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The Role of Values in the Science of Psychology
George S. Howard
University of Notre Dame
ABSTRACT." The role of the researcher has long
been construed as that of the neutral, value-free truth
seeker who tries to understand the world in a totally
objective manner. Recent developments in the philos-
ophy of science suggest the value-laden nature of all
research. This article delineates the ways in which
values do influence research in all sciences. A further
argument speculates that certain characteristics of
human beings suggest that psychological research
should consider adopting a further set of values into
its research endeavors. Although these additional
values are irrelevant for most other sciences, it is
argued that psychological research would profit by
incorporating them.
The role that values play in scientific research has
been an important topic in the philosophy of science
for the past three decades. McMullin (1983) noted
in his presidential address to the Philosophy of
Science Association that 30 years ago Rudner (1953)
argued that the making of value judgments is an
essential part of the work of science. Apparently
Rudner (1953) realized that his claim would be
quite shocking, because of the regnant positivist
orthodoxy, and in fact claimed that its acceptance
would bring about "a first-order crisis in science and
methodology" (p. 6). But McMullin (1983) indicated
that the landscape has changed dramatically in the
ensuing years:
Thirty years later, the claim that science is value-laden
might no longer even seem controversial, among philoso-
phers of science, at least, who have become accustomed
to seeing the pillars of positivism fall, one by one. One
might even characterize the recent deep shifts in theory
of science as consequences (many of them, at least) of the
growing realization of the part played by value-judgment
in scientific work. (p. 3)
Although philosophers of science still debate the role
of values in scientific research, the controversy is no
longer about
whether
values influence scientific prac-
tice, but rather about
how
values are embedded in
and shape scientific practice.
I have several ambitions in this article. The
first task involves unpacking the various meanings
of the overly broad and inclusive term
value.
Once
the sense in which any science is value laden is
established, I delineate the epistemic values that
currently undergird our conception of proper science.
Although not totally noncontroversial, these episte-
mic values are generally accepted as appropriate by
both philosophers of science and practicing scientists.
Next, I argue that certain characteristics of psychol-
ogy's subject matter--namely, human beings--sug-
gest yet another constellation of values as appropriate
for our discipline. I argue that humans possess
characteristics that are unlike those of subject matters
studied by other sciences. Thus, an appropriate
science of human action must be somewhat different
from other existent sciences. Therefore, although we
share science's epistemic values with the natural
scientist, there may well be a set of values that,
although proper for the psychologist, are irrelevant
for the natural scientist in his or her pursuit of
understanding. Finally, I delineate some of the im-
plications of such a position for research praxis in
psychology.
Types of Values
The term
value
has served as a catchall category for
an enormous array of very different judgments,
decisions, preferences, and orientations. For the pur-
poses of our discussion, it is helpful to divide values
into epistemic and nonepistemic values. As a pre-
liminary distinction between these two types of
values one might consider how each type of value
should be
involved in the conduct of science. One
might reasonably hold that all values can legitimately
and fruitfully affect the choice or selection of ques-
tions for study. Then, once a particular theoretical
issue has been raised for scientific consideration, the
epistemic values should guide our judgments regard-
ing the determination of the adequacy of competing
theoretical explanations. Although nonepistemic
values can play a role in determining what questions
one might choose to entertain, it is felt that nonepi-
stemic values should not intrude on the scientific
process of determining the relative merits of com-
peting theoretical explanations. Because the older
meanings of the term
value
are of the nonepistemic
variety, they will be considered first.
Nonepistemic Values
The first meaning of
value
relates to such features
of human experience as attraction, feeling, and
emotion. In this sense, value differences represent
differences of attitude or emotional response in
certain individuals. What, then, is the place of this
March 1985 • American Psychologist
Col~s'right 1985 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/85/$00.75
Vol. 40, No. 3, 255-265
255
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