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The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections, 1982–1990

Authors:
Susan Welch at Pennsylvania State University
Susan Welch
John R Hibbing at University of Nebraska–Lincoln
John R Hibbing
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Abstract

Fifteen years ago, Peters and Welch investigated the effects of corruption charges on the outcomes of U.S. House elections. Their evidence from 1968 to 1978 indicated that charges generally produced a decline in vote share of between 6% and 11%, depending upon the nature of the charge. Morals violations were the most consequential for candidates and conflict of interest the least. Continuing changes in American politics and the nature of campaigns have made corruption charges even more common and, indeed, central to many races. In the following research note, we explore whether the changing nature of congressional campaigns has altered the magnitude of the effects of corruption charges on congressional election outcomes.
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University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications: Political Science Political Science, Department of
2-1-1997
e Eects of Charges of Corruption on Voting
Behavior in Congressional Elections, 1982-1990
John R. Hibbing
University of Nebraska Lincoln, jhibbing1@unlnotes.unl.edu
Susan Welch
is Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications: Political Science by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska -
Lincoln.
Hibbing, John R. and Welch, Susan, "e Eects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections,
1982-1990" (1997). Faculty Publications: Political Science. Paper 14.
hp://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscifacpub/14
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... To that point,Welch and Hibbing (1997) code scandals into the following categories: campaign violations, bribery, "other crimes," conflict of interest, abuse of congressional prerogatives, moral charges, and a residual "other" category.Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved. ...
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... Evidence exists for Europe(Bågenholm 2013), Japan(Reed et al. 1996), and the United States(Welch and Hibbing 1997). For an overview, seeGolden (2010). ...
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