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Abstract

Tested the value pluralism model, which asserts that people are likely to think about an issue domain in integratively complex ways to the degree that issue domain activates conflicting values that people perceive as (a) important and (b) approximately equally important. The relations between the value hierarchies endorsed by 145 undergraduates (measured by the Rokeach Value Survey) and the policy preferences they expressed on issues designed to activate conflicts between different pairs of basic social/political values (e.g., the question of whether one is willing to pay higher taxes to assist the poor activates a conflict between concern for personal prosperity and social equality). Regression analyses revealed that (a) policy preferences could be best predicted from knowledge of which of the conflicting values Ss deemed more important and (b) the integrative complexity of people's reasoning about policy issues could be best predicted from knowledge of the similarity of the importance rankings of the conflicting values, the mean importance ranking of the 2 conflicting values, and the interaction of these 2 terms. It is concluded that the value pluralism model provides a flexible theoretical framework for predicting Ideology Issue interactions in both the content and structure of policy reasoning. (43 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
... First, the stability of moral judgments over time can shed light on the role of moral values in moral judgments. Many psychologists agree that moral values1 structure moral judgment and decision-making in a stable way, in the sense that they anchor moral judgments and decisions across a variety of different situations (e.g., Feather 1995; Hitlin and Piliavin 2004;Rohan 2000;Schwartz 2012;Tetlock 1986). For example, if someone judges that it is morally wrong to lie because honesty is a moral value, then they should continue to value honesty and think that it is wrong to lie in different contexts where the lie is about a variety of topics and the lie is told to strangers, friends or colleagues. ...
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Psychologists and philosophers often work hand in hand to investigate many aspects of moral cognition. In this paper, we want to highlight one aspect that to date has been relatively neglected: the stability of moral judgment over time. After explaining why philosophers and psychologists should consider stability and then surveying previous research, we will present the results of an original three-wave longitudinal study. We asked participants to make judgments about the same acts in a series of sacrificial dilemmas three times, 6–8 days apart. In addition to investigating the stability of our participants’ ratings over time, we also explored some potential explanations for instability. To end, we will discuss these and other potential psychological sources of moral stability (or instability) and highlight possible philosophical implications of our findings.
... First, the stability of moral judgments over time can shed light on the role of moral values in moral judgments. Many psychologists agree that moral values1 structure moral judgment and decision-making in a stable way, in the sense that they anchor moral judgments and decisions across a variety of different situations (e.g., Feather, 1995;Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004;Rohan, 2000;Schwartz, 2012;Tetlock, 1986). For example, if someone judges that it is morally wrong to lie because honesty is a moral value, then they should continue to value honesty and think that it is wrong to lie in different contexts where the lie is about a variety of topics and the lie is told to strangers, friends or colleagues. ...
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Psychologists and philosophers often work hand in hand to investigate many aspects of moral cognition. In this paper, we want to highlight one aspect that to date has been relatively neglected: the stability of moral judgment over time. After explaining why philosophers and psychologists should consider stability and then surveying previous research, we will present the results of an original three-wave longitudinal study. We asked participants to make judgments about the same acts in a series of sacrificial dilemmas three times, 6-8 days apart. In addition to investigating the stability of our participants' ratings over time, we also explored some potential explanations for instability. To end, we will discuss these and other potential psychological sources of moral stability (or instability) and highlight possible philosophical implications of our findings.
... The missing link between ambivalence and political behavior prompts research to shed light on how attitudinal ambivalence manifests itself. Following the notion of the value pluralism model [47], scholars have proposed that attitudinal ambivalence should be associated with an "integrative complexity" or "balanced judgment," that is, individuals are capable of evaluating issues based on diverse and even contradictory information [48,49]. While this state of ambivalence was found to evoke more thorough processing of newly incoming information [41,50], ambivalent attitudes are more likely to increase uncertainty and induce more moderate attitudes [49]. ...
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Opinion leaders (OLs) are becoming increasingly relevant on social networking sites as their visibility can help to shape their followers' attitudes toward a variety of issues. While earlier research provided initial evidence on the effect of OLs using agent-based modeling, it remains unclear how OLs affect their network environment and, therefore, the opinion climate when: (a) they publicly hold ambivalent attitudes, and (b) they not only express support for their own stance but also discredit or 'debunk' the opposing side. This paper presents an agent-based model that determines the influence of OLs in social networks in relation to ambivalence and discreditation. The model draws on theoretical foundations of OLs as well as attitudinal ambivalence and was implemented using two network topologies. Results indicate that OLs have significant influence on the opinion climate and that an unequal number of OLs of different opinion camps lead to an imbalance in the opinion climate only in certain situations. Furthermore, OLs can dominate the opinion climate and turn their stance into a majority opinion more effectively when discrediting the opposing side. Ambivalent OLs, on the other hand, can contribute to greater balance in the opinion climate. These findings provide a more nuanced analysis of OLs in social networks by pointing to potential amplifications as well as boundaries of their influence. Implications are discussed with a focus on human and artificial key actors in online networks and their efficacy therein. Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s42001-022-00161-z.
... From cognitive consistency approaches, such as balance theory (Heider, 1958), cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), and self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), the coexistence of conflicting psychological components is typically experienced as aversive. Similarly, the simultaneous pursuit of opposing values is said to yield strong psychological and social conflicts (Schwartz, 1992;Tetlock, 1986). Yet, this is not to say that such paradoxes cannot exist, nor that the experience will necessarily be negative. ...
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An integrative complexity coding system was used to explore the relations between cognitive style and political ideology among US Supreme Court justices who served on the Court between 1964 and 1978. The integrative complexity of case opinions that Ss authored during their 1st terms on the Court and the overall liberalism–conservatism of their voting records throughout their tenure were assessed. Consistent with past work on cognitive style and political ideology, Ss with liberal and moderate voting records exhibited more integratively complex styles of thought in their early case opinions than did those with conservative voting records. Unexpectedly, these relationships between cognitive style and ideology were more powerful on cases involving economic conflicts of interest than on cases involving civil liberties and rights issues. Results remain significant after controlling for a variety of demographic and background characteristics of the Ss (e.g., age, religion, quality of law school attended) and characteristics of the judicial opinions scored for integrative complexity (unanimous or split-Court, majority–minority status of opinion). Possible explanations for the results and processes that limit the cross-issue generality of relationships between cognitive style and ideology are discussed. (60 ref)