitive strategies to regulate their
goal commitments. We hypothesized that mental contrasting
is more successful in helping participants to manage the
stresses of everyday life than indulging as the former is an
effective strategy to select feasible and desirable goals.
Journal of Personnel Psychology 2010; Vol. 9(3):138–144
DOI: 10.1027/1866-5888/a000018
Ó2010 Hogrefe Publishing

Mentally Contrasting Future and Reality
When people use the self-regulation strategy of mental con-
trasting (Oettingen, 2000; Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter,
2001; Oettingen et al., 2009), they imagine a desired future
(e.g., excelling in academic or professional achievement)
and then reflect on the current reality that stands in the
way of reaching that future (e.g., obstacles or temptations
such as having little time or being distracted). When feasibil-
ity (expectations of success) is high, elaborating both future
and reality makes them simultaneously accessible and links
them together. Now the reality is seen as an obstacle to real-
izing the desired future. When feasibility is low, future and
reality are disconnected as the reality is seen as insurmount-
able (Kappes & Oettingen, 2010). Therefore, mental con-
trasting helps to decide whether to commit to the goal of
realizing the future or not. It creates either energization
and strong goal commitments or de-energization and weak
goal commitments (Oettingen et al., 2009). On the contrary,
only focusing on the desired future (indulging) should fail to
create expectancy-dependent commitment as the reality is
not perceived as an obstacle to realizing the future. Indulg-
ing should leave the a priori commitment of the person
untouched (Oettingen et al., 2001, 2009; Oettingen, Mayer,
Thorpe, Janetzke, & Lorenz, 2005).
Mental contrasting versus indulging differ in line with
Metcalfe and Mischel’s (1999) distinction between hot and
cool self-regulation systems. As mental contrasting depicts
the reality as standing in the way of the desired future it should
activate the cool system. On the contrary, by focusing on the
desired future indulging should activate the hot system. Using
continuous magnetoencephalography, a brain-imaging tech-
nique measuring magnetic fields produced by electrical
activity in the brain, Achtziger, Fehr, Oettingen, Gollwitzer,
and Rockstroh (2009) showed that mental contrasting,
unlike indulging and resting, implicates brain activity in areas
associated with working and episodic memory,i ntention main-
tenance and action preparation, as well as vivid visualization.
Accordingly, mental contrasting more than indulging should
enable people to recognize feasibility issues that are based
on experiences in the past when committing to goals.
A series of experiments supports these hypotheses (sum-
mary by Oettingen & Stephens, 2009). Participants were
randomly assigned to either mentally elaborate both the
desired future and present reality (mental-contrasting condi-
tion) or only the desired future (indulging condition). In one
experiment, adolescent students had to elaborate the future
of excelling in mathematics (participants imagined e.g.,
pride, job prospects) with a negative reality (participants
reflected on e.g., being distracted, feeling lazy) or indulge
in the desired future only. Two weeks after the experiment,
students in the mental-contrasting condition who had ini-
tially felt they could excel in mathematics received better
effort evaluations and course grades than in the indulging
condition. The same was true for school children who
learned a foreign language, in students wanting to solve
an interpersonal problem, and in students wanting to get
to know an attractive stranger. The results held for commit-
ments measured via self-report or observations, directly after
the experiment or weeks later. Mental contrasting is an easy-
to-apply self-regulation tool, as the described effects showed
up even when participants elaborated the future and the
reality very briefly (Oettingen, 2000; Oettingen, Ho¨nig, &
Gollwitzer, 2000; Oettingen et al., 2001, 2009).
In all of these studies, mental contrasting led to strong
goal commitments when feasibility was high, but also
prevented wasting valuable resources when feasibility was
low, thus allocating energy to pursue alternative, more feasi-
ble projects (Janoff-Bulman & Brickman, 1982; Klinger,
1975). As expectations reflect past experiences (Bandura,
1977, 1997; Mischel, 1973), mental contrasting creates goal
commitments based on performances in the past. Thus it
leads to discriminative skills (Mischel, 1973) that are benefi-
cial in everyday life: It trains people only to get involved
where past experiences predict further successes. Indulging
in the positive future, on the contrary, leads to commitment
irrespective of expectations of success, and thus disconnects
a person from his/her past experience. It therefore provokes
too much investment in unfeasible goals, and too little invest-
ment in feasible ones, thus potentially wasting resources.
Indeed, futile goal pursuit breeds negative affect (Higgins,
Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994), anxiety (Pomerantz, Saxon,
& Oishi, 2000), mental problems and physical exhaus-
tion (Baumeister et al., 1998; Emmons, 1996), and low
well-being (Brunstein, 1993; Strauman et al., 2006).
Mental Contrasting Versus Indulging
as Metacognitive Strategies: A Brief
Intervention
Previous work on mental contrasting has investigated its
effects in experimental paradigms that directed participants’
thoughts at a predefined desired future, and then assessed
the effects on commitments to realizing the very same future.
For example, future thoughts pertained to excelling in
mathematics or to solving a specified interpersonal concern
(Oettingen et al., 2001). Consequently, dependent variables
were higher math grades and specific actions taken. In the
present study, we explored whether we could teach partici-
pants to apply mental contrasting versus indulging strategies
to all sorts of everyday wishes and concerns. Specifically,
we randomly assigned participants to two conditions. In one
condition we taught how to mentally contrast, in the other
how to indulge. Then all participants were encouraged to
apply thestrategies theyhad learned to their own idiosyncratic
everyday concerns. Thus we taught individuals how to control
their own mental processes, a way of thinking that has been
described as metacognition (Brinol & DeMarree, in press;
Flavell, 1979; Metcalfe, 2003) or higher order executive
processes (Sternberg, 1997). Such metacognitive strategies
enable people to direct and control their own mentalprocesses
(Nelson & Narens, 1994).
In addition, the present brief intervention fulfills recent
recommendations that extensive and multimodal interven-
tions in behavior change be replaced by more targeted and
theory-driven approaches. That is, instead of teaching a vari-
ety of self-management techniques (Frayne & Geringer,
2000; Uhl-Bien & Graen, 1998), we taught self-regulation
G. Oettingen et al.: Mental Contrasting and Managing Everyday Life 139
Ó2010 Hogrefe Publishing Journal of Personnel Psychology 2010; Vol. 9(3):138–144

strategies that would specifically target engaging and disen-
gaging from goals. However, our study also differs from
more specified goal-related interventions in that we do not
tell people how to strive for an a priori defined goal (e.g.,
weight control, Stice, Shaw, & Marti, 2006; alcohol control,
Lock, 2004; forgiveness, Harris et al., 2006, see also Webb
& Sheeran, 2006), but teach people how to apply the strat-
egies of mental contrasting versus indulging to their own
daily concerns and behaviors that may vary in specificity,
proximity, content, scope (Latham & Locke, 2007), and
framing (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Higgins, 1997).
Consequently, rather than focusing on outcome variables
pertaining to single concerns, we measured variables of gen-
eral success in managing everyday life. Specifically, two
weeks after the intervention we asked how well participants
had managed their most precious resource: Time. Second,
based on Sternberg’s triarchic model of intelligence
(1997), we measured the three different determinants of
developing practical abilities: Adaptation, shaping of exist-
ing environments, and selection of different environments.
Participants had to report about their success in relinquishing
projects (adaptation), completing projects (shaping), and
making decisions (selection). These indicators of effective
resource management have also been used in other research
traditions such as when predicting well-being in institutions
(Frayne & Geringer, 2000) or over the life span (Brandt-
sta¨dter, Wentura, & Rothermund, 1999).
We chose full-time employed middle-level health care
managers as participants in our study because professional
development in this high-stress career path demands strong
resource management. The career path is characterized by
plentiful and often conflicting demands from superiors and
subordinates and by high responsibility in contrast to rela-
tively low authority (Cobb, 1976). In the health care profes-
sion (review by McVicar, 2003), high workload and time
pressure, especially in light of low provision resources,
relate to psychological distress and somatic complaints;
the same is true for an imbalance of high effort and low
rewards (Gelsema, van der Doef, Maes, Akerboom, &
Verhoeven, 2005; Siegrist, 1996; review by Dollard,
LaMontagne, Caulfield, Blewett, & Shaw, 2004). Also, lack
of organization and communication at work hampers job
satisfaction and increases emotional exhaustion. Thus mid-
dle-level health care managers should greatly benefit from
being taught a self-regulation strategy that helps them cope
with the host of demands in their everyday work life.
Method
Participants and Design
A total of 52 middle-level personnel managers (34 women,
11 men, 7 did not specify gender) working in various units
of four large hospitals in Germany participated in groups of
5–7. Their mean age was 42 years (SD = 7.48), ranging
from 26 to 59 years. We randomly assigned participants to
one of the two experimental conditions: a mental-contrasting
condition and an indulging condition. We trained them in
either mental contrasting or indulging, by targeting their
own everyday problems. Participation was voluntary and
the training took place during work hours.
Procedure
The female experimenter greeted participants and explained
that the current practice session was part of a larger investi-
gation analyzing the importance of free thoughts and images
in everyday life. She gave an overview of the procedure,
assured confidentiality, and stressed that participation was
voluntary. To guarantee anonymity, the experimenter
requested participants to write down a personal code instead
of their names. She informed participants that after the initial
three-step practice session, she would ask them to fill out a
booklet with daily reminders for a period of 14 days to help
them rehearse what they had learned. Participants were
alerted to the importance of this daily exercise. Finally, the
experimenter told them that two weeks after the practice ses-
sion she would invite them to fill out a final questionnaire.
After these general instructions, participants started with
the first part of the practice session by indicating their pres-
ently most important personal problem. They named, for
example, conflict with an employee, writing a report, or com-
ing up with a proposal. Participants then had to list four posi-
tive aspects that they associated with their problem coming to
a happy ending and four negative aspects of reality that stood
in the way of their problem coming to a happy ending. There-
after, participants received a large blank sheet of paper where
they were supposed to draw four large thought bubbles from
the top to the bottom of the page. Participants were told to
write their thoughts and mental images into the thought bub-
bles. Participants in the mental-contrasting condition had to
elaborate in writing two positive aspects of a happy ending
to their problem and two negative aspects of reality that stand
in the way of a happy ending, in alternating order, beginning
with a positive aspect of the desired future. Participants in the
indulging condition elaborated in writing four positive
aspects associated with a happy ending to their problem.
To practice the procedures of mental contrasting versus
indulging, participants in the second step of the training ses-
sion had to generate as many pressing professional and pri-
vate everyday problems as possible. These problems had to
be quite controllable, but had to make them feel clearly
uneasy. Each participant named at least 20 such problems
or concerns, they named for example, being assertive in a
meeting, visiting a mother, canceling the contract of a
coworker, throwing a dinner party. Depending on the
conditions, they then had to either mentally contrast or
indulge with respect to the first six of these problems: the
first problem in writing and the other five in their mind.
Finally, in the third part of the practice session, all partic-
ipants received a booklet where three pages were available
for each day of the upcoming two weeks. On the first page
of Day 1, participants had to indicate the problem of the day
that made them feel most uneasy. Instructions were the
following:
140 G. Oettingen et al.: Mental Contrasting and Managing Everyday Life
Journal of Personnel Psychology 2010; Vol. 9(3):138–144 Ó2010 Hogrefe Publishing

Please name today’s professional or private problem that
makes you feel most uneasy. If you have more than one,
please name the problem that is associated with the strongest
feelings of uneasiness. The problem that makes me feel most
uneasy today is __________________________________.
On the second page of Day 1, participants in the men-
tal-contrasting condition had to jot down and then elabo-
rate in writing a positive future keyword and a negative
reality keyword pertaining to the named problem. In the
indulging condition, participants had to jot down and men-
tally elaborate two positive future keywords. On the third
page of Day 1, we told participants that for other projects
or problems of the day, they should mentally elaborate the
respective keywords in their minds whenever those prob-
lems appeared or when participants had a good opportunity
to do so (e.g., while waiting for the bus or when walking
home).
Two weeks later the experimenter approached partici-
pants again and handed them a short questionnaire assessing
the dependent variables. After completion of this question-
naire, we fully debriefed participants about the purpose of
the study. We also offered a practice session in mental con-
trasting should participants in the indulging condition want
to learn it, and provided extensive information to all partic-
ipants about further strategies to manage everyday problems
and daily hassles.
Dependent Variables
In the follow-up questionnaire, we measured the indicators
of resource management and of the development of practical
intelligence described above. Specifically, participants
reported about their time management: ‘‘How successful
were you in the past two weeks in organizing your time?’’
The answer scale ranged from 1 (not at all)to7(very). Par-
ticipants also reported relinquished projects: ‘‘How many
tasks or projects did you relinquish in the past two weeks?’’,
and on their completed projects: ‘‘How many tasks or pro-
jects which are long overdue did you complete in the last
two weeks?’’ The answer scales ranged from 1 (none at
all)to7(very many). Finally, we asked ‘‘Compared to pre-
vious experiences, how easy was it for you in the past two
weeks to make decisions?’’ Again, the answer scale ranged
from 1 (notatall)to7(very). Of the total number of partic-
ipants (N= 52), 45 (23 in the mental-contrasting condition
and 22 in the indulging condition) completed the final ques-
tionnaire as well as the booklet (for at least half of the
assigned days, i.e., 6 days in total). Thus, the following anal-
yses include 45 participants.
Results
Descriptive Analyses
Means and standard deviations are provided in Table 1. As
predicted, the dependent variable time management did not
correlate with project relinquishment (r=.11,p= .47), pro-
ject completion (r=.23,p= .14), or with ease of making
decisions (r= .05, p= .76). Project relinquishment did not
correlate with project completion (r= .07, p= .66), or ease
of making decisions (r=.18,p= .19), and project comple-
tion did not correlate with ease of making decisions
(r=.003, p= .99). These low correlations support the
notion that the dependent variables assessed distinct aspects
of resource management and of the development of practical
intelligence (see also Sternberg, 1988, 1997).
Management of Everyday Life
Two weeks after the practice session, participants in the
mental-contrasting condition reported more success in man-
aging their time than those in the indulging condition,
F(1, 43) = 8.38, p< .007. They also reported more success
in relinquishing projects, F(1, 43) = 6.24, p< .02 (Figure 1,
left bars) and in completing projects, F(1, 43) = 3.24,
p< .04 (one-tailed). Finally, compared to participants in
the indulging condition, participants in the mental-contrast-
ing condition experienced an easier time making decisions,
F(1, 43) = 5.28, p< .03 (Figure 1, right bars).
Discussion
The present brief intervention shows that people can be
trained to use mental contrasting in a short practice session
and then readily apply it to the various problems they are
confronted with during their everyday life. In comparison
to participants in the indulging condition, those in the men-
tal-contrasting condition reported having solved problems in
their everyday life more successfully. They reported success
Table 1. Correlations, Ms, and SDs for the relevant variables (N= 52)
Variables M(SD)123
1. Time management 4.87 (1.44) –
2. Project relinquishment 2.52 (1.14) .11 –
3. Project completion 4.02 (1.62) .23 .07 –
4. Ease of deciding 4.71 (1.41) .05 .18 .003
G. Oettingen et al.: Mental Contrasting and Managing Everyday Life 141
Ó2010 Hogrefe Publishing Journal of Personnel Psychology 2010; Vol. 9(3):138–144

in managing their time, making decisions, and mastering
their projects by letting some go and completing others.
Mental Contrasting Versus Indulging
as Metacognitive Strategies: Processes
We do not know which exact processes were responsible for
the differential effects of teaching mental contrasting versus
indulging as metacognitive strategies. Based on past
research that mental contrasting leads to expectancy-depen-
dent goal commitments, we speculate that by applying men-
tal contrasting, our participants may have relinquished those
projects where chances of success were low, thus avoiding
psychological distress of pursuing unfeasible goals. To the
contrary, when chances of success were high, mental con-
trasting may have led participants to vigorously pursue
and complete feasible projects. We speculate that mental
contrasting eased the burden of unpromising and multiple
projects and thus helped the health care professionals to
manage their everyday lives.
Certainly, our results may have stemmed from other pro-
cesses than deciding on feasible projects. For example, par-
ticipants in the two conditions may have differed in the
frequency of using the strategies and they may have applied
them to different types of concerns. Thus future research
should assess the frequency of use as well as record the
types of concerns in each condition. In addition, participants
in the two conditions might have differed in the amount of
advice and instrumental help sought from others. Responses
from participants’ colleagues and supervisors should yield
clues to what extent such help may have contributed to com-
pleting projects and easing decisions.
Further, in the present study we did not measure the
baseline of our outcome variables. Thus the data are silent
about change over time. In fact, participants in both condi-
tions may have benefited in the management of their every-
day problems which would imply that in the present paper
we underestimated the beneficial effects of mental contrast-
ing. Future studies should check this possibility.
Mental Contrasting Versus Indulging
as Metacognitive Strategies: Consequences
We also do not know which aspects of our dependent vari-
ables were differentially affected by participants being
taught mental contrasting versus indulging. For example,
mental contrasting and indulging might have differentially
affected time management in terms of taking notes, planning
meetings, or organizing work materials (Green & Skinner,
2005); they might have differentially influenced relinquish-
ing projects in terms of postponing, delegating, or letting go
of projects; mental contrasting may have fostered comple-
tion of projects by changing standards, working faster, or
working more effectively. Finally, they may have differen-
tiallyaffecteddecisionmakingbypromotingproblemsolv-
ing skills, fostering insight, or strengthening people’s
assertiveness. Previous research has supported differential
effects of mental contrasting versus indulging on all these
variables (summary by Oettingen & Stephens, 2009).
In the present study, we focused on indicators of goal
commitment as measured by single-source self-report mea-
sures of relevant behavior. Future research should use multi-
ple source data and assess behavioral consequences as
measured by more objective indicators. For example, one
may assess persistence in pursuing daily chores, job absen-
teeism, or productivity and creativity (e.g., as reported by
peers and supervisors) and physiological and nonverbal indi-
cators of effective stress management (e.g., systolic blood
pressure; Oettingen et al., 2009; gestures, postures, facial
movements; Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2009). Finally, the
study is silent about the downstream effects on performance
and well-being. We speculate that teaching mental contrast-
ing, since it has been found to make people commit to fea-
sible goals and drop unfeasible goals, should equip people to
manage their everyday life in a more self-disciplined way.
Self-discipline, characterized by control over impulses,
thought, emotion, and behavior, should then lead to high
achievement and increased well-being as well as job satis-
faction (Duckworth & Seligman, 2005; Kahneman, Diener,
& Schwarz, 1999; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004).
Importantly, however, the present research adds to the lit-
erature in that we established a brief intervention to induce
mental contrasting versus indulging as metacognitive strate-
gies (Brinol & DeMarree, in press; Flavell, 1979; Metcalfe,
2003) or higher order executive processes (Sternberg, 1997).
We observed that health care managers in the mental-con-
trasting condition more effectively managed their time and
decision making than those in the indulging condition.
Benefits of Teaching Mental Contrasting
Teaching mental contrasting made people take action to
relinquish some projects and complete others. Accordingly,
mental contrasting may be an effective self-regulation tool
Figure 1. Mean values depict the difference between the
mental contrasting and the indulging condition in suc-
cessful time management (left), project relinquishment
(middle left), project completion (middle right), and ease
of deciding (right).
142 G. Oettingen et al.: Mental Contrasting and Managing Everyday Life
Journal of Personnel Psychology 2010; Vol. 9(3):138–144 Ó2010 Hogrefe Publishing

to ensure that people commit themselves only to a manage-
able number of relatively promising goals. Although mental
contrasting demands the performance of a series of relatively
complex cognitive procedures in a specific order, it still can
be easily learned and applied. Learning how to use mental
contrasting rather than elaborating only the desired future
would provide people with the opportunity to actively deter-
mine whether or not to commit to specific endeavors,
depending on their prospects. We observed that teaching
mental contrasting versus indulging produced the predicted
effects within the two-week period of the study. Future stud-
ies should assess to what extent such effects can be main-
tained over time, beyond setbacks and first successes.
Assuming that mental contrasting benefited time
management and project selection in line with feasibility
concerns, one may speculate that the metacognitive strat-
egy of mental contrasting may be more beneficial for some
participants than for others. For example, one may argue
that individuals prone to negative feelings or depression
(who are inclined to generate projects of low feasibility)
may suffer from being taught mental contrasting as it
fosters disengagement. Precisely such disengagement, how-
ever, may also liberate a person to subsequently pursue
more feasible endeavors (Klinger, 1978; Strauman, 2002),
at least as long as such opportunities exist. This consider-
ation has the following implications, however: if relin-
quishment is not an option because there are no feasible
alternatives, then indulging in the desired future should
be a helpful self-regulation strategy because it guarantees
that individuals stay engaged at least to a moderate degree
(Oettingen & Stephens, 2009).
Finally, our findings are silent with respect to whether
people have a predilection for mental contrasting versus
indulging, and if so, which factors influence such a predilec-
tion. We speculate that the kind of problems people face dur-
ing their everyday life might play a role. Individuals whose
everyday life demands separating the feasible from the
unfeasible (e.g., pilots, air traffic controllers, doctors, police-
men) might be those who predominantly engage in mental
contrasting, while people whose everyday life brings unsure
gratification (e.g., musicians, artists) or bleak prospects (e.g.,
social workers) may engage more in indulging (Oettingen,
1997). Thus the professional context of health care manage-
ment may work in two ways: It may foster the predilection
to mentally contrast, but in turn will benefit from mental
contrasting as mental contrasting fosters successful mastery
of its everyday demands and challenges.
Acknowledgment
Preparation of this article was supported by German Science
Foundation Grant Oe-237/5-1 awarded to the first author.
References
Achtziger, A., Fehr, T., Oettingen, G., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Rockstroh,
B. (2009). Strategies of intention formation are reflected in
continuous MEG activity. Social Neuroscience, 4, 11–27.
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50, 179–211.
Atkinson, J. W. (1957). Motivational determinants of risk-taking
behavior. Psychological Review, 64, 359–372.
Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of
behavioral change. Psychological Review, 84, 191–215.
Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of control.
New York, NY: Freeman.
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M.
(1998). Ego depletion: Is the active self a limited resource?
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1252–1265.
Brandtsta¨dter, J., Wentura, D., & Rothermund, K. (1999).
Intentional self-development through adulthood and later
life: Tenacious pursuit and flexible adjustment to goals. In
J. Brandtsta¨ dter & R. M. Lerner (Eds.), Action and self-
development: Theory and research through the life span
(pp. 315–342). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Brinol, P., & DeMarree, K. (in press). Social meta-cognition.
Frontiers of social psychology series. New York, NY:
Psychology Press.
Brunstein, J. C. (1993). Personal goals and subjective well-
being: A longitudinal study. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 65, 1061–1070.
Cobb, S. (1976). Social support as a moderator of life stress.
Psychosomatic Medicine, 38, 300–314.
Dollard, M. F., LaMontagne, A. D., Caulfield, N., Blewett, V., &
Shaw, A. (2007). Job stress in the Australian and international
health and community services sector: A review of the literature.
International Journal of Stress Management, 14, 417–445.
Duckworth, A. L., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2005). Self-discipline
outdoes IQ in predicting academic performance of adoles-
cents. Psychological Science, 16, 939–944.
Dweck, C. S., & Leggett, E. L. (1988). A social-cognitive
approach to motivation and personality. Psychological
Review, 95, 256–273.
Emmons, R. A. (1996). Striving and feeling: Personal goals and
subjective well-being. In J. Bargh & P. M. Gollwitzer (Eds.),
The psychology of action: Linking motivation and cognition
to behavior (pp. 314–337). New York, NY: Guilford.
Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring:
A new area of cognitive-developmental inquiry. American
Psychologist, 34, 906–911.
Frayne, C. A., & Geringer, J. M. (2000). Self-management training
for improving job performance: A field experiment involving
salespeople. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 361–372.
Gelsema, T. I., van der Doef, M., Maes, S., Akerboom, S., &
Verhoeven, C. (2005). Job stress in the nursing profession:
The influence of organizational and environmental conditions
and job characteristics. International Journal of Stress
Management, 12, 222–240.
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1990). Action phases and mind-sets. In E. T.
Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation
and cognition (Vol. 2, pp. 53–92). New York, NY: Guilford
Press.
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1999). Implementation intentions: Strong
effects of simple plans. American Psychologist, 54, 493–503.
Green, P., & Skinner, D. (2005). Does time management training
work? An evaluation. International Journal of Training and
Development, 9, 124–139.
Harris, A. H. S., Luskin, F., Norman, S. B., Standard, S., Bruning,
J., Evans, S., & Thoresen, C. E. (2006). Effects of a group
forgiveness intervention on forgiveness, perceived stress, and
trait-anger. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 62, 715–733.
Heckhausen, H. (1977). Achievement motivation and its constructs:
A cognitive model. Motivation and Emotion, 1, 283–329.
Heckhausen, H., & Kuhl, J. (1985). From wishes to action: The
dead ends and short cuts on the long way to action. In M. Frese
& J. Sabini (Eds.), Goal directed behavior: The conception of
action in psychology (pp. 134–159). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
G. Oettingen et al.: Mental Contrasting and Managing Everyday Life 143
Ó2010 Hogrefe Publishing Journal of Personnel Psychology 2010; Vol. 9(3):138–144

Higgins, E. T. (1997). Beyond pleasure and pain. American
Psychologist, 52, 1280–1300.
Higgins, E. T., Roney, C. J. R., Crowe, E., & Hymes, C. (1994).
Ideal versus ought predilections for approach and avoidance
distinct self-regulatory systems. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 66, 276–286.
Janoff-Bulman, R., & Brickman, P. (1982). Expectations and
what people learn from failure. In N. T. Feather (Ed.),
Expectations and actions: Expectancy-value models in
psychology (pp. 207–237). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Kahneman, D., Diener, E., & Schwarz, N. (1999). Well-being: The
foundations of hedonic psychology.NewYork,NY:RussellSage.
Kappes, A., & Oettingen, G. (2010). From wishes to goals:
Mental contrasting connects future and reality. Manuscript in
preparation.
Klein, H. J., Wesson, M. J., Hollenbeck, J. R., & Alge, B. J.
(1999). Goal commitment and the goal setting process:
Conceptual clarification and empirical synthesis. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 64, 885–896.
Klinger, E. (1975). Consequences of commitment to and
disengagement from incentives. Psychological Review, 82, 1–25.
Klinger, E. (1978). Modes of normal conscious flow. In K. S.
Pope & J. L. Singer (Eds.), The stream of consciousness:
Scientific investigations into the flow of human experience
(pp. 225–258). New York, NY: Plenum Press.
Koole, S. L., & Jostmann, N. B. (2004). Getting a grip on your
feelings: Effects of action orientation and external demands
on intuitive affect. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 87, 974–990.
Kuhl, J., & Beckmann, J. (Eds.). (1994). Volition and personality:
Action versus states orientation. Seattle, WA: Hogrefe and Huber.
Kuhl, J., & Kaze´ n, M. (1994). Self-discrimination and memory:
State-orientation and false self-ascription of assigned activities.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 1103–1115.
Latham, G. P., & Locke, E. A. (2007). New developments in and
directions for goal setting research. European Psychologist,
12, 290–300.
Lock, C. A. (2004). Screening and brief alcohol interventions:
What, why, who, where and when? A review of the literature.
Journal of Substance Use, 9, 91–101.
Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (2002). Building a practically
useful theory of goal setting and task motivation: A 35-year
odyssey. American Psychologist, 57, 705–717.
McVicar, A. (2003). Workplace stress in nursing: A literature
review. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 44, 633–642.
Metcalfe, J. (2003). Drawing the line on metacognition. Behav-
ioral and Brain Sciences, 26, 350–351.
Metcalfe, J., & Mischel, W. (1999). A hot/cool system analysis of
delay of gratification: Dynamics of willpower. Psychological
Review, 106, 3–19.
Mischel, W. (1973). Toward a cognitive social learning reconcep-
tualization of personality. Psychological Review, 80, 252–283.
Nelson, T. O., & Narens, L. (1994). Why investigate metacog-
nition? In J. Metcalfe & A. P. Shimamura (Eds.), Metacog-
nition (pp. 1–26). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Oettingen, G. (1997). Culture and future thought. Culture &
Psychology, 3, 353–381.
Oettingen, G. (2000). Expectancy effects on behavior depend on
self-regulator thought. Social Cognition, 18, 101–129.
Oettingen, G. & Gollwitzer, P. M. (2001). Goal setting and goal
striving. In A. Tesser, N. Schwarz (Vol. Eds.), M. Hewstone,
& M. Brewer (Series Eds.), Intraindividual processes.
Volume 1 of the Blackwell handbook in social psychology
(pp. 329–347). Oxford, England: Blackwell.
Oettingen, G., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (2009). Embodied goal pursuit.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 39, 1210–1213.
Oettingen, G., Ho¨nig, G., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (2000). Effective
self-regulation of goal attainment. International Journal of
Educational Research, 33, 705–732.
Oettingen, G., & Mayer, D. (2002). The motivating function of
thinking about the future: Expectations versus fantasies.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1198–1212.
Oettingen, G., Mayer, D., Sevincer, A. T., Stephens, E. J., Pak,
H., & Hagenah, M. (2009). Mental contrasting and goal
commitment: The mediating role of energization. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 608–622.
Oettingen, G., Mayer, D., Thorpe, J. S., Janetzke, H., & Lorenz,
S. (2005). Turning fantasies about positive and negative
futures into self-improvement goals. Motivation and Emo-
tion, 29, 237–267.
Oettingen, G., Pak, H., & Schnetter, K. (2001). Self-regulation of goal
setting: Turning free fantasies about the future into binding goals.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 736–753.
Oettingen, G., & Stephens, E. J. (2009). Fantasies and motiva-
tionally intelligent goal setting. In G. B. Moskowitz & H.
Grant (Eds.), The psychology of goals (pp. 153–178).
New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Pomerantz, E. M., Saxon, J. L., & Oishi, S. (2000). The
psychological trade-offs of goal investment. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 617–630.
Siegrist, J. (1996). Adverse health effects of high-effort/
low-reward conditions. Journal of Occupational Health
Psychology, 1, 27–41.
Sternberg, R. J. (1988). The triarchic mind: A new theory of
human intelligence. New York, NY: Viking.
Sternberg, R. J. (1997). Intelligence and lifelong learning:
What’s new and how we can use it? American Psychologist,
52, 1134–1139.
Stice, E., Shaw, H., & Marti, C. N. (2006). A meta-analytic
review of obesity prevention programs for children and
adolescents: The skinny on interventions that work. Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 132, 667–691.
Strauman, T. J. (2002). Self-regulation and depression. Self and
Identity, 1, 151–157.
Strauman, T. J., Vieth, A. Z., Merrill, K. A., Woods, T. E.,
Kolden, G. G., Klein, M. H., ... Kwapil, L. (2006). Self-
system therapy as an intervention for self-regulatory dys-
function in depression: A randomized comparison with
cognitive therapy. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology, 74, 367–376.
Tangney, J. P., Baumeister, R. F., & Boone, A. (2004). High self-
control predicts good adjustment, less pathology, better grades,
and interpersonal success. Journal of Personality, 72, 271–324.
Taylor, S. E., Pham, L. B., Rivkin, I. D., & Armor, D. A. (1998).
Harnessing the imagination: Mental simulation, self-regula-
tion, and coping. American Psychologist, 53, 429–439.
Uhl-Bien, M., & Graen, G. (1998). Individual self-management:
Analysis of professionals’ self-managing activities in func-
tional and cross-functional work teams. Academy of Man-
agement Journal, 41, 340–350.
Vroom, V. H. (1964). Work and motivation. New York, NY: Wiley.
Webb, T. L., & Sheeran, P. (2006). Does changing behavioral
intentions engender behavior change? A meta-analysis of the
experimental evidence. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 249–268.
Gabriele Oettingen
Psychology Department
New York University
6 Washington Place
New York, NY 10003
USA
Tel. +1 212 998-7915
Fax +1 212 533-1024
E-mail gabriele.oettingen@nyu.edu
144 G. Oettingen et al.: Mental Contrasting and Managing Everyday Life
Journal of Personnel Psychology 2010; Vol. 9(3):138–144 Ó2010 Hogrefe Publishing