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International Humanitarian Law and Bombing Campaigns: Legitimate Military Objectives and Excessive Collateral Damage
Abstract
Despite the introduction and increasing use of ‘smart’ bombs, recent bombing campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and Serbia, formerly known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), have resulted in what some commentators consider to be an unacceptably high level of civilian casualties, especially when compared with the low level of combatant casualties in the attacking force. During the most recent Gulf conflict, a conservative estimate suggests that over 1,100 Iraqi civilians died within the first 2 months as a result of aerial bombardment or missile attacks by Coalition forces and that approximately another 600 civilians were killed by unexploded ordinance during the same period. There are no reliable statistics for civilians injured by aerial bombardment and unexploded ordinance in that period but the number is likely to have been many times higher than the number of fatalities.(Online publication August 15 2011)
... Despite technological advancements in military capabilities, the outcomes and consequences of conflicts have remained largely unchanged. Although the use of "smart" bombs has become more prevalent, it has led to what some observers perceive as a significant number of casualties (Byron, 2011). ...
The enduring conflicts among Middle Eastern nations have caused devastating casualties and loss of life, leading to deep human suffering and significant societal distress. Their impact is not limited to the immediate regions involved but has reverberated across communities within those countries. Additionally, the international community has been deeply affected by the conflict and has made efforts to seek a resolution. The inadequate understanding of collateral damage and a primitive mindset have resulted in the unfortunate deaths of numerous innocent civilians. This article explores the psychological mechanisms underlying collateral damage in the context of war and conflict. In an effort to shed light on the multifaceted nature of collateral damage and its impact on both affected populations and combatants, the complex interplay of cognitive, emotional, and social factors was explored. The aim was to explore the psychological consequences of collateral damage and provide theoretical assumptions to understand collateral damage and war. The SANRA narrative review method was adopted to discuss the psychological underpinnings of collateral damage. Several studies have explored the concept of collateral damage in the context of war and psychology. By understanding the psychological mechanisms behind collateral damage, it is possible to effectively address the root causes and develop strategies to minimise its occurrence in armed conflicts. Moreover, it is essential to prioritise the education of leaders and military personnel regarding the concept of collateral damage
... C. Byron points out that they are also highly volatile electronic devices, which might be interrupted, broken down or misguided by electronic warfare. 129 In fact, attacks with guided missiles need to be carried out with a greater degree of care to avoid becoming disproportionate. 130 The attacking aircraft might be forced to fly at lower altitudes or lower speed, or to approach a target zone from a different angle of attack. ...
Air power is a dominant factor in both past and modern battlespace. Yet, despite its undisputed importance in warfare, its legal framework did not correspond with the significance of the air military operations, especially before the adoption of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1977. Even after this date, not all the particulars of air warfare are regulated by the positive rules, as the law is scattered in norms of customary character. Even more challenging process than reconstruction of the legal architecture of the air warfare is the evaluation of the specific incidents containing the elements of military aviation activity. The aim of the article is to present possible challenges arising from very complex normative and operational background of the air warfare and air bombardments in particular. The pivotal point in considerations is the forgotten inquiry conducted by the military experts operating within the established by the League of Nations commission reviewing the conduct of air bombardment during the Civil War in Spain. The adopted methodology of the commission could be considered as a reasonable and balanced approach of analyzing the cases including the involvement of the air power and a relevant reference in contemporary investigations.
The Russian aggression against Ukraine involves extensive use of air power, proving that without the sufficient level of air control, the combat operations on the ground face significant operational challenges. The use of air power raises questions regarding the legality of the aerial actions conducted over Ukraine. This conflict in the air domain is characterised by separate campaigns. The first one was a battle over the air superiority of Ukraine, which was relatively short in time (February–April 2022), albeit intense, and lost by the Russian Air Force due to the inability to destroy Ukrainian air defence assets and Ukrainian military aviation. The second one, still in progress at the moment this article is being written, looks to become an unresolved contest of attrition, as both belligerents vastly increased their air disruption capabilities. In particular, during the last period of the first phase, it is believed that many of the Russian air strikes were, in fact, indiscriminate or deliberately directed against civilian objectives. The aim of the article is to analyse the overall conduct of the air war over Ukraine and pinpoint the legal challenges in assessing the legality of such air operations. In the context of available information, the paper will seek to understand the legal framework concerning the destruction of the An-225 at the Hostomel airport during the first phase of hostilities, the use of certain aerial weapons, and the selection of targets.
This book seeks to clarify the legal concept of proportionality in international humanitarian law, as it applies during armed conflict. It is argued in the book that a refocus of the interpretation of the proportionality rule is warranted to enhance the protection of civilians. More precisely, this book seeks to dissect the origins of the rule, determine how its components must be interpreted and how it is to be applied in practice. The book considers practical situations that may arise in the conduct of military operations and searches for the limits international humanitarian law sets to commanders' assessments of proportionality during armed conflict. The book concludes that proportionality is an inherently subjective and imprecise yardstick that nonetheless serves to protect civilians during armed conflict.
This collection of essays focusses on the following concepts: sovereignty (the unique, intangible and yet essential characteristic of states), statehood (what it means to be a state, and the process of acquiring or losing statehood) and state responsibility (the legal component of what being a state entails). The unifying theme is that they have always been and will in the future continue to form a crucial part of the foundations of public international law. While many publications focus on new actors in international law such as international organisations, individuals, companies, NGOs and even humanity as a whole, this book offers a timely, thought-provoking and innovative reappraisal of the core actors on the international stage: states. It includes reflections on the interactions between states and non-state actors and on how increasing participation by and recognition of the latter within international law has impacted upon the role and attributes of statehood.
حقوق بشردوستانه بینالمللی به دنبال انسانی کردن وجهه جنگها و مخاصمات مسلحانه میباشد و در این راستا علاوه براینکه هدف قرار دادن غیرنظامیان به طور مستقیم ممنوع شده است، خسارات اتفاقی که در اثر حمله نسبت به اموال و اهداف غیرنظامی وارد میشود نیز نباید در قیاس با مزیت نظامی حاصل از حمله بیش از حد باشد که این امر به عنوان اصل تناسب در حقوق بشردوستانه شناخته میشود. حال مسأله اصلی این است که آیا نقض این اصل را میتوان جرمانگاری نموده و مورد محاکمه کیفری قرار داد یا خیر؟ با توجه به اسناد و رویهی محاکم کیفری بینالمللی به ویژه دادگاه کیفری بینالمللی یوگسلاوی سابق و دیوان بینالمللی کیفری، نقض اصل تناسب در زمان مخاصمات مسلحانه یکی از مصادیق جنایات جنگی محسوب شده و این محاکم صلاحیت رسیدگی به این جنایت را دارا میباشد.
The book addresses the question of whether the currently available instruments of international environmental and international humanitarian law are applicable to climate conflicts. It clarifies the different pathways leading from climate change to conflict and offers an analysis of international environmental law embedded within the international doctrine of state responsibility. It goes on to discuss whether climate change amounts to an issue covered by Art. 2.4 UN Charter - the prohibition of the use of force. It then considers the possible application of international humanitarian law to climate conflicts. The book also offers a definition of the term "climate conflict", drawing on legal as well as peace and conflict studies.
It is increasingly recognized that environmental degradation has the potential to produce internal and interstate conflict by undermining stability and producing mass migration. Given the integrated nature of the environment, it is impossible for a state to protect itself entirely against intentional or accidental environmental harm originated in another state. The consequences of that harm may be severe and long lasting to the receiving state. This chapter covers ius in bello, which refers to the body of international law which governs conduct in case hostilities arise, i.e. international humanitarian law (IHL). Here, the analysis assesses the question how far IHL regulates environmental damages deriving from conflicts. The ENMOD Convention and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions are analyzed due to their regulations covering environmental damage during war. The analysis questions whether the findings regarding environmental damage during times of war are transferable to the case of climate change.
In the context of IHL, the book also examines whether climate change may generate situations that trigger the so-called responsibility to protect, which refers to the responsibility of the international community to possibly interfere with state sovereignty in cases of great humanitarian need for the civilian population.
If anyone doubted the technological future of the means of warfare in the early twenty-first century, such doubts will have been dispelled by the Pentagon’s announcement, in February 2013, of the creation of a new medal for US troops for ‘extraordinary achievement’ in combat operations. The putative recipients of this award, directors of cyber-attacks and the operators of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, often referred to as ‘drones’), do not physically participate in ground operations or directly risk their own lives. It is the first new US military combat award to be created since the Bronze Star Medal during the Second World War. The journey from recognising the meritorious service of those who ‘lead miserable lives of extreme discomfort and […] who must close in personal combat with the enemy’ to a non-combat ‘accomplishment so exceptional and outstanding as to clearly set the individual apart from comrades or from other persons in similar situations’ speaks volumes for the direction in which the nature of warfare has evolved over the last seven decades. Although a certain element of physical bravery undoubtedly retains its place on contemporary battlefields, and will no doubt continue to do so in the future, the need to bash an enemy’s brains out with a club – or at least to have visual contact in order to shoot him with a rifle – has been replaced by the firing of a missile at a target on a computer screen, with the push of a button, in an air-conditioned office up to thousands of kilometres away from the scene of the engagement.
When an attack is launched by an army against a military objective of the adverse party to an international armed conflict (IAC), causing incidental civilian casualties, the legal question that immediately arises is whether such ‘collateral damage’ is ‘excessive’ in relation to ‘the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’ within the meaning of Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2) of the 1977 Geneva Additional Protocol I (API).1 These provisions embody the principle of proportionality, which is recognised as part of customary international law.2 Assuming that the test of attribution is met, the responsibility of the attacking State can be engaged. Further, if such an attack has been carried out in the knowledge that the incidental loss ‘would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated’, then the question of individual criminal responsibility of the soldier involved in the attack may concurrently arise under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute). With respect to incidental casualties of civilians (and damage of civilian objects, and combination thereof), it is clear that Article 8(2)(b)(iv) ICC derives from the rules embodied under Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2) API. As Bianchi notes, such duality of responsibility, and this without any hierarchy between them, has been ‘a constant feature of international law’. That said, fundamental differences must be borne in mind. The law on State responsibility is an ‘objective’ regime, which is not predicated on a ‘fault’ (culpa) or subjective element of the pertinent State’s organ or agent, save for the primary rules that inherently incorporate a subjective element, such as those on genocide. The responsibility of a State for the excessive collateral damage arises, even though perpetrators are judged as not having entertained the requisite degree of mens rea, as required under Article 30 ICC Statute, with respect to their conduct.
Under treaty law all civilian objects are protected in international armed conflicts (IAC) whereas it is only certain civilian objects that enjoy protection under treaty law in non-international armed conflicts (NIAC). However, it is commonly argued that all civilian objects are protected in NIAC under customary law. This article examines the reasons for the differences in the protection of civilian objects under treaty law and the argument that customary law now provides equal protection for all civilian objects under both IAC and NIAC. The article argues that this equal protection may hinder the ability of states to maintain law and order under their domestic law in NIAC in situations where they may need to destroy property which belongs to armed opposition groups. The article advances the argument that the law regarding targeting should be that all civilian objects are protected in NIAC but, unlike the protection of civilian objects in IAC, this protection does not bar a state from destroying in its territory objects which were considered to be illegal under domestic law before the commencement of the NIAC, in accordance with international human rights law as lex specialis.
Hybrid Threats as an emerging new form of armed conflict often lead to confusion regarding the nature of the threat itself and the choice and legality of potential countermeasures by the affected state. There seems to be a need for establishing a legal framework to regulate the response by a state to such threats in cases of asymmetric war, irregular warfare and hybrid war. Any military response will have to comply with the three main principles of the law of armed conflict, namely military necessity, proportionality and distinction. In addition, existing civil-military cooperation should be intensified and increased.
Threats to environmental security (‘eco-threats’) face not only shortcomings of environmental protection during hostilities under the Law of Armed Conflict. Considering the new ‘Hybrid Threat’ concept, which had recently been discussed by NATO, the authors recognise from the perspective of International Law the need for adopting a comprehensive legal approach towards such threats. The International Environmental Law, the International Humanitarian Law and the Customary International Law show some shortcomings to tackle the new challenge. In the focus is the rule of law, in particular the principle of proportionality, which can play a role when countering such threats and legal rules can have a positive effect on the international community’s ability to act.
The principle of proportionality is one of the core principles of international humanitarian law. The principle is not easy to apply on the battlefield, but is even harder to apply retrospectively, in the courtroom. This article discusses the challenges in applying the principle during international criminal trials. It discusses the principle itself, followed by an explanation of the general challenges of dealing with violations of international humanitarian law, and more specifically the rules related to the conduct of hostilities, during war crime trials. The way in which the principle has been used before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is examined, including an in-depth discussion of the recent Gotovina case. The second part consists of an evaluation of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and discusses the difficulties the International Criminal Court would face in cases dealing with violations of the principle of proportionality.
In this paper, the author examines the 2011 NATO led operations in Libya by reference to the applicable rules of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello. He considers the constitutionality of the mandate of the Security Council and its implications for the use of force in implementing that mandate. The author then considers the implications of the mandate and the use of force used pursuant to it for the applicability of the jus in bello laws regulating the conduct of hostilities. In the second half of the paper, the author examines a number of instances of targeting during the NATO led operation by reference to the jus in bello laws of targeting, demonstrating the complexity of the targeting decision making process in view of the rapidly changing situation on the ground.
Introduction: Of all the topics in international humanitarian law, arguably none is of more importance than securing compliance with the law's provisions and enforcing the law. Given that armed conflict by its very nature occasions violence, destruction and death, all too often to innocent people, there is little point in having an elaborate system of detailed rules for the conduct of hostilities and the protection of victims in war if there is no corresponding effective system for securing compliance and enforcing those rules. It is all very well having a doctrine of individual criminal responsibility for violations of humanitarian law but criminal proceedings by definition may be brought only after the crime has been committed and the damage done. While war crimes trials are undoubtedly considered more interesting and newsworthy by the media and the public at large, it cannot be doubted that adequate prevention – the task primarily of States, acting through military command hierarchies – is in many respects even more essential to a credible system of legal rules, Thus, compliance with and enforcement of international humanitarian law at the State level of civil (as opposed to criminal) responsibility, obligations to disseminate the legal rules and incorporate them in domestic legal systems, and ensuring that armed forces are adequately instructed in their content, are crucial. By attaining these objectives, States can encourage the observance of the law in armed conflict and ensure that there is a workable system for obtaining enforcement.
Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules is a comprehensive analysis of the customary rules of international humanitarian law applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts. In the absence of ratifications of important treaties in this area, this is clearly a publication of major importance, carried out at the express request of the international community. In so doing, this study identifies the common core of international humanitarian law binding on all parties to all armed conflicts.
On December 11, 1977, the Swiss Government opened for signature two Protocols to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the Protection of War Victims. Forty-four governments signed either one or both Protocols on that day, and, by September 1979, 62 governments had signed one or both Protocols. The Protocols entered into force on December 7, 1978, and by October 1980, were in force for 15 states. One of these Protocols develops the law applicable in international armed conflicts, and the other expands the protections currently accorded to the victims of noninternational armed conflicts by Article 3 common to the 1949 Conventions. Together the Protocols represent many years of effort, first by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and more recently by more than one hundred governments assembled in conference. During more than 8 months of conference sessions over 4 years, these governments struggled to correct the perceived deficiencies in the law and to develop and articulate new rules to improve the protections available to the victims of armed conflicts. Each government drew on its own experiences, and the result may reasonably be thought to be the composite reaction by the international community to the perceived inhumanities of wars during the past quarter century. Since we shall probably have to wait at least another quarter century before new efforts are made to develop the law further, it would seem appropriate to begin to analyze the two new Protocols and to draw some conclusions about them. This article, written by an active participant in the Geneva conference, attempts to contribute to this process by analyzing a few of the more significant developments in the law contained in Protocol I, that is, the Protocol dealing with international armed conflicts.
Preface Abbreviations General Introduction and Guide to Documentation (B./P.) Protocol I Part I General Provisions Part II Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Section I -General Protection Section II - Medical Transportation Section III - Missing and Dead Persons Part III Methods and Means of Warfare Combatant And Prisoner-of-War Status Section I - Methods and Means of Warfare Section II - Combatant and Prisoner-of-War Status Part IV Civilian Population Section I - General Protection against Effects of Hostilities Section II - Relief in Favour of The Civilian Population Section III - Treatment of Persons in the Power of a Party to the Conflict Part V Execution of the Conventions and of this Protocol Section II - Repression of Breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol Part VI Final Provisions Annex I Regulations Concerning Identification Annex II Identity Card for Journalists on Dangerous Professional Missions Protocol II Part I Scope of this Protocol Part II Humane Treatment Part III Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Part IV Civilian Population Part V Final Provisions Selective Bibliography List Of States Signatories Declarations Made Upon Signature List Of States Parties Reservations And Declarations Made Upon Ratification Or Accession Index.
I shall often go wrong through defect of judgment. When right, I shall often be thought wrong by those whose positions will not command a view of the whole ground. I ask your indulgence for my own errors, which will never be intentional, and your support against the errors of others, who may condemn what they would not if seen in all its parts.
—Thomas Jefferson
On August 2,1990, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied Kuwait, beginning a seven-monthlong series of events that would come to be known as the Persian Gulf war. Perhaps the most thoroughly examined of these events was the thirty-eight-day air campaign, which began on January 17,1991, and marked the beginning of the offensive by the coalition of states arrayed against Iraq, which ended after the latter’s withdrawal from Kuwait. Much has been written about the air campaign and its objectives, its implications for the future use of military force, and the extent to which it conformed to international law. Although this article will focus on the last of these topics, a contextual understanding of the air campaign is essential to a serious consideration of the military necessity and proportionality issues that lie at the heart of the legal analysis.
Proportionality is a fundamental component of the law on the use of force and the law of armed conflict— the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello . In the former, it refers to a belligerent’s response to a grievance and, in the latter, to the balance to be struck between the achievement of a military goal and the cost in terms of lives. The legitimate resort to force under the United Nations system is regarded by most commentators as restricted to the use of force in self-defense under Article 51 and collective security action under chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resort to force in both these situations is limited by the customary law requirement that it be proportionate to the unlawful aggression that gave rise to the right. In the law of armed conflict, the notion of proportionality is based on the fundamental principle that belligerents do not enjoy an unlimited choice of means to inflict damage on the enemy. Since the entry into force of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, proportionality has been both a conventional and a customary principle of the law of armed conflict.
The ICRC’s Clarification Process on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law - Volume 103 - Nils Melzer
L'obligation de faire la distinction entre objectifs militaires, d'une part, et personnes et objets civils, d'autre part, est à la base des règles internationales qui régissent la conduite des hostilités. Exemples concrets à l'appui, l'auteur démontre que grâce au développement de l'armement et à un changement certain des mentalités, la règle fondamentale de la distinction est aujourd'hui mieux respectée que ce n'était le cas, par exemple, pendant la Première Guerre mondiale ou la Seconde. Cependant, le nombre de victimes civiles des récents conflits est proportionnellement beaucoup plus élevé que le nombre des victimes militaires. Par ailleurs, les opérations au Kosovo prouvent que les dommages collatéraux qui frappent la population civile font partie de la réalité même des opérations conduites avec le matériel de guerre le plus moderne. Sur cette toile de fond, l'auteur examine la portée et les limites des possibilités de mener des opérations militaires «sans victimes» et lews conséquences. Il conclut avec un rappel que seul le respect absolu des obligations du droit international humanitaire peut garantir la survie de l'homme en cas de conflit armé.
A report to the Prosecutor of the ICTY concludes that there was no sufficient reason to institute proceedings against persons responsible for the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. The following rules of international humanitarian law were analysed in the report: protection of the environment in times of armed conflict; prohibition on attacking civilian objects; and the limitation of admissible collateral damage according to the proportionality principle. In relation to the protection of the environment, the report is too restrictive as it combines the test provided for by Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions with a proportionality test. In relation to the protection of civilian objects, or the definition of military targets, the report practically sticks to the traditional assumption that traffic and communications infrastructure always constitutes a military objective. It fails, despite some lip service to the contrary, to ask the necessary critical question as to the real contribution of that infrastructure to the military effort of Yugoslavia. The proportionality principle requires a balancing of military advantage and civilian damage. The report's view concerning the value system which has to inspire this balancing process is highly questionable, in particular taking into account the humanitarian purpose of the entire operation. The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had to deal with a number of communications requesting her to institute criminal proceedings against those responsible for the bombing campaign of NATO between March and June 1999. The Prosecutor established an expert commission to evaluate both the law and the facts in this respect. The members of this expert group
The author analyses the report on the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, prepared by the Review Committee created by the ICTY's Prosecutor, and observes that the recommendation that no investigation be commenced because 'either the law is not sufficiently clear or investigations are unlikely to result in the acquisition of sufficient evidence' appears prima facie questionable. The author points out the shortcomings of the Committee's 'Work Program' arising from the unbalanced evidence on which the Committee's statements are founded and by the restriction of the collateral damages of the campaign to the civilian casualties. Moreover, the Committee's assessment of general issues (damage to environment, legality of weapons, target selection, proportionality) shows a poor grasp of legal concepts, and deviates from well-established ICTY case law. The Committee's assessment of specific incidents is also characterized by shortcomings: inter alia, the report frequently slips from the level of individual criminal responsibility to that of state responsibility. In his conclusion, the author observes that other fora are likely to verify some of the incidents occurring during the bombing campaign. Proceedings have started before the European Court of Human Rights and there are grounds for the European Court to affirm its jurisdiction.
In the wake of the Second Lebanon conflict, the UN Human Rights Council established an independent body of experts to investigate alleged violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) perpetrated by Israeli forces. The Commission's report suffers from one serious and conspicuous flaw — the Commission was not charged with simultaneously considering Hezbollah's violations of the same body of law. In some instances, this one-sided focus was not only politically unbalanced, but substantively inadequate since a full understanding of Hezbollah's command structure, strategic objectives and military operations was essential in determining whether targets destroyed by Israel were legitimate military objectives and whether consequences for civilians were disproportionate to the military advantage gained. Be that as it may, the Commission's final report testified to the excessive, indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force by Israeli forces and an overall lack of respect for the cardinal principles regulating the conduct of armed conflict. The Commission's findings are particularly disquieting, given the independent nature of the investigation and, ultimately, the compatibility of much of the Commission's legal reasoning with orthodox interpretations of IHL. The legal issues raised by the Inquiry are therefore of ongoing importance, most notably for the Israeli-appointed Winograd Committee.
The M/G/1 queue with repeated attempts is considered. A customer who finds the server busy, leaves the service area and joins a pool of unsatisfied customers. Each customer in the pool repeats his demand after a random amount of time until he finds the server free. We focus on the busy period L of the M/G/1$ retrial queue. The structure of the busy period and its analysis in terms of Laplace transforms have been discussed by several authors. However, this solution has serious limitations in practice. For instance, we cannot compute the first moments of L by direct differentiation. This paper complements the existing work and provides a direct method of calculation for the second moment of L. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 115–127, 2000
The 1999 NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia relied upon modern precision weaponry and purported to pay due regard to contemporary legal standards, in particular to the requirement to limit incidental civilian casualties. There are no such things as error-free wars or casualty-free wars. It appears, however, that NATO classified a wider range of objects as military objectives than has traditionally been the case, in particular the RTS broadcasting station headquarters in Belgrade. It also appears that some earlier bombing campaigns (the 1972 'Linebacker 2' campaign against North Vietnam which was conducted at the dawn of the era of precision weapons is an example) were conducted paying equal regard to the requirement to limit incidental civilian casualties.
The targeting of national electric power systems by aerial bombardment or aerospace power is an integral part of a wartime campaign. Destruction or neutralization of an enemy's electric power is alleged to have far-reaching strategic and operational effects on the enemy's ability to continue the war which extend beyond a mere military impact. However, international law advocates and humanitarians argue that this form of warfare indirectly targets the civilian population because it destroys the civilian life support system and the essential elements of civilian sustenance. They view these 'reverberating effects' as excessive and in violation of the discrimination and proportionality requirements of the international law of noncombatant immunity. The military asserts the concept of military necessity is controlling, and states that the direct and concrete military benefit derived from these types of air operations outweigh the harm to noncombatants and is not excessive in law or fact. These charges were brought to the fore by the U.S.-led Coalition air operations in the Persian Gulf war.
Toute violation du droit international humanitaire commise par quelque partie que ce soit au cours de la campagne militaire des forces de l'OTAN contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie peut tomber sous la juridiction du Tribunal pénal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY). Préparé sur instruction du procureur du TPIY, le rapport mentionné en exergue examine différents incidents qui, à première vue, devraient faire l'objet d'une enquête criminelle contre des membres des forces de l'OTAN. Il conclut qu'aucun incident ne justifie l'ouverture d'une procédure pénale. L'auteur revoit les conclusions d'un œil critique: il s'insurge notamment contre ce raisonnement qui recommande de ne pas ouvrir une enquête sous le prétexte que le droit n'est pas clair (non liquet). Le droit en sort diminué, estime Ronzitti.
On 10 June 1977, at Geneva, the representatives of ninety-seven States, of the Holy See and of three national liberation movements put their signatures to the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. This event brought to a formal close a Conference which had commenced its work in 1974, and which had, in the course of four consecutive annual sessions deliberated, negotiated, and more or less satisfactorily resolved a large number of often delicate issues of humanitarian law.
In the fifth week of NATO's 78–day aerial intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the FRY initiated proceedings in the International Court of Justice against ten of its member States which it accused of violating the principles of international law in relation to the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.1 NATO's action, known as Operation Allied Force, had commenced on the night of 24 March 1999 when cruise missiles were directed on Serbian targets located in the Kosovan capital of Pristina and in the Republic's capital of Belgrade.2 This robust application of armed force came on the eve of the 50th anniversary of NATO, an organisation which was established after the Second World War for the collective defence of its member States, and constituted the first offensive launched against another sovereign State in the organisation's entire history.
Résumé
Dans un article publié dans le numéro de septembre 2000 de la Revue, l'auteur examinait les résultats des travaux de la Commission préparatoire de la Cour pénale internationale chargée d'élaborer les éléments des crimes de guerre qui compléteront les dispositions du Statut de Rome et se rapportent aux violations graves des Conventions de Genève et de son Protocole additionnel I. La présente contribution continue l'analyse des travaux de la Commission et porte plus particulièrement sur les éléments des autres violations graves des lois et coutumes applicables aux conflits armés, de caractère international ou non international. Se référant à l'ensemble des travaux de la Commission préparatoire, l'auteur rappelle que les «éléments des crimes» ne créent pas un nouveau droit mais constituent plutôt un instrument qui aidera les juges dans l'interprétation du droit en vigueur. Compris dans ce sens, le résultat est positif.
Examines the impact of changes in the nature of warfare, including technological advancements, on the international humanitarian law principle of discrimination.
No place is safe-no place is at peace. There is no place where a woman and her daughter can hide and be at peace. The war comes through the air, bombs drop in the night. Quiet people go out in the morning, and see air-fleets passing overhead-dripping death-dripping death!
1
The Principle of Proportionality, codified in Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, defines as disproportionate any attack in which the incidental damage to civilians is excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated from the attack. However, it is close to impossible to pinpoint exactly what is meant by "excessive." This writer posits that this vagueness is not a coincidence, but rather a tool, serving the purposes of attacking states. It is argued that international legal discourse blurs this definition, and this is demonstrated with reference to NATO's operations in Kosovo. It is submitted that, despite this, it would be beneficial to define this requirement more clearly, and a way in which this could be accomplished is suggested.
Typescript. Thesis (LL. M.)--George Washington University, 2000. Includes bibliographical references.
Combatant and prisoner of war status Armed conflict and the new law: aspects of the 1977 Geneva protocols and the 1981 weapons convention
- M Clarke
- T Glynn
The value of the 1977 Geneva protocols for the protection of civilians
- L Doswald-Beck
The rule of proportionality and Protocol 1 in conventional warfare
- W J Fenrick
- WJ Fenrick
The French ‘interpretative declaration’ regarding nuclear weapons. Available at www.lcnp.org/global/french
- J Burroughs
Is there some element in the US military that wants to take out journalists? The Independent
- R Fisk
A critique of the additional protocols to the Geneva conventions of 1949 The changing face of conflict and the efficacy of international humanitarian law The Hague
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TV attack entirely justified, says Blair, London, The Daily Telegraph
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