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When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?
Abstract
Previous research has documented only a modest success rate for imposed sanctions. By contrast, the success rate is higher in cases that are settled at the threat stage. In this article, the authors provide new insights about the circumstances under which sanctions cause behavioral change only after being imposed. First, the target must initially underestimate the impact of sanctions, miscalculate the sender's determination to impose them, or wrongly believe that sanctions will be imposed and maintained whether it yields or not. Second, the target's misperceptions must be corrected after sanctions are imposed. A game-theoretical model with incomplete information is used to develop and clarify the argument.
... Prior research suggests that different types of sanctions may have different effects (Portela 2010), yet these impacts have not been systematically compared in a large-N study. Previous studies have focused only on some types of sanctions, such as economic sanctions (e.g., Kreutz 2015;Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005;Sejersen 2021), individual sanctions (e.g., Portela 2005Portela , 2014Sejersen 2021) or aid withdrawal (e.g., Donno and Neureiter 2018;Crawford and Kacarska 2019). ...
... 3 Since such measures are designed to directly affect the target country's material incentives, the theoretical approach adopted in this article builds on the target's rational cost-benefit calculations (cf. Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005;Sejersen 2019). ...
... Some studies assert that the threat of sanctions may be more effective than their employment (Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005). Such threats powerfully communicate the senders' position (Peksen 2009;Hultman and Peksen 2015: 5). ...
Respect for human rights is one of the main conditions for European Union (EU) cooperation with third countries. When human rights are gravely violated, the EU can apply a variety of restrictive measures ranging from issuing sanctions threats to imposing economic sanctions. However, can such measures impact the subsequent human rights situation in the target country, and under what conditions? Using time-series cross-sectional data accounting for eleven post-Soviet states over a period of twenty-six years (1991–2016), this article demonstrates that the impact of sanctions on the target’s human rights situation depends on two factors – the type of sanction applied and the extent of the target’s linkage with alternative regional powers. In the absence of regional alternative support, sanctions in the form of arms embargoes and aid suspension demonstrate a positive effect on the human rights situation.
... In order to evaluate the potential effectiveness of infringement procedures and funding conditionality, we scrutinise two determinants derived from general sanctions theory that are applicable to our toolbox: (i) the credibility of sanctions imposition, based on the design of the mechanism, with attention to decision-making thresholds and number of actors involved, and (ii) the possibility of significant economic costs to the target resulting from the sanctions. The credibility of a sanction, and the threat thereof, is a classical determinant of its efficacy (Hovi et al., 2005;Walentek et al., 2021). Scholarship relates the credibility of sanctions threats to their issuance via an international organisation that can rely on co-ordination mechanisms for reassurance and information (Bapat and Kwon, 2015;Drezner, 2000) or to the sender's reputation (Peterson, 2013). ...
... Moreover, Poland challenged the supremacy of EU law, entering a court war with the CJEU. Nevertheless, the fact that Warsaw did not reverse reforms despite fines under Article 260(2) TFEU corroborates the longstanding assumption that sanctions are more effective at the threat stage than after imposition (Hovi et al., 2005;Morgan et al., 2009). Our hypotheses regarding funding conditionality predicted that all three regimes were likely to be effective. ...
The European Union (EU) responded to democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland by implementing a sanctions toolbox, which includes the Article 7 Treaty on European Union (TEU) mechanism , infringement procedures and funding conditionality. Whilst the Article 7 TEU procedure has been extensively studies and found to be ineffective, the efficacy of infringement procedures and the recently introduced funding conditionality-comprising the Conditionality Regulation, the Recovery and Resilience Facility and the Common Provisions Regulation-remains less understood. Drawing on the sanctions scholarship, we identify two central determinants for sanction effectiveness: the credibility of sanctions imposition and their economic costs. We then explore how they influence the effectiveness of the sanction mechanisms introduced by the EU by testing four hypotheses. The findings indicate that both infringement procedures and funding conditional-ity are only partially effective. This comparative analysis enhances our understanding of coercive mechanisms that can mitigate decline in democratic governance.
... A substantial body of literature conceptualizes economic coercion as a bargaining game between a sender and a target state ( Tsebelis 1990 ;Eaton and Engers 1992 ;Smith 1995 ;Drezner 1999 ;Lacy and Niou 2004 ;Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005 ;Bapat and Kwon 2015 ;Aidt, Albornoz, and Hauk 2021 ). These models assume that states act rationally and unitarily. ...
... As a result, sanction threats are never credible in the basic game-theoretic framework underlying many influential studies on economic coercion. Threats only become potentially credible if the models incorporate relative gains or reputation ( Eaton and Engers 1992 ;Drezner 1999 ), incomplete information ( Lacy and Niou 2004 ;Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005 ), or signaling ( Smith 1995 ). ...
Existing research shows that economic coercion successfully influences targeted states' behavior 38 percent of the time. This article integrates research on economic sanctions and foreign aid by assessing the relative effectiveness of two types of economic coercion: economic sanctions and foreign aid suspensions. It argues that suspending aid is more effective than adopting economic sanctions because (1) aid suspensions are economically beneficial for the adopting state, while sanctions are costly, (2) aid suspensions directly affect the targeted government's budget, (3) market forces undermine sanctions but not aid sus-pensions, and (4) aid suspensions are less likely to spark adverse behavioral reactions. A quantitative analysis estimates the success rate of imposed aid suspensions to be 44 percent and that of economic sanctions to be 26 percent. The results are robust across two alternative datasets on economic coercion, and qualitative evidence corroborates the outlined mechanisms. The findings suggest that economic sanctions are less effective than previously thought and that large donor states have a higher chance of achieving political goals through economic coercion.
Las investigaciones existentes demuestran que la coerción económica influye con éxito en el comportamiento de los Estados objetivo el 38 percent de las veces. Este artículo integra la investigación, tanto en materia de las sanciones económicas como en materia de la ayuda exterior, mediante la evaluación de la eficacia relativa de dos tipos de coerción económica: las sanciones económicas y las suspensiones de la ayuda exterior. El artículo argumenta que la suspensión de la ayuda es más eficaz que la adopción de sanciones económicas debido a que: (1) las suspensiones de la ayuda son económicamente beneficiosas para el Estado que adopta las medidas, mientras que las sanciones son costosas, (2) las suspensiones de la ayuda afectan directamente al presupuesto del Gobierno objetivo, (3) las fuerzas del mercado debilitan las sanciones pero no las suspensiones de la ayuda, y (4) es menos probable que las suspensiones de la ayuda provoquen reacciones adversas a nivel de comportamiento. Estimamos, mediante un análisis cuantitativo, que la tasa de éxito de las suspensiones de las ayudas impuestas es del 44 percent y que la de las sanciones económicas es del 26 percent. Los resultados resultan sólidos a lo largo dos conjuntos de datos alternativos sobre coerción económica, y las pruebas cualitativas corroboran los mecanismos descritos. Las conclusiones sugieren que las sanciones económicas son menos efectivas de lo que se pensaba y que los grandes Estados donantes tienen una mayor probabilidad de lograr objetivos políticos a través de la coerción económica.
La recherche existante montre que la coercition économique a réellement une influence sur le comportement des États cibles 38 percent du temps. Cet article intègre la recherche sur les sanctions économiques et l'aide étrangère en évaluant l'efficacité relative des deux types de coercition économique : les sanctions économiques et la suspension de l'aide étrangère. Il affirme que la suspension des aides revêt une efficacité supérieure à l'adoption de sanctions économiques parce que (1) la suspension des aides est avantageuse sur le plan économique pour le pays qui adopte cette mesure tandis que les sanctions sont coûteuses, (2) la suspension des aides a une incidence directe sur le budget du gouvernement cible, (3) les forces du marché sapent les sanctions, mais non la suspension des aides, et (4) la suspension des aides a moins de chance de déclencher des comportements indésirables en réaction. Une analyse quantitative estime le taux de réussite de l'imposition de suspensions d'aides à 44 percent, et celui des sanctions économiques à 26 percent. Les résultats restent vrais dans deux ensembles de données alternatifs sur la coercition économique, et les preuves qualitatives confirment les mécanismes décrits. Les conclusions suggèrent que les sanctions économiques sont moins efficaces que l'on ne le pensait et que les grands États donateurs ont plus de chances d'atteindre leurs objectifs politiques par la coercition économique.
... It harms the economic growth of the targeted country (Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2015) [3]. Researchers looked into how and when economic sanctions were implemented (Hovi, Huseby, & Sprinz, 2005;Marinov, 2005) [14], [15], why they did not work (Pape, 1997) [16]. As well as whether or if the effects may be made to improve (Hufbauer et al., 2008) [2], What were the humanitarian ramifications that emerged? ...
... It harms the economic growth of the targeted country (Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2015) [3]. Researchers looked into how and when economic sanctions were implemented (Hovi, Huseby, & Sprinz, 2005;Marinov, 2005) [14], [15], why they did not work (Pape, 1997) [16]. As well as whether or if the effects may be made to improve (Hufbauer et al., 2008) [2], What were the humanitarian ramifications that emerged? ...
This study assesses the impact of economic sanctions on oil exports and economic growth through case studies of Libya. By setting up a synthetic group method that reproduces the oil exports and economic growth of the case study before the imposition of economic sanctions, we compare the oil exports and the economic growth of the Synthetic and the actual for each period. We address a crucial gap in the literature of sanction in a petrostate case study using the synthetic control approach. Our analysis found that both petroleum exports and economic growth were lower with economic sanctions. This research is integrated into the comparative and international landscape of international influence relations with the domestic economy. Economic sanctions, the results show, are the key driver in fluctuations in oil exports and economic growth that might be represented in the oil curse. We believe that our empirical research can contribute to domestic and international policy formation by sanctioned countries. Overall, the findings confirm that sanctions may be imposed on Libya as another channel of the resource curse from the global and foreign policy perspectives.
... It also facilitates an analysis of the possibilities for monitoring, naming, and shaming to be deployed as tools for eliciting behavioural changes in international relations without the recourse to more traditional trade sanctions. This is especially relevant as the evolving practice and literature on sanctions, in general, have highlighted the indiscriminate effects that trade and economic sanctions can have on sections of societies that bear no responsibility for the breaches of norms or standards that triggered the sanctions (Portela, 2018), and the fact that such sanctions have often failed to achieve their desired objectives (inter alia, Galtung, 1967;Hovi et al., 2005;Pape, 1997). This article uses the example of the TSD dispute case under the EU-Korea FTA to address the questions of whether the soft law and promotional approach of the TSD chapters, which is not linked to the overall FTA dispute settlement whereby non-compliance can lead to economic sanctioning in the form of withdrawal of trade preferences agreed under the FTA, can achieve its aims, and whether the way this case has been interpreted by the panel of experts enhances the enforceability of TSD chapters in the absence of hard economic sanctions. ...
... Three months after the panel of experts published its recommendations, the government of Korea had achieved relevant reforms of TULRAA enabling it to ratify three of the four outstanding fundamental ILO conventions and was working towards the ratification of the final one on the abolition of forced labour. The case hints at the possibility of non-legally binding sanctions (naming and shaming) achieving desired outcomes, without the arbitrary punishment that trade sanctions and trade restrictions can inflict (Hovi et al., 2005;Pape, 1997;Portela, 2018), provided, importantly, that the receiving government is interested in making changes. It signals to partners the EU's commitment to improved implementation of TSD chapters. ...
Although sanctions targeting political regimes receive the most media attention, the EU can also sanction states for labour rights violations through its trade policy. Although in practice such sanctions are applied only in extreme cases, the possibility of suspending trade preferences increases the EU’s leverage. In modern trade agreements, the EU incorporates Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters for labour and environmental matters. However, trade sanctions for non-compliance with this chapter are absent. Instead, a dedicated dispute settlement arrangement exists, leading to recommendations by a panel of experts. In 2019 the EU launched proceedings against South Korea for failing to uphold commitments to ratify and implement International Labour Organisation core conventions regarding trade unions under the 2011 EU–Korea Trade Agreement. In 2021, the panel of experts sided with the EU’s interpretation of commitments under the TSD chapter. This initial case represents the EU’s intention to focus on the implementation of TSD chapters. Using data from official documents, this article process-traces the dispute with Korea. It argues that the outcome of the case, and Korea’s ratification of fundamental International Labour Organisation conventions in 2021, demonstrate the potential of the TSD chapter, when forcefully enforced, to partially redress the weak sanctioning capacity in TSD chapters. It also uncovers important caveats regarding state capacity and alignment with government objectives as conditioning the effectiveness of TSD chapters’ non-legally binding sanctioning mechanisms.
... In parallel to these real-world developments, research has also evolved, thanks to the incorporation of new foci. In line with the habitual focus on the determinants of target compliance ( Jones and Portela 2020 ), various authors have attempted to capture factors that may help account for the success and failure of sanctions, such as the role of sanctions threats ( Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005 ;Whang, McLean, and Kuberski 2013 ) or of concurrent actions such as conflict mediation ( Hudáková 2021 ;Amaral 2022 ). Others have paid attention to pre-existing trends absent from previous research. ...
... The impetus for the TIES dataset arose from the need to record cases of threatened sanctions in addition to imposed sanctions. This aimed to accommodate an emerging scholarly intuition about the role of threats in generating concessions: since potential targets can adjust their behavior before sanctions are imposed in anticipation of the potential costs, sanctions might be more effective at the threat stage than at the imposition stage ( Drezner 1999 ;Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005 ;Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014 , 542). In this vein, an episode is assumed to begin when the sender issues a threat about the possibility of sanctions or imposes sanctions with no previous threat ( Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2021 , 46). ...
Databases constitute key research tools in sanctions scholarship. Over the past few years, we have witnessed a proliferation of sanctions databases: while only a single dataset was available until 2009, this number had increased to five by 2020; thus, the choice has more than doubled in less than a decade. This essay assesses the evolution observed. It reviews the five major datasets, comparing some of their basic choices, and evaluates them along two dimensions: the extent to which they capture targeted sanctions and the degree to which they brought innovations to the subfield. We find that targeted sanctions are not adequately reflected in databases, which remain state-centric in their approach. We conclude that the crafting of new databases does not entail an incremental refinement in which each iteration renders its predecessors obsolete. Rather, the evolution observed has resulted in a diverse set of options with different emphases. We nevertheless observe that a trend toward innovation has yielded to one toward consolidation, more focused on enlarging the empirical testing ground than in innovating. We conclude by discussing implications for the development of sanctions scholarship.
... Their dual focus on positive cases and material sanctions is thus apparent. Subsequent research departed from the work of Hufbauer et al. (2007) in important ways, for example by incorporating the threat of sanctions and by including non-economic sanctions (Biersteker et al., 2018;Hovi et al., 2005;Weber & Schneider, 2022). They retained, however, the focus on positive cases and material sanctions: The only relevant events are those where the outcome of interest, be that the actual or threatened use of sanctions, in fact occurred and where the sanctions were verbal in nature. ...
... Second, there is a danger of overstating the importance of material sanctions. When an actor issues both social and material sanctions, most studies only register the latter (e.g., Barber, 1979;Eriksson, 2011;Hovi et al., 2005). Any effect of social pressure is then falsely attributed to material influence. ...
This article aims to enrich the literature on EU sanctions in two ways. First, it argues that the absence of material sanctions does not imply a non-response. When faced with human rights violations, policymakers enjoy a third option besides exerting material pressure or refraining from intervening. They may instead employ what constructivist scholars call social sanctions. This option consists of verbally calling out the violators, either publicly, through a naming-and-shaming strategy , or diplomatically via political dialogue and demarches. Social sanctions can be a credible alternative or complement to material sanctions. Second, we argue for the importance of disaggregating the EU as a sender of sanctions. A non-response by executive institutions does not mean that the EU as a whole is standing idly by. Looking at social sanctions alongside material ones more accurately describes the choices policymakers face when designing their response to human rights violations. We demonstrate the value of our arguments by examining the EU's various responses to LGBTI rights violations in Lithuania and Uganda.
... Once elite members are threatened with a listing, or find themselves listed, they can feel compelled to sever links with more senior targets or switch sides to forestall or reverse designation. Recent scholarship highlights the power of threats, which are often believed to be more effective than imposed measures (Hovi et al., 2005;Whang et al., 2013). Finding themselves deprived of the backing of erstwhile supporters and facing increased unpopularity, leaders may align policy with sender preferences, which, in our cases, entail organising free and fair elections or stepping down, as this option is preferable to being unseated by force. ...
... Firstly, several designees reported being unaware of their listings, which implies that, in most cases, senders did not make use of threats prior to the actual designations. This seems counterintuitive, as threats of sanctions have often proved more successful than sanctions imposition itself (Hovi et al., 2005;Whang et al., 2013). The Council of the EU is legally bound to "communicate its decision, including the grounds for listing, to the person or entity concerned, either directly… or through the publication of a notice" (Council Decision 2010/801/CFSP of 22 December 2010, 2010). ...
Since the 1990s, sanctions senders like the European Union, the United States, and the United Nations have been imposing visa bans and asset freezes on individuals as a key element of their sanctions packages. Notwithstanding the growing centrality that individual sanctions have acquired in international sanctions practice, little is known about the impact of sanctions listings on designees. Some researchers have scrutinised targeting choices, while others have explored the effects of sanctions on designees. However, no study has yet examined the fit between targeting choices and impacts on designees. First, we interrogate the theory of targeted sanctions to identify the expectations that it generates. Second, we examine the effects on designees and contrast them with the targeting logic of the sender, in a bid to ascertain their fit. Our analysis of the cases of Côte d’Ivoire (2010–2011) and Zimbabwe (2002–2017) benefits from original interview material.
... 13 Resolution 757 was adopted on May 30, 1992 Contrary to that, sanctions are imposed by countries, i.e. by the decision of the national political elite. 14 The United States is a country that has imposed most of the national sanctions worldwide (Early, Preble 2020; Eineman 2020). A typical example of sanctions as a national legal instrument are the (previously mentioned) US sanctions against Cuba, introduced in 1960. ...
The paper proposes several key questions that should be unavoidable in the research on history of economic sanctions. Four key questions are identified. The first one is what the aim of the sanctions is; what are they supposed to achieve? The second question relates to the mechanisms of sanctions. The third question is, are sanctions effective, i.e. do they produce economic impact and what is its magnitude? The fourth question is, are sanctions efficient, i.e. has the aim been achieved? All these questions are further developed into several more specific questions. Crucial methodological obstacles to answering all these questions are identified and guidelines for overcoming them are provided. The answers to the proposed key questions should be only the starting point in research on history of economic sanctions. Some preliminary answers to these questions were given for the case of February 2022 sanctions against Russia, imposed after it invaded Ukraine.
... This reading would explain not only the indecisiveness of Brussels institutions to bring Article 7 procedures to a conclusion but also the consecutive addition of two "antechamber" stages-the "alert" mechanism and the "Rule of Law Framework"-whose effect is that of deferring the materialization of a suspension under Article 7.2. It would also account for the very absence of concrete sanctions measures specified in the mechanism, as a consequence of which governments at fault are unaware of what penalty could be waiting for them at the end of Article 7. Interestingly, this approach would be in line with sanctions scholarship, which claims that sanctions threats are more effective in promoting compliance than sanctions imposition (Hovi et al. 2005;Morgan et al. 2021). If this reading was correct and if Article 7 had been put in place in order to never be activated, member states and EU institutions would have seen its worth in its sheer deterrent effect. ...
... Researchers have studied the operation of economic sanctions, their effectiveness, humanitarian implications, and the relationship between law and economic sanctions. Sanctions have severe health effects, adverse impacts on trade, and negative externalities by diminishing targeted state human rights and civil liberties, as well as reducing democratic freedoms in the target country (Hovi& Sprinz, 2005;Marinov, 2005: Pape, 1997: Hufbauer et al., 2008Moret, 2015: Alexander, 2009:Allen & Lektzian, 2013Gibbons & Garfield, 1999: Forrer & Zhu, 2009and, Peksen & Drury, 2010. ...
Oil curse ams economic sanctions in russia
... Initial scholarly work on sanctions produced inconclusive evidence on the question of whether sanctions work (e.g., Pape, 1997). Later studies evolved this question to when sanctions do work (e.g., Blanchard and Ripsman, 1999;Hovi et al., 2005), and later, when states and international organizations initiate sanctions (e.g., Drury, 2001;Hafner--Burton and Montgomery, 2008). In relation, other studies analyzed how long these sanctions last (e.g., McGillivray and Stam, 2004;Attia et al., 2020). ...
Geopolitical crises, and economic sanctions, in particular, have created considerable disturbance in natural resource markets. This study focuses on a significant consequence of this disturbance, namely how sanctions may derail targeted states from their low-carbon pathways. Increasing capital costs and difficulties in accessing technology force sanctioned states to move away from capital-and technology-intensive greener alternatives to employ more carbon-intensive (predominantly coal) generation modes in their primary energy supply. We also show that the recovery process from sanctions further increases coal use in these targeted states. Our econometric results from a global cross-sectional time-series dataset support our expectations. Our findings call for a deeper understanding of the challenges in achieving sustainable recovery in the aftermath of geopolitical crises. These results call for assessing carbon-footprint implications of specific foreign policy actions before these actions are carried out.
... Thus, in some cases, achieving the objectives of sanctions may come at a high cost to the sender. Hovi et al. (2005) presented an economic model showing that the more costly a sanction for the sender is, the more credible the perceived effects of the sanctions will be to the target state, resulting in a greater chance of altered behaviour from the target. Drezner (1999) suggested that both the states that impose economic sanctions, and their targets, incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion. ...
This paper addresses the relevant and ongoing debate surrounding
the effectiveness of economic sanctions. In light of recent sanctions
imposed by Canada, the United States, Europe, and other Western
states in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the topic has
garnered renewed attention. To assess the effectiveness of these
sanctions thus far, it is important to revisit key contributions in
the existing literature. We begin by defining economic sanctions
and describing their most common forms. Next, we explore the
question of whether sanctions are effective, by examining
different conceptions of the term “effectiveness.” Then, we
address the skeptics to understand why many scholars have
argued that sanctions tend to be ineffective or have adverse
consequences. Finally, we examine the key question of the
effectiveness of economic sanctions thus far in the context of
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, utilizing a five-dimensional
framework devised by Lindsay (1986. Trade sanctions as policy
instruments: A Re-examination. International Studies Quarterly, 30
(2), 153–173). We find evidence that the sanction regime on
Russia has been mostly effective thus far in dimensions of
deterrence, international symbolism, and domestic symbolism,
partially effective in terms of compliance, and mostly ineffective
in terms of subversion. We conclude by arguing that future
research should take a broader, more interdisciplinary approach
when assessing sanction effectiveness.
... This approach to sanctions research is significantly broader than most others. Indeed, although some authors have also highlighted non-coercive purposes of sanctions (Doxey 1972;Barber 1979;Schwebach 2000;Giumelli 2011), most scholarly analyses of sanctions remain focused on their ability to achieve compliance (Galtung 1967;Wallensteen 1968, p. 249), yield concessions (Drezner 2003: 643;Hovi et al. 2005) or produce a change in the target's behaviour (Hufbauer et al. 2007;Morgan et al. 2014;von Soest and Wahman 2015). ...
The United Nations (UN) has had the power to impose sanctions in response to threats tointernational peace and security since its inception in 1945. However, this policy instrumentwas used only rarely before the end of the Cold War. Blocked by superpower rivalry betweenthe United States and the Soviet Union, the UN did not become a major sender of sanctionsuntil the 1990s, when ‘a new consensus’ within the UN Security Council (UNSC) prompteda dramatic increase in the number of new UN sanctions regimes (Doxey 2009, p. 540). Thechange was so spectacular that Cortright and Lopez (2000) dubbed the period ‘the sanctionsdecade’. A ‘more interventionist’ approach of the UNSC regarding the use of sanctions(Weschler 2010, p. 32) was also observed with respect to UN mediation and UN peacekeepingoperations, signalling a renewed focus of the UN on its original function as a collective securityorganization. Although the establishment of new UN sanctions regimes has recently declined,the cumulative application of UN sanctions has not diminished. On the contrary, the last 15years have witnessed a steady increase in the number of ongoing sanctions regimes, with anall-time peak of 16 simultaneous UN sanctions regimes in place in 2015 and 2016. There are15 active UN sanctions regimes at the start of 2021.
... The spiralling escalation of the Ukraine crisis since 2014 has moved economic sanctions to the fore of the political agenda in countries that condemn the Russian military aggression against Ukraine as violation of international law and a fundamental breach of the Ukrainians' right to self-determination (Sjursen & Rosén, 2017). While economic sanctions are a long-established trade policy instrument with clearly defined goals as to politically isolate the sanctioned country and place hardship on its socio-economic development (Carbaugh & Gosh, 2019;Hovi et al., 2005), evidence-based assessments of their effects remain a challenge (Afesorgbor, 2019;Felbermayr et al., 2021;Hufbauer & Jung, 2020). This is due to the unique historical and geopolitical context of the underlying conflict, its dynamic development and the specific nature of how sanctions are implemented and anticipated. ...
This article studies the development of scientific co-publications between EU countries and Russia since the start of the Ukraine crisis in 2014. We investigate if economic sanctions and counter-sanctions imposed during the crisis affected EU-Russia knowledge flows even before all science collaborations between the EU countries and Russia were eventually suspended as part of the EU sanctions in 2022. Our econometric analysis uses a gravity model framework and a comprehensive dataset covering more than 540 million scientific publications and 8.6 million international co-publications for 35 countries (EU, BRICS, Belarus and Ukraine) during 1995-2018. Findings indicate that the imposition of EU sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions from 2014 onwards had a significantly negative effect on EU-Russia co-publication intensities. As a lower bound estimate, we find that sanctions reduced the EU-Russia scientific co-publication intensity by 15% at the aggregate level. Effects are higher in specific scientific fields. We uncover transmission channels of this effect, for example , related to dual-use technologies and growing resentments , and assess the robustness of our estimates. Time-dynamic regressions show that the sanctions effect on scientific collaboration increases over time. This underlines the susceptibility of global knowledge flows to geopolitical conflicts.
... Recent work in international relations and human rights studies by political scientists and sociologists challenges traditional state-centered approaches to repression and highlights the significance of transnational factors. This work largely uses what I call a punitive model to demonstrate how external interventions put pressure on recalcitrant governments to correct their behavior and decrease the level of violent coercion through sanctions or naming and shaming (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999;Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005;Hathaway 2007;Wong 2012;Hafner-Burton 2013). This approach suggests that a given transnational institution's effects hinge on whether the targeted governments obey external demands or reject them (Finnemore 1996;Sikkink 2011;Goodman and Jinks 2013). ...
Existing research has focused on the extent to which transnational interventions compel recalcitrant governments to reduce levels of domestic repression, but few have considered how such interventions might also provoke new forms of repression. Using a longitudinal study of repression against AIDS activism in China between 1989 and 2013, the author proposes that transnational institutions' provision of material resources and reshaping of organizational rules can transform a domestic repressive apparatus in specific policy areas. The intervention of transnational AIDS institutions not only constrained traditional violent coercion but also generated new forms of "diplomatic repression" through (1) changing repressive motives by moving AIDS from the margin to the center of mainstream politics and (2) supplying resources, networks, and models of action that enabled government organizations to reformulate health social organizations as new repressive actors with innovative repertoires of strategies inside and outside China's territory.
... Disse hendelsene kan imidlertid ha andre karakteristikker enn hendelsene hvor mottakerstaten gir etter for trusler eller lovnader. For eksempel finner sanksjonslitteraturen at sanksjoner har høyere suksessrate dersom trusler om, og ikke kun innførte, sanksjoner inkluderes (Drezner 2003a;Hovi, Huseby og Sprinz 2005). 22 ...
The purpose of this report is to shed light on how China may use economic instruments to pursue
strategic, foreign policy goals (economic statecraft) and to discuss the implications for Norwegian
security. We seek to answer this by starting the construction of a data set, based on open sources,
which provides information on China's use of economic instruments, and analyze key
characteristics and patterns that emerge from cases in the data set. Combined with information
about China's economy and interaction with Norway, the dataset provides a good foundation for
discussing how China can use economic statecraft against Norway.
In the period 2000–2021, China appears to have used economic statecraft in several different
ways. Overall, we distinguish between potential attempts at exercising power and accumulating
power. The latter enables economic – or other types of – use of force in the future. We find that
China predominantly seems to have exercised power – mainly pressure – by implementing
various forms of import restrictions and reductions in tourism. We assess that China has also tried
to accumulate power through economic statecraft by strengthening Chinese military capabilities
(e.g. through technology transfers) and by shaping vested interests and perceptions in other
countries. However, there are several types of cases we are unable to detect through open source
search. This could imply that actions with the greatest potential to constitute a threat to Norway’s,
and other countries’, security – such as facilitating future sabotage of infrastructure – are difficult
to detect, understand and assess based on empirical data.
What are the implications for Norway? Although China is one of Norway's most important trading
partners, the Norwegian economy is less dependent on economic interaction with China than
several other advanced economies. This means that China may exercise power against Norway
by implementing import restrictions and similar measures, but that those actions may not pose a
threat to Norwegian security. However, some investments that grant Chinese actors control over
critical functions and infrastructure in Norway may constitute a security threat. Some important
functions in Norway may also depend on Chinese resources and expertise. Withdrawal of these
may threaten Norwegian security. If China continues to grow and increase its importance in global
value chains, this challenge may be aggravated. Furthermore, it is equally important to
understand how China can exploit economic activity in Norway to accumulate power. This can
take place as attempts at shaping vested interests and perceptions of Norwegian businesses,
politicians, elites and the population, conducting intelligence activities on Norwegian territory,
facilitating future sabotage, or strengthening China's military capabilities through access to
technology, knowledge and resources. We assess that Norwegian businesses and society should
be prepared for such attempts by China to accumulate power, and that these actions, in principle,
could pose a threat to Norwegian security.
Going forward, it will be important to strengthen institutional and legal mechanisms to identify and
protect against potentially security threatening use of economic statecraft. It will also be important
to strengthen Norway’s ability to coordinate and build knowledge across public authorities,
businesses, society, and between Norway and like-minded countries, for example through
EEA/EU and NATO.
... Disse hendelsene kan imidlertid ha andre karakteristikker enn hendelsene hvor mottakerstaten gir etter for trusler eller lovnader. For eksempel finner sanksjonslitteraturen at sanksjoner har høyere suksessrate dersom trusler om, og ikke kun innførte, sanksjoner inkluderes (Drezner 2003a;Hovi, Huseby og Sprinz 2005). 31 ...
The purpose of this report is to shed light on how Russia may use economic instruments to pursue
strategic, foreign policy goals (economic statecraft) and to discuss the implications for Norwegian
security. We seek to answer this by starting the construction of a data set, based on open sources,
which provides information on Russia's use of economic instruments, and analyze key
characteristics and patterns that emerge from cases in the data set. Combined with information
about Russia's economy and interaction with Norway, the dataset provides a good foundation for
discussing how Russia can use economic statecraft against Norway. We emphasize that this
study mainly was conducted before Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.
In the period 2000–2021, Russia appears to have used economic statecraft in several different
ways. Overall, we distinguish between potential attempts at exercising power and accumulating
power. The latter enables economic – or other types of – use of force in the future. Russia has
potentially exercised power by implementing various forms of import restrictions and using its
control over regional gas networks to put pressure on other countries. We assess that Russia has
also tried to accumulate power through economic statecraft by shaping vested interests and
perceptions in other countries, strengthening Russian military capabilities (e.g. by acquiring
foreign technology), conducting intelligence activities (through economic activity), and strengthen
Russia’s position as a supplier of oil and gas to European and Central Asian countries. However,
there are several types of cases we are unable to detect through open source search. This could
imply that actions with the greatest potential to constitute a threat to Norway’s, and other
countries’, security – such as facilitating future sabotage of infrastructure – are difficult to detect,
understand and assess based on empirical data.
What are the implications for Norway? The Norwegian economy’s dependence on Russia is
limited. We therefore consider that Russia's opportunities to exercise power against Norway
through economic statecraft also are limited. Small reductions in trade, investments or the like,
would usually not pose a threat to Norway’s security. However, some investments, which grant
control over critical functions in Norway or access to military and dual-use technology, may
constitute a security threat. It is also important to understand how Russia can utilize economic
activity in Norway to accumulate power. This can take place as attempts at shaping vested
interests and perceptions of Norwegian businesses, politicians, elites and the population,
conducting intelligence activities on Norwegian territory, facilitating future sabotage, or
strengthening Russia's military capabilities through access to technology, knowledge and
resources. We assess that Norwegian businesses and society should be prepared for such
attempts by Russia to accumulate power, and that these actions, in principle, could pose a threat
to Norwegian security.
Going forward, it will be important to strengthen institutional and legal mechanisms to identify and
protect against potentially security threatening use of economic statecraft. It will also be important
to strengthen Norway’s ability to coordinate and build knowledge across public authorities,
businesses, society, and between Norway and like-minded countries, for example through
EEA/EU and NATO.
... 17 Biersteker et al. 2018. 18 Wallensteen 1968Drezner 2003;Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005;Hufbauer et al. 2005;Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014. Global Governance 28 (2022) 203-227 tions,19 leading Thomas Biersteker et al. to differentiate between three separate, but often interrelated, purposes of sanctions: 1) coerce a change in target behavior; 2) constrain the target from engaging in proscribed activity; and 3) signal a violation of an international norm.20 Sanctions can thus be valuable to mediators not only by enhancing their coercive power, but also for achieving other related, noncoercive purposes. ...
While sanctions and mediation are often used to address the same conflict situations, they are usually employed without significant coordination. Focusing on a rare case of a mediator successfully wielding the threat of sanctions, this article explores the utility of sanctions for mediation in the Yemeni political transition during the mandate of UN special adviser Jamal Benomar. Although the transition ultimately derailed, the analysis shows that the threat of sanctions can be used in different phases of the mediation process to provide mediators with the leverage needed to convince conflict parties to engage in negotiations, break stalemates during talks, nudge parties toward an agreement, or persuade potential spoilers to refrain from undermining the implementation of the negotiated agreement. Their success, however, not only depends on the degree of convergence between the application of the two instruments, but also on the type of target, regional support, and institutional backing.
... 2) ошибочные суждения страны-мишени должны быть скорректированы только после введения санкций (Hovi et al., 2005). ...
... This paper investigates the impact that geo-political conflicts, particularly economic sanctions, have on knowledge flows between conflict parties. While the use of sanctions as foreign policy tools has grown over time, our scientific understanding of their intended and unintended socio-economic effects is still in the making (e.g., Hovi et al., 2005, Hufbauer & Jung, 2020Felbermayr et al., 2020Felbermayr et al., , 2021. Different from previous work, which has predominately studied implications for bilateral trade, FDI and labor mobility following a sanctions period, our focus is set on the development of international knowledge exchange measured through scientific co-publications. ...
We address the question how sensitive international knowledge flows respond to geo-political conflicts taking the politico-economic tensions between EU-Russia since the Ukraine crisis 2014 as case study. We base our econometric analysis on comprehensive data covering more than 500 million scientific publications and 8 million international co-publications between 1995 and 2018. Our findings indicate that the imposition of EU sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions from 2014 onwards has significant negative effects on bilateral international scientific co-publication rates between EU countries and Russia. Depending on the chosen control group and sectors considered, effect size ranges from 15% to 70%. Effects are also observed to grow over time.
... It can also be debated whether the very discussion of a boycott can send an equally clear signal as a boycott itself (Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz, 2005). The international discussion about labour rights and the FIFA World Cup in Qatar, led by the well-reputed newspaper The Guardian, clearly impacts the reputations of both Qatar and FIFA, and could create change. ...
Report to the Norwegian Football Federation - 2021
... In such cases, political motivation is usually the trigger. Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz (2005) identify three different possible outcomes involving sanctions in situations where both actors behave rationally. The first entails the failure of the sanctions because the target does not deem the action credible enough. ...
... In a separating (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium, therefore, sanctions get implemented when the foreign power is willing to go through with the threat; and in response to this, the target country ex post adjusts its policy and the sanctions, having proved effective, are lifted. 38 The second reason why sanctions may be imposed in equilibrium, explored by Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz (2005), is that sanction policies are "lumpy" and, unlike in our model, cannot be fine-tuned perfectly. They argue that rather than not imposing any sanction or imposing a tough one that works, the foreign power can impose lenient sanctions that are less costly to both parties, but will not induce the target country to adjust its policy. ...
In an interconnected world, economic and political interests inevitably reach beyond national borders. Since policy choices generate external economic and political costs, foreign state and non-state actors have an interest in influencing policy actions in other sovereign countries to their advantage. Foreign influence is a strategic choice aimed at internalizing these externalities and takes three principal forms: (i) voluntary agreements, (ii) policy interventions based on rewarding or sanctioning the target country to obtain a specific change in policy, and (iii) institution interventions aimed at influencing the political institutions in the target country. We propose a unifying theoretical framework to study when foreign influence is chosen and in which form, and use it to organize and evaluate the new political economics literature on foreign influence along with work in cognate disciplines (JEL D72, D74, F51, F53, P26, P33).
... It should be taken into consideration that even though the "eff ective sanctions" -which we defi ne here -may coincide with another definition of "successful sanctions, " whereas sometimes this is far from the case. For example, Hovi et al. (2005) off er a formulation where economic sanctions can be eff ective when a sanctioned party reaches the condition of "noncompliance impossible". While this consideration may at fi rst seem to capture the point, the moment we try to operationalize this concept, we get into a very abstract environment. ...
This paper offers a broader reflection on the current and historical discourse related to the analysis of the effectiveness of economic sanctions. Is it possible to reliably measure the effectiveness of economic sanctions ? In addition to summarizing the literature in this area, the article points out numerous problems in the interpretation and use of terminology. Confusion about different approaches in this discipline creates an environment in which it is difficult to orient oneself or segregate objective information. This confusion affects the behaviour of national governments. National governments frequently resort to economic sanctions, even though the measurement of their effectiveness is unclear. The article aims to introduce partial and valid arguments related to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the imposed sanctions. Moreover, its goal is to present the preferred approach how to measure the effectiveness. The paper concludes that universally valid metrics for measuring effectiveness are hardly achievable due to the inability to compare events across modern history, without taking into account the context. At the same time, there is neither a terminological nor a semantic consensus on the basic concepts, which makes the situation more complicated. One of the main issues is the inconsistent terminology, since many authors do not distinguish between effectiveness and efficiency. Thus, the author tends to interpret effectiveness as an ability to achieve the goals initially pre-set. Although this definition offers a rather loose view which does not allow too much comparison and generalization, it is, in the author’s view, the least “blurred” one. At the same time, the author encourages an individual approach to particular case reports and warns against attempting to econometrically and statistically capture something that is practically incommensurable or not measurable at all. Therefore, the author recommends, as a result of this literature overview, to stick to the perception of effectiveness (or its negation) as an ability (or a disability) to achieve predetermined goals . The value-added of this article is to contribute to the discussion about economic sanctions nowadays. It comes with conclusions about diverging approaches based on the unique, comprehensive literature review of respected authors. Also, the short list of case studies of what the author considers an example of effective and non-effective sanctions will be included.
We analyze a range of future scenarios for Russia related to the Ukraine War. Although regime change is a publicly-stated objective for several leaders of NATO countries, we find very little prospect for it. The Russian economy has largely evaded the effects of the sanctions. Despite enormous casualties and incompetence in the management of the war, both Putin and the war remain popular with the Russian public. Contrary to most analysis to date, the Wagner Group mutiny of June 2023 is not an indication of Putin’s weakness, but his strength. The coercive mechanisms of the Russian state remain intact. Indeed, they have grown stronger. Finally, there is little to no prospect for the emergence of a significant antiwar movement. Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Putin is likely to remain in power. Western leaders should begin to grapple with this unpleasant reality and its policy implications.
This study analyzes sanctions in terms of their impact on the decision-making processes of leaders of states with authoritarian political regimes. Under current geopolitical conditions, three states were selected as the most unique in their structure, political system, and history of sanctions: Russia, Iran, and North Korea, which remain secluded from the international community. The study examines how violations of international norms, such as the invasion of a neighboring state, the development of nuclear weapons and their movement, and total violation of human rights leading to international sanctions have strategic significance in the further development of the state. The situation in the state and the fact whether authoritarian regimes can survive external pressure in the future constitute a vital influence on the final decision, particularly on the most pressing political issues. The study is mainly focused on the study of sanctions in the 21st century by Western powers, the United States, and the European Union, as well as international sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council. The analysis focuses on strategic responses and adaptation, emphasizing on political and diplomatic consequences.
This research delves deeply into the intricate dynamics of economic sanctions levied by Western nations against Russia, investigating their wide-ranging implications. Employing a blend of quantitative analysis and hypothesis testing, the study unravels a notable insight: these sanctions carry a more substantial impact on the economies of the sanctioning nations themselves than on Russia. The study introduces the "Mary-Jeanne" theory, developed by Professors Jeanne Kaspard Kamel and Richard Hanna Beainy from Holy Spirit University. This theory asserts that the inefficacy of the sanctions on Russia, and their subsequent repercussions on Europe, emanate from the targeting of essential raw materials, particularly oil and gas. The research recommends an alternative approach to sanctions, advocating for the utilization of Russian gas at a moderated price cap, rather than a complete embargo on the commodity as currently enforced. This strategic shift would seek to address the present situation, wherein Russia encounters relatively minor losses due to the low raw material value, while Western industrialized nations grapple with substantial declines in their economies due to the high finished goods' value.
The increasing international political tensions and the growing use of economic sanctions in world markets have made it more important to compare the prospects for the development of major players in the global economy. The aim of this study is to evaluate the potential of the BRICS and G7 countries based on the attractiveness of their industries for other countries, including those from the Global South and East, which are still undecided about joining either group. To achieve this goal, the following objectives were set and achieved: to obtain statistically significant data on the capabilities of associations, taking into account the political and economic orientation of supranational organizations; to form and compare the financial and economic profiles of industry participants from BRICS, G7, and non-aligned countries; to assess the attractiveness and development potential of players in the BRICS and G7 markets. The methodology used has been based on regression analysis, comparative analysis, multidimensional analysis, and nonparametric testing of corporate financial statements from public companies in 2019 and 2020. The analysis of the images of the industry residents of BRICS, G7, and “neutral” countries has allowed to identify a trend toward increased polarization and growing differences between the BRICS and G7 members. The criteria for this trend are indicators of business margins, sales volumes, capital, and the volume of non-current assets. According to three out of four criteria, the overall image of an industry resident from BRICS is more attractive than that of from G7 due to multiple exceedances of the values of these criteria indicators. This serves as a clear example of the potential for undecided countries from the Global South and East to join this association and strengthens BRICS’ authority and development.
This chapter explores the contemporary weaponisation of geoeconomic tools, with a focus on the increased utilisation of sanctions in the post-Cold War era and its implications for international security. Analysing the popularity of sanctions in preserving the liberal world order, the chapter contends that despite their widespread use, there exists significant debate about their effectiveness. A systematic case study is employed to propose a ‘triangular credo of utility and efficacy’, taking into account the systemic complexity of international politics, the characteristics of target states, and the commitments of sanctions senders. Emphasising the uniqueness of each sanctions case, the chapter concludes that no universal criteria can strictly determine sanctions’ efficacy in the current state of permacrisis, given systemic complexity, and the interplay among diverse domestic variables that include the motives and intents of states participating in sanctions contests.
This study explores the role of business associations in adaptation of Russian companies to international sanctions. To address this query, we have used survey data from leaders of Russian manufacturing companies in 2018 and 2022, which are representative in terms of size and sectors. Membership in a business association has a dual nature: on the one hand, associations can act as a tool for adapting to sanction shocks (direct effect); on the other hand, because of the self-selection effect, they tend to comprise more proactive and resilient companies, which are less fearful of external shocks and, as a result, may be less inclined to take active measures (indirect effect). We distinguish these effects from our analysis by constructing models using a mediator. The findings indicate that in 2018, members of business associations perceived the consequences of sanctions as less severe and were less likely to take any action, possibly because sufficient time had passed for adaptation to them since 2014. Conversely, in 2022, membership in associations did not reduce leaders’ perceptions of the seriousness of sanctions. However, we have found a direct effect of associations, revealing in a quicker response of their members to sanctions, including seeking new suppliers and reducing costs.
We build on Baqaee and Farhi (2019, 2021) and derive a theoretically-grounded criterion that allows targeting bans on exports to a sanctioned country at the level of ∼5000 6-digit HS products. The criterion implies that the costs to the sanctioned country are highly convex in the market share of the sanctioning parties. Hence, there are large benefits from coordinating export bans among a broad coalition of countries. Applying our results to Russia reveals that sanctions imposed by the EU and the US in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are not systematically related to our arguments once we condition on Russia’s total imports of a product from participating countries. We discuss drivers of these differences, and then provide a quantitative evaluation of the export bans to show that (i) they are very effective with the welfare loss typically ∼100 times larger for Russia than for the sanctioners; (ii) improved coordination of the sanctions and targeting sanctions based on our criterion allows to increase the costs to Russia by about 80% with little to no extra cost to the sanctioners; and (iii) there is scope for increasing the cost to Russia further by expanding the set of sanctioned products.
The growth in economic sanctions has been matched by a surge in scholarly research. This article reviews the current state of scholarship on economic sanctions to see where the literature has advanced since Baldwin's Economic Statecraft—and where there is need for further research. Over the past few decades, sanctions scholarship has made its greatest strides in investigating the effects and effectiveness of economic coercion attempts. This vein of research suggests that economic coercion is more effective than previously believed—but at the same time, the policy externalities of sanctions are far greater than previously understood. There remain many fruitful areas of research. Scholars need to consider how to better measure the deterrent effects of economic sanctions over time. Claims that there are different national styles of economic statecraft need to be tested to determine whether these styles are enduring or ephemeral. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, international relations scholars need to consider the systemic implications of increased sanctioning behavior. Scholars need to assess when and how sanctions affect the broader global political economy.
Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Political Science, Volume 27 is June 2024. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
This paper seeks to expand the concept of a contractual natural resource curse and suggests another channel that may not be addressed as one of the resource curse channels in petrostate countries since there remains little understanding of the Resource Curse Hypothesis (RCH), by which economic sanctions bring a new manifestation and shape the prospect of international economic relations. A sample of 21 petrostate economies is investigated over 1995–2018. The empirical results show a symptom of the oil curse from a new transmission channel under the international relations arena. This result supports our argument that the interactive relationship between sanctions and oil dependence affects sanctioned countries’ economic growth. Transmission channels determine whether natural resources are either a curse or a blessing. Our study found evidence supporting the concept of the oil resource curse taking place through economic sanctions. Hence, the presence of such a negative link casts new light on the debate concerning the influence of natural resource/oil resource curse on the international relations–growth nexus. Policy research needs to be conducted in understanding and mitigating the resource curse.
This article contributes to the understanding of why states resort to targeted, or smart, sanctions to meet the threat of cyber intrusions and whether this type of response is a forced measure or an effective tool to halt, prevent and punish attacking states. The tools of analysis used in the article are legal positivism and political theories, including Mancur Olson's theory of groups and Francesco Giumelli's analytical framework for assessment of sanctions. The authors address the effectiveness of sanctions as a reaction to cyber-enabled activities through the lens of regulation introduced in the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom, which are the most developed counter-cyber sanction regimes, analysing publicly known cases of cyber-related sanctions.
This article analyses economic sanctions starting from the perspective of a target that has to allocate its income between spending on resources to pursue a contentious policy and consumption goods. By studying the target’s consumption problem, it demonstrates how sanctions could backfire causing the target to shift its spending to resources to pursue the contentious policy, thereby increasing the severity of the policy. Whether this will come to pass depends on the elasticities of substitution, which are determined by the target’s utility function. Therefore, even sanctions that seem like they could do no harm, such as embargoes on luxury goods consumed by only the target’s dictator, could aggravate the level of the policy given the right utility function. Considering the target’s consumption problem also illustrates how sanctions could (depending on the form of the target’s utility function) reduce the resources it could allocate to pursuing the contentious policy, thereby moderating it. If the benefits of this constraint outweigh the costs of sanctions to the sender, it could be in the sender’s best interest to impose sanctions. In these cases articulating a demand and waiting for the target to consider it would simply provide the target with additional time to continue the contentious policy, so the sender would impose constraining sanctions without warning. Constraining sanctions, therefore, provide an explanation for sanctions imposed without a threat stage. Constraining sanctions can occur even with complete and perfect information and may persist indefinitely, explaining the existence of long-term costly sanctions as well as sanctions that occur in cases of full information.
This paper mainly presents a complete analysis of the impact of such sanctions on the innovation performance of target countries by exploiting the difference‐in‐differences method for panel data of 91 countries in the period 1988–2016. The empirical results confirm a significantly negative impact of overall international sanctions on innovation in the target countries; moreover, except for noneconomic sanctions, other types of sanctions have a negative impact on the level of innovation in the target countries to varying degrees. These findings are also supported by two semiparametric matchings: artificially matching according to the two factors of geographical location and land area respectively and the propensity score matching, one nonparametric matching: entropy balancing, as well as the system generalized method of moments estimates that account for any bias due to lagged dependent variables. This paper also shows that the significantly negative effect of international sanctions is manifested in the countries with high levels of trade openness, globalization, and democracy, but not in the countries with low levels of trade openness, globalization, and democracy. Our empirical findings merit particular attention from policy‐makers in target countries.
Sanctions and mediation are often applied simultaneously by the UN , but there has been little systematic exploration of their interrelationships. Drawing on research from the Sanctions and Mediation Project ( SMP ), both complications and complementarities can be identified. Sanctions can complicate mediation by fostering exclusion, emboldening nonsanctioned parties, closing mediation space, undercutting mediator impartiality, and forcing premature agreements. At the same time, sanctions can complement mediation by deterring spoilers, breaking stalemates, incentivizing cooperation, modifying cost-benefit calculations, ensuring broad participation in talks, and facilitating the onset of talks. The conditions under which complementarity can be enhanced include UN Security Council unity, focus and coherence of mandates, and regional cooperation. This article concludes with policy recommendations for different institutional actors and some suggestions for future research.
The UN frequently employs sanctions on the same conflicts where it attempts medi�ation. While both efforts carry a UN stamp, they follow different political logics that
are not always coherent with each other: sanctions are enacted by the UN Security
Council, while mediation is led by a special representative/envoy of the UN Secretary�General, often on the basis of a Security Council mandate. This article explores two UN interventions in Libya that combined mediation with mandatory sanctions: the
conflict leading to the overthrow of the Muammar Qaddafi regime (2011) and the civil
war that ensued when the country was split between the first elected parliament and
its successor (2014–2015). The Libyan case illustrates that the coherence of mediation
and sanctions ultimately depends on the UN Security Council unity of purpose.
This paper investigates the influences of global economic sanctions on corruption by using the structural gravity model for 148 sanctioned countries (108 developing countries and 40 developed countries) during the 1995-2018 period. We consider various forms of sanction, including arms, military, trade, finance, travel, and others. The results reveal that the imposition of sanctions, especially arm, financial, travel, and other sanctions have a significantly negative effect on the prevalence of corruption of target countries. The effects are also largely heterogeneous across sanctioned countries in terms of their economic development. Furthermore, the properties of the institutional quality of the sanctioned state critically affect the relationship between global sanctions and national corruption. Particularly, the well-developed institutional quality helps target countries address the consequences of global sanctions on national corruption. The empirical findings of this study are expected to provide vital insightful lessons for economists and policymakers in the target countries in combating the corruption pervasiveness.
Research involving the utility of economic sanctions introduces misrepresentations and if categorized would include: ignoring comparisons of economic sanctions with coercive alternatives, analyzing economic sanctions as a substitute to hard force exclusively, and redefining the uses of economic sanctions for political purposes. We present a definition of economic sanctions and show the sequence of power as it may be imposed across a spectrum at various intensities relative to characteristics. We analyze how characteristics between power groups are diffuse and that conclusions involving utility are insignificant without analyzing variance within power strata. We’ve categorized characteristics into two groups that are inversely positioned and regressed on a power interval: characteristics of prosperity (target size, intervention, predictability, attractiveness, efficiency, and communication) and characteristics of security (clarity, rate, return, control, risk, costs, and violence). We illustrate that as prosperity increase or decrease the security characteristics decrease or increase respectively as inverse substitutes.
In 2014, the United States, the European Union (EU) countries and some other states have imposed economic sanctions against Russia. The overcoming of sanctions requires an understanding of their effectiveness. Thus, we aimed to identify factors of the effectiveness of economic sanctions by reviewing the literature that considers sanctions as a tool for transforming the current national policies. The applied methodology of the systematic literature review (SLR) includes the following stages: 1) determining a basic sample of publications based on a keyword search in Web of Science, Scopus, Russian Science Citation Index, SSRN, EBSCO, Ideas/RePec, Google Scholar, Cambridge University Press, Routledge, De Gruyter JSTOR, Springer, Taylor & Francis; 2) identifying a representative sample based on the authors’ criteria (type of publication, language, character, content and context); 3) synthesising the representative sample; 4) reporting the research results. A method of comparative and graphical analysis was used to present the findings. The analysis of relevant literature allowed us to conclude that economic sanctions are more effective if 1) sanction costs for a target country are higher than for a sender, including those occurring as a result of regional inequality; 2) sanctions are designed as a short-term measure; 3) sanctions are multilateral and imposed by international institutes, including through regional trade agreements; 4) sanctions are targeted at democratic regimes. Moreover, the most preferred type of sanction — targeted (smart) sanctions — are less effective in achieving their goals than traditional comprehensive ones. Further review studies may focus on targeted economic sanctions (first and foremost in Russia) and include publications, analysing case studies of individual countries and industries.
his article reviews the literature on the "smart sanctions" approach developed in the late 1990s in response to the failure of conventional sanctions and questions the efficacy of this instrument. Smart sanctions modify the conventional sanctions tool by targeting the culpable political elites by means of arms embargoes, financial sanctions, and travel restrictions and by cushioning vulnerable groups (children, women, the infirm, and the elderly) by exempting specified commodities such as food and medical supplies from embargoes. This two-pronged sanctions approach is designed to hit the real perpetrators directly and spare potential innocent victims, thus leading to the speedier change of sanctionee behavior. Although the special design of smart sanctions may seem logically compelling and politically attractive, this article argues that the numerous operational problems involved, combined with the intricacies of the political processes of the UN Security Council, will make a smart sanctions regime difficult to establish and enforce effectively.
A realistic theory of economic sanctions should be built on the facts that sanctions are a game of issue linkage involving two or more issues, players may not know each other's preferences for the outcome of the game, and threatening sanctions may be as important as imposing sanctions as a strategy in international disputes. The threat and use of economic sanctions are modeled as a multistage game of two-sided incomplete information between a target and a coercer. The threat stage is critically important for understanding the outcome of sanctions, and current empirical studies suffer from a case selection bias. Economic sanctions are likely to be imposed when they are not likely to succeed in changing the target's behavior. Sanctions that are likely to succeed will do so at the mere threat of sanctions. Despite the unlikely success of sanctions, coercers must sometimes impose sanctions, even after the threat of sanctions has failed to change the target's behavior.
Why do policymakers consistently employ economic sanctions even though scholars consider them an ineffective tool of statecraft? Game-theoretic models of economic coercion suggest the success rate may be understated because of selection effects. When the targeted country prefers conceding to incurring the cost of sanctions, it has an incentive to acquiesce before the imposition of sanctions. The bulk of successful coercion episodes should therefore end with sanctions threatened but not imposed. This contradicts the recent literature on sanctions, which assumes that sanctions rarely, if ever, work at generating significant concessions from the targeted country and are imposed for domestic or symbolic political reasons. If the game-theoretic argument is correct, the crucial cases to study are those in which coercion is threatened but not implemented. A statistical analysis of data on sanctions in pursuit of economic or regulatory goals strongly supports the game-theoretic argument. These results suggest that the significance of economic coercion has been undervalued in the study of statecraft and international relations more generally.A previous version of this article was presented at the 4th meeting of the European Consortium on Political Research s Standing Group on International Relations, Canterbury, UK, September 2001. A Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship provided crucial support during the drafting of this article. Elizabeth DeSombre, Alex Downs, A. Cooper Drury, Charles Glaser, Michael Hiscox, Seth Jones, Nikolay Marinov, John Mearsheimer, Emerson Niou, Bob Pape, Duncan Snidal, and Han Dorussen provided valuable comments and suggestions. I am particularly grateful to Kimberly Elliott for making her data accessible to me. Michael Cohen s assistance was invaluable during the drafting process. The usual caveat applies.
How do international environmental standards come into being? One important way, as Elizabeth DeSombre shows in this book, is through the internationalization of regulations that one or more countries have undertaken domestically. Domestic environmental regulation, DeSombre argues, can create an incentive for environmentalists and industry—previously at odds with each other—to work together to shape international environmental policy. For environmentalists, international regulation offers greater protection of a resource. For industry, internationalization prevents unregulated foreign industries from operating at a competitive advantage. Domestic forces acting together often push for the threat or imposition of economic restrictions on countries resisting regulation. DeSombre examines this dynamic primarily from the perspective of United States environmental policy. Looking at major regulations on endangered species, air pollution, and fisheries conservation, she determines which ones the United States has attempted to internationalize and how successful the attempts have been. She underlines the importance of regulated industries in the creation of international environmental policy and presents evidence that power and threat play a significant role in the adoption of international regulations, despite the perception of international environmental politics as an arena of friendly interaction over mutual interests. She also discusses the origins of international cooperation, the regulatory effects of free trade, the usefulness of economic sanctions, and the interaction between domestic and international politics. Thus the book has theoretical implications for the fields of environmental politics and policy, international diplomacy, and international political economy.
A new dialogue is beginning between students of international law and international relations scholars concerning compliance with international agreements. This article advances some basic propositions to frame that dialogue. First, it proposes that the level of compliance with international agreements in general is inherently unverifiable by empirical procedures. That nations generally comply with their international agreements, on the one hand, or that they violate them whenever it is in their interest to do so, on the other, are not statements of fact or even hypotheses to be tested. Instead, they are competing heuristic assumptions. Some reasons why the background assumption of a propensity to comply is plausible and useful are given. Second, compliance problems very often do not reflect a deliberate decision to violate an international undertaking on the basis of a calculation of advantage. The article proposes a variety of other reasons why states may deviate from treaty obligations and why in many circumstances those reasons are properly accepted by others as justifying apparent departures from treaty norms. Third, the treaty regime as a whole need not and should not be held to a standard of strict compliance but to a level of overall compliance that is "acceptable" in the light of the interests and concerns the treaty is designed to safeguard. How the acceptable level is determined and adjusted is considered.
Theories predicting the success of economic sanctions are tested on the universe of sanction episodes from 1914 to 1989. The probability of success depends upon the cost to the target nation, the extent of trade linkages between target and sender, the stability of the target, the amount of time sanctions are in force, and whether financial sanctions are utilized. Data are analyzed using logistic regression. The factors affecting success depend upon the goals of the sending nations. When that goal is simply destabilization, the principal determinant of success is the initial stability of the target. For other goals, the use of financial sanctions is most effective. We also find evidence of a modest downward trend over time in the relative effectiveness of sanctions in the latter category.
Most studies of trade sanctions examine the success of sanctions at forcing the target country to change its policies. This article analyzes the success of sanctions in terms of a broader set of goals: compliance, subversion, deterrence, international symbolism, and domestic symbolism. I examine 19 sanctions cases using different evaluatory criteria for each goal. Three results emerge from the analysis. First, sanctions generally fail when the goal is compliance, subversion, or deterrence, but they have a great appeal as international and domestic symbols. Second, sanctions often reinforce the target's behavior and forfeit the initiator's future economic leverage over the target. Third, the goals of international and domestic symbolism usually undermine the goals of compliance and subversion.
It may seem preposterous to write about the effects of the economic sanctions currently in effect against Rhodesia since the process is not yet completed: we do not know how it will all end, and primary source material of a crucial nature is not yet available. But the purpose of this article is more in the direction of a general theory, using the case of Rhodesia as a source of examples and illustrations. The material on Rhodesia included here consists of some secondary sources, such as books and articles, and some primary sources, such as documents and other printed material; but the basic sources are mainly personal observation and a number of informal interviews with Rhodesian citizens (mostly businessmen) and with citizens of other African countries (mostly politicians), all dating from January 1966, about two months after UDI.
Little attention has been paid to how and when economic sanctions end, especially compared with the amount of research on their effectiveness. A game in which the ending of sanctions is part of interstate bargaining about a contested policy is analyzed. In case of audience costs, sanctions may occur because governments use strategies that commit them to their ideal policy position. Governments use as constraints domestic political groups that have an interest in the disputed policy. Alternatively, rent-seeking enables governments to obtain political gain from the opportunities for side payments provided by sanctions. Results show that commitment strategies help states improve their bargaining position and make the resolution of the conflict more difficult. Data on the duration and ending of sanctions initiated in the period between 1914 and 1990 are used to test these hypotheses. The analyses provide clear evidence that commitment strategies affect the duration of sanctions.
Since the mid 1970s relations between the USA and Libya have been antagonistic. The radical policies the regime of Muammar Qadaaffi has pursued have made Libya one of the USA's bêtes noires . The reasons for US antagonism derive from Libya's repression at home, its alleged support for terrorism and for radical movements opposed to US interests, its staunch opposition to Israel, and its anti-Western rhetoric. Libya's hostility towards the USA rests on a perception of the USA as a global power intent on maintaining its hegemony and control over the Arab and Islamic world. Libyans have been resentful of US support of Israel to the detriment of Arabs and Muslims. Libya's resolute opposition to the USA especially in the 1980s, resulted in a series of military confrontations. The USA has maintained sanctions despite the suspension of UN sanctions on Libya in 1999. The USA has retained Libya on its short list of 'rogue states' despite recognition that Libya has stopped sponsoring terrorism. The contention here is that Libya, like the other 'rogue states', provides justification for US domestic policies (eg National Missile Defense). Given the events of 11 September 2001 in the US, it is quite conceivable that Libya could become a target of the US antiterrorism campaign. The USA could at last find valid justification for the removal of the Qadaffi regime.
Robert A. Pape is Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. He is the author of Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
I greatly appreciate the comments of Robert Art, Michael Desch, Daniel Drezner, Fouad ElNaggar, Nelson Kasfir, Chaim Kaufmann, Lisa Martin, Michael Mastanduno, John Mearsheimer, Elizabeth Rogers, and Stephen Walt. I would also like to thank the Earhart Foundation for its generous support of this research.
1. As of August 31, 1994, the UN Security Council had approved partial or comprehensive actions against Iraq (1990), former Yugoslavia (1992), Libya (1992), Somalia (1992), Liberia (1992), Haiti (1994), the UNITA movement in Angola (1994), and Rwanda (1994), while in the UN's first four decades, the Security Council imposed mandatory sanctions only against Rhodesia (1966) and South Africa (1977). James C. Ngobi, "The United Nations Experience with Sanctions," in David Cortright and George A. Lopez, eds., Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), pp. 17-18.
2. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations," A/50/60, January 3, 1995, pp. 17-18; and "Sanctions: Do They Work?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1993), pp. 14-49.
3. The policy choice between economic sanctions and military coercion crosscuts the theoretical divide in international relations theory between liberal institutionalism and realism, which is about actors, not instruments. Whereas liberals see collective institutions as the critical actors in international politics, realists focus on self-seeking behavior by individual states. Both economic sanctions and military force are methods of employing power that can be used by either type of actor.
4. David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 373.
5. Landmarks of the literature include Johann Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 3 (April 1967), pp. 378-416; Margaret P. Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971); Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1975); and Donald L. Losman, International Economic Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel, and Rhodesia (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979).
6. Elizabeth S. Rogers, "Using Economic Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer 1996), p. 72. See also M.S. Daoudi and M.S. Dajani, Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 12; Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, p. 4; Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 233; William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, "The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach," American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 4 (September 1988), pp. 786-793; Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 250; David Cortright and George A. Lopez, "Research Concerns and Policy Needs in an Era of Sanctions," in Cortright and Lopez, eds., Economic Sanctions, p. 202; and Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 166.
7. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, assisted by Kimberly Ann Elliot (hereafter HSE), Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics [IIE], 1985); and HSE, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: IIE, 1990). All page references are to the second edition.
8. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot actually count 41 successes because they count U.S. sanctions against Egypt in 1963 as two successes even though the case is entered only once in the database.
9. Baldwin's Economic Statecraft, which set the agenda for the sanctions field during the 1980s, cites the HSE study no fewer than 21 times. In Coercive Cooperation, Martin calls it the "invaluable data set" (p. xi.), while Cortright and Lopez, in Economic Sanctions, the most recent general survey...
Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott have written probably the most comprehensive empirical study of economic sanctions in their volume Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy. They conclude their analysis with several policy recommendations. However, there are problems with their empirical analysis that significantly affect these recommendations. To overcome these problems, I reanalyze their data using ordered logit estimation. In addition to modeling their policy recommendations, I add three hypotheses derived from the sanction literature. The results show that most of the relationships between the variables in their recommendations are insignificant, calling their accuracy and importance into question. In two cases, the original recommendations are accurate only when conditioned by other variables. Cooperation only has a negative effect on success when international organizations are not involved, and nations trying to subvert the sanctions only succeed when the target was originally dependent on the sender for its imports. I conclude by discussing the policy implications these findings have for the future use of economic sanctions.
The article considers the history of the attempts to extradite or otherwise bring to trial the two Libyans suspected of carrying out the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie in 1988. As a result of sanctions and other diplomatic pressure, Libya did eventually agree to 'hand over' the suspects for trial in the Netherlands. The article considers whether the case has modified the law governing international cooperation in criminal matters, and specifically whether a 'third alternative' been added to the traditional aut dedere aut judicare principle - aut transferere . Under this principle, the requested state has hitherto had only two options: either to submit the case to its own competent authorities for prosecution, or to surrender the defendant to the authorities of the requesting state. Has the discretionary power of the requested state now increased and broadened by encompassing also the 'middle path': neither extradition, nor prosecution, but 'delivery' of the accused to a third state? Is the Security Council now playing a new role as an 'enforcer' of the principle of aut dedere aut judicare ? If so, this raises further questions, such as the scope ratione materiae of the modified principle.
Why do agents comply with the norms embedded in regimes and international institutions? Scholars have proposed two competing answers to this compliance puzzle, one rationalist, the other constructivist. Rationalists emphasize coercion, cost/benefit calculations, and material incentives; constructivists stress social learning, socialization, and social norms. Both schools, however, explain important aspects of compliance. To build a bridge between them, I examine the role of argumentative persuasion and social learning. This makes explicit the theory of social choice and interaction implicit in many constructivist compliance studies, and it broadens rationalist arguments about the instrumental and noninstrumental processes through which actors comply. I argue that domestic politics - in particular, institutional and historical contexts - delimit the causal role of persuasion/social learning, thus helping both rationalists and constructivists to refine the scope of their compliance claims. To assess the plausibility of these arguments, I examine why states comply with new citizenship/membership norms promoted by European regional organizations.