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Terror and Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America, 1956–1970
Abstract
Most of the extraordinary waves of terror which have swept many Latin American societies since 1970 have occurred in guerrilla-based insurgencies or even civil wars. Because of the massive body counts produced during these confrontations between revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries based in or linked with a government, human rights organizations have issued a long series of reports about terror—especially that which has been carried out by incumbent regimes and death squads—and which has been supplemented by the exposés of the guerrillas themselves. Amnesty International, the Human Rights group in the Organization of American States (OAS), and Americas Watch have been the major international actors documenting the wave of terror. Many independent national groups, such as El Salvador's “Socorro Juridico” and other human rights organizations linked with church bodies have undertaken that more perilous task at home.
... That such groups rely on terror to attain military and political goals has been widely established in the literature. 1 Yet several points concerning the use of terror by insurgent groups during civil wars remain unanswered. For example, why do some rebel groups rely extensively on terror while others do not? ...
... I understand terrorism to be a violent, rational strategy that serves instrumental purposes. 5 Two fundamental attributes distinguish it from other forms of violence: (1) it entails the intentional targeting of civilians (i.e., non-combatants) and (2) it is designed to achieve an ulterior goal (i.e., political, criminal) by generating fear in the general population. 6 Colombia represents a paradigmatic case for the study of terrorism in civil war because it experienced one the highest incidences of terrorism in the world between 1970 and 2014. ...
This article investigates the use of terror in Colombia's civil war by examining the behavior of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Relying on an extensive database covering 25 years of conflict, the article traces the way in which the FARC and ELN have employed terror as part of their overall insurrectional strategy. I argue that, while ideology plays an important role in inspiring revolutionary terrorism, these groups' terror practices evolved over time and were driven principally by military strategies. Changing conditions in the theatre of war, particularly growing competition with paramilitary forces, in turn, influenced these strategies. The article also discusses some interesting differences between the two groups' terror practices.
... One of the defining characteristics distinguishing civil wars from conflicts fought between nation-states is said to be the disproportionate amount of violence directed against civilians in civil war contexts (Wickham-Crowley, 1990; Downes and Cochran, 2010; Valentino et al., 2004; Balcells, 2010; Boot, 2013). 1 And within civil wars themselves, it is argued that an important characteristic of contemporary civil conflicts is the greater magnitude of civilian victimization, as compared to conflicts of the past (Kaldor, 2012: 9). While considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to understanding the dynamics of civilian victimization in civil war, at the same time, ongoing conflicts like Syria and Iraq demonstrate the limits of information gathering capabilities regarding the extent of civilian deaths. ...
... One of the defining characteristics distinguishing civil wars from conflicts fought between nation-states is said to be the disproportionate amount of violence directed against civilians in civil war contexts (Wickham-Crowley, 1990;Downes and Cochran, 2010;Valentino et al., 2004;Balcells, 2010;Boot, 2013). 1 And within civil wars themselves, it is argued that an important characteristic of contemporary civil conflicts is the greater magnitude of civilian victimization, as compared to conflicts of the past (Kaldor, 2012: 9). ...
Prior research on civilian targeting in civil war has focused on characteristics of either the government or rebel group that make them more or less likely to target civilians. However, no government or rebel group targets a population, but rather individuals within it. To date, no study has explored the issue of why particular civilians would be chosen by one actor versus the other. This study examines the divergent civilian-targeting strategies of governments and rebel groups. We argue that unique identification problem facing each political actor in civil war leads the parties to resort to social stereotypes based on data derived from known enemy subjects killed in combat. We specify and then test a model that accounts for time and space and the demographic characteristics of each victim utilizing a new dataset on the personal, political, and demographic characteristics of individual civilians targeted by the state and rebels in the civil war in Nepal (1996–2006). The findings demonstrate for the first time that governments (and rebels) tend to kill the same types of individuals in non-combat settings as they kill in combat exchanges, and the civilians targeted by each actor differ significantly in the extent that they share certain social traits.
... In internal conflicts, particularly in those where the rebels rely on guerrilla warfare, the distinction between fighters and civilians tends to be blurred. Civilians cannot always be distinguished from combatants and the support system of the group, as there is a great overlap in practice (Wickham-Crowley 1990). This poses a serious challenge when examining government violence against civilians in guerrilla wars. ...
... Of the 22 political science oriented articles included, 59% included the element "political", whereas only 23% included the element "civilians". 9 In a similar argument,Wickham-Crowley (1990) describes what he calls guerrilla terror in Latin America as an instrument of selective violence to elicit compliance from the population.10 Kalyvas's theory applies to both governments and rebel groups -here I choose to present the implications for how to interpret rebel violence. ...
... However, state violence was extensive during the civil war period in Guatemala, as well as in other countries in Latin America (Wickham-Crowley 1990). Therefore it could have been the dynamism of civil war that influenced the occurrence of violence. ...
Literature on the Guatemalan Civil War has debated whether or not state violence was triggered by rebel activities. Did the government respond to each insurrection caused by the rebels, or did it blindly target regions where antigovernment antipathy and movements had historically prevailed? Because state violence was extensive during the civil war period, the dynamism of the war could have been the reason for its occurrence. Relying on the threat-response model of state violence, this article argues that human rights violations occurred when the government perceived a rebel threat that would have seriously degraded its capability in future counterinsurgencies. The article employs propensity score matching to address the problem of confounding in empirical analysis, and reveals that rebel attacks, particularly those targeting security apparatus and resulting in human injury, increased the likelihood of state violence in the Guatemalan Civil War.
... They believe this to either occur through the use of sensational acts of terrorism to alight an insurgent spirit in the people or through over zealous responses of governments to terrorist act which will cause large discontent in the populace and sympathy for the terrorists (Jenkins, 1985). A proponent of such a tactic has been the FARC group in Colombia who has utilized terrorism as part of a wider insurgency strategy (Wickham-Crowley, 1990), (Marks, 2002). Terrorists may also aim to impose an economic cost on a country. ...
... The Vietnamese case provides a most curious dais from which to propound such a thesis, for the Viet Cong unleashed upon the civilian populace a siege of terror of such dimensions that it has not been subsequently approached by any other guerrilla movement. 102 During his study of the insurgency in the Mekong Delta's Long An province, Jeffrey Race interviewed former guerillas involved in the "extermination of traitors" campaign of 1957-59. People targeted were not necessarily corrupt officials who had abused others; oftentimes more honest civil servants were targeted. ...
This work examines how the American role in the Vietnam War has been portrayed in standard college- and university-level textbooks dealing with American foreign policy. It argues that this topic has been presented in a manner that leaves an incomplete understanding. This conclusion is based on scholarship that has been available for decades as well as much Cold War historiography that has appeared since 1975. I conclude that the distortions need to be addressed for several reasons. Their propagation produces bad scholarship, gratuitously alienates Americans from their institutions of government, and justifies anti-Americanism and authoritarianism elsewhere.
... However, state violence was extensive during the civil war period in Guatemala, as well as in other countries in Latin America (Wickham-Crowley 1990). Therefore it could have been the dynamism of civil war that influenced the occurrence of violence. ...
Literature on the Guatemalan Civil War has debated whether or not state violence was triggered by rebel activities. Did the government respond to each insurrection caused by the rebels, or did it blindly target regions where antigovernment antipathy and movements had historically prevailed? Because state violence was extensive during the civil war period, the dynamism of the war could have been the reason for its occurrence. Relying on the threat-response model of state violence, this article argues that human rights violations occurred when the government perceived a rebel threat that would have seriously degraded its capability in future counterinsurgencies. The article employs propensity score matching to address the problem of confounding in empirical analysis, and reveals that rebel attacks, particularly those targeting security apparatus and resulting in human injury, increased the likelihood of state violence in the Guatemalan Civil War.
... According to Powell, political violence has three general objectives: ―to change the bargaining rules of the democratic game, to undermine the support enjoyed by the regime or its major parties, or to intimidate the opposition while mobilizing support" (Powell 1982: 158). In the same way, other scholars have suggested that one of the central functions of violence in civil wars is to generate citizens' obedience (Kalyvas 2006;Wickman-Crowley 1990;Kalyvas 1999); thus, in contexts of internal conflict, the actual use of violence or the threat of its use is ―intended to shape the behavior of a targeted audience by altering the expected value of particular actions‖ (Kalyvas 2006: 26). 5 ...
... Según Powell, la violencia política tiene tres objetivos generales: "cambiar las reglas de negociación del juego democrático, minar el apoyo de que goza el régimen o sus partidos principales, e intimidar a la oposición y movilizar apoyo al mismo tiempo" (Powell, 1982, p. 158). En la misma vía, otros estudiosos han sugerido que una de las funciones centrales de la violencia en las guerras civiles es generar obediencia ciudadana volumen xxIII · nÚmero 1 · I semestre de 2016 miguel García sánchez (Kalyvas, 2006;Wickman-Crowley, 1990;Kalyvas, 1999); así, en contextos de conflicto interno, el uso real de la violencia, o la amenaza de su uso, "pretende moldear el comportamiento de un público determinado alterando el valor esperado de acciones particulares" (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 26). ...
Este artículo investiga la relación entre el control territorial de grupos armados
y las decisiones de voto de los individuos sometidos al mismo. Prueba la hipótesis de que
las personas que viven en un contexto violento tienden a alinearse con los objetivos estratégicos
y las orientaciones ideológicas del actor que domina el área. A partir de una encuesta
nacional realizada en Colombia en 2005 y datos de nivel contextual, se emplean
modelos de regresión jerárquica para probar la hipótesis. Los resultados sugieren que, al
pasar de áreas dominadas por el Estado colombiano hacia regiones controladas por grupos
paramilitares de derecha, los individuos se vuelven más proclives a apoyar un candidato
presidencial de la derecha del espectro ideológico. Sin embargo, esta relación resulta estar
condicionada por el partidismo, pues las decisiones de voto de los simpatizantes de partidos
minoritarios son las más afectadas por cambios en contextos violentos.
... According to Powell, political violence has three general objectives: "to change the bargaining rules of the democratic game, to undermine the support enjoyed by the regime or its major parties, or to intimidate the opposition while mobilizing support" (Powell, 1982, p. 158). In the same way, other scholars have suggested that one of the central functions of violence in civil wars is to generate citizens' obedience (Kalyvas, 2006;Wickman-Crowley, 1990;Kalyvas, 1999); thus, in contexts of internal conflict, the actual use of violence or the threat of its use is "intended to shape the behavior of a targeted audience by altering the expected value of particular actions" (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 26). ...
This paper develops a theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between violent contexts of territorial control and vote choice by drawing on insights from literature on the contextual determinants of political behavior and civil wars. It tests the hypothesis that individuals living in a violent context tend to behave in line with the strategic objectives and ideological orientations proclaimed by the armed actor dominating the area. Using a national survey conducted in Colombia in 2005, and contextual level data, this paper employs hierarchical regression models to test this hypothesis. Results suggest that on moving from areas dominated by the Colombian state to regions controlled by right-wing paramilitary groups, individuals were more likely to support a presidential candidate on the right of the ideological spectrum. However, this relationship appears to be conditioned by partisanship, as minority party sympathizers’ vote choices are the most affected by changes in violent contexts.
... Political violence is unlikely to be irrational or spontaneous, it normally serves specific instrumental purposes; in other words, political violence is used by its perpetrators to achieve diverse strategic goals (Tilly 1978). 1 According to Powell, political violence has three general objectives: "to change the bargaining rules of the democratic game, to undermine the support enjoyed by the regime or its major parties, or to intimidate the opposition while mobilizing support" (Powell 1982: 158). In the same way, other scholars have suggested that one of the central functions of violence in civil wars is to generate citizens' obedience (Kalyvas 2006;Wickman-Crowley 1990;Kalyvas 1999). Thus, in contexts of internal conflict or civil war, the actual use of violence or the threat of its use is "intended to shape the behavior of a targeted audience by altering the expected value of particular actions" (Kalyvas 2006: 26). 2 ...
As an increasing number of nations developed democracies without being able to eliminate political violence, this study develops a theoretical framework and an empirical test for understanding the impact of violent contexts on electoral participation and vote choices. The general argument is that citizens living in violent contexts tend to adjust their political behavior in accordance to the objectives and ideological orientations proclaimed by the dominant armed actor. More precisely, electoral participation is expected to diminish as armed actors consolidate their control; yet disputed areas will suffer the biggest participation decline. This study also claims that citizens will be more likely to be supportive of candidates, and parties backed by the dominant armed actor. Finally, the effects of violent contexts on political behavior are not expected to be homogeneous, as minority party sympathizers are the most affected by violent contexts. The theory proposed here is tested at the individual and aggregate levels for the case of Colombia. Therefore, this dissertation deals with two different units of analysis, citizens and municipalities.The individual level analysis suggests that citizens living in contested areas exhibit the lowest probability of participating in elections. Violent contexts also have a tremendous influence on vote intention. Going from areas dominated by left wing insurgents to regions controlled by right wing paramilitaries, citizens are more likely to support a rightist presidential candidate. Lastly, sympathizers of minority parties are the most affected by violent contexts. The municipal analysis shows that there is a significant reduction in turnout as armed actors increase their control. Electoral results are also affected by changes in violent contexts. As municipalities go from being under guerrilla influence to paramilitary control, local governments lean to the right. Finally, in municipalities governed by a leftist mayor the consolidation of paramilitaries produced the biggest reduction in turnout and local governments suffer the biggest movement towards the right. In general, results indicate that political violence is an effective tool to model political behavior, as armed actors employ violence to shape individuals' political behavior by altering the expected value of certain political actions.
... 4 According to Powell, political violence has three general objectives: "to change the bargaining rules of the democratic game, to undermine the support enjoyed by the regime or its major parties, or to intimidate the opposition while mobilizing support" (Powell 1982: 158). In the same way, other scholars have suggested that one of the central functions of violence in civil wars is to generate citizens' obedience (Kalyvas 2006;Wickman-Crowley 1990;Kalyvas 1999); thus, in contexts of internal conflict or civil war, the actual use of violence or the threat of its use is "intended to shape the behavior of a targeted audience by altering the expected value of particular actions" (Kalyvas 2006: 26). 5 4 The literature on political violence conceives violence as either contingent or inherent. The second perspective argues that since violence is one of many alternative channels of group activity, it is chosen as a tactical calculation (Eckstein 1980). ...
... 9 Kalyvas's theory on violence in guerrilla conflicts shows that guerrilla insurgencies, as they try to rule and impose order in the areas that they liberate from state control, kill civilians in an attempt to terrorize those who could defect and denounce the insurgents to state troops. 10 It is sometimes assumed that civilians are more likely to be targeted in terrorist attacks because these attacks tend to be indiscriminate. The paradigmatic example is obviously 9/11. ...
There is no consensus in the literature about the nature of terrorism. The authors’ main claim is that this is ultimately the result of the coexistence of two senses of the term, the action and the actor sense, which are not fully congruent. Rather than trying to advocate a specific conceptualization, the authors provide in this article a map of the different ways in which scholars talk about terrorism. They identify first the set of terrorist actions and the set of terrorist actors. Terrorist tactics are a variety of the power to hurt, based on the lack of military power. Terrorist groups are underground ones with no territorial control. When the two criteria meet, the core of terrorism exists: coercive violence perpetrated by underground groups. The ambiguity that surrounds terrorism is caused by two other possibilities: actors with some measure of territorial control adopting coercive tactics and underground actors adopting military tactics. Although it is not possible to remove this ambiguity in empirical research, scholars can at least identify it and analyze it. The authors illustrate the two senses of terrorism and their interaction by using the most comprehensive dataset on terrorist incidents, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).
... 5 Several general studies of terrorism devote some attention to the Colombian case; however, because of their broad scope, they present only partial accounts. 6 Another group of studies discuss tangentially the use of terrorism while examining related topics including anthropological explanations of violence, 7 guerrilla warfare, 8 paramilitarism, and the narcotics trade. 9 Many of these studies portray terrorism as a one-dimensional practice associated with a single group and therefore fail to capture the complicated, multidimensional nature of this phenomenon in the Colombian context. ...
This article examines contemporary uses of terrorism in Colombia. Combining an historical analysis with the most complete database available on political violence, we illustrate how terrorism in Colombia constitutes a specific strategy that can be distinguished from other manifestations of violence. We argue that Colombia's non-state armed groups have turned terrorism into a pivotal element of their repertoires of action. These parties have not only increased their reliance on this strategy and introduced more refined forms such as de-territorialized terrorism, but also have specialized in particular terrorist attacks that suit their general objectives. While paramilitary groups rely mostly on massacres and forced disappearance, guerrillas concentrate on agitational terrorism including kidnappings and indiscriminate bombings.
... For another overview of the history of terrorism in Latin America, see, e.g.,Lopez (1988),Wickham-Crowley (1990),Gorriti (1991),Feldmann andPerälä (2004), andFeldmann (2005). ...
We investigate the link between economic performance and terrorism for 18 Latin American countries from 1970 to 2007, taking into account the potentially complex nature of this link. Panel causality analysis findings indicate that during this period, terrorism had no causal effect on economic growth. By contrast, we find that growth reduced terrorism in the less developed but not in the higher developed Latin American economies. We argue that group-specific differences (linked to patterns of economic development) govern this causal heterogeneity. From a series of negative binomial regressions we gain additional support for our findings, while also identifying further determinants of terrorism.
Protests could exhibit properties of an asymmetrical, nonconventional war when paramilitary police utilise counterinsurgency measures and decentralised protestors adopt guerrilla tactics. This study examines the structural characteristics of the 2019 Hong Kong protests and the organisation of the police and protestors. Strategic challenges seen in civil wars emerged. Blurred frontlines and identification problems escalated violence for collaboration and control. The civil war theoretical framework explains the role of civilians, the logic of violence, and the realignment of social and economic life in prolonged protests. The resemblance of society at civil war suggests civilians were forced to take sides and participate.
While social pressures have long been a theme in the targeting scholarship, this article develops and evaluates a theory for how social forces affect militant groups’ tactical choices to target civilians. It first identifies a class of groups that exhibit community ties, which occur when a group operates in proximity to a referent society that is geographically concentrated and comprised of dense social networks. Through observable indicators of endorsement and condemnation to their tactics, groups gain information and are subjected to normative pressures from community members, which constrain their leaders’ willingness to harm civilians. The argument is evaluated through within-case process tracing in qualitative case studies of the Provisional IRA during the Troubles and Palestinian Hamas in the 1990s. The findings demonstrate that both groups modified their tactics in conformity with social pressures, even when it was costly and contrary to their ideology, strategic, and organizational goals.
Existing research generally finds that foreign aid is ineffective in bolstering perceptions of governance, especially in conflict‐affected countries. Yet while most studies have focused on aid provided to state actors, this paper examines the link between aid and popular support for governing institutions in rebel‐held territory. We argue that aid can improve opinions of these institutions when they are embedded in the demographic, aspirational, and experiential solidarities of their communities. To evaluate our theory, we analyze new perceptions of data collected from residents of 27 rebel‐held communities inside Syria from 2014 to 2016. We find a modest but positive effect of aid on perceptions of local institutions, but only when the institutions were not imposed by outside actors. These results are further supported by a case study of Raqqa City, which shows that aid only boosted citizens’ views of the local governing body when it was embedded within the community.
Democracies, handicapped by constitutional conventions and structural mechanisms which enforce the practice of humanitarian ethics, are less well-equipped to address counterinsurgencies (COIN) than popularly-unaccountable authoritarian regimes. Although commonly asserted in academic and popular channels, this statement belies a greater truth: that democracies actually outperform authoritarian governments as it relates to COIN conflict outcome. This paper makes the argument for the waging of effective COIN by emergent democracies through the analysis of the successful Venezuelan anti-Castro-Communist counterinsurgency of the 1960s. The Rómulo Betancourt (1958–1964) and Raúl Leoni (1964–1969) administrations’ tempered and humane response to urban and rural Castro-Communist violence decisively won the backing of the Venezuelan people and mortally wounded the insurgent support base. Once military operational and tactical missteps that prolonged the conflict are accounted for, the Venezuelan COIN of the 1960s can serve as an exportable model for newly emergent democracies seeking to wage war within constitutional conventions.
This paper examines illegal activities in the artisanal mining of diamond and gold in the Central African Republic (CAR) including the exportation. Artisanal mining predates the independence of the CAR in August 1960. It continued after independence and illegal activities associated with it have created conflict and insecurity in many areas in the CAR. The paper therefore discusses the consequences of these activities which include the exacerbation of communal and political conflicts, insecurity of persons, property and resources of the country. Suggestions have been made for improvement and for effective policy implementation. If the measures suggested are taken seriously, this may curb the perennial illegal exploitation of precious natural resources by terrorist and criminal networks within and without the CAR for egotistical interests. The methodology used in this study has been to interrogate reports of international NGOs, UN Panel of Experts, pronouncements of governmental officials and rival armed groups like the anti-Balaka and Séléka and also research findings of researchers on mining and development in the CAR.
This is the first book to examine and compare how rebels govern civilians during civil wars in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. Drawing from a variety of disciplinary traditions, including political science, sociology, and anthropology, the book provides in-depth case studies of specific conflicts as well as comparative studies of multiple conflicts. Among other themes, the book examines why and how some rebels establish both structures and practices of rule, the role of ideology, cultural, and material factors affecting rebel governance strategies, the impact of governance on the rebel/civilian relationship, civilian responses to rebel rule, the comparison between modes of state and non-state governance to rebel attempts to establish political order, the political economy of rebel governance, and the decline and demise of rebel governance attempts.
Rebels focused on profit sometimes provide civilian governance, contrary to the expectations of political economy and “new war” analysts. But the governance that these rebellions supply differs considerably from that of insurgents trying to win the hearts and minds of non-combatants. Charles Taylor's NPFL controlled most of Liberia between 1990 and 1992. The chaotic environment that it created would appear to help substantiate that a “greed” approach means rebels do not govern. In fact, it was integral to maintaining a distinctive political regime. Its war was not “new” and the spaces it controlled were not “ungoverned.” Violence and patronage were integral to the NPFL regime. In both respects NPFL leaders extended political practices they had learned in prewar Liberia, especially from President Samuel Doe's regime. Violence served accumulation. Maintaining insecurity facilitated personal loyalty to political leaders and military commanders. Profits from commercial ventures went into the pockets of leaders and commanders. The veneer of a government administration, legislature, and courts was constructed primarily for an unsuccessful effort to gain international recognition and for additional opportunities to collect bribes.
I take advantage of political and geographic variation to explore the underlying dynamics of rebel governance during the Greek Civil War. Two key findings emerge from this analysis. First, the political identity of rebel groups appears to have had a clear impact on the form of governance implemented. Communist rebels set up expansive institutions of rule that stressed mass mobilization and were heavily bureaucratized. In contrast, non-communist rebels relied instead on traditional local structures. Whereas communist rebels sought to incorporate local groups and communities into a centralized system, non-communist rebels were content to just collaborate with them. Second, when holding the type of rebel group constant, I find that the temporal and spatial variation in levels of territorial control affected both the depth and character of rebel governance. The more extensive the geographical scope of control exercised by a rebel group, the fuller the expression of its political identity on the institutions of rebel rule. Conversely, limited and tenuous territorial control correlates with more openly coercive practices.
This paper develops a theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between violent contexts of territorial control and vote choice by drawing on insights from literature on the contextual determinants of political behavior and civil wars. It tests the hypothesis that individuals living in a violent context tend to behave in line with the strategic objectives and ideological orientations proclaimed by the armed actor dominating the area. Using a national survey conducted in Colombia in 2005, and contextual level data, this paper employs hierarchical regression models to test this hypothesis. Results suggest that on moving from areas dominated by the colombian state to regions controlled by right-wing paramilitary groups, individuals were more likely to support a presidential candidate on the right of the ideological spectrum. However, this relationship appears to be conditioned by partisanship, as minority party sympathizers' vote choices are the most affected by changes in violent contexts.
This chapter explores the conditions that sometimes gave rise to the formation of systems of rebel governance during more than three decades of guerrilla warfare in multiple nations of Latin America, 1956–1990. In those rural areas experiencing an absence or erosion of the effective – and populace-benefitting – exercise of governance by the central authorities, rebels were presented with a basic opportunity to form counter-states. Similar opportunities were provided if politically hostile para-political influences were absent (like non-revolutionary party-loyalties), or if pro-revolutionary para-political organizations were regionally influential. Where central governments responded to the nascent or established presence of rebel governance with predation or terror against local civilians, such actions were only likely to further erode the legitimacy of central governors. Rebels could deepen their initial patterns of governance by performing the classic obligations of governors: promoting material security and welfare, providing police and judicial functions, and protecting the populace from external armed attacks. Yet central governors could also restore or expand their delivery of those same “services” (e.g., through military civic action), and the two types of governments could find themselves competing to become the sole governing body. Declines of rebel governance commonly occurred, too, and could stem from effective military repression, but more interestingly when the rebels themselves violated the obligations incumbent upon governing authorities.
This chapter discusses the relationship between the way in which the leftist militias organized and the governance structures they created and deployed in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Medellín, Colombia. These militias displaced violent bands that had previously dominated the local population without establishing order. They succeeded due to superior organization, military discipline, and intelligence gained from disaffected civilians. The militias, motivated by leftist ideologies, gained popular support by restoring a modicum of order with harsh punishments of deviants and engaging in social campaigns of re-education among residents. But their success eventually resulted in the loss of their ideological coherence, discipline, and military capacity by recruiting former band members and local youth, and by seeking rents for personal benefit. These transformations eroded their popular support. Changes in militias' internal organization, profile of fighters, and competition with other armed actors reveal some of the mechanisms through which organizational dynamics and models of governance affect each other
Reflecting on global solidarity recently took an innovative turn in a series of studies on the European mobilisation for Chile and Nicaragua. In focusing on these large-scale campaigns, history has freed the oppositional movements of the Third World from their position as passive recipients of Western solidarity and ascribed them a formidable agency in constituting and shaping their transnational solidarity networks.
Research, however, remained centred on movements whose claim to govern, stemming from actual or previous state power, was widely considered as legitimate and was backed by substantial financial and cultural capital. In turn, this study investigates the transnational network that connected Flemish and European grassroots solidarity committees to the Guatemalan revolutionary insurgency. Embedding this solidarity network firmly in the social-political dynamics of Guatemala will show the insurgency’s distinctively less beneficial position in the quest for global solidarity and will uncover the necessity to nuance the observed patterns of active involvement.
Rebels may set myths into motion when they govern civilians. Rebels who want to overturn the socio-political order often incorporate its values, beliefs, representations, and practices into their governance of civilians. In doing so they govern through some of the myths underpinning that order. Many of these operate on an unreflective level among both rebels and local residents. Deploying these enables rebels to cultivate legitimacy among civilians whose support they solicit. But the novelty of rule by rebels is that it recasts existing values and beliefs into new political narratives that shape rebel governance profoundly. Drawing on a mixture of nationalist, pre-colonial, and Christian values and beliefs, General Padiri's Mai Mai militia group from South Kivu in eastern Congo produced a mythical narrative, forged around divine authority and the bipolar relation between autochthony and foreignness. This syncretic mythical narrative resonated deeply within the local society. It endowed Padiri with charismatic authority and enabled a highly centralized, authoritarian, and coercive form of rebel governance.
The practice of rebel diplomacy is essential for violent non-state actors on the verge of new statehood or seeking legitimacy for a new regime. But effective diplomacy can serve a number of critical purposes during wartime as well. In the short term, external ties may provide material resources, training, or otherwise martial support to alter the course of fighting on the ground. Over the longer term, establishing bilateral relations with third parties, concluding trade agreements, or being allowed to participate in cease-fire or settlement negotiations can lock in strategic advantages that are difficult to overturn. Rebels face significant barriers to utilizing diplomacy, however. Some are inherent to the nature of the international system, some are erected by the embattled governing regime, and still others are endemic to rebel organizations themselves. This chapter introduces the important – and so far neglected – topic of rebel diplomacy in wartime. I argue that we can only hope to understand contemporary civil war by better understanding the interplay between violent and non-violent tactics
Several experts share their views on the several efforts taken by Colombian state to eliminate internal corruption, paramilitarism, Marxist insurgency in the Americas. One of the experts, Jasmin Hristov, contextualizes and deconstructs the realities of Colombian paramilitarism, and its formal facilitation of minority-held political-economic interests. Hristov provides a much-needed new sphere of analysis, which properly situates paramilitarism as an ever-changing and contributing factor to, and for, capital accumulation alongside the maintenance of the long entrenched political power structure. Dermot O'Connor and Juan Pablo Bohórquez Montoya's highlights the effects of conventional development strategies related to monetary growth and the consequence of such approaches on Colombian workers. Terry Gibbs focuses on the role of women in the struggle for substantive change in Colombia. Gibbs provides an insightful analysis of the trials and trajectories of women who are engaged in direct action against forces of discrimination.
The notorious conflict between the Hatfield and the McCoy families of West Virginia and Kentucky is often remembered as America's most famous feud, but it was relatively brief and subdued compared to the violence in Breathitt County, Kentucky. From the Reconstruction period until the early twentieth century, Breathitt's 500 square miles of rugged upcountry land was known as “the darkest and bloodiest of all the dark and bloody feud counties” due to its considerable number of homicides, which were not always related to the factional conflicts that swept the region. In Bloody Breathitt, T. R. C. Hutton casts a critical eye on this territory for the first time. He carefully investigates instances of individual and mass violence in the county from the Civil War through the Progressive era, exploring links between specific incidents and broader national and regional events. Although the killings were typically portrayed as depoliticized occurrences, Hutton explains how their causes and implications often reflected distinctly political intentions. By framing the incidents as “feuds,” those in positions of authority disguised politically motivated murders by placing them in a fictive past, preventing outsiders from understanding the complex reality. This meticulously researched volume offers the first comprehensive narrative of the violence in this infamous Kentucky county, examining Breathitt's brutal history and its significance to the state, the South, and the nation. While the United States has enjoyed unparalleled longevity as a republic, Hutton's timely study reminds readers that the nation's political stability has had a tremendous cost in terms of bloodshed.
This chapter organizes the conjectures from a rationalist literature on terrorist organizations, analyzing the strategic issues that they face and the consequences of their actions. From this perspective, terrorism is seen as one of a set of rebel tactics that is chosen in response to changes in five factors: funding, popular support, competition against other rebel groups, the type of regime against which they are fighting, and counterinsurgency tactics. However, once groups adopt terrorist tactics over other, more traditional, tactics of insurgency, terrorism becomes self-perpetuating. This is especially true when the use of terrorist tactics coincides with a shift into underground modes of organization. The value added by this literature, in conjunction with some standard econometric analyses, is that it helps to identify the relevant actors, to reckon their utilities and payoffs, and to highlight different factors that affect when/where/and against whom terrorists strike. However, because the studies under review are not, by and large, written as part of a coherent, self-aware literature, a summary of the conjectures offered in the literature will not lead to an internally consistent body of testable hypotheses. Instead, we use the literature as a jumping off point to suggest a series of broad hypotheses that should serve as a foundation for future theoretical analysis and statistical testing. The emphasis here will be on developing hypotheses to understand why, where, and when civilians are likely to become victims in rebellions.
Rebel groups vary in their organization of civilian governance. How insurgents understand the nature of their rebellion and their relation to the population living in territory in which they act guides their development of governance functions. Rebel doctrine varies according to whether rebels presume they share a pre-existing identity with particular civilians and whether they want to transform civilians or realize values civilians already hold. Comparison of two Indian rebel groups shows how divergent initial premises affect governance practice. The NSCN (National Socialist Council of Nagaland) (IM) started with the idea of a natural polity, a state that would realize Naga ethnic identification. The Naxalite CPI (Maoist) began with the principle of a revolutionary polity, the establishment of a state that would eventually achieve universal social justice ideals. These divergent principles led both Naga and Naxalite administrations to different administrative choices about whom they extended protection, justice, and social services and whom they taxed. Both rebel groups applied their basic doctrines in administering local residents, but the problems of governing during civil war modified some of their choices. In particular, their belief that revolution would occur in stages allowed the Naxalites a surprising degree of pragmatism that included some accommodation with Indian state officials.
Research into the causes of civilian abuse during civil conflict has increased significantly in recent years, yet the mechanisms responsible for changes in actors' tactics remain poorly understood. I investigate how the outcomes of discrete conflict interactions influence subsequent patterns of rebel violence against civilians. Two competing logics suggest opposite influences of material loss on violence. A stylized model of rebel-civilian bargaining illustrates how acute resource demands resulting from recent severe conflict losses may incentivize insurgent violence and predation. I also identify several factors that might condition this relationship. I evaluate hypotheses based on these expectations by first analyzing the behaviors of the Lord's Resistance Army using subnational conflict data and then analyzing a cross-sectional sample of post–Cold War African insurgencies. Results from both the micro- and macrolevel analyses suggest that rising battlefield costs incentivize attacks on civilians in the period immediately following the accrual of losses. However, group-level factors such as effective control over territory and the sources of rebel financing condition this relationship. The findings suggest potential benefits from examining the interaction of strategic conditions and more static organizational characteristics in explaining temporal and geographic variation in rebel violence.Reed M. Wood is Assistant Professor of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University, Tempe. He can be reached at reed.wood@asu.edu.
One of the major policy concerns surrounding violent conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Pakistan, Russia’s North Caucasus region, Somalia, and Syria has been that these struggles may both attract and breed transnational insurgents, or foreign fighters. Yet despite this growing worry, relatively little is known about the ways in which transnational insurgents influence the domestic struggles they join. Existing scholarship assumes that such “outsiders” strengthen domestic opposition movements by bringing with them fighters, weapons, know-how, and access to finanancial resources. Indeed, access to such assets explains why domestic resistance leaders may initially welcome transnational insurgents. Foreign fighters, however, can also weaken domestic insurgencies by introducing new ideas regarding their objectives and how these struggles should be waged. The introduction of new goals and tactics can not only create divisions with opposition movements, but can also complicate the ability of local leaders to attract and maintain vital public support. Domestic resistance leaders’ willingness and ability to adapt the ideas of transnational insurgents to local conditions is key to determining whether and how foreign fighters strengthen homegrown insurgencies.
This article reviews the political science literature on political violence against civilians, including genocide, mass killing, and terrorism. Early work on these subjects tended to portray this kind of violence as irrational, random, or the result of ancient hatreds between ethnic groups. Most scholars studying political violence today, however, understand it to be primarily, if not exclusively, instrumental and orchestrated by powerful actors seeking to achieve tangible political or military objectives. Scholars continue to disagree, however, about the specific motives that drive belligerents to target civilians or the conditions under which large-scale violence against civilians is most likely.
"Small wars" have returned to the international political agenda in the early twentieth century with almost a vengeance. Leaving aside the factors of social media and satellite television today, the nature of small wars has adhered to its politicized, xenophobic, and asymmetrical characteristics. The latter were predicted by British and American military manuals produced in the early to middle twentieth century. This special issue aims to revisit the nature of small wars in the era of great power interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya in the 2000s. It will be apparent that two further characteristics need to be appended to small wars: chameleonic missions and virtual aggression.
This study models the structural sources of variation in the use of selective (discriminate) repression within 89 civil wars fought between 1981 and 2005. The severity of repressive violence is modeled as a function of the amount of territory being contested by the insurgents. This idea is operationalized using measures of the location, size, and density of insurgency violence. The analysis finds evidence that the repressive behavior of both governments and rebel groups is linked to conflict geography. Governments violate physical integrity rights more frequently and kill more civilians the greater the overall amount of territory under contestation. Rebels kill more civilians in highly dispersed insurgencies that lack a clear epicenter.
The following are current definitions from the US government regarding war, torture, and terrorism. War is defined as:
[Civil wars in the age of globalizationNew realities, new paradigms] There are three major theoretical trends offering an explanation for the persistence of wars following the end of the Cold War and the age of globalization. The most influential of them is probably the one that views the difference between wars today and those of the previous period as qualitative, its most credible representative being Mary Kaldor. According to these authors, today's wars are identity-based, their violence is turned mainly against population groups, and their economy is based on pillage, whereas those of yesterday were mainly ideological, seeking to win people to their cause and mobilizing resources to achieve their ends. These theories do not hold up to careful scrutiny. Yet the stakes are sizeable of one considers that, along with the other two theories and despite enormous differences, this trend constitutes a dominant paradigm (which is not, however, the single perspective) that exerts a decisive influence on the policies of the "international community".
Part of a special issue on new perspectives on Central America's revolutions. The writer investigates the effects of politically motivated violence on popular movements in Guatemala between 1954 and 1985. The state-sponsored violence of this period was one of the great injustices of the 20th century, and despite the peace accords of 1996, the violence has deeply affected political life in Guatemala. There is cause for optimism, however, in the adaptations demonstrated by Guatemalan popular organizations. The changes that were made by the popular organizations could reasonably be explained as a response to violence.
I use a rationalist framework to explore an issue typically framed and understood as irrational: large-scale violence against civilians in the context of civil wars. More specifically, I focus on the massacres of civilians in Algeria and seek to uncover the logic that drives such actions. The main thesis is that these massacres are not irrational instances of random violence motivated by extremist Islamist ideology, as they are typically described in the media; they can be understood instead as part of a rational strategy initiated by the Islamist rebels aiming to maximize civilian support under a particular set of con- straints. Mass, yet mostly targeted and selective, terror is used to punish and deter defection by civilians in the context of a particular strategic conjuncture characterized by (a) fragmented and unstable rule, (b) mass civilian defections toward the incumbents and (c) escalation of viol- ence. I check this thesis against the available evidence, address puzzles such as the identity of the victims and the behavior of the army, extend it to similar massacres in other countries, draw a number of implica- tions and discuss a research agenda. KEY WORDSpolitical violencecivil warcivilian massacres • insurgencyAlgeria
While non-state terrorism has grown substantially in many parts of the world since the mid 1990s, in Latin America, the insurgent continent par excellence, where radical non-state actors at both ends of the political spectrum have historically resorted to terror to attain political goals, this scourge has dwindled. Drawing on the seminal work of Timothy Wickham-Crowley, this article posits that this baffling trend can be explained as a result of a shift in the cultural repertoires of Latin American revolutionary and other anti-systemic groups in the 1990s. The traumatic experiences associated with authoritarian backlash and repression; a more pragmatic attitude that values democracy, accommodation, and dialogue as political strategies; and the rejection by vast sectors of the population of wanton violence as a tool to attain political objectives have subtracted terror from the range of activities (stock) of collective action of former and new radical groups. Groups fighting for change have thus internalized that terror ultimately constitutes an ineffectual and de-legitimized strategy. Colombia constitutes the exception to this regional trend. There, it is argued, terror is widely used as and informed by the perverse logic of armed conflict, whereby armed parties deliberately target civilians to advance military and political objectives.
By analytically decoupling war and violence, this book explores the causes and dynamics of violence in civil war. Against the prevailing view that such violence is an instance of impenetrable madness, the book demonstrates that there is logic to it and that it has much less to do with collective emotions, ideologies, and cultures than currently believed. Kalyvas specifies a novel theory of selective violence: it is jointly produced by political actors seeking information and individual civilians trying to avoid the worst but also grabbing what opportunities their predicament affords them. Violence, he finds, is never a simple reflection of the optimal strategy of its users; its profoundly interactive character defeats simple maximization logics while producing surprising outcomes, such as relative nonviolence in the 'frontlines' of civil war.
The ideological hegemony of Cold War analysis blinds U.S. foreign-policy makers to the reality they are determined to eradicate. Ever since the Truman administration, foreign- policy rhetoric (and practice) has been redundantly consistent. U.S. leaders are victims of their own propaganda. They categorically assert that all Third World national liberation movements are devoid of genuine, indigenous, popular support. Revolutions are automatically treated as plots masterminded—or at least manipulated—by a clique in the Kremlin. This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.
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Examined the incidence, meaning, and function of rape in a cross-cultural sample of 156 tribal societies from the assumption that human sexual behavior, although based in a biological need, is an expression of cultural forces. Two general hypotheses guided the research: (1) The incidence of rape varies cross-culturally, and (2) a high incidence of rape is embedded in a distinguishably different cultural configuration than a low incidence of rape. Data suggest that rape is part of a cultural configuration that includes interpersonal violence, male dominance, and sexual separation. Rape is interpreted as the sexual expression of these forces in societies where the harmony between men and their environment has been severely disrupted. (32 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
La violencia in Colombia, from 1946 to 1965, the largest armed conflict in the western hemisphere since the Mexican Revolution, was one of the world's most extensive and complex internal wars of this century. The study of the violencia strains at the limits of all the social sciences.
As explained in the report which follows, Dr. Navarro, Professor of Public Health at The Johns Hopkins University, was a member of the Tribunal on El Salvador which met in Mexico City on February 9-11. The full report of the Tribunal, together with supporting documents and legal argumentation, will be published by the secretariat of the Tribunal, but unfortunately this will take time and money. Meanwhile, the situation in El Salvador both domestically and internationally becomes graver with every day that passes. In these circumstances, and since there was a total blackout in the U.S. media on the work of the Tribunal, and even on its very existence, we are taking the unusual course of publishing this summary report by one of its members on the hearings and findings of the Tribunal. Correspondence concerning the Tribunal and its activities should be addressed to: Permanent Tribunal of the Peoples, Via Dogana Vecchia 5, 00186 Rome, Italy. Dr. Navarro closes his report with an urgent appeal to readers to make known its contents as widely as possible and to do everything within their power to halt the genocide now taking place in El Salvador. We strongly support this appeal and call attention to the recently formed Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES). National headquarters are in Washington (P.O. # 12056, Washington, D.C. 20005. Tel.: 1-202-887-5019). The New York Committee is located at 853 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10011. Tel.: 1-212-473-4848. At the time of writing in early March over 100 local committees have been formed around the country. For further information contact the Washington office. —The Editors
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After ten years of ruthless military dictatorship, the 1959 advent of a democratically elected government in Venezuela lifted popular hopes for social-economic reform and political democracy. In 1958, Romulo Betancourt (President 1959-1964) spoke like a revolutionary, in 1959 like a reformist. His initial actions were, in fact, reformist; but in the last four years of his regime, under pressures from Left and Right, he performed increasingly as a conservative. This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.
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As dusk fell, the guerrilla patrol halted its march across the mountain. We removed our shoulder packs and put up hammocks. We opened some cans of food, while tortillas were heated over the open fire. A companero tuned in Radio Havana. It was 6 p.m, Maybe there was still daylight beyond the thickly wooded mountain slope where we had pitched our camp, but all we could see were each other's faces in the glow of the fire. After the newscast, as on every other night, there was a political discussion, with participation by the entire patrol. This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.
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In the spring of 1938, Mao Tse-tung delivered a series of lectures at the "Yenan Association for the Study of the Anti-Japanese War." The Japanese War had been going on for almost a year. The Communists and the Nationalists had joined in a tenuous "United Front," and the Communists' Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chu Teh, was in the field. Japanese forces, driving out of Manchuria, had overrun the northern area of China down to the Shantung peninsula and in the south were well established on the Yangtze River. Chiang Kai-shek had borne the brunt of the Japanese attack and, despite heavy losses around Shanghai, had managed to preserve the fighting strength of his army. The Communists, in the meantime, had begun the political organization of the thinly held Japanese territory in Shansi-Hopeh provinces. Their base area in northwest Shensi had not been reached by the Japanese. Chairman Mao was being pressured to be more active in the military fight against the invading Japanese Army. Some were discouraged and felt there was little hope of defeating the relentless Japanese military machine. Mao used the theory of "protracted war" to encourage and unify his people and to turn the energies of his party to expanding political control over the peasants and establishing guerrilla bases. Mao's brilliant examination of the existing contradictions in the Sino-Japanese struggle and his three-stage portrayal of China's victory plan has become a modern military classic. It is taught in many service schools and widely used by scholars in explaining the Vietnamese Communist strategy, first against the French and later against the U.S./South Vietnamese forces in the unending Indochina War. The purpose of this paper is to look at the essentials of this strategy and to see if the historical evidence of the Sino-Japanese War supports the contemporary acclaim accorded to Mao's theoretical opus.
It is not surprising that Western statesmen and students of politics everywhere have recently begun to give major attention to what are variously termed guerrilla warfare, irregular warfare, paramilitary operations, la guerre révolutionnaire , insurrectional warfare, resistance movements, and other, allegedly military, doctrines. Of course, irregular armed struggles are not a unique feature of mid-twentieth-century politics; however, they have occurred with great frequency in our time and, more important, they have resulted in baffling victories over vastly better armed, better trained, and more numerous forces. President Kennedy, in response to the apparent superiority in military doctrine possessed by Communist forces in Asia, has ordered the rapid expansion of United States “guerrilla and counter-guerrilla forces.” On a more prosaic level, the publication in a national Sunday-morning newspaper of excerpts from a celebrated pamphlet on guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung suggests that “guerrilla warfare,” along with “massive retaliation,” has entered the popular Cold War vocabulary.
For more than a decade, the most decisive influence on the empirical study of the British class structure has been the three consecutive electoral victories of the Conservative Party during the 1950s. The widespread belief that these events reflected some underlying change in the stratification of British society stimulated a new examination of the political attitudes and behaviour of the working class. In sociology this led to the exploration of the ‘embourgeoisement’ thesis culminating in the ‘affluent worker’ study by Goldthorpe and his colleagues and it is, perhaps, a comment on the state of sociological research into the British class structure that this study, together with its associated papers, remains the centre around which much of the debate on social stratification in contemporary Britain continues to revolve. In political science, however, the investigation took a different track. Instead of seeking an explanation of the Conservative electoral successes in terms of the working class becoming more middle class, political scientists sought an explanation in terms of increased working-class ‘deference’. Bagehot was enthusiastically resurrected (a new edition of The English Constitution appeared in 1963), and a spate of studies attempted to assess the ‘deferential’ component of English political culture.
Guerrilla governments arise where landlord or central government authority has decayed. In such situations, the guerrillas often establish a new implicit social contract with the peasantry, replacing the previous social contract, the abrogation of which has reduced the traditional authorities from legitimate to predatory powers in their relationships with peasants. Guerrillas build up their authority by carrying out three contractual obligations of authority: (1) defense of the people from external enemies; (2) maintenance of internal peace and order; and (3) contributions to the material security of the populace, the last by increasing peasant incomes and by providing health services, literacy training, and sometimes land to rural cultivators. As a result of such activities, peasants often come to perceive guerrillas as the new legitimate authorities in the region. Such authority has decayed, however, where the guerrillas in turn fail to fulfill the obligations of the social contract. Loss of authority can appear when guerrillas fail to defend the peasantry against military attackers, or when guerrillas themselves come to employ terror against the rural populace, thus violating the social contract uniting legitimate authorities and their subjects. This paper concludes with a discussion of the relevance of the study of guerrillas to social movement theory.
The Legacy of Che Guevara
- Gall
Six Years of Aggression
- Oci Venezuela
Peru's Sendero Luminoso Rebellion: Origins and Trajectory
- Smith
Guatemala and the Guerrillas
- Geyer
Proceso a Campesinos
- Guardia
Los Cachorros del Pentagono
- Guevara
A Memoir of the Young Guevara
- Martin
Avec les Guerillas du Guatemala
- Castano
Peru's Misfired Guerrilla Campaign
- Gall
Enemy Colleagues: A Reading of the Salvadoran Tragedy
- Zaid
Revolution and Guerrilla Movements
- Petras
Guatemala: Always La Violencia
- Perera
The Cuban Insurrection
- Martin Bonachea
- San
Inside a State of Siege: Legalized Murder in Guatemala
- Bodenheimer
Notably , by late September the government claimed that only fifty guerrillas had been killed in the area in the previous two months; see La Prensa
- La Prensa
Notes on the Cuban Revolution
- Friedenberg
El Salvador's Divided Military
- Christian
Inquest in the Andes
- Mario
Zur Krise der Revolutiondren Linken in Lateinamerika: Das Beispiel Venezuela
- Lindenberg
Why They Shoot Americans
- Diamond
Sendero Luminoso: Peru's Maoist Guerrillas
- McClintock
Another View of El Salvador
- Berryman
Guerrilla Governments
- Wickham-Crowley
Peru's Sendero Luminoso Rebellion
- Peru Mcclintock
Las Guerrillas en el Peru
- Castillo
Conversations with the Guatemalan Delegates in Cuba
- Short
Bilan d'une Guérilla au Pérou
- Hector
Los Cachorros del Pentagon, 8 (quote)
- Guevara
The Continental Revolution
- Gall
Legitimate and Illegitimate Uses of Violence: A Review of Ideas and Evidence” (Paper prepared for the Behavioral Studies Research Group of the Hastings Center
- M Williams Robin
- Jr