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PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
The Cessation of Rumination Through Self-Affirmation
Sander L. Koole, Karianne Smeets, Ad van Knippenberg, and Ap Dijksterhuis
University of Nijmegen
Drawing from self-affirmation theory (C. M. Steele, 1988) and L. L. Martin and A. Tesser's (1989, 1996)
theory of ruminative thinking, the authors hypothesized that people stop ruminating about a frustrated
goal when they can affirm an important aspect of the
self.
In 3 experiments participants were given failure
feedback on an alleged IQ test. Failure feedback led to increased rumination (i.e., accessibility of
goal-related thoughts) compared with no-failure conditions (Studies 1 and 2). Rumination was reduced
when participants could self-affirm after failure (Studies 1 and 2) or before failure (Study 3). In Study 3,
self-affirmation led to increased positive affect on a disguised mood test and more positive name letter
evaluations. Moreover, the obtained increase in positive affect mediated the effect of self-affirmation on
rumination. It is concluded that self-affirmation may be an effective way to stop ruminative thinking.
Sometimes people cannot help thinking about the same thing
over and over again. Those who are attempting to get rid of surplus
body weight often find that their minds keep dwelling on images
of food (Herman & Polivy, 1993; Wegner, 1989). Thoughts related
to a forthcoming exam may interrupt a student's concentration at
unexpected moments, even when the event is still 1 month away
(Lepore, 1997). And even after finding a new romantic partner,
lovers may still entertain vivid daydreams about an old flame
(Wegner & Gold, 1995).
The experience of repetitive thoughts in the absence of imme-
diate environmental cueing is commonly called ruminative think-
ing (Beckmann, 1994; Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Although certain forms of
ruminative thinking may be helpful in coping with stress and goal
achievement (e.g., Taylor & Schneider, 1989), ruminations can
unwantedly occupy attentional capacity and interfere with what
one is trying to achieve (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996; Kuhl &
Helle, 1986; Mikulincer, 1989). Furthermore, certain negative
ruminative thoughts may be experienced over a period of years,
resulting in decreased psychological well-being and contributing
to the development of depression (Mclntosh & Martin, 1992;
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). Con-
Sander L. Koole, Karianne Smeets, Ad van Knippenberg, and Ap
Dijksterhuis, Department of Social Psychology, University of Nijmegen,
Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
We thank Agnes van den Berg and Laura Sweeney for helpful com-
ments on an earlier version of this article. We also thank Daniel Wigboldus
for statistical advice concerning the mediation analyses in Study 3 and Nol
Bendermacher for his help in devising a computer program to compute the
name letter effect.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sander L.
Koole, Department of Social Psychology, University of Nijmegen, P.O.
Box 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, the Netherlands. Electronic mail may be
sent to koole@psych.kun.nl.
sequently, it is of interest to explore how people can control and
regulate their ruminative thinking.
In the present article we investigate a specific regulatory mech-
anism that may protect people from (negative) ruminative
thoughts. More specifically, we examined whether failure-induced
ruminative thinking can be stopped by affirming an important
unrelated aspect of the self (see Steele, 1988; Tesser & Cornell,
1991).
In the following paragraphs we discuss a model of the
processes' that instigate ruminative thinking. Drawing on this the-
oretical understanding of ruminative thinking, we will elaborate on
different ways of stopping ruminative processes, including the
proposed self-affirmation route. Although in theory ruminative
thinking can be evaluatively positive or negative, our focus is on
negative ruminative thoughts.
The Instigation of Rumination
Human thought and action are generally goal directed (Austin &
Vancouver, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Gollwitzer & Mosko-
witz, 1996; Heckhausen, 1991; Srull & Wyer, 1986). Ruminative
thinking appears to be no exception to this rule, as the content of
ruminations is clearly related to people's goal strivings (see
Klinger, 1971, 1975). However, ruminative thinking is also unin-
tentional; people do not control the instigation of rumination. At
first glance, this may seem contradictory, because goal-
directedness and intentionality are traditionally treated as near-
synonyms. Nevertheless, recent findings have demonstrated that
certain mental processes are goal directed and unintentional at the
same time. For example, goal-directed behavior can be instigated
on perception of environmental cues, without the need for con-
scious intent (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994). Likewise, inferring traits
from behavioral episodes may occur without awareness, but only
when the perceiver has the goal of forming an impression of a
target person (Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994). Thus, there is no
inherent contradiction in describing ruminative thinking as an
instance of goal-directed and unintentional mental functioning.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1999, Vol. 77, No. 1, 111-125
Copyright 1999 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0022-3514/99/33.00
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