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Abstract

Recent studies showed that a period of unconscious thought can help when making complex decisions. Under some circumstances, unconscious thought improves decisions even more than conscious thought. Executive functioning depends on energy provided by glucose, and we know from previous research that the performance of various conscious processes deteriorates when energy is low. Unconscious processes require less energy and may operate unhampered when energy is low. Therefore, we propose that whereas low blood glucose levels impair conscious thought, this is not the same for unconscious thought. An experiment, where we manipulated blood glucose levels, indicated that indeed, when making decisions, the unconscious can best be trusted when blood glucose levels are low, whereas conscious deliberation yields the best results when blood glucose levels are elevated. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Food for Thought? Trust your unconscious when energy is low
Maarten W. Bos
1,2
Ap Dijksterhuis
1
Rick van Baaren
1
1
Radboud University of Nijmegen
2
Harvard Business School
Number of words main text (including references): 2482 (3803)
Number of words abstract: 125
Running head: Food for Thought?
Address for correspondence: Maarten Bos, Harvard Business School, Baker Library 467,
Boston, MA 02163, USA, mbos@hbs.edu.
2
Abstract
Recent studies showed that a period of unconscious thought can help when
making complex decisions. Under some circumstances, unconscious thought improves
decisions even more than conscious thought. Executive functioning depends on energy
provided by glucose, and we know from previous research that the performance of
various conscious processes deteriorates when energy is low. Unconscious processes
require less energy and may operate unhampered when energy is low. Therefore we
propose that whereas low blood glucose levels impair conscious thought, this is not the
same for unconscious thought. An experiment, where we manipulated blood glucose
levels, indicated that indeed, when making decisions, the unconscious can best be trusted
when blood glucose levels are low, whereas conscious deliberation yields the best results
when blood glucose levels are elevated.
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Common knowledge dictates that when we have a complex decision to make, we
should consciously weight all relevant information and think hard. However, research
shows that this may be ill-advised, as conscious thought is – at least under some
circumstances - sensitive to various pitfalls and biases (Bos & Dijkterhuis, 2011; Bos &
Dijksterhuis, in press; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Wilson & Schooler, 1991;
Dijksterhuis, Van Baaren, Bongers, Bos, Van Leeuwen, & Van der Leij, 2010). So what
is the best way to come to optimal decisions? A growing body of literature says that
under some circumstances, a period of unconscious thought can be beneficial for decision
making.
Unconscious thought (UT) can be defined as a deliberative cognitive process in
the absence of conscious attention (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). In a typical
experiment, participants were given information about a decision problem. Some
participants were asked to consciously think about the information, whereas others were
given a distracting task and engaged in unconscious thought. The common finding is that
unconscious thought leads to good decisions (Bos, Dijksterhuis, & Van Baaren, 2011),
and sometimes even better decisions than conscious thought (Bos, Dijksterhuis, & Van
Baaren, 2008; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & Van Baaren, 2006a;
Dijksterhuis, Bos, Van der Leij, & Van Baaren, 2009; Ham, Van den Bos, & Van Doorn,
2009; Lerouge, 2009).
The UT effect is controversial (e.g., Gonzalez-Vallejo, Lassiter, Bellezza, &
Lindberg, 2008; Payne, Samper, Bettman, & Luce, 2008) and the controversy is fed by
the fact that the UT effect is far from robust. There are also a growing number of
researchers who reported failures to replicate the UT effect (Acker, 2008; Calvillo, &
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Penaloza 2009; Newell, Wong, Cheung, & Rakow, 2009; Thorsteinson, & Withrow,
2009; Waroquier, Marchiori, Klein, & Cleeremans, 2009, 2010). However, given that the
number of successful replications is also increasing rapidly (for a meta-analysis see
Strick, Dijksterhuis, Bos, Sjoerdsma, Van Baaren, & Nordgren, 2011), investigating
circumstances under which unconscious thought is or is not beneficial can be helpful.
Various people have asked the question to what extent the UT effect is
generalizable to other paradigms or situations (see also Bekker, 2006; Payne et al., 2008;
Shanks, 2006, but see Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & Van Baaren, 2006b; 2006c; Krans
& Bos, in press). By now, the UT effect has been obtained for many different choices,
including hypothetical houses, cars, and computers, posters that people could take home
(whereby quality of choice was operationalized as post-choice satisfaction), roommates,
and even for the predictions of sport games (Dijksterhuis, et al., 2009). In addition, the
UT effect extends to situations whereby people make moral or justice judgments (Ham et
al., 2009; Ham & Van den Bos, 2010), but it seems to not generalize to decisions
whereby people have to rely on numerical information, such as used in many games
(Payne et al, 2008). It seems a logical step to find more theoretical underpinnings of
when either conscious or unconscious thought would be more beneficial, depending on
the situation. Why do some decisions benefit from thinking consciously and do other
decisions benefit from thinking unconsciously?
Decisions based on conscious thought depend on declarative memory
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993), so circumstances
under which declarative memory is facilitated may prove beneficial for conscious
thought. Administering glucose improves verbal memory in difficult tasks (Sünram-Lea,
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Foster, Durlach, & Perez, 2002a; Meikle, Riby, & Stollery, 2005) and supports episodic
memory (Riby, McMurtrie, Smallwood, Ballantyne, Meikle, & Smith, 2006). Could a
low blood sugar level negatively impact conscious thought, but leave unconscious
thought unhampered? Let us first turn to the influence of blood glucose level on cognitive
functioning.
Glucose
The brain relies on glucose for almost all of its operations (Scholey, Harper, &
Kennedy, 2001; Siesjo, 1978; Taylor & Rachman, 1988). Cerebral stores of glucose and
glycogen run out in a matter of minutes (Marks & Rose, 1981). This makes the brain, in
contrast to other organs and tissues, dependent upon a continuous supply of glucose. So
glucose furnishes energy for the brain and indeed, various conscious processes deteriorate
when energy is low (Donohoe & Benton, 1999). For instance, low blood glucose levels
impair memory, attention and problem solving abilities (e.g. Benton, Owens, & Parker,
1994; Benton & Sargent, 1992; Donohoe & Benton, 1999; Kennedy & Scholey, 2000;
Morris & Sarll, 2001; Owens & Benton, 1994; Pollitt, Jacoby, & Cueto, 1996; Pollitt,
Leibel, & Greenfield, 1981; Pollitt, Lewis, Garza, & Shulman, 1983). Participants who
were asked to remember words from a list show an increase in memory performance
when blood glucose levels were elevated (Benton et al., 1994) and problem solving
abilities were increased in students after eating a snack containing sugar (Kanarek &
Swinney, 1990).
Not only do blood glucose levels affect performance, blood glucose levels also
decrease as a result of cognitively demanding tasks (e.g. Fairclough & Houston, 2004).
Brain glucose and glycogen levels run low after a demanding task (Gibson & Green,
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2002) and it follows naturally that performing a demanding task negatively influences
performance on a subsequent demanding task.
Coming back to decisions: Given that various brain processes are dependent on
glucose, it seems likely that consciously thinking about decisions also suffers when blood
glucose is low. As said, decisions based on conscious thought are dependent on
declarative memory, and declarative memory is dependent on glucose (Sünram-Lea,
Foster, Durlach, & Perez, 2001, 2002b). So, how are we to make good decisions when
glucose levels are low?
Decisions based on unconscious thought are probably less dependent on
declarative memory (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006), so unconscious thought may suffer
less from low blood glucose. With an experiment, we examined the effects of
manipulating blood sugar levels on decisions made after conscious and unconscious
thought. Fasted participants were given either a drink containing sugar or a drink without
sugar, after which they were presented with a decision problem. Some participants were
asked to make a decision after a period of conscious thought, whereas other were given a
distracting task and engaged in unconscious thought. With this setup, we tried to answer
the question: Under what blood glucose conditions should we trust conscious deliberation
to provide the best results and when can we trust unconscious thought?
Participants and Design
Of the 156 Dutch undergraduate students of the University of Amsterdam with an
average age of 21.18 (SD = 3.98) 35 were male. They were randomly assigned to the
cells of a 2 (Mode of Processing: Conscious versus Unconscious) x 2 (Blood sugar level:
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Low versus Increased) between-participants design. They received course credits or 7
Euros for their participation.
Procedure and Materials
Participants were asked not to eat or drink anything (other than water) three hours
prior to coming into the lab. Self-reports indicated that participants had indeed followed
this instruction. The entire study lasted for a total of 30 minutes, and participants were
tested somewhere between 9AM and 4PM. Blood glucose levels naturally change during
the day and with circadian rhythm, but conditions were randomly divided over the day, to
eliminate circadian rhythm or blood glucose variability confounds. Upon coming into the
lab, half the participants were given a drink containing sugar (250 ml of 7-up ©,
containing roughly 28 grams of sugar), whereas the other half were given a drink without
sugar (250 ml of 7-up Free ©, sweetened with aspartame). Both drinks were pre-tested
and tested in our experiment and participants in the pre-test as well as in the experiment
reported no difference in taste (sweetness) or liking of the drinks (all Fs<1). It takes about
12-15 minutes for sugar in a liquid to have an effect on the brain (there is a range from
10-12 minutes, as described by Masicampo & Baumeister in 2008 to 20 minutes, as
described by Benton in 1990), so after imbibing the drink, participants were presented
with a movie about sea life for 9 minutes and some demographic questions before they
read information about four hypothetical choice options.
Some participants read information about four hypothetical cars (n=54); some
about four hypothetical jobs (n=102). The car materials had been used previously
(Dijksterhuis et al., 2006a) and the job materials were constructed in the same way the
car materials had been constructed. Each choice option (car or job) was described by
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twelve attributes. The attributes were either positive or negative. The optimal choice
option was described by 75% positive attributes, two other choice options were described
by 50% positive attributes, and the last choice option by 25% positive attributes (see
Online supporting materials of Dijksterhuis et al., 2006a, appendix 1 for insight in the
construction of the materials). The attributes were presented one by one in random order
on a computer screen. Each attribute was presented for 4 seconds. After reading the
information, participants were either assigned to a conscious thought condition, or to an
unconscious thought condition. The timing was such that at the time participants were
assigned to either a conscious or unconscious thought condition, the glucose should have
its effect. In the conscious thought condition, participants were presented with a computer
screen with instructions asking them to think about the information carefully for four
minutes, so they could later make a decision. After that they rated the choice options. In
the unconscious thought condition, participants were distracted for four minutes (they
were given another, unrelated movie clip about sea life). Before watching the movie they
were told that after the period of distraction they would be asked their opinion of the
choice options. Participants in the unconscious thought condition were asked questions
about the second movie clip, which they received to distract them, to assess whether they
had paid attention, and were therefore sufficiently distracted. In general, participants in
both drink conditions performed equally well (F<1), scoring an average of 1.33
(SD=1.53) out of 4 in-depth questions about the movie.
Participants gave their attitude towards each of the four individual choice options.
The attitudes towards the individual choice options were measured by having participants
click a score between 1 (“very negative”) to 20 (“very positive”). The attitudes towards
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the four choice options were measured in random order. A higher score on the attitude
difference measure indicates a greater ability to differentiate between choice options.
Participants were asked some questions about the drinks (taste, sweetness), after which a
subset of the participants received a mood questionnaire (n = 54). Further analyses
revealed no effect of the drinks on experienced mood (F<1). Mood was measured after
all other dependent variables, by using a subset of the PANAS mood questionnaire items
(Watsen, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).
Results
We calculated a difference score by subtracting participants’ rating (scored 1-20)
of the worst car from participants’ rating (scored 1-20) of the best car (as used by
Dijksterhuis et al., 2006a; Bos et al., 2008). This resulted in a scale ranging from -19 to
19. A higher score indicates a greater ability to correctly differentiate between the best
option and the worst option. We compared the difference scores between conditions
using a 2 (Mode of processing: Conscious versus Unconscious) x 2 (Blood sugar level:
Low versus Increased) analysis of variance.
We found no main effect of either mode of processing condition (F<1) or blood
sugar level condition (F<1). The two-way interaction is significant however, F(1,152) =
10.19, p < .01, R
2
= .07. As depicted in Figure 1, conscious deliberation improved (from
M=3.439, SE=.741 to M=5,220, SE=.741) when blood sugar level was increased, F(1, 82)
= 4.05, p < .05, η
2
= .05. However, the reverse is true for unconscious processing F(1, 74)
= 5.90, p < .05, η
2
= .05, (from M= 5.444, SE=.790 for low to M=2.368, SE=.769 for
increased blood sugar). Performance after unconscious processing actually declined when
10
blood glucose level was increased. A possible explanation is that a change of blood
glucose level disrupts unconscious processes. Such a disruptive influence of blood
glucose changes on unconscious, automatic processes has indeed been found before
(Holmes, Hayford, Gonzalez, & Weydert, 1983), although this was shown in diabetes
patients, who have a somewhat different glucose metabolism and tolerance for low and
high blood glucose.
Discussion
In line with our hypotheses, we found that when we have enough energy,
conscious deliberation enables us to make good decisions. The unconscious on the other
hand seems to operate fine with low energy. We suggest the reason why conscious
deliberation is aided by an increase in blood sugar level is through declarative memory,
which improves with increases in blood sugar level. We did not directly measure
declarative memory however, the actual process behind our findings remain therefore
unclear.
There are several other shortcomings in the study, that need to be addressed in
future. One important drawback of the method used, is that participants did not make a
choice in this task, but instead only rated the choice options. Although this gives an
indication of the extent to which participants are able to differentiate between choice
options, it could be that participants with a low score on this measure would still make
good decisions. Another shortcoming is that the used task is artificial (as argued by
Newell et al., 2009). This goes for the distraction task less so, as watching a movie is
more common than solving anagrams or doing an n-back task, which has been used in
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various other unconscious thought tasks. However, it could well be that watching a movie
does not fully capture conscious attention. Therefore, conscious processing of the
information in the ‘unconscious processing’ condition can not be ruled out completely.
There are conceptual concerns with regard to the influence of blood sugar level on
performance measures in general. There is debate about the ability of blood glucose to
have a direct effect on performance. That is, the amount of glucose necessary to perform
mental operations is minimal. However, arguments have been made that there is a role for
peripheral detection (outside of the brain) of the glucose supply in the body. Several
receptors throughout the body feed information to the brain about the amount of glucose
in the body (Langhans 2000). In this way, the ingestion of glucose could change mental
function indirectly, by giving off signals that the body is ‘safe’ in terms of glucose stores.
Conclusion
Clearly, neither solely conscious nor solely unconscious thought is always
beneficial. Previous papers have argued that the complexity of a decision is one of the
determinants for which mode of thought is beneficial (Dijktershuis et al., 2006a). Another
recent paper has argued that, under certain circumstances, the combination of both
conscious and unconscious thought leads to optimal decisions (Norgren, Bos, &
Dijksterhuis 2010). This paper indicates another potential boundary for when to use
either conscious or unconscious thought. Our unconscious does not seem to require the
same energy needed for conscious processes. Our data show that when we are low on
energy we can employ another decision strategy than thinking consciously: We can trust
our unconscious.
12
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Figure 1: Performance after conscious and unconscious processing of information as a
function of high energy (after sugar intake) and low energy (after no sugar intake).
Higher scores indicate greater ability to distinguish good from bad options.
... in connection with the favourable period of development of speed and coordination abilities at the age of 12-13 years, the training process of young football players of this age focuses on the development of these qualities in particular. This activates the processes of conducting a pulse on nerve fibres and increases the rate of response to various signals [33,34]. ...
Article
Full-text available
Introduction. The purpose of the research was to provide a comparative characteristic of the dynamics of psychophysiological functions and indicators of physical and technical readiness of young footballers aged 12–13 and 15–16 years during 3 months of training. Methods. The study involved 24 football players; 12 were 12–13 years old, 12 were 15–16 years old. Parameters characteristic of determining the psychophysiological status, indicators of the nervous system work capacity, and attention indicators were analysed with the help of computer programs for psychophysiological testing. Also, the level of physical preparedness (60-m running, 1000-m running, shuttle running, pull-ups, standing long jump), and of technical preparedness (juggling, running throw) were established. Testing was carried out at the beginning of the preparatory period and at the beginning of the competition period of an annual training process cycle. The gap between the tests was 3 months. Results. Changes of psychophysiological indicators and indicators of physical and technical fitness that occurred in the observed period were more expressed among the 12–13 years old football players than in those aged 15–16 years. Conclusions. At the age of 12–13 years, emphasis should be put on the development of psychophysiological functions since at an older age the level of these functions is more difficult to influence, which can be decisive for the perfection of the athlete in football. Key words: football, psychophysiological indicators, training, preparation
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The purpose of the study is to determine the correlation of psycho-physiological functions with indicators of physical and technical readiness of young footballers of 12-13 and 15-16 years in the preparatory and competitive periods of the annual cycle of the training process. Methods. 24 football players participated in the study, 12 of them 12-13 players; 12 football players 15-16 years old. Parameters characteristic for determining the psychophysiological state, indicators of the nervous system's work capacity, and attention indicators were analyzed with the help of computer programs for psychophysiological testing. Also, determination of the level of physical preparedness (running on 60 m, running on 1000 m, shuttle running, pulling on the crossbar, jumping from place), determination of the level of technical preparedness (juggling, impact on range). Testing was carried out at the beginning of the preparatory period and at the beginning of the competition period of the annual cycle of the training process. The gap between the two tests was 3 months. Results. In the preparatory period of young footballers 15-16 years, the total number of reliable relationships between psychophysiological indicators and indicators of physical and technical preparedness is lower than that of young footballers 12-13 years in the preparatory and competitive periods. In the competitive period of 15-16 year old football players there is an increase in the number of interconnections between psychophysiological indicators and indicators of physical and technical preparedness compared with the preparatory period. In footballers aged 15-16 in the competitive period, there is an increase in the number of relationships that reflect rapid physical qualities and mobility of the nervous system, the ability to switch attention, the speed of a simple and complex reaction in comparison with the preparatory period and the results of testing the players 12-13 years. Conclusions. The obtained data is a reflection of the process of formation of a specific type of football player, when the speed of neurodynamic processes is associated with high-speed and speed-strength physical qualities.
... Recently, psychophysiology has been referred to as the junction of psychological and medical science, and its popularity and importance have expanded in proportion to the implementation of the relationship between mind and body [5,6]. Within the framework of psychophysiology, certain areas are identified that are associated with the research of particularly important problems. ...
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Specialized scientific publication on the problems of physical education, sports, the formation of a healthy lifestyle, rehabilitation, recreation. The journal presents articles on topical problems of physical education and sports, as well as problems of forming, restoring, strengthening and preserving the health of representatives of various groups of the population, physical rehabilitation and recreation, medical and recreational physical culture. It also reflects the means of physical education, its forms and methods, the basic principles of health-saving technologies and disease prevention.
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