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The Psychology of Curiosity: A Review and Reinterpretation

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Abstract

Research on curiosity has undergone 2 waves of intense activity. The 1st, in the 1960s, focused mainly on curiosity's psychological underpinnings. The 2nd, in the 1970s and 1980s, was characterized by attempts to measure curiosity and assess its dimensionality. This article reviews these contributions with a concentration on the 1st wave. It is argued that theoretical accounts of curiosity proposed during the 1st period fell short in 2 areas: They did not offer an adequate explanation for why people voluntarily seek out curiosity, and they failed to delineate situational determinants of curiosity. Furthermore, these accounts did not draw attention to, and thus did not explain, certain salient characteristics of curiosity: its intensity, transience, association with impulsivity, and tendency to disappoint when satisfied. A new account of curiosity is offered that attempts to address these shortcomings. The new account interprets curiosity as a form of cognitively induced deprivation that arises from the perception of a gap in knowledge or understanding. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Psychological Bulletin
1994.
Vol.
116,
No.
1.75-98
Copyright
1994
by the
American
Psychological
Association,
Inc.
0033-2909/94/S3.00
The
Psychology
of
Curiosity:
A
Review
and
Reinterpretation
George
Loewenstein
Research
on
curiosity
has
undergone
2
waves
of
intense activity.
The
1st,
in the
1960s,
focused
mainly
on
curiosity's psychological underpinnings.
The
2nd,
in the
1970s
and
1980s,
was
character-
ized
by
attempts
to
measure curiosity
and
assess
its
dimensionality. This article reviews these contri-
butions
with
a
concentration
on the 1st
wave.
It is
argued that theoretical accounts
of
curiosity
proposed during
the
1st
period
fell
short
in 2
areas: They
did not
offer
an
adequate explanation
for
why
people voluntarily seek
out
curiosity,
and
they
failed
to
delineate situational determinants
of
curiosity.
Furthermore, these accounts
did not
draw attention
to, and
thus
did not
explain, certain
salient
characteristics
of
curiosity:
its
intensity, transience, association with impulsivity,
and
ten-
dency
to
disappoint
when
satisfied.
A new
account
of
curiosity
is
offered
that attempts
to
address
these
shortcomings.
The new
account interprets curiosity
as a
form
of
cognitively
induced depriva-
tion
that arises
from
the
perception
of a gap in
knowledge
or
understanding.
Curiosity
is the
most
superficial
of all the
affections;
it
changes
its
object
perpetually;
it has an
appetite
which
is
very
sharp,
but
very
easily satisfied;
and it has
always
an
appearance
of
giddiness, rest-
lessness
and
anxiety.
(Edmund Burke,
1757/1958,
p.
31)
Curiosity
has
been consistently recognized
as a
critical
mo-
tive
that influences human behavior
in
both positive
and
nega-
tive
ways
at all
stages
of the
life
cycle.
It has
been identified
as
a
driving
force
in
child development (e.g., Stern, 1973,
p. 33;
Wohlwill,
1987)
and as one of the
most
important
spurs
to
edu-
cational attainment (Day,
1982).
The
pedagogical literature
en-
courages teachers
to
stimulate curiosity (e.g., McNay, 1985),
provides
practical guidelines
for
doing
so
(e.g., Tomkins
&
Tway,
1985;
Vidler, 1974),
and
decries
the
educational system's ten-
dency
to
quell
it
(Torrance,
1965).
Curiosity
has
also been cited
as a
major impetus behind
scientific
discovery, possibly eclips-
ing
even
the
drive
for
economic gain
(e.g.,
see
Koestler, 1973;
Simon,
1992). Furthermore, curiosity
is
seen
as a
significant
response evoked
by
literature
and art (H.
Kreitler
&
Kreitler,
1972)
and has
recently been exploited
in the
commercial realm.
Advertisers
have begun
to
harness
the
power
of
curiosity
in
"mystery"
ads
that reveal
the
identity
of the
product only
at the
end
of the
advertisement (King,
1991).'
Less happily, curiosity
is
associated with behavior disorders such
as
voyeurism
and has
been blamed
for
nonsanctioned behaviors such
as
drug
and al-
cohol
use
(Green,
1990),
early sexual experimentation (Cullari
&
Mikus, 1990),
and
certain types
of
crime such
as
arson
(Kolko
&
Kazdin, 1989).
Yet
our
fascination with curiosity does
not
derive
from
its
I
thank
Baruch
Fischhoff,
Colin Camerer, Linda
Babcock,
Donna
Harsch,
Sophie Freud, Daniel
Kahneman,
Richard Goodkin,
Dan Ad-
ler,
Jodi
Gillis,
and
Dean Behrens
for
helpful
comments
and
sugges-
tions;
three
anonymous
referees
for
highly
constructive comments;
and
Jill
Shapiro
for
editorial advice.
Correspondence concerning this
article
should
be
addressed
to
George Loewenstein, Department
of
Social
and
Decision Sciences, Col-
lege
of
Humanities
and
Social Science, Carnegie Mellon
University,
Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania
15213-3890.
practical significance alone. Curiosity poses
an
anomaly
for ra-
tional-choice analyses
of
behavior that assume that
the
value
of
information
stems solely
from
its
ability
to
promote goals more
basic than
the
satisfaction
of
curiosity. Such analyses assume
that "the utility
of
information
to the
agents
...
is
indirect
and
not
direct
like
the
utility derived
from
consuming
goods"
(Laffont,
1989,
p.
54). However, there
is
considerable research
documenting situations
in
which people demand more
infor-
mation than would
be
predicted
by
"value
of
information
anal-
yses"—as
if
they value
the
information
for its own
sake.
For
example,
managers "systematically gather more information
than they use,
yet
continue
to ask for
more"
(Feldman
&
March,
1981,
p.
171).
Patients want more information about their med-
ical conditions than they typically receive
but do not
want more
control over decisions (Strull,
Lo, &
Charles,
1984).
Asch,
Pat-
ton,
and
Hershey
(1990)
described
this
as a
paradox because
the
decision-theoretic
view
is
that patients should only want
to
know
something
if it
helps them
to
make
a
more informed
de-
cision.
The
theoretical puzzle
posed
by
curiosity
is why
people
are so
strongly attracted
to
information that,
by the
definition
of
curiosity, confers
no
extrinsic benefit.
This combination
of
practical importance
and
theoretical
puzzle
has
stimulated psychologists' interest
in
various
aspects
of
curiosity. Rather than producing
an
ever-growing mountain
of
research,
however,
the
interest
in
curiosity
has
surged
in two
major
"waves,"
divided
from
each other
not
only
by an in-
tervening
trough
of
publications
but by a
focus
on
different
is-
sues.
The first
wave,
which crested
in the
early
1960s,
focused
on
three basic issues. Foremost
was the
question
of
curiosity's
un-
derlying
cause. Psychologists representing diverse intellectual
perspectives speculated about
the
cause
of
curiosity
and
invari-
ably
concluded
that
curiosity could
be
explained
in
terms
of
their
own
preexisting theoretical frameworks. Secondarily,
cu-
riosity
researchers pondered
why
people voluntarily seek
out
'
Researchers
have
found
that
such
advertisements produce greater
subsequent
brand recognition than matched
nonmystery
ads
that reveal
the
product's
identity
from
the
start (Fazio, Herr,
&
Powell,
1992).
75
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