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"Ratiomorphic" models of perception and thinking.
... Berlin categorized various poets and luminaries as either abstract "hedgehogs" (e.g., Plato, Hegel, Dostoyevsky, or Nietzsche) or pluralist, context-aware "foxes" (e.g., Aristotle, Franklin, Pushkin, or Diderot) who draw on both the abstract and the concrete to move on "many levels, seizing upon the essence of a vast variety of experiences." In many areas of life imbued with uncertainty (Keil, 2010) such as geopolitics (Tetlock, 2005), one may take a step back and approach an issue abstractly or consider how to balance abstract analytical principles with concrete features of the situation at hand (Brunswick, 1955;Hammond, 2010). ...
... Bringing social and cognitive science insights together, we propose that abstractness and concreteness have complementary benefits for wisdom, and that the optimal approach may be to balance or switch between them. This aligns with the idea that wisdom is pluralistic (Brunswick, 1955;Dhami & Mumpower, 2018;Hammond, 2010), involving a balance between abstract and context-specific elements of judgment to maximize adaptive outcomes. Moreover, it aligns with the cognitive science view on the complementarity of abstract construal (or categorical abstraction) and concrete construal (or perceptual concreteness) in mental representations. ...
We explored how individuals’ mental representations of complex and uncertain situations impact their ability to reason wisely. To this end, we introduce situated methods to capture abstract and concrete mental representations and the switching between them when reflecting on social challenges. Using these methods, we evaluated the alignment of abstractness and concreteness with four integral facets of wisdom: intellectual humility, open-mindedness, perspective-taking, and compromise-seeking. Data from North American and UK participants (N = 1,151) revealed that both abstract and concrete construals significantly contribute to wise reasoning, even when controlling for a host of relevant covariates and potential response bias. Natural language processing of unstructured texts among high (top 25%) and low (bottom 25%) wisdom participants corroborated these results: semantic networks of the high wisdom group reveal greater use of both abstract and concrete themes compared to the low wisdom group. Finally, employing a repeated strategy-choice method as an additional measure, our findings demonstrated that individuals who showed a greater balance and switching between these construal types exhibited higher wisdom. Our findings advance understanding of individual differences in mental representations and how construals shape reasoning across contexts in everyday life.
... From this assumption, then, we conclude that even whena consciously applied rationality can be excluded (as in the workings of the subconscious or the behaviour of animals) the success of strategies or the applicability of organs is guaranteed only insofar they meet rational criteria, i.e. insofar as they are 'ratiomorph' (E. Brunswik, 1955). This means that strategies and construction principles (concerning both the physical and the cognitive context) have to consider all relevant facts in the same manner as an accordingly informed analyst would do. ...
... From what we understand as the success of rationality we often conclude that it must be based on the constitution of the world we live in, and, consequently, that the world's order can be decoded only by rational methods. From this, then, we conclude that even in those cases in which consciously applied rationality seems to be excluded (as in the subconscious or with animals' behaviour) the success of strategies or the applicability of organs is guaranteed only insofar as they meet rational criteria, i.e. insofar as they are 'ratiomorph' (Brunswik, 1955). This means that strategies and construction principles (concerning both the physical and the cognitive context) have to consider all relevant facts in the same way as an accordingly informed analyst would. ...
IntroductionThe Equivalence PostulateOur Inborn World ViewThe Cognitive Operator TheoryThe Operational Definitions of Space, Time, and CausalityInduction and the Compressibility of Observational and Theoretical TermsCommunication, Meaning, and the Compressibility of Semantic TermsExtensionsAction, Perception, and the Role of ‘Cyclic Variables’ in Cognitive EvolutionAdaptation and Assimilation vs. Action and PerceptionEpistemological AutoreproductionIs Cultural/Scientific Evolution Really Lamarckian?Physical and Social Problem-Solving in Cognitive EvolutionSummaryReferences
... However, this activity would not be considered a logical operation, not even a rational one, since it is simply based on 'intuitive' gestalt perception mechanisms. Following a postulated 'ratiomorphic apparatus', which forms the phylogenetically acquired basis of human ratio (Brunswik 1955, Riedl 1979, one can characterise these mechanisms as 'aesthetomorphic cognitive structures' (Wessel 2020). These aesthetomorphic structures can be assumed to be phylogenetically much older than ratiomorphic ones. ...
Taxonomy is a science whose roots go back to the dawn of human curiosity. Its evergrowing body of knowledge, laid down in the biological classification, provides the framework within which every biologist operates. Taxonomists have always used the oldest scientific tools for their research - their natural capabilities of observation, gestalt perception, categorization, and classification - as well as the most advanced technologies of the day. Today, taxonomy is firmly anchored in evolutionary theory, spearheading on topics such as the species problem and biodiversity and its development.
... NorbertBischof (2009: p.506) therefore recommends that it is better to speak of prerational or ratiomorphic (›reason-like‹) processes. The term ratiomorphic was coined by EgonBrunswik (1955) for unconscious conclusions, such as those that occur frequently in perception -cf. Hermann von Helmholtz (1896), IrvinRock (1998: p.197 f.),Donald Hoffman (2001: p.27 f.) as well as NorbertBischof (2009: p.501). ...
Cognitive Semiotics is not identical with and not limited to cognitivist semiotics, since the cognitivist approach underestimates the constructive dimensions of cognitive processes as well as expectations (which are derived from a pragmatic perspective) — and therefore tends to a positivistic worldview. This is crucial for aesthetics and semiotics as well, because in both domains there is a tradition of analyzing artefacts in detail and simultaneously disregarding cognitive and microcognitive processes. This is a central problem for Empirical Aesthetic as the focus on static artefacts offers a deficient approach to evolutionary, ontogenetic and situative dynamics. Hence, the cognitive microgenesis of perception and action planning against the backdrop of an embodied agent in specific situation. Aesthetic experience must be reconsidered due to embodied/enactive cognition. Linear cognitivist schemes (input-processing-output) do not suffice. The ›ideomotor approach‹ (where action is ›epistemic action‹) offers a wider range of validity than the ›sensorimotor approach‹ (where a passive observer is just reacting to sensory stimuli). Aesthetic experience can be interpretated as an evolutionary reinforcement of learning processes (from enactive interoceptions via external Gestalt perceptions up to purely mental operations): ›Instrumental action‹ works also as ›epistemic action‹. Any goal-driven action additionally induces sensory input for optimizing cognitive models to predict action effects. Thus, even the most simple Gestalt perception has to be understood as a cognitive model of action options, which is constructed by the observer (who uses his or her former experiences in order to extrapolate the given to expectations which again extend the cognitive space from the given to the possible or probable). An aesthetic experience appears when the agent evaluates the quality of modelling processes (efficacy and efficiency). Intensional models are sparse (with relief of neural resources), and the model’s range of validity is larger than the extensional data’s. This enables the agent to dissolve occlusions (›decentering‹) and to model expectations (›forward modelling‹) and/or hypotheses about earlier states (›inverse modelling‹). Both qualities (›relief of resources‹ and ›decentering‹) are evaluated by biological systems. The outcome of these evaluations are aesthetic experiences — signifying successful modelling processes (positive aesthetic experiences) or failing processes (negative aesthetic experiences). What is maximized is not the external world but the cognitive model (in its range of validity and its capability to minimize prediction errors). Hence, the observing system must be active in order to maximize aesthetic experience. Due to our ideomotor approach the pragmatic dimension is the basis for a successive development of the embodied agent from enactive patterns via iconic Gestalt perceptions to symbolic communication (where all three domains are Gestalt phenomena of different kinds). Aesthetic experiences can be found in different modes and granularities as well as in a variety of complexities. All aesthetic experiences are based on cognitive modellings in different range, although they are more relevant in higher-order levels of larger scale. Finally, the ›possibility space of aesthetic experience‹ is developed which is able to explain incompatible aesthetic preferences within a common theoretical framework (e.g. enactive, iconic, and/or symbolic operations).
... Norbert Bischof (2009: p.506) therefore recommends that it is better to speak of prerational or ratiomorphic (›reason-like‹) processes. The term ratiomorphic was coined by Egon Brunswik (1955) for unconscious conclusions, such as those that occur frequently in perception -cf. Hermann von Helmholtz (1896), Irvin Rock (1998: p.197 f.), Donald Hoffman (2001: p.27 f.) as well as Norbert Bischof (2009: p.501). ...
A. Summary Evolutionarily and ontogenetically, cognition primarily comes from interactions that are to be understood as epistemic actions of a situated-embodied observer. Only gradually do cognitive simulations (as mental rehearsals) and abstract reflections become possible. The beginning, however, is formed by processes of enactive cognition. These actions already control affective feedback, which can be interpreted as the simplest case of an aesthetic experiences (e.g. when playing or dancing without music). Efficiency (the economy of biological resources) and effectiveness (the possible prediction of action effects) are positively reinforced. Analogously, if the sign is negative, this leads to negative aesthetic experiences. In terms of embodied cognition, these perceptual judgements occur in diverse granularities and massively in parallel: Aesthetic experience is primarily not a judgement about an external object, but about the quality of the cognitive modelling processes themselves as embodied cognition (forward modelling and inverse modelling as the basis for anticipation/forecasting): Aesthetic experience becomes recognisable as an evolutionary learning amplifier that can control conscious as well as unconscious processes through affective feedback.
... Norbert Bischof (2009: S.506) empfiehlt deshalb, besser von prärationalen oder ratiomorphen (›vernunftähnlichen‹) Prozessen zu sprechen. Der Begriff ratiomorph wurde von Egon Brunswik (1955) geprägt für unbewusste Schlussfolgerungen, wie sie etwa in der Wahrnehmung vielfach vorkommen -vgl. Hermann von Helmholtz (1896), Irvin Rock (1998: S.197 f.), Donald Hoffman (2001: S.27 f.) sowie Norbert Bischof (2009: S.501). ...
Evolutionär und ontogenetisch primär stammt Erkenntnis aus Interaktionen, die als epistemische Handlungen eines situiert-verkörperten Beobachters zu verstehen sind. Erst sukzessive werden auch kognitive Simulationen (als mentales Probehandeln) und abstrakte Reflexionen möglich. Den Anfang bilden jedoch Prozesse der Enactive Cognition. Bereits diese Handlungen steuert ein affektives Feedback, das sich als einfachster Fall einer ästhetischen Empfindung interpretieren lässt (z.B. beim Spielen oder Tanzen ohne Musik). Positiv verstärkt wird die Effizienz (die Sparsamkeit biologischer Ressourcen) und die Effektivität (die mögliche Prognose von Handlungseffekten). Analog führt dies bei negativem Vorzeichen zu negativen ästhetischen Erlebnissen. Im Sinne der Embodied Cognition treten diese Wahrnehmungsurteile in diversen Granularitäten und massiv parallel auf: Ästhetische Erfahrung ist primär kein Urteil über einen externen Gegenstand, sondern über die Qualität der kognitiven Modellbildungs-Prozesse selbst als verkörperte Erkenntnis (Forward Modelling sowie Inverse Modelling als Basis für Antizipation/Prognose): Die ästhetische Erfahrung wird erkennbar als evolutionärer Lernverstärker, der bewusste wie auch unbewusste Prozesse durch affektives Feedback steuern kann.
... Aunque fue Donald T. Campbell (1916Campbell ( -1996 el primero en acuñar el nombre y darle un primer tratamiento integral, la teoría evolutiva del conocimiento vio la luz en los estudios realizados por el zoólogo vienés Konrad Lorenz (1903, quien fue el primero en postular la existencia de un subconsciente cognitivo que posibilita el aprendizaje. A este subconsciente lo denominó sistema raciomorfo, expresión que tomó prestada del psicólogo húngaro Egon Brunswik (1952Brunswik ( , 1955 y que describió como un conjunto de funciones preconscientes que, pese a no operar sobre criterios lógicos ni racionales (Lorenz 1971a(Lorenz , 1971b(Lorenz , 1981, condicionan nuestro modo de percibir el mundo 23 . ...
Para el constructivismo, la ciencia y la cognición comparten intereses similares. Ambos dominios pueden describirse como dos sistemas entrelazados que se activan mutuamente y se modulan entre sí a través de un lazo interno de retroalimentación, lazo que opera mediante la dinámica interna representativa en el caso de la cognición y mediante la dinámica del desarrollo teórico en el caso de la ciencia. Cada uno de estos dominios —ciencia y cognición— busca generar un marco de interacción adecuado que garantice, por parte de la ciencia, el éxito predictivo a partir de los modelos utilizados en la investigación y, por parte de la cognición, una amplia gama de estrategias funcionalmente exitosas con las que salvaguardar una imagen viable del mundo. Al pensar la ciencia como una extensión de nuestra apertura cognitiva al mundo, el constructivismo adopta la noción de viabilidad, es decir, de ajuste funcional, con el entorno como fundamental en la correcta aproximación al estudio tanto de la cognición como de la modelización, ya que, al igual que ocurre con las estructuras y procesos que conforman la arquitectura cognitiva de cualquier sistema de observación, más o menos evolucionado, los modelos en ciencia se encuentran limitados por su propia estructura teórica, así como por su dinámica operativa. Adoptando el constructivismo como una factible filosofía de la ciencia, este trabajo tiene como objetivo estudiar el fenómeno de la modelización, así como examinar el papel que asumen algunas estrategias tropológicas inherentes a la actividad científica, como la analogía y la metáfora, a la hora de configurar modelos y formular hipótesis y conjeturas que sirven de aproximación para la indagación y el estudio del mundo empírico.
... El Homo habilis arcaico también fabricaba herramientas (según el llamado modo I, olduvayense) y, sin embargo, no nos referimos a él como la "persona habilis", ya que, aunque desde un punto de vista zoológico pueda ser considerado como perteneciente al género Homo, desde un punto de vista filosófico no lo reconocemos como persona humana. Lo mismo ocurre cuando definimos a la persona humana por la característica de la racionalidad, ya que muchos etólogos y psicólogos hablan de la conducta racional, o al menos "raciomorfa" de ciertos animales (Brunswik, 1955). El lenguaje fonético de palabras tampoco parece suficiente como rasgo distintivo de las personas humanas, ya que, como admite el consenso científico actual, el hombre de Neanderthal hablaba algún tipo de lenguaje fonético de palabras rudimentario y, sin embargo, tampoco nos referimos a él como la "persona de Neanderthal" (Dediu & Levinson, 2013). ...
In this paper, I will discuss what specific traits distinguish sciences from other historical institutions. First I will review several philosophies conceiving sciences having in mind constitutive, but generic, features. This is the case when sciences are understood as explanation, as comprehension, as knowledge, as description, as representation, as construction, as cultural institution, as experimentation and elaboration of hypotheses, as theory, and as instrument of domination and intervention on reality. I put forward certain specific traits of theorems and scientific fields that allow us to distinguish sciences from other historical formations.
... He took the lead in extending probabilistic function so that it applied to judgment and decision making processes as well as to perception, which was Brunswik's original and primary focus. In the last few years of his life, Brunswik introduced the concepts of quasirationality (Brunswik, 1952) and ratiomorphic models of perception and thinking (Brunswik, 1955b;1956, pp. 89-93). ...
Kenneth R. Hammond (1917–2015) made several major contributions to the science of human judgment and decision making. As a student of Egon Brunswik, he kept Brunswik’s legacy alive – advancing his theory of probabilistic functionalism and championing his method of representative design. Hammond pioneered the use of Brunswik’s lens model as a framework for studying how individuals use information from the task environment to make clinical judgments, which was the precursor to much ‘policy capturing’ and ‘judgment analysis’ research. Hammond introduced the lens model equation to the study of judgment processes, and used this to measure the utility of different forms of feedback in multiple-cue probability learning. He extended the scope of analysis to contexts in which individuals interact with one another – introducing the interpersonal learning and interpersonal conflict paradigms. Hammond developed social judgment theory which provided a comprehensive quantitative approach for describing and improving judgment processes. He proposed cognitive continuum theory which states that quasi-rationality is an important middle-ground between intuition and analysis and that cognitive performance is dictated by the match between task properties and mode of cognition. Throughout his career, Hammond moved easily from basic laboratory work to applied settings, where he resolved policy disputes, and in doing so, he pointed to the dichotomy between theories of correspondence and coherence. In this paper, we present Hammond’s legacy to a new generation of judgment and decision making scholars. © 2018. The authors license this article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
... Though both the interpretive and realist forms of lingualism about inference may still have much to offer when it comes to explicit adult human cognition, especially forms of thought that involve inner speech- (Carruthers, 2011), though see also (Langland-Hassan, 2014)-they unfortunately can no longer be regarded as empirically plausible when it comes to nonlinguistic animals. While animals may often judge in ways consistent with classical logic and decision theory in limited domains-a mode of thinking that Brunswik (1955) dubbed "ratiomorphic"-they lack the mastery of syncategorematic and mathematical relations required to apply such rules in a domain-general way (Hurley, 2003;Watanabe & Huber, 2006). Moreover, it is unlikely that any animals are capable of explicit metarepresentational awareness of the contents of their mental states or the inferential connections between them. ...
A surge of empirical research demonstrating flexible cognition in animals and young infants has raised interest in the possibility of rational decision-making in the absence of language. A venerable position, which I here call “Classical Inferentialism”, holds that nonlinguistic agents are incapable of rational inferences. Against this position, I defend a model of nonlinguistic inferences that shows how they could be practically rational. This model vindicates the Lockean idea that we can intuitively grasp rational connections between thoughts by developing the Davidsonian idea that practical inferences are at bottom categorization judgments. From this perspective, we can see how similarity-based categorization processes widely studied in human and animal psychology might count as practically rational. The solution involves a novel hybrid of internalism and externalism: intuitive inferences are psychologically rational (in the explanatory sense) given the intensional sensitivity of the similarity assessment to the internal structure of the agent's reasons for acting, but epistemically rational (in the justificatory sense) given an ecological fit between the features matched by that assessment and the structure of the agent's environment. The essay concludes by exploring empirical results that show how nonlinguistic agents can be sensitive to these similarity assessments in a way that grants them control over their opaque judgments.
... In the last few years of his life, Brunswik began to expand his theory from an exclusive focus on perception to include thinking as well. He introduced the concept of quasirationality (Brunswik 1952) and discussed "ratiomorphic" models of perception and thinking (Brunswik 1955). In 1955, he laid out the differences between perception and thinking as follows: ...
Scholz deserves much credit for advancing the state of the art and introducing new and provocative perspectives on how Brunswik’s ideas can be used to help us to approach both old problems of human visual perception and newer problems of environmental sustainability. The paper will serve as a solid platform for important work going forward on the management of complexity, in general, and the foundations of decision making in sustainable transitioning, in particular.
... This problem is much more closely approximated by approaches in search of transcultural universals of human or cultural ethology and the "ratiomorphic apparatus" as outlined by BRUNSWICK (1955). Be it defined as "primitive" or not, the focus here is on what is generally human as well as what are identical phenomena in different cultures of the world. ...
The heuristic value of synergetic models of evolving and self-organizing complex systems as well as their
application to epistemological problems is shown in this paper. Nonlinear synergetic models turn out to be
fruitful in comprehending epistemological problems such as the nature of human creativity, the functioning
of human intuition and imagination, the historical development of science and culture. In the light of
synergetics creative thinking can be viewed as a selforganization and self-completion of images and
thoughts, filling up gaps in the nets of knowledge. Insight, fast and sudden solutions of scientific problems,
instabilities when “an idea is in the air” are considered as examples of blow-up regimes in the cognitive
field.
... (Lorenz, 1973Lorenz, /1977 He called these inborn structures innate teaching mechanisms [Angeborene Lehrmeister]: " These mechanisms also meet the Kantian definition of a priori: they were there before all learning, and must be there in order for learning to be possible " (Lorenz, 1973Lorenz, , 1977: 89). Following Egon Brunswick (1955), Riedl (1979) speaks of the ratiomorphic apparatus. That is, human beings feature a system of innate forms of ideations that allows the anticipation of space, time, comparability, causality, finality, and a form of subjective probability or propensity (Riedl et al., 1992 ). ...
I identify two similarities between evolutionary epistemology (EE) and radical constructivism (RC): (1) They were founded
primarily by biologists and (2) their respective claims can be related to Kant. Despite this fact there seems to be an abyss
between them. I present an attempt to reconcile this gap and characterize EE as the approach that focuses on external behaviour,
while RC emphasizes the perspective from within. The central concept of hypothetical realism is criticized as unnecessarily
narrowing down the scope of EE. Finally, methodological and philosophical conclusions are drawn.
The question of why an animal acts this or that way invokes the further question of whether it acts for specific reasons. In a more sophisticated sense, the capacity for intentional action—not merely giving in to a desire and aiming for a goal but also knowing why, which means acting for specific reasons, which in turn means that the decision taken is based on a reasonable conclusion. Can animals reason, can they draw practical conclusions? More generally, can they be rational? In his famous essay on rational creatures, Donald Davidson [4], as mentioned above, made a clear differentiation about the possession of propositional attitudes. Only creatures that can have beliefs, desires, and intentions, which in turn presupposes the possession of language, are rational. Snails are therefore not, and according to Davidson, human infants are not yet rational either. The point here is that communication partners can exchange ideas about external things, think about the same things, thus sharing their world and objectifying it in the process. They produce an intersubjective truth in the sense of objectivity via a process of triangulation (2 subjects and one object). Rationality is thus a social construct.
In the wake of phenomena such as Donald Trump's "Alternative Facts," anti-vaccine demonstrations against COVID-19 measures, or Herbert Kickl's "deworming treatment," public awareness has been drawn to the perils of irrational anti-science sentiment. The author of these lines has been engaged in the study of the ramifications of esotericism and the exploitation of human credulity since 1999. In this endeavor, the author seeks to provide a synthesis of the foundational scientific principles, the interrelations examined, and personal encounters, experiences, and conclusions.
Methodological problems often arise when a special case is confused with the general principle. So you will find affordances only for ‚artifacts’ if you restrict the analysis to ‚artifacts’. The general principle, however, is an ‚invitation character’, which triggers an action. Consequently, an action-theoretical approach known as ‚pragmatic turn’ in cognitive science is recommended. According to this approach, the human being is not a passive-receptive being but actively produces those action effects that open up the world to us (through ‚active inferences’). This ‚ideomotor approach’ focuses on the so-called ‚epistemic actions’, which guide our perception as conscious and unconscious cognitions. Due to ‚embodied cognition’ the own body is assigned an indispensable role. The action theoretical approach of ‚enactive cognition’ enables that every form can be consistently processualized. Thus, each ‚Gestalt’ is understood as the process result of interlocking cognitions of ‚forward modelling’ (which produces anticipations and enables prognoses) and ‚inverse modelling’ (which makes hypotheses about genesis and causality). As can be shown, these cognitions are fed by previous experiences of real interaction, which later changes into a mental trial treatment, which is highly automated and can therefore take place unconsciously. It is now central that every object may have such affordances that call for instrumental or epistemic action. In the simplest case, it is the body and the facial expressions of our counterpart that can be understood as a question and provoke an answer/reaction. Thus, emotion is not only to be understood as expression/output according to the scheme ‚input-processing-output’, but acts itself as a provocative act/input. Consequently, artifacts are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for affordances. Rather, they exist in all areas of cognition—from Enactive Cognition to Social Cognition.
Nothing concerning the human consciousness makes sense except in the light of evolution. I propose a concept describing the evolution-based structure of human consciousness as an encaptic hierarchy of different “inborn teachers” („angeborene Lehrmeister“, K. Lorenz). This is based on A. G. Baumgarten’s idea of aesthetics as epistemology, which postulates the existence of a “sensual knowledge (cognitio sensitiva)” – based on an “inborn natural aesthetics (aesthetica naturalis connata)” – as opposed to logical and rational knowledge. Taking the concepts of K. Lorenz, G. Tembrock, R. Riedl and K.-F. Wessel further, I distinguish between the aesthetomorphic, ratiomorphic and ethomorphic “world view apparatuses”, and discuss their evolution as well as their role in the establishment of the integral consciousness of the human being as biopsychosocial unit.
The general lines of Bayesian modeling (BM) in the study of perception are outlined here. The main thesis argued here is that BM works well only in the so-called secondary processes of perception, and in particular in cases of imperfect discriminability between stimuli, or when a judgment is required, or in cases of multistability. In cases of “primary processes,” on the other hand, it is often arbitrary and anyway superfluous, as with the laws of Gestalt. However, it is pointed out that in these latter cases, simpler and more well-established methodologies already exist, such as signal detection theory and individual choice theory. The frequent recourse to arbitrary values of a priori probabilities is also open to question.
Embodied/Enactive Cognition erfordert es, die ästhetische Erfahrung neu zu denken. Analysiert man den Beobachtungs-Prozess selbst, wird die aktive Konstruktion jeder Gestalt erkennbar. Aisthesis als kognitive Modellbildung dient somit der Selbst- und Welterschließung. Ein Action-Perception-Cycle ermöglicht durch „epistemische Handlungen“ (die auch unbewusst/verkörpert sein können) die Prognose von Handlungseffekten. Die Entwicklung von Hypothesen zu wahrscheinlichen Wirkungen (Forward Modelling) und möglichen Ursachen (Inverse Modelling) bilden so den Kern der Wirklichkeits-Konstruktion. Dabei kann es sich um gelingende oder misslingende Prozesse der kognitiven Modellbildung handeln.
Im ersten Schritt wird der Basis-Mechanismus jeder ästhetischen Erfahrung formuliert. Dieser wird evolutionär als Lern-Verstärker interpretiert und ist evolutionär, neurobiologisch sowie lebensweltlich plausibel. Hiermit lassen sich positive ästhetische Erfahrungen präzise erklären – und bei Umkehrung der Prozessrichtung auch negative ästhetische Erfahrungen. Soll dieser Mechanismus als notwendige und hinreichende Bedingung fungieren, stellt sich die Frage: Warum empfinden dann nicht alle Menschen gleich?
Im zweiten Schritt wird aus dem Basis-Prozess durch Iteration und Rekursion der Möglichkeitsraum ästhetischer Erfahrung und ein erweitertes Prozess-Modell abgeleitet. Es zeigt sich, dass konkurrierende Präferenz-Stile als Teilmengen dieses Möglichkeitsraumes zu verstehen sind. Meta-ästhetisch betrachtet ist selbst die Vorliebe für eine bestimmte (Bereichs-)Ästhetik ein solcher Präferenz-Stil, der als Mittel zu einem Zweck bestimmbar ist.
p>Artykuł dotyczy współczesnych problemów intersubiektywności. W intersubiektywności rodzi się rozumienie i porozumienie. Nowe media i procesy globalizacji sprawiają, że racjonalność, kultura i wiedza nie mogą stanowić jedynego fundamentu dla rozumienia i porozumienia – nie ma już bowiem wspólnej racjonalności, kultury i wiedzy, które dotychczas stanowiły ich podstawę.
W artykule argumentuję na rzecz tezy, że w świecie globalnym, ale jednocześnie rozfragmentaryzowanym na skalę nieznaną we wcześniejszych epokach medialnych, porozumienie jest znacznie istotniejsze niż rozumienie. Trzeba się porozumiewać nawet bez zrozumienia. Dlatego fundamentów porozumienia należy także szukać w racjomorficzności, a nie tylko w racjonalności; racjomorficzność jest wspólna wszystkim ludziom, bez względu na kulturę, religię, status społeczny, światopogląd itd.
„Pozytywną” formą racjomorficzności jest aksjomorfizm, w którym ujawnia się biologicznie warunkowana empatia i sympatia wobec przedstawicieli tego samego gatunku – Homo sapiens socialis et communicans. Odwołując się do idei Konrada Lorenza, proponuję, by Habermasowską racjonalność komunikacyjną nie tyle zastąpić, co uzupełnić komunikacyjną aksjomorficznością.</p
Constructivism is a philosophical current that manifests itself greatly within the realm of contemporary epistemology. Its bases come from the idea that knowledge is not only actively constructed by the observer but also provides a lens through which reality can be interpreted as a result of experiences. This paper traces a brief interdisciplinary curve that outlines some of the most important philosophical approaches that contributed to the consolidation of this school of thought for more than twenty-five centuries.Keywords: Constructivism, Cybernetics, Epistemology, History of Philosophy, Perception, Reality.
Alliance between natural sciences and the humanities postulated by Konrad Lorenz found its creative expression primarily in the alliance between philosophy and ethology. Numerous Lorenz’s works show the impact of ethology on the intensity of philosophical reflection on a number of issues traditionally undertaken by disciplines such as philosophical anthropology, ontology, epistemology and ethics. Anthropological relevance of ethology determines the prospect of exploring its eco-edu-cational relevance. This means that the ethological concept of man as a cultural being from his nature is the starting point for the work on the strategy of ecological education, which express actualization of biological potential of man in the course of his ontogenetic adaptation to the specific conditions of the natural environment.
The purpose of the work is finding the reasonability of using bio-evolutionary paradigm for researching ratio morphic cognitive activity. Methodology. Methodological grounds consist of the original principles and conceptual apparatus of evolutionary epistemology. Scientific novelty. The article identifies opportunities for using of biological and evolutionary paradigm to study the peculiarities of ratiomorphic cognitive backgrounds and their influence on the formation and development of human knowledge. Conclusions. The article concludes that together with the idea of hyper cycles (feedback loop with mutual transmission of information in cognitive process) the concept of ratiomorphic cognitive backgrounds, as well as attempts to examine cognitive processes based on the scientific criteria (empirical verification, explanatory power and ability to predict) should be certainly considered as a positive contribution to the development of evolutionary epistemology into modern epistemological research. However, it is also indicated the fact of narrowing the heuristic possibilities of this epistemological direction because of excessive metaphor of bio-evolutionary paradigm. Further development of evolutionary epistemological research is considered in shifting the emphasis from biological and evolutionary towards cultural and evolutionary paradigm.
Kulturwandel — genauer: soziokultureller Wandel —, traditioneller Gegenstand der Ethnowissenschaften, von Kultur- und Sozialanthropologie, wurde auch von Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Politologie, von Ethologie, Semiotik und Kommunikationswissenschaft entdeckt. Trotz dieser Multidisziplinarität konvergiert die Forschung immer deutlicher gegen das Paradigma von Kultur als einem sich ständig transformierenden Kommunikationssystem.
Brunswiks Wahrnehmungstheorie war während der 40er und 50er Jahre sehr umstritten. Doch gerade die Ideen, die den größten Widerstand seiner Zeitgenossen hervorriefen, sind heute eher anerkannt. So zum Beispiel die Idee des Zufälligen, des nur Wahrscheinlichen, des Unsicheren; diese Idee wurde besonders in der Psychologie der 40er und 50er Jahre in den USA nur als Mangel angesehen, denn sie spiegele, so die damalige Meinung, den Mangel an sicherem Wissen wider. Brunswik aber stellte diesen Mangel in das Zentrum seiner Wahrnehmungstheorie. Was seine Wahrnehmungstheorie heute so interessant erscheinen läßt, ist der disziplinübergreifender Ansatz, da dieser gerade für die Kognitionswissenschaft einen Argumentations- und Erklärungsrahmen bieten kann.
Brunswiks Wahrnehmungstheorie war während der 40er und 50er Jahre sehr umstritten. Doch gerade die Ideen, die den größten Widerstand seiner Zeitgenossen hervorriefen, sind heute eher anerkannt. So zum Beispiel die Idee des Zufälligen, des nur Wahrscheinlichen, des Unsicheren; diese Idee wurde besonders in der Psychologie der 40er und 50er Jahre in den USA nur als Mangel angesehen, denn sie spiegele, so die damalige Meinung, den Mangel an sicherem Wissen wider. Brunswik aber stellte diesen Mangel in das Zentrum seiner Wahrnehmungstheorie. Was seine Wahrnehmungstheorie heute so interessant erscheinen läßt, ist der disziplinübergreifender Ansatz, da dieser gerade für die Kognitionswissenschaft einen Argumentations- und Erklärungsrahmen bieten kann.
The success of Kepler’s dioptrics should not make us blind for the tremendous theoretical problems which the adoption of mechanicism as a comprehensive research program brought in its wake in the fields of philosophy, epistemology and theoretical psychology. It is not surprising that it was not until the days of Kepler that the dioptrical aspect of the problem of perception was (largely) solved although practically in ingredients for that solution had already been available since antiquity. For a real solution of the problem of non-radial rays which had vexed medieval scholars since Alhazen required a total commitment to the mechanistic methodology. And until Kepler’s time this proved too large a step.
Evolutionary epistemology represents in its totality an interdepartmental branch of research, but its fundamental principles and assumptions are based on the empirical recognitions of biology. The basic constructive method of proceeding consists in finding out how the evolution of structures and functions could occur with an increase in information content. The problem is not the storage and conversion of information but rather how evolution transmits to the organism a sort of “knowledge” about certain properties of its surroundings. We can express this as follows: the characteristic of the process of evolution is a permanent increase in order (cf. Riedl, 1977; Kaspar, 1981).
“In the future I see open fields for … important researches. Psychology will be securely based on the foundation already well laid by Mr. Herbert Spencer, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation.” Thus Charles Darwin wrote in On the Origin of Species;1 in the sequel he announced: “Much light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history.”2 And Thomas Henry Huxley, Darwin’s famous advocate, predicted that Darwin’s own work, “if you take it as the embodiment of a hypothesis ... is destined to be the guide of biological and psychological speculation for the next three or four generations.”3 Since Darwin, much light has indeed been thrown on the origin of man, his history and his place in nature, and Huxley’s prediction has proved to be true.
The idea of an evolutionary approach to epistemology was first proposed to explain the nature of irreducible concepts in human knowledge, called “a priori” (see K. Lorenz, 1941). The further development of evolutionary epistemology (EE) was characterized by the application of the evolutionary method to all the other problems of epistemology that appear to be unsolvable within an analytical framework, based on deduction alone (Brunswik, 1955, Campbell, 1959; Kaspar, 1980; Lorenz, 1973; Oeser, 1976; Popper, 1972; Riedl, 1980; Vollmer, 1975; and Wuketits, 1981). Thus the claim is attached to EE that this theory is able to circumvent some of the basic short-comings of traditional and analytical philosophy (Riedl, 1980, pp. 175–184).
Evolutionary epistemology has had a surprisingly quick start. Fundamentally it proposes to regard patterns of thought as derivative products from patterns of nature, arrived at through the process of selection,1 having gone so far, it may be asked what caused these very clearly defined patterns in nature.
Klaus Schwarzfischer zeigt, wie wichtig es ist, mit dem einfachsten Fall einer ästhetischen Erfahrung zu beginnen. Die individuell-kognitiven Perspektiven und die sozial-kommunikativen Prozesse werden in einer einheitlichen Theorie analysierbar. Die Evolution wird dabei ebenso berücksichtigt wie neurobiologische Aspekte. Interdisziplinär verständlich und ausführlich illustriert werden die Basis-Konzepte dargestellt. Schritt für Schritt nachvollziehbar werden auch komplexere Anwendungen entwickelt: Von der Gestalt zur Gestaltung.
Was genau ist eine ästhetische Erfahrung?
Welcher biologische Mechanismus liegt jeder ästhetischen Erfahrung zugrunde?
Warum haben sich ästhetische Erfahrungen aus evolutionärer Perspektive durchgesetzt?
Haben nur Menschen ästhetische Erfahrungen?
Was ist der Gültigkeitsbereich ästhetischer Beobachtungen? (Was alles kann eine ästhetische Erfahrung auslösen?)
Warum sind Destruktion und Provokation sowie Ironie und Humor auch ästhetische Phänomene?
Wie können die „Gestalt-Gesetze“ als Symmetrien (d.h. als Invarianzen) interpretiert werden, um so mit Semiotik und Systemtheorie kompatibel zu werden?
Cognition takes place in our heads. Using the signals that we receive from our sense organs our brain builds up a picture of the world in to a whole worldview. We construe the world as three-dimensional, as ordered and directed in time, as regular, even structured by laws of nature, and causally connected. With some of our constructions we are successful, with others we fail. The principles by which we construct this world picture are not only dictated by our sense organs or exclusively by external stimuli. How did they come into our heads? This question is answered by evolutionary epistemology. We recapitulate its main theses, characterizing it as a naturalistic position and answering three typical objections. We then turn to more recent arguments, concerning language, realism, and the theory of natural selection.
Especially for severely disabled people, a powered wheelchair is an important means to participate in societal life and live as far as possible independently. To achieve this goal for users, who cannot operate their wheelchair with the traditional joystick or specialty controls, methods have been developed to enable steering the wheelchair on the basis of the user's gaze behavior. While existing approaches require the user to adapt his/her gaze behavior to match the characteristics of the human-technology interaction and/or only provide reasoning about the desired motion direction of the user, the conducted study gives crucial input about the relationship between the gaze behavior of wheelchair users and the - from the user - desired goal position as well as his/her anticipated mission. Implications for a natural gaze-based assistance system for electrically powered wheelchairs are drawn, which allows reasoning on the user's behavioral goal position and his/her current mission.
This paper critically examines the argument structure of Fodor's theory of modularity. Fodor claims computational autonomy as the essential properly of modular processing. This property has profound consequences, burdening modularity theory with corollaries of rigidity, non‐plasticity, nativism, and the old Cartesian dualism of sensing and thinking. However, it is argued that Fodor's argument for computational autonomy is crucially dependent on yet another postulate of Fodor's theory, viz. his thesis of strong modularity, ie. the view that functionally distinct modules must also have physical counterparts in the neural architecture of the brain. Yet, Fodor offers little or no independent support for this neurological speculation.
Moreover, due to the cognitivist underpinnings of Fodor's theory his view of modules as ‘mental organs'faces an untenable dilemma that is to be traced back to the earliest history of modem cognitive science, viz. to the rationalist‐computationalist research program initiated by Descartes and Male‐branche. The tension characteristic for the Cartesian program was one that arose between information correlation and information processing accounts of the transactions between body and mind. Similarly, the tension characteristic for Fodor's theory of modularity is one between a causal account of modules on the model of simple detection mechanisms, and an information processing account of modules on the model of vast and elaborate cognitive systems. It is argued that the resulting concept of a cognitive module Fodorian style constitutes an amalgam of incompatible desiderata that fails to stake out a natural kind for cognitive science.
As an alternative account, the final section shows connectionism to be capable of encompassing both Gibsonian and ‘new look’ accounts of cognitive achievements within one theoretical perspective, thus providing a fruitful interfield theory capable of combining the theoretical resources of the ecological approach with the indispensable theoretical complement provided by psychological processing accounts. This change of perspective would ultimately involve recasting the symbo‐functionalist notion of cognitive function along bio‐psychological lines.
Kommunikation wird hier definiert als Erzeugung von Signalen, um Botschaften zu übertragen, die mit Cherry (1957, 1966) auch als „Message“ bezeichnet werden (vgl. Tembrock 1992). Der Sender intendiert auf der organismischen Ebene eine Einflußnahme auf den Zustand des Empfängers. Im Sinne der Semiotik beschreiben wir diesen Zusammenhang so: Die Botschaft realisiert beim Empfänger das zum Signifikanten gehörende Signifikat. In Abb. 1 ist dieser Grundzusammenhang dargestellt. Der Sender trägt (statisch) oder erzeugt (dynamisch) eine „Menge von Zeichen“. Im verhaltensbiologischen Sinne handelt es sich bei den Signifikanten um „Kennreize“, wenn der Empfänger sie identifiziert und semantisch interpretiert, beispielsweise ein Nahrungsobjekt erkennend. Von Signalreizen spricht der Verhaltensbiologe, wenn der Empfänger ein vom Sender intendierter Adressat der „Nachricht“ ist. Anders gesagt: Kennreize sind Voraussetzung für die Entstehung informationeller Signifikate, Signalreize erzeugen kommunikative Signifikate, bei denen der Sender bereits die Bedeutung vorgibt.
Especially for severely disabled people, a powered wheelchair is an important means to participate in societal life. To optimally support people in need without putting an additional burden on them, methods have been developed to enable controlling an electrically powered wheelchair on the basis of the user's natural gaze behavior. While existing approaches consider psychological/physiological research results, they do not take differences in the cognitive and motor abilities of the wheelchair users into consideration. However, according to the study at hand, which analyzed the gaze behavior of 10 wheelchair users when acting in an environment with a varying degree of familiarity, these individual differences are important when interpreting the gaze behavior for enhanced wheelchair control. Implications for a natural gaze-based assistance system for electrically powered wheelchairs are provided.
Our knowledge of the causes of social prejudice is insuflicient; conventional sociological and psychological approaches should be com plemented by a search for biological causes. Evolutionary theory can explain why there is a need for prejudices. The formation of prejudices is supported by some characteristics of our cognitive apparatus. Apart from that, behavioural tendencies such as group orientation and xenophobia, as well as the biologically rooted rejection of outsiders, contribute to the formation of prejudices. Prejudices are hard to fight because of their biological basis, but insight into this element may indicate effective countermeasures.
Egon Brunswik (1903–1955) first made an interesting distinction between perception and explicit reasoning, arguing that perception
included quick estimates of an object’s size, nearly always resulting in good approximations in uncertain environments, whereas
explicit reasoning, while better at achieving exact estimates, could often fail by wide margins. An experiment conducted by
Brunswik to investigate these ideas was never published and the only available information is a figure of the results presented
in a posthumous book in 1956. We replicated and extended his study to gain insight into the procedures Brunswik used in obtaining
his results. Explicit reasoning resulted in fewer errors, yet more extreme ones than perception. Brunswik’s graphical analysis
of the results led to different conclusions, however, than did a modern statistically-based analysis.
Are experience and stimulus necessarily alike? Wertheimer spoke of this as an “insidious and insistent belief”. By contrast, Watson devotes an entire book to the defense of the thesis that representation necessarily requires resemblance. I argue that this bold and important thesis is ambiguous between a historical and a systematic reading, and that in either one of these readings the thesis, for different reasons, will be found wanting. Second, a proper evaluation of it in either one of its possible interpretations requires a careful analysis of the notion of resemblance. I proceed to supply some necessary distinctions and argue that, given such an analysis, Watson's thesis may be historically applicable only to ancient and medieval philosophy, while its systematic import is untenable.
During the 1940s Konrad Lorenz formulated his early epistemological views, focusing on the cognitive mechanisms induction and Gestalt perception. After the war he used this philosophical framework to defend the approach of classical ethology against other approaches to animal behavior. The present paper examines the relationship between Lorenz's ethological methodology and his philosophy of science and knowledge. The main aim of Lorenz's post-war epistemological writings is to provide an epistemological and cognitive theory of observation in order to defend the observational approach of classical ethology against the view that it was no rigorous science. Ethology brought some crucial insights and perspectives to the study of behavior, in particular the idea that behavior can be studied within a comparative-evolutionary framework by means of homologizing components of behavioral patterns and by causal analysis of behavior components and their integration. Early ethology is well-known for its extensive use of qualitative observations of animals under their natural conditions. These observations are combined with experiments that try to analyze behavioral patterns and establish specific claims about animal behavior. Nowadays, there is still disagreement about the significance of observation and experiments and their relation.
My dissertation focuses mainly on Evolutionary epistemology of mechanisms (EEM) and General selection theory (GST) versions of Evolutionary Epistemology. Chapter 1 introduces the descriptive epistemological assumptions of Campbell; Chapter 2 focuses on Campbell’s arguments favoring anti-foundationalism and selectionism; Chapter 3 pictures how Campbell is elucidating his general selectionist ideas to explain knowledge processes, particularly Perception and Creativity. My dissertation concludes how Campbell’s naturalistic evolutionary epistemology is developed or supported by later evolutionary epistemologists and what repercussions it can have on understanding knowledge processes – both in the domains of (naturalistic) epistemology and cognitive sciences.
The term “evolutionary epistemology” refers to the phenomenon of pre-scientific common-sense knowledge as well as to the phenomenon of science itself. Both evolutionary views emerged independently in the course of our century. Both had forerunners in the nineteenth century, reaching back before the time of Darwin. Moreover, both forms of evolutionary epistemology are closely related to other evolutionary views that deal not only with human knowledge but also with certain human activities as well, whether in an ethical-moralistic, social, or cultural sense. The framework for these evolutionary views is made up partly by general cosmological evolutionary philosophical systems which, from a historical point of view, though rendering the formulation of the theory of evolution possible, have nevertheless been disproved by it.1 At least, this holds true for Darwin’s theory of evolution, which removed any kind of teleology that dominated not only earlier evolutionary philosophical systems, but also the theory of Lamarck. Nevertheless, even Darwin himself did not exclude the possibility of such a comprehensive and universal theory of evolution for the time to come; he hoped that “the principle of life will be recognized as part or sequel of a universal law”.2 In the course of this century a considerable number of biologists and philosophers have adopted this idea.
Starting from views on traditional metaphor and mental/conceptual model theory this paper describes the possible influence of the »evolutionary epistemology« (EE) theory to the HCI theory base. This theory is particularly important to HCI especially because of its culture independence on the proposed basis and its coverage of unconscious processes. The first had been a long struggle and still is. For the second area it holds true, that the vast majority of studies and models are dealing with rational part of cognition. This rational part, as is shown by EE rests on the concepts of »ratiomorphus apparatus« and it even cannot be freed from this pre-assumptions given in that apparatus. Meta-communication via training, manuals or even short explanations is getting more rare. Systems are used as is. Which makes it important to get system images »self explanatory at first sight«. Furthermore systems are turning more and more towards multi-media systems, which indeed calls for integration of the different senses. It seems that graphical user interfaces are well studied but senses apart from the visual are missing. Sound and haptics are often designed carefully but sometimes separately from the rest of the design. Not to mention olfactory.
Empirical research on the perception of physical events is rarely designed to test a particular theory. The research often fails to be embedded in a larger theoretical context or it is carried out with the implicit goal to support a particular theoretical approach. I argue that this is not very productive. While three theories are relevant for our understanding of events, their limits have rarely been addressed. I expose these limits. The three theories or approaches are (1) direct or ecological perception, (2) inference theory, and (3) the concept of internalization. I demonstrate that all three fail empirically and/or theoretically with respect to explaining the perception of events. They fail because they adhere to simplistic stationary views or because they remain too vague. An adequate theory of event perception has to include three factors at the level of the explanans, namely the stimulus, the purpose of the action to which the percept belongs, and the appraisal of this action's success. Examples from the domains of arrival-time judgment and perception of events involving classical mechanics are used to support the claims. I suggest that a new pragmatic theory of event perception ought to modify and to incorporate the three concepts of affordances, thought-like processes, and evolutionary principles.
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