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Hell and Divine Reasons for Action
Abstract
Escapism, a theory of hell proposed by Andrei Buckareff and Allen Plug, explicitly relies on claims about divine reasons for action. However, they say surprisingly little about the general account of reasons for action that would justify the inferences in the argument for escapism. I provide a couple of plausible interpretations of such an account and argue that they help revive the ‘Job objection’ to escapism that Buckareff and Plug had dismissed.
... 24 Swan correctly notes that we do not believe that God is subject to the types of mistakes that may cause an agent's normative and motivating reasons to come apart. 25 Swan claims, however, that this fact about God's motivating and normative reasons does nothing to show that the Job objector is not being sensitive to the nature of practical rationality. The Job objector simply refuses to accept premise (5) of our original argument for escapism. ...
In our paper, ‘Escaping hell: divine motivation and the problem of hell’, we defended a theory of hell that we called ‘escapism’. We argued that, given God's just and loving character, it would be most rational for Him to maintain an open-door policy to those who are in hell, allowing them an unlimited number of chances to be reconciled with God and enjoy communion with Him. In this paper we reply to two recent objections to our original paper. The first is an argument from religious luck offered by Russell Jones. The second is an argument from Kyle Swan that alleges that our commitments about the nature of reasons for action still leaves escapism vulnerable to an objection we labelled the ‘Job objection’ in our original paper. In this paper we argue that escapism has the resources built into it needed to withstand the objections from Jones and Swan.
In his posthumously published essay, “Divine Evil,” David Lewis presents an argument from evil against theism that focuses on the problem of hell. In our paper, we use Lewis’s challenge to the theist to help motivate our escapist alternative to the traditional doctrine of hell that we have developed and defended elsewhere. Specifically, we argue that the problem as presented by Lewis dissipates once we shift to an issuant view of hell on which hell is not a place where retributive punishment is exacted against the unrepentant but is rather a place God has provided, being motivated by love, for those who wish to be separated from God. On an issuant view, hell issues from God’s loving character. Further, we argue that an issuant view of hell is more compatible with traditional views of God’s desires and motivational states than is a retributive view of hell. Finally we argue that, while any version of issuantism fares better than retributivism, not all versions of issuantism are equal. Focusing on Jonathan Kvanvig’s version of issuantism, we argue that the escapist version of issuantism we have defended better provides theists with the resources needed to respond to objections to theism such as Lewis’s.
The case is discussed for the doctrine of hell as posing a unique problem of evil for adherents to the Abrahamic religions who endorse traditional theism. The problem is particularly acute for those who accept retributivist formulations of the doctrine of hell according to which hell is everlasting punishment for failing to satisfy some requirement. Alternatives to retributivism are discussed, including the unique difficulties that each one faces.
We argue that it is most rational for God, given God's character and policies, to adopt an open-door policy towards those in hell – making it possible for those in hell to escape. We argue that such a policy towards the residents of hell should issue from God's character and motivational states. In particular, God's parental love ought to motivate God to extend the provision for reconciliation with Him for an infinite amount of time.
In recent years a number of sophisticated versions of soteriological universal-ism have appeared in the literature. In this essay I offer some critical reflections them. In particular, I argue that universalism offers no explanation for the fact that God puts human creatures through the earthly life, and that if there is no such reason then the earthly life and the evil it contains are both gratuitous. Finally, I argue that universalists are obliged to deny that human beings have a centrally important feature of human freedom.
A new volume of philosophical essays by Bernard Williams. The book is a successor to Problems of the Self, but whereas that volume dealt mainly with questions of personal identity, Moral Luck centres on questions of moral philosophy and the theory of rational action. That whole area has of course been strikingly reinvigorated over the last deacde, and philosophers have both broadened and deepened their concerns in a way that now makes much earlier moral and political philosophy look sterile and trivial. Moral Luck contains a number of essays that have contributed influentially to this development. Among the recurring themes are the moral and philosophical limitations of utilitarianism, the notion of integrity, relativism, and problems of moral conflict and rational choice. The work presented here is marked by a high degree of imagination and acuity, and also conveys a strong sense of psychological reality. The volume will be a stimulating source of ideas and arguments for all philosophers and a wide range of other readers.
Reasons, motives, and the demands of morality : an introduction Subjective accounts of reasons for action
- See Stephen
See Stephen Darwall ' Reasons, motives, and the demands of morality : an introduction ', in Darwall,
Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton (eds) Moral Discourse and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997), and David Sobel ' Subjective accounts of reasons for action ', Ethics, 111 (2001), 461–492.
The characterization of different versions of universalism as ' naı¨venaı¨ve ' and ' sophisticated ' comes from Michael Murray ' Three versions of universalism
The characterization of different versions of universalism as ' naı¨venaı¨ve ' and ' sophisticated ' comes from
Michael Murray ' Three versions of universalism ', Faith and Philosophy, 16 (1999), 55–68.
Internal reasons and the obscurity of blame ', in idem Making Sense of Humanity
- Bernard Williams
Bernard Williams ' Internal reasons and the obscurity of blame ', in idem Making Sense of Humanity
(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1995), 35.