Content uploaded by David Lublin
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by David Lublin
Content may be subject to copyright.
Context and Francophone Support
for the Sovereignty of Quebec:
An Ecological Analysis
David Lublin American University
D. Stephen Voss University of Kentucky
In the nal decades of the twentieth century, and on into the twenty-
rst, Quebec’s status has been at the centre of political debate in
Canada, yet mass opinion on the issue remains dif cult to gauge. The
same citizenry who only narrowly failed to pass a sovereignty referen-
dum in 1995, for example, routinely express overwhelming satisfac-
tion with life in Canada—two messages that seem dif cult to recon-
cile.1Nor is public inconsistency entirely to blame. Politicians and
activists often obfuscate the meaning of sovereignty, since opinion
shifts depending upon how this complex issue is framed.2The stream
1 Maurice Pinard, ‘‘Les déterminants psychosociaux,’’ in Maurice Pinard, Robert
Bernier and Vincent Lemieux, eds., Un combat inachevé (Sainte-Foy: Presses de
l’Université du Québec, 1997), 338-45.
2 Earl H. Fry, Canada’s Unity Crisis: Implications for U.S.-Canadian Economic
Relations (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1992), 28; Richard Johnston,
André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil and Neil Nevitte, The Challenge of Direct
Democracy: The 1992 Canadian Referendum (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Uni-
versity Press, 1996), 196-97; and Hudson Meadwell, ‘‘The Politics of National-
ism in Quebec,’’ World Politics 45 (January 1993), 225.
Acknowledgement: We are grateful for funding provided by the Government of
Canada under the Canadian Embassy’s Faculty Research Grant Program. We thank
Munroe Eagles, George Krause, Scott Piroth, Candace Redden, Pierre Serré and the
anonymous reviewers for this Journal for their help and comments on earlier ver-
sions of this manuscript. Of course, all conclusions and errors should be attributed
solely to the authors.
David Lublin, Department of Gove r m e n t , School of Public Affa i r s , American Unive r s i t y,
4400 Massachusetts Ave . , N.W., Washington, D.C., USA 20016; dlublin@american.edu
D. Stephen Voss, Department of Political Science, 1615 Patterson Of ce Tow e r,
Unive r s i t y of Kentucky, Lex i n g t o n , Ke n t u c ky, USA 40506; dsvoss@uky. p o p . e d u
Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science poli tique
35:1 (March/Mars 2002) 75-101
© 2002 Canadian Political Science Association (l’Association canadienne de science politique)
and / et la Société québécoise de science politique
of ambiguous public information has taken its toll. Many voters in
Quebec’s sovereignty referendum in 1995, for example, wrongly
thought that Quebec would remain part of Canada and continue to
send representatives to the federal parliament in Ottawa if it passed.3
In light of this sort of confusion and uncertainty, it is not entirely clear
what any particular expression of preferences really means.
Super cially, the sove r e i g n t y move m e n t might appear a prime
ex a m p l e of ‘‘symbolic politics,’’ of the sort found to dominate ethnic
relations in the United States.4Supporters believe that continued surviva l
of the French fact in North America necessitates separation of Quebec
from the rest of Canada, so the desire to weaken political ties inevitably
invo kes a voter’s perception of threat, around which much work in the
social psychology of inter-group relations revo l ves.5If desire for sove r-
eignty is primarily a psychological phenomenon, demand for sove r e i g n -
ty would respond to the character and upbringing of individual franco-
phone voters, and self-interest would play little role.6
Interestingly, contextual effects heretofore have received little
attention despite the likely relationship between geographic context
and self-interest. If self-interest matters, then context would have a
disparate impact on support for sovereignty across Quebec, with the
costs and bene ts structured geographically. Action based upon self-
interest rather than on symbolic politics would not be particularly dif-
cult for self-regarding voters, should such exist, and would reveal
itself in contextual voting patterns. Thus Quebec provides a valuable
opportunity to test theories of ethnic con ict outside the arenas in
which they were developed.7Determining which contexts enhance
francophone desire for sovereignty will also make a useful contribu-
3 Pinard, ‘‘Les déterminants psychosociaux,’’ 345-53.
4 It is worth noting, however, that some scholars question whether the symbolic
politics model even applies to the US case. See Lawrence Bobo, ‘‘Group Con-
ict, Prejudice, and the Paradox of Contemporary Racial Attitudes,’’ in Phylis A.
Katz and Dalmas A. Taylor, eds., Eliminating Racism: Pro les in Controversy
(New York: Plenum, 1988), 85-114; and D. Stephen Voss, ‘‘The Rational Basis
of Symbolic Racism,’’ paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association, Chicago, 1999.
5 Fry, Canada’s Unity Crisis, 28-34; Thomas F. Pettigrew, ‘‘New Black-White Pat-
terns: How Best to Conceptualize Them?’’ Annual Review of Sociology 11
(1985), 329-46.
6 Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, Divided by Color: Racial Politics and
Democratic Ideals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
7 For the main exception, see Pierre Drouilly, Indépendance et démocratie:
Sondages, élections et référendums au Quebec 1992-1997 (Montréal: Harmattan,
1997). Paul Nesbitt-Larking has examined the impact of context on support for
protest parties in English Canada (‘‘The 1992 Referendum and the 1993 Federal
Election in Canada: Patterns of Protest,’’ paper presented at the annual meeting
of the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, 1994).
76 David Lublin and D. Stephen Voss
Abstract. New techniques of ecological inference are utilized to estimate with con -
dence intervals francophone support in each federal electoral district in Quebec for the
pro-sovereignty side in the 1993 and 1997 Canadian general elections and the 1992 and
1995 referenda. Analyzing the link between demographic and political contextual vari-
ables and support for the sovereignty of Quebec suggests that demographic factors, such
as the proportion of farmers and government workers, in uence francophone voting
behaviour more often than political factors such as incumbency. Unlike in many other
countries with ethnically based movements, francophone support for sovereignty actually
rises as the francophone portion of the population rises. This nding indicates that the
contact hypothesis probably applies to the Quebec sovereignty movement.
Résumé. Les nouvelles techniques d’inférence écologique sont utilisées ici pour esti-
mer avec abilité les écarts de l’appui francophone au camp souverainiste, dans les cir-
conscriptions électorales fédérales du Québec, lors des élections générales canadiennes
de l993 et l997 et les référendums canadien de l992 et quebécois de l995. L’analyse de la
relation entre les variables contextuelles démographiques et politiques d’une part, et l’ap-
pui à la souveraineté du Québec d’autre part, suggère que les facteurs démographiques,
tels la proportion d’agriculteurs et de fonctionnaires, in uencent plus souvent le compor-
tement électoral des francophones que les facteurs politiques tels les mandats politiques.
Contrairement à ce qui se passe dans plusieurs pays où existent des mouvements eth-
niques, l’appui des francophones à la souveraineté augmente lorsque le poids démogra-
phique des francophones croît. Ce constat indique que l’hypothèse du contact s’applique
probablement au cas du mouvement souverainiste québécois.
tion to the more general question of which social conditions exacer-
bate cultural con ict.
The Quebec case is especially useful because the sove r e i g n t y issue
wa s implicated in seve r a l elections. Quebeckers had an unusually high
number of opportunities to express themselves on sove r e i g n t y at the
polls between 1992 and 1997: the referendum on the constitutional
Charlottetown Accord in 1992, against which sove r e i g n i s t s campaigned;
the federal elections of 1993 and 1997 contested by the sove r e i g n i s t
Bloc Québécois; and the 1995 sove r e i g n t y referendum promoted by the
Pa r t i Québécois.8The rapid recurrence of this issue in so many guises
aids an analysis of voter preferences, since the noise in any one vote
wa s h e s out, allowing a concentration on patterns that remain constant.
Supporters and opponents agree that sovereignty has certain clear
implications for Quebec. In particular, it means that the Quebec gov-
ernment will be strengthened, and the in uence of the federal govern-
ment in Ottawa reduced, if not eliminated. Quebec City, not Ottawa,
will have the nal say over public policy. Attentive voters should be
able to weigh the stakes. Any systematic pattern found in all four elec-
tion results should re ect voter impulses on this federalism issue,
8 Jonathan Lemco, Turmoil in the Peaceable Kingdom: The Quebec Sovereignty
Movement and Its Implications for Canada and the United States (Toronto: Uni-
versity of Toronto Press, 1994), 49-53. Quebeckers could also support sovereign-
ty by voting for the PQ in the 1994 provincial elections for the Assemblée
nationale. The analysis excludes this election because of the absence of data.
rather than any intervening source of variation such as partisan loyal-
ties, strategic voting or ballot confusion. This article therefore takes
advantage of returns from the four campaigns to analyze links between
local context and support for sovereignty within Quebec.
Obviously we cannot study patterns of francophone voting unless
we have a means to determine how francophones voted. For this pur-
pose, we use an ecological inference technique that can estimate vot-
ing behaviour by primary language, not just for all of Quebec but also
for each of its ridings.9These estimates allow us to concentrate on
variation in francophone voting, as required for an understanding of
contextual group relations.10
Our results reve a l that the demographic character of a locality con-
sistently in uences sove r e i g n t y support leve l s . They imply that self-
interest drive s vo t i n g behaviour on sove r e i g n t y, at least when interest is
measured contextually; ethnicity does not trump all other personal con-
cerns. Howeve r, a community’s ethnic balance does shape francophone
attitudes. Voters show less sympathy with sove r e i g n t y when they reside
in ridings with a linguistic mix, consistent with the ‘‘contact hypothesis’’
that others have applied to Canada.11 These results validate work by
other scholars, particularly Pierre Drouilly, using different methods
9 Gary King, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Indi-
vidual Behavior from Aggregate Data (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1997); and D. Stephen Voss and David Lublin, ‘‘Ecological Inference and the
Comparative Method,’’ APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in
Comparative Politics 9 (1998), 25-31.
10 Most geographic comparisons of support for sovereignty do not control for eth-
nicity, so it is dif cult to determine if ethnicity or other factors explain regional
differences in support for sovereignty. See Leo Driedger, Multi-Ethnic Canada,
Identities and Inequalities (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1996). That is,
aggregation con ates ethnicity with other contextual in uences on the vote. We
focus on francophones, and strip out anglophones and allophones, since they
almost uniformly oppose sovereignty, and there is not sufcient geographical
variation for contextual study. See André Blais and Richard Nadeau, ‘‘To Be or
Not to Be Sovereignist: Quebeckers’ Perennial Dilemma,’’ Canadian Public Pol-
icy 18 (1992), 90-91; Drouilly, Indépendance et démocratie, 286-92; Fry,
Canada’s Unity Crisis, 31-34, 39; and Maurice Pinard, ‘‘Le contexte politique et
les dimensions sociodémographiques,’’ in Maurice Pinard, Robert Bernier and
Vincent Lemieux, eds., Un combat inachevé (Sainte-Foy: Presses de l’Université
du Québec, 1997), 307-13. Drouilly and Pinard estimate that support for sover-
eignty among anglophones and allophones was not greater than 5-10 per cent in
either 1980 or 1995. Most First Nations Canadians opposed sovereignty, though
approximately one quarter of the Abénaquis and Hurons, who are more likely to
speak French as their second language, voted in favour.
11 See, for example, J. W. Berry, ‘‘Cultural Relations in Plural Societies: Alterna-
tives to Segregation and Their Sociopsychological Implications,’’ in Norman
Miller and Marilynn B. Brewer, eds., Groups in Contact: The Psychology of
Desegregation (Orlando: University Press of America, 1984), 11-27.
78 David Lublin and D. Stephen Voss
and alternate levels of aggregation. The results contradict the popular
‘‘power threat hypothesis,’’ a common approach to inter-group rela-
tions that suggests proximity should fuel group con ict.12
Estimating Francophone Support for Sovereignty
Four campaigns between 1992 and 1997 called on Quebec’s voters to
express their preferences on sovereignty. Adoption of the Charlotte-
town Accord in 1992 would have signaled acceptance of the 1982
Constitution Act and foreclosed sovereignty as an option, although not
ev eryone opposing the Accord supported sovereignty.13 The 1993 and
1997 federal elections also had major implications for sovereignty,
ev en if they were not directly on the issue. Some non-sovereignists
undoubtedly supported the BQ, perhaps to place pressure on Ottawa,
but defeat for the BQ at the polls would have represented a major set-
back for the sovereignty movement.14 The 1995 referendum, mean-
while, dealt with sovereignty directly, even if voters did not always
understand precisely in what manner.15 Voting behaviour in each elec-
tion therefore might include sources of variation other than support for
political separation from Canada, but these differed in each election,
so any pattern that persists in all four votes presumably re ects the
process governing support for sovereignty itself.
Actual ballots are secret, so we cannot identify the demographic
characteristics of each voter. Analyzing the effect of context on fran-
cophone voting requires some method of estimation, and no approach
is perfect. Surveys might seem to be the natural choice, since gener-
ally one knows the personal characteristics of each respondent. How-
ev er, they also present clear disadvantages. Leaving aside the usual
complications with question wording, interviewer effects and response
bias, surveys also do not facilitate contextual studies because they con-
tain too few voters from each electoral district, creating excessive
sampling error within any one context.16 Contextual studies using sur-
12 Micheal W. Giles and Arthur S. Evans, ‘‘The Power Approach to Intergroup Hos-
tility,’’ Journal of Con ict Resolution 30 (1986), 469-86.
13 Johnston et al., The Challenge of Direct Democracy, 192-93.
14 Blais and Nadeau, ‘‘To Be or Not to Be Sovereignist,’’ 90; and Donald Charette,
‘‘ ‘Le choix est clair:’ Pour Duceppe, le résultat de l’élection vient d’anéantir les
espoirs des fédéralistes,’’ Le Soleil (Quebec City), June 3, 1997.
15 Pinard, ‘‘Les déterminants psychosociaux,’’ 343-53.
16 Researchers who analyze data on support for sovereignty have been laudably
forthcoming about the limitations of survey data. Blais and Nadeau provide a
valuable discussion of the complications (‘‘To Be or Not to Be Sovereignist,’’
90-91). It is worth noting that, aside from the methodological dif culties dis-
cussed elsewhere, aggregate data studies suffer real substantive limitations. They
cannot include variables such as gender, lacking real geographical variation. Nor
Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec 79
veys are forced to fall back upon multilevel models, which pose
known drawbacks, including steep data demands that usually rule out
complex multivariate models of the sort we need here.17 For this rea-
son, we chose to use aggregate data for our contextual analysis.
Aggregation Bias and Contextual Research
We do not know how francophones voted, either within individual rid-
ings or in Quebec as a whole. On the other hand, we do know overall
voter preferences in each of 75 federal ridings, as well as the linguistic
breakdown. The challenge of ecological inference is to estimate how
each linguistic group behaved according to how riding support for
sovereignty varied with a group’s share of the population.18 This is a
risky venture, since an unfortunate pattern of aggrega t i o n could produce
deceptive correlations between group density and voting behaviour.19
However, an ecological inference programme developed by Gary
King, called EI, surmounts most of the pitfalls common to ecological
inference. King’s approach allows voting estimates by linguistic cate-
gory not only for Quebec as a whole, but also for individual federal
ridings, and with con dence intervals around each estimate.20 EI
avoids imposing speci c assumptions about how any group behaved,
either within or across ridings, instead only requiring distributional
assumptions about the process governing voting. It is able to handle
can they explore the correlations among distinct political attitudes, since each
person’s opinions are con ated into a single vote.
17 Anthony S. Bryk and Stephen W. Raudenbush, Hierarchical Linear Models:
Applications and Data Analysis Methods (Newbury Park: Sage, 1992); and
Marco R. Steenbergen and Bradford S. Jones, ‘‘Modeling Multilevel Data Struc-
tures,’’ paper presented at the annual meeting of the Political Methodology
Group, Columbus, Ohio, 1997.
18 Although some non-sovereignists vote for the BQ and some sovereignists voted
for other parties, ‘‘support for sovereignty’’ is used throughout as a shorthand for
support for the pro-sovereignty position in each of the four elections.
19 Christopher H. Achen and W. Phillips Shively, Cross-Level Inference (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1995); Brad Palmquist, ‘‘Ecological Inference,
Aggregate Data Analysis of U.S. Elections, and the Socialist Party of America’’
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1993); and
W. S. Robinson, ‘‘Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals,’’
American Sociological Review 15 (1950), 351-57.
20 The choice of federal ridings as our lower-level unit of aggregation is not obvi-
ous, since the 1995 referendum was conducted using provincial ridings. How-
ev er, using electoral districts is only a data convenience, a proxy for the swirl of
local interests and in uences that would affect someone’s vote. Any approach
naturally introduces some noise, and there is no particular reason why the elec-
torally relevant riding would capture the demographic context better than an elec-
torally irrelevant one. More practically, data for all demographic variables in the
analysis were not available for the provincial ridings.
80 David Lublin and D. Stephen Voss
the greater across-riding variation among francophone preferences
compared to those of other Quebeckers (that is, heteroskedasticity). It
prevents absurd estimates of behaviour, such as rates of support for
sovereignty that fall below 0 per cent, that other forms of estimation
would nd.21
The most important advance of King’s method, though, is that it
is partially robust to ‘‘aggrega t i o n bias.’’ If individual voting behaviour
is somehow related to a community’s linguistic composition, as most
theories of inter-group relations would predict, then other popular
forms of ecological inference (for example, Goodman’s ecological
regression, homogeneous unit analysis) would be facially invalid.
Given our speci c interest in contextual effects, those other methods
would also be useless unless signi cantly altered, and at any rate
should not perform as well as King’s solution.22
The key to King’s success derive s from the ‘‘method of bounds.’’
Fo r each riding, EI begins by identifying the complete set of values that
might describe voting behaviour. The obvious rst limit is that turnout
rates for each linguistic group must fall between 0 per cent and 100 per
cent, but the range of possible values is actually much narrower. Using
Quebec itself as an example, 4.7 million people voted in 1995, and only
1.1 million people in Quebec are members of linguistic minorities, so at
least 3.6 million francophones must have voted. That is, the ‘‘lower
bound’’ on francophone turnout is about 61.5 per cent. The upper bound
is 81.1 per cent. Even if no linguistic minorities voted, at most 4.7 mil-
lion of the 5.8 million francophones could have turned out.
Such bounds, when applied to each riding, do a great job constrain-
ing voting estimates. Furthermore, if the range of possible values shifts
as the linguistic context shifts, there is strong evidence of aggrega t i o n
bias—that is, strong evidence that francophone voting responds to the
21 We hav e evaluated the bene ts of King’s solution much more thoroughly else-
where. See D. Stephen Voss, ‘‘Familiarity Doesn’t Breed Contempt: The New
Geography of Racial Politics’’ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Univer-
sity, 2000), chap. 7; and D. Stephen Voss and David Lublin, ‘‘Black Incumbents,
White Districts: An Appraisal of the 1996 Congressional Elections,’’ American
Politics Quarterly 29 (2001), 141-82. We also provide much more detail on how
his method would be applied to Quebec, showing how other methods of ecologi-
cal inference produce impossible estimates and how King’s approach clearly cap-
tures aggregation bias that those other methods do not (Voss and Lublin, ‘‘Eco-
logical Inference and the Comparative Method’’).
22 Achen and Shively, Cross-Level Inference; James E. Alt, ‘‘Persistence and
Change in Southern Voter Registration Patterns, 1972-1990,’’ paper presented to
the Workshop on Race, Ethnicity, Representation and Governance, given by the
Center for American Political Studies of Harvard University Government Depart-
ment, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1993; Voss, Familiarity Doesn’t Breed Con-
tempt, chap. 7; and Voss and Lublin, ‘‘Ecological Inference and the Comparative
Method.’’
Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec 81
linguistic mix of the riding.23 King’s EI is able to pick up the pattern
and apply it when computing voting estimates for each riding, preserv-
ing at least some of the meaningful contextual variation. Having to
take into account this additional complication naturally adds uncer-
tainty to the riding estimates, but we can evaluate how much once the
estimates are in hand. Furthermore, to whatever extent EI consistently
underestimates aggregation bias,24 it would only weaken the apparent
contextual effects, not create signi cant contextual ndings.
Ecological Estimates for Four Campaign Outcomes
We performed an ecological analysis for each of the four contests,
using data on the proportion of francophones in the population from
the 1991 Census.25 We prompted the software to model aggregation
bias, where present, so that the estimates would be sensitive to contex-
tual voting among francophones.26
Table 1 shows the estimated proportion of francophones voting
against the Charlottetown Accord in the 1992 referendum and for the
Bloc Québécois in the 1993 federal election, as well as con dence
intervals around these estimates for the riding boundaries used in
1993. Table 2 similarly presents estimates and con dence intervals
around these estimates of proportion of francophones voting for sover-
eignty in the 1995 referendum and for the BQ in the 1997 general
election in the riding boundaries in place in 1997.27 The size of the
con dence intervals around the estimates is generally very small. The
median size of 95 per cent con dence intervals for the federal elec-
tions is .013 for 1993 and .018 for 1997. The median size of the same
con dence intervals for the referenda is .025 in 1992 and .018 in 1995.
Although the con dence intervals for some ridings are considerably
larger, the majority of ridings in all elections have very small con -
dence intervals that permit a high degree of certainty about estimated
francophone support for the pro-sovereignty position.
23 It does not provide evidence, however, that context causes the shifts.
24 Wendy Tam Cho, ‘‘Iff the Assumption Fits . . . : A Comment on the King Eco-
logical Inference Solution,’’ Political Analysis 7 (1998), 143-63.
25 Munroe Eagles, James P. Bickerton, Alain-G. Gagnon and Patrick Smith, The
Almanac of Canadian Politics (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995); Pro le
of Federal Electoral Districts—Parts A and B (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1992).
26 Exact globals were, for 1993’s rst stage, _Eeta=1, _EalphaB=(0˜.15). For 1992
we added _Estval=(0|0|-2|-2|-2|0). The second stage for 1995 also added _Eis-
fac=2. For 1997’s second stage we used _Eeta=3, _EalphaB=(0˜.15), _Eal-
phaW=(0˜.15), _Estval=(-0.2|0|-1|.1|-2|-2|-.2). The remaining analyses used basic
EI. Replication buffers are available from the authors.
27 No data are available on the results of the 1992 referendum in the 1997 riding
boundaries. Similarly, data are unavailable on the results of the 1995 referendum
or the 1997 federal election within the 1993 boundaries.
82 David Lublin and D. Stephen Voss
Table 1
Proportion of Francophones Supporting the BQ in 1993 and Opposing the 1992 Charlottetown Accord in the
Riding Boundaries of 1993
For the BQ in 1993 Opposed to the Charlottetown Accord 1992
Riding
Proportion
French Home
Language
95% CI Lower
Bound Estimate
95% CI Upper
Bound
95% CI Lower
Bound Estimate
95% CI Upper
Bound
Abitibi .840 .541 .548 .550 .740 .762 .773
Ahuntsic .720 .605 .621 .626 .618 .639 .654
Anjou-Rivière-des-Prairies .728 .576 .588 .592 .591 .624 .640
Argenteuil-Papineau .879 .534 .537 .538 .649 .661 .668
Beauce .995 .364 .364 .364 .551 .552 .552
Beauharnois-Salaberry .869 .583 .589 .591 .667 .679 .685
Beauport-Montmorency-Orléans .991 .582 .582 .582 .676 .677 .677
Bellechasse .997 .408 .408 .408 .578 .580 .579
Berthier-Montcalm .962 .631 .633 .633 .676 .680 .682
Blainville-Deux-Montagnes .903 .652 .656 .658 .710 .718 .723
Bonaventure-Îles-de-la-Madeleine .871 .380 .383 .385 .550 .561 .567
Bourassa .786 .525 .532 .534 .598 .618 .629
Brome-Missisquoi .784 .507 .517 .520 .587 .600 .609
Châteauguay .825 .690 .700 .703 .728 .751 .764
Chambly .904 .654 .659 .660 .677 .685 .690
Champlain .970 .502 .503 .503 .656 .659 .660
Charlesbourg .984 .603 .603 .604 .661 .662 .663
Charlevoix .972 .636 .637 .638 .687 .690 .691
Chicoutimi .990 .645 .645 .645 .739 .740 .740
Drummond .986 .556 .557 .557 .642 .643 .644
Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec 83
Table 1 (continued)
For the BQ in 1993 Opposed to the Charlottetown Accord 1992
Riding
Proportion
French Home
Language
95% CI Lower
Bound Estimate
95% CI Upper
Bound
95% CI Lower
Bound Estimate
95% CI Upper
Bound
Frontenac .986 .592 .592 .592 .622 .623 .624
Gaspé .933 .482 .484 .484 .629 .633 .637
Gatineau-La Lièvre .905 .387 .389 .390 .457 .465 .468
Hochelaga-Maisoneuve .900 .677 .681 .682 .719 .731 .737
Hull-Aylmer .766 .340 .352 .355 .484 .496 .504
Joliette .988 .670 .671 .671 .726 .727 .728
Jonquière .990 .682 .683 .683 .783 .784 .785
Kamouraska-Rivière-du-Loup .998 .530 .530 .530 .627 .627 .627
Lévis .991 .620 .621 .621 .701 .702 .702
La Prairie .706 .586 .603 .610 .613 .641 .658
Lac-Saint-Jean .997 .758 .758 .758 .773 .773 .773
Lachine-Lac-Saint-Louis .366 .498 .539 .556 .589 .660 .725
LaSalle-Émard .550 .562 .594 .605 .624 .689 .729
Laurentides .961 .630 .631 .632 .670 .674 .675
Laurier-Sainte-Marie .812 .749 .757 .761 .774 .798 .815
Laval Centre .852 .642 .646 .648 .664 .675 .683
Laval Est .891 .578 .581 .582 .631 .639 .645
Laval Ouest .689 .607 .619 .624 .607 .644 .662
Longueuil .925 .710 .713 .714 .724 .734 .738
Lotbinière .993 .542 .542 .542 .632 .632 .632
Louis-Hébert .961 .578 .549 .580 .640 .643 .645
Mégantic-Compton-Stanstead .856 .516 .520 .522 .562 .572 .578
Manicouagan .788 .686 .694 .698 .789 .814 .831
84 David Lublin and D. Stephen Voss
Matapédia-Matane .996 .575 .575 .575 .670 .671 .671
Mercier .915 .638 .642 .644 .711 .721 .726
Mont-Royal .226 .249 .291 .308 .449 .497 .520
Notre-Dame-de-Grâce .254 .442 .529 .558 .604 .701 .812
Outremont .552 .633 .667 .677 .665 .732 .783
Papineau-Saint-Michel .652 .580 .596 .601 .619 .656 .678
Pierrefonds-Dollard .349 .427 .480 .498 .552 .632 .677
Pontiac-Gatineau-Labelle .755 .433 .442 .446 .599 .620 .631
Portneuf .980 .546 .547 .547 .666 .667 .668
Québec .965 .556 .557 .558 .644 .647 .649
Québec-Est .986 .604 .604 .605 .670 .672 .672
Richelieu .989 .672 .672 .672 .644 .646 .646
Richmond-Wolfe .956 .545 .546 .547 .625 .628 .630
Rimouski-Témiscouata .997 .601 .601 .601 .672 .672 .672
Roberval .987 .607 .608 .608 .681 .682 .683
Rosemont .868 .721 .724 .726 .733 .746 .755
Saint-Denis .491 .678 .726 .745 .691 .776 .855
Saint-Henri-Westmount .402 .429 .457 .470 .596 .667 .724
Saint-Hubert .807 .692 .701 .705 .710 .731 .745
Saint-Hyacinthe-Bagot .992 .578 .579 .579 .625 .626 .626
Saint-Jean .958 .581 .583 .584 .645 .648 .650
Saint-Léonard .544 .480 .496 .503 .558 .592 .613
Saint-Laurent-Cartierville .436 .386 .412 .421 .478 .570 .549
Saint-Maurice .992 .408 .408 .408 .653 .654 .654
Shefford .965 .575 .577 .577 .624 .627 .629
Sherbrooke .928 .405 .408 .408 .617 .624 .627
Témiscamingue .952 .583 .584 .585 .673 .677 .679
Terrebonne .972 .707 .709 .709 .747 .749 .751
Trois-Rivières .988 .540 .540 .541 .634 .635 .636
Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec 85
Table 1 (continued)
For the BQ in 1993 Opposed to the Charlottetown Accord 1992
Riding
Proportion
French Home
Language
95% CI Lower
Bound Estimate
95% CI Upper
Bound
95% CI Lower
Bound Estimate
95% CI Upper
Bound
Vaudreuil .642 .560 .593 .601 .621 .652 .676
Verchères .976 .689 .689 .690 .702 .704 .705
Verdun-Saint-Paul .685 .594 .613 .620 .664 .697 .718
86 David Lublin and D. Stephen Voss
Table 2
Proportion of Francophones Supporting the BQ in 1993 and 1997 and Supporting Sovereignty in 1995
For the BQ in 1993 For the BQ in 1997 For Sovereignty in 1995
Riding
Proportion
French
Home
Language
95% CI
Lower
Bound Estimate
95% CI
Upper
Bound
95% CI
Lower
Bound Estimate
95% CI
Upper
Bound
95% CI
Lower
Bound Estimate
95% CI
Upper
Bound
Abitibi .814 .494 .534 .559 .392 .434 .455 .650 .656 .659
Ahuntsic .689 .501 .571 .619 .354 .418 .455 .539 .550 .555
Anjou-Rivière-des-Prairies .734 .500 .562 .596 .347 .407 .440 .542 .552 .556
Argenteuil-Papineau .880 .497 .519 .531 .418 .447 .464 .565 .568 .570
Beauce .995 .363 .364 .365 .266 .267 .268 .439 .439 .439
Beauharnois-Salaberry .874 .530 .566 .582 .403 .436 .452 .417 .420 .421
Beauport-Montmorency-Orléans .991 .581 .583 .584 .431 .434 .435 .566 .566 .566
Bellechasse-Etchemins .997 .409 .410 .410 .333 .333 .334 .463 .463 .463
Berthier-Montcalm .960 .638 .647 .652 .529 .542 .548 .655 .656 .657
Bourassa .773 .459 .505 .532 .351 .396 .421 .519 .529 .532
Brome-Missisquoi .784 .469 .512 .536 .289 .331 .352 .517 .523 .527
Brossard-La Prairie .721 .512 .594 .632 .328 .419 .451 .544 .554 .558
Chambly .940 .638 .660 .669 .493 .514 .524 .628 .630 .631
Champlain .971 .492 .499 .502 .440 .449 .453 .611 .612 .612
Charlesbourg .984 .603 .606 .608 .385 .389 .390 .552 .553 .553
Charlevoix .972 .623 .633 .638 .545 .553 .557 .684 .685 .685
Châteauguay .819 .613 .672 .704 .469 .522 .553 .666 .673 .676
Chicoutimi .989 .641 .644 .645 .428 .431 .432 .687 .687 .687
Compton-Stanstead .852 .486 .525 .542 .332 .367 .384 .538 .542 .544
Drummond .986 .552 .556 .557 .423 .426 .428 .581 .581 .582
Frontenac-Mégantic .986 .571 .574 .576 .371 .375 .376 .517 .517 .518
Bonaventure-Gaspé .898 .420 .446 .456 .401 .442 .458 .618 .622 .624
Gatineau .912 .356 .376 .384 .202 .221 .228 .305 .307 .308
Hochelaga-Maisonneuve .868 .580 .621 .639 .462 .506 .524 .627 .630 .632
Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec 87
Table 2 (continued)
For the BQ in 1993 For the BQ in 1997 For Sovereignty in 1995
Riding
Proportion
French
Home
Language
95% CI
Lower
Bound Estimate
95% CI
Upper
Bound
95% CI
Lower
Bound Estimate
95% CI
Upper
Bound
95% CI
Lower
Bound Estimate
95% CI
Upper
Bound
Hull-Aylmer .765 .306 .339 .354 .218 .250 .267 .322 .328 .331
Joliette .991 .660 .662 .664 .466 .468 .469 .664 .664 .664
Jonquière .990 .679 .682 .683 .486 .489 .490 .717 .717 .717
Kamouraska-Rivière-du-Loup .998 .528 .529 .529 .383 .383 .384 .568 .568 .568
Notre-Dame-de-Grâce-Lachine .379 .401 .528 .606 .247 .368 .422 .544 .583 .600
Lac-Saint-Jean .996 .756 .758 .758 .635 .636 .636 .744 .744 .744
Lac-Saint-Louis .257 .327 .409 .461 .343 .544 .827 .349 .389 .408
LaSalle-Émard .564 .446 .549 .601 .294 .379 .431 .567 .588 .597
Laurentides .960 .616 .627 .633 .458 .471 .477 .609 .610 .610
Laurier-Sainte-Marie .843 .648 .730 .764 .533 .610 .647 .744 .749 .752
Laval Centre .852 .582 .625 .647 .384 .445 .464 .592 .596 .598
Laval Est .891 .540 .567 .582 .394 .419 .432 .556 .559 .561
Laval Ouest .689 .516 .579 .621 .292 .401 .443 .559 .572 .577
Lévis .991 .620 .622 .623 .452 .455 .456 .592 .592 .592
Longueuil .929 .674 .696 .707 .512 .531 .540 .647 .649 .650
Lotbinière .991 .553 .555 .556 .370 .373 .374 .531 .532 .532
Louis-Hébert .961 .566 .575 .580 .401 .411 .415 .540 .541 .541
Manicouagan .826 .577 .651 .682 .485 .539 .568 .756 .763 .765
Matapédia-Matane .966 .491 .498 .501 .451 .460 .463 .611 .612 .613
Mercier .916 .606 .634 .644 .507 .536 .551 .650 .653 .654
Mont-Royal .223 .185 .269 .302 .087 .155 .182 .258 .284 .297
Outremont .570 .475 .604 .683 .350 .432 .490 .623 .638 .647
Papineau-Saint-Denis .540 .468 .587 .655 .346 .456 .526 .643 .664 .674
Pierrefonds-Dollard .341 .452 .686 .896 .184 .269 .312 .396 .427 .442
Pontiac-Gatineau-Labelle .770 .379 .422 .441 .337 .388 .414 .477 .487 .490
Portneuf .979 .542 .547 .549 .436 .442 .444 .555 .555 .555
88 David Lublin and D. Stephen Voss
Québec .967 .547 .554 .558 .445 .456 .460 .570 .571 .572
Québec-Est .986 .498 .601 .603 .395 .398 .399 .542 .542 .542
Repentigny .971 .700 .709 .714 .565 .575 .579 .687 .688 .688
Richelieu .988 .661 .665 .667 .548 .552 .553 .609 .610 .610
Richmond-Arthabaska .964 .525 .532 .536 .370 .378 .382 .573 .573 .574
Rimouski-Mitis .995 .611 .612 .613 .470 .472 .472 .643 .643 .643
Roberval .987 .604 .606 .607 .518 .521 .523 .672 .673 .673
Rosemont .826 .602 .680 .713 .455 .539 .573 .673 .679 .681
Témiscamingue .952 .567 .578 .584 .469 .483 .490 .587 .588 .589
Saint-Eustache-Saint-Thérèse .904 .617 .641 .653 .478 .501 .512 .646 .649 .650
Saint-Bruno-Saint-Hubert .846 .614 .656 .681 .464 .505 .530 .635 .640 .642
Saint-Hyacinthe-Bagot .992 .573 .575 .576 .428 .430 .431 .556 .557 .557
Saint-Jean .959 .571 .583 .589 .462 .475 .480 .578 .580 .580
Saint-Lambert .769 .555 .620 .656 .383 .464 .503 .610 .617 .620
Saint-Laurent-Cartierville .436 .239 .309 .338 .206 .258 .288 .353 .375 .386
Saint-Léonard-Saint-Michel .539 .356 .417 .447 .197 .271 .303 .435 .452 .460
Saint-Maurice .992 .413 .415 .415 .441 .442 .443 .568 .568 .568
Shefford .963 .555 .563 .566 .358 .369 .372 .546 .547 .547
Sherbrooke .928 .391 .404 .410 .302 .316 .323 .561 .563 .564
Terrebonne-Blainville .943 .661 .678 .686 .504 .525 .533 .663 .664 .665
Trois-Rivières .988 .532 .535 .536 .426 .430 .431 .571 .571 .571
Vaudreuil-Soulanges .752 .522 .586 .621 .349 .413 .442 .560 .566 .570
Verchères .976 .677 .685 .689 .540 .547 .550 .640 .641 .641
Verdun-Saint-Henri .700 .491 .563 .600 .372 .434 .472 .596 .605 .610
Westmount-Ville Marie .328 .278 .394 .441 .195 .296 .343 .440 .475 .493
Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec 89
Some of the largest con dence intervals appear in ridings with a
mixed population. This is quite natural: we know the least about fran-
cophone voting in such places, since the presence of so many linguis-
tic minorities conceals in the totals what francophones are doing. Nev-
ertheless, EI has disclosed what information the bounds did provide
for these ridings, and otherwise borrowed strength from the other rid-
ings (and the trend in their bounds) to choose the most likely voting
estimates. Figures produced this way are never as strong as one might
like, but they are precise compared to what would be possible with a
typical opinion poll.28 Without a specialized (and costly) survey
intended to maximize contextual variation, EI is the best option avail-
able.
Support for sovereignty varied considerably across Quebec rid-
ings in all campaigns. Estimated support among francophones for the
BQ ranged from 30 per cent in Mont Royal to 77 per cent in Laurier-
Sainte Marie in 1993, and from 15 per cent in Mont Royal to 64 per
cent in Lac Saint Jean in 1997. Francophones in the median riding
gave 59 per cent of their votes to the BQ in 1993 and 44 per cent in
1997. The standard deviation around these estimates was 10 per cent
in 1993 and 9 per cent in 1997. Francophone opposition to the Char-
lottetown Accord in 1992 ranged from 46 per cent in Gatineau-La
Lièvre to 78 per cent in Jonquière. The median level of opposition to
the Accord was 65 per cent with a standard deviation of 7 per cent.
Estimates indicate that 74 per cent of francophones in Lac Saint Jean
but only 24 per cent of francophones in Mont Royal voted for sover-
eignty in the referendum of 1995. Fifty-seven per cent of franco-
phones in the median riding supported sovereignty in 1995, with a
standard deviation of 11 per cent.
28 Consider that, in a random sample of 1,500 Quebeckers, only 42 would be fran-
cophones residing in the six west-Montreal ridings where they are a linguistic
minority. Whereas the EI 95 per cent con dence intervals in these ridings aver-
aged less than +/- 8 per cent in 1993 and 1995, the equivalent margin of error for
a proportion (p) computed from a survey of only 42 people is 2Ö` ```````
p(1 -p)/42 or
as much as +/- 16 percentage points for two standard errors; see Thomas H. Won-
nacott and Ronald J. Wonnacott,Introductory Statistics (5th ed.; New York: John
Wiley, 1990), 207. Controlling for other contextual variables would drive the
hypothetical sample size to minimal levels. Any generalization about franco-
phones in mixed ridings would thus be much less reliable with surveys, unless
they consciously oversampled that group, and when considered this way EI’s per-
formance is impressive.
90 David Lublin and D. Stephen Voss
Context and Support for Sovereignty
The contextual variables theorized to in uence support for sovereignty
are primarily demographic, although we also capture whether candi-
dates held of ce prior to the 1993 and 1997 elections. The demo-
graphic variables are aggregated characteristics of individuals in the
riding, such as their income or education. These demographics are
more than crude measures that parallel the individual characteristics
utilized in survey data analysis. Rather, we hypothesize that voters are
in uenced by the context in which they liv e,29 especially when sover-
eignty might carry indirect economic consequences for most residents
of a locale. Government workers may vote against sovereignty if they
believe that it will cost them their jobs, but reduced government
employment would also carry serious implications for the entire econ-
omy in ridings with a high percentage of government workers. Self-
interest might fuel widespread opposition among all voters in such a
context. A similar logic applies to other demographic variables: highly
educated francophones may in uence those with less schooling when
the former are numerous. Some of the in uences of a youthful popula-
tion may rub off on the older voters who reside near them.
For most of the contextual variables, we cannot separate the
direct in uence of individuals from the indirect in uence of context.
For example, if ridings with a younger population tend to support sov-
ereignty, we cannot say to what extent that pattern stems from younger
voters differing from older voters, rather than places with a youthful
population differing from those with an older population. This does
not pose a major barrier to the analysis, though, because it does not
apply to our variable of prime theoretical interest: linguistic context.
For that variable we used EI to estimate individual behaviour, so any
remaining systematic relationship between a riding’s linguistic mix
and its vote should be purely a contextual phenomenon.
Proportion Where French is the Home Language
Francophones in mixed ridings might be the strongest supporters of
sovereignty because they are more likely to compete with non-franco-
phones for jobs or for control of their localities. They are presumably
most likely to hear English idioms creeping into their children’s
speech, or to endure conversations spoken in English in public places.
29 Robert Huckfeldt, ‘‘Political Participation and the Neighborhood Social Con-
text,’’ American Journal of Political Science 23 (1979), 579-92; and Christopher
B. Kenny, ‘‘Political Participation and Effects from the Social Environment,’’
American Journal of Political Science 36 (1992), 259-67.
Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec 91
Proximity fuelling separatist sentiment would accord with the ‘‘power
threat’’ approach to inter-group relations.30
On the other hand, francophones in mixed ridings may have
adjusted to the stresses of living between two worlds already, and may
have economic or social ties to the Canadian majority. They might fear
that their ridings will secede from Quebec if Quebec secedes from
Canada, a possibility already raised by federalist politicians and sup-
ported in some opinion polls.31 Those living in heavily francophone
areas, meanwhile, may feel besieged without the mitigating effect of
cross-cultural contact. They could have less to lose from severing
provincial ties with Ottawa. They naturally might view sovereignty as
less disruptive, and perceive less kinship with non-francophones,
either in Quebec or in other Canadian provinces. Proximity lessening
the sense of threat francophones might feel about cohabiting with the
rest of Canada would correspond to the ‘‘contact hypothesis’’ popular-
ized by Gordon Allport and applied to Canada by J. W. Berry.32 It
would validate the ndings reported by Drouilly’s study, which used a
different methodology.33 We therefore include an explanatory variable
30 Giles and Evans, ‘‘The Power Approach to Intergroup Hostility.’’ The threat
hypothesis was once dominant in the study of US race relations, especially in the
South, but it has been on the defensive even in the region from which it origi-
nated. See Michael Curt Corbello, ‘‘Searching for Evidence of ‘Racial Threat’ in
Louisiana,’’ American Review of Politics 19 (1998), 163-74; David Lublin and
D. Stephen Voss, ‘‘Racial Redistricting and Realignment in Southern State Legis-
latures,’’ American Journal of Political Science 44 (2000), 792-810; Jeffrey D.
Sadow, ‘‘David Duke and Black Threat: Laying to Rest an Old Hypothesis,
Revisited,’’ American Review of Politics 17 (1996), 59-68; D. Stephen Voss,
‘‘Beyond Racial Threat: Failure of an Old Hypothesis in the New South,’’ Jour-
nal of Politics 58 (1996), 1156-70; D. Stephen Voss and Penny Miller, ‘‘Follow-
ing a False Trail: The Hunt for White Backlash in Kentucky’s 1996 Desegre-
gation Vote,’’ State Politics and Policy Quarterly 1 (2001), 63-81; and Voss and
Lublin, ‘‘Black Incumbents, White Districts.’’
31 Edward Greenspon, ‘‘Liberal unity agenda part of the election debris,’’ Globe
and Mail (Toronto), June 3, 1997; Lemco, Turmoil in the Peaceable Kingdom,
69-70; and ‘‘ ‘Plan B’ for Quebec developed by Trudeau’s cabinet,’’ Politics
Canada, June 16, 1997, http://politicscanada.com/archive/.
32 Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1954).
Some francophones have compared their status in Canada to that of blacks in the
US; see Hudson Meadwell, ‘‘The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec,’’ World Pol-
itics 45 (1993), 207 n8, 218; and Berry, ‘‘Cultural Relations in Plural Societies.’’
See also, Pierre Vallières, Nègres blancs d’Amérique (Montreal: Editions Parti
Pros, 1968). It may therefore seem strange to apply a hypothesis developed to
describe majority attitudes. However, francophones are clearly a majority in Que-
bec, forming roughly 85 per cent of the population. The threat mechanisms
described by these proximity theories would therefore still apply.
33 Drouilly’s study compared ridings within the Montreal region and throughout
Quebec separately (Drouilly, Indépendance et démocratie, 287-96). Support for
the contact hypothesis is stronger in the Montreal region, although that may be a
92 David Lublin and D. Stephen Voss
to capture the linguistic mix: percentage of homes with French as a
primary language.34
Income and Education
Harold D. Clarke and Allan Kornberg found no statistically signi cant
relationship between education or income and support for the BQ in their
analysis of voting behaviour in the 1993 election.35 Nevertheless, sup-
port for sovereignty and the BQ may decline as median family income
rises because af uent residents (as well as people who depend on con-
sumption by the af uent for their livelihoods) may fear the cost of sov-
ereignty to their incomes.36 Since leading sovereignists have stated
their intention to maintain, and perhaps even to expand, existing social
welfare programmes and government employment, and Quebec pays
less in taxes to Ottawa than it receives in federal transfers, wealthy
Quebeckers could fear that a ‘‘sovereignty tax’’ would be levied to
make up the difference. They also might fear a temporary reduction of
economic growth during the rst decade of sovereignty, especially if
international bond rating agencies view Quebec as a risky debtor.37 On
the other hand, if ethnicity trumps economic concerns, there may be
little relationship between the median family income of a riding and
its support for sovereignty after controlling for other variables.38
Income and education are often highly related at the individual
level, but less so at the aggregate level. The correlation between
statistical result of the city’s greater linguistic diversity rather than a behavioural
difference.
34 The inclusion of the proportion French home language variable necessitates
excluding several other closely related variables that are effectively proxies for
the ethnic composition of the riding. The correlation between proportion French
home language and proportion English home language was -.94 in 1997. The
correlations with proportion Catholic and proportion immigrant were .94 and
-.89, respectively.
35 Harold D. Clarke and Allan Kornberg, ‘‘Partisan Dealignment, Electoral Choice,
and Party-System Change in Canada,’’ Party Politics 2 (1996), 467.
36 Drouilly,Indépendance et démocratie, 297-98.
37 Fry, Canada’s Unity Crisis, 28; Lemco, Turmoil in the Peaceable Kingdom,
68-69, 81-84, 93, 97, 114, 133-34. Although most scholars agree that Quebec is
economically viable, they disagree over the economic implications of sovereign-
ty. Lemco is essentially a pessimist. See Pierre Fournier for a more optimistic
conclusion, though he also acknowledges business concerns (A Meech Lake Post-
Mortem: Is Quebec Sovereignty Inevitable [Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 1991], 104-19, 133-37).
38 Blais and Nadeau, ‘‘To Be or Not to Be Sovereignist,’’ 96-97; Fry, Canada’s
Unity Crisis, 39; Johnston et al., The Challenge of Direct Democracy, 198-200;
Pierre Martin, ‘‘Générations politiques: rationalité économique et appui à la sou-
verainteté au Québec,’’ this Journal 27 (1994), 347-55; and Meadwell, ‘‘The
Politics of Nationalism in Quebec,’’ 212-28.
Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec 93
median family income and the proportion of adults with university
degrees was .41 for the 1993 ridings and .48 for the 1997 ridings. Uni-
versity students and professors have been in the vanguard of the sover-
eignty movement.39 Particularly after controlling for income, ridings
with relatively educated populations may exhibit greater support for
sovereignty and the BQ. However, analyses of survey data suggest that
educational attainment is unrelated to support for sovereignty after
controlling for other factors. André Blais and Richard Nadeau found
that socio-economic differences between federalists and sovereignists
virtually disappeared after 1990.40 Maurice Pinard argues that educa-
tional differences in voting greatly eroded during the 1995 referendum
battle, particularly after the BQ leader, Lucien Bouchard, entered the
campaign.41
Proportion Aged 65 or Older
Ridings with relatively large populations of voters aged 65 or older
should demonstrate relatively high levels of support for federalist par-
ties. Quebec’s ‘‘Quiet Revolution’’ of the 1960s and the subsequent
economic advancement of French Quebeckers, particularly the rise of
a francophone business elite, increased con dence that Quebec could
succeed as a sovereign nation. The decline of religious conservatism
among francophones has meant that younger francophones tend to
look to secular elites, including the Quebec government, rather than
the Roman Catholic Church, to protect French language and culture.42
Younger francophones grew up in an era during which sovereignty
was widely discussed as a viable and legitimate option, and survey
research has consistently documented that they support sovereignty
and the BQ at a higher rate than their elders.43 However, these results
could re ect that young anglophones have been leaving Quebec;44 it is
not clear that the age pattern should appear within linguistic cate-
gories.
39 Drouilly,Indépendance et démocratie; and Fry, Canada’s Unity Crisis, 39.
40 Blais and Nadeau, ‘‘To Be or Not to Be Sovereignist,’’ 94-99; Johnston et al., The
Challenge of Direct Democracy, 198-200; and Richard Nadeau, ‘‘Le virage sou-
verainiste des Québécois,’’ Recherches sociographiques23 (1992), 13, 24.
41 Pinard, ‘‘Le contexte politique,’’ 305-07.
42 Stéphane Dion, ‘‘Explaining Quebec Nationalism,’’ in R. Kent Weaver, ed., The
Collapse of Canada? (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992); Fry,
Canada’s Unity Crisis, 39; and Meadwell, ‘‘The Politics of Nationalism in Que-
bec,’’ 207.
43 Blais and Nadeau, ‘‘To Be or Not to Be Sovereignist,’’ 93; Clarke and Kornberg,
‘‘Partisan Dealignment, Electoral Choice,’’ 467; Fry, Canada’s Unity Crisis, 39;
Martin, ‘‘Générations politiques,’’ 6; Nadeau, ‘‘Le virage souverainiste des
Québécois,’’ 13; and Pinard, ‘‘Le contexte politique,’’ 301-05.
44 Lemco, Turmoil in the Peaceable Kingdom, 86-89, 99.
94 David Lublin and D. Stephen Voss
Proportion Employed in Government
Quebec contains two areas with a high proportion of government
workers: Quebec City and Hull. Quebec may not have the nancial
resources to hire all former Canadian federal employees, especially
since supporters typically argue that sovereignty would eliminate
needless duplication of government services by Quebec and the fed-
eral government.45 Regardless, sovereignty would undoubtedly be dis-
ruptive to economic activity in ridings with large numbers of govern-
ment employees. Evidence on the relationship between attitudes and
government employment has varied over time, but its success is con-
sistent enough to warrant inclusion in our model.46
Proportion Employed in Agriculture
Farmers may fear that a sovereign Quebec will have to cut farm subsi-
dies. Farmers also might lose protected access to Canadian markets, as
well as bene ts from federal regulation of the Canadian market.47
Non-agricultural workers in ridings with signi cant agricultural
employment undoubtedly would also suffer if farm incomes declined.
Finally, agricultural regions may be more traditionalist than other rid-
ings, and therefore less in uenced by, or imbued with, the con dence
generated in the business sector by the Quiet Revolution. Conse-
quently, ridings with high proportions of agricultural workers may
support the BQ and pro-sovereignty positions in referenda at relatively
low rates.48
Incumbency
Studies of elections for the House of Commons in the United King-
dom and the House of Representatives in the United States have
revealed that incumbents often fare better than other candidates at the
polls.49 Party identi cation is far more uid in Canada than in those
45 Ibid., 68-69, 97-100.
46 André Blais and Stéphane Dion, ‘‘Les employés du secteur public sont-ils dif-
férents?’’ Revue française de science politique 37 (1987), 279-317; André Blais
and Richard Nadeau, ‘‘L’appui du Parti québécois: évolution de la clientèle de
1970 à 1981’’ and ‘‘La clientèle du ‘oui,’’’ in Jean Crête, ed., Comportement
electoral au Québec (Chicoutimi: Gaëtan Morin, 1984), 323-34; Edouard
Cloutier, Jean H. Guay and Daniel Latouche, Le virage l’évolution de l’opinion
publique au Québec depuis 1960 (Montreal: Québec-Amérique, 1992); Fry,
Canada’s Unity Crisis, 35; and Meadwell, ‘‘The Politics of Nationalism in Que-
bec,’’ 208-09.
47 Fry, Canada’s Unity Crisis, 35.
48 Drouilly,Indépendance et démocratie, 294.
49 Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency
Service and Electoral Independence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec 95
two countries.50 The federal party system does not extend into the
provinces, and elites switch parties in Canada more often than their
American or British counterparts. So it is possible that incumbency
would carry great weight in Quebec. To measure the effect of incum-
bency on francophone voting behaviour, we use three dummy vari-
ables, coded one for incumbents and zero for non-incumbents—one
each for the Bloc Québécois, Liberal or Progressive Conservative can-
didates. The coef cient on the BQ variable should be positive , indicating
stronger pro-sove r e i g n t y candidates, while the Liberal and Conservative
va r i a b l e s should return nega t ive coef cients because they indicate
stronger anti-sove r e i g n t y candidates.51
Results
Table 3 presents the results of regressing the estimated pro-sovereignty
position in each of the four campaigns on the demographic and politi-
cal contextual factors. The impact of the independent variables on sup-
port for the pro-sovereignty side, as measured by the direction of their
coef cients, is largely consistent across elections. Con dence in the
coef cients does vary from model to model.
As found by Drouilly, francophone support for sovereignty con-
sistently rose with the proportion of francophones.52 Raising the per-
1987); James Campbell, Cheap Seats: The Democratic Party’s Advantage in U.S.
House Elections (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1996); J. Curtice and
M. Steed, ‘‘The Voting Analyzed,’’ in Dav i d E. Butler and Dennis Kava n a g h , eds.,
The British General Election of 1983 (London: Macmillian, 1983); Andrew Gel-
man and Gary King, ‘‘Estimating the IncumbencyAdvantage Without Bias,’’ Amer-
ican Journal of Political Science 34 (1990), 1142-64; Philip Norton and David
Wo o d , ‘‘ C o n s t i t u e n cy Service By Members of Parliament: Does it Contribute to a
Personal Vote?’’ Parliamentary Affairs 43 (1990), 196-208; and David Wood and
Philip Norton, ‘‘Do Candidates Matter? Constituency-Specic Vote Changes for
Incumbent MPs, 1983-1987,’’ Political Studies40 (1992): 227-38.
50 Harold D. Clarke and Allan Kornberg, ‘‘Risky Business: Partisan Volatility and
Electoral Choice in Canada, 1988,’’ Electoral Studies 11 (1992), 138-56; Harold
D. Clarke and Allan Kornberg, ‘‘Support for the Canadian Federal Progressive
Conservative Party Since 1988: The Impact of Economic Evaluations and Eco-
nomic Issues,’’ this Journal 25 (1992), 29-54; Harold D. Clarke and Allan
Kornberg, ‘‘Evaluations and Evolution: Public Attitudes toward Canada’s Federal
Political Parties, 1965-1991,’’ this Journal 26 (1993), 287-312.
51 Thanks to the party’s loss of all but two seats nationally in 1993, Jean Charest,
the Conservative leader, was the only Conservative incumbent in Quebec in 1997
so the analysis of the 1997 elections excludes the Conservative incumbency vari-
able.
52 On the surface, the data appear to support Drouilly’s conclusion that the relation-
ship between proportion francophone and proportion of francophones voting
‘‘yes’’ is strongest in Montreal (Drouilly, Indépendance et démocratie, 287-90).
Correlations from the 1995 referendum suggest a strong relationship in Montreal
96 David Lublin and D. Stephen Voss
Table 3
Contextual Factors and Proportion Francophone
Support for Quebec Nationalism
For the BQ
in 1993
Federal
Election
For the BQ
in 1997
Federal
Election
For No in
Charlotte-
town
Referendum
For Yes in
Sovereignty
Referendum
Intercept .75a.45a.91a.80a
(.14) (.16) (.09) (.12)
Proportion French home language .18b.23a.15a.38a
(.08) (.10) (.05) (.06)
Median family income ($1000) -.003 -.002 -.005a-.007a
(.002) (.002) (.001) (.002)
Proportion with university degrees .33 .25 .46a.53a
(.23) (.23) (.16) (.19)
Proportion aged 65 or older -1.13a-.69b-1.20a-1.33a
(.43) (.42) (.29) (.34)
Proportion employed in government -.95a-.78a-.79a-1.24a
(.25) (.25) (.16) (.19)
Proportion employed in agriculture -1.42a-1.22a-1.17a-1.88a
(.40) (.36) (.26) (.29)
BQ incumbent .10a.03
(.04) (.02)
Liberal incumbent -.08b-.03
(.04) (.03)
Conservative incumbent -.02
(.02)
R-Squared .51 .44 .45 .65
Adjusted R-Squared .44 .37 .41 .62
Standard Error of the Regression .08 .07 .05 .06
Number of Cases 75 75 75 75
Note: Diagnostic tests conducted on the OLS results include the Jarque-Bara test, the
White test, and the Ramsey-RESET test. The Jarque-Bara test indicates that the resid-
uals are not normally distributed for the 1993 models. The White test suggests that
heteroskedasticity is a problem for the 1997 models. These models were reestimated
using a nonparametric bootstrap regression technique that resamples the OLS residu-
als 1000 times to produce more accurate estimates based on the empirical distribution
of the data. Since the bootstrap results are virtually identical to the OLS results, the
table presents only the OLS results.
ap <.01 for one-tailed tests.
bp <.05 for one-tailed tests.
Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec 97
centage of francophones by one standard deviation, 19 per cent,
increased francophone support for the BQ by approximately 3 per cent
in 1993 and 5 per cent in 1997. The impact of a similar change on
opposition to the Charlottetown Accord was slightly less than 5 per
cent. The ethnic composition of the population had the greatest impact
on support for sovereignty in 1995, with a one standard deviation
increase in the proportion of francophones causing the proportion of
francophone ‘‘oui’’ voters to rise by nearly 10 per cent. Francophones
who reside in a linguistically mixed community do not exhibit hostile
backlash against their neighbours or greater perceived threat from
anglophones; some combination of contact, assimilation and self-
interest may even make them more supportive of retaining political
ties to Canada. Furthermore, these ndings indicate that the sovereign-
ty movement cannot be viewed purely as the continuance of ethnic
con ict through the federalism debate. Though rm conclusions
require attitudinal data, support for sovereignty seems more likely to
re ect the belief that a sovereign Quebec can manage and protect fran-
cophone interests better than a federal Canada can.
The direction of the remaining demographic variables re ects the
theories outlined in the previous section, although the results cannot
distinguish between individual- and aggregate-level effects. Franco-
phones in af uent ridings seem more risk averse, since they are less
likely to support sovereignty. After controlling for income, those in
ridings with a disproportionate share of university graduates support
sovereignty at a higher rate. A change of one standard deviation in
median family income, or $7000, corresponds to 4 per cent fewer bal-
lots for sovereignty in the 1995 referendum and 3 per cent fewer for
the Charlottetown Accord in 1992. Increasing income by a similar
amount reduced support for the BQ by 2 per cent in 1993 and over 3
per cent in 1997. Raising the proportion of university graduates by one
standard deviation, 7 per cent, reduced francophone support for Char-
lottetown in 1992 by nearly 3 per cent and increased francophone sup-
port for sovereignty in 1995 by the same amount. Similar increases in
the share of university graduates resulted in 2-3 per cent more support
for the BQ in both 1993 and 1997.
As expected, francophones in ridings with relatively elderly pop-
ulations support sovereignty at a lower rate. Reducing the percentage
of elderly in the riding’s population by one standard deviation, 3.5 per
cent, causes a rise in francophone support for the pro-sovereignty
(r = .77) and a weak relationship elsewhere (r =.17). After controlling for other
variables, however, the relationship between proportion francophone and propor-
tion francophone voting ‘‘oui’’ is strong even for non-Montreal ridings. When the
regression is performed for just non-Montreal ridings, ß on Proportion French
Home Language equals .36 (standard error of .10).
98 David Lublin and D. Stephen Voss
position of approximately 3-4 per cent in all four votes. Survey
research suggests that generational replacement, rather than aging,
explains this nding.53 Generational replacement may aid the sover-
eignty movement in future federal elections and referenda.
Francophones in ridings with a high proportion of government
workers voted against the sovereignist position at a greater rate than in
other ridings. Those in ridings with relatively high numbers of agricul-
tural employees demonstrated similar sensitivity to their economic
base. The negative relationship was strongest for the 1995 referendum,
likely because sovereignty posed a greater threat to the livelihoods of
government employees and farmers than a vote for the BQ or against
the Charlottetown Accord. By casting ballots against Charlottetown or
for the BQ, francophone voters could stand up for Quebec, rebuke the
federal government, and maintain sovereignty as an option for the
future without actually risking the dissolution of Canada. Increasing
the percentage of government workers by only 4.5 per cent, a standard
deviation, resulted in a decline in francophone support for the BQ by 4
per cent in 1993 and 1997. Similar increases in the share of govern-
ment employees reduced the francophone pro-sovereignty vote by 3
per cent in 1992 and 6 per cent in 1995. Raising the percentage
employed in agriculture by a standard deviation of 3 per cent reduced
the pro-sovereignty vote among francophones by 4 per cent in 1992
and 1993, and 5 per cent in 1995 and 1997.
It is worth noting that, while these results con ate both individual
and contextual patterns, they provide fairly clear evidence that context
in uences francophone support for sovereignty. Coef cients greater
than 1.0 or less than -1.0 should not appear if the correlations being
studied are entirely individual-level effects. Increasing the percentage
working in agriculture by one point should at most decrease the per-
centage voting in a particular way by one point as well, unless some of
the non-agricultural workers also behave differently on average in that
changed context. Coef cients exceed this range at least once on the
age, government employment and agricultural employment variables.
This is additional evidence that francophone voters are somehow
being in uenced by the demographic makeup of their local communi-
ties when formulating an opinion on sovereignty.
Incumbency appears to have strongly in uenced the vote for the
BQ in 1993, but not in 1997. BQ incumbents receive d 10 per cent more
of the francophone vote in 1993 than other BQ candidates after control-
ling for other factors. BQ candidates running in ridings with Liberal
incumbents receive d 8 per cent less of the francophone vote than other
53 Nadeau, ‘‘Le virage souverainiste des Québécois,’’ 14-16; and Pinard, ‘‘Le con-
texte politique,’’ 304.
Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec 99
BQ candidates. Re ecting the meltdown of Conservative party fortunes,
the presence of a Conservative incumbent did not in uence francophone
vo t i n g behaviour in 1993. Neither the presence of a BQ incumbent nor
a Liberal incumbent in uenced the share of the vote receive d by the BQ
in 1997. The 1997 results are consistent with the party-centred nature of
Canadian elections. The strength of the incumbency advantage in 1993
may re ect that there were only nine BQ and eleve n Liberal incum-
bents. Representing bastions of support for their parties, these incum-
bents may have bene ted disproportionately from the electoral swing
against the Conservative s . BQ incumbents were founding members of
their party and most likely attracted disproportionate media attention
and public support through their by-election victories or when they dra-
matically abandoned federalist parties.
Conclusion
This article examined the effect of local context on francophone sup-
port for sovereignty in four Quebec campaigns: the 1992 vote on the
Charlottetown Accord, the 1995 sovereignty referendum, and the 1993
and 1997 federal elections. We isolated francophone voting behaviour
using King’s solution to the ecological inference problem, and then
ran multivariate OLS models predicting the estimated francophone
vote one contest at a time.
Our main interest was to test competing theories of ethnic con-
ict. The power threat (or con ict) approach predicts that franco-
phones in mixed-language ridings should feel most threatened. The
contact hypothesis, by contrast, predicts that those in mixed ridings
would have their fears assuaged by exposure to, assimilation with and
interdependence with English speakers. The latter approach wins con-
sistent support across all four elections, con rming Drouilly in a man-
ner that should instill great con dence.
These results t the con ict over Quebec’s sovereignty into a
much larger (and growing) literature on ethnic relations. Research
almost consistently targets homogeneous ethnic communities as a cat-
alyst for inter-group friction. In the United States, for example, the
sources of cultural con ict between blacks and whites are enhanced in
all-white neighbourhoods or counties.54 The relationship between the
ethnic composition of a riding and support for sovereignty in Quebec
54 Donald P. Green, Dara Z. Strolovitch, and Janelle Wong, ‘‘Defended Neighbor-
hoods, Integration, and Racially Motivated Crime,’’ American Journal of Sociol-
ogy 104 (1998), 372-403; and Voss, ‘‘Beyond Racial Threat,’’ and ‘‘Familiarity
Doesn’t Breed Contempt.’’
100 David Lublin and D. Stephen Voss
also resembles patterns of support for the Plaid Cymru in Wales. Sup-
port for the Plaid correlates positively with the percentage of the popu-
lation in a constituency that speaks Welsh.55
More generally, Quebec’s francophones respond to context, as do
voters in other nations. Uniquely Canadian institutions and history
condition their response to that context, as do local demographics and
the incentives that those conditions bring to bear in the sovereignty
debate. Francophone voters appear quite sensitive to the potential eco-
nomic impact of sovereignty. Ridings with large numbers of govern-
ment employees apparently fear that sovereignty might eliminate jobs
and undermine the economic base of their region. This nding
explains the high level of opposition to sovereignty in the Ottawa/Hull
region. Agricultural regions similarly appear to fear the economic
impact of sovereignty. That the francophone vote re ects such sensi-
tivity to local context, in predictable ways corresponding to hypothe-
sized self-interest, gives a more optimistic picture of voter rationality
than implied by opinion poll results.56
55 Robert Waller and Byron Criddle, The Almanac of British Politics (6th ed.; Lon-
don: Routledge, 1999).
56 Pinard, ‘‘Les déterminants psychosociaux,’’ 345-53.
Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec 101
