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How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?
Abstract
This study is a comparative survey of the political processes through which peaceful secession has taken place. The main focus is upon Singapore-Malaysia, Austria-Hungary and Norway-Sweden, though some attention is paid to other cases, including Czechoslovakia. The object is to derive, inductively, a set of empirical generalizations about the politics of the transition from a union or federation to two or more sovereign states. The article presents 13 such generalizations. Each is discussed and shown to hold in the various cases. Together, they comprise the pattern of politics that characterizes instances of peaceful secessionRésuméCette étude offre un survol des processus politiques qui accompagnent la séparation sans violence entre des États. On se penche notamment sur les rapports entre Singapour et la Malaisie, l'Autriche et la Hongrie, la Norvège et la Suède, sans ignorer d'autres situations semblables, et en particulier celle de la Tchécoslovaquie. Par la logique inductive, on veut arriver à des généralisations empiriques qui saisissent la dynamique politique d'une transition paisible d'une union ou d'une fédération à l'existence de deux ou de plusieurs États souverains. L'article présente et analyse 13 généralisations semblables, tout en illustrant leur manifestation dans les diverses situations. Prises ensemble, les généralisations décrivent adéquatement le processus politique d'une sécession non-violente.
... Some of the major issues between the two states were: the political threat posed by the anti-Malaysia opposition parties; the formulation of economic policies for a common market; the extension of federal authority and government services into Singapore and the Borneo states; and the creation of a pan-Malaysian party system (Means, 1976: 333). Somewhat similar reasons of Singapore-Malaysia frictions except few were given by Robert Young (1994) in his article explaining the peaceful secessions of Singapore-Malaysia, Austria-Hungary and Norway-Sweden (Young, 1994). ...
... Some of the major issues between the two states were: the political threat posed by the anti-Malaysia opposition parties; the formulation of economic policies for a common market; the extension of federal authority and government services into Singapore and the Borneo states; and the creation of a pan-Malaysian party system (Means, 1976: 333). Somewhat similar reasons of Singapore-Malaysia frictions except few were given by Robert Young (1994) in his article explaining the peaceful secessions of Singapore-Malaysia, Austria-Hungary and Norway-Sweden (Young, 1994). ...
... Ethnic or racial differences emerged over the Malaysian policy of "Malay Malaysia" whereas PAP favoured a "Malaysian Malaysia" (Milne, 1966). The accession of Singapore brought about 80 percent Chinese population to the Federation which disturbed the demographical balance in Malaysian society (Young, 1994) where Malaysian and Chinese were in the proportion of 49.8 and 37.1 percent respectively (Federation of Malaya Yearbook, 1962). ...
The Malaysian society, one of the successful and managed multi-ethnic societies, is replete of imbalances and there still underlie the racial and ethnic disproportions in geographical dwellings, educational and professional fields, and economic and political roles. The modern racial relation in Malaysia is the legacy of pre-colonial and colonial period of history dating back to fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The unstable demographic balance, the unrestricted immigration policy or the policy of divide and rule by the colonial masters contributed besides other reasons toward the troubled relations between ethnic communities of Malaysia- Malays, Chinese, Indians, and others. But the way the respective Malaysian governments have managed such sour relationship in their socio-economic and political spheres is the lesson that all multiethnic states can learn from.
... Some of the major issues between the two states were: the political threat posed by the anti-Malaysia opposition parties; the formulation of economic policies for a common market; the extension of federal authority and government services into Singapore and the Borneo states; and the creation of a pan-Malaysian party system (Means, 1976: 333). Somewhat similar reasons of Singapore-Malaysia frictions except few were given by Robert Young (1994) in his article explaining the peaceful secessions of Singapore-Malaysia, Austria-Hungary and Norway-Sweden (Young, 1994). ...
... Some of the major issues between the two states were: the political threat posed by the anti-Malaysia opposition parties; the formulation of economic policies for a common market; the extension of federal authority and government services into Singapore and the Borneo states; and the creation of a pan-Malaysian party system (Means, 1976: 333). Somewhat similar reasons of Singapore-Malaysia frictions except few were given by Robert Young (1994) in his article explaining the peaceful secessions of Singapore-Malaysia, Austria-Hungary and Norway-Sweden (Young, 1994). ...
... Ethnic or racial differences emerged over the Malaysian policy of "Malay Malaysia" whereas PAP favoured a "Malaysian Malaysia" (Milne, 1966). The accession of Singapore brought about 80 percent Chinese population to the Federation which disturbed the demographical balance in Malaysian society (Young, 1994) where Malaysian and Chinese were in the proportion of 49.8 and 37.1 percent respectively (Federation of Malaya Yearbook, 1962). ...
The Malaysian society, one of the successful and managed multi-ethnic societies, is replete of imbalances and there still underlie the racial and ethnic disproportions in geographical dwellings, educational and professional fields, and economic and political roles. The modern racial relation in Malaysia is the legacy of pre-colonial and colonial period of history dating back to fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The unstable demographic balance, the unrestricted immigration policy or the policy of divide and rule by the colonial masters contributed besides other reasons toward the troubled relations between ethnic communities of Malaysia-Malays, Chinese, Indians, and others. But the way the respective Malaysian governments have managed such sour relationship in their socioeconomic and political spheres is the lesson that all multi-ethnic states can learn from.
... Primary data from across the projects included hundreds of semi-structured interviews on different aspects of the independence debate, as well as extensive analysis, both quantitative and qualitative, of secondary data. In this way, the scenarios we produced were evidence-based and routed in rigorous , multi-disciplinary analytical techniques (for supporting evidence see Armstrong and Ebell, 2014; Bekker and Warne, 2013; Curtice, 2016; Dunleavy, 2014; Henderson, 2014; Keating, 2013; King, 2014; Levie, 2012; Lisenkova and Mérette, 2013; MacKay and Stoyanova, 2013; McCollum et al., 2014; McEwen, 2014; Phillips and Tetlow, 2014a,b; Price, 2014; Riddell et al., 2013; Tierney, 2013a,b; Tindal et al., 2014; Young, 2013). While the Fellows were meeting regularly to discuss their research and disseminate findings, much of the 'brain-storming' of the scenario drivers, their relative importance and uncertainty, and the outline of the story-lines came from on-line discussions. ...
... Some academic work suggests that there are three components to transition cost: they include the fiscal costs of setting up new institutions, the costs of disentangling the two states, and the effects of uncertainty (Young, 1994a,b). While the broad range of what the costs of setting up new institutions can be estimated (Young, 2013 ), the costs of disentangling the two states are relatively uncertain. Most importantly, however, are the effects of uncertainty . ...
This paper draws on a social theory-informed understanding of causality to illustrate how notions of agent–structure interactions can enhance the intuitive logics (IL) approach to scenario planning. It incorporates concepts such as the ‘subjective’ predispositions of agency, ‘objective’ structures of social systems, activity dependence, unintended consequences of action and event-time temporality in the IL method to augment causal analysis in the scenario development process. The paper illustrates the social theory-informed IL framework through its application to a scenario exercise undertaken in the lead-up to the Scottish referendum on independence from the United Kingdom on September 18th, 2014. The central thesis of the paper is that agent–structure interactions underpin the unfolding of futures in social systems by both constraining and enabling the range of possible futures that can emerge
... 12 Heraclides' position implies that another concept, other than partition, is required for imposed divisions in the formation of the borders of new states or territories, because his stipulation makes all partitions consensual. Heraclides is right that a secession can be accompanied by a partition, but he is wrong, I think, in the example that he gives, namely Norway's peaceful secession from Sweden (discussed by Young, 1994; and see Lindgren, 1959 ). The Swedes did not regard Norway's departure within its existing home rule borders under the then-common crown as a partition of Sweden, a conviction obviously shared by the exiting Norwegians, since a mere 184 of them voted against the formation of an independent kingdom. ...
... Do Norway's departure from Sweden, Singapore's departure from Malaysia, and Slovakia's departure from Czechoslovakia become partitions because there was an agreement among political elites? These three cases are usually and better understood as peaceful secessions (though some argue that Malaysia expelled Singapore from its federation; see the discussion in Young, 1994). In the Czech case, a double secession occurred from the previously shared federation (Innes, 2001). ...
Political partitions should be carefully distinguished from secessions, de-colonizations and disengage-mentsdthough they may accompany these phenomena. Political partitions involve a fresh cut, an at least partially novel border, ripped through at least one national community's homeland. Partitions of national and multinational polities may be distinguished, as may external and internal partitions. External partitions have been rarer than suggested in conventional accounts, and explanations of their occurrence are evaluated , and recommendations are made that their rarity should persist.
... In order to survive, weak African governments had to be assured of the recognition and respect for their sovereignty by neighboring states, as well as any other states in a position to undermine their authority and control"~1969: 232-33!. 3 For an analysis of vulnerable states, see Saideman, 2001: 147 20 EUGene does not provide information on the level of democracy for Djibouti and Moldova for the years 1990-1992. Therefore, we had to refer to MAR's variables DEMOC 89 and DEMOC 94~Polity 98!, which provide the level of democracy of these two states for the years 1989and 1994. In 1989and 1994, the level for Djibouti's democracy was 0010. ...
... Therefore, we had to refer to MAR's variables DEMOC 89 and DEMOC 94~Polity 98!, which provide the level of democracy of these two states for the years 1989and 1994. In 1989and 1994, the level for Djibouti's democracy was 0010. Therefore, we conclude that Djibouti is not a democracy. ...
This article explores the impact of political regime type on the decision of third states to support secessionist movements abroad. It suggests that democracies share political values, which lead them to oppose their mutual secessionist claims, while autocracies are not bound by this normative consideration. The statistical analysis supports the effect of the democratic factor: democracies rarely support secessionist groups emerging from democratic states. Moreover, it shows that there is no autocratic counterpart to this argument. This research also casts some serious doubts on the ability of conventional explanations—namely vulnerability and ethnic affinities—to explain external support to secessionist movements.
Résumé. Cet article analyse l'impact du type de régime politique sur la décision des États tiers d'appuyer des mouvements sécessionnistes à l'étranger. L'étude soutient que les démocraties partagent des valeurs politiques communes qui les mènent à s'opposer aux mouvements indépendantistes qui se manifestent parmi elles, alors que les régimes autocratiques ne sont pas liés par cette considération normative. L'analyse statistique valide l'effet du facteur démocratique : les démocraties appuient rarement les groupes sécessionnistes qui émergent au sein d'autres États démocratiques. Les données démontrent également qu'il n'y a pas d'équivalent autocratique faisant écho au facteur démocratique. L'étude indique en outre que les thèses courantes de la vulnérabilité et du lien ethnique expliquent mal l'appui des États tiers aux groupes sécessionnistes.
... The literature has pointed out several explanations for why secessions do not occur, including psychological factors (Dion, 1996) and economic and political variables (Hechter, 1992). Moreover, peaceful secessions are rare and involve a high degree of consensus and a constitutional or legal framework (Young, 1994). However, with the empirical evidence I have accumulated, I can propose some ideas on the use of independence referendums as a leverage. ...
This article explores the strategic functions of independence referendums. These referendums are normally framed as popular decisions on statehood over a certain territory. However, I argue that the popular will does not always have the decisory function that plebiscitarian theories suggest. In fact, actual decision referendums are rare; often independence referendums are instead used strategically as a leverage and signalling tactic. The article is structured as follows. First, I propose two key criteria to classify independence referendums regarding actors and timing. Through the application of these criteria, I build a typology proposing four main uses of referendums: leverage, signalling, decision and ratification. Second, I focus on the specific case of leverage referendums. I argue that analyzing the outcomes of leverage referendums can provide some clues about why secessionists still call for these referendums even though they almost never result in internationally recognized statehood. Finally, I conclude by discussing the implications of my findings.
... Depending on how a secession takes place, it can be peaceful and swift, or painful and costly (Tir et al. 1998;Young 1994). According to Sorens (2012: 3), "since the 1980s, at least half of all ongoing civil wars in any given year have been secessionist"-see Cederman and Vogt (2017) for an overview of the civil war literature. ...
This article presents a political economic analysis of exit from federations. After the federation has formed, members’ benefits from it may be different than expected. If a member ends up not benefitting, it may wish to secede i.e. exit the federation. Based on formal models, we show how state-contingent exit penalties can induce socially efficient exit decisions: they force the secessionist member to take into account the lost benefits of the federation for the other. Even if ex-ante specified exit penalties cannot be made state-contingent, they may still enhance social welfare by preventing forceful exit. Empirical evidence concerning Montenegro, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and the EU is compatible with these claims. In spite of the simplifications inherent to any modeling exercise, we hope that our results stimulate more research into exit clauses as a means to mitigate the problem of violent secessionism.
... Consequently, unlike debates concerning violent partition, there are no well-developed theories or discussions surrounding peaceful separations. There are only various assumptions, scattered across the literature (Hanf, 1991, p. 40;Bunce, 1999, p. 229;Bookman, 1994;Young, 1994a;Young, 1994b;Wood, 1981). How could the cases of successful separation contribute to our understanding of partition in post-conflict peacebuilding? ...
How could the cases of successful state separation contribute to our understanding of partition in post-conflict peacebuilding? Can they tell us anything new that prevailing partition theories may have missed? In an attempt to address such questions, this paper focuses on the break-up of Czechoslovakia, perhaps the most frequently cited case of successful partition. The case expands the existing partition theories’ account of elite’s motivations and their role in successful partition. While some of the factors revealed by the Czechoslovak break-up are consistent with the logic of prevailing partition theories, some have not been fully recognized by partition scholars.
... The consequence of this mutually reinforcing obduracy is an escalating war of attrition as each side attempts to demonstrate its ability to 'out wait' the other while placing itself in a superior position to extract concessions in future negotiations. Of the many attempted and successful secessions in recent history, only a small minority have not resulted in significant violence, destruction of property or loss of life, e.g., the Québécois in Canada, the departure of Norway from Sweden in 1905, the expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993 (Young 1994) and the departure of Montenegro from the Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006. ...
Since decolonization began in the late 1940s, a series of often lengthy and destructive separatist insurgencies have imposed severe financial, economic and human costs upon the states of South Asia. Whereas previous analyses of these conflicts have typically focused upon the parent state or separatist group as the relevant unit of analysis, this book adopts a broader framework, arguing that separatism cannot be understood in isolation from the concept of state sovereignty. This book explores the motives, tactics, successes and failures of South Asia’s separatist movements by deconstructing sovereignty into its constituent components and offers an explanation for why separatism, but not political violence, has recently declined in the region. Taking a comparative explanatory viewpoint, it offers a comprehensive review of relevant explanatory theories dominant in the scholarly literature on separatism and an examination of their application to the South Asian states of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. As a thought-provoking discussion of statehood and sovereignty, this book will be of interest to students of political theory, comparative politics, international relations and South Asian politics.
... Consequently, unlike debates concerning violent partition, there are no well-developed theories or discussions surrounding peaceful separations. There are only various assumptions, scattered across the literature (Hanf, 1991, p. 40;Bunce, 1999, p. 229;Bookman, 1994;Young, 1994a;Young, 1994b;Wood, 1981). How could the cases of successful separation contribute to our understanding of partition in post-conflict peacebuilding? ...
This article reports fieldwork carried out in 2011 with the aim of investigating the attitudes and
reported behaviour of young Congolese men and women concerning relationships. A total of 56
boys and girls aged 16-20 from two urban and two rural high schools took part in focus groups 40 of
these were subsequently interviewed individually. For girls, the risks of pregnancy and sexuallytransmitted
diseases and loss of respect – their self-respect and the respect of their boyfriend –
made them careful about engaging in sex. For boys, sex in a relationship was seen as normal and a
key indicator of them entering manhood. When girls say no, boys do not regard this as the final
answer and begin trying to persuade her to change her mind. The majority, influenced by peer
pressure, believe that it is OK to force a girlfriend to have sex. Indeed, force is a major way of
resolving conflicts and often has the approval of girls as a ‘sign of love’. The need to build
communication skills about relationships and sex is an important recommendation.
... The consequence of this mutually reinforcing obduracy is an escalating war of attrition as each side attempts to demonstrate its ability to 'out wait' the other while placing itself in a superior position to extract concessions in future negotiations. Of the many attempted and successful secessions in recent history, only a small minority have not resulted in significant violence, destruction of property or loss of life, e.g. the Quebecois in Canada, the departure of Norway from Sweden in 1905, the secession of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965 and the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993 [3]. ...
... Because secessionists typically confront a numerically larger and better-equipped adversary, assistance from external actors is crucial to ensuring the viability of an armed struggle. 16 Reluctance to set a precedent that might lead to their own dismemberment limits overt support from states (Kashmiri secessionists have received assistance from Pakistan, although its nature and scope are disputed). More common is support from diaspora, i.e. families, communities and religious networks integrated in a territory by a host state, 17 who have left or been forced out of their traditional residence in a homeland state. ...
Grievance theories that emphasize injustice as the primary cause of secessionist violence offer valuable insights into the motivations of sponsors and participants. However, they face a difficulty in explaining the participation and support of geographically dispersed populations of co-ethnics (diaspora) that is not shared by rival theories that instead emphasize self-interest. This article uses the Kashmiri diaspora in Britain to examine how appeal to nationalist factors of shared identity, mutual sympathy and common understandings might allow grievance theories to effectively explain diaspora support. It concludes that, while a hybrid grievance-nationalist model might offer a more accurate and nuanced explanatory account of secessionist violence, it does so at the cost of conceptual clarity. Finally, the article addresses the implications for states and strategies to reduce the mobilization of diaspora in order to deny secessionists’ valuable assistance.
... Consequently, unlike debates concerning violent partition, there are no well-developed theories or discussions surrounding peaceful separations. There are only various assumptions, scattered across the literature (Hanf, 1991, p. 40;Bunce, 1999, p. 229;Bookman, 1994;Young, 1994a;Young, 1994b;Wood, 1981). How could the cases of successful separation contribute to our understanding of partition in post-conflict peacebuilding? ...
Empirical evidence regarding the relationship between the relative strength and coherence of
political institutions and the propensity of democratizing states to go to war is inconclusive.
Focusing on the immediate post-Cold War period not covered in extant quantitative assessments,
and on militarized inter-state disputes, rather than full-scale wars, this paper re-evaluates the
importance of political institutions as they relate to the democratization—war linkage. Further, this
study uses a recent ethnopolitical polarization index to assess the impact of polarization on
democratization and war. Results suggest that political institutions and politicized ethnicity are both
relevant factors to the belligerency of democratizing states, however, chi-square tests reveal no
statistically significant association in their effects. Hence, democracy promotion policies ought to
pursue both institution-building and multiculturalism for auspicious democratic outcomes.
... 6 As Young illustrates, peaceful secessions do occur, as Framing Separatism as Terrorism 431 exemplified by the secessions of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, of Hungary from Austria in 1867, and of Norway from Sweden in 1905. 7 As Young argues, peaceful secessions occur as a result of established legal processes. In these cases, the leadership of the predecessor state accepts the inevitability of secession, and negotiations follow. ...
Article available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/dNRcQ5DZ5P3rCszGrCfC/full.
Framing separatism as terrorism presents numerous opportunities for governments facing ethno-nationalist challenges. Namely, such framing allows states to avoid addressing the ethno-nationalist roots of separatist conflicts. This article analyzes incentives and opportunities that terrorism presents for states involved in ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. The article investigates how the framing dynamics proved to be successful in the cases of the Kurdish and Chechen separatist conflicts. The case of Kosovo is examined as illustrative of a different outcome: the international presence in the Kosovo conflict made it substantially different from the previous cases and served as an intervention in the Serbian framing dynamics.
In the wake of the Italian debt crisis and the Euro crisis, Northern secessionist voices have been grumbling over the costs of inter-regional fiscal redistribution – but without action. The roots of discontent run deep. The Italian founding of 1861 was forced from above, as centralization quashed local voices. The Fascist disaster and the post-world-war two republic continued the problem, with two complications: a redistributive state that uses Northern taxes to buy votes in the South; and an incomplete decentralization that added to the center‘s weight, fueling resentment in the Northern economic engines. Secession is rare – even with Italy‘s recent economic crisis and other secessionist movements within the European Unions, we continue to see grumbling but no action. The cost of staying is high, but the cost of leaving appears to be higher… but that calculus may change with the next crisis.
For the first time in its history, Ghana held a referendum in 2018 to divide some of its regions to create new ones. Though the regions are purely administrative, the division faced resistance in some areas and not in others. This study combines qualitative comparative analysis with process tracing to show that the resistance occurred within regions with relatively high support for the opposition party, but only in the combined presence of (traditional) elites competing from either side of the region and controversies regarding claims to (traditional) political authority. Further, it finds a bottom-up mechanism of the resistance, evolving as the threatened interests of stakeholders grew from the community to the regional, national and diaspora levels. As in other African cases, this suggests that the sources of conflicts in Africa are not so much about ethnic differences but more about elites’ unequal access to political and economic resources.
The right of self-determination of peoples holds out the promise of sovereign statehood for all peoples and a domination-free international order. But it also harbors the danger of state fragmentation that can threaten international stability if claims of self-determination lead to secessions. Covering both the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century independence movements in the Americas and the twentieth-century decolonization worldwide, this book examines the conceptual and political history of the right of self-determination of peoples. It addresses the political contexts in which the right and concept were formulated and the practices developed to restrain its potentially anarchic character, its inception in anti-colonialism, nationalism, and the labor movement, its instrumentalization at the end of the First World War in a formidable duel that Wilson lost to Lenin, its abuse by Hitler, the path after the Second World War to its recognition as a human right in 1966, and its continuing impact after decolonization.
The Cambridge History of the Kurds is an authoritative and comprehensive volume exploring the social, political and economic features, forces and evolution amongst the Kurds, and in the region known as Kurdistan, from the fifteenth to the twenty-first century. Written in a clear and accessible style by leading scholars in the field, the chapters survey key issues and themes vital to any understanding of the Kurds and Kurdistan including Kurdish language; Kurdish art, culture and literature; Kurdistan in the age of empires; political, social and religious movements in Kurdistan; and domestic political developments in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Other chapters on gender, diaspora, political economy, tribes, cinema and folklore offer fresh perspectives on the Kurds and Kurdistan as well as neatly meeting an exigent need in Middle Eastern studies. Situating contemporary developments taking place in Kurdish-majority regions within broader histories of the region, it forms a definitive survey of the history of the Kurds and Kurdistan.
Borders as imaginary or physical lines that serve as elements of separation (exclusion) and unification (inclusion) are widely discussed in fields such as history, international relations theory, international relations history, strategic studies, political science, and political geography, to name a few. Recent advances in the study of border problems have reshaped the conventional research paradigm in the fields of geography and political geography. This is why, in a study on the contemporary meanings of borders co-authored by numerous famous European and North American academics, an analysis of research paradigms, concepts, and future perspectives in border studies is offered. Corey Johnson and Reece Jones see borders as a complicated network of political, social, and cultural influences as long as sovereign states dominate the planet. This article will conduct an empirical examination of the Baltic Sea region's limits during the interwar period. It considers the complexities of borders as a twinning of political, social, cultural, economic, and psychological processes and occurrences, practically all of which are connected to a manifestation of power in its "hard" component. It is referred to as a "hard" border, pointing to the ones that divided Poland from Lithuania, or the Soviet Union from the Baltic States and the rest of the world, and as a "soft" or even "the softest" border, referring to the boundaries of the Scandinavian states during the same time period. As a Rezumat Granițele ca linii imaginare sau fizice care servesc ca elemente de separare (excludere) și unificare (includere) sunt discutate pe larg în domenii precum istoria, teoria relațiilor internaționale, istoria relațiilor internaționale, studiile strategice, știința politică și geografia politică, pentru a numi numai câteva. Progresele recente în tematica studiilor de frontieră au remodelat paradigma de cercetare convențională în domeniile geografiei și geografiei politice. Acesta este motivul pentru care, într-o abordare despre semnificațiile contemporane ale granițelor, în colaborare cu numeroși cercetători celebri europeni și nord-americani, a fost realizată o analiză a paradigmelor de cercetare, conceptelor și perspectivelor de viitor în studiile de frontieră. Corey Johnson și Reece Jones consideră granițele ca pe o rețea complicată de influențe politice, sociale și culturale atâta timp cât statele suverane domină planeta. Acest articol va proceda la o examinare empirică a frontierelor din regiunea Mării Baltice în perioada interbelică. Vom privi complexitatea granițelor ca pe o îngemănare a structurilor, proceselor și evenimentelor politice, sociale, culturale, economice și psihologice, toate acesta fiind conectate la o manifestare a puterii în componenta sa "dură". Sunt denumite granițe "dure" cele care despărțeau Polonia de Lituania sau Uniunea Sovietică de țările baltice și restul lumii, și granițe "soft" cele ale națiunilor scandinave în aceeași perioadă de timp. Ca un complement al ideologiilor naționale, noțiunea T 86 | Revista Română de Studii Baltice şi Nordice / The Romanian Journal for Baltic and Nordic Studies 13 (2) complement to national ideologies, the notion of political and surveillance checkpoints would be an extension of Anssi Paasi's dual vision of discursive and emotional spaces (encompassing acquisition, exclusion, protection, love, hate, and violence). Liam O'Dowd's case for the need of understanding the history of state-building processes is compelling. While our study will concentrate on state and supranational processes, it will also examine border-related activities at the local and regional levels. de puncte de control politice și de supraveghere ar fi o extensie a viziunii duale a lui Anssi Paasi asupra spațiilor discursive și emoționale (cuprinzând achiziție, excludere, protecție, iubire, ură și violență). Argumentul lui Liam O'Dowd cu privire la nevoia de a înțelege istoria proceselor de construire a statului este convingător. Deși studiul nostru se va concentra asupra proceselor statale și supranaționale, va examina și activitățile legate de frontieră la nivel local și regional.
Is separatism economically costly or is the violence associated with separatism to blame? Most separatist movements overlap with violent ethnic tensions and are associated with economically destructive outcomes. In this paper, we consider a (largely) peaceful separatist movement. Specifically, we use the synthetic control method to study the economic consequences of the surprising victory of the Parti Québécois in Quebec in 1976 and the subsequent referendum on Quebec's independence in 1980. We find that, relative to our control, the election of separatists had a small positive effect on economic activity until 1980 after which a small negative effect appears. We find similar results following the 1994 election that returned the Parti Québécois to power. We further find that the size of the provincial government (relative to GDP) constantly and significantly exceeded the counterfactual. We argue that the economic costs of separatist movements may arise from the frequently associated violence and not be intrinsic to any sort of attempted political disintegration.
While a number of movements seek state secession, the majority fails to achieve internationally recognized statehood. What accounts for the success of some secessionist movements and the failure of so many? I argue that success has little to do with the legal requirements of statehood or the particular traits of a movement. Rather, it is the politics of regional actors that drive the process. Without the support of regional actors, a secessionist movement will not achieve statehood. The role of regional actors is critical because their proximity positions them: (1) to provide tangible support to the movement; (2) to provide diplomatic support to the movement; (3) and to influence great power policy in the region. I apply this regional framework to an analysis of four secessionist movements across two regions: South Asia and the Horn of Africa. Finally, I discuss the implications of this theory for the independence movement in the Kurdish Region of Iraq.
This chapter addresses secession and Africa’s responses to the breaking of European-constructed nations, challenging the OAU’s 1964 Cairo Declaration that retained colonial borders and reaffirmed the principle of uti possidetis—retaining pre-independence borders. Africa experienced some interstate conflict, but internal conflict was far more insidious and as Rwanda’s 1994 genocide showed. However, secessionist wars have caused copious numbers of deaths, challenged territorial integrity and the OAU’s ability to broker peace, and the splitting of African nations. The chapter further examines Kenya’s Northern Frontier District (NFD), the Greater Somalia project, former Coastal Sultanates, Nigeria’s Biafra War and Sudan’s conflicts. The First and the Second Sudanese Civil Wars are addressed as are the circumstances leading to South Sudan’s secession in 2011, after the series of Comprehensive Peace Agreements and a referendum, capping 40+ years of conflict and close to 3 million deaths. It examines OAU responses to secession attempts, showing the organization itself to be beholden to Uti possidetis, challenging the OAU’s ability to be a neutral arbiter, but also exposing divisions among African countries—for example, in the Biafra War, 6 countries abstained or voted against reaffirming Nigeria’s territorial integrity. Biafra also mirrored other secession attempts such as Katanga and the Ogaden regions. OAU’s stance appeared to give carte blanche to countries unwilling to deal with internal conflicts even with legitimate causes, sustaining the internal conflicts.
The core approach of the work deals with postcolonial studies and the geographical reference area of "Western Borderlands", which largely consists of Eastern and East Central Europe. However, the Baltic states stand at the focus of the analysis and as such they are devoted the largest share of the eight chapters of the book. Colonialism, coloniality, and post-colonial are insightfully analyzed in the monograph and the author blends them to concepts such as colonial subject positions and colonial ideology. How to behave properly, what one could speak or do in public and what one instantly felt was forbidden, what could be published and what was rather to be shelved established certain boundaries between the conceivable and the inconceivable. Everything was driven by the colonial ideology which Annus defines as "a system of beliefs and corresponding statements that motivate and guide colonial discourse". Spotlighting both colonial subject positions and colonial ideology and further encompassing the notion of colonization in the meaning of "territorial acquisition" and "system of domination", the book is clearly operating in an innovative conceptual framework which turns it into a vital contribution in colonial/postcolonial studies.
В статье предложен авторский подход к возможному построению знаний. Внимание сосредоточено на общей концептуальной основе понимания знания Гегелем. Отправная точка вытекает из его концепции рационального познания реальности. Это позволяет немецкому философу систематизировать и классифицировать философию. Созданная им философская система позволяет раскрыть процесс познания и его логику.
This paper tries to apply Lijphart’s way of description with ten factors for the two models of democracy to the Republic of Turkey. Turkey, with her essential location and a different political structure and social structure, can be added to Lijphart example. This research mainly analysis Turkish political system with Lijphart’s majoritarian and consensus democracy idea. In this study, while examining the case of Turkey, the World Bank, IMF, and Freedom House reports and data were used.
This paper tries to apply Lijphart's way of description with ten factors for the two models of democracy to the Republic of Turkey. Turkey, with her essential location and a different political structure and social structure, can be added to Lijphart example. This research mainly analysis Turkish political system with Lijphart's majoritarian and consensus democracy idea. In this study, while examining the case of Turkey, the World Bank, IMF, and Freedom House reports and data were used. Abstrak Makalah ini mencoba untuk menerapkan cara deskripsi Lijphart dengan sepuluh faktor untuk dua model demokrasi di Republik Turki. Turki, dengan lokasinya yang penting, yang merupakan negara dengan struktur politik dan struktur sosial yang berbeda, dapat jadikan contoh dari deskripsi Lijphart. Penelitian ini terutama menganalisis sistem politik Turki dengan ide demokrasi mayoritas dan konsensus dari Lijphart. Dalam studi ini, saat menganalisis kasus Turki, laporan dan data Bank Dunia, IMF, dan Freedom House yang digunakan.
The prevalent approach suggests that constitutions are silent about secession and may even implicitly allow it. But an examination of world constitutions reveals that the overwhelming majority of countries vigorously protect territorial integrity. This is true even of countries classified as consociational or consensus democracies. Scholars further point to the existence of secessionist political parties as proof that secession may align with constitutionalism. This Article, however, explains how democracies engage in a delicate game to chase and eliminate secessionist political mobilization. Democracies have been able to conceal their fight against secessionists by creating a large gap between “the law on the books” and “the law as practiced.” Some constitutions also use doublespeak to declare territorial integrity inviolable while nevertheless setting procedures for territorial change. In fact, democracies employ the most unconventional constitutional weapons to fight against secession. These include a ban on secessionist political parties from participating at elections and a constitutional eternity clause that makes territorial integrity an eternal value, not subject to constitutional amendment. These tools raise democratic paradoxes so extreme that democracies appear to be using the tools of authoritarian regimes. Militant democracy must be re-characterized to capture not just bans on political parties, but also eternity clauses. It serves to protect existential needs of states, not just their democratic regime. Even when democracies allow for secession, they set such hurdles that secession becomes all but impossible to achieve. Countries’ total prohibition on secession may be explained on strategic as well as principled constitutional law considerations. This Article argues that constitutions’ treatment of secession reveals that “We the People” is a territorial concept. The Canadian landmark Reference re Secession of Quebec decision’s precedential value for world constitutionalism must thus be qualified.
Historians who have examined the ‘failure’ of the Kurds to obtain statehood in the immediate aftermath of the First World War have, understandable, closely examined the lobbying efforts engaged in by the Kurdish elites in Istanbul, specifically those activists associated with the Society for the Betterment of Kurdistan (est. 1918). These efforts culminated in the summer of 1920 with the inclusion of clauses within Treaty of Sèvres which provided Kurdish-inhabited regions of the dying Ottoman Empire with a pathway to independence. Yet, only a few years later, Sèvres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), a treaty which made no provisions for Kurdish self-rule. This reversal of fortunes is accounted for in a number of ways, divisions amongst the Kurdish nationalists, the military success of Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s ‘nationalist’ forces in the Greco-Turkish War (1920–1922), and the ‘betrayal’ of the Kurds by perfidious European powers. However, often overlooked in this story is the geopolitical legacy of the First World War. It will be argued here that the failure of Kurdish nationalists in the immediate aftermath of the war can in large part be explained by developments that occurred over the four years of conflict.
Denk and Lehtinen present a theoretical model of state formation, which assumes that state formation is a sequence of events that have five phases: demand phase, response phase, reaction phase, decisive phase, and implementation phase. The chapter argues that cases of state formation may have different qualities in these phases and presents a framework with typologies that specify various modes of the phases. The authors use the framework to classify 132 cases of state formation, which describe the phases of state formation since 1946. The empirical analyses show that the cases have different modes in the phases, which indicates that the cases have become independent states after various processes.
Today it is known why, how and when ethnic conflicts erupt, the form they will take, and the factors associated with their de-escalation. However most research continues to select heavily on the dependent variable while comparatively less examines questions about the timing, escalation and the duration of group interactions in both its cooperative and conflictual forms. In order to understand why some ethnic conflicts are prone to violence while others are not, the author argues programmes are needed to map out patterns of co-existence on a global scale.
Created in part by outsiders in the aftermath of World War I, Czechoslovakia enjoyed only a brief period of self-rule during its short history. Scarcely was the state in place before the Great Depression and the prelude to World War II deprived its leaders of the opportunity to build either durable political institutions or a durable political community. Then came the twin traumas of German occupation during the war and postwar Soviet control. Consequently, in a sense it was not until the peaceful overthrow of the country’s communist regime in 1989 that the Czech and Slovak peoples themselves had the opportunity to decide what they wanted to do with their union. Within three years they decided to end it.
Modelling Ethnic Conflict: Problems and Pitfalls - Volume 16 Issue 2 - David Carment
Previous studies about democracies on a global level have assumed that democratisation occurs when an autocratic regime moves toward becoming a democratic regime. This article recognises an alternative mode to democratic transition: democratisation by state-formation, which occurs when democratic regimes are established in new states as an outcome of state-formation. The article describes how cases of democratisation can be classified according the two modes of democratisation. Furthermore, the classification is applied in illustrative analyses of democratisation on the global level during 1800–2007. The analyses describe how transition and state-formation have affected the global number of democracies. These analyses indicate that both modes of democratisation have empirical relevance and that the classification provides a more complete description of the global development of democracies than previous studies. The main conclusion of this article is therefore a proposal for future studies to include both modes to understand and explain democratisation on the global level.
Purpose
– The purpose of this paper is to undertake an analysis of the implications of potential Scottish independence for inward foreign direct investment (FDI), multinational enterprise strategies and the local economy.
Design/methodology/approach
– This paper takes a multidisciplinary approach drawing on literature and evidence in the international business and management, political economy and economic geography fields to analyse the role and impact of inward FDI in Scotland following possible Scottish independence.
Findings
– Scotland continues as an attractive location for FDI, with greater diversity than hitherto. While the country’s comparative advantages in immobile natural resources provide some protection from uncertainty, weak embeddedness is a risk factor irrespective of independence. A range of transition costs of independence are identified, which could be high and of indeterminate duration, and some will be sector-specific. There are also new possibilities for tailoring of policies and potential reindustrialization opportunities in renewable technologies. The foreign investors most vulnerable to political risks and uncertainties are those whose market scope is the rest of the UK (rUK) either as exporters or value-chain integrators, in addition to the high political risk industries of energy, banking and financial services and defence. Scottish subsidiaries’ significance within their parent MNE groups will also be a major factor in determining responses to political risks and uncertainties.
Originality/value
– Specific focus on the impact of potential independence on the foreign-owned sector as a major contributor to the Scottish economy.
With the changing political and economic circumstances confronting their countries, regionally concentrated minorities have been facing a strategic problem, important aspects of which can be stylized as a situation in which a minority leader is uncertain about the costs of secession for her community. This paper shows that this uncertainty is a central cause of secession, using a model which incorporates both policies to appease secessionist aspirations and informational asymmetries. In a situation of asymmetric information, in which the policy-maker is better informed about the consequences of separation than the minority leader, signaling incentives make secession the unique equilibrium outcome, whether mutually advantageous compromises exist or not. We also show that the ruling majority may seek to maintain political unity by pre-committing to minority protection rules which prevent bluffing by the informed policy-maker. Additionally, the model generates comparative statics results on the question of which states are most likely to adopt constitutional rules protecting the minorities living within their borders.
This article demonstrates that the costs incurred in the process of a region becoming a sovereign state can be large enough
to outweigh the long-term material benefits of independence. Transition costs consist of transaction costs, fiscal costs,
and the cost of uncertainty. Their size depends crucially on whether the politics of the transition are cooperative. Game
theory, however, shows that there are incentives for threats of non-cooperation and for the exercise of such threats. These
considerations are applied, briefly, to the debate about Scottish independence. This includes a short analysis of how transition
costs can be reduced. A final section inquires about possible transition benefits, which can consist of solidarity.
1 This article aims at highlighting the dynamics which determined the process of disgregation of Czechoslovakia from a comparative perspective, adopting the Belgian process of State decentralization as a functional interpretative lens. This work represents the first attempt to tackle this issue from a comparative perspective, beyond the boundaries of CEE. I assume that Belgium and post-communist Czechoslovakia faced similar challenges of both political and socio-cultural nature. In the two countries the long-lasting ethno-linguistic divisions did alter the nature of inter-party political competition and of the society as such. However, despite these common traits the attempts towards unitary federalism produced opposite outcomes. The aim of this work is therefore to identify the factors which determined such different outcomes.
A shadowy francophone organisation, the Mouvement de Libération du Québec, has blacklisted 22 companies it considers pro-English. Anonymous letters carrying a picture of an armed French revolutionary have been sent to some senior anglophone businessmen. A second list, of 'enemies of the people', include the leaders of the anglophone Equality Party ( The Times, April 17 1996)
This article is a response to Stephen
Saideman's criticism of our research findings on third state
intervention in secessionist crises, which was published in this journal
in 2005. Here we defend our methodology and the validity of our results.
We also explain why, in our view, Saideman's criticisms and the
alternative research design that he offers are seriously questionable.
More specifically, our reply focuses on his problematic case selection and
on his measurement of ethnic ties, which is methodologically inconsistent
and biased.
This article focuses on foreign labor and economic development in Singapore by reviewing the historical ebb and flow of foreign labor, presenting the prevailing government policy and philosophy on the importation of labor, contrasting the economic benefits and costs of foreign labor, describing common characteristics of foreign workers in Singapore, projecting the implications of such labor in Singapore and discussing policy alternatives.
This paper presents an analysis of secession based on rational choice premises. From these premises, secession is seen to be the outcome of a series of collective decisions made by regional leaders and populations, and by the leaders and populations of host states. This emphasis on collective decisions serves to differentiate secession from another process that leads to the formation of political units — the fragmentation of host states The analysis explains why secession has been such a rare outcome in modern history and suggests that it will continue to be rare in the foreseeable future.
Class, regional and communal conflicts which influence the probability of secessionist war are affected substantially by the nature of the colonial economic system and the post-colonial international economic nexus. In Nigeria and India, British colonial rule brought about imbalances in the mobilization of populations, reinforced or created ethnic identities, and provided a framework for competition between classes and regional groups. The post-independence political and economic ties of Nigeria and Pakistan to Britain and the United States further intensified these imbalances by strengthening the dominant elite within each less developed country. Military and economic assistance, and private capital from the U.K. and the U.S. served also to shield this elite from peripheral groups within its own nation-state. The dominant classes utilized sentiments associated with sub-national identities to transfer potential hostilities from class disparities within their own communities to differences with and antagonisms toward other ethnic groups and regions. Major political elites pursued and implemented economic policies which served their economic advantage. These policies had the effect of increasing inter-regional discrepancies in Pakistan, and threatening established regional cconomic interests in Nigeria. Though patterns of perceived deprivation thus differed in the two cases, both Biafra and Bangladesh came to view their membership within a federal union as one entailing persistent economic costs. The precipitants of the two political conflicts - the reorganization of the Nigerian federation and the postponement of the Pakistan constituent assembly - were only final steps on the long road to secessionist civil war.
RésuméUn large éventail de concepts et de pré-théories de diverses disciplines des sciences sociales et de sous-champs de science politique sont passés en revue pour établir un cadre d'analyse trans-culturel de la sécession. Pour expliquer la sécession, nous proposons une approche processuelle basée sur le renversement de la conceptualisation de Haas de l'intégration politique. L'évolution des tentatives de sécession est examinée sous cinq titres: (1) les pré-conditions; (2) la montée des mouvements sécessionnistes; (3) la réponse des gouvernements centraux; (4) les précipitants de la sécession; et (5) la résolution des crises sécessionnistes par le conflit armé. La sécession peut être réprimée ou accomodée à bien des étapes avant celle du conflit armé. Les facteurs affectant les divers résultats sont évalues grâce aux preuves fournies par les tentatives ratées, réussies ou actuelles de sécession. Des arguments sont avancés pour le développement de types spécifiques de recherches comparatives sur les sécessions.
The fall of the Dual Monarchy in October 1918, after a half-century existence, gave rise to a Schuldfrage which prolonged by another fifty years the polemics begun in 1867 about the constitutional foundations of the reformed Habsburg state. Both before and after 1918 the pivotal problem of the controversy had to do with the political wisdom and implementation of the Ausgleich or Compromise of 1867. The purpose of this article is to reconstruct the dispute over the Compromise in its successive historical settings through four generations of critics and, with benefit of their insight, to attempt a reassessment of the 1867–1918 edifice from a centennial vantage point.
In the absence of oppression, citizens of a sub-unit who contemplate secession carefully weigh the benefits and costs of different
outcomes. Here these costs are shown to be highly variable: they depend on the strategic behavior of each state and on whether
cooperative relations would be re-established after secession. Using Quebec as a case, it is shown that threats of non-cooperation
by the predecessor state may be discounted as not credible. Elementary game theory, however, shows that, with repeat play,
retaliatory non-cooperation could be a rational strategy. Moreover, it is shown that reaching a compromise solution requires
a credible threat on the part of the potential secessor to accept a sovereignty where there would be no economic cooperation.
In modern welfare states, these risks are severe enough to make secession rare, and incremental constitutional change the
norm.
This article discusses the impact of electoral competition on the relations between the different levels of government in a federal State. It examines the strategies of two levels of government, national and local, during a constitutional revision process on the new division of powers. The author shows how the perspective of a fundamental change in the division of powers in Canada can shape the strategy of opposing political groups. Their analysis suggests that, in order to minimize risks of electoral defeat, the Canadian federal government could have the incentive to abandon Quebec in favor of the preferences of the Canadian citizens outside Quebec.
Why Is Secession Rare? Lessons from Quebec
- Dion
On the Economic Viability of New Nation-States
- Schroeder
New Life in an Old Pact
- Jenkins