Metacognition and Problem Solving: A Process-Oriented Approach

Abstract

Four studies were conducted to demonstrate that the positive effects of verbalization on solution transfer found in previous studies were not due to verbalization per se but to the metacognitive processing involved in the effort required to produce explanation for solution behaviors. In Experiments 1, 2, and 3, a distinction was made between process-oriented, problem-oriented, and simple "think aloud" verbalizations. The process-oriented (metacognitive) solvers performed significantly better than nonprocess control groups on both training and transfer tasks. Experiment 4 further demonstrated this effect by showing that process-oriented participants consistently form more sophisticated problem representations and develop more complex strategies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

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Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition
1995,
Vol. 21, No.
1,205-223
Copyright 1995 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
Metacognition and Problem Solving: A Process-Oriented Approach
Bernadette Berardi-Coletta
University of Illinois at Chicago
Roger L. Dominowski
University of Illinois at Chicago
Linda S. Buyer
Governor's State University
Elizabeth R. Rellinger
University of Notre Dame
Four studies were conducted to demonstrate that the positive effects of verbalization on solution
transfer found in previous studies were not due to verbalization per se but to the metacognitive
processing involved in the effort required to produce explanations for solution behaviors. In
Experiments 1,2, and
3,
a distinction was made between process-oriented, problem-oriented, and
simple "think aloud" verbalizations. The process-oriented (metacognitive) solvers performed
significantly better than nonprocess control groups
on
both training and transfer
tasks.
Experiment
4 further demonstrated this effect by showing that process-oriented participants consistently form
more sophisticated problem representations and develop more complex strategies.
We observe, anecdotally, in our ordinary encounters with
colleagues, peers, and acquaintances that individuals engaged
in a difficult or complex problem solving task often talk aloud
while trying to find the solution. Many of us have the sense
that, somehow, it
is
helpful to talk through a problem and that,
somehow, this aids the process of finding the solution. Al-
though we are not sure specifically why it helps or what the
mechanism is that provides
us
with such assistance, the urge to
think out loud is almost irresistible.
So,
what happens when
we
engage in such an act? What is it
that is so helpful? Much of the problem-solving research that
includes verbalization as part of the paradigm has confirmed
that, indeed, some kind of thinking aloud is beneficial both
during practice/learning trials and on transfer of learning to
other tasks (Ahlum-Heath & DiVesta, 1986; Berry, 1983;
Berry & Broadbent, 1984,1987; Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann,
& Glaser,
1989;
Gagne & Smith, 1962; Stinessen,
1985;
Wilder
& Harvey,
1971).
Generally, verbalization instructions in these
problem-solving studies require stating reasons for solution
moves, choices, trials, and so forth. An exception was the Chi
et al. (1989) study that simply asked participants to "think
aloud." Chi et al. observed that when asked to simply think
aloud without further instructions, good problem solvers were
more likely to make statements defined as self-explanations
and self-monitoring than were poor problem
solvers.
Thus, the
relationship between verbalization or, more specifically, stat-
ing reasons and problem-solving performance seems to be a
robust, positive one.
Explanations of the effect are varied. Gagne and Smith
(1962) were the first to posit an explanation. They explained
the beneficial effects of verbalizing on solutions to the Tower-
of-Hanoi problem by stating that requiring students to verbal-
Bemadette Berardi-Coletta and Roger L. Dominowski, Depart-
ment of Psychology, University of Illinois at Chicago; Linda S. Buyer,
Department of Psychology, Governor's State University; Elizabeth R.
Rellinger, Department of
Psychology,
University of Notre Dame.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Bernadette Berardi-Coletta, 180 North Michigan Avenue, #1120,
Chicago, Illinois
60601.
ize makes them "stop and think." Similarly, Stinessen (1985)
proposes that verbalization "slows one down," and Ahlum-
Heath and Divesta (1986) suggest that a control mechanism is
induced. Berry (1983) and Berry and Broadbent (1984) further
specify that verbalization keeps attention focused on salient
features of the problem and forces concentration on critical
task components. Berry and Broadbent (1987) also propose
that the timing of explanations (i.e., participant vs. experi-
menter control of presentation of explanations) is important
because "temporary
cognitive
units"
must be activated at the time
they are needed, if lasting domain knowledge is to be enhanced.
Additionally, Wilder and Harvey (1971) conclude that perfor-
mance is
linked
to
'Verbal
mediation"
whether
overt
or covert.
These explanations all suggest that verbalization focuses
attention on and enhances problem-domain knowledge. That
is,
verbalization slows one down or makes one stop and think
more carefully about salient problem features and critical task
components. This is consistent with Stein, Way, Benningfield,
and Hedgecough (1986) who concluded that unless critical
problem features are made explicitly salient, transfer will not
occur between similar but contextually different problems.
Gick and Holyoak
(1980)
and Catrambone and Holyoak (1989)
reached similar
conclusions.
They all found that unless partici-
pants were told that two problems were analogous to one
another, participants did not make the connection and were
unable to use information from one problem to solve the other.
Clearly, then, it is necessary, at some level, for critical
features of a problem to be attended to, remembered, and
applied appropriately. Verbalization seems to enhance this
component of
the
problem-solving
process.
But the question
of
how
verbalization accomplishes this
is
not fully answered. One
important variable that has not been closely examined is the
type of verbalization required and/or produced. Participants
in all but one of the above-mentioned studies were required to
state a reason or tell why they made a particular solution
attempt, trial, or
move.
Dominowski (1990) has proposed that
the demand that one explain oneself invokes executive pro-
cesses such as monitoring, planning, and attention to problem
features and that this yields "more efficient performance."
205
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