The Act Frequency Approach to Personality

Abstract

Personality dispositions are viewed as summaries of act frequencies that, in themselves, possess no explanatory status. As sociocultural emergents, dispositions function as natural cognitive categories with acts as members. Category boundaries are fuzzy, and acts within each category differ in their prototypicality of membership. This formulation is illustrated by a series of studies involving undergraduate raters, which focused on indices of act trends and on a comparative analysis of the internal structure of dispositions. The act frequency approach is placed within a taxonomic framework of the relations among act categories and hierarchic classification. Theoretical implications of the act frequency approach are examined. Dispositional consistency is distinguished from behavioral consistency, and several act frequency indices (e.g., dispositional versatility and situational scope) are defined. Situational analysis and personality coherence are viewed from the act frequency perspective. Discussion focuses on the possible origins and development of dispositional categories and implications of alternative middle-level constructs for act categorization and personality theory. (102 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Full text

Psychological
Review
VOLUME
90
NUMBER
2
APRIL
1983
The Act
Frequency Approach
to
Personality
David
M.
Buss
Harvard
University
Kenneth
H.
Craik
University
of
California,
Berkeley
The
act
frequency
approach
to
personality
is
advanced
in
this article. Dispositions
are
viewed
as
summaries
of act
frequencies
that,
in
themselves, possess
no ex-
planatory
status.
As
sociocultural emergents, dispositions
function
as
natural
cognitive
categories with acts
as
members. Category boundaries
are
fuzzy,
and
acts
within
each category
differ
in
their prototypicality
of
membership.
A
series
of
studies
focusing
on
indices
of act
trends
and on a
comparative analysis
of the
internal
structure
of
dispositions illustrates this basic
formulation.
The act
fre-
quency
approach
is
then placed within
a
taxonomic
framework
of the
relations
among
act
categories (horizontal
dimension)
and
hierarchic
classification
(vertical
dimension).
Theoretical
implications
of the act
frequency
approach
are
examined.
Dispositional
consistency
is
distinguished
from
behavioral
consistency
and
several
act
frequency
indices (e.g., dispositional versatility, situational scope)
are
defined.
Situational
analysis
and
personality coherence
are
then
viewed
from
the act
fre-
quency
perspective. Discussion
focuses
on the
possible origins
and
development
of
dispositional
categories
and
implications
of
alternative
middle-level
constructs
for
act
categorization
and
personality theory.
The
concept
of
disposition
has
occupied
a
central
place
in
personality
theory
and re-
search. Most major
efforts
have been directed
at
determining
the
external relations among
dispositions (Cattell, 1957; Eysenck, 1953;
Leary,
1957;
Wiggins,
1979).
In
contrast,
the
internal structure
of
dispositions
has
received
remarkably little theoretical treatment.
At
the
Ninth International Congress
of
Psy-
chology
in
1929,
Allport
(1931)
addressed
the
This
formulation
has
benefited
from
the
comments
and
critiques
of J.
Block,
R.
Brown,
H. G.
Gough,
R.
Hogan,
B. R.
Little,
S. R.
Maddi,
W.
Mischel,
L. A.
Pervin,
C.
Phinney,
D. J.
Ozer,
J. A.
Russell,
N. D.
Sund-
berg,
and J. S.
Wiggins.
An
early version
was
presented
at the
Stanley House Conference
on
Interactional
As-
sessment,
New
Richmond,
Gaspe
Peninsula, Canada,
June
29-July
3,
1981.
Requests
for
reprints should
be
sent
to
David
M.
Buss,
Department
of
Psychology
and
Social
Relations,
Har-
vard University,
33
Kirkland
Street, Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts 02138
or to
Kenneth
H.
Craik, Institute
of
Personality
Assessmment
and
Research, 3657
Tolman
Hall, University
of
California, Berkeley, California 94720.
question: What
is a
trait?
On
returning
to
that
basic
question
35
years later, Allport
(1966)
found
that
no
extensive literature
of
close conceptual analysis
of the
concept
of
trait
or
disposition existed.
Once
Allport's
own
early
considerations
of
the
concept
of
disposition (Allport,
1921,
1927,
1931;
Allport
&
Allport,
1921)
had
culminated
in his
classic volume (Allport,
1937),
the field of
personality appears
to
have
set
its
theoretical gears into neutral
and to
have
coasted with
his
formulation. During
the
decades since
the
1930s,
important phi-
losophical analyses
of the
concept
of
dispo-
sition appeared (Hampshire,
1953;
Ryle,
1949)
that might have sparked renewed con-
ceptual
discourse,
but
they failed
to do so at
the
time.
In a
recent compelling advocacy,
Maddi
(1980)
has
argued
for the
advantages
of
vigorous theorizing
for the field of
person-
ality.
In
that
spirit,
an act
frequency
analysis
of
dispositions
is
advanced here,
and its im-
plications
for an
approach
to
personality
are
reviewed.
Copyright
1983
by the
American
Psychological
Association,
Inc.
0033-295X/83/9000-0105$00.75
105

106
DAVID
M.
BUSS
AND
KENNETH
H.
CRAIK
2
14
Person
A
Person
B
Figure
1.
Dominant
acts
over
1-week
period
of
monitoring.
The Act
Frequency Approach:
Basic
Orientation
Dispositional
Assertions
as
Summarizing Statements
Hampshire (1953) asserts that disposi-
tional attributions
function
to
summarize
the
trend
of
someone's
behavior, thoughts,
and
feelings.
In
saying
that
a
person
is
generous,
Hampshire claims
that
"the word
'generous'
is
so far the
right word
to
summarize
the
general
trend
or
tendency
of his
conduct
and
calculations"
(p.
35).
To
warrant
the
claim,
one
must engage
in
prolonged
and
continu-
ous
study
of an
individual's conduct. Actual
incidents,
dispersed
over time, must
be
man-
ifested.
Lapses
are
possible;
to
attribute
a
disposition
to
someone
is not to
preclude
that
he
or she may on
some
occasion
have
acted
uncharacteristically
(Brandt, 1970; Powell,
1959). When someone's disposition
is in
dis-
pute, "the
final and
conclusive argument
must
be a
balancing
of one set of
actual
in-
cidents
against
another
set of
actual
inci-
dents" (Hampshire, 1953,
p.
35).
Dispositional assertions
are
summary
statements
about
behavior
up to the
present;
they
are not
predictions, although they carry
"the normal implications that [the individ-
ual's] character
is so
far
continuing
the
same"
(Hampshire,
1953,
p.
39). Dispositional
as-
sertions,
in
this
view, serve descriptive
and
forecasting
functions,
but
they
do not
deal
with
causal properties
nor
provide
a
causal
account
of the
behavior
at
issue.
With
various modifications
and
exten-
sions, this philosophical analysis
of
disposi-
tional
assertions
has
guided
the
development
of
an act
frequency
conception
of
disposition
that
can be
offered
as an
approach
to
per-
sonality research.
The
Frequency
Concept
of
Disposition
The
frequency analysis
of
dispositional
constructs
focuses
on
specifying
the
relative
incidence
of
acts
within
circumscribed
cat-
egories
or
domains
(Buss
&
Craik, 1980,
1981).
From
a
frequency
perspective,
the
statement
"Mary
is
arrogant"
means that,
over
a
period
of
observation,
she has
dis-
played
a
high
frequency
of
arrogant acts, rel-
ative
to a
norm
for
that
category
of
acts.
Acts
within
a
given
category
may be
topographi-
cally dissimilar,
but
they
are
still considered
to be
manifestations
of a
given disposition.
To
say
that Mary
is
arrogant
one
must
be
able
to
marshal evidence
of her
manifesta-
tions drawn
from
the
category
of
arrogant
acts over
a
delimited period
of
observation.
Act
frequency
tallies
from
dispositional
cat-
egories
provide
not
only
summary interpre-
tations
of
past conduct
but
also,
on
actuarial
grounds,
a
basis
for
predicting future
trends
in
behavior.
Within
this
approach,
the
fundamental
measure
of an
individual's disposition
is a
multiple-act composite index, provided
by
frequency
summary
across
a
specified
period
of
observation.
It
follows
that
in
predicting
future
standing regarding
a
disposition,
the
appropriate
criterion
measure
is
also
a
mul-
tiple-act composite index, based
on the
fre-
quency
tally
for the
period
of
observation
about which
the
prediction
is
made.
Act
trends,
operationalized
as
multiple-act com-
posite
indices,
become
fundamental units
of
analysis
in
personality research.
A
paradigmatic assessment
is
illustrated
in
Figure
1.
Persons
A and B
have been tracked
and
their conduct
has
been monitored over
a
1-week
period
of
observation.
The
entries
indicate
the
occurrence
of
dominant
acts.

ACT
FREQUENCY APPROACH
107
The act
frequency
approach would assess
Person
A as
more dominant than Person
B,
based upon
the
tally
of
observed dominant
acts and,
on
actuarial grounds, would
fore-
cast
a
continued higher base rate
of
domi-
nance
for
Person
A
over Person
B.
Temporal
Reliability
and
Prediction
The act
frequency approach incorporates
several
previous recognitions
in
psychological
research. First,
the
notion that composite
in-
dices based upon multiple observations
are
more
reliable than single observations
is not
new.
It is the
basis
for the
Spearman-Brown
formula
(Wiggins,
1981)
and is
widely used
in
scale construction (see Wiggins,
1973)
and
observer ratings (e.g., Block,
1961;
Horowitz,
Inouye,
&
Siegelman,
1979).
More recently,
the use of
multiple criteria
has
been advo-
cated
for
attitude measurement
(Fishbein
&
Ajzen,
1974) and,
by
extension,
for
per-
sonality
measurement (Jaccard, 1974).
Also,
Epstein
(1979,
1980)
has
argued that
im-
pressive stability
can be
demonstrated
over
a
wide
range
of
behavioral variables
as
long
as
the
behavior
is
averaged over
a
sufficient
number
of
occurrences.
Because
an
individual's acts
are
necessarily
dispersed over time,
the use of
aggregation
in
composite-act indices specifically
ad-
dresses
the
issue
of
temporal reliability.
In his
studies
on the
stability
of
behavior, Epstein
(1979,
1980)
has
demonstrated impressive
levels
of
temporal reliability
for
even brief
periods
of
observation
(12-14
days).
In the
assessment
of act
trends within
the
frequency
approach, this reliability yielded
by
compos-
ite
indices
is
afforded
to
both predictor
and
criterion
indices.
The use of
composite mul-
tiple-act indices
is not
simply
a
matter
of
measurement convenience
in the act
fre-
quency
approach
to
personality. Rather,
it is
at the
heart
of its
formulation
of
dispositional
constructs.
The
summary approach
and
mul-
tiple-act indices
are
intrinsically related con-
ceptually.
Temporal stability
of
personality
dispositions
is
therefore directly
and
gener-
ally
linked
to
constuct validity.
In
summary,
the act
frequency approach
asserts that,
for a
given disposition,
an act
trend,
or
composite multiple-act index, con-
stitutes
an
appropriate
basis
for
predicting
Table
1
Dispositions
and
Explanations
Element
GlassPerson
Dispositional
construct
brittleness
dominance
Manifestation
of
shattering taking charge
after
the
disposition
the
accident
Causal
account molecular genes, roles
structure
future
act
trends
or
multiple-act indices.
The
measurement operations
and
statistical anal-
yses
for
this fundamental kind
of
prediction
in
personality
fall
within
the
domain
of
tem-
poral reliability. This approach
to
personality
prediction
acknowledges
that
the
reliability
offered
by
composite indices
is
necessary
for
both predictor
and
criterion variables,
if
pre-
diction
is to be
conceptually
appropriate
and
successful.
In
this basic
form
of
personality
prediction
from
observed
act
trends
to
future
acts trends,
full
symmetry, except
for
tem-
poral locus, holds
for the
predictor
and
cri-
terion variables.
Act
Frequency
Approach
and
Explanation
A
critical question
in
personality psychol-
ogy
pertains
to the
status
of
dispositions
as
casual
or
explanatory accounts. Recent phi-
losophical treatments
of
this issue center
on
the
relations among three elements:
(a) the
disposition,
(b)
manifestations
of the
dispo-
sition,
and (c) a
causal account
of the
man-
ifestations
(see Table
1).
The first
issue
is the
relationship between
the
disposition
and its
manifestations. Addis
(1981),
Hampshire (1953),
O'Shaughnessy
(1970),
Squires (1968,
1970),
and
others
ar-
gue
that
a
dispositional statement does
not
offer
a
causal explanation
of its
manifesta-
tions.
Saying
that
an
individual
is
dominant
does
not
explain
the
acts
of
taking charge
after
the
accident, deciding which movie
the
group
will
attend,
or
commanding someone
to
leave
the
room.
The
manifestations must
instead
be
explained
on
independent grounds
and not
with recourse
to the
dispositional
statement itself. This position contrasts
markedly with
any use of
dispositional
state-

108
DAVID
M.
BUSS
AND
KENNETH
H.
CRAIK
ments
to
explain
or
account
for
observed
manifestations
(e.g., "She issued
the
com-
mand because
she is
dominant").
A
related issue bears directly upon
the re-
lationship between dispositional statements
and
causal accounts.
In
differing
ways,
Arm-
strong
(1969)
and
Cummins
(1974)
identify
the
disposition with
its
causal account (e.g.,
"brittleness
is a
sort
of
bonding
of
mole-
cules").
In
contrast,
O'Shaughnessey
(1970)
argues
that whereas dispositions
may be as-
sociated
with causal
explanations
in
some
poorly
understood
fashion,
there
is no
causal
role
for the
disposition itself ("it simply
falls
outside
the
causal schema"). Dispositional
constructs,
in
this
view,
perform
a job
dif-
ferent
from
that
of
explanations.
By
acknowledging
the
"poweflessness
of
dispositions"
in
explanation (O'Shaughnessey,
1970),
the act
frequency approach
separates
two
distinct scientific endeavors:
(a)
mapping
regularities
in
conduct,
and (b)
providing
causal
or
explanatory
accounts
of
them.
Once
regularities
in
behavior
are
identified,
the
usefulness
of
concepts drawn
from
ge-
netics
and
biology (e.g., Buss,
1983;
Eysenck,
1981),
role theory (e.g., Sarbin
&
Allen,
1968),
motivational theory (e.g., McClelland,
1983),
functional analysis (e.g., Skinner,
1938),
interactional analysis (e.g., Magnus-
sen
&
Endler, 1977),
and
other
explanatory
schemes must
be
determined. Prior
to
such
determination, however,
the act
frequency
approach
to
personality
dispositions
pro-
vides,
an
actuarial grounds,
useful
predic-
tions about
future
trends
in
conduct
and
identifies
regularities
of act
patterns that call
for
explanatory accounts.
Dispositions
as
Natural Cognitive
Categories
of
Acts
The
frequency
concept
of
disposition treats
acts
as
basic units
of
analysis
and
seeks
to
specify
the
nature
of
dispositional
categories
that encompass these acts.
The
view
of
dis-
positions
as
summary statements carries
the
implication
of
multiple-act categories. That
is,
dispositional assertions summarize topo-
graphically
dissimilar manifestations
across
a
variety
of
situations (Buss
&
Craik, 1980,
1981,
in
press; Craik, 1976; Fishbein, 1972;
Jaccard,
1974; Wiggins, Note
1). The
cog-
nitive
form
of
dispositional
categories,
their
criteria
for
membership,
and
their structure
pose important
and
heretofore relatively
unexamined
issues
in
personality theory.
Four
different
facets
of
dispositional cat-
egories
may be
examined.
The first
pertains
to the
internal category
structure—a
facet
that
has
received almost
no
attention
in
per-
sonality research. Examination
of the
inter-
nal
category structure raises important ques-
tions about category boundaries, internal
re-
lationships among category
members,
the
differing
conceptual status
of
category mem-
bers,
and so on. The
second
facet
deals with
the
comparative analysis
of
dispositions
in
terms
of
their internal
and
manifested struc-
tures.
The
third
facet
of the
dispositional cate-
gory
structure involves examining
the
exter-
nal
relationships
among
dispositional
cate-
gories
that
are
posited
to
reside
at the
same
level
in a
given taxonomic scheme.
In the
context
of the act
frequency
approach,
this
second
issue yields questions such
as (a)
What
are the
empirical relationships between
frequency
summaries
of
dispositional cate-
gories
such
as
dominance
and
gregarious-
ness?
(b) Can a
taxonomic model
be
applied
to
describe these external category relation-
ships?
The
fourth facet
of the
dispositional
cat-
egories
entails what Rosch
(1978)
and
others
have
called
the
vertical level
of
categoriza-
tion. Analysis
of
dispositions
along
the
ver-
tical dimension
involves
examining
the re-
lations between superordinate dispositional
categories
(e.g.,
the
rubric
of
interpersonal
traits),
middle-level dispositional categories
(e.g., dominance, gregariousness),
and
sub-
ordinate categories (e.g.,
specific
acts).
Be-
cause
the
internal category structure
has
been
the
most neglected
in
personality research,
and
because
the act
frequency
approach
af-
fords
a
novel contribution
at
this level,
it
will
be
considered
first and in the
greatest detail.
Internal
Category
Structure
Acts
are to the
behavioral world what
ob-
jects
are to the
inanimate world: basic con-
stituent elements. Dispositional constructs
offer
a
fundamental
system
for the
categori-
zation
of
acts.
Dispositional
constructs
can

ACT
FREQUENCY APPROACH
109
be
analyzed
as
natural cognitive categories
(Rosch, 1975a, 1978; Rosch
&
Mervis, 1975)
or
fuzzy
sets (Zadeh,
Fu,
Tanaka,
&
Shimura,
1975)
in
that
act
categories
for
specific
dis-
positions
are
assumed
to be
cognitively struc-
tured around prototype
or
central members,
with
nonprototype members becoming pro-
gressively
more peripheral
to the
category.
At
the
borders,
the
array
of
peripheral acts
for
a
given dispositional category blends into
ad-
jacent
act
categories.
Conjoining
the
summary
view
of
person-
ality
dispositions
with
the
cognitive
analysis
of
natural categories generates
a
program
of
personality
research. Thus far,
the
acts sub-
sumed
within
six
interpersonal dispositions
(agreeable, aloof, dominant, gregarious,
quarrelsome,
and
submissive) have been
ex-
plored
and
their internal structure examined
(Buss&Craik,
1980,1981;
Buss,
198
la).
The
procedure
used entails
two
steps:
act
nomi-
nations
and
prototypicality ratings.
Procedures
Act
nominations.
For
each
of the six
dis-
positional
constructs, undergraduates were
asked
to
nominate acts
that
would count
as
manifestations
of the
disposition.
The
basic
instructional
set
(e.g.,
for
dominance)
was
"Think
of the
three most dominant
females
[males]
you
know.
With these individuals
in
mind,
write down
five
acts
or
behaviors they
have
performed that
reflect
or
exemplify
their
dominance."
The
instructions were then
re-
peated,
with
sex of
actor
altered.
The aim of
this
procedure
was to
secure
for
each dis-
position
100
acts that could reasonably
be
considered
to
fall
somewhere within
the
dis-
positional
act
category.
Systematic
analysis
of
this act-nomination
procedure
has not yet
been undertaken
but
is
warranted. Despite
the aim of the
proce-
dure
and its
instructions, many
of the
nom-
inations
did not
constitute reports
of
occur-
rences,
in
Ryle's term
(1949),
or
accounts
of
episodes (e.g.,
"issued
orders
to the
group")
that
had
happened. Some
of the
nominations
were
phrased
in
general terms (e.g., "gives
out
orders")
and
often
included
a
frequency
term (e.g., "constantly,
forever,
sometimes,
rarely,
never")
in the act
description (e.g.,
"always
issuing
orders").
Nominations
of
this
kind
can be
readily converted
to
occurrence
statements.
A
substantial portion
of the
nom-
inations,
however,
missed
the
point
of the in-
structions
and
offered
nonact terms,
often
in
the
form
of
trait adjectives (e.g., regarding
dominance:
"argumentative, talkative, stub-
born").
The
central
focus
of the
instructions
upon
specific
persons
may
have
shifted
the
psychological set. Variations
in
instructions
and
provision
of
examples
offer
a
basis
for
systematic examination
of the
act-nomina-
tion procedure.
For the
purposes
of the
initial series
of em-
pirical
studies,
the
lists
of
acts
generated
for
each
disposition were subsequently reduced
by
eliminating redundancies, nonact state-
ments,
general tendency statements, fre-
quency
statements,
and
statements that were
considered
too
vague
to
constitute
an ob-
servable
act. Grammatical errors were cor-
rected,
and
each selected
act
statement
was
phrased
in a way
suitable
for
performance
by
either sex.
A
list
of 100
acts
was
derived
for
each
dispositional construct
in
this way.
In
the
case
of
aloofness,
11
acts
generated
from
an
expert panel were used
to
supplement
the
89
acts generated
by the
undergraduate pan-
els.
Apparently, acts
of
aloofness
are
less
readily
summoned
up
than
are
acts
for the
categories
of
dominance, gregariousness,
submissiveness,
quarrelsomeness,
or
agreea-
bleness.
Prototypicality
ratings.
For
each
of the six
act
lists, panels
of
judges rated
the
prototyp-
icality
of
each
of the 100
acts
for the
dispo-
sitional
construct
at
issue.
Instructions
in-
cluded
this adaptation
from
the
Rosch
and
Mervis
(1975)
procedure
for
judging
the
pro-
totypicality
of
colors:
Close
your
eyes
and
imagine
a
true red.
Now
imagine
an
orangish
red ...
imagine
a
purple-red.
Although
you
might
still
name
the
orange-red
or the
purple-red
with
the
term red, they
are not as
good examples
of red
(as
clear cases
of
what
red
refers
to) as the
clear
"true"
red.
In
short, some reds
are
redder than others.
Judges
then rated
on a
7-point scale
how
good
an
example each
act was of the
dispositional
category
at
issue.
The
alpha reliabilities
of the
composite
prototypicality
ratings
and the
average
be-
tween-rater
agreements (panel size
in
paren-
theses)
are as
follows:
aggreeable, .77,
.12
(31);
aloof,
.97,
.42
(45); dominant, .95,
.20
(79);
gregarious, .95,
.31
(42); quarrelsome,

110
DAVID
M.
BUSS
AND
KENNETH
H.
CRAIK
.95,
.44
(29);
and
submissive, .96,
.36
(47).
Except
for
agreeable, these indices
are
high,
indicating
that each rating panel displayed
adequate composite reliability
in
judging
which
acts were more
or
less prototypical
of
the
dispositional category, even within sets
of
acts independently nominated
as
falling
within each category.
The
ranked listing
of
acts
on
prototypi-
cality
was
partitioned into
quartiles,
each
successive
25
acts forming
an
independently
composited multiple-act index
(from
Proto
1,
the
most central acts,
to
Proto
4, the
most
peripheral acts). Table
2
presents
illustrative
acts
from
each multiple-act index
for the six
dispositions under study.
Prototypicality ratings
afford
a
convenient
and
relatively direct means
of
examining cat-
egory
structure. However,
the
assumption
that dispositional constructs
function
through
natural
categories
of
acts would
be
strength-
ened
by
convergent evidence
from
other typ-
icality
indices.
In the
domain
of
concrete
objects,
convergent
findings
have been dem-
onstrated
for
prototypicality
ratings,
verifi-
cation times
for
category membership, prob-
ability
of
item output
in
membership-nom-
ination tasks,
and
expectations
generated
by
the
category name
(Rosch,
Simpson,
&
Miller,
1976).
Similar examination
of
alternative
typicality
indices
should
be
undertaken
for
dispositional categories.
The
composite reliabilities
of
prototypi-
cality ratings
for
act-disposition
judgments
Table
2
Acts
of
Varying
Prototypicality
for Six
Dispositional Constructs
Dispositional
construct
Act
Agreeableness
Proto
1
Proto
2
Proto
3
Proto
4
Aloofness
Proto
1
Proto
2
Proto
3
Proto
4
Dominance
Proto
1
Proto
2
Proto
3
Proto
4
Gregariousness
Proto
1
Proto
2
Proto
3
Proto
4
Quarrelsomeness
Proto
I
Proto
2
Proto
3
Proto
4
Submissiveness
Proto
1
Proto
2
Proto
3
Proto
4
I
readily
did the
dishes
after
dinner.
I
forgave
my
acquaintance
after
she had
spread
a
false rumor
about
me.
I
picked
up the tab for
lunch.
I
arrived
on
time
for the
meeting.
I
offered
a
monosyllabic response
to the
conversational overture.
While
the
others chatted,
I
gazed into
the fireplace.
I
declined
the
invitation
to the
large party.
I
visited
a
museum alone.
I
forbade
her
to
leave
the
room.
I
gave
advice,
although none
was
requested.
I
resisted conceding
an
argument.
I
walked ahead
of
everybody else.
I
introduced myself
to new
coworkers without
hesitation,
told
a
joke
at the
dinner
party,
studied
with
a
group
to
prepare
for the
examination,
went
to the
football game.
picked
a fight
with
the
stranger
at the
party,
ended
the
conversation
by
stalking
out of the
room,
complained about having
to do him a
favor.
I
insisted upon doing
the
driving
on the
trip.
I
walked
out of the
store knowing that
I had
been shortchanged.
I
continued
to
apologize
for the
minor mistake.
I
let my
partner choose which movie
we
would see.
When
the
three
of us set out on the
journey,
I
took
the
back seat
of the
car.
Note.
Proto
1
=
most prototypical; Proto
4 =
least prototypical.

ACT
FREQUENCY APPROACH
111
are
substantial
and
adequate
for the act
fre-
quency
research.
It is
less clear what minimal
level
of
between-rater agreement
is
required
to
justify
application
of the
concept
of
nat-
ural
cognitive categories
to a
judgment
do-
main.
For
concrete object categories (e.g.,
bird,
vehicle, vegetable, clothing), Rosch
(1975b)
reports split-half reliabilities
of .97
or
higher
for a
panel
of
201
judges, which
are
comparable
to
those obtained
for the
dis-
positional
categories.
However, Rosch does
not
cite average between-rater agreement,
which
may be
higher
for
concrete object cat-
egories than
for
dispositional categories
(which
ranged
from
.12
to
.44). Systematic
comparison
of
between-rater agreement lev-
els
for the
categories
of
objects
and
acts
is
needed.
Within
the act
frequency approach, dis-
positional constructs
are
treated
as
sociocul-
tural
products
held
by
members
of a
culture.
Panels
offer
a
direct means
of
seeking
act
specifications
for
dispositional categories,
with
individual misinterpretations, transient
errors,
and
other variations presumably can-
celing each
other
out.
Thus,
reliability
esti-
mates
for
composite indices
are
appropriate
theoretically
and, with
the
possible exception
of
agreeableness, reach
sufficient
levels
to
pursue
a
research program
in a
manageable
fashion
(e.g., with panels
of 20 or so
judges).
Comparative
Analysis
of
the
Internal
Structure
of
Personality
Dispositions
The
present
framework
provides
two
kinds
of
structural comparisons among personality
dispositions.
The
procedures
of act
nomi-
nation
and
prototypicality rating suggest
po-
tentially
useful
attributes
for
comparing
the
internal
cognitive structures
of
dispositional
concepts. Additional
and
quite distinct com-
parisons
among dispositions
in
terms
of
their
manifested
structures
can be
generated
from
the
analysis
of
overt
act
performance, derived
from
self-
or
observer-based
field
monitor-
ings.
The
internal structures
of
dispositional
categories
can be
compared according
to
their category volume,
the
composite
reli-
ability
of
prototypicality ratings,
and the
range
and
central tendency
of
prototypicality
ratings
for act
members
of a
category.
First,
the
difficulty
in
soliciting
100
acts
of
aloofness
from
undergraduate panels
(11
acts
had
to be
derived
from
expert panel nomi-
nations)
suggests that
the
volume
of
acts cog-
nitively
available
for
specific
dispositional
categories
may
vary. More systematic
act
nomination
procedures
can
provide
useful
probes
concerning
the
variation among dis-
positions
in
category volume.
For
example,
examining
the
number
of
acts nominated
per
unit
of
time would provide
an
index
of
rel-
ative
differences
among dispositions
in
cat-
egory
volume.
The
main implication
is
that
the
total
act
membership
of
each disposi-
tional
category
can be
estimated, with
an ac-
tual size
and
specifiable
distribution
along
the
prototypicality
continuum.
Category
volume
may be
related
to
Hamp-
son's
(1982)
notion
of the
imaginability
of
trait categories, that
is, to how
easy
it is "to
imagine
a
behavior
that
would
be
described
specifically"
by the
trait term
(p. 5). The
gen-
eration
of
instances
of
traits rated
high
on
imaginability
(e.g.,
helpful,
clumsy)
was
found
by
Hampson
to be
more subjectively
difficult
than
for
traits
rated
low
(e.g., important, sin-
cere).
Behavioral instances nominated
for
highly
imaginable traits were also judged
to
be
more prototypical than those
for
less
imaginable
traits.
A
second comparative attribute
is the re-
liability
of
prototypicality ratings.
For ex-
ample,
the
composite reliability
for
ratings
of
agreeable acts
is
somewhat lower than
for
our
other
five
categories. Agreeable acts
may
not
vary along
the
prototypicality continuum
as
much
as
acts
in
other dispositional cate-
gories.
This restriction
of
range would make
differentiation
among agreeable acts
difficult
for
judges, thus reducing composite reliabil-
ity.
The findings in
Table
3
support this sug-
gestion:
The
variance
in the
mean prototyp-
icality
ratings
for
aggreeable acts
is
lower than
for
those
in the
other
five
categories. Exam-
ination
of the
prototypicality ratings
for the
100
aggreeable acts shows that they
are
con-
centrated
within
the
middle range,
with
nei-
ther
extremely central
nor
extremely periph-
eral
acts appearing. Whether this distribution
characterizes
the
actual category
of
agreeable
acts
or
merely represents
an
artifact
of our
nomination
and
selection procedure
will
re-
quire
more systematic examination.

112
DAVID
M.
BUSS
AND
KENNETH'H.
CRAIK
Table
3
Comparative Analysis
of
the
Internal Structure
of
Dispositional
Categories
Prototypicality
ratings
Reliability
Category
Agreeableness
Aloofness
Dominance
Gregariousness
Quarrelsomeness
Submissiveness
Alpha
.77
.97
.95
.95
.95
.96
Between
rater
.12
.42
.20
.31
.44
.36
M
4.62
3.38
4.03
3.96
4.07
4.25
SD
0.58
1.22
0.78
0.99
1.24
1.02
Assessed
act
performance
Base
rate
(%)
79
53
66
67
41
48
Manifested
structure
Alpha
.93
.89
.94
.93
.93
.91
Interact
r
.12
.07
.14
.12
.13
.09
Note.
Each
category
includes
100
acts.
M =
prototypicality
ratings
across
the 100
acts;
SD =
standard
deviations
of
the
means across
the 100
acts;
and
base rates
=
average percentage across
the 100
acts within each category
of
those
individuals
reporting
act
performance.
Third,
in
addition
to
range,
the
central ten-
dency
of the
distribution
of
acts
on the
pro-
totypicality
continuum
may
vary
from
dis-
position
to
disposition.
As
shown
in
Table
3,
the
mean prototypicality ratings
for
each
of
the six
sets
of
100
acts show
the
highest mean
prototypicality
for
agreeable
acts
and the
low-
est
for
aloof acts.
The
interesting question
is
whether
the
disposition
of
aloofness
is ac-
curately
characterized
as
relatively lacking
in
core acts
or
whether
this
result
is a
deficiency
of
our
current act-nomination
and
rating
procedures.
Systematic monitoring
of
individuals'
con-
duct
in
everyday settings over standard
pe-
riods
of
observation
will
eventually provide
a
basis
for
analyzing
the
manifested
structure
of
dispositions
and for
making comparisons
between
them.
For a
preliminary examina-
tion
of the
issues encountered
in
these anal-
yses,
the 100
acts
for
each disposition under
study
were rephrased
as first-person
state-
ments
that yielded
six act
reports,
one for
each
dispositional construct (i.e., agreeable-
ness,
aloofness, dominance,
gregariousness,
quarrelsomeness,
and
Submissiveness).
A
sample
of
100
university students completed
the
act
reports,
providing
a
dichotomous
(yes/no)
report
for
each
act
and,
for
those
they
had
performed,
a
frequency rating
(rarely,
sometimes,
often).
Despite
the
retrospective self-report nature
of
the act
reports,
findings
from
the
reports
serve
to
illustrate
two
ways
of
comparing dis-
positions
that
are
based upon
the
assessed
performance
of
acts,
in
contrast
to the
anal-
ysis
of the
internal cognitive structures. These
features
of
dispositional
categories
are
base
rates
of
occurrence
and
tightness
of
mani-
fested
structure.
Using
the
present method
of
self-reported
assessment
of act
performance, base rates
averaged
across
the
100
acts within each
cat-
egory
yielded
a
range
from
41% for
quarrel-
someness
to 79% for
agreeableness, with sub-
missiveness (48%), aloofness (53%),
domi-
nance
(66%),
and
gregariousness
(67%)
falling
in
between.
If
confirmed
by
converging meth-
ods of
assessing
act
performance, these dif-
ferences
in
category base rates provide
a
cen-
tral,
but as yet
relatively unexamined, issue
for
personality theory
and
actuarial
predic-
tion.
Finally,
dispositions
may
vary
in the
tight-
ness
of
their
manifested
structure, gauged
by
the
empirical intercorrelations
of
acts within
each category.
An
extremely tight empirical
structure
(very
high correlations among acts)
may
suggest
an
undifferentiated
style
of
con-
duct;
a
looser structure
indicates
a
potential
for
differentiating
styles
in
manifesting
a
dis-
position.
In the
present studies,
the
alpha
coefficients
and the
mean between-act cor-
relations
for the six act
reports were
as
fol-
lows:
agreeableness, .93,
.12;
aloofness, .89,
.07;
dominance,
.94,
.14;
gregariousness, .93,
.12;
quarrelsomeness, .93, .13;
and
Submis-
siveness,
.91, .09. Thus, this
set of
disposi-
tions displays only modest variation
in the
tightness-looseness
of
manifested structure.

ACT
FREQUENCY
APPROACH
113
Loevinger
(1957)
referred
to the
level
of
tight-
ness
of a
disposition's manifest structure
as
its
characteristic intercorrelation
and
drew
implications
for the
structural
component
of
personality
scale validity.
It is
noteworthy
that
a
disposition
can
serve
as a
relatively
unitary
cognitive
and
conceptual
act
category
and
still
possess
either
a
tight
or
loose
man-
ifested
structure.
The
Horizontal Dimension: Relations
Among
Act
Categories
at the
Same Level
In
addition
to a
close analysis
of the in-
ternal
and
manifested structure
of act
cate-
gories,
a
second critical issue pertains
to the
relations
among
act
categories that
are
pos-
ited
to
reside
at the
same level
in a
given
taxonomic
framework.
A
simple list
of
such
categories,
each analyzed separately,
is un-
desirable
on
both heuristic
and
aesthetic
grounds.
A
taxonomic model that
specifies
or
posits
the
relations between each
act
cat-
egory
and
every
other
act
category
offers
a
more
useful
guide
to
conducting personality
research
and
generating theory. Such
a
model
is
offered
by the
Wiggins circumplex (Wig-
gins,
1979, 1980).
Briefly,
the
Wiggins circumplex model
is
a
two-dimensional taxonomy consisting
of
16
interpersonal
dispositional categories (e.g.,
dominant,
arrogant, calculating, cold)
ar-
rayed
in a
circular
fashion.
The two
major
dimensions
that
define
the
circumplex, dom-
inant-submissive
and
agreeable-quarrel-
some,
are
orthogonal
to
each other
in the
model.
Each
of the
remaining dispositional
categories
is
posited
to
possess varying
de-
grees
or
facets
of
these
two
dimensions.
A
distinct advantage
of the
Wiggins circumplex
is
that
it
offers
a
basis
for
making predictions
about
the
relations among dispositional cat-
egories: Orthogonal variables
are
predicted
to be
uncorrelated, adjacent variables
posi-
tively
correlated,
and
opposing variables neg-
atively
correlated.
The
most
direct
test
of the
circumplex
model within
the
act-frequency
approach
is
simply
to
examine
the
correlation matrix
of
act-frequency
summaries across
all
studied
categories
and
then
to
examine
its
corre-
spondence
to the
predicted correlation
ma-
trix.
The
fairest
test entails using composites
of
the
most prototypical acts
from
each cat-
egory—in
this case,
the top
quartiles
or
com-
posite-act indices based
on the
most proto-
typical
25
acts
from
each dispositional cat-
egory.
Table
4
shows
the
correlation matrix
of
these prototypic composites
for the six act
categories (above
the
diagonal)
and the
cor-
relations
predicted
on the
basis
of the
cir-
cumplex
model (below
the
diagonal).
The
correlation between
the
predicted
and ob-
tained
correlations
(N =
15)
for the six
cat-
egories
is .89
(calculated
via
Spearman's rho).
This
finding
indicates that, overall,
the
pat-
tern
of
predicted correlations corresponds
well
to
those that were obtained.
The
absolute magnitudes
of the
correla-
tions
are, however, discrepant
from
those pre-
dicted
by the
circumplex model,
in
many
cases. This
finding
points
to a key
feature
of
the
horizontal
level
of
dispositional catego-
rization
within
the act
frequency
approach:
Performance
of
many acts within
one
dis-
positional
category does
not
preclude perfor-
mance
of
many acts within other disposi-
tional categories, even
if
they
are
concep-
Table
4
Correlations
of
Multiple-Act Criteria With
Each
Other
Disposition
1.
2.
3.
4.
6.
1.
Aloof
2.
Gregarious
3.
Dominant
4.
Submissive
5.
Hostile
6.
Agreeable
_
-1.00
-.25
.25
.75
-.75
-.13
—
.25
-.25
-.75
.75
.22*
.55**
—
-1.00
.00
.00
.32**
-.07
-.13
—
.00
.00
.46**
.11
.36**
.00
—
-1.00
.12
.45**
.23*
.36**
-.11
—
Note.
Correlations
to the
left
of the
diagonal
are
those predicted
by the
circumflex
model; those
to the right are the
obtained
correlations.
* p <
.05, two-tailed;
** p <
.001,
two-tailed.

114
DAVID
M.
BUSS
AND
KENNETH
H.
CRAIK
tually
or
semantically
opposite
to
each other.
The
correlations among act-frequency sum-
maries
may not
correspond
to
semantic
re-
lations inherent
in
trait-descriptive vocabu-
laries.
The
present data
set
cannot rule
out the
hypothesis
that methodological artifacts (e.g.,
general
acquiescence
or
endorsement tenden-
cies)
may
have unduly
inflated
the
magni-
tudes
of the
correlations
observed
in
Table
4
or the
possibility that, were they absent,
the
absolute magnitudes
of
the
correlations would
correspond more closely
to
those posited
by
the
Wiggins circumplex model.
But if we
hold
this potential confound
in
abeyance
for the
moment,
the
present data
may
indicate
the
absence
of
true bipolarity
in the act
frequen-
cies
studied; those
who
perform many dom-
inant
acts,
for
example,
may be
neither more
nor
less
apt to
perform many submissive acts.
If
absence
of
bipolarity among semantically
opposed
act
categories
is
confirmed
by field
studies,
a
different
taxonomic
framework
may
be
called
for by the act
frequency
ap-
proach.
One final
conjecture
may be
advanced:
The
positive
correlations
among most mul-
tiple-act criteria stem
not
from
methodolog-
ical
artifacts
but
from
a
general activity
or
g
factor
in the act
domain.
In
this case,
in-
dividuals
may
reliably
differ
in the
number
of
acts performed, regardless
of the act
cat-
egory
within which they
are
classified.
To the
extent
that
such
a g
factor
exists,
it
would
have
to be
partialed
out
from
any
assessment
device
in
order
to
obtain circumplexity
in the
act
domain. Russell
(1979)
has
suggested
an
analogous
partialing
of a
general
factor
in the
emotional
domain; however,
in his
view
the
general
factor
is a
purely methodological
ar-
tifact.
On the
other hand,
a g
factor
in the
act
domain,
if not
artifactual,
would require
a new
conceptualization
of
personality,
just
as
the
discovery
of a g
factor
in
intelligence
(Spearman,
1904) required
a new
concep-
tualization
of
intelligence.
The
Vertical
Dimension: Hierarchic
Taxonomic
Classification
Beyond
the
internal
structure
of
disposi-
tional
categories
and
issues surrounding
the
relations among
different
categories
at the
same
level,
another important issue pertains
to
vertical
or
hierarchic relations among dis-
positional
categories. Broadly speaking,
two
such
taxonomic approaches
have
been pur-
sued.
First,
lexical-conceptual
analyses
of
dispositional
terms within
the
natural lan-
guage
have
been conducted (e.g.,
Allport
&
Odbert,
1936;Cattell,
1957;
Goldberg,
1982;
Wiggins,
1979).
Wiggins
(1979),
for
example,
partitions
the
universe
of
trait-descriptive
terms
into seven superordinate categories
(e.g., interpersonal, temperamental, mate-
rial). Within each superordinate category
are
specific
dispositions (e.g.,
the
dispositions
of
"stingy"
and
"generous"
fall
within
the su-
perordinate category
of
material traits).
Al-
though they
are
not
explicit
in
Wiggins's
taxonomy,
subordinate categories
are
pre-
sumably
specific
acts that
fall
within each
middle-level
dispositional category.
An
alternative strategy
has
been
to
develop
hierarchic classifications based
in
part
on the
interrelations
among dispositional measures,
through
factor
analysis
and
related tech-
niques
(e.g., Eysenck,
1953;Guilford,
1959).
Eysenck's
theory
of
vertical classification,
for
example, involves extraversion
as a
super-
ordinate
category, with
the
specific
disposi-
tions
of
liveliness, excitability, sociability,
and
impulsivity
at the
second level.
Specific
habits
and
responses
define
subordinate-level cate-
gories.
From
the
vantage point
of the act
fre-
quency approach,
the
point
of all
taxonomic
hierarchies
is
that they must ultimately deal
with
the
categorization
of
acts. This basic
goal
is
often
missed
by
taxonomic
ap-
proaches that stop
at the
level
of
lexical-con-
ceptual analysis
of
trait
terms
or at
primary
and
second-order
factor
structures capturing
the
covariation among personality inventory
items
or
scales. Attention
to the
categoriza-
tion
of
acts would grant such taxonomic
schemes greater ultimate significance.
A
comparison
of the
hierarchic taxonomy
of
objects
and the
taxonomy
of
acts
is in-
structive
(see Table
5). For
object categories,
Rosch
and her
associates
(1978;
Rosch, Mer-
vis
et
al.,
1976) have identified three levels
of
abstraction: superordinate (e.g.,
furniture),
basic
(e.g., chair, table),
and
subordinate (e.g.,
kitchen
chair, livingroom table).
For
dispo-
sitional
terms, Wiggins
(1979,
1981)
has
sug-

ACT
FREQUENCY APPROACH
115
gested
groupings that might indicate
useful
superordinate categories (e.g., interpersonal
style,
temperament, character, mental pred-
icate). Presumably, specific
dispositional
con-
structs (e.g., dominance,
agreeableness)
func-
tion
as
basic level categories. Subordinate
categories would consist
of
single acts (e.g.,
tallied
across single
or
multiple situations).
In
this scheme, ordinary dispositional con-
structs
emerge
at the
basic level within
the
categorization system
for
acts, paralleling
basic categories
of
objects.
Dispositional categories sort together acts
that
are
dispersed across time
and
situation
throughout
the
individual's stream
of
behav-
ior.
In
addition
to
temporal dispersal,
the to-
pographic distinctiveness
of
similarly cate-
gorized
acts suggests
a
complexity inherent
in
dispositional categories that
may set
them
apart
from
other categorization schemes.
What common attributes
of
prototypically
dominant
acts
warrant
the
generation
of the
category
"dominance"?
Such attributes
of
acts
and
their relation
to
common member-
ship
in
dispositional categories have received
little
attention.
One
possible basis
of
com-
monality
rests upon similar
effects
or
impacts
on
the
environment (see, e.g., Jones
&
Davis,
1965;
Wiggins,
Note
1).
But
whether that fac-
tor
would hold across
the
entire range
of
spe-
cific
dispositional categories remains
to be
determined.
Theoretical Implications
of the
Act
Frequency Approach
Although
founded primarily upon
a
dis-
tinctive
formulation
of the
concept
of
dis-
position,
the act
frequency
approach carries
implications
for a
broad
range
of
theoretical
issues
in
personality research, including those
bearing
upon personality consistency, situa-
tional analysis,
and
personality coherence.
Personality
Consistency
The
issue
of
consistency
and
ways
of
for-
mulating
the
notion have held
a
central place
in
discourse about
the
nature
of
personality.
The act
frequency
approach draws
a
funda-
mental distinction between behavioral con-
sistency
and
dispositional consistency.
Be-
havioral
consistency
refers
to
indices derived
Table
5
Taxonomies
of
Objects
and
Acts
Level
Superordinate BasicSubordinate
Concrete
object categories
furniture
tree
chair
maplekitchen chair
sugar
maple
Act-dispositional
categories
interpersonal
dominance taking charge
at the
style
meeting
temperament
obstinacy
ignoring
the
associate's
suggestions
from
the
molecular level
of
single-act anal-
ysis.
Dispositional
consistency
refers
to mo-
lar-level
multiple-act indices derived
from
analyzing
the
cognitive structure
of
disposi-
tional
categories
of
acts.
Indices
of
Behavioral
Consistency
Consider
the
data yielded
by
monitoring
the
total behavioral output
of a
sample
of
persons
during
two
extended periods (Time
1
and
Time
2).
Prior
to any
dispositional cat-
egorization
of
acts, several indices
of
behav-
ioral
or
act-level consistency
can be
com-
puted.
Single-act
consistency.
The
temporal con-
sistency
of
single-act categories (e.g., taking
charge
of a
meeting; attending psychology
class)
can be
gauged.
For
example, adequate
levels
of
temporal stability
have
been
re-
ported
for
single-act categories within
the
domain
of
conscientiousness
(Mischel
&
Peake, 1982).
Consistency
of
overall
act
output.
Persons
may
demonstrate reliable individual
differ-
ences
in
aspects
of the
total number
of
acts
performed
during
a
period
of
observation,
without
regard
to any
dispositional catego-
rization
of
acts.
Two
additional consistency
measures
of
overall
act
output
are (a)
con-
sistency
in
overall
act
versatility—the
relative
position maintenance
of
individuals across
periods
of
observation
on the
number
of
dif-
ferent
acts performed, with same-act repeti-
tions
not
counted
and (b)
consistency
in
over-
all
situational
scope—the
relative position

116
DAVID
M.
BUSS
AND
KENNETH
H.
CRAIK
maintenance
of
individuals across periods
of
observation
on the
total number
of
different
situations
in
which acts
are
performed. Note
that these indices
of
behavioral consistency
may
be
calculated prior
to any
dispositional
categorization
and
thus
are
less relevant
to
personality
consistency.
Indices
of
Dispositional
Consistency
Within
the act
frequency
approach, single-
act
consistency
and the
intercorrelations
among
single-act categories
are
properly con-
sidered
to be
predispositional matters. Thus,
the
question
of
why
some single acts correlate
with
certain others, whereas some
do
not,
is
primarily
a
behavioral rather than
a
dispo-
sitional
issue. Personality research emerges
more clearly when single acts
are
categorized
and
analysis moves
from
a
molecular
to a
molar
level.
A
fundamental conceptual con-
tribution
of
dispositional constructs
is to of-
fer
a
system
for
categorizing single-act units
into middle-level conceptual units.
Basic
dispositional
consistency:
Act-trend
consistency.
An act
trend
is the
tally
of all
acts
falling
within
the
boundaries
of a
mul-
tiple-act
dispositional category that
are
per-
formed
by an
individual during
a
period
of
observation.
Act-trend consistency
refers
to
relative
position maintenance
of
individuals
on act
trends
for a
specific
disposition across
periods
of
observation.
It
should
be
noted
that act-trend consistency
can be
high even
if
individuals
do not
display
the
same
specific
acts across time periods. Consistency
of
fre-
quency
within category rather than same-act
repetition
becomes
the
critical index
of
con-
sistency.
Two
additional measures
of
dispositional
consistency
are (a)
consistency
in
disposi-
tional
versatility—the
relative position
maintenance
of
individuals across periods
of
observation
on the
number
of
different
acts
performed
within
a
specific
dispositional cat-
egory,
excluding same-act repetitions,
and
(b)
Consistency
in
dispositional-situational
scope—relative
position maintenance
of in-
dividuals
across periods
of
observation
on the
number
of
different
situations within which
prototypical acts
for a
specific
dispositional
category
are
performed.
In the first, two in-
dividuals
may
obtain
the
same act-trend
in-
dex for
dominance,
for
example,
but
differ
markedly
in the
range
and
versatility
of
acts
they
display
in
mainfesting their dominance.
In
the
second,
two
individuals
may
obtain
the
same act-trend index
for
dominance,
but
one
may
manifest dominance
in
delimited
kinds
of
settings (e.g., only
at
home) whereas
others
may
display
the
same absolute number
of
dominant acts across
the
same time period,
but
disperse them across
a
wider range
of
set-
tings
(e.g.,
at
home,
at
work,
in
leisure set-
tings).
Thus,
the act
frequency
approach
of-
fers
several novel consistency indices that
elude
more traditional approaches that assess
scale
or
rating consistency across
two or
more
time periods.
A
fuller
treatment
of
these con-
sistency
issues
in
personality psychology
can
be
found
in
Ozer's
(1982)
formulation.
Ipsative
measures
of
dispositional
consis-
tency.
Unlike strategies that employ
trait-
rating indices,
Q
sorts,
or
ranking measures,
the
act
frequency approach provides
a
true
zero
point: when
no
acts within
a
given dis-
positional category
are
exhibited. Therefore,
ratio
measures
can be
developed
by
which
act
frequencies
in one
dispositional category
are
compared with
act
frequencies
for an in-
dividual
in all
other categories. Thus, those
researchers persuaded
by
arguments
in
favor
of
idiographic analysis
can
derive consistency
indices
for
three ipsative measures:
(a)
idio-
graphic
act
trend—the
act
tally
for a
given
dispositional category divided
by the
person's
index
of
overall
act
output,
(b)
idiographic
dispositional
versatility—the
number
of
dif-
ferent
acts performed within
a
given dispo-
sitional category divided
by the
person's
in-
dex
of
overall
act
versatility,
and (c)
idio-
graphic
dispositional-situational
scope—the
number
of
different
situations
in
which acts
for
a
given dispositional category
are
per-
formed
divided
by the
person's index
of
over-
all
situational scope.
Behavioral
Consistency
and
Dispositional
Breadth
The
breadth
of
dispositions,
as
Mischel
and
Peake
(1982)
have rightly noted,
is one
of
the
central issues
in
continuing contro-
versies
about
the
adequacy
of
traditional for-
mulations
of
personality. They have recently
reported
a
study
of
dispositional breadth that

ACT
FREQUENCY APPROACH
117
can be
usefully
viewed
from
the
vantage point
of
the act
frequency
approach.
For a
sample
of 63
college students, Mis-
chel
and
Peake analyzed
19
measures
from
the
domain
of
conscientiousness/studious-
ness
(e.g., attending psychology class, reading
reserve library materials punctually, keeping
the
dorm room tidy). Adequate levels
of
sin-
gle-act consistency were
found,
with
a
mean
composite
reliability, averaged
across
the
19
single-act categories,
of
.66.
The 19
measures
of
single-act categories were intercorrelated,
yielding
an
average between-act
r of
.13
(or
.20
when attenuation
due to
unreliability
of
measures
is
taken into account). These
in-
tercorrelations
between single
acts,
termed
cross-situational
consistency
coefficients
are
taken
as
measures
of
dispositional breadth
for
the
construct
of
conscientiousness/stu-
diousness. They conclude that
the
average
r
of.
13 (or
.20)
offers
evidence
for a
relatively
stable
mean level
of
individual
differences
but
also reflects behavioral discriminativeness
(sensitivity
to
situational cues). They suggest
(a)
that
we
seek
to
understand when
and why
these
obtained coherences among single-cat-
egory
acts emerge
and
when
and why
they
fail
to
emerge,
and (b)
that
we
search
for
con-
sistency
at
different
levels
of
abstraction—
from
subordinate, molecular levels
to
molar
and
superordinate levels.
Mischel
and
Peake's
(1982)
use of the av-
erage
intercorrelation among single acts most
closely resembles
the
tightness-looseness
of
manifested
dispositional structure. That
is,
tightly-structured
dispositions
are
considered
to be
broad
or
global. Note that
a
trade-off
exists
between
the
tightness
of a
dispositional
category
and the
number
of
observations
needed
for an
adequate
act
trend:
The
tighter
the
manifested disposition,
the
fewer
the
number
of
observations required.
Within
the act
frequency
approach, dis-
positional breadth takes
on at
least
four
ad-
ditional meanings.
In
each case, dispositional
breadth
is an
empirical matter
and not
fun-
damentally
a
conceptual issue.
For a
given
disposition,
versatility
and
situational
scope
refer
to the
breadth
of an
individual's rep-
ertoire
of
prototypical acts
and
the
breadth
of
contexts
in
which they
are
performed,
re-
spectively.
These
two
measures
of
disposi-
tional breadth generate person variables.
In
contrast,
two
measures
of
breadth gauge
properties
of the
dispositional construct
it-
self.
Category
volume
refers
to
variations
among
dispositions
in the
number
of
acts
considered
to be
prototypical members, rang-
ing
from
few to
many. Finally,
category
struc-
ture
refers
to the
tightness
or
looseness
of the
correlational matrix
for
manifested acts
fall-
ing
within
the
category boundaries.
Situational Analysis
In
its
most
general
form,
the act
frequency
approach grants little place
to
situational
analysis.
In
assessing individuals
on a
per-
sonality
disposition,
act
frequency analysis
sums displays
of
prototypical acts without
regard
for
attributions
of
causality
to
person
or
situation.
At
this
level,
it
remains
strictly
descriptive, entailing situational considera-
tions
only
as
qualifications
in the
description
of
prototypical
acts.
For
example,
an act of
displaying
little emotion when meeting
an old
friend
at the
airport constitutes
an
aloof act,
but
displaying
little
emotion
at a
formal cer-
emony
or
while reading
the
newspaper prob-
ably
does not. Beyond that,
the
acts, once
specified
in
this manner,
are
credited
to the
individual's
account independently
of any
inferences
of
causal attribution
to
person
or
situation
and
without
any
effort
to
match
or
control
for
situational
and
related
factors.
It
follows
from
this approach
that
in field
monitoring
of
persons
for the
purpose
of
dis-
positional assessment,
the
basic unit
of
com-
parative measurement
is
temporal.
That
is,
two
persons
are
deemed similarly dominant
if
they have achieved equivalent tallies
of
pro-
totypically
dominant acts over
an
equal
pe-
riod
of
observation, regardless
of
whether
they
differ
in
age,
for
example,
or in the
kind
of
social ecologies within which they
function
(e.g.,
one may be a
young
bus
driver
and the
other
an
elderly business executive).
However,
the act
frequency
approach
can
be
conjoined with situational analysis
by
sub-
aggregating
act
trends according
to
specific
contexts
or
categories
of
situations.
This pro-
cedure
would entail developing multiple-act
indices
of a
given dispositional construct
(within specified subsets
of
situations)
and
applying
them
to
individuals (e.g.,
at
work,
at
home). Such subaggregation resembles

118
DAVID
M.
BUSS
AND
KENNETH
H.
CRAIK
Table
6
Aversive
Acts Aggregated
by
Situation
and
Period
Of
Observation (Hypothetical)
Situation
Frequency
Person
Mother
Father
Younger
sister
Older
sister
Brother
Grandmother
Total
Mother
_
4
2
13
5
4
28
Father
17
—
3
18
8
1
47
Younger
sister
3
5
—
4
3
10
25
Older
sister
8
11
9
—
6
4
38
Brother
24
13
10
20
—
2
69
Grand-
mother
11
2
5
12
7
—
37
Time
1
63
35
29
67
29
21
Time
2
67
31
33
72
34
14
procedurally
Patterson's
(1975, 1979)
func-
tional
analysis
of
coercive behaviors. Patter-
son
and his
associates have observed individ-
uals within
the
context
of
family
interaction.
Table
6
presents
a
hypothetical illustration
of
the
kinds
of
frequency
tallies yielded
by
their
observational strategy.
The act
category
for
aversive behaviors,
for
example, might
include crying, ignoring
others,
noncomply-
ing
with
requests, teasing, whining, yelling,
and
humiliating others.
The
Time
1
column
sums
the
frequency
of
aversive acts
by
each
family
member over
the
period
of
observa-
tion.
The
Time
2
column gives
a
hypothetical
result
for a
second period
of
observation.
The
latter information, typically
not
presented,
serves
to
demonstrate that
by
tracking per-
sons
useful
data
can be
produced
for an act
frequency
assessment
of the
dispositional
construct
of
aversiveness.
Table
6
also breaks down
the
manifesta-
tions
of
aversive acts according
to the
family
member
with whom
the
person
was
inter-
acting. These units
can be
treated
as
situa-
tions
or,
within Patterson's theoretical per-
spective,
as
discriminative stimuli (Patterson
&
Bechtel, 1977),
The
primary
focus
of
Pat-
terson's analyses
has not
been upon dispo-
sitional
constructs,
and he has not
analyzed
the
internal structure
of the
constructs (e.g.,
aversiveness).
Nevertheless,
the
operations
employed would yield summary
indices
of
the
kind required
by the act
frequency
ap-
proach (e.g.,
the
Time
1 and
Time
2
columns)
as
well
as
multiple-act indices that
are
situ-
ationally
specific
(e.g., Mother
and
Brother
columns).
Finally,
Table
6
illustrates
the
usefulness
of
an
index
of
situational scope
in act
fre-
quency
analysis. Situational
scope
assesses
the
range
or
variety
of
situational
contexts
in
which
the
individual manifests prototypical
acts
from
a
dispositional category (e.g.,
di-
recting
aversive acts
to all
members
of the
family
versus only
to the
youngest sister).
Situational scope
is a
person variable
and an
analogue
to
dispositional
versatility
(the range
or
variety
of
different
prototypical acts man-
ifested
over
a
period
of
observation, e.g., yell-
ing,
teasing,
and
whining
versus just teasing).
Within
an act
frequency analysis, each
in-
dividual's
conduct
can be
tallied across
all
situations
or
across
specific
subclasses
of
sit-
uations.
If
act-trend indices
differ
signifi-
cantly
across certain classes
of
situations
and
the
differential
is
stable over
time,
then
this
contingent relation could
be
used
in
predict-
ing
future
act
trends. Detailed knowledge
of
situational
contingencies
of act
trends might
warrant
a
shift
of
dispositional constructs
from
the
status
of
categorical
summaries
(Hampshire, 1953)
to
that
of
hypothetical
propositions
(Ryle,
1949).
In
contrast
to
Hampshire,
Ryle
and
others
(Tuomela,
1978) argue that personal dispo-
sitions
are
hypothetical
propositions,
akin
to
dispositional statements
in
physics (e.g., "the
glass
is
brittle")
and
take
the
form:
It is
likely
or
a
good
bet
that
the
entity will respond
in
certain
ways
(x, y,
z;
e.g.,
"shatter")
to
certain
circumstances
(a, b,
c;
e.g., "being
hit by a
stone"). This strategy
of
subaggregation
of
act
trends
by
types
of
situations presupposes
some advances
in
formulating
effective
sys-

ACT
FREQUENCY
APPROACH
119
terns
for the
categorization
of
situations
(Magnusson,
1981).
Personality
Coherence
As
Cattell
(1957)
and
Block
(1977)
have
recognized,
it is
useful
to
distinguish between
kinds
of
personality data. Most personality
research entails data subsumed
by
four
cat-
egories:
O
data
(based upon observer
re-
ports),
L
data (based upon personal
and so-
cietal
life
outcomes),
T
data (based upon lab-
oratory test situations),
and S
data (based
upon
self-reports). Temporal
stability
of O
data
and S
data
can be
demonstrated (Mis-
chel,
1968; Block,
1971).
Furthermore,
sub-
stantial relations that make psychological
sense
can be
shown among these various
kinds
of
personality data, giving evidence
for
the
orderly
and
robust phenomena with
which
this
field of
inquiry
deals.
For
example,
in
the
analysis
of
longitudinal
data,
Block
(1971)
has
found
impressive coherence
be-
tween
Q-sort
descriptions
for the
adolescent
period
(O
data)
and
personality scale scores
for
the
mid-30s
(S
data), whereas Block
and
Block
(1980), Buss
(1981b),
and
Buss, Block,
and
Block
(1980)
have
identified
meaningful
patterns
of
relations between
O
data
and T
data during
the
childhood years. Also,
S
data
have
been related
to a
host
of
life
outcomes
(L
data), including school achievement
(Gough,
1968)
and
architectural creativity
(Hall
&
MacKinnon, 1969).
The act
frequency approach makes
two
contributions
to the
study
of
personality
co-
herence.
First,
it
offers
act
trends
(A
data)
as
a fifth
hybrid class
of
personality data, which
can be
usefully
differentiated
from
each
of
the
other
four
types. Second,
it
highlights
an
omission
that
handicaps
any
personality-re-
search agenda that restricts itself
to
exam-
ining
the
interrelations within
or
among typ-
ical
forms
of O
data,
L
data,
T
data,
and S
data. Consider
the
example
of a
researcher
who
sets
out to
study professional musicians
by
assessing music-conservatory students
through
(a)
personality descriptions
by
peers
(O
data),
(b)
performance
in
laboratory tests
(T
data),
and (c)
mail-back personality
in-
ventories
(S
data),
which
in
later years
are all
related
to
personal
and
professional
life
out-
comes (e.g., marital status, prominence
as a
performer:
L
data). What
is
lacking
in
this
research design
is any
monitoring
of
what
the
individuals
do all
day—a
missing link that
can be
supplied
in
part
by the
act-frequency
approach.
Act-Trend
Data
(A
Data)
The
classification
of S, O, L, and T
data
is
based primarily upon
the
source
of
data
(i.e.,
from
self,
observer, laboratory,
or
society
and
other sciences).
In
this sense,
A
data
are
a
hybrid species that
can
derive
from
the
monitoring
of
acts
by
either self
or
observers.
But
from
an
alternative perspective,
the
typ-
ical
forms
of S and O
data actually draw upon
only
limited
subclasses
of
data
from
their
re-
spective
sources and,
in
each case,
different
subclasses than those
that
generate
A
data.
S
data
are
typically based upon self-ratings
of
dispositions
or
upon assessments
of
dis-
positions
from
personality scales, whereas
A
data
are
based specifically
on
tallies
of
self-
monitored
acts.
O
data
are
typically derived
from
dispositional attributions
by
observers;
A
data
are
based upon tallies
of
observers'
recordings
of
specific
monitored acts.
Before
comparing
A
data
with
the
other
kinds
of
personality
data,
several additional
features
of A
data warrant
notice.
First,
the
act
remains
the
primitive term
in
this
ap-
proach
and
requires
further
explication. Suf-
fice
it
to
note here that
acts
as
typically
ap-
perceived
by
observers (Murray, 1938) entail
not
only
the
physical movements
(or
actones,
in
Murray's terminology)
but
also ingredients
of
style
and
intensity
of the act and of its
context.
All of
these elements play
a
role (not
yet
fully
examined)
in the
categorization
and
prototypicality rating
of
specific
acts
vis-a-vis
dispositional constructs. Second, adequate
analysis
of the
internal
structure
of
disposi-
tional-act
categories presents
a
challenge.
Is-
sues
in the
act-nomination
and
prototypi-
cality-rating procedures have already been
noted.
The
phrasing
of
written accounts
of
acts
is
another issue. Queneau
(1947/1981)
has
demonstrated
how a
simple social epi-
sode
can be
depicted
in 195
different
literary
styles
(e.g., narrative, insistence,
reported
speech, exclamations).
And the
gathering
of
prototypicality ratings
of
ongoing
or
recorded
acts (e.g., videotaping) presents
its own
prob-
lems.

120
DAVID
M.
BUSS
AND
KENNETH
H.
CRAIK
Third,
the
challenge
of
assessing
act
trends
of
individuals over extended periods
of
time
(required
by the act
frequency
approach)
poses formidable problems.
A
variety
of
methods
are
available
for
such assessment,
but
each method carries serious limitations.
Retrospective accounts
of act
performance,
both
by
actor
and
observers,
offer
one
method.
"Beeper"
technology (e.g., Czikszentmihalyi,
1975; Pawlik
&
Buse, 1982; Sjoberg, 1981),
in
which individuals carry devices that signal
at
random intervals,
notifying
the
subjects
to
record their actions
at
that moment,
offers
a
second method. Contemporaneous
ob-
server recording
of
acts
offers
a
third
method.
Each
poses
a
unique
set of
problems,
and
ideally,
convergence should
be
obtained across
methods.
Barker
and his
associates
at the
Midwest
Psychological
Field
Station
(Barker
&
Wright,
1955;
Barker, 1963) initially sought
ways
of
segmenting
the
stream
of
behavior
before
they
shifted
from
behavior episodes
to be-
havior
settings
as the
primary unit
of
analysis
in
ecological psychology.
The act
frequency
approach requires
a
return
to
that original,
person-centered,
observational
mission
but
points beyond
One
Boy's
Day
(Barker
&
Wright,
1951)
to, for
example,
One
Domi-
nant
Boy's Day.
This
task will require atten-
tion
to the
perceptual units
of
social action
(Collett, 1980;
Newtson,
Engquist,
&
Bois,
1977),
to the
role
of
context,
and to
pluralistic
meanings
in the
interpretation
of
social acts
(Rommetveit,
1980). Procedures
for
self-
monitoring
and
other monitoring
of the
stream
of
behavior have received increasing
attention
in
recent research (Epstein, 1979,
1980;
Forgas, 1976; McGowan
&
Gormley,
1976;
Mischel
&
Peake, 1982; Pervin,
1976).
A
Data
and O
Data
O
data,
as
recorded consensual
and
stable
impressions that observers
form
about
the
personalities
of
target individuals, constitute
fundamental
sources
for
personality assess-
ment (Block,
1961;
Wiggins, 1973).
The
pro-
cesses entailed when observers move
from
the
perception
of
acts
to the
attribution
of
dis-
positions have also been
a
major
topic
in re-
search
on
person perception (Hastorf,
Schneider,
&
Polefha
1970).
The act
frequency
approach
suggests
that
inferences
about
the
dispositions
of
others
are
based
largely
but not
completely
on
memory
traces
of
observed
act
trends. This position
has
wide-ranging implications
for the
direc-
tion
and
interpretation
of
attribution
re-
search.
For
example,
the
influential
research
program
of
Jones
and
Davis (1965)
is
guided
by
a
notion
of the act and a
general concep-
tion
of
disposition that
are not
seriously
at
odds with
the act
frequency
approach.
Yet
their
typical research design presents judges
with
a
single
act of the
target person,
from
which
inferences about dispositions
are re-
quested. Indeed, their construct
of the
"cor-
respondence
of
inference"
specifies
that
"a
disposition
is
being rather directly reflected
in
behavior
and
that
this
disposition
is un-
usual
in its
strength
or
intensity"
(p.
264).
In
contrast,
the act
frequency
approach holds
explicitly
that
a
single
act is an
inadequate
basis
for
dispositional inferences; such
infer-
ences
are
more appropriately based upon
act
trends
over
a
period
of
observation. Neither
the
intensity
nor the
consequences
of a
single
act
offer
a
strong
or
sensible foundation
for
dispositional
inference.
Thus, much
of the
attribution-research literature based
on
sin-
gle
acts
or
adjectival descriptions
is
largely
irrelevant
from
the
standpoint
of the act
fre-
quency
approach.
Inferring
dispositions
from
observed-act
trends must
be
recognized
as a
complex cog-
nitive
process.
Any act is a
potential member
of
several
dispositional
categories,
especially
at the
periphery
of act
categories.
The
infer-
ence
process presumably entails
the
encoding
and
monitoring
of
topographically dissimilar
acts
and
requires tracking
of a
person's
act
trends, which
are
extended over
time
and in-
terspersed
among other assortments
of
acts
and
act
trends. Finally,
the
internal
structure
of
manifested
dispositions
may not
generally
be
very
tight.
Yet to
gain
an
understanding
of
act-to-disposition inferences, direct study
of
the
perceptions
of act
trends
and
inferences
about
them
is
necessary.
The
evidence that dispositional
inferences
may
be
influenced
by
factors
other than
the
perception
of act
trends complicates matters

ACT
FREQUENCY APPROACH
121
even
more. First,
the
nature
of
natural cog-
nitive
categories
may
lead
to
asymmetric
ex-
pectations
at the
level
of
act-to-category
judgements.
If the
observed person displays
a
highly
prototypical
act
(e.g.,
of
dominance),
then
the
perceived likelihood
of his or her
performing
a
given peripheral
act may be
deemed relatively high.
But in the
reverse
case,
a
person performing
a
peripheral
act
may
not be
expected
to
perform
a
given core
act. Rips (1975)
has
found
similar asym-
metries
of
inference
in
examining categories
of
natural objects (e.g.,
if a
prototypical
bird,
such
as a
robin,
is
found
to
have
a new
con-
tagious disease,
the
judged likelihood
is
also
high
for a
more peripheral
form
of
bird, such
as a
duck,
but the
reverse does
not
appear
to
hold).
Asymmetric expectations
of
this sort
could
affect
the
perception
of act
trends
and
warrant study.
Second,
other
cognitive
sche-
mata, perhaps based upon empirical regu-
larities,
are at
play
in
dispositional
inferences,
apart
from
the
role
of
observed
act
trends.
These factors include inferences based upon
nonact
attributes (e.g., clothing
style)
and
those
derived
from
cross-dispositional
impli-
cative
systems
(e.g.,
evidence
for wit
leading
to
inferences
regarding intelligence).
A
Data
and L
Data
Life-outcome
data
are
typically
found
in
indices derived
by
social institutions
and
other
scientific
disciplines.
The
range
in-
cludes
biological
and
medical indices (e.g.,
gender,
diagnosed alcoholism), sociodemo-
graphic
indices (e.g., social class), institu-
tional
outcomes (e.g., graduation
from
law
school,
award
for
creative performance, pro-
motion
to
higher position),
and
even certain
socially
salient single acts (e.g.,
of
heroism,
crime).
The
relation
of
act-trend
indices
for
personality
dispositions
to
specific
forms
of
L
data
is an
empirical question
and
repre-
sents
an
important research agenda linking
personality
to
sociology
and the
other sci-
ences.
A
Data
and T
Data
The
relations between
T
data
collected
under
laboratory conditions
and A
data
mon-
itored
from
daily
life
depend upon several
factors.
The
degree
of
mundane realism
(Aronson
&
Carlsmith, 1968)
of the
con-
trived
laboratory situation
has
some bearing,
but two
other considerations
are
perhaps
more important. First,
the act
frequency
ap-
proach
offers
a
procedure
for the
conceptual
analysis
of
dispositional constructs.
In
con-
trast,
T
data
are
often
based upon contrived
acts whose centrality
to the
disposition
at is-
sue
is not
established. Second,
the act
fre-
quency
approach considers multiple-act
in-
dices
in the
form
of act
trends
as
appropriate
criteria
for
personality prediction, whereas
studies
employing
T
data have
often
sought
to
predict single-act criteria (Epstein, 1980).
The
degree
of
coherence
to be
expected
be-
tween
A
data
and T
data
depends upon
the
adequacy
of
procedures
for
generating
T
data,
a
point
that
has
been amply
illustrated
elsewhere
with regard
to the
relations
be-
tween
O
data
and T
data
(Block
&
Block,
1980).
A
Data
and S
Data
The use of A
data
as
multiple-act-criterion
indices
for
the
validation
of
personality
scales
has
been demonstrated (Buss
&
Craik,
1980,
1981,
in
press).
In
addition,
the act
frequency
approach
contributes
new
facets
to the
more
detailed
conceptual analysis
of
psychological
scores
and
measures (Gough, 1965). These
conceptual
indicators based upon
A
data
in-
clude
act
density (the number
of
significant
act
correlates
of a
scale within
the
nominally
appropriate
act
category),
act
bipolarity
(the
number
of
significant
act
correlates
of a
scale
from
the
semantically opposing
act
category),
and act
extensity (the number
of
significant
act
correlates
within
act
categories other than
the
nominally appropriate
and
semantically
opposing
act
categories) (Buss
&
Craik,
in
press;
Buss,
198la,
1981c).
Summary
and
Discussion
The act
frequency
approach
to
personality
adopts
the
categorical-summary
view
of
per-
sonal
dispositions.
A
dispositional
assertion
refers
to the
relative
frequency
with which
the
individual
has
displayed acts counting
as
members
of
that
dispositional category, over

122
DAVID
M.
BUSS
AND
KENNETH
H.
CRAIK
a
period
of
observation. These multiple-act
indices,
or act
trends,
are a
fundamental
form
of
personality data
and
represent
a
theoreti-
cally
sanctioned union
of the
concept
of
dis-
position
with principles
of
aggregation
and
reliability
of
measurement.
This
approach
to
personality
treats
dis-
positional
constructs
as
natural
cognitive
cat-
egories
of
topographically dissimilar acts,
with
status
of act
members
varying
in
pro-
totypicality
from
core
to
peripheral standing.
Recent
advances
in
cognitive psychology pro-
vide
guidance
and
procedures
for an
empir-
ical
research program examining
the
internal
structure
of
dispositional categories
of
acts
as
well
as the
horizontal
and
vertical dimen-
sions
of
this system
of act
categorization.
Although founded
in
behavioral observa-
tion,
the act
frequency
approach draws
a ba-
sic
distinction between behavioral consis-
tency
(covariation among observed acts)
and
dispositional consistency (covariation among
act-trend
indices)
and
identifies
several dis-
tinctive
facets
of
dispositional breadth.
The
primary
frame
of
measurement
in
this
ap-
proach
is the
period
of
observation rather
than
a set of
specified
situations.
In its
most
general
form,
the act
frequency
approach
proceeds without regard
for
attributions
of
causality
to
persons
or
situations. However,
for
analytic purposes,
the
approach
can be
joined
to any
system
of
situational
classifi-
cation, examining
act
trends subaggregated
according
to
specific
types
of
situation.
Fi-
nally,
the
act-frequency
approach contributes
act-trend
data
(A
data)
as a
neglected ingre-
dient
in the
delineation
and
understanding
of
coherence
in
personality, augmenting
the
more
often
explored
forms
of
observer-based
(O
data), self-report
(S
data),
laboratory
(T
data),
and
life-outcome
(L
data) measures.
Dispositional constructs
as
categories
of
acts
are
sociocognitive devices
or
inven-
tions—emergents
of
sociocultural evolution
(Campbell,
1965).
An
effort
to
understand
the
origins
and
basis
of
this system
for the
categorization
of
acts leads
to
some
of the
most
difficult
and
problematic questions
of
personality
theory. Dispositional constructs
serve
the
specific
function
of
facilitating
the
categorization
of
trends
in the
acts
of
persons.
It
is
reasonable
to
assume that core
or
pro-
totypical
acts served
as
reference acts around
which
dispositional
categories emerged
(Rosch,
1975a;
Rosch, Mervis
et
al.,
1976).
Three
possible sources
of
emergence
can be
identified.
First, dispositional categories
may
have
developed
to
capture observed cooccurrences
of
acts
in the
streams
of
individuals'
behavior.
Individual
differences
in
frequencies
for
sin-
gle
acts
may
have preceded
the
discernment
and
conceptualization
of
individual consis-
tencies
for
cooccurrences
in
multiple-act
cat-
egories.
In
both cases, covariations
in the
structure
of
individual action
form
the
basis
of
dispositional categories,
in a way not un-
like
that hypothesized
for
categories
of ob-
jects (Craik, 1981; Rosch
&
Mervis, 1975;
Rosch, Mervis
et
al.,
1976).
Second,
dispositional
categories
may
have
formed
around reference acts that share
a
salient
or
notable attribute, somewhat
or en-
tirely
apart
from
their cooccurrence within
the
stream
of
individuals' behavior. Jones
and
Davis
(1965)
focus
upon
the
assumed desir-
ability
of the
act's
effects
or its
hedonic rel-
evance.
Wiggins (Note
1)
also points
to
com-
mon
consequences
of
acts
as the key
attribute
but
strives
for a
nonevaluative consideration
from
an
institutional
or
rule-system stand-
point (e.g.,
an act
likely
to
harm
or
injure
another counts
as
aggressive
in the
context
of
rules
for
classifying
the
social conse-
quences
of
actions). Given this possibility,
within
the act
frequency
approach
the as-
sumption
regarding
the
internal structure
of
dispositional categories would take prece-
dence over
the
summary notion,
and a
looser
depiction
of
variation
in the
structure
of
manifested
individual acts could
be
antici-
pated.
Third,
dispositional
constructs
could
re-
flect
generative mechanisms
of
action.
In the
domain
of
colors, human categorization
ap-
pears
to
possess
a
physiological basis (i.e.,
fo-
cal
colors correspond
to
properties
of
color-
vision;
Kay &
McDaniel,
1978;
Rosch,
1975a)
from
which
the
cross-cultural generality
of
Rosch's
findings in
this domain
may
follow.
The
relation
of
dispositional categories
of
acts
to
generative mechanisms
of act
trends
cannot
be
established
at
this time
but
rep-
resents
a
central
issue
in
personality theory
(Wiggins,
Note
2). If
dispositional categories
are
formed
primarily around attributes
of

ACT
FREQUENCY
APPROACH
123
acts
that
possess cultural salience, then
im-
portant cross-cultural variations
in
content
and
internal structure
are
possible
and the
likelihood
that such categories mirror
or
pro-
vide
important clues about generative mech-
anisms
is
diminished. Cross-cultural research
bearing
on
this
topic
is
appearing (White,
1980),
but
studies dealing specifically with
the
internal cognitive structure
of
disposi-
tional
categories would speak directly
to
this
issue.
'
Within
current personality theory, Alston
(1970,
1975, Note
3) has
identified
a
con-
ceptual divide between
frequency
concepts
of
disposition
and
purposive-cognitive con-
cepts.
He
deems this distinction
the
most
fun-
damental alternative
for
personality research.
Unlike
frequency
concepts, purposive-cog-
nitive
concepts
do not
entail
a
category
of
occurrences
that
can be
specified
to
count
as
displays
of a
disposition. Instead, they derive
their meaning
and
standing
from
their place
in
a
theoretical framework (typically moti-
vational
in
nature) intended
to
explain
be-
havioral
occurrences.
Purposive-cognitive
concepts include desires,
beliefs,
and
abilities
that function within
a field of
tendencies
be-
tween
activated desires
and
guiding
beliefs
on
the
one
hand
and
manifested behavior
on the
other. Alston points
to
psychoanalytic theory
(Rapaport,
1959)
and
cognitive social-learn-
ing
conceptualizations
of
personality
(Mis-
chel,
1973)
as
distinctive examples
of the
purposive-cognitive
approach.
Alston
further
argues
that
in
addition
to
other theoretical jobs, purposive-cognitive
concepts
offer
an
explanation
of
frequency
dispositions. Between observed acts
and
pur-
posive-cognitive concepts,
frequency
dispo-
sitions
form
a
middle
level
of
analysis.
But
it is
possible, instead, that
the act
frequency
and
purposive-cognitive concepts
may be
components
of
incommensurate approaches.
Consider Figure
1: The act
frequency
ap-
proach would assess Person
A as
more dom-
inant than Person
B and
forecast
a
continuing
differential
manifestation
of
dominant acts.
Marshalling
purposive-cognitive
concepts
requires
a
more indirect procedure, including
a
theoretical formulation
of the
individual
and an
interpretation
of the
observed behav-
ior.
For
example,
the
analysis
of
mood states,
displaced
affective
outbursts, slips
of the
tongue,
and
dreams might lead
to the
infer-
ence
that Person
B has a
strong need
for
dom-
inance that
is
inhibited
by a
stronger
fear
of
rejection; Person
A,
with
a
weak need
for
dominance,
incurs heavy psychological costs
in
his
many
acts
of
dominance, which
at
some points
are
motivated
by a
fear
of
failure
in
an
institutional role that requires such
displays
and at
other points
by a
fear
of al-
lowing
someone else
to
take control
of
situ-
ations.
The
contrast
in the
functions
of the
frequency
concept
of
dominance
and the
pur-
posive-cognitive concept
of
need
for
domi-
nance
in the
analysis
of
acts within
the
stream
of
behavior
is
striking.
The
purposive-cog-
nitive
explanation
for
Person
A's
observed
behavior
also requires
a
subaggregation
of
dominant acts
not
entailed
by the act
fre-
quency
approach.
The
relation
of
frequency
and
purposive-cognitive approaches clearly
requires
further
theoretical examination.
In
his
search
for
intraindividual measures
of
personality,
G. W
Allport
(1937, 1958,
1962)
often
championed
F. H.
Allport's
(1937)
concept
of
teleonomic
trend. Like dis-
positional
act
trends, teleonomic trends
are
derived
from
the
monitoring
of an
individ-
ual's daily acts over
a
period
of
observation.
Instead
of
being aggregated into dispositional
categories, however, acts
are
ordered accord-
ing
to
what
the
person
is
trying
to do
through
them
(e.g., seeking justice, trying
to
maintain
self-esteem,
avoiding responsibility, helping
others,
or
gaining
the
attention
of
elders).
According
to F. H.
Allport, such concepts
can
be
used objectively
and
reliably
by
observers
to
order acts
in a way
that indicates
how the
person
is
trying
to
make adjustments
or
changes
in his or her
environment through
everyday
acts.
A
purposive-cognitive variant
of
teleon-
omic-trend
analysis
can be
found
in the re-
cent
formulation
of
personal-projects
analy-
sis
(Palys,
Little,
&
Baker-Brown, Note
4).
This
approach examines
the
acts
of
persons
by
means
of the
self-reported ordering
of
them
according
to the
concept
of
personal
projects,
that
is,
sequences
of
goal states
and
means-end,
or
instrumental, acts.
The
con-
cept
can be
considered
a
type
of
serial pro-
ceeding within Murray's
(1938)
framework.
Act
frequency
analysis
of
dispositions
and
personal-projects analysis
offer
two
quite dif-

124
DAVID
M.
BUSS
AND
KENNETH
H.
CRAIK
ferent
systems
for the
classification
of
acts.
The
act of
complaining when served
a
tough
steak
at a
restaurant,
for
example,
may be
classified
with
other
topographically
dissim-
ilar
manifestations
of
dominance
in the act
frequency
approach
but
might
be
grouped
instead with other
and
different
topographi-
cally
dissimilar acts within
the
personal-pro-
jects category such
as
getting
a
promotion
(in
this
instance,
by
impressing
the
boss).
Efforts
to
clarify
the
conceptual
and em-
pirical
interrelations among various middle-
level
personality approaches
to the
categori-
zation
of
acts
and to
explanatory systems
offer
an
important road
to the
revival
of
theo-
retical
discourse that Maddi
(1980)
has ad-
vocated. Indeed, this endeavor
is
likely
to
occupy
personality theorists
in a
profitable
fashion
during this decade
of the
1980s.
In
the
meantime,
the act
frequency
approach
to
personality
poses
an
extensive research agenda
and
raises
a
host
of
novel questions. What
are the
prototypical
act
members
of
impor-
tant dispositional categories?
How do
dis-
positional
constructs
differ
in
terms
of
their
category
volume,
the
range
and
central ten-
dency
of act
membership,
and the
tightness
of
their manifested structure? What
are the
effects
of
various
instructional
sets
upon
act
nominations
and
prototypicality ratings?
How
do
alternative indices
of act
prototypicality
interrelate? Does
the
average between-rater
agreement
for
prototypicality ratings
of
acts
differ
from
that
for
objects?
Are
there age-
specific
variations
in
prototypical
acts
for
some dispositional constructs? Does act-trend
analysis
support
a
circumplex model
of in-
terpersonal
dispositions?
In
person percep-
tion,
are
there asymmetries
of
inference
to-
ward
more prototypical
act
members
of
dis-
positional
categories? What levels
and
forms
of
coherence obtain
in the
relations
of
act-
trend data
to
observer ratings,
to
laboratory
and
self-report
measures,
and to
significant
life
outcomes?
Reference
Notes
1.
Wiggins,
J. S. In
defense
of
traits.
Invited
address
to
the
Ninth
Annual
Symposium
on
Recent Develop-
ments
in the Use of
MMPI,
Los
Angeles,
February
28,
1974.
2.
Wiggins,
J. S.
Caltell's
system
from
the
perspective
of
mainstream
personality
theory.
Unpublished
manu-
script,
University
of
British
Columbia,
Vancouver,
British
Columbia,
Canada,
1979.
3.
Alston,
W. P. A
conceptual
divide
in
personality
de-
scriptions.
Paper presented
at the
meeting
of the
American
Psychological Association (invited address
to
Division
8),
September 1973.
4.
Palys,
T.
S.,
Little,
B. R., &
Baker-Brown,
G. A
project-
oriented
inquiry
into
community
organization,
dynam-
ics
and
satisfactions.
Unpublished
manuscript, Uni-
versity
of
British
Columbia,
Vancouver,
British
Co-
lumbia,
Canada,
1980.
References
Addis,
L.
Dispositions, explanation
and
behavior.
In-
quiry,
1981,
24,
205-227.
Allport,
F. H.
Teleonomic
description
in the
study
of
personality.
Character
and
Personality,
1937,
6,
202-
214.
Allport,
G. W.
Personality
and
character.
Psychological
Bulletin,
1921,
18,
441-455.
Allport,
G. W.
Concepts
of
trait
and
personality.
Psy-
chological
Bulletin,
1927,
24,
284-293.
Allport,
G. W.
What
is a
trait
of
personality?
Journal
of
Abnormal
and
Social
Psychology,
1931,25,
368-372.
Allport,
G. W.
Personality:
A
psychological
interpreta-
tion.
New
York:
Holt, 1937.
Allport,
G. W.
What
units
shall
we
employ?
In G.
Lind-
zey
(Ed.),
Assessment
of
human
motives.
New
York;
Rinehart,
1958.
Allport,
G.
W.The
general
and the
unique
in
psycholog-
ical
science.
Journal
of
Personality,
1962,30,405-422.
Allport,
G. W.
Traits
revisited.
American
Psychologist,
1966,
21,
1-10.
Allport,
G.
W.,
&
Allport,
F. H.
Personality
traits: Their
classification
and
measurement.
Journal
of
Abnormal
and
Social
Psychology,
1921,
16,
6-40.
Allport,
G.
W.,
&
Odbert,
H. S.
Trait-names:
A
psycho-
lexical
study.
Psychological
Monographs,
1936,
47(1,
Whole
No.
211).
Alston,
W. P.
Toward
a
logical
geography
of
personality:
Traits
and
deeper
lying
personality characteristics.
In
H. D.
Kiefer
& M.
K.
Munitz
(Eds.),
Mind,
science
and
history.
Albany,
N.Y.:
SUNY
Press, 1970.
Alston,
W. P.
Traits,
consistency
and
conceptual
alter-
natives
for
personality
theory.
Journal
for the
Theory
of
Social
Behavior,
1975,5,
17-48.
Armstrong,
D. M.
Dispositions
are
causes.
Analysis,
1969,
30,
23-36.
Aronson,
E. &
Carlsmith,
J. M.
Experimentation
in so-
cial
psychology.
In G.
Lindzey
& E.
Aronson
(Eds.),
The
handbook
of
social
psychology,
(Vol.
2, 2nd
ed.).
Reading,
Mass.:
Addison-Wesley,
1968.
Barker,
R. G.
(Ed.).
The
stream
of
behavior.
New
York:
Appleton,
1963.
Barker,
R.
G.,
&
Wright,
H. F. One
boy's
day.
New
York:
Harper
&
Row,
1951.
Barker,
R.
G.,
&
Wright,
H. F.
Midwest
and its
children.
New
York:
Harper
&
Row, 1955.
Block,
J. The
Q-sort
method
in
personality
assessment
and
psychiatric
research.
Springfield,
111.:
Charles
C.
Thomas,
1961.
Block,
J.
Lives
through
time.
Berkeley,
Calif.:
Bancroft
Books,
1971.

ACT
FREQUENCY APPROACH
125
Block,
J.
Advancing
the
psychology
of
personality: Par-
adigmatic
shift
or
improving
the
quality
of
research?
In
D.
Magnussen
& N. S.
Endler
(Eds.),
Personality
at
the
crossroads: Current issues
in
interactional psy-
chology.
Hillsdale,
N.J.: Erlbaum, 1977.
Block,
J. H., &
Block,
J. The
role
of
ego-control
and
ego-
resiliency
in the
organization
of
behavior.
In W. A.
Collins
(Ed.),
Minnesota Symposia
on
Child
Psychol-
ogy
(Vol. 13). Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1980.
Brandt,
R. B.
Traits
of
character:
A
conceptual
analysis.
American Philosophical
Quarterly,
1970,
7,
23-37.
Buss,
D. M. The act
frequency
analysis
of
interpersonal
dispositions.
Unpublished
doctoral
dissertation, Uni-
versity
of
California, Berkeley,
1981.
(a)
Buss,
D. M.
Predicting parent-child interactions
from
children's activity level. Developmental
Psychology,
1981,
17.
59-65.
(b)
Buss,
D. M. Sex
differences
in the
evaluation
and
per-
formance
of
dominant acts.
Journal
of
Personality
and
Social
Psychology,
1981,40,
147-154.
(c)
Buss,
D. M.
Evolutionary biology
and
personality psy-
chology: Implications
of
genetic variability.
Personal-
ity
and
Individual
Differences,
1983,
4,
51-63.
Buss,
D.
M.,
Block,
J.
H.,
&
Block,
J.
Preschool activity
level:
Personality correlates
and
developmental impli-
cations. Child
Development,
1980,
57,
401-408.
Buss,
D.
M.,
&
Craik,
K.
H. The
frequency concept
of
disposition: Dominance
and
prototypically dominant
acts. Journal
of
Personality,
1980,
48,
379-392.
Buss,
D.
M.,
&
Craik,
K. H. The act
frequency analysis
of
interpersonal
dispositions:
Aloofness, gregarious-
ness,
dominance
and
submissiveness. Journal
of
Per-
sonality,
1981,
49,
174-192.
Buss,
D.
M.,
&
Craik,
K. H. Act
prediction
and the
conceptual analysis
of
personality scales: Indices
of act
density,
bipolarity,
and
extensity. Journal
of
Person-
ality
and
Social
Psychology,
in
press.
Campbell,
D. T.
Variation
and
selective retention
in so-
cio-cultural
evolution.
In H. R.
Barringer,
G. I.
Blank-
sten,
& R. W.
Mack
(Eds.),
Social change
in
developing
areas.
Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1965.
Cattell,
R. B.
Personality
and
motivation structure
and
measurement.
Yonkers-on-Hudson,
N.Y.: World Book,
1957.
Collett,
P.
Segmenting
the
behaviour stream.
In M.
Bren-
ner
(Ed.),
The
structure
of
action.
New
York:
St.
Mar-
tin's Press, 1980.
Craik,
K. H. The
personality research paradigm
in en-
vironmental
psychology.
In S.
Wapner,
S. B.
Cohen,
& B.
Kaplan
(Eds.),
Experiencing
the
environment.
New
York:
Plenum,
1976.
Craik,
K. H.
Comment
on
"The psychological represen-
tation
of
molar physical environments"
by
Ward
and
Russell.
Journal
of
Experimental
Psychology:
General,
1981,
110, 158-162.
Cummins,
R.
Dispositions, states
and
causes. Analysis,
1974,
34,
194-204.
Csikszentmihalyi,
M.
Beyond boredom
and
anxiety.
San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975.
Epstein,
S. The
stability
of
behavior:
I. On
predicting
most
of the
people much
of the
time. Journal
of
Per-
sonality
and
Social
Psychology,
1979,37,
1097-1126.
Epstein,
S. The
stability
of
behavior:
II.
Implications
for
psychological research. American Psychologist, 1980,
35,
790-806.
Eysenck,
H. J. The
structure
of
human personality.
New
York: Wiley, 1953.
Eysenck,
H. J. A
model
for
personality.
Berlin:
Springer-
Verlag,
1981.
Fishbein,
M. The
prediction
of
behaviors from attitude
variables.
In K. K.
Sereno
& C. D.
Mortensen
(Eds.),
Advances
in
communication research.
New
York: Har-
per &
Row, 1972.
Fishbein,
M.,
&
Ajzen,
I.
Attitudes toward objects
as
predictions
of
single
and
multiple behavioral
criteria.
Psychological
Review, 1974,
81,
59-74.
Forgas,
J. P. The
perceptions
of
social
episodes:
Cate-
gorical
and
dimensional
representations
in two
dif-
ferent
social millieus. Journal
of
Personality
and
Social
Psychology,
1976,
34,
199-209.
Goldberg,
L. R.
From
ace to
zombie! Some
explorations
in
the
language
of
personality.
In C. O.
Spielberger
&
J. N.
Butcher
(Eds.),
Advances
in
personality
as-
sessment (Vol.
1).
Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1982.
Gough,
H. G.
Conceptual
analysis
of
psychological
test
scores
and
other diagnostic variables. Journal
of
Ab-
normal
Psychology,
1965,
70,
294-320.
Gough,
H. G. An
interpreter's
syllabus
for
the
California
Psychological Inventory.
In P.
McReynolds
(Ed.),
Ad-
vances
in
psychological
assessment (Vol.
1).
Palo Alto,
Calif.:
Science
and
Behavior Books, 1968.
Guilford,
J. P.
Personality.
New
York: McGraw-Hill,
1959.
Hall,
W.
B.,
&
MacKinnon,
D. W.
Personality inventory
correlates among architects. Journal
of
Applied
Psy-
chology,
1969,
53,
322-326.
Hampshire,
S.
Dispositions. Analysis,
1953,
14,
5-11.
Hampson,
S. E.
Person memory:
A
semantic category
model
of
personality traits. British Journal
of
Psy-
chology,
1982,
73,
1-11.
Hastorf,
A.
H.,
Schneider,
D.
J.,
&
Polefka,
J.
Person
perception.
Reading, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley,
1970.
Horowitz,
L.,
Inouye,
D.,
&
Siegelman,
E. Y. On
aver-
aging
judges' ratings
to
increase their
correlation
with
an
external criterion. Journal
of
Consulting
and
Clin-
ical
Psychology,
1979,
47,
453-458.
Jaccard,
J. J.
Predicting social behavior
from
personality
traits. Journal
of
Research
in
Personality,
1974,
7,
358-367.
Jones,
E.
E.,
&
Davis,
K. E.
From acts
to
dispositions:
The
attribution process
in
person
perception.
In L.
Berkowitz
(Ed.),
Advances
in
experimental social psy-
chology
(Vol.
2). New
York: Academic
Press,
1965.
Kay,
P., &
McDaniel,
C. K. The
linguistic significance
of
the
meanings
of
basic color terms. Language,
1978,
57,
383-405.
Leary
T.
Interpersonal
diagnosis
of
personality.
New
York:
Ronald Press, 1957.
Loevinger,
J.
Objective tests
as
instruments
of
psycho-
logical theory. Psychological Reports, 1957,
3,
635-
694
(Monograph
No. 9).
Maddi,
S. R. The
uses
of
theorizing
in
personology.
In
E.
Staub
(Ed.),
Personality: Basic aspects
and
current
research.
Englewood
Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980.
Magnusson,
D.
(Ed.).
Toward
a
psychology
of
situations:
An
interactional
perspective.
Hillsdale,
N.J.:
Erlbaum,
1981.
Magnusson,
D.,
&
Endler,
N. S.
(Eds.).
Personality
at the
cross-roads:
Current issues
in
interactional
psychology.
Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1977.

126
DAVID
M.
BUSS
AND
KENNETH
H.
CRAIK
McClelland,
D. C. The
nature
of
human motivation.
Glenview,
111.:
Scott,
Foresman, 1983.
McGowan,
J., &
Gormly,
J.
Validation
of
personality
traits:
A
multicriteria approach. Journal
of
Personality
and
Social
Psychology,
1976,
34,
791-795.
Mischel,
W.
Personality
and
assessment.
New
York:
Wiley,
1968.
Mischel,
W.
Toward
a
cognitive
social
learning
recon-
ceptualization
of
personality. Psychological Review,
1973,
80,
252-283.
Mischel,
W.,
&
Peake,
P. In
search
of
consistency: Mea-
sure
for
measure.
In M. P.
Zanna,
E. T.
Higgins,
&
C. P.
Herman
(Eds.),
Consistency
in
social behavior:
The
Ontario Symposium
of
Personality
and
Social
Psychology
(Vol.
2).
Hillsdaie,
NX:
Erlbaum, 1982.
Murray,
H. A.
Explorations
in
personality.
New
York:
Oxford,.
1938.
Newtson,
D.,
Engquist,
G.,
&
Bois,
J. The
objective basis
of
behavior units. Journal
of
Personality
and
Social
Psychology,
1977,
35,
847-862.
O'Shaughnessy,
B. The
powerlessness
of
dispositions.
Analysis, 1970,
31,
1-15.
Ozer,
D. J.
Consistency, coherence,
and
convergence:
A
framework
for the
study
of
personality.
Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, University
of
California, Ber-
keley,
1982.
Patterson,
G. R. A
three-stage functional analysis
for
children's coercive behaviors:
A
tactic
for
developing
a
performance
theory.
In B. C.
Etzel,
J. M.
LeBlanc,
&
D. M.
Baer
(Eds.),
New
developments
in
behavioral
research:
Theory,
methods
and
applications.
Hillsdaie,
N.J.:
Erlbaum,
1975.
Patterson,
G. R. A
performance theory
for
coercive fam-
ily
interaction.
In R.
Cairns
(Ed.),
Social interaction:
Methods,
analysis
and
illustration.
New
York: Hal-
stead Press, 1979.
Patterson,
G.
R.,
&
Bechtel,
G. G.
Formulating
the
sit-
uational
environment
in
relation
to
states
and
traits.
In
R. B.
Cattell
& D. M.
Dreger
(Eds.),
Handbook
of
modern
personality
theory.
New
York:
Halstead,
1979.
Pawlik,
K.,
&
Buse,
L.
Rechnergestiitze
verhaltensregis-
trierung
im
feld:
Beschreibung
und
erste psychome-
trische
iiberpriifung
einer neuen
erhebungsmethode.
Zeitschrift
fur
Differentielle
und
Diagnostische
Psy-
chologie,
1982,5,
101-118.
Pervin,
L. A. A
free-response description approach
to
the
analysis
of
personsituation
interaction.
Journal
of
Personality
and
Social
Psychology,
1976,34,465-474.
Powell,
B.
Uncharacteristic actions. Mind, 1959,
68,
492-509.
Queneau,
R.
Exercises
in
style
(B.
Wright
Trans.).
New
York:
New
Directions,
1981.
(Originally published,
1947.)
Rapaport,
D. The
structure
of
psychoanalytic theory:
A
systematizing attempt.
In S.
Koch
(Ed.),
Psychology:
A
study
of
a
science, (Vol.
3). New
York:
McGraw-
Hill, 1959.
Rips,
L. J.
Inductive judgements
about
natural catego-
ries.
Journal
of
Verbal
Learning
and
Verbal
Behavior,
1915,14,
665-681.
Rommetveit,
R. On
"meanings"
of
acts
and
what
is
meant
and
made known
by
what
is
said
in a
pluralistic
social world.
In M.
Brenner
(Ed.),
The
structure
of
action.
New
York:
St.
Martin's
Press,
1980.
Rosch,
E.
Cognitive reference points. Cognitive Psy-
chology,
1975,
7,
532-547.
(a)
Rosch,
E.
Cognitive
representations
of
semantic cate-
gories. Journal
of
Experimental
Psychology:
General,
1975, 104,
192-233.
(b)
Rosch,
E.
Principles
of
categorization.
In E.
Rosch
&
B.
B.
Lloyd
(Eds.),
Cognition
and
categorization. Hills-
dale, N.J.:
Erlbaum,
1978.
Rosch,
E.,
&
Mervis,
C. B.
Family resemblances: Studies
in
the
internal structure
of
categories.
Cognitive Psy-
chology,
1975,
7,
573-605.
Rosch,
E.,
Mervis,
C.
B.,
Gray,
W.
D.,
Johnson,
D.
M.,
&
Boyes-Braem,
P.
Basic
objects
in
natural
categories.
Cognitive
Psychology,
1976,5,
382-439.
Rosch,
E.,
Simpson,
C.,
&
Miller,
R. S.
Structural bases
of
typicality
effects.
Journal
of
Experimental
Psychol-
ogy:
Human
Perception
and
Performance,
1976,
2,
491-502.
Russell,
J. A.
Affective
space
is
bipolar. Journal
of
Per-
sonality
and
Social
Psychology,
1979,
37,
345-356.
Ryle,
G. The
concept
of
mind.
New
York:
Barnes
& No-
ble, 1949.
Sarbin,
T.
R.,
&
Allen,
V. L.
Role theory.
In
G.
Lindzey
& E.
Aronson
(Eds.),
The
handbook
of
social psy-
chology
(Vol.
1, 2nd
ed.). Reading,
Mass.:
Addison-
Wesley,
1968.
Skinner,
B. F. The
behavior
of
organisms.
New
York:
Appelton-Century-Crofts,
1938.
Spearman,
C.
"General
intelligence"
objectively
deter-
mined
and
measured. American Journal
of
Psychology,
1904,
15,
201-293.
Squires,
R. Are
dispositions
causes?
Analysis, 1968,
29,
45-47.
Squires,
R. Are
dispositions lost causes? Analysis,
1970,
31,
15-18.
Sjoberg,
L.
Life
situations
and
episodes
as a
basis
for
situational
influence
on
action.
In D.
Magnusson
(Ed.),
Toward
a
psychology
of
situations:
An
interac-
tional
perspective.
Hillsdaie, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1981.
Tuomela,
R.
(Ed.).
Dispositions.
Boston,
Mass.:
D.
Rei-
del,
1978.
White,
G. M.
Conceptual universals
in
interpersonal lan-
guage.
American Anthropologist, 1980,
82,
759-781.
Wiggins,
J. S.
Personality
and
prediction: Principles
of
personality
assessment.
Reading,
Mass.:
Addison-Wes-
ley,
1973.
Wiggins,
J. S. A
psychological taxonomy
of
trait descrip-
tive
terms:
I. The
interpersonal
domain.
Journal
of
Personality
and
Social
Psychology,
1979,3
7.
395-412.
Wiggins,
J. S.
Circumplex models
of
interpersonal
be-
havior.
In L.
Wheeler
(Ed.),
Review
of
personality
and
social
psychology
(Vol.
1).
Beverly Hills,
Calif.:
Sage,
1980.
Wiggins,
J. S.
Clinical
and
statistical prediction: Where
are we and
where
do we go
from
here? Clinical Psy-
chology
Review, 1981,
1,
3-18.
Zadeh,
L.
A.,
Fu, K.
S.,
Tanaka,
K.,
&
Shimura
(Eds.).
Fuzzy sets
and
their applications
to
cognitive
and de-
cision
processes.
New
York: Academic Press, 1975.
Received
May 5,
1982
Revision
received
November
1,
1982