Content uploaded by Valerie S. Folkes
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Valerie S. Folkes on Jul 28, 2014
Content may be subject to copyright.
Journal
of
Personality
and
Social
Psychology
1985,
Vol.
48, No. 3.
600-604
Copyright
1985
by
the
Am
n
Psychological
Association,
Inc.
0022-3514/85,400.75
Mindlessness
or
Mindfulness:
A
Partial
Replication
and
Extension
of
Langer,
Blank,
and
Chanowitz
Valerie
S.
Folkes
University
of
California,
Los
Angeles
Four studies examined whether verbal behavior
is
mindful
(cognitive)
or
mindless
(automatic).
All
used Langer, Blank,
and
Chanowitz's
(1978) experimental paradigm.
Experimenters
approached
subjects
at
copying machines
and
asked
to use it first.
Their
requests
varied
in the
amount
and
kind
of
information given. Study
1 found
less
compliance
when experimenters gave
a
controllable
reason
(".
. .
because
I
don't
want
to
wait")
than
an
uncontrollable
reason
(".
. .
because
I
feel
really
sick").
In
Studies
2 and 3,
requests
for
controllable
reasons elicited less
compliance
than
requests used
in the
Langer
et
al.
study. Neither
study
replicated Langer
ct
al.'s
results. Furthermore,
the
controllable
condition's
lower
compliance
supports
a
cognitive
approach
to
social
interaction.
In the
fourth
study subjects were given
instructions
intended
to
increase
cognitive
processing
of the
requests
and the
pattern
of
compliance indicated
in-depth
processing
of the
request.
Results
of the
four
studies
provide
evidence
for
cognitive
processing
rather than mindlessness
in
social
interaction.
In
contrast
to
most social psychological
theories emphasizing cognitive
processes,
Langer
and her
colleagues characterize
be-
havior
as
"mindless."
Most people would
probably
agree that some activities, such
as
walking
and
typewriting,
are
overlearned
and
automatic.
But
Langer,
Blank,
and
Chanowitz
(1978)
make
a
much stronger
claim:
"pseu-
dothinking
behavior
is
more
the
rule
than
the
exception
for
practically
all
verbal
as
well
as
nonverbal behavior"
(p.
638).
If
their claim
is
correct,
our field has
erred
in
emphasizing
the
cognitive.
Before
relegating models
of the
thoughtful
person
to the
minor leagues
of
social psycho-
logical theorizing,
we
should
carefully
exam-
ine the
evidence
for
Langer
et
al.'s claim,
particularly
for
mindlessness
in
"complex
social interaction."
A
norm
of
mindlessness
when
people talk
and
interact with others
contradicts
the
beliefs
of
most cognitive
social
Special thanks
are
extended
to
Mary Curren, Janet
Meltzer,
Kate
Blinston,
and
Joanna
Bascome
for
their
help
in
this
research.
Bernard
Weiner
and
Susan
Green
provided
valuable criticism
on an
earlier draft
of
this
article.
Requests
for
reprints
should
be
sent
to
Valerie
S.
Folkes,
who is now at the
School
of
Business Adminis-
tration,
California
State
University, Fullerton, California
92634.
psychologists.
A
widely
cited study
in
support
of
mindlessness
of
this
sort
involves compli-
ance
to a
request (Langer
et
al.,
1978,
Exper-
iment
1).
Experimenters approached subjects
about
to use a
copying machine
and
asked
to use it first. The
request
varied
in the
amount
and
kind
of
information given.
In
one
condition, experimenters
simply
made
the
request ("Excuse
me, I
have
5(20) pages.
May
I use the
Xerox
machine?").
In a
second
condition
experimenters
gave
"real"
infor-
mation
when
stating
the
reason
for the
request
("Excuse
me, I
have 5(20) pages.
May I use
the
Xerox
machine because
I'm in a
rush?").
In
the
"placebic
information" condition
the
reason
given
contained redundant
informa-
tion
("Excuse
me, I
have
5(20) pages.
May 1
use the
Xerox machine because
I
have
to
make
copies?").
Langer
et al.
reasoned
that
the
placebic
and
request only conditions
are
equivalent
in
terms
of the
amount
of
information given.
Therefore,
if
information
is
processed
by
subjects,
compliance should
be
equal
in the
placebic
and
request
only
conditions
but
greater
in the
real-information condition. This
pattern occurred when experimenters asked
a
large
favor
(Table
1).
However, when
the
experimenter asked
a
small
favor,
giving
a
reason
led to
equal compliance (Table
1).
600
MINDLESSNESS
OR
MINDFULNESS
601
Table
1
Percentage
of
Subjects
Complying
With
Requests
Conditions
Experiment
Langer
et
al.
Large
favor
Small
favor
Experiment
1
Experiment
2
Experiment
3
Experiment
4
No
information
24%
(25)
60%
(15)
—
93%
(14)
83%
(24)
58%
(19)
Placebic"
information
24%
(25)
93%
(15)
—
100%
(8)
67%
(24)
52%
(25)
Real'
information
42%
(24)
94%
(16)
—
90%
(10)
79%
(24)
92%
(25)
Controllable
reason
—
—
74%=
(19)
70%'
(10)
54%c
(24)
—
Uncontrollable
reason
—
—
95%"
(19)
—
—
—
.
because
I
have
to
make
copies."
.
because
I'm in a
rush."
.
because
I
don't
want
to
wait."
.
because
I
feel
really
sick."
.
because
1
want
to go see my
boyfriend."
Subjects
complied whether real information
or
placebic information
was
stated. Langer
et
al.
concluded that people interact
in an au-
tomatic,
mindless
fashion
when
an
effortful
response
is not
required.
These
conclusions have received
a
great
deal
of
attention.
The
study described above
has
frequently
been detailed
in
widely
circu-
lated
books
and
journals (e.g., Abelson,
1981;
Brody,
1980;
Wrightsman
&
Deaux,
1981).
Yet
Langer
et
al.'s
interpretation
of the
results
is
problematical.
Mindlessness
is
inferred
on
the
basis
of
subject's behavior. Because Langer
et al.
consider compliance
with
placebic
in-
formation
irrational
(in
terms
of the
infor-
mation given), they
call
it
mindless. But,
as
Langer
et al.
recognize,
"subjects
may
simply
not be
thinking about what
one
thinks they
are
thinking
about."
What might subjects
be
thinking about
in
this
situation? Perhaps subjects processed
the
placebic information, realizing
it
made little
sense.
But the
small
favor
is a
minor impo-
sition
and the
placebic information could
be
interpreted
as a
garbled attempt
to
give
a
good excuse. Rather than waste time inves-
tigating
exactly
what
the
placebic
information
meant, subjects
may
have decided
to
comply
with
the
request.
In the
large
favor
condition,
breaking
into
the
line constitutes
a
greater
imposition
on the
subject; subjects were less
forgiving.
Moreover,
the
experimenter's giving
a
vague excuse provides
the
subject
with
a
convenient
justification
to
refuse
the
request.
Assuming
this pattern
of
inference would
explain
Langer
et
al.'s results without recourse
to the
mindlessness concept (cf., Harvey
&
Weary,
1981).
In
brief,
the
similar compliance
rates that were observed
in the
placebic
and
in
the
real-information conditions need
not
be
interpreted
as an
absence
of
cognitive
processing.
Is
there
a way to
test
mindfulness
versus
mindlessness using
the
same paradigm?
One
possibility
is to
manipulate
different
reasons
for
the
favor
than those manipulated
by
Langer
et
al.—reasons
that
we can be
more
confident
will
elicit
different
compliance
in
mindless than
in
mindful
states. Whereas
placebic
information
provides
an
ambiguous
justification
for a
favor,
an
obviously
bad
justification
should elicit about
the
same
amount
of
compliance
as a
good justification,
;/
subjects
are in a
mindless state.
In a
mindful
state,
on the
other hand,
a bad
excuse
should elicit
a
lower compliance rate
than
a
good one.
Attribution
research suggests that
one
dis-
tinction between good
and bad
excuses
is in
perceived
controllability.
An
excuse
can
sug-
gest
one is
compelled
to
perform
an
action
or
imply volitional
control
(Weiner, 1980).
Lack
of
control mitigates responsibility
for a
transgression more than volitional control.
Thus,
when people
ask
favors
for
reasons
they
cannot control, their requests
are
more
602
VALERIE
S.
FOLKES
frequently
complied with than
when
reasons
for
the
requested
favor
are
controllable
(Barnes,
Ickes,
&
Kidd,
1979;
Weiner,
1980).
In
the
copying machine paradigm, requests
to go first
because
of
controllable reasons
(e.g.,
"because
I
don't want
to
wait")
should
be
complied with
less—they
do not
mitigate
responsibility
for
needing
the
favor.
When
a
person
lacks
control over
the
reason
for
want-
ing
to go first
(e.g.,
"because
I
feel
really
sick"), compliance should
be
greater. This
should
hold true only
if
subjects
are
processing
information
(mindfully).
If,
on the
other hand,
subjects
are
mindless,
giving
a
controllable
reason should
elicit
the
same compliance
as
an
uncontrollable
reason.
Experiment
1
In
Experiment
1, the
copying machine
paradigm
was
used
but
requests
for
using
the
machine
first
were
either
for a
controllable
reason
or an
uncontrollable reason.
If
subjects
are
behaving mindlessly, they should comply
equally
to the
requests.
If
subjects
are
behav-
ing
mindfully,
compliance should
be
greater
when
an
uncontrollable
reason
is
given.
There
is
the
qualification that
the
request
not be
stated
in a
structurally novel way. Stating
a
controllable reason
is
novel
in
that people
typically
state
uncontrollable reasons
for
their
negative
actions (Folkes, 1982).
But
Langer
et
al.
maintain
that
as
long
as the
request
fits
a
"Favor
X +
Reason
Y"
structure, semantic
novelty
is
unimportant.
Method
Subjects were
82
persons
using copying
machines
in
Univeisity
of
California,
Los
Angeles,
libraries.
Of
these,
38
were asked
a
small
favor
(subjects
had
more
than
5
pages
to
copy). Because
mindlessness
is
postulated
only
in
the
small
favor
(low
effort)
conditions,
requests
were
to
copy only
5
pages.
Experimenters were
2
undergraduate females
and 1
undergraduate male. Before running
any
subjects, they
read
the
Langer
et al.
article. They
understood
that
Langer
et al.
would predict
no
differences
in the
study
they were
to
conduct.
Furthermore,
they were blind
to
the
alternative, attributional prediction
of
differences.
Thus,
any
experimenter
bias
should
have,led
to
equal
compliance levels
(mindlessness).
(Langer
et al.
found
no
difference
in the
pattern
of
compliance
between
the
blind
experimenter
and the
informed experimenter.)
The
procedures
of the
Langer
et al.
Experiment
1
were
followed,
except
only
two
requests
were
made.
In the
controllable
condition, experimenters
asked
to
".
. . use
the
Xerox machine,
because
I
don't
want
to
wait".
In
the
uncontrollable
condition
experimenters
explained
".
. .
because
I
feel
really
sick".
The
experimenters
repeatedly
rehearsed
the
requests
so
that
they were
stated
in
the
same manner,
facial
expression,
eye
contact,
tone
of
voice,
and
posture
were
uniform.
Results
and
Discussion
Results
were consistent
with
attributional
predictions. More subjects complied with
the
request
when
justified
by the
uncontrollable
reason
(18 of 19
subjects) than
the
control-
lable
reason
(13
of 19
subjects).
The
difference
is
significant
when
using
a
one-tailed
a
priori
contrast
with
arc
sine transformation,
t(36)
=
3.27,
p
<
.05.
The
small
difference
between
conditions occurs partly because
of
high
compliance
from
most subjects; only
a mi-
nority
refused
a
small request.
Experiment
2
A
second experiment
was
undertaken
to
replicate Experiment
1's
lower compliance
for
controllable reasons
as
well
as the
results
of
Langer
et
al.'s
small
favor
conditions.
Met/tod
Subjects were
42
people
copying
more
than
4
pages
at
the
University
of
Sussex library,
Brighton,
England.
The
procedures
of
Langer
et
al.'s Experiment
1
were followed
with
a few
modifications.
The 3
female undergraduate
experimenters
were informed
of
both cognitive
and
mindlessness
hypotheses.
Although they
read the
Langer
et
al.
article, they were unaware
of the
replication exper-
iment
described
above. Additionally,
the
experimenters
requested
to
copy
4
pages.
There
were
four
conditions:
no
information,
placebic
information, real information,
and
controllable
reason.
In the
latter condition
the ex-
perimenters
stated,
"Excuse
me, I
have
4
pages.
May I
use
the
Xerox machine
because
I
want
to go see my
boyfriend?"
Results
and
Discussion
The
results provide support
for the
cogni-
tive
position. Consistent with
an
attributional
approach,
the a
priori contrast shows less
compliance
in the
controllable reason condi-
tion than
in the
combined placebic
and
real-
information
conditions (70%
vs.
94%),
/(38)
=
2.49,
p <
.05, one-tailed. Unlike Langer
et
al.,
the a
priori
contrast
between
the no-
information
and the
combined placebic
and
real-information
condition
is not
significant
M1NDLESSNESS
OR
MINDFULNESS
603
(93%
vs.
94%),
r(38)
=
.24,
ns
(see Table
1).
Nor
is the
direction
of
differences
similar
to
Langer
et
al.
Experiment
3
Another
experiment
was
conducted with
a
larger
number
of
subjects
to
replicate
the
above
findings.
Method
Subjects were
96
persons
copying
more
than
5
pages
in
the
University
of
California,
Los
Angeles, libraries.
The 4
experimenters
(2
male
and 2
female
undergraduates)
stated
they
had S
copies
to
make.
In the
controllable
reason
condition
the
excuse given
was
".
. .
because
1
don't
want
to
wait."
Experimenters were informed
of the
alternative
hy-
potheses
and
read
the
Langer
et al.
article
but
were
unaware
of
Experiments
1 and 2.
Additionally, experi-
menters were specifically
instructed
to
state
the
request
in
a
neutral manner
and to
avoid excessively pleading
nonverbal behavior.
Dramatic
nonverbal behavior
could
overwhelm
the
content
of the
request,
resulting
in
equal
compliance
across
conditions.
Care
was
also taken
to
ensure
requests
were
stated
slowly enough
so
subjects
could
comprehend
them.
Equal compliance
across
con-
ditions would
occur
if
requests
were
stated
so
quickly
that subjects could
not
recognize
the
script
(as
in
mind-
lessness)
or
process
the
controllability information
(as in
mindfulness).
Results
and
Discussion
The
results
are
similar
to
Experiments
1
and 2.
Fewer subjects complied when
a
con-
trollable reason
was
given than when
placebic
or
real information
was
given
(54%
vs.
73%),
f(92)
=
1.8,
p <
.05,
one-tailed.
The
lower
compliance
in the
controllable condition sug-
gests cognitive processing.
As in
Experiment
2,
compliance
did not
differ
between
the no-
information
condition
and the
combined
placebic
and
real-information conditions (83%
vs.
73%),
f(92)
=
.79,
ns
(Table
1).
Thus,
neither Experiment
2 nor 3
replicates Langer
et
al.'s
results.
The
difference
between
the
no-information
and
placebic information
conditions
and the
real-information condition
did not
approach significance
in
either
ex-
periment.
Nor was
mean compliance
in the
predicted direction.
The
failure
to
replicate Langer
et
al.'s
results
may be
surprising.
"Most
psychologists
have
an
exaggerated belief
in the
likelihood
of
replicating
an
obtained
finding"
(Tversky
&
Kahneman, 1971,
p.
105)
and "in the
validity
of
conclusions based
on
small sam-
ples"
(p.
106).
On the
other hand, unexpect-
edly
high compliance
rates
in the
no-infor-
mation condition (93%
and 83% in
Experi-
ments
2 and 3,
respectively)
may
have
constituted
a
ceiling
effect.
Such
a
ceiling
effect
would make
it
impossible
to
generate
an
enhanced rate
of
compliance through
the
introduction
of
real information
or
placebic
information.
If,
however,
the
present results
do not
derive
from
a
ceiling
effect
then
we
must
account
for the
surprising
fact
that subjects
seem
to
comply similarly when given
no
excuse
and
real information.
The
real
infor-
mation
(".
. .
because
I'm
in a
rush")
seems
intuitively
more compelling than
the
control
condition
(no
excuse
at
all),
but
does
not
present
as
compelling
an
excuse
as
".
. .
because
I
feel
really sick." Putting aside ceiling
effect
considerations,
we can
perhaps under-
stand
the
observed pattern
of
compliance
if
we
assume that subjects process information
in
the
small request condition
but do not
process
the
available
information
thoroughly.
Thus subjects responded similarly
to no-
information,
real-information,
and
placebic
conditions because
they
considered
the
favor
too
small
to
justify
in-depth processing.
In
contrast,
the
controllable reason information
is
more easily processed because
it is
more
clearly
a bad
excuse.
Experiment
4
Experiment
4
examined compliance under
conditions encouraging complex information
processing.
If
subjects
are not
processing
at
a
complex
level
in the
small-effort
conditions
tested above, then
a
different
pattern
of
com-
pliance should emerge when conditions
facil-
itate
complex information processing.
The
pattern should correspond
to
Langer
et
al.'s
high-effort
condition (Table
1).
Compliance
should
be
similar
in the
no-information
and
placebic conditions
but
higher
in the
real-
information
condition.
In
contrast, asking
a
small
favor
should lead
to a
high level
of
compliance across
all
conditions.
The
Langer
et al.
conditions were
manip-
ulated using
a
role-play methodology.
Al-
though there
are
disadvantages
to a
role-play
604
VALERIE
S.
FOLKES
methodology,
it was
considered most feasible.
To
encourage complex processing, Experi-
ment
4
subjects were instructed
to
"think
carefully
about this decision"
of
whether
to
comply
with
the
request.
In
addition subjects
were
asked
to
justify
their decision
to
comply
or not to
comply
with
the
request. Accounting
for
one's
actions
to an
individual with
un-
known
views
increases complex
information
processing
(Tetlock,
1983).
Method
Subjects were
69
UCLA undergraduates
(47
females,
22
males) taking
a
course
in
social
psychology. Each
received
a
questionnaire explaining that
two
questions
would
be
asked,
the first
asking
"what
action
you
would
take
in a
certain
situation"
and the
second
asking "you
to
explain
why you
would
take
that
action."
Then
the
following
situation
was
described:
Imagine
yourself
in the
following
situation.
You are in
a
UCLA library
and
decide
to
copy
10
pages
from
a
book.
This
floor of the
library
has
only
one
copying
machine
but
when
you
arrive
no one is
using
the
machine.
You
place
the
material
on the
machine.
Just
before
you
deposit
the
money
someone
approaches
you
and
says,
"Excuse
me, I
have
5
pages."
This description included
one of the
three
requests
conditions
from
the
Langer
et
al.
experiment
(no
infor-
mation,
placebic,
or
real).
Subjects were then asked
"What
would
you
do?"
and
were instructed
to
"think
carefully
before answering." Subjects
put a
check
by "1
would
let the
person
use the
machine"
or "I
would
not
let
the
person
use the
machine."
The
second
question
asked
to
"please
explain
in
detail
why you
would
or
would
not
let
the
person
use the
copying machine."
Results
and
Discussion
The
pattern
of
compliance indicates com-
plex
processing
of
requests consistent with
the
Langer
et al.
large
favor
condition (Table
1).
Compliance
was
similar
in the
no-infor-
mation
and the
placebic information condi-
tions
(58%
vs.
52%, respectively)
and was
higher
in the
real-information condition
(92%),
*(66)
=
6.71,
p <
.05, one-tailed.
General Discussion
These studies provide evidence
for
cognitive
processing
in a
situation that
had
previously
appeared
to
elicit mindless behavior. Dem-
onstrating cognitive processing
is
difficult
us-
ing
the
copying machine paradigm because
the
majority
of
subjects comply
with
a
small
request;
variation between conditions occurs
only
for a
minority
of
subjects.
The
obvious
solution
is to
increase
the
size
of the
request,
thereby lowering overall compliance. Yet,
the
more
effortful
response would
be
accompa-
nied
by
increased
cognitive
processing,
ac-
cording
to a
mindlessness perspective.
Confidence
that cognitions
influence
be-
havior
is
gained more
from
the
consistently
lower
compliance
in the
controllable condition
than
from
the
size
of the
differences.
Despite
evidence
for
cognitive processing
in
Studies
1,
2, and 3,
Study
4
suggests that processing
in
response
to
small
favors
may be
less com-
plete than
it
might
be
under more ideal
circumstances.
Although everyday social
in-
teractions
may
often
be
less than completely
mindful,
they
do not
appear
to be as
mindless
(automatic)
as
might
have been surmised
from
the
results reported
by
Langer
et al.
(1978).
References
Abelson,
R. P.
(1981).
Psychological
status
of the
script
concept. American
Psychologist.
36,
715-729.
Barnes,
R. D.,
Ickes,
W. J., &
Kidd,
R. F.
(1979).
Effects
of
the
perceived
intentionality
and
stability
of
another's
dependency
on
helping behavior.
Personality
and
Social
Psychology
Bulletin,
5,
367-372.
Brody,
N.
(1980).
Social
motivation.
Annual
Review
of
Psychology,
31,
143-168.
Folkes,
V. S.
(1982). Communicating
the
reasons
for
social
rejection. Journal
of
Experimental Social
Psy-
chology,
18,
235-252.
Harvey,
J. H., &
Weary,
G.
(1981).
Perspectives
on
Attridutional
Processes. Dubuque,
IA:
Brown.
Langer,
E.,
Blank,
A.,
&
Chanowitz,
B.
(1978).
The
mindlessness
of
ostensibly
thoughtful
action.
Journal
of
Personality
and
Social
Psychology,
36,
635-642.
Tetlock,
P. E.
(1983).
Accountability
and
complexity
of
thought.
Journal
of
Personality
and
Social
Psychology,
45,
74-83.
Tversky,
A.,
&
Kahneman,
D.
(1971). Belief
in the law
of
small
numbers,
Psychological
Bulletin,
76.
105-110.
Weiner,
B.
(1980).
A
cognitive
(attribution)—emotion—
action
model
of
motivated behavior:
An
analysis
of
judgments
of
help-giving.
Journal
of
Personality
and
Social
Psychology.
39,
186-200.
Wrightsman,
L., &
Deaux,
K.
(1981).
Social psychology
in
theSO's.
Monterey,
CA:
Brooks/Cole.
Received
October
26,
1983
Revision
received
April
25,
1984
•
- A preview of this full-text is provided by American Psychological Association.
- Learn more
Preview content only
Content available from Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
This content is subject to copyright. Terms and conditions apply.
