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A Review and Critical Analysis of Philosophical Counseling
Samuel Knapp
Pennsylvania Psychological Association
Alan C. Tjeltveit
Muhlenberg College
Psychologists are increasingly encountering philosophers in independent practice who use philosophy to
help individuals or groups work through practical problems. An overview of the diverse expressions of
the philosophical counseling movement is provided, including scope of practice, methods, training
curriculum, codes of ethics, and evidence of effectiveness. The field is critically analyzed: Philosophical
counseling is not currently a viable alternative to mental health treatment. Carefully conducted and
appropriately focused philosophical counseling may, however, help some individuals or groups. To
clarify whether philosophical counseling may benefit a particular individual with a given problem,
psychologists (and potential clients) thus need to carefully evaluate individual philosophical counselors.
Keywords: philosophy, counseling, training, ethics
The practice of philosophical counseling raises several issues of
interest to psychologists. Will philosophical counseling provide
services that supplement, but do not replace, those of psycholo-
gists? Or will it become a competing profession that lures indi-
viduals away from appropriate treatment? Will philosophical
counselors’ critiques of psychology spur psychologists to better
reflect on and appreciate the philosophical implications of their
work? Or will these critiques attack and attempt to undermine the
assumptions on which professional psychology is based?
More broadly, how should psychologists evaluate the growing
philosophical counseling movement? How can they best respond
when clients, friends, or acquaintances ask advice about seeing a
philosophical counselor?
We first describe philosophical counseling, noting the broad
diversity of ways in which philosophical counselors understand the
field and work practically to help individuals address real life
problems. We also critically evaluate the field, considering the
potential benefits of different forms of philosophical counseling
but also the companion issue of whether some of those forms have
the potential to harm (Mills, 1999).
An Overview of Philosophical Counseling
Philosophy predates psychotherapy as a way to address painful
and disturbing life problems. Even before Socrates, philosophers
helped people to think through their problems. Philosophers such
as Zeno the Stoic, Epicurus, and others viewed philosophy as a
practical aid to effective living (de Botton, 2000; Nussbaum,
1994). Classical philosophical writings have inspired many gen-
erations of readers (LeBon, 2001), and some psychotherapy inno-
vators explicitly acknowledge their debt to classical philosophy
(e.g., Ellis, 1987; Yalom, 1989).
Over the years, however, philosophy has become an almost
purely academic discipline detached from day-to-day personal
concerns. Nonetheless, the practical applications of philosophy
reemerged in the 1980s when Gerd Achenbach opened a philo-
sophical practice near Cologne, Germany. Others followed. The
movement received popular attention as a result of several well-
written popular books about ways that philosophy can assist peo-
ple with life crises and decisions (e.g., de Botton, 2000; LeBon,
2001; Marinoff, 1999).
Philosophical counseling associations can now be found in
Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada,
the United States, and other countries. In the United States, phil-
osophical counselors may belong to academic (the American So-
ciety for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy [ASPCP];
see ASPCP, n.d.-a) or professional societies (the American Phil-
osophical Practitioners Association [APPA], see APPA, n.d.-a.; or
the American Philosophical Counseling Association [APCA], see
APCA, n.d.). However, no one organization or one individual
appears to dominate this field. Instead, philosophical counseling
appears to be a loosely connected movement with several organi-
zations and many individuals who share a love of philosophy and
a common goal of using cherished philosophical wisdom as a
means to improve the day-to-day lives of individuals.
A committed core of philosophical counselors has led this
movement, which has produced professional organizations, Web
sites, numerous professional publications, and several well-written
and widely read popular books. However, the durability of the
movement is unclear. At present, it appears to be a cottage industry
with limited referrals generated from articles in the popular press
(e.g., Duane, 2004), professional advertisements, personal refer-
rals, Web sites, or word of mouth.
SAMUEL KNAPP received his EdD in counseling from Lehigh University in
1982 and is the director of professional affairs for the Pennsylvania
Psychological Association. His major area of research is professional
ethics.
ALAN C. TJELTVEIT received his PhD in clinical psychology from the Fuller
Graduate School of Psychology in 1984, interning at the University of
Minnesota. He is professor of psychology at Muhlenberg College, Allen-
town, Pennsylvania. His interests are in ethics and psychology, philosoph-
ical psychology, and religion and psychology.
THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS ARTICLE do not necessarily represent those of
the Pennsylvania Psychological Association.
CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THIS ARTICLE should be addressed to Samuel
Knapp, c/o the Pennsylvania Psychological Association, 416 Forster Street,
Harrisburg, PA 17102. E-mail: sam@papsy.org
Professional Psychology: Research and Practice Copyright 2005 by the American Psychological Association
2005, Vol. 36, No. 5, 558–565 0735-7028/05/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0735-7028.36.5.558
558
Philosophical counselors differ widely in their views of the
profession’s scope of practice. We use the term narrow-scope
philosophical counselors to refer to those who address issues that
typically appear outside the realm of psychotherapy and within the
realm of philosophy (including ethical, metaphysical, political, and
logical problems). Clients may seek philosophical counseling for a
practical problem, such as a professional ethical dilemma. They
may seek counseling to consider epistemological, worldview, or
conceptual issues, such as “what gives life dignity or what makes
life worthwhile” (Heath, 1998, p. 49), or they may seek to learn
philosophical ways of thinking so that they can handle future
problems. Particular attention is paid to the relationship of philo-
sophical ideas (e.g., “those related to the nature of freedom, the
morality of lying, the meaning of love,” Lahav, 2001, p. 6) and the
client’s life situation. Narrow-scope philosophical counseling, Pa-
den (1998) asserted, “does not undertake to treat ‘mental illness’ ”
(p. 10). Thus, Dorothy Cantor’s reported criticism of the compe-
tence of philosophical counselors to treat “emotional” and “mental
health” problems (see Sharkey, 1998, p. 1) does not appear to
address narrow-scope philosophical counseling.
By way of contrast, we use the term broad-scope philosophical
counseling to refer to those who address issues that typically
appear within the realm of psychotherapy. Their goals include
helping people in interpersonal relationships or life crises, or those
coping with anxiety or depression. “If a person seeks ethical
[philosophical] counseling, and the counselor has no reason to
believe that the problem is reducible to some physiological or
neuropsychiatric dysfunction,” Marinoff (1995) contended, “then
the counselor will treat the problem as solvable exclusively in a
moral dimension” (p. 174). Consistent with a broad-scope perspec-
tive, Raabe (1999) asserted that “the philosophical counselor’s
intention is to help his client reach any reasonable and morally
permissible goal the client has set for herself” (¶12). Gibbs (1997)
drew a parallel between schizophrenia and solipsism (the view that
“the only things that exist are my mind and its ideas,” p. 50) and
speculated that, because they address solipsism, “philosophers
perhaps have a unique understanding of the schizophrenic patient’s
world view, and are therefore most appropriately suited to counsel
them” (p. 47). His counseling includes teaching those with schizo-
phrenia skepticism so they can accept the rationality of their
solipsism. Cantor’s critique (see Sharkey, 1998) seems on target
here.
Philosophical Techniques and Methods
Philosophical counselors also differ in their use of techniques.
Some use approaches that overlap with nondirective psychological
approaches, emphasizing the need to listen to others and to allow
them to talk. Others are more directive, using methods similar to
those of cognitive or rational– emotive behavior therapy in which
they identify and confront their clients’ irrational assumptions
(Paden, 1998).
Philosophical counselors more commonly describe their inter-
ventions in philosophical terms. They provide clients with philo-
sophical content (which may include relevant “concepts, distinc-
tions, methods, assumptions, etc.,” Lahav, 2001, p. 5), often in the
form of assigned homework (philosophical readings). Some focus
on one philosopher or philosophical approach (e.g.,
O’Donaghue’s, 2003, Nietzschean approach); others draw on a
range of philosophers (Raabe, 2002). Philosophical methods
(Borowicz, 1997; Marinoff, 1998; Perring, 2003; Raabe, 1999,
2002) are emphasized, including clarifying the philosophical is-
sues in practical issues, defining key terms, questioning and crit-
ically analyzing presuppositions and basic principles (especially
when hidden), and identifying and correcting problems in thinking
(e.g., identifying and eliminating inconsistencies and contradic-
tions). Philosophical counselors help clients “inspect the range of
choices available to them” and “understand the different points of
view on the choices they face” (Perring, 2003, p. 1). Finally, they
help clients formulate their own philosophical stances and justify
their choices. Not all philosophical counselors think identifying
method is a good idea, however. Achenbach, as Schuster (1999)
noted, held that philosophical practice opposes “the positivist
notion that it is necessary to have a method” (p. 36). Achenbach
claimed that his practice is “beyond method” (Schuster, 1999, p.
38).
Professional Status
Although philosophical counselors draw on both the mental health
professions and academic philosophy, they strive to demarcate their
profession’s boundaries in relationship to both (Ruschmann,
1998). They sometimes sharply distinguish philosophical counsel-
ing from psychotherapy, for example. On the other hand, Duane
(2004) reported that many academic philosophers have “an almost
visceral revulsion at the very idea of philosophical counseling” (p.
37). Philosophical counselors thus differentiate themselves from
academic philosophers who, in general, “overlook the problems of
daily life” (Ruschmann, 1998, p. 34).
Some philosophical counselors contend that they should be
licensed and eligible for third-party reimbursements (Duane, 2004;
Marinoff, 1999; Sharkey, 1998). Certification and other forms of
regulation have, however, proven controversial even among phil-
osophical counselors (Duane, 2004; Marinoff, 1999; Controversial
Legislation, n.d.). The constraints on training and practice associ-
ated with certification are opposed, the critics contend, in part
because regulation limits freedom of speech and thought, stifles
creativity, and tramples on the rights of philosophers to practice as
they choose (Controversial Legislation, n.d.). Schuster (1999)
contended that “furthering the academic professionalization of
philosophy practice will very likely deplete it from its revolution-
ary ethics and turn it into a highly professional discourse that
actually contributes little” (p. 47). Although Marinoff (1999)
claimed that Achenbach now supports certification, Achenbach
historically opposed professionalization, a position consistent with
his conviction that philosophical counseling is “beyond method”
(Schuster, 1999, p. 38), is “nongoal oriented” (Mills, 1999, p. 151),
and “assumes no responsibility for the client’s welfare or the
outcome of mutual philosophic exchange” (Mills, 1999, p. 151).
The challenge facing philosophical counseling as a profession,
Mace (1999) suggested, is
whether it will be based on an informed vision of what change
depends upon, in the kind of circumstances it claims to ameliorate.
Without this, it is difficult to generalize about what it could bring to
the situation of individuals that neither an educative exposure to
philosophy, nor a psychotherapy . . . would afford. (p. 275)
559
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELING
Training Programs and Certification
Training programs should screen out individuals who have not
mastered the requisite academic material or who lack the necessary
social skills or emotional maturity to become professionals. How-
ever, we know of no graduate training programs in philosophical
counseling. Nevertheless, Marinoff (2002) has led the APPA to
certify philosophical counselors as associates or advanced practi-
tioners. Applicants for APPA associate certification must have at
least a master’s degree in philosophy and “demonstrate practical
knowledge of interpersonal psychology, psychopathology, experi-
ence and/or training in personal counseling, familiarity with the
history of philosophy as a discipline of counsel, and evidence of
personal stability and good character” (Marinoff, 2002, p. 215).
Demonstration of these skills may be established by completing
the 3-day APPA Primary Certification Training Program for Phil-
osophical Counselors. APPA certification for independent practice
requires submission of 10 supervised cases conducted over a
1-year period, plus completion of an advanced 3-day training
workshop.
The APCA plans to establish a National Register of Philosoph-
ical Counselors (APCA, n.d.) and to sponsor a part-time 2-year
training program, a time period matching that of a Norwegian
model that Herrestad (2001) described as including didactic com-
ponents, role-playing, providing and receiving philosophical coun-
seling, and supervision. Unfortunately, the competencies intended
to be created by these training programs are not clearly specified,
making it difficult to determine the adequacy of existing and
proposed training programs.
Codes of Conduct
The ASPCP (n.d.-b), APPA (n.d.-b), and APCA (n.d.) ethics
codes require philosophical counselors to maintain confidentiality,
obtain informed consent, refer when necessary, and limit their
practices to their areas of competence. The APPA code, for in-
stance, states that “philosophical practitioners will refer clients for
appropriate alternative care if the clients’ problems are adjudged to
be not primarily philosophical in origin, or not amenable to phil-
osophical approaches” (APPA, Part 1, Section iii). The ASPCP
and APPA codes affirm the importance of client welfare and state
that counselors “should avoid sexual intimacy with clients”
(APPA, n.d.-b, Part 2, Section xviii). The ASPCP and APPA codes
indicate that allegations of ethical impropriety are referred to
decision-making bodies, but don’t specify any consequences for
ethical violations. The APCA code specifies a range of conse-
quences (up to expulsion from the APCA, with notification of the
same published in the association’s newsletter) if a philosophical
counselor is found to have engaged in unethical behavior.
A Critical Review of Philosophical Counseling
Philosophical counseling’s diversity is either an indication of
“healthy pluralism” (Heath, 1998, p. 45) or an indication that the
field lacks coherence. Marinoff (1998) took the former view. Mace
(1999), however, viewed the diversity as a sign of the field’s
infancy, and Shibles (1998) thought the field was in “a state of
confusion as to its definition, area of expertise and purpose” (p.
19). The question is whether philosophical counselors have much
in common— except their name.
Greater coherence, commentators have suggested, is important
but difficult to achieve. Robertson (1998) noted that closure and
consensus seem contrary to philosophy’s nature. However, Perring
(2003) warned that
if no philosophical theory is generally accepted, then no philosophical
theory will be very helpful to people trying to work out what they
should do when facing a real life problem, because we cannot know
which philosophical theory is the right one with any degree of assur-
ance. (p. 1)
A second problem is the tension between beneficence and
nonmaleficence (helping others vs. refraining from harming oth-
ers) and other ideals widely held by philosophers. Jopling (1998)
identified truth as philosophy’s goal. In those instances in which
truth and client well-being conflict, clients (and society) deserve to
know which the philosopher thinks is more important. Another
potential conflict between beneficence and philosophical counsel-
ing is raised by O’Donaghue’s (2003) Nietzschean approach.
Given Nietzsche’s declaration that benevolence is “the ultimate
obstacle to self-affirmation” (see Taylor, 1989, p. 255), Tjeltveit
(1999) labeled as oxymoronic the notion of a Nietzschean profes-
sional. How can someone bitterly opposed to benevolence claim to
consistently exhibit benevolence? In the counseling relationship,
do counselors—in accord with Nietzsche—seek their own self-
affirmation above all, or—in accord with traditional professional
ideals—seek the well-being of their clients?
More generally, if no coherent account can be given of the
nature, goals, and methods of philosophical counseling, it is not
clear why the movement should receive societal support or pro-
fessional status. Incoherence is, of course, a philosophical problem
and a serious one. Although we think philosophical counseling
would benefit from greater coherence (if formulated with suffi-
cient breadth to sustain healthy pluralism), our primary concern is
whether philosophical counseling does, in fact, promote the public
welfare and the well-being of particular individuals. Clients may
benefit despite its incoherence. The critical evaluation of the field
in this section is thus relevant to evaluations of particular philo-
sophical counselors as well as the field as a whole.
Marinoff (2000) asserted, “I take it as obvious that philosophical
practitioners possess philosophical expertise . . . with which we
benefit our clients” (p. 55). We disagree that this is obvious. The
philosophical and empirical claim that philosophical counselors
practice effectively requires convincing arguments and empirical
evidence. To examine whether the practice does, in fact, contribute
to the general welfare, we consider in turn three assumptions on
which we believe philosophical counseling rests: (a) philosophical
issues sometimes underlie human problems; (b) some philosoph-
ical problems can be addressed effectively through philosophical
means; and (c) philosophical counselors can use philosophical
methods to assist clients with the philosophical dimensions of their
life concerns.
Philosophical Issues Sometimes Underlie Human
Problems
To some degree, philosophical issues underlie many dimensions
of human life addressed in psychotherapy. Yalom (1989), for
560 KNAPP AND TJELTVEIT
instance, reported that at a key juncture in therapy, he “felt more
like a philosophy or religious teacher than a therapist” (p. 79). This
bridging of disciplinary boundaries is even more obvious in Ellis’s
(1987) article. Apparently unencumbered by discomfort about his
lack of philosophical training, Ellis asserted that he strives, when
conducting elegant rational– emotive therapy, to produce in his
clients a “profound philosophic change” (p. 473). Less ambitious
forms of therapy also address philosophical issues. Shipley and
Leal (2002) noted, for instance, that the focus on beliefs in
cognitive– behavioral therapy “looks rather like doing philosophy”
(p. 4). To the extent that philosophical questions (and working
answers) are inescapable whenever practical human problems ex-
ist, everyone should ultimately benefit from philosophers giving
sustained attention to those issues. Clients wanting those questions
addressed may find their needs best met by philosophers.
Sophisticated discussions of philosophical issues are, however,
occurring in psychology (Martin, Sugarman, Thompson, & Lee,
2003; Meehl, 1981; Messer & Woolfolk, 1998; Miller, 1992;
O’Donohue & Kitchener, 1996; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon,
1999; Tjeltveit, 1999) and in psychiatry (Radden, 2004; Sadler,
2002). Philosophical counselors may benefit from exploring that
literature, just as psychologists may benefit from dialogue with
philosophical counselors.
Perhaps even more advantageous may be an awareness across
professions that psychology and philosophy are often inextricably
intertwined in practical problems. Developing a broad competence
involving expertise and cooperation across disciplinary lines may
thus be optimal (Robertson, 1998; Ruschmann, 1998; Shipley &
Leal, 2002). As Evans (1984 –1985) suggested, perhaps to para-
phrase and update Plato’s famous claim, our human troubles will
never cease unless “either philosophers become clinical psychol-
ogists or those whom we now call our psychologists take the
pursuit of philosophy seriously and adequately, and there is con-
junction of two things, therapeutic skills and philosophical intel-
ligence” (p. 134).
Philosophical issues addressed by narrow-scope philosophical
counselors. Narrow-scope philosophical counselors focus on
problems that are clearly philosophical (e.g., sorting out clients’
metaphysical commitments or political philosophy) and outside
the realm of problems that psychologists typically consider. How-
ever, even narrow-scope philosophical counselors may encounter
practical problems when helping persons with those narrowly
defined philosophical problems.
Some problems addressed by narrow-scope philosophers may
overlap at times with the domains of psychologists and other
mental health professionals. The Web site of one apparently
“narrow-scope” philosophical counselor described a client issue
with a broad label (general morality) that was followed by an
example that looked like it required relationship counseling.
My girlfriend caught me in a couple of lies, and now she says she
doesn’t trust me. But it isn’t like I tell really awful lies or anything, so
I don’t see what the problem is. I wish you’d talk some sense into her.
(Ray, 2001, p. 5)
This “philosophical problem” may, in fact, be a psychological or
relationship issue best addressed through psychotherapy. Many
clients present with relatively innocuous entry problems that mask
more pervasive psychological disorders. Similarly, a client may
present with an apparent philosophical problem (e.g., is suicide
ever justified?) with roots in chronic or severe depression.
In addition, some philosophical counselors might not identify
subtle signs of mental illness and may work with persons who
really need mental health treatment. For example, persons with
generalized anxiety disorder may be labeled (either by the philo-
sophical counselor or themselves) as having existential angst.
Philosophical counselors with no formalized training in clinical
diagnostics may not be capable of discerning the difference (Mills,
1999).
Furthermore, if philosophical counselors work alone with clients
whose philosophical problems coexist with psychological prob-
lems, the psychological problems may be neglected. In addition,
raising philosophical issues, or doing so in a manner that the client
perceives as insensitive or authoritarian, may exacerbate the symp-
toms of a fragile or rigidly defended client. As Jopling (1998)
warned, “philosophical counseling has all the resources to lead
clients to ‘overphilosophize’ their problems, or even create prob-
lems that were not there in the first place. As Bishop Berkeley
warned, philosophers have the bad habit of kicking up a dust and
then complaining that they cannot see” (p. 108).
These caveats should not be taken to imply that narrow-scope
philosophical counselors will necessarily make these errors. With
proper training, they may be able to identify and refer individuals
with psychological disorders to appropriate treating professionals.
Finally, well-trained philosophical counselors with a suitably fo-
cused practice may make substantial contributions to psycholo-
gists’ understanding of the philosophical dimensions of the prac-
tical problems that people face and may be better able than
psychologists to assist clients with some of them.
Philosophical issues addressed by broad-scope philosophical
counselors. Broad-scope philosophical practitioners expand the
interpretation of philosophical problem to include all mental health
problems that are not medical problems and are not biologically
based. Philosophical counseling is, then, an alternative form of
mental health treatment for individuals with troubled interpersonal
relationships, life crises, depression, and anxiety (Marinoff, 1999).
The assumptions of broad-scope philosophical practitioners are
problematic for several reasons. First, it seems mistaken to assume
that nonmedical mental disorders are entirely or largely philosoph-
ical in nature. Most, if not all, human problems have a philosoph-
ical component to them, but that does not make them essentially
philosophical issues. For example, the use of medication to treat
the symptoms of schizophrenia involves many ethical problems
(e.g., was the consent for treatment truly informed?). Although the
use of medications in this context has philosophical implications,
it does not follow that philosophers would be best qualified to treat
persons with schizophrenia.
Second, it is unclear whether philosophical counselors want to
replace the concept of mental illness or propose a philosophical
taxonomy of problems to replace the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., American Psychiatric As-
sociation, 1994). Either task is daunting.
Third, broad-scope philosophical counselors’ distinction be-
tween medical and nonmedical mental illnesses is simplistic. The
mind– body interaction is highly complex, but, for purposes of our
discussion, we note that most mental illnesses include an interac-
tion of biological and psychological factors. Panic attacks, for
example, are characterized by measurable physiological arousal
561
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELING
and appear to involve some genetic predisposition. However, they
can be precipitated by either cognitive or physiological events.
Also, the symptoms of schizotypal and other personality disorders
are primarily behavioral, but genetic factors may predispose indi-
viduals to develop them. Marinoff (1999) did not clarify whether
he considers panic attacks or personality disorders outside of his
realm of competence.
Furthermore, the etiology of a disorder appears to be less im-
portant than the functional limitations it imposes. The qualities of
“medical” mental illnesses that make sufferers ineligible for broad-
scope philosophical counseling are never described, but it is pos-
sible that Marinoff (1999) does not believe that such clients are
capable of attending to the content of the philosophical discussions
adequately. However, the ability to attend to content, whether
philosophical or not, is not a dichotomous variable. Some persons
with major depression or severe anxiety might not be able to attend
adequately, at least some of the time. Or persons with dependent
personality disorder may be able to understand the content ade-
quately but may be unable to live out newly acquired philosophical
ideas because of their fear of offending their significant others.
In summary, we support the claim of narrow-scope philosoph-
ical counselors that philosophical issues sometimes underlie hu-
man problems but reject the claims of broad-scope philosophical
counselors that “nonmedical” or “nonbiological” mental illnesses
are really philosophical in nature.
Some Philosophical Problems Can Be Addressed
Effectively Through Philosophical Means
The difficulty in defining which problems are philosophical is
compounded by the difficulty in determining which methods are
philosophical (not psychological). We agree that narrow-scope
philosophical problems can probably be addressed through infor-
mal discussions, tutorials, guided readings, or other didactic expe-
riences with trained and empathic philosophical counselors.
Even if we accepted the broad-scope claim that nonbiological
mental illnesses are philosophical, we are not convinced that these
“philosophical problems” can necessarily be addressed effectively
through philosophical means, and certainly not best treated by
them.
Many broad-scope philosophical counselors distinguish philo-
sophical counseling from psychotherapy. However, the distinc-
tions made by some take the form of overgeneralizations or of
attacking stereotypes of the activities and perspectives of psycho-
therapists. Fideler (2002), for instance, warned that psychothera-
pists may be coercive and “impose ideas of ‘illness’ and ‘well-
ness,’ which may undermine an individual’s personal needs and
integrity” (p. 1), and Raabe (1999) suggested that a mental health
therapist “expects the client to passively receive treatment” (¶11).
Marinoff (1999) claimed that psychotherapists usually progress no
further than analyzing the causes of behavior and do not deal with
solutions. He saved some ammunition for psychiatrists, whom he
claimed “are committed to identifying as many ‘mental illnesses’
as they possibly can. Why? For the usual reasons: power and
profit” (Marinoff, 1999, p. 20).
Although some mental health professionals have committed
these errors, we believe such actions are atypical. Attacking the
straw man of bad mental health treatment does not, in any case,
establish the efficacy of philosophical counseling. The positive
arguments of broad-scope philosophical counselors are sometimes
weak, taking the form of sweeping generalizations or occasional
examples of treatment failures by psychotherapists whose patients
suddenly do remarkably well when they finally work with a
philosophical counselor.
Philosophical counselors have an ethical obligation to demon-
strate empirically that philosophical means can help clients. This
would require them, in the first instance, to articulate a clearly
identifiable set of change procedures (the philosophical means)
that are unique to philosophical counselors and distinct from the
techniques that philosophical counselors borrow from mental
health professionals (e.g., nondirective techniques or rational–
emotive therapy disputations). If philosophical counselors intend
to provide an alternative form of mental health care, it is impera-
tive that they obtain scientific evidence that these techniques
actually produce some benefit beyond nonspecific treatment ef-
fects. Like psychological practitioners, their services should be
informed by relevant research. The isolated case histories that
appear in the current literature are not adequate. The selection of
methodologies appears to reflect more folk psychology than sci-
ence. Philosophical counselors appear to pick therapeutic ap-
proaches because they intuitively feel right for them.
If philosophical counselors eventually acquire evidence for
the effectiveness of philosophical counseling, they need to ask
other questions. For example, for what populations and what
conditions can philosophical counseling be of benefit? Are
philosophical methods more or less effective than other meth-
ods of change? When, if ever, should philosophical counseling
be combined with more traditional mental health treatment?
Under what circumstances might philosophical counseling be
iatrogenic? Ineffective philosophical counseling is not morally
neutral if it discourages clients from taking advantage of more
traditional interventions.
Broad-scope philosophical counselors should respect client au-
tonomy and inform clients of the experimental (not empirically
supported) nature of philosophical methods and the empirically
supported alternatives to philosophical counseling. In contrast to
the overly broad and inaccurate stereotypes of psychotherapists
provided by Fideler (2002), Marinoff (1999), and Raabe (2002),
philosophical counselors need to present accurate research find-
ings on the effectiveness of psychotherapy (Lambert, 2004). Var-
ious forms of psychotherapy, for instance, effectively treat gener-
alized anxiety disorder. It would be unfair to subject clients with
generalized anxiety disorder to philosophical counseling without
informing them of the option of relatively brief and effective
psychotherapy. When adequate research has been conducted, the
results of comparative research on psychological interventions,
pharmacological interventions, and philosophical counseling will
need to be provided to ensure that prospective clients can make
informed decisions.
In summary, we do not know if philosophical methods produce
positive change because we lack a clear and coherent account of
those methods and because relevant research has not been con-
ducted. While philosophical methods probably work well with
narrowly focused philosophical problems, we know of no evidence
that establishes the effectiveness of philosophical methods for
broadly focused (mental health) problems.
562 KNAPP AND TJELTVEIT
Philosophical Counselors Can Use Philosophical Methods
to Assist Clients With the Philosophical Dimensions of
Their Life Concerns
The final assumption on which philosophical counseling rests
focuses on the training and skill level of philosophical counselors.
Are they capable, or more capable than others, of using philosoph-
ical methods to help individuals with philosophical concerns? Are
trained philosophical counselors optimally equipped to use those
methods?
Some philosophical counselors point to the fact that cognitively
oriented psychologists derive their methods, at least in part, from
classic philosophical works from stoicism and other schools of
philosophy. Because they know these philosophical classics better
than the psychologists, they argue that they are skilled at broad-
scope philosophical counseling. However, cognitively oriented
psychotherapies do not claim that change stems entirely from
challenging philosophical assumptions; cognitive changes occur in
the context of a treatment relationship and through a combination
of emotive and behavioral techniques. In addition, cognitive ther-
apists use cognitions as a means to address psychological prob-
lems, whereas philosophical counselors appear to use cognitions to
address problems considered to be, at base, not psychological, but
philosophical.
Many philosophical counselors undoubtedly have good inter-
personal skills and an intuitive sense of how to help others.
Perhaps they had been successful classroom teachers. The skills
adequate for good classroom presentations, however, may not be
adequate for dealing with some difficult clients. Clients with
pervasive mental or personality disorders might not respond well
to the philosophical methods that would benefit most persons.
Whereas a talented academic may excite students about philosoph-
ical concepts through skillful didactic techniques, those same
techniques may fail when dealing with clients who have serious
emotional problems that create high arousal, make it difficult for
them to process personal information, or cause them to have highly
selective attention.
Psychological researchers have clarified the relationship quali-
ties present in effective helping relationships and have studied
methods for teaching those skills (Norcross, 2002). Developing
and managing effective treatment relationships require active lis-
tening skills and the ability to express ideas clearly through con-
fronting, clarifying, expressing empathy, providing personal sup-
port, giving interpretations, and other skills. Acquiring the ability
to establish rapport and to get clients to open up on deeply personal
issues can require considerable training and supervision.
In addition, philosophical counselors may not be attuned to
problems that can arise in relationships—such as transference,
countertransference, resistance, splitting, or the manifestations of
defense mechanisms—to which psychologists are very attuned.
The handling of interpersonal relationships is extremely important.
Knowledgeable and technically skilled psychotherapists and phil-
osophical counselors may be limited in their ability to facilitate
change if they lack the requisite interpersonal skills. Training as a
philosopher, however, does nothing to ensure the development of
these skills. Jongsma (1995) describes how she and colleagues, to
their credit, spent hours having their tapes reviewed by her col-
leagues to improve their philosophical counseling. It may also
have been desirable, however, for them to have been supervised by
an expert in interpersonal or counseling relationships.
Although philosophical counselors may be more knowledgeable
about abstract ethical theories than psychologists, they may not be
aware of the practical ethical issues that arise in counseling. Some
are obvious and found in the philosophical counseling ethics codes
(e.g., do not have sex with clients). Other boundary issues are more
subtle (e.g., issues related to self-disclosure, touch, hugging, bar-
tering, and unavoidable out-of-the-office contacts) but nonetheless
very important (Knapp & VandeCreek, 2003). Raabe (2002)
claimed, however, that “since transference and countertransference
are not a method employed in philosophical counseling, there is no
professional reason that would justify a philosophical counselor
allowing sexual feelings to develop between himself and the
client” (p. 16).
Given clear goals, a crucial test of the effectiveness of philo-
sophical counselors is, of course, empirical. Lahav (1995) once
claimed that philosophical counselors do not need such outcome
studies because the evidence that cognitive therapy has been
effective in the treatment of mental disorders “suggests that phil-
osophical counseling can be helpful” (p. 15). Extrapolating from
empirically supported psychological techniques used by trained
psychotherapists to philosophers untrained in psychological meth-
ods is hardly warranted, however. More promising is Lahav’s
(2001) recently completed empirical outcome study (the field’s
first), a post hoc qualitative process study in which 13 volunteer
college students/clients received either three or four sessions of
philosophical counseling and completed a questionnaire about
their experiences as clients. Philosophical counseling, they gener-
ally reported, was meaningful because of “the philosophical nature
of the conversations” (p. 12). Marinoff (2002) also reported re-
search in progress; however, no results have yet been published.
More (and better) research is clearly needed. At this point, ana-
logue studies appear appropriate. There is not enough evidence to
risk experimentation with broad-scope philosophical counseling
with clinical populations.
In summary, evidence to support the claim that philosophical
counselors can effectively use philosophical methods to address
philosophical problems is, at best, minimal. Because there is ample
evidence that psychotherapy effectively treats many psychological
problems, but none regarding philosophical interventions, the
claims of broad-scope philosophical counselors should be rejected.
Implications for Practice
We return to the questions raised at the beginning of this article.
What will be the impact of philosophical counseling on profes-
sional psychology and the public? Many psychologists who have
benefited from philosophy want it disseminated to wider audi-
ences. Among their contributions, philosophers could assist in the
training of psychologists and other mental health professionals.
Logical analysis, epistemology, philosophy of science, and ethics
are especially relevant to the issues psychologists face. Whether
philosophical counseling, as a profession, is an optimal means for
improving client welfare, however, remains an open question.
Broad-scope philosophical counseling has not yet demonstrated
that it can help people and raises the possibility that it may harm
them. It uses an overly broad definition of philosophical problems,
fails to identify treatment procedures adequately, and provides no
563
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELING
evidence that its training programs are related to desired profi-
ciency outcomes. Indeed, Mills (1999) recommends that broad-
scope philosophical counselors get advanced degrees in both phi-
losophy and a mental health field (and preferably a doctorate in
one). The burden of proof is on broad-scope philosophical coun-
selors to demonstrate that they currently provide a reasonable
alternative to traditional mental health services. They have not yet
done so.
We believe that narrow-scope philosophical counselors, by way
of contrast, may provide useful services to individuals with phil-
osophical concerns. The boundaries between psychologists and
philosophical counselors will sometimes be sharp and sometimes
hazy, because psychotherapy clients’ problems often involve phil-
osophical issues, just as philosophical counseling clients’ concerns
often involve psychological issues. Narrow-scope philosophical
counseling has the potential to be beneficial under certain circum-
stances—when philosophical counselors consult with psycholo-
gists or other mental health professionals, integrate relevant sci-
entific findings into their practices, evaluate the effectiveness of
their interventions, develop a more coherent account of their goals
and methods, “make clear to the client the limits of philosophical
counseling” (Paden, 1998, p. 14), and refer when appropriate.
Psychologists evaluating a particular philosophical counselor do
well to take these characteristics into account—to ensure that a
potential client can benefit from, and not be harmed by, philosoph-
ical counseling.
What should psychologists say to their clients, friends, or family
members who ask about the appropriateness of philosophical
counseling? We would answer succinctly: If they have a narrow
issue that is in an area generally considered philosophical in nature
(e.g., political philosophy or ethics), then philosophical counseling
may be of value. Philosophical counselors will ideally have grad-
uate degrees and training in interpersonal interactions and will use
discretion in referring issues outside of their scope of competence.
If an issue is generally considered psychological in nature (e.g.,
dysfunctional emotions, problematic or compulsive behaviors, or
relationship problems), then they are better off going to a licensed
mental health professional.
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Received September 17, 2004
Revision received May 19, 2005
Accepted June 10, 2005 䡲
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