The Political Economy of Imperialism, Decolonization and Development

Abstract

Nations have historically sought power and prosperity through control of physical space. In recent decades, however, this has largely ceased. Most states that could do so appear relucant, while the weak cannot expand. This article presents a theory of imperialism and decolonization that explains both historic cycles of expansion and decline and the collective demise of the urge to colonize. Technological shocks enable expansion, while rising labour costs and the dynamics of military technology gradually dilute imperial advantage. Simultaneously, economic development leads to a secular decline in payoffs for appropriating land, minerals and capital. Once conquest no longer pays great powers, the systemic imperative to integrate production vertically also becomes archaic.

Full text

The Political Economy of Imperialism,
Decolonization, and Development∗
Erik Gartzke†Dominic Rohner‡
25 April 2010
Abstract
Nations have historically sought power and prosperity through control of physical space. In
recent decades, however, territorial empire has largely ceased. Most states that can take and hold
territory no longer appear eager to do so, while the weak are unable to expand. Have powerful
countries become “kinder and gentler,” or has something fundamental changed about the logic
of empire? We offer a theory of imperialism and decolonization that explains both historic cycles
of expansion and decline and the demise of the urge to colonize. Technological shocks enable
expansion, while rising labor costs and the dynamics of military technology gradually dilutes
imperial advantage. At the same time, economic development has led to a secular decline in the
payoffs for appropriating land, minerals, and capital. Once conquest no longer pays for great
powers, the systemic imperative to vertically integrate production also becomes archaic.
∗We thank Victor Asal, Alexander Cooley, Eugene Gholz, Lucy Goodhart, three referees and the editor for
comments. Vsevolod Gunitskiy provided research assistance. A version of this paper was presented at the meeting
of the Peace Science Society (International) in Columbus, Ohio, November 10-12, 2006. Dominic Rohner gratefully
acknowledges financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF grant no. 100014-122636). All
data and a STATA “do” file that replicates the analysis are available from the authors upon publication.
†University of California, San Diego. E-mail: egartzke@ucsd.edu.
‡University of Zurich. E-mail: drohner@iew.uzh.ch.

Other nations in history have fought in foreign lands and remained to occupy and exploit.
Americans, following a battle, want nothing more than to return home – George W. Bush
1 Introduction
Two recent US wars in the Middle East reawakened discussions of American Empire.1In contrast
to traditional patterns, however, the United States appears to have no desire to acquire more ter-
ritory. Whether empire requires physical expansion and colonization, or simply “effective control”
of another society,2seems to us to be largely definitional.3Labeling US motives and practices as
imperial, hegemonic, or something else is perhaps less critical than attempting to understand why
such behavior exists and evolves over time.4We seek to explain the acquisition or abandonment
of colonial holdings, offering an account that ties together the rise and fall of territorial expansion
with the current US penchant for influence rather than long-term occupation. Developed nations
exhibit little of the traditional preoccupation with obtaining land and resources through force. The
appeal of colonial holdings evaporated for leading nations by the mid-twentieth century. Rather
than reflecting an exception to traditional tendencies, US efforts represent a secular change in the
imperatives of power; owning land or minerals matters much less than guiding the global commons.
One of the defining characteristics of the modern world has been the cycle of European empire.
In it, the familiar pattern of expansion and contraction is readily discernible.5Yet, while acts
viewed as “imperialist” may persist today, no nation or set of nations have come forward to pick up
the gauntlet of empire. The world’s richest and most powerful countries show little interest in the
continuous administration of foreign territory, as opposed to attempting to influence, intimidate, or
coerce foreign sovereigns and polities. These same powers are also vigorously opposed to allowing
other countries to pursue any territorial ambitions. What some have labeled a norm of territorial
integrity seems to us to require further explanation.6What motivates an end of empire? Can
we expect this phenomenon to continue or will the future return to historical patterns of imperial
growth and decay? The notion of American Exceptionalism implies that other, less “exceptional”
nations will someday resurrect these more traditional patterns. China or India, for example, might
use growing economic and military potential to expand at the expense of their neighbors. Alter-
1

nately, rising powers may find that control of physical space is best accomplished by proxy, ensuring
that other countries accommodate Beijing or Delhi, rather than by actually having to conquer, and
administer, marginally productive places that are geographically distant from the metropolis.
We offer a theory of imperialism and decolonization based on the dynamics of systemic struc-
ture, military technology and economic development. Random capability shocks create military
advantages that gradually decay as insights or equipment disseminate, or as accumulating capital
forces a change in the logic of military organization that dilutes initial military advantages. Military
capability shocks by themselves can explain the cycle of empire, but not the secular trend away
from territorial expansion. A second feature, economic development, has led nations gradually to
prefer commerce to conquest. Capital abundance makes empire expensive, shifting incentives away
from appropriating inputs to production and toward efforts to influence the terms under which
nations interact. A third element explains the timing and rapidity of decolonization. Conquest
imparts political control that invites the vertical integration of economic processes. Mercantilism
in turn impels other countries to acquire or maintain colonies in order to access markets and inputs
to production. This imperialist prisoners’ dilemma is reversed once influential actors prefer free
market policies, allowing other countries to abandon empire as well. The theory predicts that ter-
ritorial empire is archaic. Power in the modern world derives from productivity, rather than from
raw materials. The lust for land could return, however, if inputs again become scarce, if military
technology lowers occupation costs, or if powerful nations fail to perpetuate and abet open markets.
2 Literature: Tropes of Empire
Lasting over three and one half centuries, the age of imperialism profoundly shaped the modern
world. The classical practice of territorial expansion virtually ended soon after World War II, but
the institutions and economies of the often contrived successor nations formed to manage abandoned
colonial holdings remain heavily conditioned by their dependency.7Territorial imperialism has been
widely criticized both during,8and after its formal practice.9Considerable attention also focused
on the consequences of decolonization.10 Yet, while many scholars examine the origins of empire,11
its practice,12 or demise,13 less effort has been devoted to relating historical cycles of expansion and
2

decay to the secular, and precipitous, terminus of territorial empire in the mid-twentieth century.14
Explorations of contemporary imperialism seem more rhetorical and didactic than deductive or
analytical.15 Discussion of American empire has ebbed and flowed with shifting US power,16 and
with a variable landscape of international actors.17 Careful research has focused on an evolving
logic of hierarchy,18 or on the role of U.S. hegemony in deterring territorial aggression.19 Absent is
an account of why, in fact, things are not more like they used to be.
2.1 Explanations for Imperialism
Explanations for empire focus on the demand of the metropolis for riches, resources, markets,
or jobs; on the supply of targets for conquest; or on system-level factors that condition colonial
opportunities or demand.20 Hobson, Lenin, and others claimed that the imperial impetus comes
from over-extended capitalism.21 Snyder views instead political and military elites as the cause of
empire, while jingoistic propaganda deceives the masses.22 Dependency theorists shift the emphasis
to political tensions and economic incentives on the periphery.23 Agents co-opted by the metropolis
undermine developing nations. A third category of argument involves structural theories from
realists,24 to Marxist historians like Wallerstein,25 to long cycle theorists.26 Empires expand or
contract in an organic fashion, responding in an unending cycle of world power or prosperity.
2.2 Explanations for Decolonization
Scholarship on the end of empire can be grouped by supply-side, demand-side, and system-structural
approaches. Some researchers emphasize domestic politics in the metropolis.27 The need of landed
nobles to provide employment for “second sons” may have dissipated with the rise of other more
fungible forms of property. Alternately, democracy itself may have shifted the domestic political
calculus. A second perspective emphasizes colonial resistance and/or the decline of the European
educated “comprador” class of native elites.28 Finally, other researchers favor international factors,
such as the “demonstration effect” of initial Japanese victories over the western colonial powers in
World War II, or the rise of an anti-imperialist bipolar system during the Cold War.29
3

2.3 Putting Together Growth and Decay
Students of world affairs have long been interested in the rise and fall of great powers.30 The
World-Economy approach has been particularly influential in conjunction with the dependency
theory.31 Inequality varies between core and periphery.32 Economic stagnation leads to imperial
conquest, while booms reduce interest in colonial holdings. The world-economy model thus pays
more attention to long economic cycles than to the variable costs of colonial occupation.
Economic determinists stress that imperialism is the inevitable product of capitalist expansion.33
Changes in the economies of capitalist countries forced Western powers to seek dependencies that
continue today in the post-colonial periphery.34 However, Marxist thinkers in particular are less
interested in explicating the forces driving divestment of colonial holdings.
Institutionalism emphasizes political and social factors as the leading determinants of imperial
growth and decay.35 Empire and decolonization result from shifting power relations among benefi-
ciaries and those hurt by colonialism.36 Competition is intensified by political liberalization in the
metropolis,37 or by metropolitan cultural traditions.38 Yet, institutionalists face a heavy burden in
explaining the persistent impotence of anti-colonialist ideas, as well as their sudden salience. Rapid
decolonization, in a context of dramatic economic change suggests the value of economic incentives
in bolstering institutionalist arguments. Indeed, as the other two approaches make clear, many
view the colonial enterprise as fundamentally economic, even as other factors play significant roles.
Only a few studies attempt to explore intensively the micro-foundations for colonial expansion
and decline. According to Grossman and Iyigun, investments in colonies could be profitable due
to monopoly rents, provided that the risk of insurrection is low.39 Increasing the insurrection
technology or size of local populations could make colonization unprofitable, eventually triggering
an abandonment of empire.40 These studies rely on largely exogenous changes in the colony to
explain the end of empire. Nationalism or insurgency could make colonialism more expensive.41
But these same challenges confront domestic sovereigns who nevertheless strive to retain power. It
seems unlikely that these changes alone explain the rapid and widespread divestment of colonial
holdings. The question of why modernity has trended away from empire remains to be explained.
4

3 Territory Ain’t What it Used to be: Cycles and Trends
We offer a theory combining the flow, ebb, persistence and demise of territorial empire that focuses
on three factors. First, exogenous military capability shocks create the opportunity to reallocate
territory through colonization.42 Second, occupation encourages mercantilist economic policies,
in turn increasing incentives for other nations to acquire colonies. Finally, development produces
a secular decline in the value of colonial holdings, while making occupation less efficient. Other
influences on empire, including democratization in the metropolis, and nationalist sentiments and
resistance movements in the colony are explored in the modeling section and in two appendices.43
3.1 Military Effectiveness: The Onset and Diffusion of Shock and Awe
Anecdote and logic suggest that the advent of empire is closely tied to the ability and incentive to
project power.44 Empire generally begins with new military, economic, transportation, or logistical
technology that suddenly allows one country to conquer and control other states or territories.45 Ca-
pability shocks are thus a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for imperial expansion. Conversely,
military and other advantages borne of technological innovation diffuse over time. Targets of em-
pire have incentives to adapt, absorbing technologies and limiting or eliminating advantages of the
imperial power.46 Unless the imperial power continues to innovate, it eventually declines.47 As one
British historian describes the situation, “we had a comparative advantage as an island seapower.
It was then enlarged and sustained because we secured the further comparative advantage of being
the world’s first industrial nation. These advantages first shrank and then disappeared.”48
European expansion and colonization took place in the context of dramatic increases in the ad-
ministrative, transportation, and military capabilities of European states.49 This transformation,
and its consequences for European politics, are discussed elsewhere.50 Accounts of the origins of
these dramatic increases in capabilities vary. Some authors argue that harsh competition pushed
European powers to develop more powerful arms and armies.51 Others emphasize financial innova-
tions which permitted powerful militaries, and particularly navies.52 Still other research identifies
a symbiosis in which states promoted a European state system, which in turn privileged states as
actors.53 For our purposes, identifying the origins of these innovations is less pertinent than ex-
5

plaining why waves of technological and administrative change propelled adventurers, then armies,
to distant places and why this impetus later ebbed and evaporated, and has not returned.54
The cyclical nature of empire,55 and of military advantage,56 are well established, if somewhat
stylized, empirical facts. What is less well understood is whether there exists variation in the
motivation for empire. Some scholars argue that the urge to conquer is ubiquitous, occurring in
all nations at all times and held in check only by the lack of technological advantage or martial
expertise, or alternatively by mutual deterrence.57 Alternately, one can conceive of the impetus to
empire as particularistic, housed in the aspirations of individual leaders, and thus more the stuff
of historical and biographical research than of social science. We view the preference for territorial
aggression as a variable driven by environmental conditions that can recur or trend over time.
A second aspect of military innovation involves specialization. Armies can be used to fight
and win wars against other armies, or to control the populations and territories of subject places.
Winning at war involves massing military power against critical elements of an opposing force.58
Controlling civilian populations involves exerting limited force in many places at once. Innovations
in military technology presumably influence the classic elements of firepower, mobility, and protec-
tion.59 While the last two elements increase the ability of a military force of a given size to exert
combat power and to control a populated space, the first factor leads optimal force structure in
different directions. Heavy (strategic) bombers and missile cruisers are ineffective tools for crowd
control. The logic of conventional war increasingly demands relatively large allocations of capi-
tal. In contrast, the logic of conquest and control calls for “old fashioned” labor-intensive force
structures—lots of soldiers with relatively little mechanization. The divergence of optimal force
structures should mean that sophisticated capital-intensive militaries, armies that tend to win the
wars they fight, should be less and less effective as occupiers. To the degree that the determinants
of battlefield and colonial effectiveness differ, and to the extent that resources available to the mil-
itary are finite, nations contemplating colonizing another country must choose between a military
that is optimized for conventional combat, and a force structure intended primarily for occupation.
6

3.2 Economic Development: When Empire Pays, and When it Does Not
A central debate in the study of imperialism is over how much nations profited from empire.60
While a number of studies provide evidence that colonies could be profitable, at least over certain
periods,61 scholars remain divided in their reading of the “balance sheet” of empire.62 This debate
is instrumental to our objectives in explaining the basic imperial dynamic, however. We note simply
that colonial conquest offered a perceived economic benefit to key constituencies or decision makers.
Subsequently, the value of empire declined. If colonial holdings were never profitable (we doubt
this), then rising costs of control, or declining benefits from markets or resources would eventually
make clinging to empire prohibitive. Alternately, if empire was never a net drain on the imperial
exchequer (we doubt this too), then plummeting profits must still weaken the forces of colonialism
and embolden opponents. Social forces within the metropolis (i.e. democracy) or in the colony (i.e.
nationalism) could also have tipped the balance sheet, as we discuss later. The critical issue, which
appears to be widely accepted, is that the economic benefits of empire declined over time.63
Nations, like firms or individuals, must address their wants through some combination of pro-
duction, purchase, and theft.64 Stealing is appealing when taking is more lucrative than making
or trading.65 Theft can be preferred to purchase or production when the technology of stealing
(appropriation) is relatively advanced, when the inputs to theft are relatively abundant, and when
that which is taken is relatively valuable. Within borders, muggings and other property crimes
tend to be committed by unemployed or unskilled labor.66 Governments attempt to reduce the
appeal of private theft by limiting access to the technology of appropriation (regulating firearms,
explosives, lock smiths, etc.), by improving the productivity of non-appropriative labor (schools,
vocational training), or by reducing the expected benefits of theft (police and prisons).67
In contrast, the international system lacks some of the tools available domestically to discourage
appropriation.68 Across national borders, governments or populations seek to prevent aggression
by making conquest expensive (defense) or occupation unprofitable (nationalism, “scorched earth”
policies). Countries cannot much alter the productivity of foreign labor, however, and typically
nations control their own appropriative technology. International incentives for choosing production
over predation thus depend heavily on environmental conditions, and on exogenous change.69 If,
7

for example, labor productivity rises in countries with the best appropriative technology, or if labor
becomes scarce in these economies, while capital abundance drives down returns on appropriated
capital, then countries capable of conquest will no longer covet colonial holdings, though these
countries may continue to use force in a punitive manner for other political (policy) reasons.70
The question of whether to trade or take is one civilizations have confronted throughout his-
tory.71 Indeed, the two processes are linked. Vikings, the marauders of feudal Europe, were also the
chief merchants of the era.72 After robbing the churches and great houses, they often established
trading posts, where less lucrative goods were bought and sold.73 Bank robbers often have bank
accounts, while mobsters and petty criminals rob one person in order to pay another. Identifying
how nations profit from particular combinations of trade and theft is central to the logic of empire.74
3.3 The Imperialists’ Dilemma: Mercantilism Made Me Do It
Imperialism creates an opportunity for states to engage in anti-competitive economic behavior.75
The metropolis is in a position to determine whether trade will be allowed with third-parties.76
These incentives extend beyond the dependencies of any imperial power when vertical integration
restricts the growth of non-imperialist states. Barriers to market entry and to raw materials in
foreign colonies encourage nations to seek their own colonies and to adopt mercantilist policies.
Prisoners’ dilemma beggar-thy-neighbor colonial policies ensured that industrializing states
sought colonial holdings to gain access to markets and resources. As key imperial powers chose
to prevent other nations from trading in their colonial hinterlands, nations experiencing follow-on
industrialization were forced to choose between limited growth and entry into empire. The mad
rush to conquer the remaining unclaimed portions of the globe followed, not so much because every
property was profitable, but because staying home ensured that possible future profits would never
arise. The process of territorial “crowding out” reversed itself once the predominant power no
longer sought markets through colonial occupation, but instead used its leverage to open access.
Preliminary attempts by the United States to acquire colonies suggests that moral opposition
to empire could be contained.77 Instead, later industrialization and large internal markets gave the
US a comparative advantage in free trade, while colonial expansion threatened war with Europe.78
8

4 Modeling Imperialism
We construct three main versions of a game-theoretic model of imperialism: a basic model of the
effects of power, technology and economic development, a model of domestic political liberalization,
and a third model that examines the role of system effects (mercantilism) in perpetuating empire.
Supply-side arguments (nationalism, colonial populations) are modeled by varying the cost of ap-
propriation. Additional treatments (the size of empire, insurgency) appear in two appendixes.79
We begin with two actors (N, S) that represent tribal groups, countries, or regions of the world.
4.1 The Basic Model
We can think of the potential for colonization as “lumpy.” A critical mass of fighting effectiveness
and labor is necessary before a state can achieve any result. Warships and adventurers were needed
before Europe could discover, and then conquer, the New World. Even neighboring states must ac-
quire some minimal level of capabilities to engage in territorial aggression. Appropriative activities
thus only occur if the fighting effectiveness ρis higher than some arbitrary level bρ. Formally, the
restriction ρ > bρensures that a state projects power only when the threshold has been exceeded.
The production functions for actors Nand Sare displayed as equations (1) and (2) below:
yN=αLa
NKb
N(1)
yS=βLc
SKd
S(2)
where y= production output, L= labor allocated to domestic production, K= physical capital
and land stock, α, β = total factor productivities, and where a, b, c, d = exogenous parameters.
These production functions take the standard Cobb-Douglas form, where output depends on
the two factors of production, capital Kand labor L, which are complements and are subject to
decreasing returns (i.e. a < 1, b < 1, c < 1, d < 1). Actors also have a time endowment normalized
to 1 and choose a proportion of time to allocate to production and to appropriation or defense:
1 = Li+Fi+Di(3)
9

where F= time devoted to appropriation, D= time used for defense, and where i∈[N, S].
Imagine that Ndevelops a technological advantage. Europe’s historical turning point began in
the late feudal period when ideas and technology from the Muslim world diffused through Europe.80
At this stage neither Nnor Shad reached the technological threshold for overseas conquest (ρS<
ρN<bρ). By the 15th century, however, Nreaches the threshold, while Sdoes not, ρS<bρ<ρN.
In the age of imperialism, ρS<bρ.Scannot colonize N. Accordingly, Salways chooses FS= 0.
Thus, the time constraint of Sbecomes LS+DS= 1. Since Nwill not be attacked by S,Nchooses
DN= 0 and its time constraint becomes LN+FN= 1. Thus, there is asymmetry in the incentive
structure of the two players. This simplifies the analysis and reflects historical conditions.
Colonizing an opponent entails appropriating land and physical capital, assets that are valuable
but which can either be bought or stolen. The prospects of colonization are endogenous in our
framework and depend on the fighting efforts of Nand S. We first discuss the potential corner
solutions where one or both actors select zero fighting effort. Clearly, when FN= 0, no colonization
takes place. In this case there is no fighting and both actors just receive their own domestic produc-
tion: Nreceives the entire yN, and Sthe entire yS. Further, if Nmakes a positive appropriation
effort FN>0, but Sfails to defend itself DS= 0, we assume that Ncaptures the whole production
of both actors. Note, however, that in equilibrium we never observe FN>0 and DS= 0, because
Swould always be better off selecting a positive defense level (as we discuss further below).
We next introduce the payoff functions for interior solutions when both players select positive
fighting efforts, FN>0 and DS>0. We assume that the part of the land and physical capital in
Scaptured by Ndepends on the difference between the fighting efforts of Nand S. When FNis
much larger than DS, we assume that on average Ncaptures a large part of KS, while Ncaptures
an intermediate portion of KSwhen FNand DSare of similar size, and so on. Use of a linear
appropriation technology allows for a tractable model with production functions with decreasing
returns to labor and capital (i.e. Cobb-Douglas).81 As actors trade off concave production gains
with linear appropriation gains, there is always a unique interior optimum involving positive fighting
levels of both players. Formally, equation (4) represents the payoff (utility) function for actor N:
10

VN=αLa
NKb
N+1
2+θ(ρNFN−ρSDS)KS(4)
where ρ= fighting effectiveness or latent power (0 <ρ<1), and θ= a parameter (0 < θ < 0.5).
N’s payoff equals its production output (αLa
NKb
N), plus what capital and territory it “steals”
from S. The term 1
2+θ(ρNFN−ρSDS)is the “contest success function.”82 As mentioned above,
the greater the appropriation effort of N, and the lower the defensive effort of S, the more capital
and territory Ngains. The parameter θrefers to the decisiveness of the fighting effort. If θ=1
2,
fighting is perfectly effective in determining distribution, whereas if θ= 0, time spent on fighting
has no effect on the distribution of benefits.83 We also include a friction component to the fighting
effort (1 −ρ). Improvements in military effectiveness or capabilities (higher ρ) make appropriation
more efficient, which also means that Nhas less to lose by fighting S.
We shall now look inside the “black box” of fighting effectiveness or latent military power. It is
important to distinguish between the concepts of “fighting effectiveness” and “fighting technology.”
While the first concept refers to how successful a state is at appropriating or controlling colonial
holdings for a given level of fighting effort, the second concept refers to the capital intensiveness
of an army (i.e. the capital labor ratio of defense or appropriation). Development leads to capital
accumulation and results in the substitution of capital for labor in both civilian production and
the military. This substitution (an increase in fighting technology) is usually less than one to
one. Hence, it makes sense to think of fighting technology as a concave, increasing function of
total factor productivity. This higher capital-intensity of the army may or may not lead to greater
fighting effectiveness (although if it does improve fighting effectiveness, we can assume that this
rise is also less than one to one). While it is reasonable to think that military technology is very
important for conquest (e.g. ships are crucial), for the control of the colonized populations labor
may matter more than capital, and capital-intensive high-tech armies may not perform as well.
Given this, fighting effectiveness, ρNand ρS, respectively, can be seen as a concave function
of the total national factor productivity denoted by αand β. We assume that ρNis a concave
function of α, and that ρSis a concave function of β, as increases in the general technology level
of a society result in less than proportional increases (or even decreases) in fighting effectiveness.
11

Technology requires military specialization, which optimizes force structures for battlefields versus
riot control or counterinsurgency.84 Factors such as muscle power and the morale of personnel are
also effectively fixed. Thus, doubling a country’s weapons less than doubles the country’s military
strength. A functional form that reflects this reasoning is ρ=kαγ, where k=constant, γ < 1.85
Introducing the time constraint LN+FN= 1 into N’s payoff function and solving for first order
conditions, we obtain N’s optimal level of LN:
L∗
N=αaKb
N
θρNKS1
1−a
(5)
where L∗
N= the optimal level of LN, and other variables or parameters are as described. For
simplicity we will focus on parameter values for which 0 < L∗
N<1, which guaranties that there
always exists an interior solution and which is the most interesting case for our research question.
Note that this interior L∗
Nis the unique solution in the basic framework. An equilibrium of
no appropriation and no defense would not be sustainable as Nwould always have incentives to
deviate and choose some positive level of appropriation. Similarly, for positive appropriation efforts
of Nalso Swould always have incentives to select positive levels of defensive activities.
N’s optimal production level increases with total factor productivity, and decreases with fighting
effectiveness (its military power or capabilities). Productivity increases encourage domestic pro-
duction, while greater military power makes it more appealing to appropriate (steal) land or capital
from S. The net effect of production technology on labor time is positive, however, as productivity
increases yield less than proportional increases, or even decreases, in fighting effectiveness.
The payoff function for actor Sfollows a similar logic. Scan either invest time into production or
defense. Its payoff simply corresponds to its economic output that is produced using its remaining
capital (the part which has not been appropriated by N) and its time devoted to labor. Formally:
VS=βLc
S1
2+θ(ρSDS−ρNFN)KSd
(6)
The part of KScontrolled by N,1
2+θ(ρNFN−ρSDS), and the portion owned by S,1
2+
θ(ρSDS−ρNFN), sum to 1. Introducing the time constraints, LS+DS= 1 and LN+FN= 1, and
12

setting the first derivative of (6) with respect to LSequal to zero, we obtain S’s reaction function:
L∗
S=c1
2+θ(ρS−ρN(1 −L∗
N))
θρS(c+d)(7)
where L∗
S= the optimal level of LS, and other variables or parameters are as described.
As expected, S’s defense effort increases (lower LS) in N’s colonization effort (lower LN).
The first and second waves of European colonization (Latin America, Asia) can be explained
using the basic model outlined above. The third wave of colonization involves system effects
discussed below. As illustrated in Figure 1, threshold conditions initially constrain territorial
empire. The level where domestic production technology reaches this first threshold (such that
ρN>bρ) is labeled α1. Incentives for empire then decay gradually with increasing productivity.
Finally, colonialism collapses when development reaches α2. The rapidity in the fall of colonialism
can be accounted for by fixed costs (see appendix A)86 or by democratization (see section 4.2).
<< Figure 1 about here >>
Figure 1 reveals that the relationship between productivity (economic development) and efforts
to acquire colonies is non-linear. Initially, development increases the ability to plunder, encouraging
the pursuit of empire once threshold capabilities are achieved. As productivity continues to increase,
however, and capital accumulates, incentives to appropriate decline (Nprefers making to taking).
Hypothesis 1 The effect of economic development on territorial empire should be strictly concave,
first increasing, and then later decreasing the likelihood of a country possessing colonial holdings.
Unsurprisingly, military power probably makes empire more attractive. While power is a
somewhat ambiguous term—referring alternately to the potential to influence and to the act of
influencing—there are reasonably direct empirical analogues for the notion of capable or effective
military power. We thus hypothesize that capability should increase the appeal of empire.
Hypothesis 2 Increasing military effectiveness (greater capabilities/latent power) should make
countries more likely to hold colonies.
13

Fighting technology can also be measured empirically, as we discuss in the empirical section
below. The model does not tell us directly whether fighting technology leads to more or less
territorial empire. However, we have speculated that capital-intensive armies do a poorer job
at controlling subject populations. As nations accumulate capital, it is substituted for labor in
both civilian and military (appropriative) production technologies. If in addition, optimal force
structures for winning wars and for plundering populations diverge with development, then we
expect that the capital-intensiveness of an army is negatively associated with maintaining colonies.
Hypothesis 3 Increasing fighting technology (more capital-intensive military) should tend to dis-
courage territorial empire.
4.2 Political Liberalization
A number of scholars suggest that European democratization contributed to decolonization.87 In
this section, we examine the possibility that political liberalization discourages territorial empire.
Appropriation and production decisions do not result from a plebiscite. Leaders and key political
supporters may receive intense benefits from appropriation, even if empire is not socially optimal
for the country as a whole. In the model below, the task of the government is to choose and impose
a unified level of labor Lwhich can be more or less close to socially optimal levels, but which is
eventually adopted by both the population and the elite. This politically optimal level is found by
optimizing equation (8), the payoff function for the government of N, with respect to labor L.
VGN =φVP N + (1 −φ)VEN −ζ(VEN −VP N ) (8)
where VGN = payoff function of the government of N,φ= relative weight attributed to the
collective payoff function of the population, VP N = payoff function of the population of N,VEN =
payoff function of the ruling elite of N,ζ= parameter capturing the costs of political instability.
The government cares about the payoff function of the population, as the leader wants to stay
in power. However, for similar reasons it also cares about the payoff function of the ruling elite.
The relative weight of the two payoff functions depends on the level of democratization (M). As a
14

regime becomes more democratic, the weight attributed by the leader to the utility of the population
increases, φ=φ(+
M). A complete theory of democratization would endogenize φin terms of other
parameters or variables. Making φexogenous serves our purposes here and simplifies exposition.
We also model the risk of political instability due to distributive conflicts that occur if relative
payoffs of VEN and VP N are quite different. This is captured by the term ζ(VEN −VP N ), which we
can represent as ζ(VEN −VP N ) rather than in absolute values, ζ|VEN −VP N |, assuming conven-
tionally that elites are richer, more productive, and can more easily capture rents from colonies:
αEN > αP N , KE N > KP N , ρEN > ρP N . Elites have better access to business relationships,88 and
to political power,89 extracting heavy rents from the country’s colonial policies. If elites benefited
from empire at the expense of the larger population,90 or if democratization in Europe allowed
moral sentiment to hold sway,91 then democracy should lead to a decline in territorial empire.92
Given that the level of labor is imposed by the government, L=LEN =LP N , it follows from
equation (4) that VEN > VP N , if the assumptions αE N > αP N , KE N > KP N , ρEN > ρP N hold and
if aEN and aP N , as well as bEN and bP N are of a similar magnitude. Introducing equation (4) for
both the elite and the population into the government’s payoff function (8), we obtain equation
(9). The new variables x,y, and zare introduced to facilitate interpretation of the results. For the
purposes of illustration only, we further assume that a=aEN =aP N and b=bEN =bP N .
VGN =φ(xP N La−yP N L+zP N ) + (1 −φ)(xE N La−yEN L+zEN )
−ζ(xEN La−yE N L+zEN −(xP N La−yP N L+zP N )) (9)
where xP N =αP N Kb
P N , yP N =θρP N KS, zP N =1
2+θ(ρP N −ρSDS)KS,xEN =αEN Kb
EN ,
yEN =θρEN KS,and where zEN =1
2+θ(ρEN −ρSDS)KS.
Taking first order conditions, we obtain equation (10), the optimal labor level set by government:
L∗
GN =a((φ+ζ)xP N + (1 −φ−ζ)xEN )
(φ+ζ)yP N + (1 −φ−ζ)yEN 1
1−a
=a((φ+ζ)αP N Kb
P N + (1 −φ−ζ)αEN Kb
EN )
(φ+ζ)θρP N KS+ (1 −φ−ζ)θρEN KS1
1−a
(10)
15

Note that for xP N =xEN the result for L∗
GN is just identical to the result in equation (5):
L∗
GN =L∗
N=αaKb
N
θρNKS1
1−a. It is also interesting to see that political instability increases the
weight attributed to the population’s payoff. In fact, increases in ζhave exactly the same effect
as increases in φ. By moving Lcloser to the population’s optimum, inequality between elite and
population is reduced, which decreases the government’s loss resulting from political turmoil.
Whether democratization (higher φ) leads to a higher or lower L∗
GN depends on the relative
size of L∗
EN and L∗
P N , where L∗
P N =αP N aK b
P N
θρP N KS1
1−a=axP N
yP N 1
1−aand L∗
EN =αE N aKb
EN
θρEN KS1
1−a=
axEN
yEN 1
1−a. Assuming that elites are richer (KEN > KP N ), and more productive (αEN > αP N ),
implies that xEN > xP N . Assuming that elites extract more of the rents from colonies (ρEN > ρP N )
implies that yEN > yP N . Whether on the whole L∗
EN is greater or smaller than L∗
P N depends on
the relative size of the wealth-productivity effect on one hand (xEN versus xP N ) and of the rent-
extracting effect (yEN versus yP N ) on the other. If the difference in wealth and productivity is large,
but elites are much better at extracting rents (yEN >> yP N ), then L∗
EN < L∗
P N . This implies that
democratization (a larger φ) reduces colonization, as the greater weight of L∗
P N increases L∗
GN .93
Colonial holdings could have continued to profit elites even if they produced losses overall.
Rapid decolonization can be explained by economic factors alone (see Appendix A),94 but political
liberalization could also have played a role. We must rely on empirical assessment to determine
what mix of factors triggered decolonization. Domestic politics suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 Democracies should be less likely to possess (or to seek to acquire) colonies.
4.3 Accounting for System Effects
The logic of empire may be conditioned as well by system-level variables. The structure of the
global economy is affected by the choices of multiple nations. While free markets are socially
optimal, individual participants often have incentives to engage in anticompetitive policies, if able.95
Countries may pursue or perpetuate colonial holdings if other countries inhibit free trade or capital.
Parsimonious models explain particular relationships, while omitting others. Different models
also reflect competing claims in the literature and allow us to compare the implications of different
assumptions. We next relax the assumption of a single imperialist country, including two players
16

N1 and N2, that compete over access to S. We use the Nash equilibrium solution concept to solve
a game in which the two imperialist countries choose between producing (L), and fighting (F).
Li+Fi= 1, with i =N1, N 2.(11)
Equation (12) displays the payoff function of country N1 (N2’s payoff function is analogous):
VN1=LN1(A+B1
2+ψ(ρN1FN1−ρN2FN2)(1 −λDS))
+1
2+ψ(ρN1FN1−ρN2FN2)(1 −λDS)KS(12)
where A= marginal productivity of labor , B= potential marginal gains from trade, ψ= parameter
related to the decisiveness of the fighting effort (with 0 < ψ ≤0.5), ρ=N’s fighting effectiveness
or power (0 <ρ<1), and λ= a parameter related to the defensive technology of player S.
Equation (12) has the same overall structure as equation (4). However, since including a second
colonial power increases model complexity, we simplify other aspects to keep the model tractable.96
The payoff for country N1 is composed of three elements. First, there are returns on productive
activities, which are increasing in the parameter A. Second, there are gains from trade that increase
in the parameter Band in the portion of country Sthat is controlled by N1, (1
2+ψ(ρN1FN1−
ρN2FN2))(1 −λDS).97 Treating Sas divisible can be interpreted as the portion of the developing
world controlled by a given imperialist power. Mercantilism attempts to restrict trade with a given
colony to the colonial power. Thus, if one country (N1) acquired all of S,N2 would not trade.
The portion of country Sthat is colonized is represented by (1 −λDS). Given that the focus
here is on the interaction between N1 and N2, we treat DSas exogenous. The part of this colonized
fraction of Sthat is controlled by N1 and that can be used as an exclusive trade partner is specified
by the difference-form contest success function (1
2+ψ(ρN1FN1−ρN2FN2)). The parameter ψreflects
how decisive fighting is in determining the division of the colony. If ψ= 0, fighting does not affect
the division of resources. For ψ= 0.5, fighting is fully decisive. We assume that fighting has some
strictly positive effect (i.e. ψ > 0). The logic of this contest success function parallels the basic
model. When FN1is larger than FN2,N1 receives a greater share of the colony, and vice versa.
17

The third component of country N1’s payoff is the portion of the value of the colony, KS, that
it captures through fighting. Fighting for colonies against rival imperialist powers results in a direct
benefit, the portion of KSgained, and in an indirect benefit, the possibility of trade. The profit
from appropriation must be balanced against productive income lost due to friction from conflict.
Introducing players’ time constraints (11) into N1’s payoff function (12), we get equation (13):
VN1=LN1(A+B1
2+ψ(ρN1(1 −LN1)−ρN2(1 −LN2))(1 −λDS))
+1
2+ψ(ρN1(1 −LN1)−ρN2(1 −LN2))(1 −λDS)KS(13)
Setting the first derivative of equation (13) with respect to LN1equal to zero and expressing
the result in terms of LN1, we find the optimal value of LN1displayed in the reaction function (14).
The solution is analogous for player N2. Note that these are the results for an interior solution.
Corner solutions follow from the fact that neither variable can become negative, LN1≥0, FN1≥0:
L∗
N1=A+B(1
2+ψ(ρN1−ρN2))(1 −λDS)−ψρN1KS(1 −λDS)
2BρN1ψ(1 −λDS)+ρN2L∗
N2
2ρN1
(14)
where L∗
N1, resp. L∗
N2are the optimal levels of LN1, resp. LN2.
According to equation (14), the proportion of labor time N1 devotes to production increases
in its productivity (A), and decreases with a more attractive target (higher KS). These findings
are both consistent with the basic model, but in addition, systemic competition now creates an
“imperialist race.” The more time N2 spends on productive activities (higher LN2), the more time
country N1 devotes to production. Conversely, when country N2 puts time effort into fighting,
country N1 does so also. Thus, colonization by one power induces imperialism in other states:
Hypothesis 5 A country is more likely to hold colonies when the system contains many colonies.
The strategic interaction between the two imperialist countries N1 and N2 is illustrated in
Figure 2.98 The grey (black) lines represent the reaction function of country N1 (N2). The
solid (dashed) lines correspond to a case of low (high) productivity, A= 0.16 (A= 0.24). The
Nash equilibrium for the solid lines is at (0.5;0.5), and is (0.75;0.75) for the dashed lines. The
18

reaction functions for both countries are positively sloped, indicating that each country increases
its production effort for increases in the productive effort of the other state. This also means that
a state increases its colonization effort for increases in the colonial activity of the other power.
<< Figure 2 about here >>
A slight extension of the systemic model helps to explain how the move from mercantilism
to freer global markets helped to trigger rapid decolonization. Up to now we have assumed that
all gains from trade depend on the territorial control of trade partners (mercantilism). We can
now allow that only a part γof the trade gains depend on possession of colonies. The move from
mercantilism to capitalism and freer trade is reflected by a gradual decrease in γ.99
We introduce the possibility of partially free trade, by changing equation (12) into (12’) below:
VN1=LN1(A+B(1 −γ) + Bγ 1
2+ψ(ρN1FN1−ρN2FN2)(1 −λDS))
+1
2+ψ(ρN1FN1−ρN2FN2)(1 −λDS)KS(12’)
All variables are defined as before. The parameter γcan be interpreted as the level of mercan-
tilism. Naturally, the results for γ= 1 are identical to the results presented above. By contrast,
γ=ε(where εis an infinitely small positive number) corresponds to a capitalist free trade system.
Introducing the time constraints (11) in (12’) and computing the first-order conditions, we get:
L∗
N1=A+B(1 −γ) + Bγ(1
2+ψ(ρN1−ρN2))(1 −λDS)−ψρN1KS(1 −λDS)
2BγρN1ψ(1 −λDS)+ρN2L∗
N2
2ρN1
(14’)
We can evaluate the effect of mercantilism and capitalism on incentives for imperialism and
decolonization by looking at the first derivative of LN1with respect to γ. A negative first deriva-
tive implies that more capitalism (lower γ) increases the incentives to produce (higher LN1) and
accordingly reduces the incentives to fight (lower FN1) to gain or retain control of foreign territory
or markets. The first derivative of LN1with respect to γbecomes negative, if condition (15) holds:
A+B > ψρN1KS(1 −λDS) (15)
19

Condition (15) holds when the gains from production (A) and the gains from trade (B) are each
large relative to the product of S’s capital endowment, the fighting effectiveness of N1, and the
pivotal nature of warfare. In the post-World War II period, the steady decay of barriers to trade,
the relative poverty of developing countries, as well as the rise of nationalist insurgency movements
made colonialism less appealing. Changes in the global economy had by the early 20th century
created conditions in which the economics of colonies, and the vertical integration of production
networks, were increasingly inefficient. Sources for raw materials proliferated. The ascendance of
the United States as hegemon further degraded the economic advantages of empire.100
Mercantilism can be proxied empirically as a situation where the hegemon holds many colonies.
Hypothesis 6 A country is more likely to hold colonies when the hegemon has many colonies.
Development started with agricultural societies, moved through mercantilism, to be followed
by capitalism. We expect the effect of systemic development on colonial holdings to be non-linear.
Hypothesis 7 The effect of systemic development on territorial empire should be strictly concave,
first increasing, and then later decreasing the likelihood of a country possessing colonial holdings.
5 Research Design and Data
While our theory applies to broad swaths of history, our empirical analysis is limited by data avail-
ability to the last two centuries (1816-1992). Our unit-of-analysis is the country year. We examine
both dichotomous (presence or absence) and ordinal (count) indicators of colonialism/decolonization.
Given a dichotomous dependent variable, we use the ReLogit estimator.101 We use negative bino-
mial regression to estimate the number of colonies a country holds. We correct for spatial depen-
dence using Huber/White robust standard errors. Independent variables are lagged by one year to
address endogeneity. We also include a set of spline variables to control for duration dependence.102
5.1 Dependent Variable
The dichotomous and count versions of the dependent variable come from two sources. Strang pro-
vides a list of the start and end years for a large number of dependencies beginning in the late 15th
20

century.103 Strang includes dependencies that are not under colonial domination, and cases where
political boundaries change over time. This could be a problem if dependencies operated under a
different logic than colonies, or if dependencies experience reorganization, but not decolonization.
These discrepancies are bound to weaken support for our claims. We also examine colony data
generated by Ravlo, et al.104. The authors use these data as an independent variable as part of a
statistical analysis of their argument that democracies are less warlike toward former colonies.
5.2 Independent Variables
•Economic development: Given the need to cover substantial time periods before the mid-
Twentieth century, was adopt two variables widely used as proxies for per capita GDP.105
1.) Energy Cons./Pop. comes from the COW National Material Capabilities dataset of total
annual fuel consumption in coal-ton equivalents.106 2.) Iron & Steel/Pop. measures the
quantity of iron (1816-1899) or steel (1900-2000) produced by a country in a given year.
•Fighting Technology : No convention exists as to the measurement of fighting technology.
Dupuy advocated an index where each weapon is given a lethality score.107 The index requires
detailed information that makes it unworkable here. Further, such an index does not really
address a focus of our concern, the capital-intensiveness of a country’s military organization.
We adopt a simpler and more direct measure of fighting technology, dividing defense spending
from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset (CINC) by the number of
military personnel per country year.108 The result is a statistic analogous to GDP per capita
identifying which armies have advanced weaponry, etc, and which do not.109
•Democracy : Polity data provide indexes based on formal constraints on the executive (autoc)
and institutional support for democracy (democ).110 We prepare monadic values by combin-
ing democ and autoc scales as follows, [(democi–autoci) + 10]/2, (where i∈[A,B]). We
add 10 to make all values non-negative and divide by 2 to yield a 0–10 index. We examine
both the monadic values and higher and lower democracy scores for states in a dyad.111
•Fighting Effectiveness: Capabilities determine the ability of states to project power and
21

conduct warfare abroad. We assess national military power or fighting effectiveness using the
Correlates of War (COW) Composite Indicators of National Capabilities (CINC) score. CINC
scores are computed as the weighted average of a state’s share of total system population,
urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military manpower and
military expenditures. CINC is widely acknowledged as an approximation of national power.
•Major Power Status: Major powers tend to be more active internationally, resulting in more
frequent conflict behavior. Since they may also tend to be more capable and prosperous, there
is a danger that the relationship between development and conflict might be confounded by
major power politics. We include a dummy, Maj. Power, coded (1) for the major powers.
•Temporal Dependence: Finally, we control for temporal dependence by constructing four
splines for each dependent variable, interpolated from a dummy matrix coding the lag between
directed dyad years of conflict initiation or onset.112
6 Results
Results of our analysis of development, democracy, technology, hegemony, and colonies are sum-
marized in two tables containing eight regressions. Each of the six regressions listed in Table 1
estimates the probability that a given country possesses at least one colony. Succeeding models in-
troduce additional variables to test hypotheses, compare model specifications, or assess robustness.
<< Table 1 about here >>
As Model 1 in Table 1 reveals, no simple monotonic relationship exists between economic
development (Energy Cons./Pop.) and a nation’s status as a colonial power. In contrast, both
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 appear to be borne out in these data. More capable countries
(Fighting Effectiveness) are more likely to possess colonies, ceteris paribus, while nations with
capital-intensive armed forces (Fighting Technology) are less inclined toward territorial imperialism.
Contrary to Hypothesis 4, democratic countries appear much more likely to hold colonies. As we
22

will see, this strongly counter-intuitive finding depends largely on the incomplete statistical model
specification of Model 1. Major power status appears largely irrelevant for the possession of colonies.
The linear specification used for economic development in Model 1 may be inappropriate. Model
2 adds a quadratic term for economic development.113 Introducing the second, quadratic term for
development leads both coefficients to become highly statistically significant. Energy Cons./Pop.
and its square produce the concave function predicted by Hypothesis 1.Fighting Effectiveness
(Hypothesis 2 ) is positive and significant, though at a lower significance threshold than previously.
The modest significance of the capabilities variable suggests power is not as important a determinant
of colonial status as other variables in the analysis, but this may be a byproduct of the research
design and available data. Our theory and available intuition suggest that Fighting Effectiveness
was most salient during the onset of the colonial era, for the expansion of empire rather than for its
demise. Of course, the dataset contains only a limited portion of the period of imperial expansion.
In contrast to the power variable, Fighting Technology becomes statistically significant at a much
higher threshold in Model 2. Since the available data cover the entire period of decolonization, the
mechanisms encouraging the end of empire are able to perform more effectively, especially with
the proper model specification. With the addition of a second term for economic development,
the Regime Type variable is no long positive and significantly significant, though the relationship
remains positive. It appears that democracy does not influence decolonization one way or the other
(Hypothesis 4 ). The major power status variable also continues to be statistically insignificant.
Civilian and military technology are of course related.114 Treating the two processes as inde-
pendent, when they are not, risks biasing estimates of their respective independent effects. Model
3 adds an interaction term between Energy Cons./Pop. and Fighting Technology.Energy ×Fight
Tech. is statistically significant and positive indicating that, for small values of Fighting Technol-
ogy, increases in civilian economic development tend to increase the probability of colonial holdings.
While there is some synergy between civilian and military technology, all three development and
technology variables remain highly statistically significant in the presence of the interaction term.
Figure 3 offers a three-dimensional plot of the predicted probability of an independent country
possessing at least one colony based on Model 3. Development (Energy/Pop.) increases from left
23

to right, while fighting technology (Mil. Tech.) increases from front to back in the image. The
probability of colonial possessions is plotted on the vertical axis. The resulting plot looks roughly
like a “grand piano,” “mesa,” or the bow of a ship (facing slightly right of the reader). Recall that
in the formal model fighting technology is a declining function of development. Imagine beginning
in the left foreground of the figure (low Energy/Pop. and Mil. Tech.) and moving in a diagonal line
toward the most advanced countries (high Energy/Pop. and Mil. Tech.). The declining marginal
impact of development on fighting technology leads the trajectory of a nation to veer right as we
travel first up onto the piano/mesa/boat, and then down again onto the floor/valley/water on the
right side of the figure. Notice also that the transition to and from colonialism is abrupt. Colonial
holdings were acquired as nations expanded their ability to subdue distant territories. They were
abandoned suddenly, collectively, as if the logic of empire had suddenly fallen off a cliff.
<< Figure 3 about here >>
While hypotheses 1 through 3 are supported, but not Hypothesis 4, we have yet to assess
the systemic and hegemonic hypotheses. Models 4 and 5 in Table 1 introduce variables for the
number of colonies in the system (Hypothesis 5 ) and the number of colonies held by the hegemon
(Hypothesis 6 ). Neither hypothesis can be rejected.115 Systemic and hegemonic colonial portfolios
clearly influence individual national decisions to maintain or abandon empire. By “crowding out”
access to markets and raw materials, the presence of colonies in the system appears to have lead
to additional acts of imperialism by other nations. Conversely, as soon as the hegemon or other
nations abandoned empire, countries found perpetuation of a colonial system less necessary.
Model 6 completes Table 1 by introducing variables to evaluate systemic development, the effects
of U.S. hegemony, and to control for factors relevant to the systemic variables.116 Consistent with
Hypothesis 7,Sys. Energy/Pop. and its square reveal a concave relationship between systemic
development levels and the appeal of colonies. Development initially leads to systemic predation as
states compete to capture resources and markets. These incentives reverse themselves, however, as
the gains from production (Ain the formal model) increase with development and the gains from
trade (B) grow with the size of the world economy. Similarly, the appeal of colonization appears to
ebb with increases in US productivity, though at a declining marginal rate. As the chief proponent,
24

and beneficiary, of free trade in the twentieth century, the US possessed few incentives to prop up
the European colonial system when the US became hegemon. We add # States in System and #
Major Powers to evaluate the effects of changing system structure and size. Having more major
powers in the system does not significantly increase territorial empire, once monadic and systemic
development, technology, and other factors are considered. The number of states in the system is
negatively associated with colonialism, though these two variables are of course rough complements.
<< Table 2 about here >>
Table 2 lists two negative binomial regressions, each estimating the number of colonies a country
holds. Theoretical expectations for the count of colonies are less precise than for the dichotomous
variable. Still, results are substantially consistent with those in Table 1. Model 7 reports the curvi-
linear relationship between development and the count of colonies. Fighting Technology is again
negative and significant, while the interaction term between development and military technology
is again positive. The power variable (Fighting Effectiveness) is positive, though significant only in
Model 8. The number of colonies held by the hegemon significantly increases colonialism by other
states, while state capabilities or major power status have modest effects. Model 8 substitutes iron
and steel production per capita for energy consumption.117 Regime Type becomes marginally signif-
icant in the expected direction for the first time. Six of our seven hypotheses are thus consistently
supported. The fact that democracy is usually insignificant suggests that, while institutionalist
arguments are logically tenable, popular rule does not appear to impact imperialism in practice.
7 Conclusion: Once and Future Empire?
The lust for territory subsided among powerful nations as it became cheaper to make than to
take, and as the global mercantilist system gave way to freer trade. Empire is unappealing when
appropriative technology is low, domestic labor is scarce, or when global markets are obstructed.
In contrast, the desire to control land, rooted labor, and minerals remains strong in the de-
veloping world. Poor countries still covet territory, though they often lack the capacity to project
power beyond their borders. In places where labor is cheap and abundant and capital is expensive,
25

conquest and other activities designed to allow the state to acquire a larger pool of rents will remain
appealing. A final factor is US enforcement of a norm of territorial integrity, though this could
decay if the US weakens or developing states become more capable of conquest.118
Paradoxically, successful development could increase the number of “middle tier” economies,
which could then overwhelm internal or external inhibitions against territorial aggression. Rapid
development could see nations cross the military effectiveness threshold (bρ) faster than the rise
in the cost of labor. At the same time, technological innovation might again increase the ability
of the most advanced nations to take rather than make. Automation and smart weaponry could
dramatically lower the cost of empire. Alternately, political instability or dramatic price increases
in critical resources could spark efforts to control mineral-rich regions. Global political competition
could also ignite efforts to capture and control scarce minerals. We must hope that rising powers
see themselves as beneficiaries of the global economy and endorse open markets in due course.
Finally, what should be made of the revived empire debate? At least some of the controversy
follows from different conceptions of what empire entails. Proponents of American Exceptionalism
seem in fact to be advocating US leadership. To the degree that our results suggest an important
role for the hegemon in promoting open markets, we can support this limited form of leadership.
However, much of the advocacy is overblown and confused, precisely because sponsorship of global
markets limits the incentives for powerful states to pursue other aspects of empire. Critics, too,
seem to exaggerate the continuity between recent US policies and earlier incarnations of territorial
empire. There is something different about how the current hegemon treats territory, but in contrast
to George W. Bush, we see this change as applicable to every nation, not just the United States.
26

Figure 1: The level of colonization effort chosen by N
27

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
L_N1
L_N2
Reaction
function
N2
Reaction function N1
Figure 2: The reaction functions of the countries N1 and N2
28

Figure 3: Estimated Effects of Development and Military Technology on Empire (Model 3)
29

Notes
1Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. New York: Owl Books, 2001;
Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic. New York: Metropolitan
Books, 2004; Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2002; Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire. New York: Penguin, 2004.
2Michael W. Doyle, Empires. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986, p. 30.
3Niall Ferguson prefers the term empire to hegemony. “To compare . . .the United States and the United Kingdom
as hegemonies is to miss differences that become obvious when the two are compared as empires.” Distinguishing
between US hegemony and British empire would highlight the differences Ferguson seeks to emphasize. “A century
ago, the United Kingdom’s formal empire was very large indeed, covering nearly a quarter of the world’s surface and
ruling roughly the same proportion of its population. Today, on the other hand, the United States’ formal empire
includes just 14 dependencies (of which the largest is Puerto Rico) and covers less than 11,000 square kilometers.”
Niall Ferguson, Hegemony or Empire?: Book Review. Foreign Affairs, 82 2003b, Nr. 5, p. 160-161.
4President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela recently claimed in the United Nations that the US was led by “the devil.”
5See, for example, Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. New York: Knopf, 1993[1776];
Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West. London: Allen and Unwin, 1932; George A. Modelski, Long Cycles in
World Politics. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987.
6Mark Zacher, The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force. International
Organization, 55 2001, Nr. 2; Tanisha Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and
Annexation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
7See, for example, Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton, 1981; Daron
Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical
Investigation. American Economic Review, 91 2001, Nr. 5; Hendrik Spruyt, Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty
and Territorial Partition. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.
8John A. Hobson, Imperialism. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1938[1905]; V.I. Lenin, Imperialism:
The Highest Stage of Capitalism. New York: International Publishers, 1970[1916]; George Orwell, Shooting an
Elephant and Other Essays. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1950; Jean Paul Sartre, Colonialism and Neo-
colonialism. London: Routledge, 2001.
9Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism. New York: Knopf, 1993; Edward W. Said, Orientalism. New York:
Vintage Books, 1994; Edward W. Said, Yeats and Decolonization. In The Edward Said Reader. New York: Vintage
Books, 2000; Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance. New York: Metropoli-
tan Books, 2003. Johnson (2001), Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, ibid.; Johnson (2004).
10John Darwin, Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World. New York: St.
Martin’s, 1988; Raymond F. Betts, Decolonization. London: Routledge, 1998.
30

11Tony Smith, The Pattern of Imperialism: The United States, Great Britain, and the Late-Industrializing World
since 1815. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; Geoffrey Scammell, The First Imperial Age: European
Overseas Expansion c. 1400–1715. Boston: Unwin-Hyman, 1989; Nicholas Canny, editor, The Oxford History of the
British Empire: Vol I: The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century.
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2002.
12Heinz Gollwitzer, Europe in the Age of Imperialism, 1880-1914. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1969; Peter J.
Cain and Anthony G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914. London: Longman, 1993b.
13Alexander Motyl, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse and Revival of Empires. New York: Columbia University
Press, 2001; Johan Galtung, Tore Heiestad and Erik Rudeng, On the Decline and Fall of Empires: The Roman
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14Our argument is by no means incompatible with the view that moral suasion helped to end empire. See, for
example, Robert Jackson, The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations.
In Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, editors, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political
Change. Cornell University Press, 1993; Neta Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decoloniza-
tion, and Humanitarian Intervention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Yet, such arguments risk being
overly congratulatory about the triumph of western ethics over western avarice. Western civilization set aside ethical
qualms for hundreds of years. The very dawn of empire is punctuated by acts like the encomiendo that nominally
guaranteed Church protection in the New World, but which effectively gave authorities a free hand with indigenous
populations.
15Johnson (2001), Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, ibid.; Johnson (2004); Fergu-
son (2004).
16Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986; Paul Kennedy, Rise
and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change & Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House,
1989.
17Bacevich (2002), ibid..
18David Lake, Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Institutions. International Organization, 50
1996, Nr. 1; Alexander Cooley, Logics of Hierarchy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.
19Zacher (2001), ibid.; Fazal (2007).
20Our comments on the literature are necessarily brief. They are not intended as a thorough or balanced represen-
tation of available perspectives. Instead, we focus on contemporary debates and our own view of salient controversies.
21Hobson (1938[1905]), ibid.; Lenin (1970[1916]). For reviews and criticism, see David K. Fieldhouse, ‘Imperialism’:
31

An Historiographical Revision. The Economic History Review, 14 1961, Nr. 2; David K. Fieldhouse, The Theory of
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State of the Art in Three Theories. Polity, 19 1986, Nr. 2; A. M. Eckstein, Is There a ‘Hobson-Lenin Thesis’ on Late
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22Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
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23John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, The Imperialism of Free Trade. Economic History Review, 6 1953, Nr. 1;
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24Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959; Robert Gilpin, War
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25Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
26Modelski (1987), ibid.. George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Seapower in Global Politics, 1494–1993.
Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1988; Joshua S. Goldstein, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the
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27Miles Kahler, Decolonization in Britain and France: the Domestic Consequences of International Relations.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984; Roy Holland, European Decolonization, 1918–1981: An Introductory
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Survey. New York: St. Martin’s, 1985.
28Stuart C. Easton, The Rise and Fall of Western Colonialism. New York: Praeger, 1964; Henri Grimal, Decolo-
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29David McIntyre, Commonwealth of Nations: Origins and Impact. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
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30See, Gibbon (1993[1776]), ibid.. A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660–1783. 5th edition.
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31Dos Santos (1970), ibid.. Andre Gunder Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment. Monthly Review, 18
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32Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European
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33Karl Marx, The East India Company: Its History and Results. In Karl Marx, Fredrick Engels: Col lected Works.
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37Miles Kahler, External Ambition and Economic Performance. World Politics, 40 1988, Nr. 4.
38Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, 1500-1800. New
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Cambridge University Press, 2000.
33

39Herschel Grossman and Murat Iyigun, The Profitability of Colonial Investment. Economics and Politics, 7 1995,
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41Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983; James D. Fearon and
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42Military advantage can lead to other forms of hierarchy, such as vassal states, which we do not explore here.
43All appendices are available online at: ***.
44J.F.C. Fuller, Armament and History: A Study of the Influence of Armament on History from the Dawn of
Classical Warfare to the Second World War. London: Scribner, 1945; William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West:
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45Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century.
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34

1979; Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray and Kenneth H. Watman, The Effectiveness of Military Organizations.
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46Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998; Keith
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they were scrupulously careful to avoid pitched battles—much to the fury of the Europeans—because they always
lost them. Only gradually did the Europeans recognize that the only way to beat the Indians was to adopt those
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47Gibbon (1993[1776]), ibid.; Kennedy (1989); Gilpin (1981).
48Low (1991), ibid., p 6.
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50See, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of
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35

demand side arguments with the supply side (the ease of conquest). William R. Thompson, The Military Superiority
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53Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change. Princeton: Princeton
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54On the origins of western military advantage see, John Lynn, The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West,
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56Rasler and Thompson (1983), World Politics 35 [1983] , ibid. Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts
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57Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Knopf, 1948
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58Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1971[1838].
59Basil Henry Liddell Hart, The Strategy of Indirect Approach. London: Faber and Faber, 1946.
60Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay?: The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies. Princeton: Princeton
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and Benefits of British Imperialism, 1846-1914. Past and Present, 120 1988.
63Doyle (1986), ibid..
64Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and
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65Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. American Political Science Review, 87 1993, Nr. 3.
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70Erik Gartzke and Dominic Rohner, Rich Neighbors: War, Peace, and Economic Development. San Diego, 2009.
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72Karl W. Deutsch, Medieval Unity and the Economic Conditions for an International Civilization. The Canadian
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75Jacob Viner, Power vs. Plenty as Objectives of Statecraft in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. World
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76See, for example, Andrew Porter, European Imperialism, 1860-1914. London: Macmillan, 1994; Judith B.
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37

cal Economy, 99 1991, Nr. 6; J.R. Ward, The Industrial Revolution and British Imperialism, 1750-1850. The Economic
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77Mahan (1987[1890]), ibid.. Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion. Ithaca,
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78Richard Van Alstyne, The Rising American Empire. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960; Fareed Zakaria,
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79All appendices are available online at: ***.
80Bernard Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe. New York: W.W. Norton, 1982; Bernard Lewis, Cultures in
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81Several studies use similar linear appropriation technologies. See, for example, Dominic Rohner, Beach Holiday
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82Hirshleifer (1989), Public Choice 63 [1989], ibid..
83Rohner (2006), ibid..
84Jeremy Black, War: Past, Present and Future. New York: St. Martin’s, 2000. Few states are able to integrate
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85One could also imagine that fighting effectiveness decays in the distance between metropolis and colony: ρ=ρ(
−
d),
where d= distance, or assume a specific function, as in the gravity model: (1 −ρ) = ωd2, where ωis exogenous.
86All appendices are available online at: ***.
87See, for example, Kahler (1984), Decolonization in Britain and France: the Domestic Consequences of Inter-
national Relations, ibid.; Snyder (1991). David Strang, The Inner Incompatibility of Empire and Nation: Popular
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88Cain and Hopkins (1993a), British Imperialism: Crisis and Destruction, 1914-1990 , ibid..
89Snyder (1991), ibid..
90Daron Acemoglu, Why Not a Political Coase Theorem?: Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics. Journal of
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91Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World. New York: Cambridge
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92For claims that democracies are imperialistic, see Michael Haas, When Democracies Fight One Another, Just
38

What is the Punishment for Disobeying the Law? Chicago, 1995. Galtung (1996), The Decline and Fall of Empires:
A Theory of Re-Development, ibid.. Errol A. Henderson, Democracy and War: The End of an Illusion. Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002. Spruyt (2005), Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition, ibid..
93Economic development results in higher values of αEN , αP N ,ρEN , ρP N , which increases xEN , xP N , yEN , yP N ,
though not necessarily at the same rate. The net effect of democracy thus varies with time and development.
94All appendices are available online at: ***
95John A.C. Conybeare, Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1987.
96These simplifying assumptions are not critical to the main results of the model.
97We again focus on the unique interior Nash Equilibrium with FN1>0, FN2>0.
98The following parameter values are used for the solid lines (they are symmetrical for both players): A= 0.16,
B= 0.8, KS= 1, ψ= 0.4, ρN1=ρN2= 1, λ= 0.5, DS= 0. For the dotted lines we have A= 0.24.
99With γin the denominator, the reaction function (14’) is undefined when γ= 0. It makes sense to treat free
trade as an absolute that is only approximated empirically (after multiple WTO rounds, trade is still not “free”).
100William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire
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101Gary King and Kangche Zeng, Explaining Rare Events in International Relations. International Organization,
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Nr. 2. Results are equivalent using logit. A Stata “do” file that replicates the analysis is available from the authors.
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106J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer and John Stuckey, Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War.
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39

1987; Correlates of War Project, National Material Capabilities Data Documentation, V. 3.0. State College, PA: The
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107Dupuy (1979), Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the
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Paragon House, 1987.
108COW provides military expenditure figures in nominal (current year) British pounds (1816–1913) and US
dollars (1914–2000). We used GDP deflators available at EH.net, (URL: http://eh.net/hmit/) to obtain con-
stant (2000) dollars. See, Louis D. Johnston and Samuel H. Williamson, Economic History Services. Chicago,
2005; Lawrence H. Officer, Exchange Rate Between the United States Dollar and the British Pound, 1791–2004.
Chicago, 2004; Lawrence H. Officer, The Annual Real and Nominal GDP for the United Kingdom, 1086–2004.
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109A lowess regression and scatter plot of the military technology variable on GDP per capita reveals the declining
marginal relationship that is assumed by the model (plot available from the authors).
110Keith Jaggers and Ted R. Gurr., Transitions to Democracy: Tracking Democracy’s ‘Third Wave’ with the Polity
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111John R. Oneal, Bruce Russett and Michael L. Berbaum, Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and
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112Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998), ibid..
113We also examined a regression in which we added a quadratic term for fighting technology. Both the linear (−),
and exponential (+) fighting technology variables are statistically significant, but the overall effect of the two variables
is negative for most values, with coefficients and means as follows: (−58.098 ×0.0190)+(149.924 ×0.0025) = −0.7346.
114Energy Cons./Pop. and Fighting Technology are moderately correlated (r≈0.3). While linear and squared terms
are highly correlated, multicollinearity is not indicated, as the linear terms are statistically insignificant by themselves,
the non-linear variables are significant, other variables are unaffected, and theory dictates this specification.
115A variable coded for the proportion of territories that are colonies ( colonies
colonies+countries ) yields equivalent results.
116We drop the # Colonies variables which are highly collinear with the systemic/hegemonic development variables.
117All models presented in this analysis have been replicated using iron and steel production in place of the energy
consumption variables. In most cases, the iron and steel production variables provide an even better fit than energy
consumption. However, the interaction term between iron an steel production and military technology is generally
not statistically significant. All results are available from the authors.
118Zacher (2001), ibid. Tanisha Fazal, State Death in the International System. International Organization, 58
2004, Nr. 2.
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Table 1: The Political Economy of Decolonization (Relogit estimator [King & Zeng 2001a, 2001b])
D.V.: Colonies ——- Strang (1990) —-— —– Ravlo, et al. (2003) –—
1 2 3 4 5 6
Indep. Variables Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
Energy Cons./Pop. -0.0184 1.255 ∗∗∗ 1.182 ∗∗∗ 1.762 ∗∗∗ 1.293 ∗∗∗ 1.909 ∗∗∗
(0.0172) (0.329) (0.310) (0.394) (0.313) (0.399)
Energy Cons./Pop.2-0.0922 ∗∗∗ -0.132 ∗∗∗ -0.166 ∗∗∗ -0.143 ∗∗∗ -0.183 ∗∗∗
(0.0267) (0.0260) (0.0435) (0.0368) (0.0455)
Fighting Effectiveness 31.46 ∗∗ 29.82 ∗27.00 ∗43.93 48.37 ∗41.17
(11.70) (13.58) (12.85) (23.22) (24.29) (24.40)
Fighting Technology -14.76 ∗-42.92 ∗∗∗ -66.55 ∗∗∗ -65.27 ∗∗∗ -66.58 ∗∗∗ -69.01 ∗∗∗
(6.882) (10.65) (14.83) (17.79) (12.80) (18.68)
Energy ×Fight Tech. 8.580 ∗∗∗ 6.327 ∗∗∗ 6.646 ∗∗∗ 6.639 ∗∗∗
(1.783) (1.450) (1.044) (1.536)
Regime Type 0.190 ∗∗∗ 0.0586 0.0629 -0.0276 0.0487 -0.0103
(0.0486) (0.0518) (0.0542) (0.0604) (0.0563) (0.0649)
# Colonies System 6.145 ∗∗∗
(0.904)
# Colonies Hegemon 0.0618 ∗∗∗
(0.0143)
Sys. Energy/Pop. 12.35 ∗∗∗
(3.424)
Sys. Energy/Pop.2-4.099 ∗∗∗
(1.166)
US Energy/Pop. -2.317 ∗∗∗
(0.585)
US Energy/Pop.20.168 ∗∗∗
(0.0417)
Major Power 0.850 0.683 0.518 0.805 0.685 1.036
(0.776) (0.929) (0.973) (0.964) (0.952) (1.061)
# States in System -0.0365 ∗∗
(0.0113)
# Major Powers 0.345
(0.186)
Intercept 0.747 1.038 1.328 ∗-1.883 ∗∗ 0.656 0.781
(0.546) (0.546) (0.579) (0.701) (0.560) (1.364)
N 9671 9671 9671 10474 10474 10474
Sig. levels : †: 10% ∗: 5% ∗∗ : 1% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%. Coefficients and S.E.’s for spline variables suppressed.
51

Table 2: Political Economy and the Number of Colonies (Neg. Binomial Regression)
D.V.: # of Colonies —– Strang (1990) –— —– Ravlo, et al. (2003) –—
7 8
Indep. Variables Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.)
Energy Cons./Pop. 0.871∗∗ (0.281)
Energy Cons./Pop.2-0.094∗∗∗ (0.029)
Iron & Steel/Pop. 17.297∗∗∗ (4.676)
Iron & Steel/Pop.2-29.698∗∗ (10.034)
Fighting Effectiveness 7.712 (7.711) 26.749†(15.890)
Fighting Technology -26.300∗∗ (9.395) -24.975∗(11.272)
Dev. ×Fight Tech. 3.023†(1.602) 45.906†(25.591)
Regime Type 0.066 (0.051) -0.114†(0.063)
# Colonies Hegemon 0.027∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.035∗∗∗ (0.005)
Major Power 1.614∗(0.780) 0.269 (0.986)
Intercept -1.962∗(0.834) -3.762∗∗∗ (0.451)
/ln(α) 2.311∗∗ (0.331) 1.273∗∗ (0.311)
N 9671 10865
Log-likelihood -8159.553 -8959.683
χ2
(8) 76.11 200.466
Sig. levels : †: 10% ∗: 5% ∗∗ : 1% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%. Spline variables suppressed.
52

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for All Variables used in Table 1 and Table 2
Variable name Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables
Colony Dummy (Strang) 10300 0.1574757 0.3642664 0 1
Colony Dummy (Ravlo, et al.) 11115 0.1964912 0.3973621 0 1
Colony Count (Strang) 10300 1.710291 7.495472 0 73
Colony Count (Ravlo, et al.) 11115 1.301664 4.955584 0 50
Key Indep. Variables
Energy Cons./Pop. 12590 1.683821 5.273448 0 87.94954
Energy Cons./Pop.212590 30.6423 291.3086 0 7735.122
Iron & Steel/Pop. 13008 0.1155529 0.7869664 0 18.16338
Iron & Steel/Pop.213008 0.6326209 9.46593 0 329.9084
Energy ×Mil. Tech. 12590 0.1119399 1.067389 0 60.71391
Fighting Technology 13212 0.0190369 0.0459871 0 2.797716
Fighting Technology213212 0.0024771 0.087587 0 7.827213
Fighting Effectiveness (CINC) 13020 0.0146515 0.0392248 0 0.383864
Regime Type 12925 4.142592 3.533467 0 10
# Colonies System (Strang) 10482 94.21847 35.38304 35 148
# Colonies System (Ravlo, et al.) 13020 57.48694 40.79045 0 120
# Colonies (proportion, Ravlo) 13020 0.3862178 0.2874053 0 0.7964602
# Colonies (proportion, Strang) 10482 0.5435864 0.2140161 0.1785714 0.8130081
# Colonies Heg. (Strang) 13212 17.18377 23.27788 0 73
# Colonies Heg. (Ravlo, et al.) 13020 9.106836 15.38836 0 48
US Energy/Pop. 13212 7.16194 3.916243 0 11.67185
US Energy/Pop.213212 66.62918 46.14584 0 136.2322
Sys. Energy/Pop. 12829 1.388583 0.7335191 0.1209896 2.290689
Sys. Energy/Pop.212829 2.466171 1.890983 0.0146385 5.247256
Other Indep. Variables
Major Power 13212 0.0830306 0.2759389 0 1
# States in System 13212 105.9584 58.13557 23 192
# Major Powers 13212 5.824932 1.047652 4 8
“Colony years” (Strang) 10300 34.96078 38.14619 0 170
“Colony years” (Ravlo, et al.) 11115 31.89051 37.06093 0 175
53