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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
1990,
Vol. 58, No.
6,1015-1026
Copyright 1990 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
0O22-35I4/9O/SOO.75
A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept
of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places
Robert
B.
Cialdini and Raymond R. Reno
Arizona State University
Carl A. Kallgren
Pennsylvania State University, Behrend College
Past
research
has generated mixed
support
among social scientists
for the
utility of social norms
in
accounting
for human behavior. We argue that norms do have a substantial impact on human
action;
however,
the impact can only be properly recognized when
researchers (a) separate 2
types
of
norms that at times act antagonistically in a situation—injunctive norms (what most others
approve
or
disapprove)
and descriptive norms (what most others do)—and (b) focus
Ss'
attention
principally
on the type of norm being studied. In 5 natural settings, focusing Ss on either the
descriptive
norms or the injunctive norms regarding littering caused the
Ss*
littering
decisions
to
change
only in accord with the
dictates of the
then more salient type of
norm.
Although social norms have a long history within social psy-
chology, support for the concept as a useful explanatory and
predictive device is currently quite mixed. Some researchers
have used and championed the concept as important to a
proper understanding of human social behavior (e.g, Berko-
witz,
1972;
Fishbein
&
Ajzen,
1975;
McKirnan,
1980;
Pepitone,
1976;
Sherif,
1936; Staub, 1972; Triandis, 1977). Others have
seen little of value in it, arguing that the concept is vague and
overly general, often contradictory, and ill-suited to empirical
testing (e.g., Darley & Latane, 1970; Krebs, 1970; Krebs &
Miller, 1985; Marini, 1984). In addition, a parallel controversy
has developed within academic sociology where ethnomethod-
ological and constructionist critics have faulted the dominant
normative paradigm of that discipline (Garfinkel,
1967;
Mehan
& Wood, 1975).
The effect of these criticisms has been positive in pointing
out problems that must be solved before one can have confi-
dence in the utility of normative explanations. One such prob-
lem is definitional. Both in common parlance and academic
usage, norm has more than one meaning (Shaffer,
1983).
When
considering normative influence on behavior, it is crucial to
discriminate between the is (descriptive) and the
ought
(injunc-
tive) meaning of social norms, because each refers to a separate
source of human motivation (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). The
descriptive norm describes what is typical or
normal.
It
is
what
most people do, and it motivates by providing evidence as to
what will likely be effective and adaptive
action:
"If everyone is
doing it, it must be a sensible thing to do." Cialdini (1988) has
argued that such a presumption offers an information-process-
We
thank Lisa
Cramer,
Cathy Daly, Ann Hazan, Bethel Kaminski,
and
Kim Whiting for
their help
in
conducting Study
5,
which served
as
the master's
thesis for Raymond R. Reno.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Rob-
ert
B. Cialdini, Department of
Psychology,
Arizona State University,
Tempe,
Arizona
85287-1104.
ing advantage and a decisional shortcut when one is choosing
how to behave in a given situation. By simply registering what
most others are doing there and by imitating their
actions,
one
can usually choose efficiently and well. Researchers have re-
peatedly found that the perception of what most others are
doing influences subjects to behave similarly, even when the
behaviors are as morally neutral as choosing a consumer prod-
uct (Venkatesan,
1966)
or looking up at the
sky
(Milgram, Bick-
man, & Berkowitz, 1969). The injunctive meaning of norms
refers
to
rules or beliefs
as
to what constitutes morally approved
and disapproved conduct. In contrast to descriptive norms,
which specify what is done, injunctive norms specify what
ought to be done. That is, rather than simply informing one's
actions, these norms enjoin it through the promise of social
sanctions. Because what is approved is often what is typically
done, it is easy to confuse these two meanings of norms. How-
ever, they
are
conceptually and motivationally distinct, and it is
important for a proper understanding of normative influence
to keep them separate, especially in situations where both are
acting simultaneously.
A second source of confusion surrounding the concept of
social norms is that, although they are said to characterize and
guide behavior within a
society,
they should not be seen as uni-
formly in force at all times and in all situations. That
is,
norms
should motivate behavior primarily when they are activated
(i.e,
made salient or otherwise focused on); thus, persons who
are
dispositionally or temporarily focused on normative consid-
erations are most likely to act in norm-consistent ways (Berko-
witz, 1972; Berkowitz & Daniels, 1964; Gruder, Romer, &
Korth, 1978; Miller & Grush, 1986; Rutkowski, Gruder, &
Romer,
1983;
Schwartz
&
Fleishman,
1978).
Of
course,
salience
procedures should be effective for both descriptive and injunc-
tive norms. In fact, in situations with clear-cut descriptive and
injunctive norms, focusing individuals on
is
versus
ought
infor-
mation should lead to behavior change that is consistent only
with the now more salient type of norm.
One purpose of
this
research was to test this assertion as it
1015
1016R. CIALD1NI, R. RENO, AND C. KALLGREN
applies to individuals' decisions to litter in public places. The
choice of littering behavior for this study occurred for several
reasons: (a) it provides a clearly observable action that is gov-
erned
by
a widely held injunctive norm
(Bickman,
1972;
Heber-
lein,
1971;
Keep America Beautiful,
Inc.,
1968)
and
(b)
it consti-
tutes
a
growing social problem of considerable aesthetic, finan-
cial, and health-related
costs to
the culture. In California alone,
for
example,
litter has increased by
24%
over
a
recent span of 15
years,
requiring $100 million annually in cleanup
costs
(Califor-
nia Waste Management Board,
1988)
and posing health threats
to humans and wildlife through water pollution, fire hazards,
rodent and insect infestations, highway accidents, and thou-
sands of injuries suffered from discarded cans and broken bot-
tles (Geller, Winett, & Everett, 1982). Thus, a better under-
standing of the normative factors moderating deliberate litter-
ing would be of both conceptual and practical value.
A
common finding in the literature on littering
is
that the act
is significantly more likely in a littered setting than in a clean
setting
(e.g.,
Finnie,
1973;
Geller, Witmer,
&
Tuso,
1977;
Heber-
lein,
1971;
Krauss, Freedman,
&
Whitcup,
1978;
Reiter
&
Sam-
uel,
1980). Although this
finding
is congruent with the norma-
tive view that, in most
settings,
individuals tend to act in accor-
dance with the clear behavioral norm there (Krausset
al.,
1978),
it
is also
consistent with other motivational
accounts.
For exam-
ple,
it might be argued that the tendency to litter more in a
littered environment is due to simple imitation. Or, it might be
argued that individuals are more likely to litter into a littered
environment because they perceive that their litter will do less
damage to the state of the environment than if it were clean.
Study 1
In our first experiment, subjects were given the opportunity
to litter into either
a
previously clean or
a
fully littered environ-
ment after witnessing a confederate who either littered into the
environment or walked through it. By varying the state of the
environment (clean vs. littered), we sought to manipulate the
perceived descriptive norm for littering in the situation.
By
ma-
nipulating whether
the
confederate dropped litter into the envi-
ronment, we sought to affect the extent to which subjects were
drawn to focus attention on the state of the environment and,
consequently, on the relevant descriptive norm there.
We had two main predictions: First, we expected that sub-
jects would be more likely to litter into an already littered envi-
ronment than into a clean one. This expectation is consistent
with the findings of prior research on littering
(e.g.,
Krauss et
al.,
1978;
Reiter
&
Samuel,
1980)
and with the
view
that,
in most
settings, individuals are at least marginally aware of the exist-
ing norms and tend to act in accordance with them. Second,
and more important, we expected the effect of the descriptive
norm for littering in the situation (as indicated by the state of
the environment) to be significantly enhanced when subjects'
attention was drawn to the environment by a littering other.
This
expectation
was
predicated on considerable prior evidence
(see Fiske
&
Taylor, 1984, for a review) indicating that substan-
tial psychological impact can result from salience procedures
involving simple shifts in the visual prominence of stimulus
information, including normative information (Feldman, Hig-
gins,
Karlovac,
&
Ruble, 1976; Ferguson
&
Wells, 1980; Manis,
Dovalina, Avis, & Cardoze, 1980; Ruble & Feldman, 1976;
Trope & Ginnosar, 1986). Specifically, then, we predicted an
interaction such that subjects who saw the confederate litter
into a fully littered environment would litter more than those
who saw no
such littering;
whereas
subjects
who saw
the confed-
erate litter into
a
clean environment would litter
less
than those
who saw no such littering.
Should we obtain this interaction, we would have good sup-
port for our focus model of normative conduct. It should be
noted that the second component of this predicted interaction
adds important conceptual weight to our test in that it is con-
trary to what would be anticipated by
rival
accounts. It
is
oppo-
site to
what would
be
expected if subjects
were
motivated simply
by a greater reluctance to litter into a clean versus littered envi-
ronment because of
the
greater relative damage to the respec-
tive environments that such littering would cause; by that ac-
count, subjects should be more likely to litter after observing
littering in a clean environment because the environment will
have already been damaged. Similarly, the second component
of our predicted interaction pits the norm focus/salience inter-
pretation against a straightforward imitation formulation, in
which an unpunished litterer would
be
expected to increase the
littering tendencies of observers in either type of environment.
By postulating that a littering other will concentrate attention
on evidence of what the majority of people have done, thereby
highlighting normative considerations, only the (descriptive)
norm focus/salience account predicts that observed littering
will reduce subsequent littering in a clean environment.
Method
Subjects and Procedure
Norm
salience.
Subjects were 139 visitors to a university-affiliated
hospital who were returning to their cars in an adjacent, multilevel
parking
garage
during the daylight hours of
5 days
within a period of 8
consecutive days. Approximately 5 s after emerging from an elevator,
subjects encountered an experimental confederate of college
age
walk-
ing toward them. In half of the instances, the confederate appeared to
be readinga
large,
2i
.6 X 35.6 cm(8'/2 X14 in.)
handbill, which heorshe
dropped into the environment approximately
4.5
m
(5 yd)
before pass-
ing the subjects (high norm salience). A second confederate judged
whether
a
subject had noticed the littering incident and, consequently,
had deflected his or her attention at least momentarily to the parking
garage
floor.
The great majority
(93%) were
judged to
have done
so,
and
only they were examined as to their subsequent littering behavior. In
the other half of the
instances,
the confederate merely walked past the
subject without carrying a handbill, so as to provide an equivalent
degree of
social
contact (low norm salience).
Existing
descriptive
norm.
For some of the subjects, the
floor
of the
parking structure had been heavily littered by the experimenters with
an assortment of handbills, candy
wrappers,
cigarette
butts,
and paper
cups (existing prolittering
norm).
For the remaining subjects, the area
had been cleaned of all litter (existing antilittering
norm).
The state of
the environment (littered or clean) was alternated in 2-hr blocks, with
the initial state determined randomly at
the
start of each
day.
On arriv-
ing at their
cars,
subjects encountered a large handbill that was tucked
under the driver's side windshield wiper so as to partially obscure vi-
sion from the driver's seat. The handbill, identical to that dropped by
the confederate, carried a stenciled message that read, "THIS IS AU-
TOMOTIVE SAFETY WEEK. PLEASE DRIVE CAREFULLY" A
similar handbill had been placed on all other cars in the area as well.
LITTERING IN PUBLIC PLACES1017
Measure of
Uttering.
From a hidden vantage point, an experimenter
noted the driver's sex, estimated age, and whether the driver littered
the handbill. Littering was denned as depositing the handbill in the
environment outside of the
vehicle.
Because there were
no
trash recep-
tacles in the area, all subjects who failed to litter did so by taking and
retaining the handbill inside their vehicles before driving away.
Analyses
Analyses in this and subsequent studies were conducted using the
SPSS-X loglinear program, wherein tests for effects within dichoto-
mous data are examined through the nesting of hierarchical models.
This technique allows the testing of individual parameters by compar-
ing the differences in the likelihood ratio chi-square of a pair of nested
models. The differenced likelihood ratio is reported as a chi-square,
Results and Discussion
Gender and
age
differences in littering have sometimes been
found in past research (see Geller et al, 1982, for a review).
Therefore, before proceeding
to
tests of our theoretical hypothe-
ses,
we explored the data for gender or age differences. None
were found; consequently neither variable was included in sub-
sequent analyses.
Figure
1
depicts the amount of littering that occurred in each
of the four experimental
conditions.
Loglinear
analysis
of those
data produced
a set
of
results
that conforms
to
that predicted
by
our norm focus model. First, as expected, there was a main
effect for the existing descriptive norm, in that subjects littered
more in a littered environment than in a clean environment
(41%
vs. 11%), x2d, JV= 139)
•=
17.06, p <
.001.
Second, this
effect occurred to a much greater extent under conditions of
high norm salience, when subjects' attention was drawn to the
existing descriptive norm for the environment. That
is,
the size
of the existing descriptive-norm effect when the confederate
littered
(6% vs. 54%),
x2(l,
JV= 55) =
16.52,
p <
.001,
was signifi-
cantly greater than when the confederate did not litter
(14%
vs.
32%), x2(l
>
N
=
84) =
3.99, p
< .05;
the resultant interaction was
tested as a planned comparison that proved highly reliable,
X2(l, N = 139) = 20.87, p < .001. The significant interaction
provides confirmation of our hypothesis that procedures de-
signed to shift attention within a setting to just one type of
operative norm—in this
case,
the
descriptive norm—will gener-
ate behavior change that is consistent only with that type of
norm. Apparently, this
is so
even
when the behavior in question
is governed by an injunctive norm—in this
case,
the antilitter-
ing norm—that
is
strongly and widely held in the society (Bick-
man, 1972; Heberlein, 1971; Keep America Beautiful, Inc.,
1968).
The pattern of
results also
supported the directional predic-
tions made from our model. That
is,
under conditions of high
(descriptive) norm salience, subjects littered more in a littered
environment
(54%
vs.
32%)
but less in a clean one
(6%
vs. 14%),
although neither simple effect was statistically significant,
X1
s = 2.76 and 1.18, respectively.
It is this latter finding, showing the least littering among
subjects in the high norm salience/clean environment condi-
tion, that seems the most provocative of our study and, there-
fore,
worthy of
pursuit.
After all, from an applied standpoint,
we
should be principally interested in strategies for litter abate-
60
-
50
-
S?
40 -
5
30 -
20
-
10
-
High Norm Salience (Confederate littered)
Low Norm Salience (Confederate walked
by)
54%
(50)
Anti-littering Norm
(Clean Environment)
(24)(34)
Pro-littering Norm
(Littered Environment)
Figure
I. Percentages of subjects littering as a function of norm sa-
lience, and the direction of
the
descriptive norm regarding littering:
Study
1.
ment Moreover, the fact that the least littering occurred among
subjects who observed prior littering into a clean environment
is
of considerable conceptual interest, as it supports norm focus
predictions over those that spring from
a
straightforward imita-
tion or environmental damage account. Good reason exists,
however, for caution in drawing strong conceptual conclusions
from this finding. Although part of
a
theoretically predicted,
significant interaction, the drop in littering due to high norm
salience in the clean environment was far from significant by
itself.
Of
course,
this lack of significance might well have oc-
curred because of a
floor
effect, owing to the low level of litter-
ing (14%) in the low norm salience/clean environment condi-
tion; nonetheless, in the interest of enhanced statistical confi-
dence, a replication seemed warranted.
Study 2
In planning to replicate and extend our initial
study,
we recog-
nized a pair of testable implications that flowed from our ear-
lier analysis. First, consistent with the outcomes of
Study
1, a
subject who witnessed evidence of littering in an otherwise
clean environment should litter less as a result; however, the
evidence would not
have
to take the form,
as it
did in Study
1,
of
observed littering action. That is, the consequence of
such
ac-
tion—a single piece of litter
lying
in an
otherwise
clean
environ-
ment—should have
the
same
effect, because of
its
conspicuous-
ness,
by drawing attention
to
an environment
whose
descriptive
norm (except for
one
aberrant litterer)
was
clearly
antilitter. Sec-
ond, as the amount of litter increases progressively in a setting,
so
should the likelihood that
a
subject will litter into it because,
by definition, that litter will change the descriptive norm for
the setting. The upshot of
this
pair of implications of our nor-
mative analysis
is a
nonintuitive
prediction:
The likelihood that
an individual will litter into an environment bearing various
pieces of perceptible, extant litter will be described by
a
check-
mark-shaped function. Little littering should occur in a clean
environment; still less should occur with
a
sole
piece of litter in
1018R. CIALDINI, R. RENO, AND C. KALLGREN
41%
40 -
40%
10
n= (60)(59)(59)(60)(60)
16
(60)
Number of pieces of litter in environment
Figure
2.
Percentages
of subjects littering
as a
function of the number
of
pieces
of litter in
the
environment:
Study 2.
dency for men to litter more frequently than women
(31%
vs.
19%),
x2(l, N
=
358)
=
7.41,
p
<
.01.
Figure 2 depicts the percentage of litterers in each of the
experimental conditions of Study 2. The data pattern closely
reflects the predicted checkmark shape of our normative analy-
sis.
The checkmark function hypothesis was tested in a two-
step
process.
First,
we
constructed
a
planned comparison using
trend
weights
that modeled the checkmark shape
(-2,
-4,
-1,1,
2,
4). It proved significant, X2{1 N= 358) = 21.80, p <
.01.
A
second planned comparison was then performed to test
whether a difference in littering occurred between the zero
littering condition and the one-piece-of-environmental-litter
condition. No significant difference was found, x2U, N -
229)
=
1.64, p < .20. Comparable analyses were conducted on
the latency to litter data shown in Figure
3.
As
with frequency to
litter, the first contrast proved significant, F(\, 352) = 20.65,
p< .01, whereas the second did not (F < 1). There was no
significant interaction between any of these contrasts and
gender.
an otherwise clean environment, but progressively greater lit-
tering should occur as litter accumulates and the descriptive
norm for the situation changes from antilitter to prolitter.
Method
Subjects and Procedure
Subjects were
358
visitors to an amusement park
in a
large southwest-
ern city during the evening hours of a pair of weekends in early sum-
mer. Immediately before turning a particular corner on a park walk-
way,
subjects encountered
a
college-age experimental confederate pass-
ing out handbills that read "DON'T MISS TONIGHT'S SHCW
which referred to an entertainment program sponsored by the park on
weekend nights. The confederate was instructed to give a handbill, at
1-min intervals, to the first passing adult walking alone
or to
one adult
(the physically closest) in the first passing
group.
On turning the walk-
way corner, subjects, who were no longer visible to the confederate,
faced a path of approximately 55 m (60 yd) from which no exit was
possible except at its ends.
State of
the
environment.
All litter had been removed from the path
except for varying numbers of handbills of
the
sort that subjects had
just been given
by a
confederate. Depending
on
the experimental con-
dition, the path contained 0,1,2,4,8, or
16
handbills that
were
visible
from the path entrance.
Measurement
of
littering.
Because no litter receptacles were avail-
able on the path, a subject who deposited a handbill into the environ-
ment at any point along the path's length was considered a litterer.
Subjects' littering behavior was covertly observed
by a
hidden, second
experimental confederate, who also timed subjects' latency to litter
(failure to litter
was
given
a
score of
100 s)
and who removed any newly
littered handbills from the path. On exiting the path, subjects turned
a
corner to find a pair of previously unseen litter receptacles; virtually
all subjects who had not littered to that point dropped their handbills
into one of
the
receptacles.
Results and Discussion
As in Study
1,
we
first
examined the littering data for
age
and
gender differences. No significant effects were obtained be-
cause of subject age. However, we did find a significant ten-
Study 3
Even though the general form of the findings of Study 2
confirmed our predictions, one crucial feature of the results
offered only ambiguous support. The hypothesized decline in
littering from the clean environment condition to the one-
piece-of-Iitter condition of the
study,
although present
(18%
vs.
10%),
was not conventionally significant, allowing the possibil-
ity that it may have been the overall linearity of the checkmark
pattern, rather than
its
elbow-like bend, that accounted for the
significance of our general planned comparison. This ambigu-
ity
is
especial ly
frustrating
because,
as
in Study
1,
it appears that
a
floor
effect in the data may have prevented a clear demonstra-
tion of reduced littering under the circumstances predicted by
our formulation. It is difficult to generate significantly less lit-
tering than that of a clean environment when the clean environ-
ment generates so little littering
itself.
100-
90 -
80 ~
^3
£ 70-
3
s
3
I 8 60 -
68
iI
16
0 12 4 8
n= (60) (59) (59) (60) (6G) (60)
Number of pieces of litter in environment
Figure
3.
Mean latency to litter
as a
function of the number of pieces
of litter in
the
environment:
Study 2.
LITTERING IN PUBLIC PLACES1019
Consequently, we decided to conduct a conceptual replica-
tion of the theoretically relevant conditions of Study 2 that was
designed to overcome the
floor-effect
problem. One
way
to deal
with a floor effect of the sort that faced us is to increase the
statistical power associated with our significance tests by in-
creasing the number of subjects run
in
each
condition.
Thus,
we
used an experimental setting that would allow us to record the
littering decisions of large numbers of subjects in a relatively
short period of
time.
Additionally, in an attempt to sharpen the
impact of our single-piece-of-litter manipulation, we chose a
more conspicuous single piece of litter than we had used in
Study 2.
Specifically, subjects were college dormitory residents who
found a public service flier in their mailboxes. The environ-
ment in front of the mailboxes had been arranged so that it
contained
(a)
no litter,
(b)
one piece of highly conspicuous litter
(a hollowed-out, end piece of watermelon rind), or (c) a large
array of various types of litter, including the watermelon rind.
The dependent variable was subjects' tendencies to litter with
the fliers. On the basis of our normative analysis and the pat-
tern of
results
of Studies
1
and
2,
we made a pair of predictions.
First, we anticipated that subjects would litter more into a fully
littered environment than into a clean one. Second, we ex-
pected that they would litter least into an otherwise clean envi-
ronment that contained a single, attention-focusing piece of
litter.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 484 residents of a densely populated, high-rise wo-
men's dormitory on the campus of
a
large state university.
Procedure
The residents' mailboxes were located in rows at one corner of the
dormitory's main lobby. The mailbox area was cut off visually from
most of
the
lobby by a translucent partition. Once past the partition,
subjects encountered an open area that fronted the mailboxes. During
a
10
a.m. to 4
p.m.
schoolday period, residents
who
opened their mail-
boxes to find a public service flier placed there as part of
the
experi-
ment were counted
as
subjects, provided that no one else
was
simulta-
neously in the area getting her mail.
Depending
on the
experimental condition, subjects passing through
the open area in front of their mailboxes encountered an environment
that contained no litter or a single piece of litter
(a
hollowed-out, heel
section of watermelon rind), or a large number of pieces of litter of
various kinds
(e.g.,
discarded fliers, cigarette butts, paper
cups,
candy
wrappers, and soft drink
cans),
including
the
watermelon rind.
A
sub-
ject
was
considered to have littered if she deposited the
flier
anywhere
in the environment (all waste containers had been removed) before
exiting the lobby onto an elevator or through a set of doors leading to
the campus. Of those subjects who littered, the great majority were
observed by an unobtrusively placed experimenter to do
so
in the area
in front of
the
mailboxes.
Results and Discussion
The percentages of littering in the three experimental condi-
tions
are
presented in Figure
4.
Their pattern accords well with
predictions based on our normative perspective; indeed, the
expected quadratic trend was highly significant,
x20»
N =
484) = 23.12, p
<
.001.
Moreover, planned contrast tests of our
two experimental predictions were supportive at conventional
levels of significance. First, subjects were more likely to litter
into a fully littered environment than into an unlittered one
(26.7%
vs. 10.7%), x2(l,
TV
= 291) - 12.62, p <
.001.
Second,
subjects were less likely to litter into an environment when it
contained
a
single,
salient piece of litter than when it
was
unlit-
tered
(3.6%
vs. 10.7%), x2(l, N= 335) = 6.79, p
<
.01.
Theoretical Implications
To this point, we have reported data from three experiments
in three different natural settings that seem to converge suffi-
ciently to allow the generation of statements about the concep-
tual and pragmatic
value
of those data. On the conceptual side,
it appears that norms can be influential in directing human
action; however, in keeping with the spirit of prior criticism of
normative explanations, it
is
necessary for norm theorists to be
specific about both the type of norm (injunctive or descriptive)
thought to be acting in a situation and about the conditions
under which it is likely to act. Distinguishing between injunc-
tive and descriptive norms is crucial, because both types can
exist simultaneously in a setting and can have either congruent
or contradictory implications for behavior. For example, in
Study
1
we showed that through procedures designed to high-
light differing descriptive norms, we could enhance or under-
mine compliance with the society wide injunctive norm against
littering. Such a
finding
should not be interpreted to mean that
descriptive norms
are,
in this instance or in
general,
more pow-
erful than injunctive norms. Rather, it is the differential focus-
ing of attention on one or the other sort of norm that
is
the key.
Indeed, even within the same type of norm, it seems to be the
case from our findings that focus of attention is an important
component. In all three experiments, exposing subjects to a
single piece of litter in an otherwise clean environment—a pro-
cedure designed to draw subjects' attention to what most people
had done in the setting (i.c, the descriptive norm)—reduced
littering there.
Practical Applications
Because littering
is
a social problem, it
is
appropriate to con-
sider the potential practical applications of our data as well.
The finding of greatest applied value appears to be that sub-
jects in three different settings littered least after encountering
a single piece of litter in an otherwise unlittered
place.
At first
glance, such a result might seem to suggest that individuals
seeking to retard the accumulation of litter in
a
particular
envi-
ronment might affix a single, prominent piece of litter there.
On closer consideration, however, it becomes clear that such an
approach would be inferior to beginning with a totally clean
environment. Examination of Figures 2 and 3, showing the
average likelihood and latency of littering among subjects in
our amusement park study, illustrates the point. Subjects who
encountered a perfectly clean environment tended not to litter
there, resulting in long delays before anyone despoiled it with a
handbill. Once a single handbill appeared in the setting, sub-
jects were even less likely to litter, generating
even
longer laten-
1020R. CIALD1NI, R. RENO, AND C. KALLGREN
30
25
20
00 15
•c
9*
10
26.7%
10.7%
Clean
(149)
Single Piece
of Litter
(193)
Fully Littered
(142)
State of the environment
Figure
4.
Percentages of subjects
littering as a
function of
the amount
of litter
in
the
environment:
Study
3.
cies before the second piece of litter appeared. At that point,
with two pieces of litter visible in the environment, the descrip-
tive norm began to
change,
and subjects' reluctance to litter into
the setting began to deteriorate steadily, leading to shorter and
shorter littering latencies with increasing accumulations of lit-
ter. Anyone wishing to preserve the state of a specific environ-
ment, then, should begin with a clean setting so as to delay for
the greatest time the appearance of two pieces of litter there,
because those two pieces of litter are likely to begin a slippery-
slope effect that leads to a fully littered environment and to a
fully realized perception that "everybody litters here." This lo-
gic further suggests that environments will best be able to re-
tard littering if they are subjected to frequent and thorough
litter pickups that return them to the optimal litter-free condi-
tion.
In considering the practical implications of our
data,
we rec-
ognized a weakness in our decision to focus subjects' attention
on the descriptive rather than injunctive norm for littering: Pro-
cedures that focus subjects on the descriptive norm will only
reduce littering when the environment is wholly or virtually
unspoiled. Indeed, as was suggested in the data of Study 1, a
descriptive norm focus when the environment is substantially
littered will tend to increase littering there—hardly a desirable
outcome for any but theory-testing purposes. A descriptive
norm-focusing procedure, then, should only have socially bene-
ficial effects in environments that do not need much help. The
circumstances are different, however, when the injunctive
norm is made salient and when, consequently, individuals are
focused on what people typically approve and disapprove
rather than on what they typically do in a situation.
By
making
the injunctive norm against littering more prominent, we
should expect reduced littering even in a heavily littered envi-
ronment.
A test of this hypothesis seemed instrumental to a pair of
potentially valuable
goals.
First, on the practical level, it might
establish norm focus procedures that could be used for litter
abatement in a variety of environments. Second, on the concep-
tual level, it would generate evidence for or against our conten-
tion that focusing attention on either is or ought information
will lead to behavior change that is consistent
only
with the now
more salient type of norm; to this point in the research pro-
gram,
we
had examined
only
half of that contention by concen-
trating just on descriptive norms.
Study 4
Recall that in Study 1, we argued that a confederate's act of
dropping a flier into the environment would draw subjects'
attention to that environment and
to
clear evidence (that
we
had
manipulated) concerning whether people typically littered
there. In this
way,
we
sought to manipulate focus of attention to
LITTERING IN PUBLIC PLACES
1021
the existing descriptive norm regarding littering in the setting.
Presumably if instead the environment were to give clear evi-
dence of what is societally approved or disapproved there, the
same attention-focusing device would function
as
an injunctive
norm activator, because societally based approval or disappro-
val is the distinguishing characteristic of injunctive norms
(Birnbaum & Sagarin, 1976; Marini, 1984; Sherif
&
Sherif,
1969).
The question of what clear approval/disapproval cue could
be placed effectively in a natural environment to test our for-
mulation
was
answered serendipitously while conducting Study
1.
That study
was
run in a parking
garage
whose walls
rose
only
halfway from the floor to the roof at each level. On one espe-
cially windy day, the litter we had distributed all around the
garage floor in the fully littered environment condition was
blown against an inside wall,
as
if someone had swept it there in
a neat line. When a confederate dropped a handbill into that
environment, virtually no subjects littered, whereas, on
previous
days
the majority of subjects in that experimental con-
dition had littered. In the course of puzzling over the discrep-
ancy, we realized that the littering tendency of windy-day sub-
jects may have
declined when attention was called to the consid-
erable litter in the environment because that litter gave the
(mistaken) impression of having been swept—a clear disappro-
val cue.
Armed with this potential insight, we decided to conduct a
partial replication and extension of Study 1, in which subjects
saw
a
confederate who either did or did not drop a handbill into
an environment that contained a large amount of either swept
or unswept litter In the case of unswept litter, we expected to
replicate the data pattern of Study
1
for the comparable experi-
mental
cells;
that
is,
we
anticipated that
by
dropping a handbill,
the confederate would focus
subjects*
attention on the environ-
ment and its evidence that people typically litter there, which
should cause littering
to
increase.
By
dropping a handbill
into a
setting where prior litter had been swept (into
piles),
we antici-
pated that the confederate would once again focus subjects'
attention on the environment. But in this instance, subjects
would encounter a mixed message, composed of
a
descriptive
norm cue (abundant litter) that would incline them toward lit-
tering and an injunctive norm cue (swept litter) that would in-
cline them against it. Accordingly, we predicted that the differ-
ence in littering found in the unswept conditions would be
reversed or at least reduced. Statistically, then, we expected an
interaction between our two independent variables of whether
a confederate dropped a handbill into the environment (high or
low norm salience) and whether the environment contained
swept or unswept litter (presence or absence of an injunctive
norm cue). Furthermore, we expected a specific form for that
interaction, such that any difference in littering found between
the swept and unswept litter conditions under low-norm sa-
lience procedures would be significantly enhanced under high-
norm salience procedures. That
is,
it
was
our belief that, under
the low salience conditions, the normative forces present would
be registered only minimally by subjects, resulting in only a
minimal swept/unswept difference. However, under high sa-
lience conditions with normative issues now focal, the effect
would be magnified.
Method
Subjects
and
Procedure
Norm
salience.
Subjects were 127 visitors to a university-affiliated
hospital during the late afternoon and early evening hours of
6
days
within a 13-day period. They underwent the same norm salience pro-
cedures as subjects in Study
1.
That is, after emerging from a parking
garage elevator, they encountered
a
college-age confederate
who
either
dropped a distinctively colored handbill onto the floor in subjects'
view or simply walked past without carrying a handbill.
Presence
of an
injunctive norm
cue.
For some subjects, the floor of
the parking structure had been heavily littered by the experimenters,
with the litter distributed
across the
environment
in a
fashion identical
to that of Study
1.
For the remaining subjects, all of this ambient litter
had been swept into three large piles situated approximately 9 m (10
yd)
apart in
a
line.
In the high-norm salience/swept litter
condition,
the
confederate dropped a handbill onto the
floor
approximately 1.5 m (5
ft) after passing
the
piles of litter.
It was
decided to
have the
confederate
drop the handbill immediately in front, but in full view, of the litter
piles
to avoid
an imitation explanation for our predicted effect. That is,
if subjects had seen the confederate drop a handbill into one of the
piles,
then the predicted reduction in subjects' subsequent littering
could be interpreted
as simple
modeling of
a
decision not to litter. The
swept or unswept litter conditions were run in alternating 2-hr blocks,
with the first run of the day determined randomly.
Measure
of
littering.
Littering was assessed as it was in Study 1.
Results
and
Discussion
The influence of age and gender on littering rates was exam-
ined in an initial analysis; no significant effects
occurred.
Thus,
these variables were not included in further analyses.
The percentage of subjects who littered in each of the experi-
mental conditions of our design
is
displayed in Figure
5.
Those
percentages occurred in a pattern consistent with the form of
the interaction that we were led to anticipate from our norm
focus formulation. Using loglinear analyses, we tested that in-
teraction with a planned comparison that contrasted the differ-
ence between the two low-norm salience cells (29% vs. 33%),
X2(l, N= 68) = 0.18,
ns,
against the difference between the two
high-norm salience
cells
(18%
vs.
45%),
x^l, #~
59) =
5.19, p <
.02.
That interaction test proved significant, x2C, N= 127) =
4.91,
p<.03.
Looking at the interaction pattern in another
way we
can see
that it
is
composed of
two
opposing trends—neither significant
by
itself,
but significantly different in contrast to one another—
both instigated by the same attention-focusing
procedure.
That
is,
when
a
dropped handbill drew attention to an unswept
envi-
ronment that, by its fully littered nature, gave evidence of a
clear descriptive norm favoring littering
there,
littering tenden-
cies rose
(33%
vs. 45%). However, when the same device drew
attention to an environment that included a clearly conflicting
injunctive norm cue as well, littering tendencies were reversed
(29%
vs.
18%).
This pattern of effects accords well with each of
the goals we set for Study 4. First, it supports our theoretical
assertion that both descriptive and injunctive norms can elicit
behavior change, with the prominence of one or the other type
of norm accounting for the direction of the change. Second, it
offers grounds for hope that certain kinds of undesirable action
(littering, drinking and driving, tax cheating, highway speed-
ing,
etc^
can be restrained by the
use
of procedures that tempo-
1022R. CIALDIN1, R. RENO, AND C. KALLGREN
t>0
I
60 -
50 -
40 -
30 -
20 -
10 -
High Norm Salience (Confederate littered)
Low Norm Salience (Confederate walked by)
45%
29%
n = (oi) (33)
Pro-littering Norm
(Unswept Litter)
(28) (35)
Conflicting Norm
(Swept Litter)
Figures.
Percentages of subjects littering
as a
function of norm salience,
and the configuration of
litter
in the environment: Study 4.
rarily focus individuals on injunctive norms in the settings
where the action is most likely to take place.
Study 5
To
this point in our research program,
we have
examined the
validity of our norm focus formulation by using an attention-fo-
cusing procedure designed to make subjects mindful of a spe-
cific descriptive norm (Studies 1-3) or of conflicting descrip-
tive and injunctive norms
(Study 4)
governing litteri
ng
in a situa-
tion. The first three studies found resultant behavior changes
wholly in line with the descriptive norm. The fourth study,
which added evidence of a contradicting injunctive norm to the
perception of the existing descriptive norm, broke the domi-
nance of the descriptive norm over subjects' behavior; it actu-
ally produced
a
(nonsignificant) reduction of littering
in an
envi-
ronment
where
a
clear,
prolittering descriptive norm existed. It
seemed
to us
that the logical next step in
this
progression
was
to
conduct one additional study that removed any prolittering
de-
scriptive norm focus and that concentrated subjects exclusively
on the injunctive, antilittering
norm.
It
was
our expectation that
such an uncontaminated, injunctive norm focus would then
lead to a significant reduction in littering.
We
saw another reason for conducting an additional experi-
ment. In Studies
1
through
4,
our norm-focusing manipulation
involved the dropping of a noticeable piece of litter into an
environment (either by a seen or an unseen individual) so as to
draw subjects' attention to the normative information present
in that environment. There were several advantages of using
that particular attention-focusing device, including the ability
to make certain nonintuitive predictions that would not have
flowed from rival theoretical accounts. We also recognized,
however, that there would be certain drawbacks to using the
same procedure yet again. First, the generality of our concep-
tual argument could be seen as untested beyond the range of
our specific norm salience manipulation. More important,
though, using littering to highlight the norms related to litter-
ing could create interpretational
ambiguities.
That
is,
the litter-
ing act itself
is
not neutral. It carries social meanings (depend-
ing
on
the
situation in which
it occurs)
that
are
likely to generate
various kinds of perceptions of the littering
agent.
It
is
possible
that one or another of these perceptions could have acted to
incline subjects to follow or reject the litterer's lead. For in-
stance, although it is unlikely that someone who littered into a
fully littered environment, as occurred in Study 4, would be
seen positively by subjects, someone who littered into an envi-
ronment of neatly swept litter might be seen in an especially
negative light; it is possible that this more negative view may
have accounted for the reduction in littering among such sub-
jects in Study
4.
Similarly, it
is
conceivable that subjects in Stud-
ies
1
through 3 may have had an unpleasant reaction to any
litterer who would litter into a previously clean setting and,
hence, may have failed to litter so as to distance themselves
from such an unsavory person.
LITTERING IN PUBLIC PLACES1023
To avoid interpretations of
this
sort,
which are based on sub-
jects'
perceptions of a litterer,
it was
necessary to design a focus
shift manipulation that would draw subjects' attention to the
injunctive norm against littering but would do so without the
action of a littering agent. To this end, in Study 5 we relied on
the device of cognitive priming, wherein one concept can be
activated in an individual
by
focusing that individual's attention
on a related concept (see Higgins
&
Bargh, 1987, for a review).
Most, although not all (cf. Ratcliif & McKoon, 1988), explana-
tions of priming effects incorporate the notion of spreading
activation, which posits that similar concepts are linked to-
gether in memory within
a
network of nodes and that activation
of
one
concept results in the spreading of the activation along
the network to other related concepts (Anderson, 1976, 1983;
Collins
&
Loftus,
1975;
McClelland
&
Rumelhart,
1981).
A
key
determinant of whether the presentation of one concept will
cause
activation of another
is
their semantic or conceptual prox-
imity
If, as research by Harvey and Enzle (1981) indicates, norms
are concepts stored in a network format, then focusing subjects
on a particular norm should activate other norms that are per-
ceived to be semanticalry close to it. Moreover, the greater the
semantic proximity, the stronger should be the resultant activa-
tion. To test this possibility, we first had a large number of
norms rated as to their similarity to the antilittering norm.
Next, on the basis of those ratings, we selected three norms
that, although alike in rated normativeness, differed in their
perceived similarity (conceptual proximity) to the antilhtering
norm. Finally, we included reference to one or another of the
norms on handbills that
we
placed on car windshields
in
a local
library parking
lot.
We
expected that the handbills containing a
message reminding subjects of the most distant norm from the
antilittering norm (voting) would be littered relatively often but
that as the handbill messages referred to norms rated closer
(energy conservation) and closer (recycling) to the antilittering
norm, fewer and fewer subjects would litter them.
We
also ex-
pected that handbills containing no normative message would
be littered most of
all,
whereas handbills containing the target,
antilittering message would be littered least.
Method
Preliminary Ratings
Study
A list of
35
norms that had been generated by the researchers and
their colleagues (e.g, "Driving at a safe speed," "Recycling" "Paying
taxes,"
and "Not littering") were shown to
95
undergraduate psychol-
ogy students during a class session at a large state university The stu-
dents were asked to indicate the extent to which they found each item
on the list to be normative or nonnormative on
9-point
scales, an-
chored by the
labels extremely
normative
(1)
and
not
at all normative
(9);
the scale midpoint
was
labeled
somewhat
normative(5).
A
definition of
norms was provided at the top of the list that read "Norms are shared
beliefs within
a
culture as to what constitutes socially appropriate con-
duct"
A second list was shown to a different class of
87
undergraduate
psychology students at the same university during a meeting of their
class.
In addition to the definition of norms at the top of
the
list, this
list contained comparisons of each of the selected norms with the
norm against littering. Subjects were asked to "indicate how closely
related you believe each of the pairs of norms are" on
9-point
scales
anchored
by the
labels identical
(I)
and unrelated
(9);
the scale
midpoint
was labeled
somewhat
close(5).
Examples of
the
comparison items are
"The norm against littering and the norm for recycling" and "The
norm against littering and the norm for returning library books on
time."
Selection
of the experimental norms. Means for both types of ratings
were computed. The norm for not littering was rated as 4.25 on the
9-point
normativeness
scale.
We
then limited our choices for the addi-
tional experimental norms to those that had means for both male and
female subjects within one scale point of 4.25 on rated normativeness.
From this pool and on the basis of the similarity scale ratings, we
selected three norms to be close to, moderately close to, and far from
the norm against littering. Those three norms and their rated dis-
tances from the norm against littering
were,
respectively, the norm for
recycling (3.57), the norm for turning off lights when last to leave a
room (5.74), and the norm for voting (7.12).
Generating
the normative
messages.
For
each
of the four experimen-
tal norms, a message was constructed that was suitable for presenta-
tion on a handbill. For the antilittering norm (identical to the target
norm),
it read, "April
is
Keep Arizona Beautiful
Month.
Please Do Not
Litter."
For the
recycling norm
(close
to the target
norm),
it read, "April
is Preserve Arizona's Natural Resources Month. Please Recycle." For
the turning off lights norm (moderately close to the target norm), it
read, "April is Conserve Arizona's Energy Month. Please Turn Off
Unnecessary
Lights."
For the voting norm (far from
the
target
norm),
it
read, "April is Arizona's Voter Awareness Month. Please Remember
That Your Vote Counts." Finally, a control message was constructed
that carried no injunctive norm; it read, "April is Arizona's Fine Art's
Month. Please Visit Your Local Art Museum."
Subjects
and
Procedure
Participants were 133 female patrons and 126 male patrons of a
municipal public library branch who parked their cars in the library
lot. After leaving the library and returning
to
their
cars,
subjects found
on the driver's side of the windshield a handbill that had been placed
there by an experimenter. The handbill carried one of the
five
experi-
mental messages designed to focus subjects differentially on the norm
against littering. Drivers' decisions to litter
the
handbill
were
recorded
by an unobtrusively placed observer. Typically, subjects who littered
did so immediately after reading the handbill message and virtually
always within 5 s of having done so. Consequently, we felt confident
that the priminglike effects we anticipated were well within the range
of priming-effect durations found
by
other investigators
(see Higgins &
Bargh,
1987,
for a
review).
No efforts were made to change the moder-
ate amount of naturally occurring litter on the library grounds and
parking
lot,
which consisted of a variety of cigarette
butts
and an occa-
sional paper cup or soft drink can.
Results and
Discussion
In tests for gender effects within the data, only the main
effect was significant, x20, N = 259) = 3.92, p
<
.05,
indicating
that men littered more frequently than women (22% vs. 14%).
To examine our hypothesis that as the conceptual distance be-
tween the antilittering norm and the handbill messages in-
creased, littering rates would increase commensurately,
we
con-
ducted a trend analysis. Only the predicted, linear trend (dis-
played in Figure 6) proved significant,
x2(l>
#= 259) = 5.48,
p
<
.02.
Within the
five
experimental message means, only one
comparison
was
significant, that between the target, antilitter-
ing norm (10%) and the no-norm control message (25%), x2(l,
1024R. C1ALDINI, R. RENO, AND C. KALLGREN
30 -
20 -
0)
10 -
25.42%
22.22%
17.65%
15.09%
10%
Identical
(Do Not Litter)Close
(Recycle)Moderately
Close
(Turn out lights)
Far
(Vote)Control
(Arts Month)
(60)(53)(53)(36)(58)
Proximity to the Anti-littering Norm
(Handbill Message)
Figure
6.
Percentages of subjects littering
a
handbill message
as a
function of
its
proximity to the injunctive norm against
littering:
Study 5.
As in Study 4, focusing subjects differentially on the injunc-
tive norm against littering, this time through the processes of
priming and spreading activation, led to littering rates corre-
sponding to the predicted degree of injunctive norm focus.
Thus,
as expected, subjects in Study 5 (a) littered least after
encountering a message focusing them directly on the antilit-
tering norm, (b) littered progressively more frequently as the
encountered (equally normative) messages directed focus pro-
gressively away from the antilittering norm, and (c) littered
most when the encountered message was not normative.
General Discussion
We
began this article by reporting the mixed support for the
utility of social norms in accounting for much of human behav-
ior; the claim that the concept, as traditionally conceived, pos-
sesses
great explanatory power currently
has
strong proponents
and equally strong opponents. From the perspective of the re-
search we have presented, it would appear that both camps are
right. Norms clearly do
have
a considerable impact on behavior,
but the force and form of that impact can only be usefully
understood through conceptual refinements that
have
not been
traditionally or rigorously applied. That is, to predict properly
the likelihood of norm-consistent action requires, first, that
one specify the type of norm—descriptive or injunctive—said
to be operating. Second, one must take into account the various
conditions that would incline individuals to focus attention on
or away from the norm.
We have
argued that our experimental manipulations worked
to focus subjects on descriptive norms
in
Studies
1
through
3,
on
descriptive and injunctive norms in Study 4, and on injunctive
norms in Study 5. Although the patterns of results in those
studies are consistent with that argument, there is certainly
room for alternative
views.
For
example,
it could be contended
that, for subjects
in
Studies
1
through
3,
seeing litter
in
an other-
wise clean environment did not simply engage the descriptive
norm against Uttering but engaged the injunctive norm
as
well.
That is, a single piece of litter may have reminded subjects of
societal objections to littering, and thus it may have been the
activation of the injunctive norm that produced reduced litter-
ing in those studies. Alternative accounts of this sort for spe-
cific segments of our data, although not parsimonious in ex-
plaining the overall pattern of
results,
remain conceivable none-
theless.
That is so in part because our work was conducted in natu-
rally occurring
field
settings where it was not possible to assess
the precision and effectiveness of our norm-focus manipula-
tions through the methods typically available to laboratory in-
vestigators. Detailed checks on the strength, specificity, and
functional impact of
a
subject's attentional focus could not have
LITTERING
IN
PUBLIC PLACES1025
been practicably administered
in our
research situations.
The
consequent absence of such measures allows questions to arise
as
to
whether
our
experimental manipulations worked
as
planned. Without
the
corroboration
of
these measures,
one
may have less confidence that the type of norm we intended
to
be functional actually mediated
our
findings.
Fortunately,
the
effectiveness
of
injunctive social norms, about which there
has
been doubt
in the
scientific community (Darley
&
Latane,
1970;
Garfinkel, 1967; Krebs, 1970; Kxebs
&
Miller,
1985;
Marini, 1984),
has the
clearest support
in our
data. That
is,
although
it
does seem possible
to
explain
our
data patterns
without recourse
to
the well-established concept of descriptive
norms,
it
does
not
seem plausible
to do
so without recourse
to
the more disputed
and
interesting concept of injunctive social
norms, especially
in
Studies
4 and 5.
Nonetheless, future
re-
search should be done
in
ways
that allow direct assessments of
the mediating processes presumed
to be
active
in the
present
work.
Throughout
this
research program,
we have
exposed subjects
to acute situational conditions designed
to
focus them
on or
away
from particular
norms.
We recognize, however, that endur-
ing cultural
and
dispositional conditions
may
also influence
one's normative focus. This distinction among cultural, situa-
tional,
and
dispositional factors strikes us
as
important
in the
realm
of
norms.
In
thinking about
the
concept, we have been
led
to
speculate that norms function
at the
cultural/societal
level,
the
situational level,
and the
individual level. Although
they
may not
have developed such
a
tripartite conceptualiza-
tion, norm theorists have recognized normative influences
at
each
of
these levels.
At the
first (cultural/societal) level,
the
influence of global norms on behavior within
a
culture or social
group
has
often been noted (Birnbaum & Sagarin, 1976;
Pai-
cheler, 1976; Pepitone, 1976; Triandis, 1977; Triandis, Marin,
Lisansky,
&
Betancourt, 1984). Indeed, many definitions
of
norms refer exclusively
to
this level. For example, Ross (1973)
considered norms
to be
"cultural rules that guide behavior
within a society"
(p.
105).
At
the second
level,
others
have
recog-
nized that cultural norms may not apply equally to all situations
(Peterson, 1982). Consequently, definitions
of
norms often
in-
clude an explicit situational component. For
example,
Popenoe
(1983) defined social norms as expectations "of how people are
supposed
to act,
think,
or
feel
in
specific situations" (p.
598).
Finally, other social scientists have evidence that norms exist at
the individual level
as
well. Most notable
in
this regard
is the
groundbreaking work of Schwartz (1973,1977) on the concept
of personal norms.
Our view
is
that what
is
normative (i.e^ most often done
or
approved or both)
in a
society,
in a setting, and within
a
person
will, in each
case,
have
demonstrable impact on action, but that
the impact will be differential depending on whether the actor
is focused
on
norms
of
the culture,
the
situation,
or the self.
Research is planned to test the implications of
this
conception.
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Received September
7,1989
Revision received January 16,1990
Accepted January 16,1990 •
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