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Does Immigration Erode Social Capital?: The Conditional Effects of Immigration-Generated Diversity on Trust, Membership, and Participation Across 19 Countries, 1981–2000
Abstract
This article is an attempt to qualify existing evidence that increasing diversity is detrimental to a vibrant civil society. We focus specifically on immigration-generated diversity, and argue that while it may have negative effects on some specific civic and political outcomes in some contexts, these effects vary widely across advanced democracies. Our argument rests on analysis of a cross-national, cross-sectional time-series dataset that brings together individual-level World Values Survey data with country-level variables. With these data, we track within-country changes over time in trust and engagement. We show that immigration can have a negative effect on social trust, organizational membership and political engagement, but that institutional arrangements shape this relationship in systematic ways. In more economically equal societies and in more multicultural countries (where cultural minorities are recognized and accommodated), the negative effects of immigration on trust and engagement are mitigated or even reversed. We conclude that there is no general link between immigration-generated diversity and collective-mindedness. Rather, the direction and strength of the relationship depend on institutional and policy contexts.
... We also adjusted for household-level variables (household's per capita income and locality type) and regional-level variables, measured at the PSU level (average income, share of highly educated inhabitants, population density, Gini index, and employment rate). Previous research has indicated that trust depends on contextual socio-economic characteristics (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010;Gundelach 2014); thus, their inclusion should minimize confounding of the link between ethnic diversity and outgroup trust (Dinesen et al. 2020). Due to limited data for Russian municipalities, the regional-level controls were measured by aggregating the answers of all respondents in a certain PSU, except for population density, which was drawn from the census. ...
... Our findings, though based on correlational data, speak in favor of a dynamic model of intergroup trust whereby the effects of intergroup coexistence are initially negative and become positive once the different groups get to know one another. They also resonate with research arguing that recent increases in diversity dampen social cohesion (Hooghe 2007;Hopkins 2010;Kesler and Bloemraad 2010;Newman 2013;Gundelach 2014;Ziller 2015). While the work on ethnic change has focused on native-born residents' reaction to increasing immigration, our analyses included members of the regional ethnic majority and ethnic minority groups and accounted for the individual migration background and group status within the region. ...
... Newcomers who have gained a higher political status than autochthonous ethnic groups are unlikely to feel threatened by the subordinated autochthonous groups, while settled immigrant groups who have always had a lower political status than the native population may still be regarded as threatening. Integration policies may influence the effects of ethnic diversity on trust among the receiving society members (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010) and can be an additional factor explaining the different associations between long-standing ethnic diversity and recent immigration with outgroup trust. Titular ethnic groups have greater rights and higher status in their own regions than other minorities in Russia (Codagnone and Filippov 2000) and as such, we argue, can be trusted more. ...
This article examines the relationship between ethnic diversity and outgroup trust in contemporary Russia, while distinguishing between long-standing ethnic diversity and recent immigration. In contrast to previous research that tested whether past regional experience with diversity is related to people's attitudes toward outgroup members, we focus on long-standing ethnic diversity, defined as diversity resulting from the long-term coexistence of ethnic groups in a region, not recent immigration. We hypothesize that while the presence of outgroups may initially be threatening to the members of an ethnic group, long-standing diversity has positive consequences for intergroup relations. Using 2015 survey data combined with census and official registration data from Russian regions, we found that inhabitants of regions with higher levels of long-standing ethnic diversity tended to show higher outgroup trust, while accounting for socioeconomic characteristics of the regions and of individuals. In contrast, inhabitants of regions with higher recent immigration tended to have lower outgroup trust, all else held constant. While these associations were weak, they speak in favor of a dynamic model of intergroup trust, which involves learning about others through mutual coexistence. We also acknowledge that the autochthonous status of ethnic minorities and existing institutional arrangements regarding different ethnic groups in Russia may additionally contribute to the development of trust.
... Perceptions of economic threat have also been shown to correlate with negative attitudes toward immigration (Olzak, 1992;Citrin et al., 1997;Kesler & Bloemraad 2010). Respondents were asked whether they believe the national economy has gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse over the last year. ...
... Ideology was therefore accounted for, respondents were asked where they placed themselves on a liberal to conservative 7-point scale, 1 = Extremely conservative to 7 = Extremely liberal. Perceptions of economic threat have also been shown to correlate with negative attitudes toward immigration (Olzak, 1992;Citrin et al., 1997;Kesler & Bloemraad 2010). Respondents were asked whether they believe the national economy has gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse over the last year. ...
... The pandemic will likely cause many more people than usual report negative perceptions of the economy. Social trust has also been shown to impact whether immigrant-generated diversity is well received (Herreros & Criado 2009;Kesler & Bloemraad 2010). Respondents were asked whether most people can be trusted (1) or whether you can't be too careful in dealing with people (0). ...
Are exclusionary boundaries drawn by those who aren’t accepting of immigrants malleable? Do beliefs about inclusion on the part of those who tend to be more accepting toward immigrants have limits? To address these questions, I look at the major factors that I believe influence reactions to immigrants: national identity and trust, and values. This dissertation contributes to two important goals. The first is to help ensure that long- term residents in communities accept people from diverse cultures and backgrounds. The second is softening the divisive power of the immigration issue to make it less of a staple in the arsenal of partisan and ideological warfare that currently plagues the American political landscape. Though attitudes about immigration are widely studied, often the boundaries of exclusion and ideas about inclusion are taken for granted. I argue that both exclusive and inclusive tendencies toward immigrants are complex and defy stereotypical categorization. Various aspects of this argument are tested using two survey experiments. In Chapter 2, I find that although trust and attitudes toward immigrants appear to be preset and difficult to manipulate in the minds of people who identify strongly with the American national identity, not all strong national identifiers are alike. It is only when strong national identity is coupled with low institutional trust that attitudes toward immigrants are significantly negatively affected. In Chapter 3, I find that “liking” fully mediates the relationship between values and behavioral intentions toward immigrants. The relevant values are self-transcendence and conservation. In everyday situations where different cultures come into contact with one another, inclusivity as pure, positive acceptance is a reaction experienced by very few. For the majority of people who are generally pro-diversity, norms violations and different sets of values create real conflicts. Overall, my dissertation shows that attitudes and reactions toward immigrants defy stereotypical images of the “racist conservative” or the morally superior liberal on issues of diversity. Advisor: Elizabeth Theiss-Morse
... Miguel R. Ramos and Miles Hewstone et al. 2016;van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). Diversity research comprises a recent but already vast body of work examining the impact of ethnic diversity on a wealth of social outcomes such as economic performance (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005), social capital , intergroup conflict (Esteban et al. 2012), civic engagement and political participation (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010) and neighbourhood trust (Schmid et al. 2014). Yet, despite multiple advances in this field, several inconsistencies and key questions remain. ...
... This perspective has now been voiced in several social sciences. Across the fields of economics and sociology, for example, scholars have noted that ethnic and racial diversity is associated with lower economic performance (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005), social trust, civic engagement and political participation (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010). A review of fifteen studies found that diversity in societies is invariably associated with lower levels of social capital (Costa and Kahn 2003). ...
... In the United Kingdom, Fieldhouse and Cutts (2010) reported a negative association between diversity and social capital but noted that this effect depends on variables such as poverty or the respondents' racial and ethnic background. In a similar vein, other authors (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010) found that countries that promote equality and the integration of immigrants tend to experience less dramatic declines in social capital as diversity increases. ...
... Protection from social exclusion represents a vertical dimension of social cohesion, linking individuals to the state and social institutions, whereas the horizontal dimension of social cohesion is indicated by the quality of social interaction among members of society (Vergolini 2011). Scholars have linked both horizontal and vertical dimensions of cohesion to diversity by investigating whether increasing homogeneity erodes welfare state support (Alesina and Glaeser 2004;Eger 2010;Mau and Burkhardt 2009) and generalized social trust among the public (Hooghe et al. 2009;Kesler and Bloemraad 2010;Putnam 2007), both a linchpin of Europe's democratic systems. ...
... Do contexts of diversity influence both outcomes similarly? Finally, the study answers calls for a shift in focus from universal reactions to context-specific responses (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010). Findings show that ethnic diversity may not elicit the same reactions everywhere. ...
... Studies focusing largely on the United States provide some support that increased ethnic heterogeneity weakens generalized social trust (Alesina and Ferrara 2002;Costa and Kahn 2003). Research that casts a comparative net produces evidence that diversity suppresses generalized social trust (Delhey and Newton 2005;Paxton 2007), other mixed evidence (Gesthuizen et al. 2009;Hooghe et al. 2009), and yet additional findings that no negative relationship exists (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010;Savelkoul, Gesthuizen, and Scheepers 2011). The constrict hypothesis finds most support in the American context (van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). ...
Research has overlooked the influence of countries’ colonizing histories on how present-day diversity shapes forms of social cohesion. Ethnic boundary theories suggest that legacies of colonizing external territories could strengthen the boundaries that separate natives from foreign migrants. Alternatively, colonization could simply give countries greater experience with foreign populations over time, thus diffusing boundaries through sustained integration processes. This article investigates how history shapes diversity’s influence on horizontal and vertical forms of social cohesion: support for welfare to reduce hierarchical class differences and trust of the generalized other. Using 2002 to 2014 European Social Survey and country history data, I find that while diversity often directly reduces both welfare support and trust, histories of conquest moderate this relationship. Specifically, diversity’s negative influence on social cohesion outcomes gradually diminishes with the occupation of foreign territories, in contrast to their colonization. While prior research emphasizes diversity as a straightforward negative force, current findings show that it is shaped by historical episodes of symbolic boundary making.
... In an analysis that is more global in scope, Kesler & Bloemraad (2010) consider the effects of immigration on social capital in 17 to 19 advanced democracies. 4 Data on immigration, measured as percent foreign born of the total population, come from the United Nations (2005), while the social capital measures (trust, civic engagement, and political participation) come from the World Values Survey (Eur. ...
... The empirical findings from Abascal & Baldassarri (2015) are consistent with the conclusions of Portes & Vickstrom (2011) and Kesler & Bloemraad (2010). In a thorough and direct reexamination of Putnam's (2007) analysis, Abascal & Baldassarri (2015) use the same Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey data set to demonstrate that ethnoracial, residential, and economic differences between communities and the residents who select into living in them are much better explanations of individual variation in self-reported trust and cooperation than is ethnic diversity. ...
Researchers have investigated the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on a range of socioeconomic and political outcomes. However, approaches to measuring ethnic diversity vary not only across fields of study but even within subfields. In this review, we systematically dissect the computational approaches of prominent measures of diversity, including polarization, and discuss where and how differences emerge in their relationships with outcomes of interest to sociologists (social capital and trust, economic growth and redistribution, conflict, and crime). There are substantial similarities across computations, which are often generalizations or specializations of one another. Differences in how racial and ethnic groupings are constructed and in level of geographical analysis explain many divergences in empirical findings. We conclude by summarizing the type of measurement technique preferred by outcome, when relevant, and provide considerations for future researchers contemplating how best to operationalize diversity. Finally, we highlight two less widely used yet promising measures of diversity.
Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Sociology, Volume 48 is July 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
... Similar to the literature found in normative political theory, social sciences also use different labels to refer to similar phenomena, such as social cohesion, capital, and trust. 2 Results stemming from various disciplines remain inconclusive if we leave aside the question of whether or not social scientists are actually writing about the same phenomenon at all. It has been studied in political economy (Carter and Poast 2017); sociology (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010;Meer and Tolsma 2014); migration studies (Koopmans 2010); and political science (Holtug & Mason, 2010;Holtug, 2016;Miller & Ali, 2014;Putnam, 2007). To give a stark example of research results, two articles that were released in the same year made completely opposed causal mechanistic claims about whether or not the incompatibility between immigration and social cohesion is the result of 'multiculturalist policies combined with large welfare state (Koopmans 2010)' or 'their absence (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010)'. ...
... It has been studied in political economy (Carter and Poast 2017); sociology (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010;Meer and Tolsma 2014); migration studies (Koopmans 2010); and political science (Holtug & Mason, 2010;Holtug, 2016;Miller & Ali, 2014;Putnam, 2007). To give a stark example of research results, two articles that were released in the same year made completely opposed causal mechanistic claims about whether or not the incompatibility between immigration and social cohesion is the result of 'multiculturalist policies combined with large welfare state (Koopmans 2010)' or 'their absence (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010)'. Similarly, Meer and Tolsma (2014) studied around 90 research papers discussing whether or not sharing a common identity is necessary for supporting the welfare state to conclude that for every research project supporting the claim that diversity is detrimental to social cohesion, there is one providing evidence that there is no such incompatibility. ...
The volume addresses two concepts underexplored in migration ethics: political stability and solidarity. In his introductory article, Michael Blake argues that the Rawlsian notion of public reason cannot address threats to stability arising from authoritarian movements. In their contributions, Raissa Wihby Ventura, Bodi Wang, Susanne Mantel, Wolfram Cremer, Dimitrios Efthymiou, Esma Baycan Herzog, Gottfried Schweiger, Alberto Pirni, Costanza Porro, Christine Straehle, Corinna Mieth and Thorben Knobloch explore the issue of migration in novel ways. They discuss the relation of stability to identity and cohesion, how to define duties towards migrants and fellowcitizens and the conceptualization of anti-immigration backlashes. The volume concludes with a reply by Michael Blake.
... Making multiculturalism viable may require focusing on its broad goals as well as emphasizing a common set of values and identity (cf. Common Underlying attitudes toward multiculturalism, social-political equity and inclusion, and socioeconomic factors are more decisive factors than diversity per se (Berry & Ward, 2016;Hoffman et al., 2018;Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010). As discussed in Hoffman and colleagues (2018), a variety of individual-and societal-level factors may explain how diversity impacts social capital (see chapter 5 for a review on this topic). ...
... These consist of social identity processes; bias; ethnic/racial and cultural homophily; cultural factors; and broader social factors such as socioeconomic inequality and societal racism. Immigration diversity, although associated with some negative outcomes under certain conditions (Laurence & Heath, 2008;Rupasingha, Goetz, & Freshwater, 2006), is also associated with positive outcomes (Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010). ...
Reviews theoretical and empirical literature on multiculturalism, with a focus on the factors that promote and thwart it, particularly in the U.S.
... At the contextual level, policies and segregation moderated diversity effects in several studies. Multicultural and integration policies have been introduced as a moderator of diversity effects, where diversity did not lead to negative outcomes when local policies were inclusive (Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010). Potentially, one reason why these policies moderate diversity effects is that they reduce segregation. ...
A more nuanced understanding of the complex relationship between ethnic diversity and social cohesion is needed. Ever since Robert Putnam (2007) has put forward the highly contested constrict claim holding that diversity is related to less trust and more social withdrawing, hundreds of follow-up studies across the globe have been conducted. In the present contribution, we investigated the association between diversity and “hunkering down” in the Netherlands, hereby taking into account the role of segregation. Indeed, Uslaner (2012) pointed to local segregation as the true motor of the so-called diversity effects on intergroup relations in general, and trust in others in particular. We did not only investigate objective indicators of diversity and segregation, but also added an “eye of the beholder” perspective by probing into the subjective perceptions of these variables. Specifically, in a stratified community sample of 680 Dutch ethnic-cultural majority members (52% male, mean age 51), we assessed the additive and interactive effects of four variables (objective diversity, perceived diversity, objective segregation, and perceived segregation) at the municipal level in the prediction of three outcomes (generalized trust, ingroup trust, and outgroup trust). The results revealed three interesting patterns. First, neither of the objective indicators of diversity and segregation, nor their interaction effect significantly predicted any type of trust. Second, higher perceptions of diversity and higher perceptions of segregation were negatively associated with outgroup trust (but not with generalized and ingroup trust). Third, and most importantly, there was a significant interaction effect between perceived diversity and perceived segregation, indicating that simultaneous perceptions of high levels of diversity and high levels of segregation were related to the lowest levels of trust in other ethnic-cultural groups. These findings shed a more nuanced light on the diversity debate, showing that perceptions of segregation shape diversity effects. In sum, the present study shows that perceived rather than objective indicators of diversity and segregation matter, and that both diversity and segregation should be taken into account when it comes to social cohesion in general, and trust in particular.
... Proponents of multiculturalism tended to view the impact of multicultural policy on social cohesion as an empirical question (Baycan-Herzog 2021; Holtug 2021). They argued that many empirical studies rather show that multicultural policies have a positive impact on minorities' civic engagement (Bloemrad 2006), on social capital (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010) and on solidarity (Banting and Kymlicka 2006;Kymlicka 2015). Commentators have also pointed to the potentially adverse consequences of granting groups more power over their members by stressing the risks of oppression of 'minorities within minorities' (Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev 2004), whether those are individual dissenters, smaller cultural minorities within a larger group, or vulnerable persons such as children. ...
The article introduces a special issue on “Rethinking Liberal Multiculturalism: Foundations, Practices and Methodologies.” The contributions presented in this special issue were discussed during the conference « Multicultural Citizenship 25 Years Later », held in Paris in November 2021. Their aim is to take stock of the legacy of Kymlicka’s contribution and to highlight new developments in theories of liberal multiculturalism and minority rights. The contributions do not purport to challenge the legitimacy of theories of multiculturalism and minority rights, they rather aim at deepening our understanding of the foundations of liberal multiculturalism and of its practical implementation, sensitive to social scientific dynamics of diverse societies. Without abandoning the general idea that cultural minorities should be granted special minority rights, the essays presented raise new questions about three dimensions central to liberal multiculturalism: its normative foundations, its practical categories of minorities or groups, and its fact-sensitive methodology. Taken together they shed light on the renewed variety of theories of liberal multiculturalism highlighting their complexity and internal disagreements. To introduce these articles, the article first draws a brief historical overview of the debates on multiculturalism since the 1990s (section 1). It then highlights the distinctive aspects of Kymlicka’s contribution (section 2) and identifies recent research trends (section 3). Doing so, it explains how the articles gathered here both expand on those distinctive aspects and explore those new research avenues. The section 4 summarizes the contributions.
... Research about the relationship between area diversity and social capital in different countries has pointed in different directions, with the effect of diversity found to differ between minority and majority groups and to be generally small in magnitude (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010;Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010;Heath and Demireva, 2014). Once socioeconomic deprivation has been accounted for at the neighbourhood level, the negative relationship between diversity and social capital largely disappears (Laurence and Heath, 2008;Letki, 2008;Laurence, 2011;Sturgis et al, 2011), raising questions about the meaningfulness of such categorisations. ...
This article analyses challenges for civil society research in superdiverse areas and proposes ways to overcome them. Key components of previous studies are problematised, such as the lack of attention to demographic complexity, the focus on formally registered organisations at the expense of informal ‘below the radar’ initiatives, the over-reliance on analyses using administrative data and building on dichotomous categorisations of social capital. The article calls for scholars to develop methodologies and theory that enable research across the full range of civil society activity. We argue for a holistic approach to researching civil society through comparative and mixed-methods designs that facilitate research about the nature of civil society action, its forms, patterns and experiences. The concept of ‘superdiversity’ is useful to reflect evolving demographic complexity, given age, gender, nationality, religion and immigration status, and divergent experiences of rights and the labour market.
... The evolution of ethnic and linguistic diversity in a society can be viewed as a type of social change, and the underlying social solidarity exhibits social capital. Kesler and Bloemraad (Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010) therefore contend that an increase in ethnic and linguistic as well as cultural diversity erode social norms on certain issues, and that the 'normative consensus' on some issues can be broken. This then results from group conflicts as well as generating an increasing level of uncertainty about the then prevailing social norms, and doubts on how the current social norms might be replaced by something else. ...
Motivated by the varying effectiveness of government intervention policies to contain the COVID-19 pandemic, and the potential positive relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and social distance, this paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and the spread of COVID-19. In particular, using global data from 113 developed and developing countries during the early stages of the pandemic (from 31 December 2019 to 8 July 2020), we have found a significant negative effect of ethnolinguistic diversity on the spread of the virus. The result is robust to alternative measures of ethnolinguistic diversity and estimator that addresses endogeneity. Moreover, we also show that the impact of ethnolinguistic diversity on the spread of COVID-19 differs in economies characterized by different levels of democracy, policy stringency on addressing COVID-19 and health expenditure.
... Segregation in the context of diversity can weaken social cohesion by reinforcing stereotypes and outgroup hostility. The long history of racism indicates that in the absence of meaningful and frequent intercultural contact, increased levels of diversity can create an atmosphere for racism and other forms of intergroup conflict (Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010;Putnam, 2007). Today, across the world, cultural diversity has rapidly increased thanks to the constant movement of people, capital and data across countries and continents (Faist, 2009). ...
Today most societies across the world are witnessing rising levels of social and cultural diversity brought about by globalisation and in particular increased human mobility and significant advances in information and communications technologies. The dilemma, therefore, has been how best to manage the resultant diversity and what optimal social policy paradigms to adopt towards this end.
Assimilation, multiculturalism and presently interculturalism have all been proposed as possible policy conduits for managing socio-cultural diversity.
This book, in focusing on the latter concept, and in particular in its intercultural dialogue manifestation, offers at once theoretical examinations, policy discussion and practical explorations of its uptake across the world. The core argument connecting the book’s three distinct sections is that whilst assimilation in its racist manifestation is no longer a viable option in today’s world, intercultural dialogue within existing multicultural settings has much to offer.
... For a review of the evidence, see Kymlicka 2010Kymlicka , 2012. See also Kesler and Bloemraad 2010;Wright and Bloemraad 2012. In all of these respects, the White Paper nicely illustrates the Meer and Modood analysis. ...
... There is indirect evidence for the interplay of policy effects with immigrant presence from other social science fields. More specifically, past research has revealed that higher immigrant presence or flow has been related to lower political and organizational participation or less support for some domains of redistribution only in countries with less inclusive or less multicultural policies (Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010;Kwon & Curran, 2016). In a similar vein, higher immigrant presence coincides with lower levels of trust only in regions with more exclusive labor policies (Gundelach & Manatschal, 2017). ...
More people than ever migrate across the world, thereby more people than ever live, study, and work in countries, regions, and institutions with high immigrant presence. Conflict and threat theories have argued that increasing immigration inevitably heightens native citizens' anti-immigrant prejudice. Drawing on alternate strands of social psychological literature such as contact theory, the present study challenges this argument. We highlight the role of the sociopolitical context of prejudice focusing on socioeconomic and legal integration policies. We reason that such integration policies shape intergroup relations by reducing structural (socioeconomic and legal) inequalities. Thus, inclusive policies will effectively reduce prejudice especially at high levels of immigrant presence through empowering immigrants and reducing immigrant disadvantage. Indeed our findings identify inclusive integration policies as a key condition for low anti-immigrant prejudice in high-immigration contexts. We analyze surveys of 143,752 participants across 66 different countries, 20 subnational regions, and 64 institutions as sociopolitical contexts using six different data sets in eight studies. Our multilevel analyses consistently demonstrate that anti-immigrant prejudice is lower among natives when higher levels of immigrant presence are coupled with inclusive, rather than exclusive, integration policies. Inclusive policies that render immigrants more equal to natives are the path to improved intergroup relations and social cohesion in diverse societies. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
... Therefore, calls are increasingly heard to return to the "melting pot" policy because its restoration is seen as a solution to ethnocultural problems. Despite such claims, many scholars believe that the retreat from multiculturalism is only popular political rhetoric that has arisen against the backdrop of populism and flirting with the electorate since it is much easier to blame a policy of multiculturalism for the inability than to try to prevent terrorist attacks (Banks, J., & Banks, C., 2010;Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010;Koopmans, 2010). ...
Definitions of multiculturalism are inconsistent and often contradictory, but common to its definitions is the demographic observation of the existence of several cultures in most societies. Multiculturalism as a theoretical concept is one of the most controversial discourses of our time, formed because of particular historical circumstances. The first mention of the concept under study tended to a cosmopolitan interpreta- tion, meaning mixing nationalities and the expansion of identities. Later, the term “multiculturalism” was understood as a variety of languages and cultures. Later, this term was used to describe the demographic fact of megacities inhabited by people of different cultural and ethnic origins. The principal purpose of the article is to highlight the social and philosophical aspects of the genesis of the discourse of multicultural- ism. The article uses the methods of formal-logical, systemic, structural and institutional analysis in order to highlight the social and philosophical aspects of multiculturalism.
... In contrast to Putnam's conclusion that diversity erodes social capital irrespective of economic conditions, subsequent work has suggested that economics does indeed play a substantial role. These latter research findings are convergent: diversity tends to erode trust when people perceive outgroup members as competitors, especially in a context of material scarcity, and as material security rises, intergroup contact is capable of washing away the residual negative impact of diversity on trust (Hooghe et al., 2009;Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010;Schmid et al., 2014;Abascal & Baldassarri, 2015; but see also Koopmans & Veit, 2014). ...
Research suggests that societies are becoming more materially secure, less intensely religious and that social interactions are increasingly computer mediated. However, sociological theorists have not yet developed robust mechanistic theories explaining how social cohesion might be generated under these new conditions. This is a notable omission because scholars have demonstrated empirically that materially secure, non-religious, people tend to be more individualistic, have more diverse networks, and are less socially engaged than traditionally religious individuals (Zuckerman et al., The nonreligious: Understanding secular people and societies, Oxford University Press, 2016). Does the secularization of societies necessarily imply societal instability, anomie, or isolation? If not, why not? Here, we posit the existence of a continuum of modes of social cohesion that are characterized by a suite of historically contingent variables which impact the volume, scope, and rate of human interactions. This novel theory of “distributive effervescence” specifies how emotional energy might be generated via punctuated interactions with heterogeneous others across diverse settings.
... I control for sociodemographic variables known to influence social cohesion attitudes: age, gender, education level, marital status, having children, immigration status, religiosity, place of residence, political orientation, main activity, unemployment experience, and discrimination (Busemeyer and Neimanns, 2017;Delhey and Newton, 2003;Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010;Van Oorschot, 2002). Some variables were recoded to facilitate interpretation. ...
Concerns have been raised about weakening social cohesion in French society against the backdrop of economic slowdown over the last decade. To understand how economic conditions are associated with social cohesion, this study analyzes the correlations between individual and macroeconomic indicators and social cohesion attitudes as well as their cross-level interaction. The results from pooled OLS regressions with year fixed effects using French European Social Survey data (2008–2018) show that individual economic strain is associated with lower social trust and with higher egalitarian and anti-immigrant attitudes. Cross-level interaction results suggest that strained individuals can have stronger egalitarian and anti-immigrant propensities under a macroeconomic downturn. As a result, larger variations in public attitudes can occur, which could pose a risk to the value consensus and social order. The results of this study suggest potential negative consequences of micro- and macroeconomic hardship for various dimensions of social cohesion and suggest the need for a comprehensive policy strategy.
... Liberal political philosophers have argued that multiculturalism is banal because it has been incorporated into the same everyday logic of negotiation and power that shapes all domestic politics in Canada (Kymlicka, 2003(Kymlicka, , 2015. Political scientists have similarly asserted that multicultural policies are successful when they create new cadres of community leaders familiar with the banality of Canadian institutions and practices (Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010). Even intellectuals who contest official and corporate forms of multiculturalism that confine the "proper boundaries of the political" to "all but elected officials and those interested groups primarily concerned with and licensed by the state" (Iton, 2008, pp. ...
Winner of the inaugural Canadian Journal of Communication Editor’s Award for the most outstanding contribution to the field of communication research in 2021.
Background: This article draws on municipal, provincial, and federal archives to examine multiculturalism as an ideology, a government strategy, and a media discourse.
Analysis: The author scrutinizes official and corporate forms of multiculturalism in Canada between 1971 and 2003, and develops case studies of “tempered radicals” who worked with and within small-l liberal institutions and discourses while trying to change them.
Conclusions and implications: The author suggests that the keyword “shy elitism” might be a helpful tool to address the forms of credentialism and anti-intellectualism that have often confined and defined the study of multiculturalism.
Keywords: History; Cultural studies; Multiculturalism; Immigration; Race relations
https://cjc-online.ca/index.php/journal/article/view/4031
... There has been considerable research done on the impact of diversity policies on other outcomes-for example, how they affect labour market outcomes for immigrants, or how multicultural or bilingual education affects the educational outcomes of immigrants, or how they affect voting and volunteering rates. See, for example, Bloemraad and Wright (2014); Koopmans (2013); Kesler and Bloemraad (2010); Bloemraad (2006); Kymlicka (2012);and Laxer (2013). But for the purposes of this project, we are particularly interested in the impact of these policy regimes on solidarity. ...
Building and sustaining solidarity is an enduring challenge in all liberal-democratic societies. The claims of solidarity require individuals to tolerate views and practices they dislike, to accept democratic decisions that go again their beliefs or interests, and to moderate the pursuit of their own economic self-interest to help the disadvantaged. Ensuring that individuals are willing to accept these “strains of commitment,” to borrow John Rawls’ apt phrase, has been a worry even in relatively homogeneous societies, and the challenge seems even greater in ethnically and religiously diverse societies. Anxiety about the impact of diversity on solidarity has been a recurring theme in both academic scholarship and public debates around immigration and multiculturalism. In order to better understand the nature of this challenge, we need to understand the meaning of solidarity, and the mechanisms by which it can be enhanced or diminished.
Our approach to these questions focuses on the sources of solidarity. Recent research has concentrated on diagnosing the dynamics that undermine solidarity and generate backlash and exclusion in diverse societies. This is understandable, since political life in democratic countries has been characterized by both neoliberal attacks on the welfare state and populist attacks on immigration. However, we look at the politics of diversity from the opposite direction, exploring the potential sources of support for an inclusive solidarity. How is solidarity built? How is it sustained over time? How has been strengthened as well as weakened in the contemporary era?
... Mutual trust is also the oil that reduces friction in the socio-economic system and reduces transaction costs, and thus is a fundamental basis for the Norwegian welfare model. However, mass immigration might have a negative effect on social trust [28][29][30]. This drastic change regarding mass immigration is something that Norway shares with many other European countries, and this can explain some of the indignation of the host population in addition to the painful problems in terms of the socio-cultural integration of immigrants into the host society [31,32]. ...
While being Norwegian is often associated with being white, the absence of a discourse on race makes it difficult to analyze racialization scientifically. It is sometimes argued that critical race theory is developed within an American context and that it is not culturally relevant in a Norwegian context. We argue that while this might be true in some cases, critical race theory might nevertheless give new insights into how racial practices and colonial structures continue to be important parts of the power relations in Norway. We base our article on two empirical materials from a Norwegian-Sámi context and from professionals in Norwegian child protective services in order to illuminate how racialization is expressed. In our comparative perspective and collaborative and self-reflexive writing process, we use the concept of interpretive repertoire to explore how postcolonial and critical race theory is a challenging, but nevertheless useful approach to analyze racialization and discrimination in Norway.
... Most research on the constrict hypothesis has, however, focused on current levels of diversity rather than on changes in diversity over time. Although some cross-national studies include dynamic measures of ethnic diversity (Gesthuizen, Van der Meer and Scheepers, 2009;Hooghe et al., 2009;Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010), these measures are rarely applied in within-country studies (for exceptions, see Dinesen and Sønderskov, 2012;Schaeffer, 2014). The same holds for research on fear of crime (for an exception, see Pickett et al., 2012). ...
... An additional consideration is not just the measurement of ethnic diversity across varying scales of contextual units but also how the type of social trust under examination relates to that context. Many studies of social trust focus on generalized social trust, which corresponds to whether a respondent believes that most people can be trusted and sometimes relates to wider measures of social capital and civic engagement (Bjørnskov 2008;Dinesen and Sønderskov 2012;Douds and Wu 2018;Gundelach and Manatschal 2017;Kesler and Bloemraad 2010;Ponce 2019;Stolle et al. 2013;Sturgis et al. 2011;Tolsma, van der Meer, and Gesthuizen 2009;Ziller 2015;Ziller, Wright, and Hewstone 2019). These measures of trust, however, are not place-specific, and a budding body of work identifies how people trust those local to them. ...
As societies become more diverse, especially with inflows of immigrants, some research finds lowered social trust as an inclusive integration eludes countries, cities, and neighborhoods. But previous research finds this diversity–trust link to be highly variable across studies and in particular across geographic scales. One under-studied scale is that of cities, even though trust is essential to facilitating intergroup contact and because cities are characterized by spatial segregation along ethnic lines. We analyze a survey of approximately 27,000 urban Europeans from 63 cities in 25 countries to assess how ethnic diversity (conceptualized as non-EU immigrants) in cities and countries affects trust of neighbors and city residents. Our multilevel model findings show that a greater percentage of non-EU immigrants in a city (but not a country) is related to less trust on both measures and that the effect size is larger for trust of city dwellers than trust of neighbors. We find that the city population, however, is a critical moderator. In more populous cities, a greater percentage of non-EU immigrants is linked to more trust, but in less populous cities more immigrants are linked to less trust. We conclude by focusing on how cities are important sites of social trust.
... Recent research has highlighted the importance of cultural diversity for both immigrants and citizens who were born in the country in which they live. Countries with policies which promote economic equality and recognition of immigrant minorities experience almost no declines in social trust, civic engagement, and political participation (Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010). Immigrant community engagement can help create more multicultural contexts because it enhances social and cultural capital (Handy & Greenspan, 2009). ...
Community participation can be considered a pillar for the promotion of social justice and well‐being for immigrants in new countries. Participation may be influenced by different forms of oppression which decrease opportunities for immigrants to be engaged. The present study explores the difficulties that Peruvian immigrants encountered and still encountering to participate in Santiago de Chile through in‐depth qualitative interviews. Eighteen semi‐structured interviews were conducted with Peruvian leaders of Ethnic Community Based Organizations (ECBOs) in Santiago de Chile. Interviews focused on the community engagement of Peruvians highlighting the difficulties they encountered when deciding whether to engage and throughout the process of carrying out their commitment, along with their perceptions when trying to engage their compatriots. The present study contributes to the literature in three aspects. First, it focused on the phenomenon of South–South migration. Secondly, it delved into the psychological and structural barriers that immigrants’ experience, considering their disadvantaged conditions. Thirdly, it used Situational Analysis, along with the constructionist drift of Grounded Theory, which is widely used in critical, qualitative research, and is sensitive to producing situated knowledge. Coding and mapping analysis identified experiences related to historical trauma, transnational bonds, and dominant master narratives in both countries as well as challenges due to balancing time and priorities, surviving institutional deterrents, and inter‐organizations competitiveness. Finally, transnational commitments, mechanisms of social disconnection, and under valuated rights that Peruvians may live in Chile were pointed out. These results intend to have practical implications for immigrants and for community psychologists.
... In this study we consider both the amount of and the effects that loss of political capital or erosion (Siegel 2007), particularly among migrants, may have on enterprise performance. This has been of particular interest since what little work that has been done with respect to erosion of capitals, has mainly focused on the erosion of social capital (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010). ...
This paper explores Migrant Returnee Entrepreneur (MRE) and the effects of their human and political capitals on their enterprise performance in emerging nations. While we know that each of these “capitals” possesses value, we know much less about how they interact, the difference that location may have on the value of these capitals and if where the capital was acquired, matters. This study analyses two capitals and compares enterprise performance in four different emerging nations while also exploring the difference of value that human and political capital of returning migrants in different geographical locations, may have to help explain these differences. The study explores the issue using a questionnaire developed based on the Social Questionnaire model (SC-IQ). The findings suggest that migrant enterprises do perform better than those founded by Home-Grown Entrepreneur (HGE) and these capitals individually do contribute to enterprise performance but that they do vary by the level of the countries’ economic development.
... A number of studies consider changes in ethnic diversity longitudinally in several countries. However, these studies either rely on immigration estimates [20], consider only one country at a time [11], or focus on subnational units [29]. Recently, some scholars published articles that use time-varying measures of ethnic fractionalization [5,7], but all of the indices used are much more limited than HIEF, either with regard to time-variation or countries covered. ...
Dramatic changes in the ethnic composition of countries in the last decades have sparked new interest among social scientists in studying and uncovering the role of ethnic diversity on social, political and economic outcomes. Yet, most ethnic fractionalization indices used by scholars to study these effects treat ethnic heterogeneity as time-invariant, thus concealing its long-term effects. However, failing to take into account historical developments in ethnic composition might seriously hinder our understanding of their effects on social, economic, and political outcomes. This paper introduces a new dataset containing an annual ethnic fractionalization index for 162 countries across all continents in the period of 1945–2013. The Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization (HIEF) dataset is a natural extension of previous ethnic fractionalization indices. It offers the opportunity to study the effects of ethnic fractionalization across countries and over time. The article concludes by offering some preliminary descriptive analysis of patterns of change in ethnic fractionalization over time.
... This negative relationship is typically stronger for trust in neighbors and when studying diversity of local areas. 1 At the same time, several studies find that demographic, economic, political, and cultural characteristics moderate the relationship between ethnic diversity and trust (Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010;Uslaner, 2012;Helbling et al., 2015;Ziller, 2015;Gundelach and Manatschal, 2017;. ...
This study examines the relationship between residential segregation and social trust of immigrants and natives in the Netherlands. Building on previous studies that have found evidence for a negative segregation-trust link, we present a nuanced narrative by (i) distinguishing between an ethnic minority and majority perspective, (ii) elaborating theoretical foundations on the moderating role of individual exposure in the form of ethnic minority concentration in the neighborhood, and (iii) taking income segregation into account. In addition to the refined theoretical framework, our study employs a rigorous empirical approach. Using two waves (2009 and 2013) of the Netherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse Study—a geocoded panel study with an oversampling of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants—we are able to study the influence of (changes in) municipality-level segregation patterns for both natives and immigrants, and consider the roles of both neighborhood ethnic minority concentration, as well as income-based segregation. Results from four-level multilevel models show that ethnic segregation is negatively related to the social trust of immigrants. At the same time, this negative relationship is particularly strong in neighborhoods with a low level of minority population concentration, which provides support for the so-called integration paradox where negative intergroup interactions reduce social trust. For respondents of Dutch origin, we find no evidence that their social trust is sensitive to ethnic segregation or that this relationship is conditional on minority concentration at the neighborhood level.
... This potential clash in views has been dubbed the progressive's dilemma, in which the rising diversity of contemporary Western societies might reduce the solidarity needed to support a universalistic social safety net (Alesina & Glaeser 2004, Van Oorschot 2006, Putnam 2007. Evidence contrary to this thesis, however, is provided in several rigorous cross-national studies (Kesler & Bloemraad 2010, Brady & Finnigan 2014, Steele 2016. Beyond different levels of support, it is also possible that working and middle classes will simply place different weights on the economic and sociocultural domains (Klar 2014), may favor different policies within each domain (Traber et al. 2019), and may be targeted differentially by party platforms and candidate rhetoric that strategically emphasize some issues (e.g., fear of immigrants and other racial cues) more than others to mobilize adherents (Hutchings & Valentino 2004, Druckman et al. 2013. ...
In many high-income countries today, scholarly interest in the politics of class has coincided with growing economic inequality, rising support for nonmainstream political parties and candidates, and increasing flows of immigration. We review social science research on the views of different class segments vis-à-vis economic, political, and sociocultural issues, finding greater scholarly attention to the interdependence of economic, social, and political concerns and preferences than arguably was the case even a few years ago. Our main aim is to synthesize and critically evaluate this rapidly expanding literature, but we also provide empirical data on class differences and similarities in political opinion across 18 countries, and we pinpoint several areas of research that are in need of further empirical, methodological, and theoretical inquiry.
Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Sociology, Volume 46 is July 30, 2020. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
... These findings demonstrate the importance of considering contextual factors, such as linguistic exposure, as determinants of nationalist sentiment in contemporary Quebec politics. More broadly, they also reinforce preexisting causal claims on the effect of inter-group contact on political attitudes, among others regarding immigration policies (Hopkins et al. 2014) and social trust (Marschall and Stolle 2004;Kesler and Bloemraad 2010;Dinesen and Sønderskov 2015). ...
This paper tests the explanatory power of exposure to English on nationalist attitudes in the 2018 Quebec general elections, during which all major political parties exceptionally excluded holding a referendum on Quebec independence. Data emanate from an exit poll conducted in Quebec City and in Montreal on October 1, 2018 (N = 122). Results from a population-based survey experiment demonstrate that exposure to written English through a bilingual survey is a positive predictor of support for independence for French-speaking Quebecers who encounter spoken English frequently in their daily lives. This suggests that exposure to written English bolsters nationalist attitudes as real-life out-group contact increases. These results reinforce causal claims on the contextual determinants of political attitudes.
... One line of work, also originating in the contact argument, looks at the role of local ethnic segregation (as opposed to integration) as a barrier to interethnic contact, which is then found to accentuate the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and social trust (e.g., Uslaner 2012, Schaeffer 2014. Another line of work looks at how various (local) integration policies moderate the relationship between ethnic diversity and social trust and finds mixed results (Kesler & Bloemraad 2010, Gundelach & Manatschal 2017. These studies provide valuable first steps for exploring the role of policy handles that may be used for alleviating the negative effect of local contextual ethnic diversity on social trust. ...
Does ethnic diversity erode social trust? Continued immigration and corresponding growing ethnic diversity have prompted this essential question for modern societies, but few clear answers have been reached in the sprawling literature. This article reviews the literature on the relationship between ethnic diversity and social trust through a narrative review and a meta-analysis of 1,001 estimates from 87 studies. The review clarifies the core concepts, highlights pertinent debates, and tests core claims from the literature on the relationship between ethnic diversity and social trust. Several results stand out from the meta-analysis. We find a statistically significant negative relationship between ethnic diversity and social trust across all studies. The relationship is stronger for trust in neighbors and when ethnic diversity is measured more locally. Covariate conditioning generally changes the relationship only slightly. The review concludes by discussing avenues for future research.
Research thus far has presented inconsistent findings regarding the effect of multiculturalism on the integration of immigrant youth; however, few studies have focused on making sense of these inconsistencies and further developing research in this field. In the current study, we focus on the possibility that policy arrangements for social welfare may condition the effect of multiculturalism in different directions. Specifically, we hypothesize that the policy mix of generous welfare spending and strong multiculturalism may not aid in the acculturation of immigrant youth in the host country. Cross‐national multilevel data from 28,879 immigrant youth in 29 countries were analysed. The results indicate that immigrant youth show higher school engagement in countries with stronger institutionalised multiculturalism. However, this pattern varies depending on the social welfare policies of individual countries. When strong multiculturalism is combined with generous welfarism in a country, it does not positively affect the school engagement of immigrant youth. These findings align with our speculation that multiculturalism is likely to work better in liberal economies than in generous welfare states.
The aim of this report is to provide an overview of the economic impact of immigration in Belgium, distinguishing between first- and second-generation immigrants as well as between immigrants with an EU or a non-EU origin. Three distinct parts will be devoted to the analysis. The first one provides an overview of net transfers to the government depending on people’s origin. The second part studies the labour market integration of immigrants and tries to explain Belgium’s performance in that respect. The third and final part defines a general equilibrium model built to evaluate the aggregate economic impact of recent immigration inflows in Belgium.
Rising socio-economic inequality in many countries raises the question of how it affects individuals’ civic engagement in the forms of charitable giving, volunteering and non-profit membership. Though a growing body of multidisciplinary literature has started to address this issue, empirical results vary considerably and explanations about what underlies this relationship remain fragmentary. We thus conduct a systematic literature review to (a) provide a synopsis of empirical findings and (b) identify theoretical explanations and presumed mediating mechanisms underlying this relationship. Reviewing 70 studies, we find that higher inequality is most often negatively related to civic engagement, and that this relation is moderated by individual factors, for example, income and education. Furthermore, we map the proposed theoretical explanations into five key approaches. For each of these, we trace and identify the underlying mechanisms at both the societal and the individual level, and provide a conceptual framework that facilitates their empirical analysis in future.
This paper examines the relationship between exposure to immigration in one’s region or locality and sense of socio-territorial belonging, understood as a “we-feeling” toward other inhabitants of the territory. Based on the Russian case, it addresses the question whether higher intensity of in-migration is related to weaker sense of belonging and how this relationship depends on immigrant origin. Using survey data combined with official statistical data, I found a negative relation when immigration from non-CIS states is
considered, but not in case of in-migration from CIS states. I interpret these findings in terms of symbolic boundaries and the Soviet legacy.
Using data from Statistic Canada's General Social Survey Cycle 24 (GSS 2010), this study examines rates and patterns of neighborly help exchanges among the Canadian and Foreign-born of different lengths of residence in the country. There is a debate in the immigrant integration literature about the specific linkages between immigrant status, length of residence and help exchange behaviour although most scholars agree that differences between immigrants and native-born should disappear over time. The GSS 2010 data suggests that the rates of giving help among the Canadian-born and Foreign-born were slightly higher (66% to 62%) as well as receiving rates (60% to 56%). Recent immigrants (less than 10 years of residence) were over-represented among those who did not give or received help from neighbours compared to more established immigrants and the Canadian-born. Multivariate analyses using logistic regressions to predict both exchange rates and patterns by immigrant status and other pro-social measures revealed that differences between Canadian and Foreign-born exchange rates and patterns were mostly attributable to the level of contact with neighbours, favourable perceptions of the community and formal volunteering. This study provides evidence for the assertion that help exchange behaviour is intimately related to broad individual drivers of pro-social behaviour rather than just immigrant status or length of residence in the country.
Does immigration naturally undermine public support for the welfare state? To what extent – and under what circumstances – should we expect to see such an effect? This chapter explores these questions by studying attitudes toward a Universal Basic Income (UBI), examining the interactive effects of education, employment status, and the size of the immigrant population. It begins by laying out why the impact of immigration on social policy preferences is likely to vary not only across countries and individuals, but also based on welfare program type. It then presents the results of an empirical investigation using 2016 European Social Survey data from 21 countries. Findings suggest that the (negative) immigration effect is concentrated among the less educated, though the scope of this concentration varies by employment status. Results thus suggest that larger immigrant populations may weaken support for a UBI, but only among a relatively small, lower-educated subset of the population.
We examine the individual-level characteristics and political and economic conditions associated with political discussion. To build our model of discursive engagement, we draw on existing research on political participation as well as our own theoretical reasoning. Our data cover two million individuals in twenty-eight European countries over forty-five years, and we employ a little-used approach to multilevel analysis that distinguishes variations in engagement attributable to cross-country differences from those stemming from within-country changes. Our primary findings reveal that, within countries, citizens are more likely to talk about politics at election time, when there are more electorally competitive political parties, during periods of recession, when unionization levels are higher, and when racial and ethnic diversity is greater. Across countries, political discussion is more likely where elections are ongoing and in countries with lower levels of income inequality and corruption. We also find that men and the higher-educated are more likely to discuss politics, as are those who are middle aged or employed. Our approach is wide-ranging, but it is also deliberately correlational. Future observational and experimental studies might expand on and identify the causal underpinnings of the associations we establish here.
Diversity and socioeconomic deprivation have been widely discussed as determinants of social cohesion. These two factors are considered to be a threat to social cohesion. The existing literature identifies the problem, however, the literature suggesting the solution is very limited. The most important determinant which can cure the problems of social cohesion is the better quality of institutions, however, there is hardly any literature on this aspect. The current study has investigated the impact of political institutional quality on social cohesion by employing the fixed‐effect model for estimation. The analysis is conducted for 135 countries, using five‐year average panel data. The results suggest that political institutional quality augments social cohesion, gender equality, and per capita income also augment social cohesion. Ethnic diversity, income inequality, and globalization are a threat to social cohesion. Moreover, the threat to social cohesion is greater when there are low political institutional quality and high ethnic diversity, and income inequality as compared to a situation where there are high political institutional quality and low ethnic diversity, and income inequality. The results further suggest that the harmful effects of ethnic diversity, inequality, and globalization can be, not only overcome by institutional quality but can also be put to use to enhance social cohesion.
Toplumsal bütünleşme son dönemde toplumların en çok ihtiyaç duyduğu dolayısıyla hükümetlerin de kendisine dair ciddi uğraşlar içinde olduğu bir husustur. Bu bağlam-da, özellikle modern dönemde çeşitli nedenlerle oluşmuş çokkültürlü yapı devletler için en önemli sorunmuş gibi durmaktadır. Toplumsal bütünleşmeyi sağlamak adına farklı toplulukları ortak norm ve değerler çerçevesinde; ortak bir amaçta buluştur-mak, devletlerin en önemli görevi haline gelmiştir. Son dönemde sıklıkla gündeme gelen iki teorinin bu anlamda ilgi çektiği söylenebilir: Sosyal sermaye ve çokkültür-cülük. Her iki teorinin de farklı kültürlerin bütünleşmesine dair pek çok ortak nokta-da buluştuklarını söylemek mümkündür. Bu nedenle bu çalışmada "Çağdaş liberal ve sosyal demokrat eşitlikçilik anlayışı çerçevesinde doğan çokkültürcülük bağlamın-da çoğulcu davranan ve birlikte yaşama kültürünün iyi örneğini sergileyen devlet-ler sosyal sermayenin güçlü olduğu ülkeler midir?" ya da "Sosyal sermayesi güçlü olan ülkeler çokkültürcü bir politika mı izlemektedir?" sorularına cevap aranmaya çalışılmıştır. Sonuç olarak ayrıştırma, ötekileştirme ve ırkçılığın olmadığı güven ve huzurun olduğu topluluklarda, sosyal sermaye ve çokkültürcülüğün korelasyonunu anlamak üzere bazı yorum ve çıkarımlarda bulunulacaktır. Abstract Social integration is an issue which societies have needed most and thus governments have dealt with seriously in recent times. In this context, the multicultural structure, which was created for various reasons especially in the modern period, seems to be the most important problem for the states. It has become the most important duty of the states to bring different communities together for a common purpose within the framework of common norms and values in order to ensure social integration. It can be said that two theories that have come to the fore a lot recently draw attention in this sense: Social capital and multiculturalism. It is possible to say that both theories meet at many common points regarding the integration of different cultures. Therefore, in this study, answers are sought for the following questions: "Are the states which act in a pluralistic way in the context of multiculturalism arising within the framework of contemporary liberal and social democratic egalitarianism and which set good examples of cultures of coexistence, the countries where social capital is strong as well?" or "Do countries with strong social capital follow a multicultural policy?" As a result, comments and inferences will be made to understand the correlation of social capital and multiculturalism in the communities where there is no segregation, marginalization and racism but trust and peace.
This paper addresses the role of cultural bias (preference for what is culturally more akin) in the entrepreneurial choice regarding different types of social networks in the context of urban mixed embeddedness. We test empirically the presence and aftermaths of this cultural bias, drawing on evidence from a natural experiment with regard to Albanian ethnic entrepreneurs in the city of Milan, Italy. Namely, these entrepreneurs are exposed to the same mixed urban embeddedness and, when we control for firm characteristics, the only discriminating component explaining their success is their choice of social network. We focus on the choice over three types of social networks, classified according to varying degrees of cultural distance between the network and the entrepreneur: (a) the indigenous population, (b) the local Albanian diaspora, and (c) fellow citizens residing in the country of origin, Albania (i.e., transnational networking). We employ a novel method for reverse engineering of preferences for networking by using a Kaplan-Meier estimator and a propensity-score matching technique. We find that strategic network liaisons with locals is actually the most beneficial social network for ethnic firm performance. However, it is social networking within the culturally closer local Albanian diaspora that is the most common behaviour.
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina led to substantial demographic changes in New Orleans. The city lost large numbers of its African American population and became more diverse with the arrival of more Latino migrants and more highly educated, affluent white newcomers. Demographic change has the potential to depress political trust, efficacy, and trust in others. In this essay, we show that more than 10 years after Katrina, neither white nor Black New Orleanians trust local or national government. Black residents, particularly Black women, are generally more distrustful of their neighbors, whites, Latinos, and newcomers in the city. White newcomers are more efficacious and trusting than pre-Katrina white residents. These findings provide more evidence for the thesis that race and place shape trust and that Katrina continues to have an impact on New Orleans in distinctly racialized ways.
This study assesses the impact of different immigrant policy climates on how Latinos feel about themselves, their place in their state and country, and how they think they are viewed by others. Using survey data from Arizona and New Mexico, we find that Latinos in Arizona exhibit lower levels of belonging than Latinos in New Mexico, but their alienation is confined to the state level. We also find that the U.S. born are most sensitive to the state climate. We conclude that policies that delineate outsiders from insiders by immigration status have wide ranging effects that fall prominently on the U.S. born.
This study examines how the interplay between racial diversity and economic inequality affects variations of social capital in the U.S. counties. In general, racial and economic heterogeneity is assumed to provide a negative environment for the growth of social capital. Building on this, we argue the effect of economic inequality is weaker than that of racial diversity because increased economic heterogeneity is felt less visibly and acutely than racial heterogeneity. Moreover, economic inequality can positively condition the adverse impact of racial diversity on social capital when the two interact. Based on the crosscutting cleavages theory, income inequality in a racially fragmented community works as an additional cleavage that crosscuts the different racial groups, mitigating the negative impact of racial diversity on social capital. The data analysis of 3,140 U.S. counties in 2009–2014 provides strong evidence for our arguments. Our findings offer important implications in understanding inequality, race and American democracy.
The large inflow of migrants into Europe in recent years has triggered more frequent discussions on how useful a pro-integrative migration policy is for society. There have been many studies considering various aspects of migrant integration policy, but its impact on social capital, particularly on an aspect as crucial as generalized trust, still requires further investigation. In our study, we use the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) and data on generalized trust and the mainstream population’s perceptions of group threat from immigrants using the European Social Survey (ESS) database to explore the relationship between generalized trust and both the total MIPEX and its components. Our database included 22 European countries and 39,079 respondents. We hypothesized that a pro-integrative migration policy would be connected with generalized trust indirectly via reduced perceived group threat from immigrants. The study identified a positive relationship between total MIPEX scores and generalized trust mediated via lowered perceptions of group threat. However, the effects of eight individual MIPEX components were discovered to be different. We discuss limitations related to the generalizability of our results, given that patterns may be different in North America where cultural distance between majority and most migrant groups is typically higher. We thus suggest that future research on generalized trust examine variables related to values and cultural distance and proximity between the mainstream and migrant groups.
This chapter focuses on the narrower question of the likelihood of negative social effects on residents of the host society, via the possible reduction of trust and social cooperation, broadly conceived. There are at least three ways in which someone might be concerned about migration's impact on trust and social cooperation. First, they may wonder whether migration reduces trust via the alleged mechanism of increasing diversity. Second, they may wonder whether migration directly affects trust and cooperation via the mechanism of importing different cooperative norms. Third, they may suppose that migration can undermine support for the welfare state, perhaps aided by political entrepreneurs willing to present immigrants as “free riders”. Paul Collier argues that increasing migration is likely to undermine social trust, a form of social capital, through increasing diversity. Collier's tendency to conflate all of these mechanisms under the rubric of “bad social models” potentially obscures the fact that they are different mechanisms.
How do religious accommodations for Muslim minorities shape religiosity levels among Muslims minorities? Answering this question is critical in the contemporary period, as Western European countries have experienced greater diversity in religious affiliations due to immigration. In this article, we address this question by analysing individual data across multiple waves of the European Social Survey (ESS). Our analysis improves on existing studies in that it (1) incorporates a greater number of countries than prior studies, (2) covers a historically novel period of religious accommodations for Muslim minorities and (3) more effectively controls for unmeasured country and time‐invariant processes than previous research. We find that in countries that have instituted greater religious accommodations, Muslim respondents generally report higher levels of religiosity. Interestingly, we also find that the greater institutionalization of religious accommodations for Muslims also impacts the subjective religiosity levels of Protestant majorities. We find no effect for Catholic respondents.
Der Umfang, in dem es einem politischen System gelingt, dem normativen Grundsatz des Pluralismus gerecht zu werden, ist ein relevanter Maßstab für dessen demokratische Legitimität. Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert aus demokratietheoretischer Perspektive die Bedeutung sowie die legitimitätsrelevanten Problemlagen von zwei Dimensionen empirischer Pluralität in modernen Gesellschaften: (1) der Meinungsvielfalt und (2) der gesellschaftlichen Pluralität, im Sinne der vielfältigen sozialen Zugehörigkeiten der Mitglieder einer Gesellschaft. Darüber hinaus erörtert der Beitrag, welcher Umgang mit neuen (migrantischen) Mitgliedern der Gesellschaft legitimitätspolitisch geboten ist. Legitimitätsrelevante Probleme ergeben sich vor allem dann, wenn in einem politischen System politische Beteiligungs- und gesellschaftliche Teilhabechancen durch soziale Zugehörigkeiten vorbestimmt sind – oder Teile der Bevölkerung eine Schlechterstellung anderer Mitglieder der Gesellschaft einfordern und damit den liberaldemokratischen Konsens der Gleichheit und Freiheit für alle negieren. Ein Abgleich der demokratietheoretischen Erkenntnisse mit den Umfrageergebnissen aus dem Demokratiemonitor (2019) zeigt grundsätzlich eine starke Affirmation zum demokratischen Grundprinzip des Pluralismus. Allerdings fordert ein gutes Drittel der Befragten eine Schlechterbehandlung von Migrantinnen, die sich nicht mit liberaldemokratischen Grundsätzen vereinbaren lässt. Davon abgesehen verdeutlichen die Umfrageergebnisse auch, dass ein kritisches Bewusstsein dafür entstanden ist, dass die Bundesrepublik Nachholbedarf hat, allen sozialen Gruppen nicht nur formalrechtlich, sondern auch tatsächlich dieselben politischen und gesellschaftlichen Teilhabechancen zu ermöglichen.
Immigrant organizations play a central role in the political behavior of immigrants in host societies. Local organizations often serve as a bridge between local authorities and immigrant constituencies, providing authorities with access to the immigrant communities and representing collective interests of immigrants. The organizing process of immigrants is therefore of particular importance to understanding the political behavior and political positions of immigrant communities. Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie (1999, 2001; Fennema 2004; Tillie 2004) have suggested that immigrant groups with a relatively high number of ethnic organizations, which are well connected through a dense network, can be characterized as more civic than those with fewer organizations and fewer networks. Networks among immigrant organizations are critical to a civic community, primarily because they create channels for communication. This process of community building is based on an accumulation of trust among organizations, achieved through the communication channels and an exchange of norms and values (Fennema and Tillie 2001). Fennema and Tillie also assumed that social trust among ethnic communities is carried over into a sense of trust in local political institutions, but only if immigrant community leaders in the ethnic elite are adequately integrated in the local political system. The basic idea here is that the greater the number of interconnected organizations an immigrant group has, the more this group can be considered civic. A subsequent question is whether, within more civic immigrant groups, immigrants will also prove to be more politically active on the individual level. Fennema and Tillie's study of immigrant groups in Amsterdam seemed to suggest this relationship: of all the city's immigrant groups, Turks have established the densest and most extended network of organizations and have proved the most politically active group of immigrants (Fennema and Tillie 1999, 2001). This chapter takes on these ideas by looking at the influence of the host state on the immigrant organizing process, and seeks to learn how immigrant organizing affects the political behavior of individual immigrants. The focus here is on Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and Berlin from 1970 to 2000. This was the period during which a Turkish organizational structure first emerged in both cities and simultaneously developed, albeit in different ways. In the early 1980s, the Netherlands implemented a multicultural regime that was meant to integrate the growing immigrant population: newcomers could obtain Dutch citizenship with relative ease and ethnic minorities' right to maintain their cultural identities was recognized. By contrast, Germany's approach could be characterized as one of exclusion: by making naturalization difficult, immigrants and their descendants were denied access to the political community and, in general, little appreciation was shown for cultural diversity (Koopmans and Statham 2000). After 2000, the political environment for the Turkish communities in both cities changed significantly. Amsterdam witnessed a multicultural backlash, as did the rest of the Netherlands. In Berlin, multicultural practices slowly became institutionalized in local integration policies (Vermeulen and Stotijn 2007).1 This analysis will also examine the relationship between degrees of group civicness and the political behavior of individual Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam and in Berlin. We first analyze the impact of different policies and institutional environments on the Turkish organizing process in Amsterdam and in Berlin. We find that Turks in Amsterdam have established a relatively high number of organizations compared with those in Berlin. Amsterdam's Turks have also established a more civic associational community: The network structure of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam is characterized by numerous horizontal ties, as measured by interlocking directorates among board members. By contrast, Berlin's organizational structure is more ideologically polarized and hierarchical: few powerful organizations are included and extreme ideological organizations are excluded. In other words, different host state environments have produced divergent Turkish organizational landscapes. We then examine whether differences in organizational networks affect political participation and political influence, demonstrating how Turkish organizations in Amsterdam have had more opportunities to influence policy making and how they seem to be better incorporated in the local political system. One example is that many Amsterdam politicians of Turkish descent have been active board members in at least one of the many local Turkish organizations. Our research also shows that, at the individual level, membership in Turkish organizations has a positive influence on the degree of political participation by individual Turks in their host societies. This is true in both cities. Turks who are active in Turkish organizations are more likely to respond proactively to political issues at the national level.2 However, in contrast to our expectations going into this project, and those of the literature, we did not find a necessary relationship between the degree of group civicness and individual political activity. Although Amsterdam has a more civic Turkish community than Berlin does, based on the number and ties of Turkish organizations, Turks in Amsterdam prove less politically active on an individual basis. It seems that a higher degree of group inclusion in Amsterdam relieves the city's Turkish organizations from a duty to mobilize their ethnic constituency. Turks' inclusion came not as the result of ethnic mobilization, but as a by-product of Dutch institutions and policies. Indeed, per haps because their organizations and leaders are more incorporated in the political system than their counterparts in Berlin, Amsterdam's Turkish immigrants have had fewer incentives as individuals to become politically active. Turkish immigrants in Berlin have had, perhaps, more reasons to be politically active. They, along with their organizations, have had to face a greater struggle to become politically incorporated than their counterparts in Amsterdam. Because Berlin's Turkish organizations do not have access to the local political system, there is greater demand for a politically active community that will work to provide them with additional tools for access.We show that more Turks in Berlin are members of Turkish organizations than Turks in Amsterdam, and that it is the hierarchical network of organizations in Berlin that seems to enhance ethnic mobilization. Still, it is worth noting that Amsterdam's Turks seemed more inclined to trust the political system than those in Berlin, which is also what Fennema and Tillie's research would anticipate. Our research endeavors to provide an answer for these different patterns of political participation and political trust by pointing to the relatively high degree of Turkish organizations that are incorporated in Amsterdam's political system. In Berlin, Turkish organizations contend with being more detached from the policy makers in their host state, a distance that enables them to act with greater independence and autonomy, but also a distance that encourages Berlin's Turks and their organizations to be more distrustful toward their city politicians. This analysis evokes Rahsaan Maxwell's findings (chapter 5, this volume) from his study of ethnic Caribbean political organizations in Britain and France: The inclusion or the exclusion of immigrant organizations in the political system plays a large role in motivating their strategies. Seeking to understand the political behavior of immigrants at the local level, this comparative study demonstrates the utility of measuring an immigrant group's civicness, both in terms of the number of organizations that belong to its network and its structure.
HE importance of social trust has become widely accepted in the social sciences. One reason for the interest in social trust is that, as measured in surveys, it correlates with a number of other variables that are normatively highly desirable. At the individual level, people who believe that in general most other people in their society can be trusted are also more inclined to have a positive view of their democratic in- stitutions, to participate more in politics, and to be more active in civic organizations. They also give more to charity and are more tolerant toward minorities and to people who are not like themselves. Trusting people also tend to be more optimistic about their own ability to influ- ence their own life chances and, not least important, to be more happy with how their life is going. 1
This chapter introduces a new framework for testing the recognition/redistribution hypothesis. It develops an index of twentythree different types of MCPs that have been adopted for three different types of minority groups (immigrants, national minorities, and indigenous peoples). Western countries are then categorized in terms of their level of MCPs. Whether countries with higher levels of MCPs have faced an erosion of the welfare state as compared to countries with lower levels of MCPs is tested. It is shown that there is no negative correlation between the strength of a country's commitment to MCPs and its ability to sustain welfare spending or economic redistribution. The chapter also examines the heterogeneity/redistribution hypothesis, and shows that this too is overstated. In general, the size of immigrant groups, national minorities, and indigenous peoples in Western countries does not affect a country's ability to sustain its welfare commitments, although a rapid change in the size of immigrant groups does seem to have an effect. Yet even here, the authors of this chapter argue, there are hints that adopting MCPs can help to mitigate whatever negative effect a rapidly increasing immigrant population may have.
This article examines why people violate rationality and take part in their communities, differentiating by types of participation, particularly political versus other, more communal types of participation. The authors argue that trust plays an important role in participation levels, but contrary to more traditional models, the causal relationship runs from trust to participation. In addition, the authors posit that trust is strongly affected by economic inequality. Using aggregated American state-level data for the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the authors present a series of two-stage least squares models on the effects of inequality and trust on participation, controlling for other related factors. Findings indicate that inequality is the strongest determinant of trust and that trust has a greater effect on communal participation than on political participation.
Americans not only bowl less today than they did fifty years ago, but also some bowl more than others. This is one of the major and simple messages of Robert Putnam's influential study of social capital in America. Using a variety of data sources, Putnam documents a significant variation in the states' levels of social capital, while arguing for specific general causes of the decline of social capital across the United States. Here, we evaluate the power of Putnam's theory in explaining state-level variation of stocks of social capital. We find that the strongest determinants of social capital levels are basic social and economic differences between states, such as education, church membership, farming and unemployment. Controlling for these determinants, we also find no evidence for a much-debated link between diversity and social capital.
Since the publication of Putnam's book, a growing quantitative literature on social capital has contributed to a much more nuanced and theoretically precise understanding of the link between social capital and the quality of American democracy. Pamela Paxton, as well as Dora Costa and Matthew Kahn, have re-examined Putnam's finding of the aggregate decline in social capital in the United States since the 1960s. Putnam's claim that higher levels of social capital improve the functioning of democracy on the state level has been examined systematically by, among others, Stephen Knack and Tom W. Rice. On a methodological level, Eric M. Uslaner has argued for a need to disaggregate different concepts of trust, and focus on generalized social trust and its effect on making democracy more effective.
Recent findings show an apparent erosion in the United States over the post-war years of ‘social capital’ understood as the propensity of individuals to associate together on a regular basis, to trust one another, and to engage in community affairs. This article examines the British case for
similar trends, finding no equivalent erosion. It proposes explanations for the resilience of social capital in Britain, rooted in educational reform, the transformation of the class structure, and government policy. It concludes by drawing some general lessons from the British case that stress the importance of the distributive dimensions of social capital and the impact that governments
can have on it.
This paper tests hypotheses concerning the effects of economic factors on public opinion toward immigration policy. Using the 1992 and 1994 National Election Study surveys, probit models are employed to test diverse conceptualizations of the effects of economic adversity and anxiety on opposition to immigration. The results indicate that personal economic circumstances play little role in opinion formation, but beliefs about the state of the national economy, anxiety over taxes, and generalized feelings about Hispanics and Asians, the major immigrant groups, are significant determinants of restrictionist sentiment. This restricted role of economic motives rooted in one's personal circumstances held true across ethnic groups, among residents in communities with different numbers of foreign-born, and in both 1992 and 1994.
This paper presents a large-scale, comprehensive test of generalized trust across 31 nations. I pay particular attention to
the theory and measurement of voluntary associations in promoting trust, hypothesizing that voluntary associations connected
to other voluntary associations are more beneficial for the creation of generalized trust than associations isolated from
other associations. The theory is tested with a multi-level, cross-national model, including both individual-level and country-level
variables to predict the placement of trust. At the individual level, I find that membership in connected associations creates
more trust than membership in isolated associations. At the national level, having more connected voluntary associations increases
trust, while having more isolated associations decreases trust.
This article focuses on the core theory recently proposed by Putnam on the relationship between ethnic diversity and dimensions of social capital. Hypotheses are derived from this theory, but also from other theories that propose competing hypotheses on relationships between national characteristics and dimensions of social capital. Essentially, the authors propose more rigorous empirical tests of Putnam's hypotheses by including these competing hypotheses: tests of these hypotheses provide possibilities to evaluate Putnam's and these other theories in terms of general (i.e. cross-national) tenability for the European continent. The general question is: To what extent do national-level characteristics like ethnic diversity, next to other national characteristics, actually affect dimensions of social capital of individual citizens in European countries? The authors set out to answer this question by testing hypotheses on cross-national data from 28 European countries. These data contain valid measurements of a number of dimensions of social capital. The individual-level data are enriched with contextual- (i.e. national-) level characteristics to be included in more advanced multilevel analyses. The main finding is that Putnam's hypothesis on ethnic diversity must be refuted in European societies. Instead, it is found that economic inequality and the national history of continuous democracy in European societies turn out to be more important for explaining cross-national differences in social capital in Europe.
Surveys suggest an erosion of trust in government, among individuals, and between groups. Although these trends are often thought to be bad for democracy, the relationship between democracy and trust is paradoxical. Trust can develop where interests converge, but in politics interests conflict. Democracy recognizes that politics does not provide a natural terrain for robust trust relations, and so includes a healthy distrust of the interests of others, especially the powerful. Democratic systems institutionalize distrust by providing many opportunities for citizens to oversee those empowered with the public trust. At the same time, trust is a generic social building block of collective action, and for this reason alone democracy cannot do without trust. At a minimum, democratic institutions depend on a trust among citizens sufficient for representation, resistance, and alternative forms of governance. Bringing together social science and political theory, this book provides a valuable exploration of these central issues.
This book explores the difference in the distributive policies of the United States and Europe. It seeks answers to why Americans are less willing than Europeans to redistribute from the rich to the poor. It finds that redistribution is influenced by political institutions, ethnic heterogeneity, and beliefs about the nature of poverty.
In many Western democracies, ethnic and racial minorities have demanded, and sometimes achieved, greater recognition and accommodation of their identities. This is reflected in the adoption of multiculturalism policies for immigrant groups, the acceptance of territorial autonomy and language rights for national minorities, and the recognition of land claims and self-government rights for indigenous peoples. These claims for recognition have been controversial, in part because of fears that they make it more difficult to sustain a robust welfare state by eroding the interpersonal trust, social solidarity and political coalitions that sustain redistribution. Are these fears of a conflict between a 'politics of recognition' and a 'politics of redistribution' valid? This book aims to test this question empirically, using both cross-national statistical analyses of the relationships among diversity policies, public attitudes and the welfare state, and case studies of the recognition/redistribution linkage in the political coalitions in particular countries, including the United States, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, and in Latin America. These studies suggest that that there is no general or inherent tendency for recognition to undermine redistribution, and that the relationship between these two forms of politics can be supportive as well as competitive, depending on the context. These findings shed light, not only on the nature and effects of multiculturalism, but also on wider debates about the social and political foundations of the welfare state, and indeed about our most basic concepts of citizenship and national identity.
Diverse Communities is a critique of Robert Putnam's social capital thesis, re-examined from the perspective of women and cultural minorities in America over the last century. Barbara Arneil argues that the idyllic communities of the past were less positive than Putnam envisions and that the current 'collapse' in participation is better understood as change rather than decline. Arneil suggests that the changes in American civil society in the last half century are not so much the result of generational change or television as the unleashing of powerful economic, social and cultural forces that, despite leading to division and distrust within American society, also contributed to greater justice for women and cultural minorities. She concludes by proposing that the lessons learned from this fuller history of American civil society provide the normative foundation to enumerate the principles of justice by which diverse communities might be governed in the twenty-first century.
Voluntary association membership varies dramatically among nations, by both the number and the type of associations that people join. Two distinctions account for much of this variation: (1) the distinction between statist versus nonstatist (sometimes called "liberal") societies, and (2) the distinction between corporate versus noncorporate societies. These two dimensions summarize historically evolved differences in state structure, political institutions, and culture of nations that channel, legitimate (or deligitimate), and encourage (or discourage) various types of associational activity. Membership in associations in 32 countries is examined using data from the 1991 World Values Survey; hierarchical models estimate the effects of individual-level and country-level factors on individual association membership. Results show that statism constraints individual associational activity of all types, particularly in "new" social movement associations. Corporateness positively affects membership, particularly for "old" social movements. Finally, temporal trends indicate some convergence toward Anglo-American patterns of association.
We test the hypothesis, dating from the work of Weber and Tocqueville, that Americans are more likely to become involved in voluntary associations than people of other nations. Compared to previous work, we employ more recent data and consider more countries. We also examine several different measures of membership levels: all memberships versus working memberships as well as membership including and excluding church or union memberships. Cross-national differences are examined before and after controls for education, employment status, size of community, gender, marital status, and age. Results show Americans at or near the top on most measures of membership, although this ranking drops significantly when church membership is excluded and drops even further when only working memberships are examined. In these instances, people from several countries, including Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, and Sweden, equal or surpass the membership levels of Americans, especially when controls are introduced. Some alternative interpretations of the cross-national differences in voluntary association activity are considered.
Levels of voluntary association membership for 33 democratic countries are compared using data from surveys of nationally representative samples of adults from the 1990s. Four explanations of national differences in association involvement are identified and tested: economic development, religious composition, type of polity, and years of continuous democracy. The analyses consider total and working association memberships, both including and excluding unions and religious associations. Americans volunteer at rates above the average for all nations on each measure, but they are often matched and surpassed by those of several other countries, notably the Netherlands, Canada, and a number of Nordic nations, including Iceland, Sweden, and Norway. Hierarchical linear models show that voluntarism tends to be particularly high in nations that have: (1) multidenominational Christian or predominantly Protestant religious compositions, (2) prolonged and continuous experience with democratic institutions, (3) social democratic or liberal democratic political systems, and (4) high levels of economic development. With some exceptions for working memberships, these factors, both separately and in combination, are clearly important predictors of cross-national variation in voluntary association membership.
This book explores the rights and situations of ethnocultural groups in Western democracies. It presents essays that share three major themes: the dialectic of nation building and minority rights, the gap between theory and practice of liberal democracies; and the effectiveness of emerging forms of nation-building and minority rights in Western democracies. The book is divided into four parts. Part I presents debates on the rights of ethnocultural minorities. Part II discusses the requirements for ethnocultural justices in a liberal democracy. Part III examines liberals’ misconceptions about nationalism. Part IV focuses on how democratic citizenship can be sustained.
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Current democratic theory and recent international policy initiatives reveal an intense interest in the relationship between social capital and democracy. This interest is the most recent variant of a long theoretical tradition positing that a vigorous associational life is beneficial for the creation and maintenance of democracy. Despite the popularity of this view, little quantitative empirical evidence exists to support the relationship. Here, the relationship between social capital and democracy is tested using data from a large, quantitative, cross-national study. Two additional tests are introduced. First, the plausible reciprocal effect-from democracy to social capital-is included in models. Second, the potentially negative impact of some associations on democracy is considered. Using data from the World Values Survey and the Union of International Associations in a cross-lagged panel design, results show that social capital affects democracy and that democracy affects social capital. Additional tests demonstrate that associations that are connected to the larger community have a positive effect on democracy, while isolated associations have a negative effect. Theory relating social capital to democracy is drawn from the literature on civil society, political culture, and social movements.
Following the work of Blumer (1958), I extend and test a theory of prejudice based on perceived threats to dominant racial or national groups by subordinate groups. Perceived threat is hypothesized to be a function of economic conditions and of the size of the subordinate group relative to the dominant group. I test the group-threat theory using a multilevel model that combines population data with survey results on attitudes towards immigrants and racial minorities from Eurobarometer Survey 30. "Group threat" explains most of the variation in average prejudice scores across the 12 countries in the sample and has a small but statistically significant effect on the influence of certain individual-level variables on prejudice. These results demonstrate the importance of perceived intergroup threat in the formation of prejudicial attitudes and suggest a re-interpretation of past findings on the relations between individual characteristics and expressions of prejudice.
The Moral Foundations of Trust seeks to explain why people place their faith in strangers, and why doing so matters. Trust is a moral value that does not depend upon personal experience or on interacting with people in civic groups or informal socializing. Instead, we learn to trust from our parents, and trust is stable over long periods of time. Trust depends on an optimistic world view: the world is a good place and we can make it better. Trusting people are more likely to give through charity and volunteering. Trusting societies are more likely to redistribute resources from the rich to the poor. Trust has been in decline in the United States for over 30 years. The roots of this decline are traceable to declining optimism and increasing economic inequality, which Uslaner supports by aggregate time series in the United States and cross-sectional data across market economies.
It is racism that has undermined the War on Poverty declared by Lyndon Johnson, and the country must come to terms with its history of racism if there is to be any hope of accomplishing welfare reform today. American social policy has continually foundered on issues of race. The antipoverty efforts begun by the Johnson administration were never fully realized because they became entwined with the civil rights movement, and triggered a white backlash. The shift of emphasis from all the poor to those disadvantaged by racial and ethnic bias alienated some white working-class Americans. Recognizing the disenchantment of the white middle class, the Nixon administration began to cut back welfare reform. Among the discussions of equal employment opportunity and political influences, the exploration of the politics of motherhood is particularly interesting. By the end of the 1960s, child care policy had also become embroiled in the struggle for racial equality. Day care and aid to families with dependent children became associated with minority issues, to the eventual detriment of such programs. (Contains 31 references.) (SLD)
In recent years an impressive amount of evidence
has been collected documenting a negative relationship between levels of
ethnic diversity and social capital indicators, in particular generalized
trust. In this article we raise a number of theoretical arguments that
should be addressed before these findings can be generalized. First, it
has to be remembered that most of these studies focus on generalized trust
as a social capital indicator, while trust probably is most vulnerable for
the effects of weakening homogeneity. Second, it is argued that in order
to arrive at a better understanding of the relation between diversity and
social capital, at least three intermediary variables need to be taken
into account: 1) the question whether diversity entails segregation of
networks at the individual level; 2) the increase in diversity rather than
the absolute level; 3) the regimes societies use to govern diversity, and
especially the variation with regard to the openness of these regimes. We
close by exploring the suggestion that in more diverse societies,
recognition of group differences and identities, and group relations based
on equality-based concepts of reciprocity should be considered as
potentially more meaningful strategies.
This article discusses the theory
and practice of multicultural
citizenship in liberal states.
Regarding theory, I point to the
shortcomings of both ‘radical’
and ‘liberal’ approaches to justify
minority rights. Regarding practice,
the state-centered notion of
multicultural citizenship defects
from the decentered accommodation
of multicultural minority
claims in functionnally differentiated
societies. It also runs
counter to a trend toward
de-ethnicization in liberal states,
in which the cultural impositions
of the majority on minority
groups are growing thin, thus
removing the case for minority
rights.
Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe. By Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005. 376p. $75.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.
This is a well-written, rigorous, empirical contribution to scholarship on immigration and ethnic relations in post–World War II Europe. The study adds particular value through its grounded evaluation of basic assumptions concerning multiculturalism. Ruud Koopmans and colleagues coded political claims of migrant, extreme-right, and pro-migrant/anti-racist actors in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, as reported in a prominent newspaper in each country. These data inform the authors' assessment of whether migrant group makeup, national conceptions of citizenship, or supranational institutions drive the various actors' political behavior. The authors conclude that different national citizenship models best explain variations in political claims making. Postwar migration to Western Europe generates intense political conflict, according to the authors, because it raises questions about basic aspects of national sovereignty, including border control, citizenship attribution, and the principles of nationhood.
“Social capital” is said to be strongly associated with better substantive outcomes as well as with civic and economic dimensions of equality in the United States. Robert Putnam argues in Bowling Alone that “the American states with the highest levels of social capital are precisely the states most characterized by economic and civic equality.” He adds: “[B]oth across space [i.e., states] and across time, equality and fraternity [social capital] are strongly positively correlated …. [T]he empirical evidence on recent trends is unambiguous …. Community and equality are mutually reinforcing, not mutually incompatible.”. © 2003, by the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.
The analysis of intergenerational mobility has primarily used mea-sures of social position that are functions of an individual's occu-pation. Occupation-based models of social mobility, however, have limitations that arguably have grown in recent decades. Meta-anal-ysis of available evidence for Sweden, western Germany, and the United States concerning occupational mobility, household income mobility, job displacement, union dissolution, and poverty dynamics shows the limitations of the individual-level occupation-based ca-reer-trajectory approach to life course mobility. This article develops an alternative formulation at the household level, which focuses on cross-national variation in the extent to which societal institutions influence the rate of events with the potential to change a house-hold's life conditions via the manipulation of incentives for mobility-generating events, and the extent to which they mitigate the con-sequences of these events through social insurance. The combination of these institutional processes produces the distinctive character-istics of the mobility regimes of these countries.
This paper provides an overview of the mushrooming economics literature on how community attributes influence the level of civic engagement. Since 1997, at least fifteeen empirical papers have investigated the consequences of heterogeneity for social capital. Social capital has been measured using indicators of group participation such as volunteer activity, organizational membership and activity, entertaining and visiting friends and relatives, and voting and indicators of the strength of network ties such as trust. These papers cover different nations, different social capital measures, and even different centuries. But a common theme emerges across these fifteen studies. More homogeneous communities foster greater levels of social capital production. We provide an overview of this literature and then focus on synthesizing our past work on volunteering and membership with new findings on trust and voting.
Ethnic diversity is increasing in most advanced countries, driven mostly by sharp increases in immigration. In the long run immigration and diversity are likely to have important cultural, economic, fiscal, and developmental benefits. In the short run, however, immigration and ethnic diversity tend to reduce social solidarity and social capital. New evidence from the US suggests that in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods residents of all races tend to ‘hunker down’. Trust (even of one's own race) is lower, altruism and community cooperation rarer, friends fewer. In the long run, however, successful immigrant societies have overcome such fragmentation by creating new, cross-cutting forms of social solidarity and more encompassing identities. Illustrations of becoming comfortable with diversity are drawn from the US military, religious institutions, and earlier waves of American immigration.
While the positive consequences of social capital and civil society are widely accepted and appreciated, the question of how they originate and can be sustained has received relatively little attention from scholars. In this study, we approach this question from a cross-national and individual-level perspective by examining how population heterogeneity in the form of ethnic and linguistic diversity affects citizenship behavior, measured by cognitive and interpersonal engagement about politics, membership in voluntary associations, and interpersonal trust. Based on data collected in 44 countries, our analyses show that heterogeneity does affect the quality of civil society in a country. However, indicators of population heterogeneity do not have uniformly positive or negative effects on individual-level measures of civil society—while they reduce some, they shore up others.
As events highlight deep divisions in attitudes between America and Europe, this is a very timely study of different approaches to the problems of domestic inequality and poverty. Based on careful and systematic analysis of national data, the authors describe just how much the two continents differ in their level of State engagement in the redistribution of income. Discussing various possible economic explanations for the difference, they cover different levels of pre-tax income, openness, and social mobility; they survey politico-historical differences such as the varying physical size of nations, their electoral and legal systems, and the character of their political parties, as well as their experiences of war; and they examine sociological explanations, which include different attitudes to the poor and notions of social responsibility. Most importantly, they address attitudes to race, calculating that attitudes to race explain half the observed difference in levels of public redistribution of income. This important and provocative analysis will captivate academic and serious lay readers in economics and welfare systems.
The popularity of the concept of social capital has been accompanied by increasing controversy about its actual meaning and effects. I consider here the alternative applications of the concept as an attribute of individuals vs. collectivities and discuss the extent to which causal propositions formulated at each level are logically sound. I present some empirical evidence illustrating the possibility that, despite the current popularity of the concept, much of its alleged benefits may be spurious after controlling for other factors. Implications of this analysis and results for theory and policy are discussed.
Canadian research is seriously scarce in the fast-growing literature on social trust—defined as the degree to which one can trust others whom one does not know personally. In this article, we have tried to address this issue by examining the levels of trust in various Canadian provinces and cities. The study shows that the level of trust in Canada rises as one moves away from the centre and toward both west and east coasts, and that the trust levels are alarmingly low for cities in the province of Quebec. We have also made an attempt to further our understanding of the dynamics of social trust, by looking at the determinants of trust at the city level. The factors examined are: the city’s population, the size of its immigrant population, average income of residents, the extent of income inequality, and the degree of its ethnic diversity. Out of these, the positive relationship found between ethnic diversity and social trust—that is, as the former rises, the latter increases as well—constitutes a uniquely Canadian trend, which is in contrast to what the existing literature on social trust suggests. Moreover, within Canada, Quebec appears as an anomaly, given the extremely low levels of trust in cities located in this province. Also, within Quebec, Montreal seems to be in a class by itself, showing the unusual combination of high diversity and low trust. Although some speculative hypotheses are proposed to explain some of these trends, the anomalies found warrant particular attention in future research.
Video-based media spaces are designed to support casual interaction between intimate collaborators. Yet transmitting video is fraught with privacy concerns. Some researchers suggest that the video stream be filtered to mask out potentially sensitive ...