Institutionalization and Political Development: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis

Abstract

In recent years, institutionalization has become one of the key concepts in comparative politics in general, and in the study of political development in particular. This elegant and almost geometrically tidy theory of political order best articulated by Huntington has been acclaimed as a major new school, one that will be able perhaps to narrow what La Palombara called the ‘widening chasm’ between ‘macrotheories and microapplications in comparative politics’. Indeed, Huntington in his book attempted to apply his theoretical tenets to the analysis of such important phenomena as military intervention in politics, corruption and violence, all this via the usage of a few major variables. In the notoriously slippery field of theorizing in comparative politics, this constituted a welcome influx of fresh air. No wonder, then, that Huntington's theory and concepts have been widely prevalent and frequently referred to—again a relative innovation in the easy-come-easy-go world of theories in the study of political development.

Full text

Institutionalization and Political Development: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis
Author(s): Gabriel Ben-Dor
Source:
Comparative Studies in Society and History,
Vol. 17, No. 3 (Jul., 1975), pp. 309-325
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/178027
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Institutionalization and Political
Development: A Conceptual and
Theoretical Analysis
GABRIEL BEN-DOR
University of Haifa
In recent years, institutionalization has become one of the key concepts in
comparative politics in general, and in the study of political development
in particular. This elegant and almost geometrically tidy theory of political
order best articulated by Huntington' has been acclaimed as a major new
school,2 one that will be able perhaps to narrow what La Palombara called
the 'widening chasm' between 'macrotheories and microapplications in
comparative politics'.3 Indeed, Huntington in his book attempted to apply
his theoretical tenets to the analysis of such important phenomena as
military intervention in politics, corruption and violence, all this via the
usage of a few major variables. In the notoriously slippery field of theoriz-
ing in comparative politics, this constituted a welcome influx of fresh air.
No wonder, then, that Huntington's theory and concepts have been widely
prevalent and frequently referred to-again a relative innovation in the
easy-come-easy-go world of theories in the study of political development.4
According to Huntington, political development, order and stability are
all closely related to institutionalization, in so far as the type of political
1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968), and the
earlier theoretical formulation in his 'Political Development and Political Decay', World
Politics XVII (April 1965).
2 See the reviews by David H. Bayley, in the Annals of the American Academy, 382 (March
1969); Immanuel Wallerstein, in the American Journal of Sociology, XXXV (November
1969), 440-1; Dankwart A. Rustow, in the Journal of International Affairs XVIII (1, 1969);
Aristide R. Zolberg in the Midwest Journal of Political Science XIII3 (August 1969); Rein-
hard Bendix in Political Science Quarterly, LXXXVII3 (March 1971). Wallerstein's review is
the most critical one. For a thoughtful and perceptive evaluation see Donald J. Baxter, The
Notion of Institutionalization in Political Development: A Concept Mauled (Paper delivered at
the 44th annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia,
November 2-4, 1972).
3 Joseph LaPalombara, 'Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics: A
Widening Chasm', Comparative Politics I (October 1968).
4 David E. Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization (Englewood
Cliffs, 1968); Fred W. Riggs, 'The Theory of Political Development' in James C. Charlesworth
(ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis (New York, 1967); Robert A. Packenham, 'Approaches
to the Study of Political Development', World Politics, XVII/1 (October 1964); Ann Ruth
Willner, 'The Underdeveloped Study of Political Development', World Politics, XVI (April
1964).
Institutionalization and Political
Development: A Conceptual and
Theoretical Analysis
GABRIEL BEN-DOR
University of Haifa
In recent years, institutionalization has become one of the key concepts in
comparative politics in general, and in the study of political development
in particular. This elegant and almost geometrically tidy theory of political
order best articulated by Huntington' has been acclaimed as a major new
school,2 one that will be able perhaps to narrow what La Palombara called
the 'widening chasm' between 'macrotheories and microapplications in
comparative politics'.3 Indeed, Huntington in his book attempted to apply
his theoretical tenets to the analysis of such important phenomena as
military intervention in politics, corruption and violence, all this via the
usage of a few major variables. In the notoriously slippery field of theoriz-
ing in comparative politics, this constituted a welcome influx of fresh air.
No wonder, then, that Huntington's theory and concepts have been widely
prevalent and frequently referred to-again a relative innovation in the
easy-come-easy-go world of theories in the study of political development.4
According to Huntington, political development, order and stability are
all closely related to institutionalization, in so far as the type of political
1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968), and the
earlier theoretical formulation in his 'Political Development and Political Decay', World
Politics XVII (April 1965).
2 See the reviews by David H. Bayley, in the Annals of the American Academy, 382 (March
1969); Immanuel Wallerstein, in the American Journal of Sociology, XXXV (November
1969), 440-1; Dankwart A. Rustow, in the Journal of International Affairs XVIII (1, 1969);
Aristide R. Zolberg in the Midwest Journal of Political Science XIII3 (August 1969); Rein-
hard Bendix in Political Science Quarterly, LXXXVII3 (March 1971). Wallerstein's review is
the most critical one. For a thoughtful and perceptive evaluation see Donald J. Baxter, The
Notion of Institutionalization in Political Development: A Concept Mauled (Paper delivered at
the 44th annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia,
November 2-4, 1972).
3 Joseph LaPalombara, 'Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics: A
Widening Chasm', Comparative Politics I (October 1968).
4 David E. Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization (Englewood
Cliffs, 1968); Fred W. Riggs, 'The Theory of Political Development' in James C. Charlesworth
(ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis (New York, 1967); Robert A. Packenham, 'Approaches
to the Study of Political Development', World Politics, XVII/1 (October 1964); Ann Ruth
Willner, 'The Underdeveloped Study of Political Development', World Politics, XVI (April
1964).
Institutionalization and Political
Development: A Conceptual and
Theoretical Analysis
GABRIEL BEN-DOR
University of Haifa
In recent years, institutionalization has become one of the key concepts in
comparative politics in general, and in the study of political development
in particular. This elegant and almost geometrically tidy theory of political
order best articulated by Huntington' has been acclaimed as a major new
school,2 one that will be able perhaps to narrow what La Palombara called
the 'widening chasm' between 'macrotheories and microapplications in
comparative politics'.3 Indeed, Huntington in his book attempted to apply
his theoretical tenets to the analysis of such important phenomena as
military intervention in politics, corruption and violence, all this via the
usage of a few major variables. In the notoriously slippery field of theoriz-
ing in comparative politics, this constituted a welcome influx of fresh air.
No wonder, then, that Huntington's theory and concepts have been widely
prevalent and frequently referred to-again a relative innovation in the
easy-come-easy-go world of theories in the study of political development.4
According to Huntington, political development, order and stability are
all closely related to institutionalization, in so far as the type of political
1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968), and the
earlier theoretical formulation in his 'Political Development and Political Decay', World
Politics XVII (April 1965).
2 See the reviews by David H. Bayley, in the Annals of the American Academy, 382 (March
1969); Immanuel Wallerstein, in the American Journal of Sociology, XXXV (November
1969), 440-1; Dankwart A. Rustow, in the Journal of International Affairs XVIII (1, 1969);
Aristide R. Zolberg in the Midwest Journal of Political Science XIII3 (August 1969); Rein-
hard Bendix in Political Science Quarterly, LXXXVII3 (March 1971). Wallerstein's review is
the most critical one. For a thoughtful and perceptive evaluation see Donald J. Baxter, The
Notion of Institutionalization in Political Development: A Concept Mauled (Paper delivered at
the 44th annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia,
November 2-4, 1972).
3 Joseph LaPalombara, 'Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics: A
Widening Chasm', Comparative Politics I (October 1968).
4 David E. Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization (Englewood
Cliffs, 1968); Fred W. Riggs, 'The Theory of Political Development' in James C. Charlesworth
(ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis (New York, 1967); Robert A. Packenham, 'Approaches
to the Study of Political Development', World Politics, XVII/1 (October 1964); Ann Ruth
Willner, 'The Underdeveloped Study of Political Development', World Politics, XVI (April
1964).
Institutionalization and Political
Development: A Conceptual and
Theoretical Analysis
GABRIEL BEN-DOR
University of Haifa
In recent years, institutionalization has become one of the key concepts in
comparative politics in general, and in the study of political development
in particular. This elegant and almost geometrically tidy theory of political
order best articulated by Huntington' has been acclaimed as a major new
school,2 one that will be able perhaps to narrow what La Palombara called
the 'widening chasm' between 'macrotheories and microapplications in
comparative politics'.3 Indeed, Huntington in his book attempted to apply
his theoretical tenets to the analysis of such important phenomena as
military intervention in politics, corruption and violence, all this via the
usage of a few major variables. In the notoriously slippery field of theoriz-
ing in comparative politics, this constituted a welcome influx of fresh air.
No wonder, then, that Huntington's theory and concepts have been widely
prevalent and frequently referred to-again a relative innovation in the
easy-come-easy-go world of theories in the study of political development.4
According to Huntington, political development, order and stability are
all closely related to institutionalization, in so far as the type of political
1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968), and the
earlier theoretical formulation in his 'Political Development and Political Decay', World
Politics XVII (April 1965).
2 See the reviews by David H. Bayley, in the Annals of the American Academy, 382 (March
1969); Immanuel Wallerstein, in the American Journal of Sociology, XXXV (November
1969), 440-1; Dankwart A. Rustow, in the Journal of International Affairs XVIII (1, 1969);
Aristide R. Zolberg in the Midwest Journal of Political Science XIII3 (August 1969); Rein-
hard Bendix in Political Science Quarterly, LXXXVII3 (March 1971). Wallerstein's review is
the most critical one. For a thoughtful and perceptive evaluation see Donald J. Baxter, The
Notion of Institutionalization in Political Development: A Concept Mauled (Paper delivered at
the 44th annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia,
November 2-4, 1972).
3 Joseph LaPalombara, 'Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics: A
Widening Chasm', Comparative Politics I (October 1968).
4 David E. Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization (Englewood
Cliffs, 1968); Fred W. Riggs, 'The Theory of Political Development' in James C. Charlesworth
(ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis (New York, 1967); Robert A. Packenham, 'Approaches
to the Study of Political Development', World Politics, XVII/1 (October 1964); Ann Ruth
Willner, 'The Underdeveloped Study of Political Development', World Politics, XVI (April
1964).
Institutionalization and Political
Development: A Conceptual and
Theoretical Analysis
GABRIEL BEN-DOR
University of Haifa
In recent years, institutionalization has become one of the key concepts in
comparative politics in general, and in the study of political development
in particular. This elegant and almost geometrically tidy theory of political
order best articulated by Huntington' has been acclaimed as a major new
school,2 one that will be able perhaps to narrow what La Palombara called
the 'widening chasm' between 'macrotheories and microapplications in
comparative politics'.3 Indeed, Huntington in his book attempted to apply
his theoretical tenets to the analysis of such important phenomena as
military intervention in politics, corruption and violence, all this via the
usage of a few major variables. In the notoriously slippery field of theoriz-
ing in comparative politics, this constituted a welcome influx of fresh air.
No wonder, then, that Huntington's theory and concepts have been widely
prevalent and frequently referred to-again a relative innovation in the
easy-come-easy-go world of theories in the study of political development.4
According to Huntington, political development, order and stability are
all closely related to institutionalization, in so far as the type of political
1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968), and the
earlier theoretical formulation in his 'Political Development and Political Decay', World
Politics XVII (April 1965).
2 See the reviews by David H. Bayley, in the Annals of the American Academy, 382 (March
1969); Immanuel Wallerstein, in the American Journal of Sociology, XXXV (November
1969), 440-1; Dankwart A. Rustow, in the Journal of International Affairs XVIII (1, 1969);
Aristide R. Zolberg in the Midwest Journal of Political Science XIII3 (August 1969); Rein-
hard Bendix in Political Science Quarterly, LXXXVII3 (March 1971). Wallerstein's review is
the most critical one. For a thoughtful and perceptive evaluation see Donald J. Baxter, The
Notion of Institutionalization in Political Development: A Concept Mauled (Paper delivered at
the 44th annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia,
November 2-4, 1972).
3 Joseph LaPalombara, 'Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics: A
Widening Chasm', Comparative Politics I (October 1968).
4 David E. Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization (Englewood
Cliffs, 1968); Fred W. Riggs, 'The Theory of Political Development' in James C. Charlesworth
(ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis (New York, 1967); Robert A. Packenham, 'Approaches
to the Study of Political Development', World Politics, XVII/1 (October 1964); Ann Ruth
Willner, 'The Underdeveloped Study of Political Development', World Politics, XVI (April
1964).
Institutionalization and Political
Development: A Conceptual and
Theoretical Analysis
GABRIEL BEN-DOR
University of Haifa
In recent years, institutionalization has become one of the key concepts in
comparative politics in general, and in the study of political development
in particular. This elegant and almost geometrically tidy theory of political
order best articulated by Huntington' has been acclaimed as a major new
school,2 one that will be able perhaps to narrow what La Palombara called
the 'widening chasm' between 'macrotheories and microapplications in
comparative politics'.3 Indeed, Huntington in his book attempted to apply
his theoretical tenets to the analysis of such important phenomena as
military intervention in politics, corruption and violence, all this via the
usage of a few major variables. In the notoriously slippery field of theoriz-
ing in comparative politics, this constituted a welcome influx of fresh air.
No wonder, then, that Huntington's theory and concepts have been widely
prevalent and frequently referred to-again a relative innovation in the
easy-come-easy-go world of theories in the study of political development.4
According to Huntington, political development, order and stability are
all closely related to institutionalization, in so far as the type of political
1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968), and the
earlier theoretical formulation in his 'Political Development and Political Decay', World
Politics XVII (April 1965).
2 See the reviews by David H. Bayley, in the Annals of the American Academy, 382 (March
1969); Immanuel Wallerstein, in the American Journal of Sociology, XXXV (November
1969), 440-1; Dankwart A. Rustow, in the Journal of International Affairs XVIII (1, 1969);
Aristide R. Zolberg in the Midwest Journal of Political Science XIII3 (August 1969); Rein-
hard Bendix in Political Science Quarterly, LXXXVII3 (March 1971). Wallerstein's review is
the most critical one. For a thoughtful and perceptive evaluation see Donald J. Baxter, The
Notion of Institutionalization in Political Development: A Concept Mauled (Paper delivered at
the 44th annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia,
November 2-4, 1972).
3 Joseph LaPalombara, 'Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics: A
Widening Chasm', Comparative Politics I (October 1968).
4 David E. Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization (Englewood
Cliffs, 1968); Fred W. Riggs, 'The Theory of Political Development' in James C. Charlesworth
(ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis (New York, 1967); Robert A. Packenham, 'Approaches
to the Study of Political Development', World Politics, XVII/1 (October 1964); Ann Ruth
Willner, 'The Underdeveloped Study of Political Development', World Politics, XVI (April
1964).
309 309 309 309 309 309
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310 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
order in any given society can be measured by the ratio of political insti-
tutionalization to political participation. Institutionalization is '. . . the
process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stabil-
ity'.5 Its level is measured by the scope and strength of institutions, mani-
fest in 'the size, number and effectiveness of its (the political system's)
organizations'.6 This is a more or less quantitative statement; it is followed
by a more or less qualitatively oriented one: 'The level of institutionaliza-
tion of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity,
autonomy and coherence of its organizations and procedures'.7 The major
problem, in this view, lies in the fact that modernization and political
development are more often than not out of step with each other. Modern-
ization (economic development, urbanization, literacy and so forth) brings
about tremendous expansion in political participation without concomitant
expansion in the strength of political institutions, thus bringing about
political decay and disorder-'praetorianism'. Such societies are vulner-
able to military coups, as the military (as well as other social forces)
undergo a process of politicization, while the civilian institutions remain
weak. 'Countries which have political armies also have political clergies,
political universities, political bureaucracies ....'8 Such is praetorian
society, in which the weakness of institutionalization leads to two alter-
native ways of making demands by the constantly expanding number of
participants: violence and corruption. Having thus diagnosed the malaise,
Huntington boldly challenges some conventional views, and argues that
under such circumstances corruption may not be a bad alternative: it is
certainly less dangerous than violence, and it contributes to the solution of
a variety of problems. First, legitimacy: 'He who corrupts the system's
police officers is more likely to identify with the system than he who
storms the system's police stations.'9 Second, corruption may help in
building and strengthening political parties and institutions. Inasmuch as
it stems from the weakness of institutionalization, '. . . Corruption varies
inversely with political organization, and to the extent that corruption
builds parties, it undermines the conditions of its own existence'.10 Only in
the civic polity, in which political institutionalization outstrips the expan-
sion of participation can military coups, violence and corruption be ex-
pected to fade away: this is the process of political development, or the
creation of political order and stability. In a simple equation, stability
varies directly with the ratio between institutionalization and participation.
This is an elegant, simple, lucid and promising theory. It uses few
variables; it explicitly hypothesizes about the connections between them;
it provides a developmental typology; and above all, it attacks head-on
5 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12 6 Ibid., p. 31.
7 Ibid., p. 12. 8 Ibid., p. 194.
9 Ibid., p. 64. 10 Ibid., p. 71.
310 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
order in any given society can be measured by the ratio of political insti-
tutionalization to political participation. Institutionalization is '. . . the
process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stabil-
ity'.5 Its level is measured by the scope and strength of institutions, mani-
fest in 'the size, number and effectiveness of its (the political system's)
organizations'.6 This is a more or less quantitative statement; it is followed
by a more or less qualitatively oriented one: 'The level of institutionaliza-
tion of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity,
autonomy and coherence of its organizations and procedures'.7 The major
problem, in this view, lies in the fact that modernization and political
development are more often than not out of step with each other. Modern-
ization (economic development, urbanization, literacy and so forth) brings
about tremendous expansion in political participation without concomitant
expansion in the strength of political institutions, thus bringing about
political decay and disorder-'praetorianism'. Such societies are vulner-
able to military coups, as the military (as well as other social forces)
undergo a process of politicization, while the civilian institutions remain
weak. 'Countries which have political armies also have political clergies,
political universities, political bureaucracies ....'8 Such is praetorian
society, in which the weakness of institutionalization leads to two alter-
native ways of making demands by the constantly expanding number of
participants: violence and corruption. Having thus diagnosed the malaise,
Huntington boldly challenges some conventional views, and argues that
under such circumstances corruption may not be a bad alternative: it is
certainly less dangerous than violence, and it contributes to the solution of
a variety of problems. First, legitimacy: 'He who corrupts the system's
police officers is more likely to identify with the system than he who
storms the system's police stations.'9 Second, corruption may help in
building and strengthening political parties and institutions. Inasmuch as
it stems from the weakness of institutionalization, '. . . Corruption varies
inversely with political organization, and to the extent that corruption
builds parties, it undermines the conditions of its own existence'.10 Only in
the civic polity, in which political institutionalization outstrips the expan-
sion of participation can military coups, violence and corruption be ex-
pected to fade away: this is the process of political development, or the
creation of political order and stability. In a simple equation, stability
varies directly with the ratio between institutionalization and participation.
This is an elegant, simple, lucid and promising theory. It uses few
variables; it explicitly hypothesizes about the connections between them;
it provides a developmental typology; and above all, it attacks head-on
5 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12 6 Ibid., p. 31.
7 Ibid., p. 12. 8 Ibid., p. 194.
9 Ibid., p. 64. 10 Ibid., p. 71.
310 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
order in any given society can be measured by the ratio of political insti-
tutionalization to political participation. Institutionalization is '. . . the
process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stabil-
ity'.5 Its level is measured by the scope and strength of institutions, mani-
fest in 'the size, number and effectiveness of its (the political system's)
organizations'.6 This is a more or less quantitative statement; it is followed
by a more or less qualitatively oriented one: 'The level of institutionaliza-
tion of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity,
autonomy and coherence of its organizations and procedures'.7 The major
problem, in this view, lies in the fact that modernization and political
development are more often than not out of step with each other. Modern-
ization (economic development, urbanization, literacy and so forth) brings
about tremendous expansion in political participation without concomitant
expansion in the strength of political institutions, thus bringing about
political decay and disorder-'praetorianism'. Such societies are vulner-
able to military coups, as the military (as well as other social forces)
undergo a process of politicization, while the civilian institutions remain
weak. 'Countries which have political armies also have political clergies,
political universities, political bureaucracies ....'8 Such is praetorian
society, in which the weakness of institutionalization leads to two alter-
native ways of making demands by the constantly expanding number of
participants: violence and corruption. Having thus diagnosed the malaise,
Huntington boldly challenges some conventional views, and argues that
under such circumstances corruption may not be a bad alternative: it is
certainly less dangerous than violence, and it contributes to the solution of
a variety of problems. First, legitimacy: 'He who corrupts the system's
police officers is more likely to identify with the system than he who
storms the system's police stations.'9 Second, corruption may help in
building and strengthening political parties and institutions. Inasmuch as
it stems from the weakness of institutionalization, '. . . Corruption varies
inversely with political organization, and to the extent that corruption
builds parties, it undermines the conditions of its own existence'.10 Only in
the civic polity, in which political institutionalization outstrips the expan-
sion of participation can military coups, violence and corruption be ex-
pected to fade away: this is the process of political development, or the
creation of political order and stability. In a simple equation, stability
varies directly with the ratio between institutionalization and participation.
This is an elegant, simple, lucid and promising theory. It uses few
variables; it explicitly hypothesizes about the connections between them;
it provides a developmental typology; and above all, it attacks head-on
5 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12 6 Ibid., p. 31.
7 Ibid., p. 12. 8 Ibid., p. 194.
9 Ibid., p. 64. 10 Ibid., p. 71.
310 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
order in any given society can be measured by the ratio of political insti-
tutionalization to political participation. Institutionalization is '. . . the
process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stabil-
ity'.5 Its level is measured by the scope and strength of institutions, mani-
fest in 'the size, number and effectiveness of its (the political system's)
organizations'.6 This is a more or less quantitative statement; it is followed
by a more or less qualitatively oriented one: 'The level of institutionaliza-
tion of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity,
autonomy and coherence of its organizations and procedures'.7 The major
problem, in this view, lies in the fact that modernization and political
development are more often than not out of step with each other. Modern-
ization (economic development, urbanization, literacy and so forth) brings
about tremendous expansion in political participation without concomitant
expansion in the strength of political institutions, thus bringing about
political decay and disorder-'praetorianism'. Such societies are vulner-
able to military coups, as the military (as well as other social forces)
undergo a process of politicization, while the civilian institutions remain
weak. 'Countries which have political armies also have political clergies,
political universities, political bureaucracies ....'8 Such is praetorian
society, in which the weakness of institutionalization leads to two alter-
native ways of making demands by the constantly expanding number of
participants: violence and corruption. Having thus diagnosed the malaise,
Huntington boldly challenges some conventional views, and argues that
under such circumstances corruption may not be a bad alternative: it is
certainly less dangerous than violence, and it contributes to the solution of
a variety of problems. First, legitimacy: 'He who corrupts the system's
police officers is more likely to identify with the system than he who
storms the system's police stations.'9 Second, corruption may help in
building and strengthening political parties and institutions. Inasmuch as
it stems from the weakness of institutionalization, '. . . Corruption varies
inversely with political organization, and to the extent that corruption
builds parties, it undermines the conditions of its own existence'.10 Only in
the civic polity, in which political institutionalization outstrips the expan-
sion of participation can military coups, violence and corruption be ex-
pected to fade away: this is the process of political development, or the
creation of political order and stability. In a simple equation, stability
varies directly with the ratio between institutionalization and participation.
This is an elegant, simple, lucid and promising theory. It uses few
variables; it explicitly hypothesizes about the connections between them;
it provides a developmental typology; and above all, it attacks head-on
5 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12 6 Ibid., p. 31.
7 Ibid., p. 12. 8 Ibid., p. 194.
9 Ibid., p. 64. 10 Ibid., p. 71.
310 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
order in any given society can be measured by the ratio of political insti-
tutionalization to political participation. Institutionalization is '. . . the
process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stabil-
ity'.5 Its level is measured by the scope and strength of institutions, mani-
fest in 'the size, number and effectiveness of its (the political system's)
organizations'.6 This is a more or less quantitative statement; it is followed
by a more or less qualitatively oriented one: 'The level of institutionaliza-
tion of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity,
autonomy and coherence of its organizations and procedures'.7 The major
problem, in this view, lies in the fact that modernization and political
development are more often than not out of step with each other. Modern-
ization (economic development, urbanization, literacy and so forth) brings
about tremendous expansion in political participation without concomitant
expansion in the strength of political institutions, thus bringing about
political decay and disorder-'praetorianism'. Such societies are vulner-
able to military coups, as the military (as well as other social forces)
undergo a process of politicization, while the civilian institutions remain
weak. 'Countries which have political armies also have political clergies,
political universities, political bureaucracies ....'8 Such is praetorian
society, in which the weakness of institutionalization leads to two alter-
native ways of making demands by the constantly expanding number of
participants: violence and corruption. Having thus diagnosed the malaise,
Huntington boldly challenges some conventional views, and argues that
under such circumstances corruption may not be a bad alternative: it is
certainly less dangerous than violence, and it contributes to the solution of
a variety of problems. First, legitimacy: 'He who corrupts the system's
police officers is more likely to identify with the system than he who
storms the system's police stations.'9 Second, corruption may help in
building and strengthening political parties and institutions. Inasmuch as
it stems from the weakness of institutionalization, '. . . Corruption varies
inversely with political organization, and to the extent that corruption
builds parties, it undermines the conditions of its own existence'.10 Only in
the civic polity, in which political institutionalization outstrips the expan-
sion of participation can military coups, violence and corruption be ex-
pected to fade away: this is the process of political development, or the
creation of political order and stability. In a simple equation, stability
varies directly with the ratio between institutionalization and participation.
This is an elegant, simple, lucid and promising theory. It uses few
variables; it explicitly hypothesizes about the connections between them;
it provides a developmental typology; and above all, it attacks head-on
5 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12 6 Ibid., p. 31.
7 Ibid., p. 12. 8 Ibid., p. 194.
9 Ibid., p. 64. 10 Ibid., p. 71.
310 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
order in any given society can be measured by the ratio of political insti-
tutionalization to political participation. Institutionalization is '. . . the
process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stabil-
ity'.5 Its level is measured by the scope and strength of institutions, mani-
fest in 'the size, number and effectiveness of its (the political system's)
organizations'.6 This is a more or less quantitative statement; it is followed
by a more or less qualitatively oriented one: 'The level of institutionaliza-
tion of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity,
autonomy and coherence of its organizations and procedures'.7 The major
problem, in this view, lies in the fact that modernization and political
development are more often than not out of step with each other. Modern-
ization (economic development, urbanization, literacy and so forth) brings
about tremendous expansion in political participation without concomitant
expansion in the strength of political institutions, thus bringing about
political decay and disorder-'praetorianism'. Such societies are vulner-
able to military coups, as the military (as well as other social forces)
undergo a process of politicization, while the civilian institutions remain
weak. 'Countries which have political armies also have political clergies,
political universities, political bureaucracies ....'8 Such is praetorian
society, in which the weakness of institutionalization leads to two alter-
native ways of making demands by the constantly expanding number of
participants: violence and corruption. Having thus diagnosed the malaise,
Huntington boldly challenges some conventional views, and argues that
under such circumstances corruption may not be a bad alternative: it is
certainly less dangerous than violence, and it contributes to the solution of
a variety of problems. First, legitimacy: 'He who corrupts the system's
police officers is more likely to identify with the system than he who
storms the system's police stations.'9 Second, corruption may help in
building and strengthening political parties and institutions. Inasmuch as
it stems from the weakness of institutionalization, '. . . Corruption varies
inversely with political organization, and to the extent that corruption
builds parties, it undermines the conditions of its own existence'.10 Only in
the civic polity, in which political institutionalization outstrips the expan-
sion of participation can military coups, violence and corruption be ex-
pected to fade away: this is the process of political development, or the
creation of political order and stability. In a simple equation, stability
varies directly with the ratio between institutionalization and participation.
This is an elegant, simple, lucid and promising theory. It uses few
variables; it explicitly hypothesizes about the connections between them;
it provides a developmental typology; and above all, it attacks head-on
5 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12 6 Ibid., p. 31.
7 Ibid., p. 12. 8 Ibid., p. 194.
9 Ibid., p. 64. 10 Ibid., p. 71.
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INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 311
hosts of blatantly relevant and pressing contemporary political problems.
Alas, an analysis of the relevant literature in recent years shows that
while hosts of works refer to institutionalization, very few actually use it in
a systematic and orderly manner.l Here an attempt will be made to
account for the difficulties of utilizing the notion of institutionalization on
both the conceptual and theoretical levels, and suggestions will be put
forth as to the possibilities of salvaging the concept for future empirical
research.
Despite the lucidity of Huntington's presentation, the notion of insti-
tutionalization is not entirely clear. It encompasses both behavioral and
structural dimensions: it is 'the process by which organizations and pro-
cedures acquire value and stability'.12 'Stability of organizations' is a
structural trait that can be explained by any number of variables, while
'procedures acquiring value' is a distinctly behavioral process13 (if so
desired, this may be regarded a trait of political culture). The distinction
is by no means semantic: although it can be argued that stable structures
are more likely to prevail in cultures where procedures are valued, this is
not necessarily the case. In fact, it is not at all difficult to think of examples
of stable organizations that are valued neither for themselves nor for their
procedures. This is crucially important-in fact, Feit who attempts to
utilize Huntington's formulation sees in this the essence of the entire
concept:
Institutions must be distinguished from organizations. An institution may be organized,
and an organization can become institutional, but the two are not necessarily the same.
Like an institution, an organization has stable and recurring patterns of behavior. The
added dimension of an institution is that these patterns and behaviors are valued.14
[Feit then goes on to argue that:] ... institutions, given an organization, result from the
interplay of three related and mutually reinforcing processes: the co-optation of new
elites into the system and elite bargaining; the ritualization of political processes; and
the condensation of this ritualization through conditioning to the regime's symbols.1s
Feit actually chooses to deal with the two latter (behavioral) variables.16
However, the connection between organizations being valued on the one
hand and stable on the other is not really self-evident. If the two were to be
related through a hypothesis linking them as a dependent and independent
variable, one would say that this is an interesting and fairly plausible hypo-
11 On this see Baxter's useful remarks in his The Notion of Institutionalization, passim. A
number of scholars attempt to utilize the concept, but only in an intuitive and unsystematic
way, e.g., Derek W. Urwin, 'Social Cleavages and Political Parties in Belgium: Problems of
Institutionalization', Political Studies XVIII/1 (March 1970).
12 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12.
13 For an excellent brief discussion on the differences between behavioral and structural
variables see Harry Eckstein, 'On the Etiology of Internal Wars,' in Bruce Mazlish et al. (eds.),
Revolution (New York, 1971), pp. 31-4.
14 Edward Feit, 'Pen, Sword and People: Military Regimes in the Formation of Political
Institutions', World Politics, XXV (January 1973), p. 251. Italics in the original.
15 Ibid., p. 252. 16 Ibid.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 311
hosts of blatantly relevant and pressing contemporary political problems.
Alas, an analysis of the relevant literature in recent years shows that
while hosts of works refer to institutionalization, very few actually use it in
a systematic and orderly manner.l Here an attempt will be made to
account for the difficulties of utilizing the notion of institutionalization on
both the conceptual and theoretical levels, and suggestions will be put
forth as to the possibilities of salvaging the concept for future empirical
research.
Despite the lucidity of Huntington's presentation, the notion of insti-
tutionalization is not entirely clear. It encompasses both behavioral and
structural dimensions: it is 'the process by which organizations and pro-
cedures acquire value and stability'.12 'Stability of organizations' is a
structural trait that can be explained by any number of variables, while
'procedures acquiring value' is a distinctly behavioral process13 (if so
desired, this may be regarded a trait of political culture). The distinction
is by no means semantic: although it can be argued that stable structures
are more likely to prevail in cultures where procedures are valued, this is
not necessarily the case. In fact, it is not at all difficult to think of examples
of stable organizations that are valued neither for themselves nor for their
procedures. This is crucially important-in fact, Feit who attempts to
utilize Huntington's formulation sees in this the essence of the entire
concept:
Institutions must be distinguished from organizations. An institution may be organized,
and an organization can become institutional, but the two are not necessarily the same.
Like an institution, an organization has stable and recurring patterns of behavior. The
added dimension of an institution is that these patterns and behaviors are valued.14
[Feit then goes on to argue that:] ... institutions, given an organization, result from the
interplay of three related and mutually reinforcing processes: the co-optation of new
elites into the system and elite bargaining; the ritualization of political processes; and
the condensation of this ritualization through conditioning to the regime's symbols.1s
Feit actually chooses to deal with the two latter (behavioral) variables.16
However, the connection between organizations being valued on the one
hand and stable on the other is not really self-evident. If the two were to be
related through a hypothesis linking them as a dependent and independent
variable, one would say that this is an interesting and fairly plausible hypo-
11 On this see Baxter's useful remarks in his The Notion of Institutionalization, passim. A
number of scholars attempt to utilize the concept, but only in an intuitive and unsystematic
way, e.g., Derek W. Urwin, 'Social Cleavages and Political Parties in Belgium: Problems of
Institutionalization', Political Studies XVIII/1 (March 1970).
12 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12.
13 For an excellent brief discussion on the differences between behavioral and structural
variables see Harry Eckstein, 'On the Etiology of Internal Wars,' in Bruce Mazlish et al. (eds.),
Revolution (New York, 1971), pp. 31-4.
14 Edward Feit, 'Pen, Sword and People: Military Regimes in the Formation of Political
Institutions', World Politics, XXV (January 1973), p. 251. Italics in the original.
15 Ibid., p. 252. 16 Ibid.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 311
hosts of blatantly relevant and pressing contemporary political problems.
Alas, an analysis of the relevant literature in recent years shows that
while hosts of works refer to institutionalization, very few actually use it in
a systematic and orderly manner.l Here an attempt will be made to
account for the difficulties of utilizing the notion of institutionalization on
both the conceptual and theoretical levels, and suggestions will be put
forth as to the possibilities of salvaging the concept for future empirical
research.
Despite the lucidity of Huntington's presentation, the notion of insti-
tutionalization is not entirely clear. It encompasses both behavioral and
structural dimensions: it is 'the process by which organizations and pro-
cedures acquire value and stability'.12 'Stability of organizations' is a
structural trait that can be explained by any number of variables, while
'procedures acquiring value' is a distinctly behavioral process13 (if so
desired, this may be regarded a trait of political culture). The distinction
is by no means semantic: although it can be argued that stable structures
are more likely to prevail in cultures where procedures are valued, this is
not necessarily the case. In fact, it is not at all difficult to think of examples
of stable organizations that are valued neither for themselves nor for their
procedures. This is crucially important-in fact, Feit who attempts to
utilize Huntington's formulation sees in this the essence of the entire
concept:
Institutions must be distinguished from organizations. An institution may be organized,
and an organization can become institutional, but the two are not necessarily the same.
Like an institution, an organization has stable and recurring patterns of behavior. The
added dimension of an institution is that these patterns and behaviors are valued.14
[Feit then goes on to argue that:] ... institutions, given an organization, result from the
interplay of three related and mutually reinforcing processes: the co-optation of new
elites into the system and elite bargaining; the ritualization of political processes; and
the condensation of this ritualization through conditioning to the regime's symbols.1s
Feit actually chooses to deal with the two latter (behavioral) variables.16
However, the connection between organizations being valued on the one
hand and stable on the other is not really self-evident. If the two were to be
related through a hypothesis linking them as a dependent and independent
variable, one would say that this is an interesting and fairly plausible hypo-
11 On this see Baxter's useful remarks in his The Notion of Institutionalization, passim. A
number of scholars attempt to utilize the concept, but only in an intuitive and unsystematic
way, e.g., Derek W. Urwin, 'Social Cleavages and Political Parties in Belgium: Problems of
Institutionalization', Political Studies XVIII/1 (March 1970).
12 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12.
13 For an excellent brief discussion on the differences between behavioral and structural
variables see Harry Eckstein, 'On the Etiology of Internal Wars,' in Bruce Mazlish et al. (eds.),
Revolution (New York, 1971), pp. 31-4.
14 Edward Feit, 'Pen, Sword and People: Military Regimes in the Formation of Political
Institutions', World Politics, XXV (January 1973), p. 251. Italics in the original.
15 Ibid., p. 252. 16 Ibid.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 311
hosts of blatantly relevant and pressing contemporary political problems.
Alas, an analysis of the relevant literature in recent years shows that
while hosts of works refer to institutionalization, very few actually use it in
a systematic and orderly manner.l Here an attempt will be made to
account for the difficulties of utilizing the notion of institutionalization on
both the conceptual and theoretical levels, and suggestions will be put
forth as to the possibilities of salvaging the concept for future empirical
research.
Despite the lucidity of Huntington's presentation, the notion of insti-
tutionalization is not entirely clear. It encompasses both behavioral and
structural dimensions: it is 'the process by which organizations and pro-
cedures acquire value and stability'.12 'Stability of organizations' is a
structural trait that can be explained by any number of variables, while
'procedures acquiring value' is a distinctly behavioral process13 (if so
desired, this may be regarded a trait of political culture). The distinction
is by no means semantic: although it can be argued that stable structures
are more likely to prevail in cultures where procedures are valued, this is
not necessarily the case. In fact, it is not at all difficult to think of examples
of stable organizations that are valued neither for themselves nor for their
procedures. This is crucially important-in fact, Feit who attempts to
utilize Huntington's formulation sees in this the essence of the entire
concept:
Institutions must be distinguished from organizations. An institution may be organized,
and an organization can become institutional, but the two are not necessarily the same.
Like an institution, an organization has stable and recurring patterns of behavior. The
added dimension of an institution is that these patterns and behaviors are valued.14
[Feit then goes on to argue that:] ... institutions, given an organization, result from the
interplay of three related and mutually reinforcing processes: the co-optation of new
elites into the system and elite bargaining; the ritualization of political processes; and
the condensation of this ritualization through conditioning to the regime's symbols.1s
Feit actually chooses to deal with the two latter (behavioral) variables.16
However, the connection between organizations being valued on the one
hand and stable on the other is not really self-evident. If the two were to be
related through a hypothesis linking them as a dependent and independent
variable, one would say that this is an interesting and fairly plausible hypo-
11 On this see Baxter's useful remarks in his The Notion of Institutionalization, passim. A
number of scholars attempt to utilize the concept, but only in an intuitive and unsystematic
way, e.g., Derek W. Urwin, 'Social Cleavages and Political Parties in Belgium: Problems of
Institutionalization', Political Studies XVIII/1 (March 1970).
12 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12.
13 For an excellent brief discussion on the differences between behavioral and structural
variables see Harry Eckstein, 'On the Etiology of Internal Wars,' in Bruce Mazlish et al. (eds.),
Revolution (New York, 1971), pp. 31-4.
14 Edward Feit, 'Pen, Sword and People: Military Regimes in the Formation of Political
Institutions', World Politics, XXV (January 1973), p. 251. Italics in the original.
15 Ibid., p. 252. 16 Ibid.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 311
hosts of blatantly relevant and pressing contemporary political problems.
Alas, an analysis of the relevant literature in recent years shows that
while hosts of works refer to institutionalization, very few actually use it in
a systematic and orderly manner.l Here an attempt will be made to
account for the difficulties of utilizing the notion of institutionalization on
both the conceptual and theoretical levels, and suggestions will be put
forth as to the possibilities of salvaging the concept for future empirical
research.
Despite the lucidity of Huntington's presentation, the notion of insti-
tutionalization is not entirely clear. It encompasses both behavioral and
structural dimensions: it is 'the process by which organizations and pro-
cedures acquire value and stability'.12 'Stability of organizations' is a
structural trait that can be explained by any number of variables, while
'procedures acquiring value' is a distinctly behavioral process13 (if so
desired, this may be regarded a trait of political culture). The distinction
is by no means semantic: although it can be argued that stable structures
are more likely to prevail in cultures where procedures are valued, this is
not necessarily the case. In fact, it is not at all difficult to think of examples
of stable organizations that are valued neither for themselves nor for their
procedures. This is crucially important-in fact, Feit who attempts to
utilize Huntington's formulation sees in this the essence of the entire
concept:
Institutions must be distinguished from organizations. An institution may be organized,
and an organization can become institutional, but the two are not necessarily the same.
Like an institution, an organization has stable and recurring patterns of behavior. The
added dimension of an institution is that these patterns and behaviors are valued.14
[Feit then goes on to argue that:] ... institutions, given an organization, result from the
interplay of three related and mutually reinforcing processes: the co-optation of new
elites into the system and elite bargaining; the ritualization of political processes; and
the condensation of this ritualization through conditioning to the regime's symbols.1s
Feit actually chooses to deal with the two latter (behavioral) variables.16
However, the connection between organizations being valued on the one
hand and stable on the other is not really self-evident. If the two were to be
related through a hypothesis linking them as a dependent and independent
variable, one would say that this is an interesting and fairly plausible hypo-
11 On this see Baxter's useful remarks in his The Notion of Institutionalization, passim. A
number of scholars attempt to utilize the concept, but only in an intuitive and unsystematic
way, e.g., Derek W. Urwin, 'Social Cleavages and Political Parties in Belgium: Problems of
Institutionalization', Political Studies XVIII/1 (March 1970).
12 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12.
13 For an excellent brief discussion on the differences between behavioral and structural
variables see Harry Eckstein, 'On the Etiology of Internal Wars,' in Bruce Mazlish et al. (eds.),
Revolution (New York, 1971), pp. 31-4.
14 Edward Feit, 'Pen, Sword and People: Military Regimes in the Formation of Political
Institutions', World Politics, XXV (January 1973), p. 251. Italics in the original.
15 Ibid., p. 252. 16 Ibid.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 311
hosts of blatantly relevant and pressing contemporary political problems.
Alas, an analysis of the relevant literature in recent years shows that
while hosts of works refer to institutionalization, very few actually use it in
a systematic and orderly manner.l Here an attempt will be made to
account for the difficulties of utilizing the notion of institutionalization on
both the conceptual and theoretical levels, and suggestions will be put
forth as to the possibilities of salvaging the concept for future empirical
research.
Despite the lucidity of Huntington's presentation, the notion of insti-
tutionalization is not entirely clear. It encompasses both behavioral and
structural dimensions: it is 'the process by which organizations and pro-
cedures acquire value and stability'.12 'Stability of organizations' is a
structural trait that can be explained by any number of variables, while
'procedures acquiring value' is a distinctly behavioral process13 (if so
desired, this may be regarded a trait of political culture). The distinction
is by no means semantic: although it can be argued that stable structures
are more likely to prevail in cultures where procedures are valued, this is
not necessarily the case. In fact, it is not at all difficult to think of examples
of stable organizations that are valued neither for themselves nor for their
procedures. This is crucially important-in fact, Feit who attempts to
utilize Huntington's formulation sees in this the essence of the entire
concept:
Institutions must be distinguished from organizations. An institution may be organized,
and an organization can become institutional, but the two are not necessarily the same.
Like an institution, an organization has stable and recurring patterns of behavior. The
added dimension of an institution is that these patterns and behaviors are valued.14
[Feit then goes on to argue that:] ... institutions, given an organization, result from the
interplay of three related and mutually reinforcing processes: the co-optation of new
elites into the system and elite bargaining; the ritualization of political processes; and
the condensation of this ritualization through conditioning to the regime's symbols.1s
Feit actually chooses to deal with the two latter (behavioral) variables.16
However, the connection between organizations being valued on the one
hand and stable on the other is not really self-evident. If the two were to be
related through a hypothesis linking them as a dependent and independent
variable, one would say that this is an interesting and fairly plausible hypo-
11 On this see Baxter's useful remarks in his The Notion of Institutionalization, passim. A
number of scholars attempt to utilize the concept, but only in an intuitive and unsystematic
way, e.g., Derek W. Urwin, 'Social Cleavages and Political Parties in Belgium: Problems of
Institutionalization', Political Studies XVIII/1 (March 1970).
12 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12.
13 For an excellent brief discussion on the differences between behavioral and structural
variables see Harry Eckstein, 'On the Etiology of Internal Wars,' in Bruce Mazlish et al. (eds.),
Revolution (New York, 1971), pp. 31-4.
14 Edward Feit, 'Pen, Sword and People: Military Regimes in the Formation of Political
Institutions', World Politics, XXV (January 1973), p. 251. Italics in the original.
15 Ibid., p. 252. 16 Ibid.
This content downloaded from 132.74.208.186 on Wed, 06 Nov 2019 04:14:49 UTC
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312 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
thesis; but to use them as two components of the same thing is an alto-
gether different matter. Again this conceptual logical argument (much
like the structural-behavioral distinction) is neither semantic nor trivial: as
a matter of fact, there are significant theoretical and methodological issues
at stake here. The methodological problem is that the statement may be
taken to imply that if the given organization is stable (presumably meaning
that it endures over a lengthy period of time) it must be valued (presum-
ably not only by its members but also by major segments of the relevant
outside population), and vice versa. This seems to me either tautological or
false. If endurance means that whatever endures must be valued or else it
would not have endured, the statement is tautological. If the statement
means that in all cases organizations endure where it can be demonstrated
that they are valued (and by 'valued' Huntington apparently means 'valued
for their own sake apart from the concrete benefits they deliver'17), it is
false. It is obvious that organizations can and do endure for long periods
of time through the use or threat of force, manipulation and other such
means18 without necessarily being valued for their own sake, and this seems
true particularly on the macro-level, which is the level of analysis of the
theory of institutionalization.
The theoretical problem (apart, of course, from Huntington's assump-
tion that order and stability are necessarily the most highly valued goals of
political development)19 is that quite imaginably stability and being valued
may be contradictory. Huntington appears to be entirely correct in arguing
that there is a need for a certain degree and level of institutionalization in
order to conduct creative political conflict as well as in order to absorb
certain innovations. On the other hand, in order to absorb and even more
so, in order to generate innovation vis-a-vis the extra-institutional environ-
ment,20 the institution itself has to develop the capacity to innovatefrom
within (and this is not the same as 'adaptability', which means the ability
to continue functioning after the original functions of the organization are
no longer relevant21). Innovation and stability do not always go together;
17 Mark Kesselman, 'Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint: The Case of France',
Comparative Politics II/1 (October 1970), p. 25.
18 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical
Framework', American Political Science Review, 57 (1963); idem, 'Two Faces of Power',
American Political Science Review 56 (December 1962).
19 Cf. Manfred Halpern, 'The Rate and Costs of Political Development', The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 358 (March 1965).
20 According to S. N. Eisenstadt, the 'most crucial test of modernization is the ability to
maintain "sustained" growth in the major institutional spheres and to develop an institutional
structure capable of absorbing such changes with relatively few eruptions and breakdowns'.
'Breakdowns of Modernization', in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political
Development and Social Change (New York, 1966), p. 574. Sidney Verba treats crises in politi-
cal development as 'situations in which the basic institutional patterns of the political system
are challenged and routine response is inadequate ... and some new institutionalized means
of handling problems of that sort is required to satisfy the discontent'. Verba, 'Sequences and
Development', in Leonard Binder et al. (eds.), Crises and Sequences in Political Development
(Princeton, 1971), p. 302.
21 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 13-17.
312 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
thesis; but to use them as two components of the same thing is an alto-
gether different matter. Again this conceptual logical argument (much
like the structural-behavioral distinction) is neither semantic nor trivial: as
a matter of fact, there are significant theoretical and methodological issues
at stake here. The methodological problem is that the statement may be
taken to imply that if the given organization is stable (presumably meaning
that it endures over a lengthy period of time) it must be valued (presum-
ably not only by its members but also by major segments of the relevant
outside population), and vice versa. This seems to me either tautological or
false. If endurance means that whatever endures must be valued or else it
would not have endured, the statement is tautological. If the statement
means that in all cases organizations endure where it can be demonstrated
that they are valued (and by 'valued' Huntington apparently means 'valued
for their own sake apart from the concrete benefits they deliver'17), it is
false. It is obvious that organizations can and do endure for long periods
of time through the use or threat of force, manipulation and other such
means18 without necessarily being valued for their own sake, and this seems
true particularly on the macro-level, which is the level of analysis of the
theory of institutionalization.
The theoretical problem (apart, of course, from Huntington's assump-
tion that order and stability are necessarily the most highly valued goals of
political development)19 is that quite imaginably stability and being valued
may be contradictory. Huntington appears to be entirely correct in arguing
that there is a need for a certain degree and level of institutionalization in
order to conduct creative political conflict as well as in order to absorb
certain innovations. On the other hand, in order to absorb and even more
so, in order to generate innovation vis-a-vis the extra-institutional environ-
ment,20 the institution itself has to develop the capacity to innovatefrom
within (and this is not the same as 'adaptability', which means the ability
to continue functioning after the original functions of the organization are
no longer relevant21). Innovation and stability do not always go together;
17 Mark Kesselman, 'Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint: The Case of France',
Comparative Politics II/1 (October 1970), p. 25.
18 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical
Framework', American Political Science Review, 57 (1963); idem, 'Two Faces of Power',
American Political Science Review 56 (December 1962).
19 Cf. Manfred Halpern, 'The Rate and Costs of Political Development', The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 358 (March 1965).
20 According to S. N. Eisenstadt, the 'most crucial test of modernization is the ability to
maintain "sustained" growth in the major institutional spheres and to develop an institutional
structure capable of absorbing such changes with relatively few eruptions and breakdowns'.
'Breakdowns of Modernization', in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political
Development and Social Change (New York, 1966), p. 574. Sidney Verba treats crises in politi-
cal development as 'situations in which the basic institutional patterns of the political system
are challenged and routine response is inadequate ... and some new institutionalized means
of handling problems of that sort is required to satisfy the discontent'. Verba, 'Sequences and
Development', in Leonard Binder et al. (eds.), Crises and Sequences in Political Development
(Princeton, 1971), p. 302.
21 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 13-17.
312 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
thesis; but to use them as two components of the same thing is an alto-
gether different matter. Again this conceptual logical argument (much
like the structural-behavioral distinction) is neither semantic nor trivial: as
a matter of fact, there are significant theoretical and methodological issues
at stake here. The methodological problem is that the statement may be
taken to imply that if the given organization is stable (presumably meaning
that it endures over a lengthy period of time) it must be valued (presum-
ably not only by its members but also by major segments of the relevant
outside population), and vice versa. This seems to me either tautological or
false. If endurance means that whatever endures must be valued or else it
would not have endured, the statement is tautological. If the statement
means that in all cases organizations endure where it can be demonstrated
that they are valued (and by 'valued' Huntington apparently means 'valued
for their own sake apart from the concrete benefits they deliver'17), it is
false. It is obvious that organizations can and do endure for long periods
of time through the use or threat of force, manipulation and other such
means18 without necessarily being valued for their own sake, and this seems
true particularly on the macro-level, which is the level of analysis of the
theory of institutionalization.
The theoretical problem (apart, of course, from Huntington's assump-
tion that order and stability are necessarily the most highly valued goals of
political development)19 is that quite imaginably stability and being valued
may be contradictory. Huntington appears to be entirely correct in arguing
that there is a need for a certain degree and level of institutionalization in
order to conduct creative political conflict as well as in order to absorb
certain innovations. On the other hand, in order to absorb and even more
so, in order to generate innovation vis-a-vis the extra-institutional environ-
ment,20 the institution itself has to develop the capacity to innovatefrom
within (and this is not the same as 'adaptability', which means the ability
to continue functioning after the original functions of the organization are
no longer relevant21). Innovation and stability do not always go together;
17 Mark Kesselman, 'Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint: The Case of France',
Comparative Politics II/1 (October 1970), p. 25.
18 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical
Framework', American Political Science Review, 57 (1963); idem, 'Two Faces of Power',
American Political Science Review 56 (December 1962).
19 Cf. Manfred Halpern, 'The Rate and Costs of Political Development', The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 358 (March 1965).
20 According to S. N. Eisenstadt, the 'most crucial test of modernization is the ability to
maintain "sustained" growth in the major institutional spheres and to develop an institutional
structure capable of absorbing such changes with relatively few eruptions and breakdowns'.
'Breakdowns of Modernization', in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political
Development and Social Change (New York, 1966), p. 574. Sidney Verba treats crises in politi-
cal development as 'situations in which the basic institutional patterns of the political system
are challenged and routine response is inadequate ... and some new institutionalized means
of handling problems of that sort is required to satisfy the discontent'. Verba, 'Sequences and
Development', in Leonard Binder et al. (eds.), Crises and Sequences in Political Development
(Princeton, 1971), p. 302.
21 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 13-17.
312 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
thesis; but to use them as two components of the same thing is an alto-
gether different matter. Again this conceptual logical argument (much
like the structural-behavioral distinction) is neither semantic nor trivial: as
a matter of fact, there are significant theoretical and methodological issues
at stake here. The methodological problem is that the statement may be
taken to imply that if the given organization is stable (presumably meaning
that it endures over a lengthy period of time) it must be valued (presum-
ably not only by its members but also by major segments of the relevant
outside population), and vice versa. This seems to me either tautological or
false. If endurance means that whatever endures must be valued or else it
would not have endured, the statement is tautological. If the statement
means that in all cases organizations endure where it can be demonstrated
that they are valued (and by 'valued' Huntington apparently means 'valued
for their own sake apart from the concrete benefits they deliver'17), it is
false. It is obvious that organizations can and do endure for long periods
of time through the use or threat of force, manipulation and other such
means18 without necessarily being valued for their own sake, and this seems
true particularly on the macro-level, which is the level of analysis of the
theory of institutionalization.
The theoretical problem (apart, of course, from Huntington's assump-
tion that order and stability are necessarily the most highly valued goals of
political development)19 is that quite imaginably stability and being valued
may be contradictory. Huntington appears to be entirely correct in arguing
that there is a need for a certain degree and level of institutionalization in
order to conduct creative political conflict as well as in order to absorb
certain innovations. On the other hand, in order to absorb and even more
so, in order to generate innovation vis-a-vis the extra-institutional environ-
ment,20 the institution itself has to develop the capacity to innovatefrom
within (and this is not the same as 'adaptability', which means the ability
to continue functioning after the original functions of the organization are
no longer relevant21). Innovation and stability do not always go together;
17 Mark Kesselman, 'Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint: The Case of France',
Comparative Politics II/1 (October 1970), p. 25.
18 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical
Framework', American Political Science Review, 57 (1963); idem, 'Two Faces of Power',
American Political Science Review 56 (December 1962).
19 Cf. Manfred Halpern, 'The Rate and Costs of Political Development', The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 358 (March 1965).
20 According to S. N. Eisenstadt, the 'most crucial test of modernization is the ability to
maintain "sustained" growth in the major institutional spheres and to develop an institutional
structure capable of absorbing such changes with relatively few eruptions and breakdowns'.
'Breakdowns of Modernization', in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political
Development and Social Change (New York, 1966), p. 574. Sidney Verba treats crises in politi-
cal development as 'situations in which the basic institutional patterns of the political system
are challenged and routine response is inadequate ... and some new institutionalized means
of handling problems of that sort is required to satisfy the discontent'. Verba, 'Sequences and
Development', in Leonard Binder et al. (eds.), Crises and Sequences in Political Development
(Princeton, 1971), p. 302.
21 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 13-17.
312 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
thesis; but to use them as two components of the same thing is an alto-
gether different matter. Again this conceptual logical argument (much
like the structural-behavioral distinction) is neither semantic nor trivial: as
a matter of fact, there are significant theoretical and methodological issues
at stake here. The methodological problem is that the statement may be
taken to imply that if the given organization is stable (presumably meaning
that it endures over a lengthy period of time) it must be valued (presum-
ably not only by its members but also by major segments of the relevant
outside population), and vice versa. This seems to me either tautological or
false. If endurance means that whatever endures must be valued or else it
would not have endured, the statement is tautological. If the statement
means that in all cases organizations endure where it can be demonstrated
that they are valued (and by 'valued' Huntington apparently means 'valued
for their own sake apart from the concrete benefits they deliver'17), it is
false. It is obvious that organizations can and do endure for long periods
of time through the use or threat of force, manipulation and other such
means18 without necessarily being valued for their own sake, and this seems
true particularly on the macro-level, which is the level of analysis of the
theory of institutionalization.
The theoretical problem (apart, of course, from Huntington's assump-
tion that order and stability are necessarily the most highly valued goals of
political development)19 is that quite imaginably stability and being valued
may be contradictory. Huntington appears to be entirely correct in arguing
that there is a need for a certain degree and level of institutionalization in
order to conduct creative political conflict as well as in order to absorb
certain innovations. On the other hand, in order to absorb and even more
so, in order to generate innovation vis-a-vis the extra-institutional environ-
ment,20 the institution itself has to develop the capacity to innovatefrom
within (and this is not the same as 'adaptability', which means the ability
to continue functioning after the original functions of the organization are
no longer relevant21). Innovation and stability do not always go together;
17 Mark Kesselman, 'Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint: The Case of France',
Comparative Politics II/1 (October 1970), p. 25.
18 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical
Framework', American Political Science Review, 57 (1963); idem, 'Two Faces of Power',
American Political Science Review 56 (December 1962).
19 Cf. Manfred Halpern, 'The Rate and Costs of Political Development', The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 358 (March 1965).
20 According to S. N. Eisenstadt, the 'most crucial test of modernization is the ability to
maintain "sustained" growth in the major institutional spheres and to develop an institutional
structure capable of absorbing such changes with relatively few eruptions and breakdowns'.
'Breakdowns of Modernization', in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political
Development and Social Change (New York, 1966), p. 574. Sidney Verba treats crises in politi-
cal development as 'situations in which the basic institutional patterns of the political system
are challenged and routine response is inadequate ... and some new institutionalized means
of handling problems of that sort is required to satisfy the discontent'. Verba, 'Sequences and
Development', in Leonard Binder et al. (eds.), Crises and Sequences in Political Development
(Princeton, 1971), p. 302.
21 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 13-17.
312 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
thesis; but to use them as two components of the same thing is an alto-
gether different matter. Again this conceptual logical argument (much
like the structural-behavioral distinction) is neither semantic nor trivial: as
a matter of fact, there are significant theoretical and methodological issues
at stake here. The methodological problem is that the statement may be
taken to imply that if the given organization is stable (presumably meaning
that it endures over a lengthy period of time) it must be valued (presum-
ably not only by its members but also by major segments of the relevant
outside population), and vice versa. This seems to me either tautological or
false. If endurance means that whatever endures must be valued or else it
would not have endured, the statement is tautological. If the statement
means that in all cases organizations endure where it can be demonstrated
that they are valued (and by 'valued' Huntington apparently means 'valued
for their own sake apart from the concrete benefits they deliver'17), it is
false. It is obvious that organizations can and do endure for long periods
of time through the use or threat of force, manipulation and other such
means18 without necessarily being valued for their own sake, and this seems
true particularly on the macro-level, which is the level of analysis of the
theory of institutionalization.
The theoretical problem (apart, of course, from Huntington's assump-
tion that order and stability are necessarily the most highly valued goals of
political development)19 is that quite imaginably stability and being valued
may be contradictory. Huntington appears to be entirely correct in arguing
that there is a need for a certain degree and level of institutionalization in
order to conduct creative political conflict as well as in order to absorb
certain innovations. On the other hand, in order to absorb and even more
so, in order to generate innovation vis-a-vis the extra-institutional environ-
ment,20 the institution itself has to develop the capacity to innovatefrom
within (and this is not the same as 'adaptability', which means the ability
to continue functioning after the original functions of the organization are
no longer relevant21). Innovation and stability do not always go together;
17 Mark Kesselman, 'Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint: The Case of France',
Comparative Politics II/1 (October 1970), p. 25.
18 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical
Framework', American Political Science Review, 57 (1963); idem, 'Two Faces of Power',
American Political Science Review 56 (December 1962).
19 Cf. Manfred Halpern, 'The Rate and Costs of Political Development', The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 358 (March 1965).
20 According to S. N. Eisenstadt, the 'most crucial test of modernization is the ability to
maintain "sustained" growth in the major institutional spheres and to develop an institutional
structure capable of absorbing such changes with relatively few eruptions and breakdowns'.
'Breakdowns of Modernization', in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political
Development and Social Change (New York, 1966), p. 574. Sidney Verba treats crises in politi-
cal development as 'situations in which the basic institutional patterns of the political system
are challenged and routine response is inadequate ... and some new institutionalized means
of handling problems of that sort is required to satisfy the discontent'. Verba, 'Sequences and
Development', in Leonard Binder et al. (eds.), Crises and Sequences in Political Development
(Princeton, 1971), p. 302.
21 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 13-17.
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All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 313
yet the challenges of modernization are such that in order for organizations
to be valued, they may be called upon to introduce major innovations,
including innovations of a magnitude threatening the stability of the
organization.22 In this sense, if constant innovation indeed characterizes
modernization, valuing organizations may indeed mean danger to their
stability, while stability may mean that the organization may no longer be
valued.
This is even truer on the macro level. Certain organizations may have to
disintegrate and disappear in order for the political system as such to
respond to the challenges of innovation, modernization and change.23 Such
organizations may obstruct necessary processes: if the entire institutional
structure of the system is to be 'valued and stable', it must have the capacity
to get rid of organizations that have become positively dysfunctional.
It is highly likely that this problem, i.e., getting rid of dysfunctional
institutions, will become really crucial at certain stages of modernization
and development. The development (i.e., institutionalization) of given
organizations may be contradictory to the demands of the development of
the entire political system. Huntington's argument that 'institutional
interest coincides with public interest' is not necessarily true; when he
argues that 'What's good for General Motors is good for the country'
contains at least a partial truth,24 that truth appears to be very partial
indeed. It is not at all unlikely to imagine circumstances in which what is
good for General Motors is very bad for the country; nor is it difficult to
imagine circumstances in which the good of the country may particularly
require getting rid of institutions such as General Motors. What is im-
portant, of course, is the continuing ability of the system to build new
institutions of the required magnitude to deal with the political problems
of modernization. However, these do not have to be the same institutions
which struggle to survive. Institutional survival is not political develop-
ment.
Similarly, Huntington's explicit arguments that ' "What's good for the
Presidency is good for the country" contains more truth' and that 'The
public interest of the Soviet Union is approximated by the institutional
interests of the top organs of the Communist Party', according to which
'What's good for the Presidium is good for the Soviet Union'25 cannot be
accepted at face value. While it may be true that the good of the Soviet
Union requires an ability and the willingness to build institutions in order
to deal with the political problems of the country, nowhere is it proved that
the institution has to be a Communist party, its 'top organs' or a Presidium
22 Cf. Manfred Halpern, 'The Revolution of Modernization in National and International
Society', Revolution (Nomos VIII) (New York, 1966).
23 See also Rustow, p. 127; Manfred Halpern, 'Toward Further Modernization of the
Study of New Nations', World Politics XVII (October 1964).
24 Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 26. 25 Ibid.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 313
yet the challenges of modernization are such that in order for organizations
to be valued, they may be called upon to introduce major innovations,
including innovations of a magnitude threatening the stability of the
organization.22 In this sense, if constant innovation indeed characterizes
modernization, valuing organizations may indeed mean danger to their
stability, while stability may mean that the organization may no longer be
valued.
This is even truer on the macro level. Certain organizations may have to
disintegrate and disappear in order for the political system as such to
respond to the challenges of innovation, modernization and change.23 Such
organizations may obstruct necessary processes: if the entire institutional
structure of the system is to be 'valued and stable', it must have the capacity
to get rid of organizations that have become positively dysfunctional.
It is highly likely that this problem, i.e., getting rid of dysfunctional
institutions, will become really crucial at certain stages of modernization
and development. The development (i.e., institutionalization) of given
organizations may be contradictory to the demands of the development of
the entire political system. Huntington's argument that 'institutional
interest coincides with public interest' is not necessarily true; when he
argues that 'What's good for General Motors is good for the country'
contains at least a partial truth,24 that truth appears to be very partial
indeed. It is not at all unlikely to imagine circumstances in which what is
good for General Motors is very bad for the country; nor is it difficult to
imagine circumstances in which the good of the country may particularly
require getting rid of institutions such as General Motors. What is im-
portant, of course, is the continuing ability of the system to build new
institutions of the required magnitude to deal with the political problems
of modernization. However, these do not have to be the same institutions
which struggle to survive. Institutional survival is not political develop-
ment.
Similarly, Huntington's explicit arguments that ' "What's good for the
Presidency is good for the country" contains more truth' and that 'The
public interest of the Soviet Union is approximated by the institutional
interests of the top organs of the Communist Party', according to which
'What's good for the Presidium is good for the Soviet Union'25 cannot be
accepted at face value. While it may be true that the good of the Soviet
Union requires an ability and the willingness to build institutions in order
to deal with the political problems of the country, nowhere is it proved that
the institution has to be a Communist party, its 'top organs' or a Presidium
22 Cf. Manfred Halpern, 'The Revolution of Modernization in National and International
Society', Revolution (Nomos VIII) (New York, 1966).
23 See also Rustow, p. 127; Manfred Halpern, 'Toward Further Modernization of the
Study of New Nations', World Politics XVII (October 1964).
24 Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 26. 25 Ibid.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 313
yet the challenges of modernization are such that in order for organizations
to be valued, they may be called upon to introduce major innovations,
including innovations of a magnitude threatening the stability of the
organization.22 In this sense, if constant innovation indeed characterizes
modernization, valuing organizations may indeed mean danger to their
stability, while stability may mean that the organization may no longer be
valued.
This is even truer on the macro level. Certain organizations may have to
disintegrate and disappear in order for the political system as such to
respond to the challenges of innovation, modernization and change.23 Such
organizations may obstruct necessary processes: if the entire institutional
structure of the system is to be 'valued and stable', it must have the capacity
to get rid of organizations that have become positively dysfunctional.
It is highly likely that this problem, i.e., getting rid of dysfunctional
institutions, will become really crucial at certain stages of modernization
and development. The development (i.e., institutionalization) of given
organizations may be contradictory to the demands of the development of
the entire political system. Huntington's argument that 'institutional
interest coincides with public interest' is not necessarily true; when he
argues that 'What's good for General Motors is good for the country'
contains at least a partial truth,24 that truth appears to be very partial
indeed. It is not at all unlikely to imagine circumstances in which what is
good for General Motors is very bad for the country; nor is it difficult to
imagine circumstances in which the good of the country may particularly
require getting rid of institutions such as General Motors. What is im-
portant, of course, is the continuing ability of the system to build new
institutions of the required magnitude to deal with the political problems
of modernization. However, these do not have to be the same institutions
which struggle to survive. Institutional survival is not political develop-
ment.
Similarly, Huntington's explicit arguments that ' "What's good for the
Presidency is good for the country" contains more truth' and that 'The
public interest of the Soviet Union is approximated by the institutional
interests of the top organs of the Communist Party', according to which
'What's good for the Presidium is good for the Soviet Union'25 cannot be
accepted at face value. While it may be true that the good of the Soviet
Union requires an ability and the willingness to build institutions in order
to deal with the political problems of the country, nowhere is it proved that
the institution has to be a Communist party, its 'top organs' or a Presidium
22 Cf. Manfred Halpern, 'The Revolution of Modernization in National and International
Society', Revolution (Nomos VIII) (New York, 1966).
23 See also Rustow, p. 127; Manfred Halpern, 'Toward Further Modernization of the
Study of New Nations', World Politics XVII (October 1964).
24 Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 26. 25 Ibid.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 313
yet the challenges of modernization are such that in order for organizations
to be valued, they may be called upon to introduce major innovations,
including innovations of a magnitude threatening the stability of the
organization.22 In this sense, if constant innovation indeed characterizes
modernization, valuing organizations may indeed mean danger to their
stability, while stability may mean that the organization may no longer be
valued.
This is even truer on the macro level. Certain organizations may have to
disintegrate and disappear in order for the political system as such to
respond to the challenges of innovation, modernization and change.23 Such
organizations may obstruct necessary processes: if the entire institutional
structure of the system is to be 'valued and stable', it must have the capacity
to get rid of organizations that have become positively dysfunctional.
It is highly likely that this problem, i.e., getting rid of dysfunctional
institutions, will become really crucial at certain stages of modernization
and development. The development (i.e., institutionalization) of given
organizations may be contradictory to the demands of the development of
the entire political system. Huntington's argument that 'institutional
interest coincides with public interest' is not necessarily true; when he
argues that 'What's good for General Motors is good for the country'
contains at least a partial truth,24 that truth appears to be very partial
indeed. It is not at all unlikely to imagine circumstances in which what is
good for General Motors is very bad for the country; nor is it difficult to
imagine circumstances in which the good of the country may particularly
require getting rid of institutions such as General Motors. What is im-
portant, of course, is the continuing ability of the system to build new
institutions of the required magnitude to deal with the political problems
of modernization. However, these do not have to be the same institutions
which struggle to survive. Institutional survival is not political develop-
ment.
Similarly, Huntington's explicit arguments that ' "What's good for the
Presidency is good for the country" contains more truth' and that 'The
public interest of the Soviet Union is approximated by the institutional
interests of the top organs of the Communist Party', according to which
'What's good for the Presidium is good for the Soviet Union'25 cannot be
accepted at face value. While it may be true that the good of the Soviet
Union requires an ability and the willingness to build institutions in order
to deal with the political problems of the country, nowhere is it proved that
the institution has to be a Communist party, its 'top organs' or a Presidium
22 Cf. Manfred Halpern, 'The Revolution of Modernization in National and International
Society', Revolution (Nomos VIII) (New York, 1966).
23 See also Rustow, p. 127; Manfred Halpern, 'Toward Further Modernization of the
Study of New Nations', World Politics XVII (October 1964).
24 Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 26. 25 Ibid.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 313
yet the challenges of modernization are such that in order for organizations
to be valued, they may be called upon to introduce major innovations,
including innovations of a magnitude threatening the stability of the
organization.22 In this sense, if constant innovation indeed characterizes
modernization, valuing organizations may indeed mean danger to their
stability, while stability may mean that the organization may no longer be
valued.
This is even truer on the macro level. Certain organizations may have to
disintegrate and disappear in order for the political system as such to
respond to the challenges of innovation, modernization and change.23 Such
organizations may obstruct necessary processes: if the entire institutional
structure of the system is to be 'valued and stable', it must have the capacity
to get rid of organizations that have become positively dysfunctional.
It is highly likely that this problem, i.e., getting rid of dysfunctional
institutions, will become really crucial at certain stages of modernization
and development. The development (i.e., institutionalization) of given
organizations may be contradictory to the demands of the development of
the entire political system. Huntington's argument that 'institutional
interest coincides with public interest' is not necessarily true; when he
argues that 'What's good for General Motors is good for the country'
contains at least a partial truth,24 that truth appears to be very partial
indeed. It is not at all unlikely to imagine circumstances in which what is
good for General Motors is very bad for the country; nor is it difficult to
imagine circumstances in which the good of the country may particularly
require getting rid of institutions such as General Motors. What is im-
portant, of course, is the continuing ability of the system to build new
institutions of the required magnitude to deal with the political problems
of modernization. However, these do not have to be the same institutions
which struggle to survive. Institutional survival is not political develop-
ment.
Similarly, Huntington's explicit arguments that ' "What's good for the
Presidency is good for the country" contains more truth' and that 'The
public interest of the Soviet Union is approximated by the institutional
interests of the top organs of the Communist Party', according to which
'What's good for the Presidium is good for the Soviet Union'25 cannot be
accepted at face value. While it may be true that the good of the Soviet
Union requires an ability and the willingness to build institutions in order
to deal with the political problems of the country, nowhere is it proved that
the institution has to be a Communist party, its 'top organs' or a Presidium
22 Cf. Manfred Halpern, 'The Revolution of Modernization in National and International
Society', Revolution (Nomos VIII) (New York, 1966).
23 See also Rustow, p. 127; Manfred Halpern, 'Toward Further Modernization of the
Study of New Nations', World Politics XVII (October 1964).
24 Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 26. 25 Ibid.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 313
yet the challenges of modernization are such that in order for organizations
to be valued, they may be called upon to introduce major innovations,
including innovations of a magnitude threatening the stability of the
organization.22 In this sense, if constant innovation indeed characterizes
modernization, valuing organizations may indeed mean danger to their
stability, while stability may mean that the organization may no longer be
valued.
This is even truer on the macro level. Certain organizations may have to
disintegrate and disappear in order for the political system as such to
respond to the challenges of innovation, modernization and change.23 Such
organizations may obstruct necessary processes: if the entire institutional
structure of the system is to be 'valued and stable', it must have the capacity
to get rid of organizations that have become positively dysfunctional.
It is highly likely that this problem, i.e., getting rid of dysfunctional
institutions, will become really crucial at certain stages of modernization
and development. The development (i.e., institutionalization) of given
organizations may be contradictory to the demands of the development of
the entire political system. Huntington's argument that 'institutional
interest coincides with public interest' is not necessarily true; when he
argues that 'What's good for General Motors is good for the country'
contains at least a partial truth,24 that truth appears to be very partial
indeed. It is not at all unlikely to imagine circumstances in which what is
good for General Motors is very bad for the country; nor is it difficult to
imagine circumstances in which the good of the country may particularly
require getting rid of institutions such as General Motors. What is im-
portant, of course, is the continuing ability of the system to build new
institutions of the required magnitude to deal with the political problems
of modernization. However, these do not have to be the same institutions
which struggle to survive. Institutional survival is not political develop-
ment.
Similarly, Huntington's explicit arguments that ' "What's good for the
Presidency is good for the country" contains more truth' and that 'The
public interest of the Soviet Union is approximated by the institutional
interests of the top organs of the Communist Party', according to which
'What's good for the Presidium is good for the Soviet Union'25 cannot be
accepted at face value. While it may be true that the good of the Soviet
Union requires an ability and the willingness to build institutions in order
to deal with the political problems of the country, nowhere is it proved that
the institution has to be a Communist party, its 'top organs' or a Presidium
22 Cf. Manfred Halpern, 'The Revolution of Modernization in National and International
Society', Revolution (Nomos VIII) (New York, 1966).
23 See also Rustow, p. 127; Manfred Halpern, 'Toward Further Modernization of the
Study of New Nations', World Politics XVII (October 1964).
24 Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 26. 25 Ibid.
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314 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
which must survive at all costs; to the contrary, it may well be argued that
the Presidium, the other 'top organs' or in fact the entire party are stifling
political life in the U.S.S.R. while being ineffective in tackling problems and
that actually they are dysfunctional to development. In this sense, it may
be that what is good for the Presidium is bad for the Soviet Union.26 It is
only an overriding fear of 'disorder' (which in fact may be functional and
creative in building new, more effective institutions) that leads the analyst
to identify the institutional is with the institutional ought to such an over-
riding extent. The well-nigh necessarily ensuing potential for a strong
conservative bias as far as 'developed' countries are concerned is almost
self-evident.
This brings us to the difficulty deriving from the duality of the concept
of institutionalization in terms of levels of analysis (macro and micro).
According to Huntington, the four criteria of institutionalization measure
not only the political system as such, but also the strength of given insti-
tutions.27 It is much easier, at least in principle, to measure the level of
organization on the micro level. On the macro level, however, we have to
face additional problems, since here again we came up against the dis-
tinctly behavioral cultural aspect of the problem:28 while the strength of
the single organization-structure can be assessed, it is much more difficult
to pin down the level of institutionalization of entire political systems,
since this really requires depicting (and comparing) profiles of entire
political cultures.
Huntington himself strongly hints at this:
Political institutions have moral as well as structural dimensions. A society with weak
political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial
desires. Politics is a Hobbesian world of unrelenting competition among social forces-
between man and man, family and family, clan and clan, region and region, class and
class-a competition unmediated by more comprehensive political organizations. The
'amoral familism' of Banfield's backward society has its counterparts in amoral clanism,
amoral groupism, amoral classism. Morality requires trust, trust requires predictability;
and predictability requires regularized and institutionalized patterns of behavior.29
We are back in the world of the classic problems of comparing political
cultures.30 Intuitively the reader tends to agree that it is indeed developing
and institutionalizing mutual trust which is at stake at crucial stages of
political development-but how can we deal with this on the macro level?
26 Thus, the good of the Soviet Union may require the passing away of a given party or
organ in order to give way to new institutions that can effectively cope with problems that the
older institutions (built in a different era in response to different problems) cannot optimally
deal with, notwithstanding the criteria of 'adaptability' in Huntington's formulation of in-
stitutionalization'.
27 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12. 28 On this, see also Baxter, pp. 22-4.
29 Huntington, Political Order, p. 24.
30 Sidney Verba, 'Comparative Political Cultures', in Lucian W. Pye and Verba (eds),
Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, 1965); Gabriel A. Almond and Verba,
The Civil Culture (Princeton, 1963), passim.
314 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
which must survive at all costs; to the contrary, it may well be argued that
the Presidium, the other 'top organs' or in fact the entire party are stifling
political life in the U.S.S.R. while being ineffective in tackling problems and
that actually they are dysfunctional to development. In this sense, it may
be that what is good for the Presidium is bad for the Soviet Union.26 It is
only an overriding fear of 'disorder' (which in fact may be functional and
creative in building new, more effective institutions) that leads the analyst
to identify the institutional is with the institutional ought to such an over-
riding extent. The well-nigh necessarily ensuing potential for a strong
conservative bias as far as 'developed' countries are concerned is almost
self-evident.
This brings us to the difficulty deriving from the duality of the concept
of institutionalization in terms of levels of analysis (macro and micro).
According to Huntington, the four criteria of institutionalization measure
not only the political system as such, but also the strength of given insti-
tutions.27 It is much easier, at least in principle, to measure the level of
organization on the micro level. On the macro level, however, we have to
face additional problems, since here again we came up against the dis-
tinctly behavioral cultural aspect of the problem:28 while the strength of
the single organization-structure can be assessed, it is much more difficult
to pin down the level of institutionalization of entire political systems,
since this really requires depicting (and comparing) profiles of entire
political cultures.
Huntington himself strongly hints at this:
Political institutions have moral as well as structural dimensions. A society with weak
political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial
desires. Politics is a Hobbesian world of unrelenting competition among social forces-
between man and man, family and family, clan and clan, region and region, class and
class-a competition unmediated by more comprehensive political organizations. The
'amoral familism' of Banfield's backward society has its counterparts in amoral clanism,
amoral groupism, amoral classism. Morality requires trust, trust requires predictability;
and predictability requires regularized and institutionalized patterns of behavior.29
We are back in the world of the classic problems of comparing political
cultures.30 Intuitively the reader tends to agree that it is indeed developing
and institutionalizing mutual trust which is at stake at crucial stages of
political development-but how can we deal with this on the macro level?
26 Thus, the good of the Soviet Union may require the passing away of a given party or
organ in order to give way to new institutions that can effectively cope with problems that the
older institutions (built in a different era in response to different problems) cannot optimally
deal with, notwithstanding the criteria of 'adaptability' in Huntington's formulation of in-
stitutionalization'.
27 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12. 28 On this, see also Baxter, pp. 22-4.
29 Huntington, Political Order, p. 24.
30 Sidney Verba, 'Comparative Political Cultures', in Lucian W. Pye and Verba (eds),
Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, 1965); Gabriel A. Almond and Verba,
The Civil Culture (Princeton, 1963), passim.
314 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
which must survive at all costs; to the contrary, it may well be argued that
the Presidium, the other 'top organs' or in fact the entire party are stifling
political life in the U.S.S.R. while being ineffective in tackling problems and
that actually they are dysfunctional to development. In this sense, it may
be that what is good for the Presidium is bad for the Soviet Union.26 It is
only an overriding fear of 'disorder' (which in fact may be functional and
creative in building new, more effective institutions) that leads the analyst
to identify the institutional is with the institutional ought to such an over-
riding extent. The well-nigh necessarily ensuing potential for a strong
conservative bias as far as 'developed' countries are concerned is almost
self-evident.
This brings us to the difficulty deriving from the duality of the concept
of institutionalization in terms of levels of analysis (macro and micro).
According to Huntington, the four criteria of institutionalization measure
not only the political system as such, but also the strength of given insti-
tutions.27 It is much easier, at least in principle, to measure the level of
organization on the micro level. On the macro level, however, we have to
face additional problems, since here again we came up against the dis-
tinctly behavioral cultural aspect of the problem:28 while the strength of
the single organization-structure can be assessed, it is much more difficult
to pin down the level of institutionalization of entire political systems,
since this really requires depicting (and comparing) profiles of entire
political cultures.
Huntington himself strongly hints at this:
Political institutions have moral as well as structural dimensions. A society with weak
political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial
desires. Politics is a Hobbesian world of unrelenting competition among social forces-
between man and man, family and family, clan and clan, region and region, class and
class-a competition unmediated by more comprehensive political organizations. The
'amoral familism' of Banfield's backward society has its counterparts in amoral clanism,
amoral groupism, amoral classism. Morality requires trust, trust requires predictability;
and predictability requires regularized and institutionalized patterns of behavior.29
We are back in the world of the classic problems of comparing political
cultures.30 Intuitively the reader tends to agree that it is indeed developing
and institutionalizing mutual trust which is at stake at crucial stages of
political development-but how can we deal with this on the macro level?
26 Thus, the good of the Soviet Union may require the passing away of a given party or
organ in order to give way to new institutions that can effectively cope with problems that the
older institutions (built in a different era in response to different problems) cannot optimally
deal with, notwithstanding the criteria of 'adaptability' in Huntington's formulation of in-
stitutionalization'.
27 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12. 28 On this, see also Baxter, pp. 22-4.
29 Huntington, Political Order, p. 24.
30 Sidney Verba, 'Comparative Political Cultures', in Lucian W. Pye and Verba (eds),
Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, 1965); Gabriel A. Almond and Verba,
The Civil Culture (Princeton, 1963), passim.
314 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
which must survive at all costs; to the contrary, it may well be argued that
the Presidium, the other 'top organs' or in fact the entire party are stifling
political life in the U.S.S.R. while being ineffective in tackling problems and
that actually they are dysfunctional to development. In this sense, it may
be that what is good for the Presidium is bad for the Soviet Union.26 It is
only an overriding fear of 'disorder' (which in fact may be functional and
creative in building new, more effective institutions) that leads the analyst
to identify the institutional is with the institutional ought to such an over-
riding extent. The well-nigh necessarily ensuing potential for a strong
conservative bias as far as 'developed' countries are concerned is almost
self-evident.
This brings us to the difficulty deriving from the duality of the concept
of institutionalization in terms of levels of analysis (macro and micro).
According to Huntington, the four criteria of institutionalization measure
not only the political system as such, but also the strength of given insti-
tutions.27 It is much easier, at least in principle, to measure the level of
organization on the micro level. On the macro level, however, we have to
face additional problems, since here again we came up against the dis-
tinctly behavioral cultural aspect of the problem:28 while the strength of
the single organization-structure can be assessed, it is much more difficult
to pin down the level of institutionalization of entire political systems,
since this really requires depicting (and comparing) profiles of entire
political cultures.
Huntington himself strongly hints at this:
Political institutions have moral as well as structural dimensions. A society with weak
political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial
desires. Politics is a Hobbesian world of unrelenting competition among social forces-
between man and man, family and family, clan and clan, region and region, class and
class-a competition unmediated by more comprehensive political organizations. The
'amoral familism' of Banfield's backward society has its counterparts in amoral clanism,
amoral groupism, amoral classism. Morality requires trust, trust requires predictability;
and predictability requires regularized and institutionalized patterns of behavior.29
We are back in the world of the classic problems of comparing political
cultures.30 Intuitively the reader tends to agree that it is indeed developing
and institutionalizing mutual trust which is at stake at crucial stages of
political development-but how can we deal with this on the macro level?
26 Thus, the good of the Soviet Union may require the passing away of a given party or
organ in order to give way to new institutions that can effectively cope with problems that the
older institutions (built in a different era in response to different problems) cannot optimally
deal with, notwithstanding the criteria of 'adaptability' in Huntington's formulation of in-
stitutionalization'.
27 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12. 28 On this, see also Baxter, pp. 22-4.
29 Huntington, Political Order, p. 24.
30 Sidney Verba, 'Comparative Political Cultures', in Lucian W. Pye and Verba (eds),
Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, 1965); Gabriel A. Almond and Verba,
The Civil Culture (Princeton, 1963), passim.
314 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
which must survive at all costs; to the contrary, it may well be argued that
the Presidium, the other 'top organs' or in fact the entire party are stifling
political life in the U.S.S.R. while being ineffective in tackling problems and
that actually they are dysfunctional to development. In this sense, it may
be that what is good for the Presidium is bad for the Soviet Union.26 It is
only an overriding fear of 'disorder' (which in fact may be functional and
creative in building new, more effective institutions) that leads the analyst
to identify the institutional is with the institutional ought to such an over-
riding extent. The well-nigh necessarily ensuing potential for a strong
conservative bias as far as 'developed' countries are concerned is almost
self-evident.
This brings us to the difficulty deriving from the duality of the concept
of institutionalization in terms of levels of analysis (macro and micro).
According to Huntington, the four criteria of institutionalization measure
not only the political system as such, but also the strength of given insti-
tutions.27 It is much easier, at least in principle, to measure the level of
organization on the micro level. On the macro level, however, we have to
face additional problems, since here again we came up against the dis-
tinctly behavioral cultural aspect of the problem:28 while the strength of
the single organization-structure can be assessed, it is much more difficult
to pin down the level of institutionalization of entire political systems,
since this really requires depicting (and comparing) profiles of entire
political cultures.
Huntington himself strongly hints at this:
Political institutions have moral as well as structural dimensions. A society with weak
political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial
desires. Politics is a Hobbesian world of unrelenting competition among social forces-
between man and man, family and family, clan and clan, region and region, class and
class-a competition unmediated by more comprehensive political organizations. The
'amoral familism' of Banfield's backward society has its counterparts in amoral clanism,
amoral groupism, amoral classism. Morality requires trust, trust requires predictability;
and predictability requires regularized and institutionalized patterns of behavior.29
We are back in the world of the classic problems of comparing political
cultures.30 Intuitively the reader tends to agree that it is indeed developing
and institutionalizing mutual trust which is at stake at crucial stages of
political development-but how can we deal with this on the macro level?
26 Thus, the good of the Soviet Union may require the passing away of a given party or
organ in order to give way to new institutions that can effectively cope with problems that the
older institutions (built in a different era in response to different problems) cannot optimally
deal with, notwithstanding the criteria of 'adaptability' in Huntington's formulation of in-
stitutionalization'.
27 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12. 28 On this, see also Baxter, pp. 22-4.
29 Huntington, Political Order, p. 24.
30 Sidney Verba, 'Comparative Political Cultures', in Lucian W. Pye and Verba (eds),
Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, 1965); Gabriel A. Almond and Verba,
The Civil Culture (Princeton, 1963), passim.
314 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
which must survive at all costs; to the contrary, it may well be argued that
the Presidium, the other 'top organs' or in fact the entire party are stifling
political life in the U.S.S.R. while being ineffective in tackling problems and
that actually they are dysfunctional to development. In this sense, it may
be that what is good for the Presidium is bad for the Soviet Union.26 It is
only an overriding fear of 'disorder' (which in fact may be functional and
creative in building new, more effective institutions) that leads the analyst
to identify the institutional is with the institutional ought to such an over-
riding extent. The well-nigh necessarily ensuing potential for a strong
conservative bias as far as 'developed' countries are concerned is almost
self-evident.
This brings us to the difficulty deriving from the duality of the concept
of institutionalization in terms of levels of analysis (macro and micro).
According to Huntington, the four criteria of institutionalization measure
not only the political system as such, but also the strength of given insti-
tutions.27 It is much easier, at least in principle, to measure the level of
organization on the micro level. On the macro level, however, we have to
face additional problems, since here again we came up against the dis-
tinctly behavioral cultural aspect of the problem:28 while the strength of
the single organization-structure can be assessed, it is much more difficult
to pin down the level of institutionalization of entire political systems,
since this really requires depicting (and comparing) profiles of entire
political cultures.
Huntington himself strongly hints at this:
Political institutions have moral as well as structural dimensions. A society with weak
political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial
desires. Politics is a Hobbesian world of unrelenting competition among social forces-
between man and man, family and family, clan and clan, region and region, class and
class-a competition unmediated by more comprehensive political organizations. The
'amoral familism' of Banfield's backward society has its counterparts in amoral clanism,
amoral groupism, amoral classism. Morality requires trust, trust requires predictability;
and predictability requires regularized and institutionalized patterns of behavior.29
We are back in the world of the classic problems of comparing political
cultures.30 Intuitively the reader tends to agree that it is indeed developing
and institutionalizing mutual trust which is at stake at crucial stages of
political development-but how can we deal with this on the macro level?
26 Thus, the good of the Soviet Union may require the passing away of a given party or
organ in order to give way to new institutions that can effectively cope with problems that the
older institutions (built in a different era in response to different problems) cannot optimally
deal with, notwithstanding the criteria of 'adaptability' in Huntington's formulation of in-
stitutionalization'.
27 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12. 28 On this, see also Baxter, pp. 22-4.
29 Huntington, Political Order, p. 24.
30 Sidney Verba, 'Comparative Political Cultures', in Lucian W. Pye and Verba (eds),
Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, 1965); Gabriel A. Almond and Verba,
The Civil Culture (Princeton, 1963), passim.
This content downloaded from 132.74.208.186 on Wed, 06 Nov 2019 04:14:49 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 315
The great contribution of the theoreticians of political culture has been
precisely that they have called attention to the fact that cultural traits of
political systems and subsystems may differ drastically even at similar
stages of modernization of structural political development. In particular,
they have called attention to trust and its opposite, distrust,31 which
according to Huntington himself are crucial variables (in fact pre-condi-
tions) of institutionalization.32 Research in political culture has conclusively
shown that certain cultures (for reasons of education, family structure,
historical experiences and so forth) are characterized by widely prevalent
distrust. In such cultures, of course, building stable institutions is difficult
indeed; on the other hand, according to Huntington, it is precisely this,
i.e., the existence of stable institutions, which brings about a different cul-
ture of trust, predictability and morality. But how are we to break this
vicious cycle of culture preventing institutionalization, lack of institution-
alization leading to cultural difficulties and so on? It seems that the
structural and cultural variables of institutionalization must be dealt with
more explicitly, perhaps by relating them as dependent and independent
variables under specified conditions and circumstances: Huntington's
remark 'The capacity to create such institutions ... is in short supply in the
world today'33 seems true enough, but analytically speaking this is not
sufficient and not specific enough, failing to specify the relevant cultural
variables as well as the possibilities and requirements of cultural trans-
formation.
Huntington, unfortunately, deals with the problem almost exclusively
structurally, the above quotation notwithstanding. He puts forth a com-
posite scale of the four criteria of institutionalization, each along a
continuum: adaptability-rigidity, complexity-simplicity, autonomy-
subordination, and coherence-disunity.34 We are not told of the possi-
bility, as Kesselman suggests, that these four criteria may not go together
and may even distinctly diverge:35 organizations may lack adaptability but
may at the same time increase their autonomy, they may lack autonomy
but develop a good deal of complexity and so forth. Obviously sometimes
the four criteria go together, and sometimes they do not.36 This may well
be the reason for the fact that the results of the few empirical studies
utilizing Huntington's concept of institutionalization are rather incon-
clusive. Hudson's factor analysis of stability, violence and institutionaliza-
tion in 63 countries led to the conclusion that there are no significant
correlations between institutionalization (as he could measure it) on the one
31 E.g., Pye, 'Political Culture and Political Development' in Pye and Verba, p. 22.
32 Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 28-32. 33 Ibid., p. 32.
34 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12-24, analysed at length in Baxter, pp. 17-21.
35 Kesselman, p. 23.
36 On the ensuing problems see Gabriel Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and
Political Development: The Revisionist Theses Revisited', Comparative Political Studies, VII
(April 1974).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 315
The great contribution of the theoreticians of political culture has been
precisely that they have called attention to the fact that cultural traits of
political systems and subsystems may differ drastically even at similar
stages of modernization of structural political development. In particular,
they have called attention to trust and its opposite, distrust,31 which
according to Huntington himself are crucial variables (in fact pre-condi-
tions) of institutionalization.32 Research in political culture has conclusively
shown that certain cultures (for reasons of education, family structure,
historical experiences and so forth) are characterized by widely prevalent
distrust. In such cultures, of course, building stable institutions is difficult
indeed; on the other hand, according to Huntington, it is precisely this,
i.e., the existence of stable institutions, which brings about a different cul-
ture of trust, predictability and morality. But how are we to break this
vicious cycle of culture preventing institutionalization, lack of institution-
alization leading to cultural difficulties and so on? It seems that the
structural and cultural variables of institutionalization must be dealt with
more explicitly, perhaps by relating them as dependent and independent
variables under specified conditions and circumstances: Huntington's
remark 'The capacity to create such institutions ... is in short supply in the
world today'33 seems true enough, but analytically speaking this is not
sufficient and not specific enough, failing to specify the relevant cultural
variables as well as the possibilities and requirements of cultural trans-
formation.
Huntington, unfortunately, deals with the problem almost exclusively
structurally, the above quotation notwithstanding. He puts forth a com-
posite scale of the four criteria of institutionalization, each along a
continuum: adaptability-rigidity, complexity-simplicity, autonomy-
subordination, and coherence-disunity.34 We are not told of the possi-
bility, as Kesselman suggests, that these four criteria may not go together
and may even distinctly diverge:35 organizations may lack adaptability but
may at the same time increase their autonomy, they may lack autonomy
but develop a good deal of complexity and so forth. Obviously sometimes
the four criteria go together, and sometimes they do not.36 This may well
be the reason for the fact that the results of the few empirical studies
utilizing Huntington's concept of institutionalization are rather incon-
clusive. Hudson's factor analysis of stability, violence and institutionaliza-
tion in 63 countries led to the conclusion that there are no significant
correlations between institutionalization (as he could measure it) on the one
31 E.g., Pye, 'Political Culture and Political Development' in Pye and Verba, p. 22.
32 Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 28-32. 33 Ibid., p. 32.
34 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12-24, analysed at length in Baxter, pp. 17-21.
35 Kesselman, p. 23.
36 On the ensuing problems see Gabriel Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and
Political Development: The Revisionist Theses Revisited', Comparative Political Studies, VII
(April 1974).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 315
The great contribution of the theoreticians of political culture has been
precisely that they have called attention to the fact that cultural traits of
political systems and subsystems may differ drastically even at similar
stages of modernization of structural political development. In particular,
they have called attention to trust and its opposite, distrust,31 which
according to Huntington himself are crucial variables (in fact pre-condi-
tions) of institutionalization.32 Research in political culture has conclusively
shown that certain cultures (for reasons of education, family structure,
historical experiences and so forth) are characterized by widely prevalent
distrust. In such cultures, of course, building stable institutions is difficult
indeed; on the other hand, according to Huntington, it is precisely this,
i.e., the existence of stable institutions, which brings about a different cul-
ture of trust, predictability and morality. But how are we to break this
vicious cycle of culture preventing institutionalization, lack of institution-
alization leading to cultural difficulties and so on? It seems that the
structural and cultural variables of institutionalization must be dealt with
more explicitly, perhaps by relating them as dependent and independent
variables under specified conditions and circumstances: Huntington's
remark 'The capacity to create such institutions ... is in short supply in the
world today'33 seems true enough, but analytically speaking this is not
sufficient and not specific enough, failing to specify the relevant cultural
variables as well as the possibilities and requirements of cultural trans-
formation.
Huntington, unfortunately, deals with the problem almost exclusively
structurally, the above quotation notwithstanding. He puts forth a com-
posite scale of the four criteria of institutionalization, each along a
continuum: adaptability-rigidity, complexity-simplicity, autonomy-
subordination, and coherence-disunity.34 We are not told of the possi-
bility, as Kesselman suggests, that these four criteria may not go together
and may even distinctly diverge:35 organizations may lack adaptability but
may at the same time increase their autonomy, they may lack autonomy
but develop a good deal of complexity and so forth. Obviously sometimes
the four criteria go together, and sometimes they do not.36 This may well
be the reason for the fact that the results of the few empirical studies
utilizing Huntington's concept of institutionalization are rather incon-
clusive. Hudson's factor analysis of stability, violence and institutionaliza-
tion in 63 countries led to the conclusion that there are no significant
correlations between institutionalization (as he could measure it) on the one
31 E.g., Pye, 'Political Culture and Political Development' in Pye and Verba, p. 22.
32 Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 28-32. 33 Ibid., p. 32.
34 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12-24, analysed at length in Baxter, pp. 17-21.
35 Kesselman, p. 23.
36 On the ensuing problems see Gabriel Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and
Political Development: The Revisionist Theses Revisited', Comparative Political Studies, VII
(April 1974).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 315
The great contribution of the theoreticians of political culture has been
precisely that they have called attention to the fact that cultural traits of
political systems and subsystems may differ drastically even at similar
stages of modernization of structural political development. In particular,
they have called attention to trust and its opposite, distrust,31 which
according to Huntington himself are crucial variables (in fact pre-condi-
tions) of institutionalization.32 Research in political culture has conclusively
shown that certain cultures (for reasons of education, family structure,
historical experiences and so forth) are characterized by widely prevalent
distrust. In such cultures, of course, building stable institutions is difficult
indeed; on the other hand, according to Huntington, it is precisely this,
i.e., the existence of stable institutions, which brings about a different cul-
ture of trust, predictability and morality. But how are we to break this
vicious cycle of culture preventing institutionalization, lack of institution-
alization leading to cultural difficulties and so on? It seems that the
structural and cultural variables of institutionalization must be dealt with
more explicitly, perhaps by relating them as dependent and independent
variables under specified conditions and circumstances: Huntington's
remark 'The capacity to create such institutions ... is in short supply in the
world today'33 seems true enough, but analytically speaking this is not
sufficient and not specific enough, failing to specify the relevant cultural
variables as well as the possibilities and requirements of cultural trans-
formation.
Huntington, unfortunately, deals with the problem almost exclusively
structurally, the above quotation notwithstanding. He puts forth a com-
posite scale of the four criteria of institutionalization, each along a
continuum: adaptability-rigidity, complexity-simplicity, autonomy-
subordination, and coherence-disunity.34 We are not told of the possi-
bility, as Kesselman suggests, that these four criteria may not go together
and may even distinctly diverge:35 organizations may lack adaptability but
may at the same time increase their autonomy, they may lack autonomy
but develop a good deal of complexity and so forth. Obviously sometimes
the four criteria go together, and sometimes they do not.36 This may well
be the reason for the fact that the results of the few empirical studies
utilizing Huntington's concept of institutionalization are rather incon-
clusive. Hudson's factor analysis of stability, violence and institutionaliza-
tion in 63 countries led to the conclusion that there are no significant
correlations between institutionalization (as he could measure it) on the one
31 E.g., Pye, 'Political Culture and Political Development' in Pye and Verba, p. 22.
32 Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 28-32. 33 Ibid., p. 32.
34 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12-24, analysed at length in Baxter, pp. 17-21.
35 Kesselman, p. 23.
36 On the ensuing problems see Gabriel Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and
Political Development: The Revisionist Theses Revisited', Comparative Political Studies, VII
(April 1974).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 315
The great contribution of the theoreticians of political culture has been
precisely that they have called attention to the fact that cultural traits of
political systems and subsystems may differ drastically even at similar
stages of modernization of structural political development. In particular,
they have called attention to trust and its opposite, distrust,31 which
according to Huntington himself are crucial variables (in fact pre-condi-
tions) of institutionalization.32 Research in political culture has conclusively
shown that certain cultures (for reasons of education, family structure,
historical experiences and so forth) are characterized by widely prevalent
distrust. In such cultures, of course, building stable institutions is difficult
indeed; on the other hand, according to Huntington, it is precisely this,
i.e., the existence of stable institutions, which brings about a different cul-
ture of trust, predictability and morality. But how are we to break this
vicious cycle of culture preventing institutionalization, lack of institution-
alization leading to cultural difficulties and so on? It seems that the
structural and cultural variables of institutionalization must be dealt with
more explicitly, perhaps by relating them as dependent and independent
variables under specified conditions and circumstances: Huntington's
remark 'The capacity to create such institutions ... is in short supply in the
world today'33 seems true enough, but analytically speaking this is not
sufficient and not specific enough, failing to specify the relevant cultural
variables as well as the possibilities and requirements of cultural trans-
formation.
Huntington, unfortunately, deals with the problem almost exclusively
structurally, the above quotation notwithstanding. He puts forth a com-
posite scale of the four criteria of institutionalization, each along a
continuum: adaptability-rigidity, complexity-simplicity, autonomy-
subordination, and coherence-disunity.34 We are not told of the possi-
bility, as Kesselman suggests, that these four criteria may not go together
and may even distinctly diverge:35 organizations may lack adaptability but
may at the same time increase their autonomy, they may lack autonomy
but develop a good deal of complexity and so forth. Obviously sometimes
the four criteria go together, and sometimes they do not.36 This may well
be the reason for the fact that the results of the few empirical studies
utilizing Huntington's concept of institutionalization are rather incon-
clusive. Hudson's factor analysis of stability, violence and institutionaliza-
tion in 63 countries led to the conclusion that there are no significant
correlations between institutionalization (as he could measure it) on the one
31 E.g., Pye, 'Political Culture and Political Development' in Pye and Verba, p. 22.
32 Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 28-32. 33 Ibid., p. 32.
34 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12-24, analysed at length in Baxter, pp. 17-21.
35 Kesselman, p. 23.
36 On the ensuing problems see Gabriel Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and
Political Development: The Revisionist Theses Revisited', Comparative Political Studies, VII
(April 1974).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 315
The great contribution of the theoreticians of political culture has been
precisely that they have called attention to the fact that cultural traits of
political systems and subsystems may differ drastically even at similar
stages of modernization of structural political development. In particular,
they have called attention to trust and its opposite, distrust,31 which
according to Huntington himself are crucial variables (in fact pre-condi-
tions) of institutionalization.32 Research in political culture has conclusively
shown that certain cultures (for reasons of education, family structure,
historical experiences and so forth) are characterized by widely prevalent
distrust. In such cultures, of course, building stable institutions is difficult
indeed; on the other hand, according to Huntington, it is precisely this,
i.e., the existence of stable institutions, which brings about a different cul-
ture of trust, predictability and morality. But how are we to break this
vicious cycle of culture preventing institutionalization, lack of institution-
alization leading to cultural difficulties and so on? It seems that the
structural and cultural variables of institutionalization must be dealt with
more explicitly, perhaps by relating them as dependent and independent
variables under specified conditions and circumstances: Huntington's
remark 'The capacity to create such institutions ... is in short supply in the
world today'33 seems true enough, but analytically speaking this is not
sufficient and not specific enough, failing to specify the relevant cultural
variables as well as the possibilities and requirements of cultural trans-
formation.
Huntington, unfortunately, deals with the problem almost exclusively
structurally, the above quotation notwithstanding. He puts forth a com-
posite scale of the four criteria of institutionalization, each along a
continuum: adaptability-rigidity, complexity-simplicity, autonomy-
subordination, and coherence-disunity.34 We are not told of the possi-
bility, as Kesselman suggests, that these four criteria may not go together
and may even distinctly diverge:35 organizations may lack adaptability but
may at the same time increase their autonomy, they may lack autonomy
but develop a good deal of complexity and so forth. Obviously sometimes
the four criteria go together, and sometimes they do not.36 This may well
be the reason for the fact that the results of the few empirical studies
utilizing Huntington's concept of institutionalization are rather incon-
clusive. Hudson's factor analysis of stability, violence and institutionaliza-
tion in 63 countries led to the conclusion that there are no significant
correlations between institutionalization (as he could measure it) on the one
31 E.g., Pye, 'Political Culture and Political Development' in Pye and Verba, p. 22.
32 Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 28-32. 33 Ibid., p. 32.
34 Huntington, Political Order, p. 12-24, analysed at length in Baxter, pp. 17-21.
35 Kesselman, p. 23.
36 On the ensuing problems see Gabriel Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and
Political Development: The Revisionist Theses Revisited', Comparative Political Studies, VII
(April 1974).
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3I6 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
hand and stability and lack of violence on the other, and he unhappily
reported the difficulties of selecting the correct indicators, partly due to
'the thoughtful but ambiguous formulation of key theoretic concepts.'37
At the same time, Schneider and Schneider38 analyzed data from ten
countries over two periods of time, and reached altogether different con-
clusions: in their study, the ratio of social mobilization to institutionaliza-
tion itself accounts for 81 per cent of the variance in political stability and
violence, while adding four more independent variables (institutionaliza-
tion, social mobilization, economic development and the ratio between the
latter two) explains 95 per cent of the variance.39 We ought to emphasize,
however, that the strongest predictor of the institutionalization index is
legitimacy-a distinctly behavioral variable not used by Huntington-
which was utilized along with two of Huntington's variables: adaptability
and complexity. Needless to say, the importance of legitimacy in prevent-
ing violence is fairly obvious and does not necessarily stem from any con-
cept of institutionalization. The main point, however, remains that a good
deal of the variance between the two studies can be explained by the eclectic
nature of using the criteria Huntington suggests (which in turn is due to
the difficulty of operationalizing them as well as by the lack of necessary
congruence among the four components of institutionalization.)
As usual in comparative politics, all the conceptual difficulties become
conspicuous when one attempts to operationalize the concept in terms of
concrete independent variables. The four characteristics of institutional-
ization (adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence) not only con-
fuse behavioral and structural traits but they also present formidable
obstacles when treated as supposedly independent variables. Huntington
does provide us with valuable clues as to the nature of the four criteria40
but he does not deal at any length with problems of concrete assessment,
comparison and measurement. For instance, adaptability again has to do
with organizations enduring over time, overcoming challenges, surviving
the disappearance of the first generation of its leaders, and outliving their
original functions41 (chronological age, challenge age, generational age,
functional age). Here again we are faced with ex post facto reasoning. If
an organization has endured for a long time, has outlived its original
37 Michael C. Hudson, 'Conditions of Political Violence and Instability: A Preliminary
Text of Three Hypotheses', Sage Professional Papers in Coinparative Politics, I, 5 (1970), pp.
282-3.
38 Peter R. Schneider and Ann L. Schneider, 'Social Mobilization, Political Insitutions and
Political Violence: A Cross-National Analysis', Comparative Political Studies IV/1 (April
1971), quoted by Baxter, pp. 26-7.
39 Baxter, p. 27.
40 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 12-22. Kesselman (p. 23) suggests subsuming the four
features into two: complexity and adaptability as one, and coherence and autonomy as the
second. Other than for purposes of parsimony, there seems to be no compelling evidence for
such an approach either.
41 Political Order, pp. 12-17.
3I6 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
hand and stability and lack of violence on the other, and he unhappily
reported the difficulties of selecting the correct indicators, partly due to
'the thoughtful but ambiguous formulation of key theoretic concepts.'37
At the same time, Schneider and Schneider38 analyzed data from ten
countries over two periods of time, and reached altogether different con-
clusions: in their study, the ratio of social mobilization to institutionaliza-
tion itself accounts for 81 per cent of the variance in political stability and
violence, while adding four more independent variables (institutionaliza-
tion, social mobilization, economic development and the ratio between the
latter two) explains 95 per cent of the variance.39 We ought to emphasize,
however, that the strongest predictor of the institutionalization index is
legitimacy-a distinctly behavioral variable not used by Huntington-
which was utilized along with two of Huntington's variables: adaptability
and complexity. Needless to say, the importance of legitimacy in prevent-
ing violence is fairly obvious and does not necessarily stem from any con-
cept of institutionalization. The main point, however, remains that a good
deal of the variance between the two studies can be explained by the eclectic
nature of using the criteria Huntington suggests (which in turn is due to
the difficulty of operationalizing them as well as by the lack of necessary
congruence among the four components of institutionalization.)
As usual in comparative politics, all the conceptual difficulties become
conspicuous when one attempts to operationalize the concept in terms of
concrete independent variables. The four characteristics of institutional-
ization (adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence) not only con-
fuse behavioral and structural traits but they also present formidable
obstacles when treated as supposedly independent variables. Huntington
does provide us with valuable clues as to the nature of the four criteria40
but he does not deal at any length with problems of concrete assessment,
comparison and measurement. For instance, adaptability again has to do
with organizations enduring over time, overcoming challenges, surviving
the disappearance of the first generation of its leaders, and outliving their
original functions41 (chronological age, challenge age, generational age,
functional age). Here again we are faced with ex post facto reasoning. If
an organization has endured for a long time, has outlived its original
37 Michael C. Hudson, 'Conditions of Political Violence and Instability: A Preliminary
Text of Three Hypotheses', Sage Professional Papers in Coinparative Politics, I, 5 (1970), pp.
282-3.
38 Peter R. Schneider and Ann L. Schneider, 'Social Mobilization, Political Insitutions and
Political Violence: A Cross-National Analysis', Comparative Political Studies IV/1 (April
1971), quoted by Baxter, pp. 26-7.
39 Baxter, p. 27.
40 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 12-22. Kesselman (p. 23) suggests subsuming the four
features into two: complexity and adaptability as one, and coherence and autonomy as the
second. Other than for purposes of parsimony, there seems to be no compelling evidence for
such an approach either.
41 Political Order, pp. 12-17.
3I6 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
hand and stability and lack of violence on the other, and he unhappily
reported the difficulties of selecting the correct indicators, partly due to
'the thoughtful but ambiguous formulation of key theoretic concepts.'37
At the same time, Schneider and Schneider38 analyzed data from ten
countries over two periods of time, and reached altogether different con-
clusions: in their study, the ratio of social mobilization to institutionaliza-
tion itself accounts for 81 per cent of the variance in political stability and
violence, while adding four more independent variables (institutionaliza-
tion, social mobilization, economic development and the ratio between the
latter two) explains 95 per cent of the variance.39 We ought to emphasize,
however, that the strongest predictor of the institutionalization index is
legitimacy-a distinctly behavioral variable not used by Huntington-
which was utilized along with two of Huntington's variables: adaptability
and complexity. Needless to say, the importance of legitimacy in prevent-
ing violence is fairly obvious and does not necessarily stem from any con-
cept of institutionalization. The main point, however, remains that a good
deal of the variance between the two studies can be explained by the eclectic
nature of using the criteria Huntington suggests (which in turn is due to
the difficulty of operationalizing them as well as by the lack of necessary
congruence among the four components of institutionalization.)
As usual in comparative politics, all the conceptual difficulties become
conspicuous when one attempts to operationalize the concept in terms of
concrete independent variables. The four characteristics of institutional-
ization (adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence) not only con-
fuse behavioral and structural traits but they also present formidable
obstacles when treated as supposedly independent variables. Huntington
does provide us with valuable clues as to the nature of the four criteria40
but he does not deal at any length with problems of concrete assessment,
comparison and measurement. For instance, adaptability again has to do
with organizations enduring over time, overcoming challenges, surviving
the disappearance of the first generation of its leaders, and outliving their
original functions41 (chronological age, challenge age, generational age,
functional age). Here again we are faced with ex post facto reasoning. If
an organization has endured for a long time, has outlived its original
37 Michael C. Hudson, 'Conditions of Political Violence and Instability: A Preliminary
Text of Three Hypotheses', Sage Professional Papers in Coinparative Politics, I, 5 (1970), pp.
282-3.
38 Peter R. Schneider and Ann L. Schneider, 'Social Mobilization, Political Insitutions and
Political Violence: A Cross-National Analysis', Comparative Political Studies IV/1 (April
1971), quoted by Baxter, pp. 26-7.
39 Baxter, p. 27.
40 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 12-22. Kesselman (p. 23) suggests subsuming the four
features into two: complexity and adaptability as one, and coherence and autonomy as the
second. Other than for purposes of parsimony, there seems to be no compelling evidence for
such an approach either.
41 Political Order, pp. 12-17.
3I6 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
hand and stability and lack of violence on the other, and he unhappily
reported the difficulties of selecting the correct indicators, partly due to
'the thoughtful but ambiguous formulation of key theoretic concepts.'37
At the same time, Schneider and Schneider38 analyzed data from ten
countries over two periods of time, and reached altogether different con-
clusions: in their study, the ratio of social mobilization to institutionaliza-
tion itself accounts for 81 per cent of the variance in political stability and
violence, while adding four more independent variables (institutionaliza-
tion, social mobilization, economic development and the ratio between the
latter two) explains 95 per cent of the variance.39 We ought to emphasize,
however, that the strongest predictor of the institutionalization index is
legitimacy-a distinctly behavioral variable not used by Huntington-
which was utilized along with two of Huntington's variables: adaptability
and complexity. Needless to say, the importance of legitimacy in prevent-
ing violence is fairly obvious and does not necessarily stem from any con-
cept of institutionalization. The main point, however, remains that a good
deal of the variance between the two studies can be explained by the eclectic
nature of using the criteria Huntington suggests (which in turn is due to
the difficulty of operationalizing them as well as by the lack of necessary
congruence among the four components of institutionalization.)
As usual in comparative politics, all the conceptual difficulties become
conspicuous when one attempts to operationalize the concept in terms of
concrete independent variables. The four characteristics of institutional-
ization (adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence) not only con-
fuse behavioral and structural traits but they also present formidable
obstacles when treated as supposedly independent variables. Huntington
does provide us with valuable clues as to the nature of the four criteria40
but he does not deal at any length with problems of concrete assessment,
comparison and measurement. For instance, adaptability again has to do
with organizations enduring over time, overcoming challenges, surviving
the disappearance of the first generation of its leaders, and outliving their
original functions41 (chronological age, challenge age, generational age,
functional age). Here again we are faced with ex post facto reasoning. If
an organization has endured for a long time, has outlived its original
37 Michael C. Hudson, 'Conditions of Political Violence and Instability: A Preliminary
Text of Three Hypotheses', Sage Professional Papers in Coinparative Politics, I, 5 (1970), pp.
282-3.
38 Peter R. Schneider and Ann L. Schneider, 'Social Mobilization, Political Insitutions and
Political Violence: A Cross-National Analysis', Comparative Political Studies IV/1 (April
1971), quoted by Baxter, pp. 26-7.
39 Baxter, p. 27.
40 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 12-22. Kesselman (p. 23) suggests subsuming the four
features into two: complexity and adaptability as one, and coherence and autonomy as the
second. Other than for purposes of parsimony, there seems to be no compelling evidence for
such an approach either.
41 Political Order, pp. 12-17.
3I6 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
hand and stability and lack of violence on the other, and he unhappily
reported the difficulties of selecting the correct indicators, partly due to
'the thoughtful but ambiguous formulation of key theoretic concepts.'37
At the same time, Schneider and Schneider38 analyzed data from ten
countries over two periods of time, and reached altogether different con-
clusions: in their study, the ratio of social mobilization to institutionaliza-
tion itself accounts for 81 per cent of the variance in political stability and
violence, while adding four more independent variables (institutionaliza-
tion, social mobilization, economic development and the ratio between the
latter two) explains 95 per cent of the variance.39 We ought to emphasize,
however, that the strongest predictor of the institutionalization index is
legitimacy-a distinctly behavioral variable not used by Huntington-
which was utilized along with two of Huntington's variables: adaptability
and complexity. Needless to say, the importance of legitimacy in prevent-
ing violence is fairly obvious and does not necessarily stem from any con-
cept of institutionalization. The main point, however, remains that a good
deal of the variance between the two studies can be explained by the eclectic
nature of using the criteria Huntington suggests (which in turn is due to
the difficulty of operationalizing them as well as by the lack of necessary
congruence among the four components of institutionalization.)
As usual in comparative politics, all the conceptual difficulties become
conspicuous when one attempts to operationalize the concept in terms of
concrete independent variables. The four characteristics of institutional-
ization (adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence) not only con-
fuse behavioral and structural traits but they also present formidable
obstacles when treated as supposedly independent variables. Huntington
does provide us with valuable clues as to the nature of the four criteria40
but he does not deal at any length with problems of concrete assessment,
comparison and measurement. For instance, adaptability again has to do
with organizations enduring over time, overcoming challenges, surviving
the disappearance of the first generation of its leaders, and outliving their
original functions41 (chronological age, challenge age, generational age,
functional age). Here again we are faced with ex post facto reasoning. If
an organization has endured for a long time, has outlived its original
37 Michael C. Hudson, 'Conditions of Political Violence and Instability: A Preliminary
Text of Three Hypotheses', Sage Professional Papers in Coinparative Politics, I, 5 (1970), pp.
282-3.
38 Peter R. Schneider and Ann L. Schneider, 'Social Mobilization, Political Insitutions and
Political Violence: A Cross-National Analysis', Comparative Political Studies IV/1 (April
1971), quoted by Baxter, pp. 26-7.
39 Baxter, p. 27.
40 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 12-22. Kesselman (p. 23) suggests subsuming the four
features into two: complexity and adaptability as one, and coherence and autonomy as the
second. Other than for purposes of parsimony, there seems to be no compelling evidence for
such an approach either.
41 Political Order, pp. 12-17.
3I6 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
hand and stability and lack of violence on the other, and he unhappily
reported the difficulties of selecting the correct indicators, partly due to
'the thoughtful but ambiguous formulation of key theoretic concepts.'37
At the same time, Schneider and Schneider38 analyzed data from ten
countries over two periods of time, and reached altogether different con-
clusions: in their study, the ratio of social mobilization to institutionaliza-
tion itself accounts for 81 per cent of the variance in political stability and
violence, while adding four more independent variables (institutionaliza-
tion, social mobilization, economic development and the ratio between the
latter two) explains 95 per cent of the variance.39 We ought to emphasize,
however, that the strongest predictor of the institutionalization index is
legitimacy-a distinctly behavioral variable not used by Huntington-
which was utilized along with two of Huntington's variables: adaptability
and complexity. Needless to say, the importance of legitimacy in prevent-
ing violence is fairly obvious and does not necessarily stem from any con-
cept of institutionalization. The main point, however, remains that a good
deal of the variance between the two studies can be explained by the eclectic
nature of using the criteria Huntington suggests (which in turn is due to
the difficulty of operationalizing them as well as by the lack of necessary
congruence among the four components of institutionalization.)
As usual in comparative politics, all the conceptual difficulties become
conspicuous when one attempts to operationalize the concept in terms of
concrete independent variables. The four characteristics of institutional-
ization (adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence) not only con-
fuse behavioral and structural traits but they also present formidable
obstacles when treated as supposedly independent variables. Huntington
does provide us with valuable clues as to the nature of the four criteria40
but he does not deal at any length with problems of concrete assessment,
comparison and measurement. For instance, adaptability again has to do
with organizations enduring over time, overcoming challenges, surviving
the disappearance of the first generation of its leaders, and outliving their
original functions41 (chronological age, challenge age, generational age,
functional age). Here again we are faced with ex post facto reasoning. If
an organization has endured for a long time, has outlived its original
37 Michael C. Hudson, 'Conditions of Political Violence and Instability: A Preliminary
Text of Three Hypotheses', Sage Professional Papers in Coinparative Politics, I, 5 (1970), pp.
282-3.
38 Peter R. Schneider and Ann L. Schneider, 'Social Mobilization, Political Insitutions and
Political Violence: A Cross-National Analysis', Comparative Political Studies IV/1 (April
1971), quoted by Baxter, pp. 26-7.
39 Baxter, p. 27.
40 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 12-22. Kesselman (p. 23) suggests subsuming the four
features into two: complexity and adaptability as one, and coherence and autonomy as the
second. Other than for purposes of parsimony, there seems to be no compelling evidence for
such an approach either.
41 Political Order, pp. 12-17.
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INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 317
leaders and functions, and has overcome several challenges it must have
been quite adaptable. But this we know only long after the organization
came into being. What advice are we to give to the policy-maker who
wants to know how to build an organization that will be able to respond
to challenges ?42 And theoretically speaking, how are we to predict (before-
hand, which is, after all, what prediction is all about) which organizations
will be 'adaptable' (and thus, institutionalized) and which would not, thus
failing to respond to challenges ? The indicators of adaptability do not add
up to a meaningful independent variable (similarly, in reference to a differ-
ent approach to institutionalization, Baxter found 'that of sixteen ideas
suggested ... as means of assessing the independent variables identified,
ten have common content with the proposed tests of institutionalization'.43)
This dimension in Hudson's work was measured simply by old age of
institutions-and not surprisingly, the correlations of institutionalization
and stability thus measured were found rather insignificant.
The other three measures (complexity, meaning hierarchical and func-
tional differentiation; autonomy, meaning the differentiation of political
organizations from social forces; and coherence, meaning consensus,
unity, esprit de corps and discipline)44 are less tautological in character, and
in principle ought to be measurable. In fact, a good deal of what Hunting-
ton says in this respect is quite congruent with earlier theories linking
political development with structural-functional differentiation.45 Never-
theless, the difficulties of measurement will remain, and they multiply if we
want to use a composite index of institutionalization of entire political
systems: in Kesselman's otherwise extremely sophisticated study almost
the only measure of institutionalization of the French polity was the
number of organizations.46 Again one suspects that even the three rela-
tively non-tautological measures of institutionalization somehow apply
more to the micro than to the macro level.
One may well argue that indeed the choice of the components (Hunting-
ton calls them criteria) of institutionalization is somewhat arbitrary: there
is no reason not to add more (e.g., functionality), to give up one or two
(e.g., complexity), to subsume one under others and so forth (indeed, all
these suggestions appear in the literature). Of course, the arbitrariness of
42 Cf. Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa
(Chicago, 1967).
43 Baxter, p. 12 44 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 17-22.
45 As articulated, inter alia, in Gabriel A. Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative
Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston, 1966). For remarks on this, see J. Peter Nettl,
Political Mobilization (New York, 1962), especially Chap. 3.
46 Kesselman 'Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint'. Kesselman also utilized
a rather vague notion of'effectiveness of interest groups' (p. 28). Organizations are numbered
absolutely and per capita. For difficulties in applying earlier conceptions of institutionaliza-
tion, see Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London,
1962). For difficulties in applying the notion of institutionalization to the study of military
intervention, see Gabriel Ben-Dor, 'The Politics of Threat: Military Intervention in the Middle
East', Journal of Political and Military Sociology I (Spring 1973).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 317
leaders and functions, and has overcome several challenges it must have
been quite adaptable. But this we know only long after the organization
came into being. What advice are we to give to the policy-maker who
wants to know how to build an organization that will be able to respond
to challenges ?42 And theoretically speaking, how are we to predict (before-
hand, which is, after all, what prediction is all about) which organizations
will be 'adaptable' (and thus, institutionalized) and which would not, thus
failing to respond to challenges ? The indicators of adaptability do not add
up to a meaningful independent variable (similarly, in reference to a differ-
ent approach to institutionalization, Baxter found 'that of sixteen ideas
suggested ... as means of assessing the independent variables identified,
ten have common content with the proposed tests of institutionalization'.43)
This dimension in Hudson's work was measured simply by old age of
institutions-and not surprisingly, the correlations of institutionalization
and stability thus measured were found rather insignificant.
The other three measures (complexity, meaning hierarchical and func-
tional differentiation; autonomy, meaning the differentiation of political
organizations from social forces; and coherence, meaning consensus,
unity, esprit de corps and discipline)44 are less tautological in character, and
in principle ought to be measurable. In fact, a good deal of what Hunting-
ton says in this respect is quite congruent with earlier theories linking
political development with structural-functional differentiation.45 Never-
theless, the difficulties of measurement will remain, and they multiply if we
want to use a composite index of institutionalization of entire political
systems: in Kesselman's otherwise extremely sophisticated study almost
the only measure of institutionalization of the French polity was the
number of organizations.46 Again one suspects that even the three rela-
tively non-tautological measures of institutionalization somehow apply
more to the micro than to the macro level.
One may well argue that indeed the choice of the components (Hunting-
ton calls them criteria) of institutionalization is somewhat arbitrary: there
is no reason not to add more (e.g., functionality), to give up one or two
(e.g., complexity), to subsume one under others and so forth (indeed, all
these suggestions appear in the literature). Of course, the arbitrariness of
42 Cf. Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa
(Chicago, 1967).
43 Baxter, p. 12 44 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 17-22.
45 As articulated, inter alia, in Gabriel A. Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative
Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston, 1966). For remarks on this, see J. Peter Nettl,
Political Mobilization (New York, 1962), especially Chap. 3.
46 Kesselman 'Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint'. Kesselman also utilized
a rather vague notion of'effectiveness of interest groups' (p. 28). Organizations are numbered
absolutely and per capita. For difficulties in applying earlier conceptions of institutionaliza-
tion, see Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London,
1962). For difficulties in applying the notion of institutionalization to the study of military
intervention, see Gabriel Ben-Dor, 'The Politics of Threat: Military Intervention in the Middle
East', Journal of Political and Military Sociology I (Spring 1973).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 317
leaders and functions, and has overcome several challenges it must have
been quite adaptable. But this we know only long after the organization
came into being. What advice are we to give to the policy-maker who
wants to know how to build an organization that will be able to respond
to challenges ?42 And theoretically speaking, how are we to predict (before-
hand, which is, after all, what prediction is all about) which organizations
will be 'adaptable' (and thus, institutionalized) and which would not, thus
failing to respond to challenges ? The indicators of adaptability do not add
up to a meaningful independent variable (similarly, in reference to a differ-
ent approach to institutionalization, Baxter found 'that of sixteen ideas
suggested ... as means of assessing the independent variables identified,
ten have common content with the proposed tests of institutionalization'.43)
This dimension in Hudson's work was measured simply by old age of
institutions-and not surprisingly, the correlations of institutionalization
and stability thus measured were found rather insignificant.
The other three measures (complexity, meaning hierarchical and func-
tional differentiation; autonomy, meaning the differentiation of political
organizations from social forces; and coherence, meaning consensus,
unity, esprit de corps and discipline)44 are less tautological in character, and
in principle ought to be measurable. In fact, a good deal of what Hunting-
ton says in this respect is quite congruent with earlier theories linking
political development with structural-functional differentiation.45 Never-
theless, the difficulties of measurement will remain, and they multiply if we
want to use a composite index of institutionalization of entire political
systems: in Kesselman's otherwise extremely sophisticated study almost
the only measure of institutionalization of the French polity was the
number of organizations.46 Again one suspects that even the three rela-
tively non-tautological measures of institutionalization somehow apply
more to the micro than to the macro level.
One may well argue that indeed the choice of the components (Hunting-
ton calls them criteria) of institutionalization is somewhat arbitrary: there
is no reason not to add more (e.g., functionality), to give up one or two
(e.g., complexity), to subsume one under others and so forth (indeed, all
these suggestions appear in the literature). Of course, the arbitrariness of
42 Cf. Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa
(Chicago, 1967).
43 Baxter, p. 12 44 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 17-22.
45 As articulated, inter alia, in Gabriel A. Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative
Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston, 1966). For remarks on this, see J. Peter Nettl,
Political Mobilization (New York, 1962), especially Chap. 3.
46 Kesselman 'Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint'. Kesselman also utilized
a rather vague notion of'effectiveness of interest groups' (p. 28). Organizations are numbered
absolutely and per capita. For difficulties in applying earlier conceptions of institutionaliza-
tion, see Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London,
1962). For difficulties in applying the notion of institutionalization to the study of military
intervention, see Gabriel Ben-Dor, 'The Politics of Threat: Military Intervention in the Middle
East', Journal of Political and Military Sociology I (Spring 1973).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 317
leaders and functions, and has overcome several challenges it must have
been quite adaptable. But this we know only long after the organization
came into being. What advice are we to give to the policy-maker who
wants to know how to build an organization that will be able to respond
to challenges ?42 And theoretically speaking, how are we to predict (before-
hand, which is, after all, what prediction is all about) which organizations
will be 'adaptable' (and thus, institutionalized) and which would not, thus
failing to respond to challenges ? The indicators of adaptability do not add
up to a meaningful independent variable (similarly, in reference to a differ-
ent approach to institutionalization, Baxter found 'that of sixteen ideas
suggested ... as means of assessing the independent variables identified,
ten have common content with the proposed tests of institutionalization'.43)
This dimension in Hudson's work was measured simply by old age of
institutions-and not surprisingly, the correlations of institutionalization
and stability thus measured were found rather insignificant.
The other three measures (complexity, meaning hierarchical and func-
tional differentiation; autonomy, meaning the differentiation of political
organizations from social forces; and coherence, meaning consensus,
unity, esprit de corps and discipline)44 are less tautological in character, and
in principle ought to be measurable. In fact, a good deal of what Hunting-
ton says in this respect is quite congruent with earlier theories linking
political development with structural-functional differentiation.45 Never-
theless, the difficulties of measurement will remain, and they multiply if we
want to use a composite index of institutionalization of entire political
systems: in Kesselman's otherwise extremely sophisticated study almost
the only measure of institutionalization of the French polity was the
number of organizations.46 Again one suspects that even the three rela-
tively non-tautological measures of institutionalization somehow apply
more to the micro than to the macro level.
One may well argue that indeed the choice of the components (Hunting-
ton calls them criteria) of institutionalization is somewhat arbitrary: there
is no reason not to add more (e.g., functionality), to give up one or two
(e.g., complexity), to subsume one under others and so forth (indeed, all
these suggestions appear in the literature). Of course, the arbitrariness of
42 Cf. Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa
(Chicago, 1967).
43 Baxter, p. 12 44 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 17-22.
45 As articulated, inter alia, in Gabriel A. Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative
Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston, 1966). For remarks on this, see J. Peter Nettl,
Political Mobilization (New York, 1962), especially Chap. 3.
46 Kesselman 'Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint'. Kesselman also utilized
a rather vague notion of'effectiveness of interest groups' (p. 28). Organizations are numbered
absolutely and per capita. For difficulties in applying earlier conceptions of institutionaliza-
tion, see Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London,
1962). For difficulties in applying the notion of institutionalization to the study of military
intervention, see Gabriel Ben-Dor, 'The Politics of Threat: Military Intervention in the Middle
East', Journal of Political and Military Sociology I (Spring 1973).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 317
leaders and functions, and has overcome several challenges it must have
been quite adaptable. But this we know only long after the organization
came into being. What advice are we to give to the policy-maker who
wants to know how to build an organization that will be able to respond
to challenges ?42 And theoretically speaking, how are we to predict (before-
hand, which is, after all, what prediction is all about) which organizations
will be 'adaptable' (and thus, institutionalized) and which would not, thus
failing to respond to challenges ? The indicators of adaptability do not add
up to a meaningful independent variable (similarly, in reference to a differ-
ent approach to institutionalization, Baxter found 'that of sixteen ideas
suggested ... as means of assessing the independent variables identified,
ten have common content with the proposed tests of institutionalization'.43)
This dimension in Hudson's work was measured simply by old age of
institutions-and not surprisingly, the correlations of institutionalization
and stability thus measured were found rather insignificant.
The other three measures (complexity, meaning hierarchical and func-
tional differentiation; autonomy, meaning the differentiation of political
organizations from social forces; and coherence, meaning consensus,
unity, esprit de corps and discipline)44 are less tautological in character, and
in principle ought to be measurable. In fact, a good deal of what Hunting-
ton says in this respect is quite congruent with earlier theories linking
political development with structural-functional differentiation.45 Never-
theless, the difficulties of measurement will remain, and they multiply if we
want to use a composite index of institutionalization of entire political
systems: in Kesselman's otherwise extremely sophisticated study almost
the only measure of institutionalization of the French polity was the
number of organizations.46 Again one suspects that even the three rela-
tively non-tautological measures of institutionalization somehow apply
more to the micro than to the macro level.
One may well argue that indeed the choice of the components (Hunting-
ton calls them criteria) of institutionalization is somewhat arbitrary: there
is no reason not to add more (e.g., functionality), to give up one or two
(e.g., complexity), to subsume one under others and so forth (indeed, all
these suggestions appear in the literature). Of course, the arbitrariness of
42 Cf. Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa
(Chicago, 1967).
43 Baxter, p. 12 44 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 17-22.
45 As articulated, inter alia, in Gabriel A. Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative
Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston, 1966). For remarks on this, see J. Peter Nettl,
Political Mobilization (New York, 1962), especially Chap. 3.
46 Kesselman 'Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint'. Kesselman also utilized
a rather vague notion of'effectiveness of interest groups' (p. 28). Organizations are numbered
absolutely and per capita. For difficulties in applying earlier conceptions of institutionaliza-
tion, see Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London,
1962). For difficulties in applying the notion of institutionalization to the study of military
intervention, see Gabriel Ben-Dor, 'The Politics of Threat: Military Intervention in the Middle
East', Journal of Political and Military Sociology I (Spring 1973).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 317
leaders and functions, and has overcome several challenges it must have
been quite adaptable. But this we know only long after the organization
came into being. What advice are we to give to the policy-maker who
wants to know how to build an organization that will be able to respond
to challenges ?42 And theoretically speaking, how are we to predict (before-
hand, which is, after all, what prediction is all about) which organizations
will be 'adaptable' (and thus, institutionalized) and which would not, thus
failing to respond to challenges ? The indicators of adaptability do not add
up to a meaningful independent variable (similarly, in reference to a differ-
ent approach to institutionalization, Baxter found 'that of sixteen ideas
suggested ... as means of assessing the independent variables identified,
ten have common content with the proposed tests of institutionalization'.43)
This dimension in Hudson's work was measured simply by old age of
institutions-and not surprisingly, the correlations of institutionalization
and stability thus measured were found rather insignificant.
The other three measures (complexity, meaning hierarchical and func-
tional differentiation; autonomy, meaning the differentiation of political
organizations from social forces; and coherence, meaning consensus,
unity, esprit de corps and discipline)44 are less tautological in character, and
in principle ought to be measurable. In fact, a good deal of what Hunting-
ton says in this respect is quite congruent with earlier theories linking
political development with structural-functional differentiation.45 Never-
theless, the difficulties of measurement will remain, and they multiply if we
want to use a composite index of institutionalization of entire political
systems: in Kesselman's otherwise extremely sophisticated study almost
the only measure of institutionalization of the French polity was the
number of organizations.46 Again one suspects that even the three rela-
tively non-tautological measures of institutionalization somehow apply
more to the micro than to the macro level.
One may well argue that indeed the choice of the components (Hunting-
ton calls them criteria) of institutionalization is somewhat arbitrary: there
is no reason not to add more (e.g., functionality), to give up one or two
(e.g., complexity), to subsume one under others and so forth (indeed, all
these suggestions appear in the literature). Of course, the arbitrariness of
42 Cf. Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa
(Chicago, 1967).
43 Baxter, p. 12 44 Huntington, Political Order, pp. 17-22.
45 As articulated, inter alia, in Gabriel A. Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative
Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston, 1966). For remarks on this, see J. Peter Nettl,
Political Mobilization (New York, 1962), especially Chap. 3.
46 Kesselman 'Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint'. Kesselman also utilized
a rather vague notion of'effectiveness of interest groups' (p. 28). Organizations are numbered
absolutely and per capita. For difficulties in applying earlier conceptions of institutionaliza-
tion, see Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London,
1962). For difficulties in applying the notion of institutionalization to the study of military
intervention, see Gabriel Ben-Dor, 'The Politics of Threat: Military Intervention in the Middle
East', Journal of Political and Military Sociology I (Spring 1973).
This content downloaded from 132.74.208.186 on Wed, 06 Nov 2019 04:14:49 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

3I8 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
the four may account partially both for the difficulty of developing good
independent variables and for the difficulty in using a coherent composite
index of institutionalization. Perhaps different indexes should be used to
measure the strength of given organizations on the micro level, and the
institutionalization of entire systems on the macro level via researching
procedures rather than organizations: for Huntington's criteria are intended
to measure indeed the strength of institutions rather than procedures,
even though in terms of value and stability of political systems the pro-
cedures of politics (which are after all, one of the two components along
with organizations in Huntington's original definition of institutionaliza-
tion) are no less important than the existence and survival of organizations.
After all, the questions of how political structures function cannot be
simply neglected in favour of the questions as to their ability to survive at
all. Actually, these two are analytically and empirically distinct variables:
different structures and institutions (and in fact, of course, individuals) may
utilize the same procedures, and similar institutions may use altogether
different procedures. It may be necessary to pick independent variables
measuring the strength of procedures, apart from that of organizations.
On the macro level, in general, the theoretical problems of asymmetrical
institutionalization arise. Kesselman in his perceptive essay called attention
to the fact that Huntington envisages only three ratios of institutional-
ization to participation: low participation and low institutionalization
('traditional 'societies), high participation and low institutionalization ('tran-
sitional' or 'modernizing' societies), and high participation and concom-
mitant institutionalization ('developed' societies)47. However, Kesselman
points out that:
In addition to these three cases which Huntington examines, there is a fourth relationship
logically possible between mobilization and development and ... (it) also produces a
distinctive political outcome. In this fourth possibility, which occurs frequently in highly
developed politics, the institutionalization outstrips mobilization ... and political
institutions are autonomous but not adaptable. In contrast to the other processes already
enumerated, participation is stifled by institutional development. The process may be
termed overinstitutionalization and the outcome, political constraint.48
Kesselman then goes on to analyse the damaging consequences of
overinstitutionalization.49 Elsewhere I have argued that overinstitutional-
ization (particularly if it stems from too much autonomy) can be the cause
of symptoms of malaise usually attributed to institutionalization, as is the
case with corruption (which comes to be resented when tolerance for the
autonomy of institutions declines).50 Similarly, overinstitutionalization
may simply result from institutions having been built (and strengthened)
prior to socio-economic modernization, yet again bringing about a dis-
47 Kesselman, p. 24. 48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., pp. 24-7, 43-4.
50 Ben-Dor 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
3I8 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
the four may account partially both for the difficulty of developing good
independent variables and for the difficulty in using a coherent composite
index of institutionalization. Perhaps different indexes should be used to
measure the strength of given organizations on the micro level, and the
institutionalization of entire systems on the macro level via researching
procedures rather than organizations: for Huntington's criteria are intended
to measure indeed the strength of institutions rather than procedures,
even though in terms of value and stability of political systems the pro-
cedures of politics (which are after all, one of the two components along
with organizations in Huntington's original definition of institutionaliza-
tion) are no less important than the existence and survival of organizations.
After all, the questions of how political structures function cannot be
simply neglected in favour of the questions as to their ability to survive at
all. Actually, these two are analytically and empirically distinct variables:
different structures and institutions (and in fact, of course, individuals) may
utilize the same procedures, and similar institutions may use altogether
different procedures. It may be necessary to pick independent variables
measuring the strength of procedures, apart from that of organizations.
On the macro level, in general, the theoretical problems of asymmetrical
institutionalization arise. Kesselman in his perceptive essay called attention
to the fact that Huntington envisages only three ratios of institutional-
ization to participation: low participation and low institutionalization
('traditional 'societies), high participation and low institutionalization ('tran-
sitional' or 'modernizing' societies), and high participation and concom-
mitant institutionalization ('developed' societies)47. However, Kesselman
points out that:
In addition to these three cases which Huntington examines, there is a fourth relationship
logically possible between mobilization and development and ... (it) also produces a
distinctive political outcome. In this fourth possibility, which occurs frequently in highly
developed politics, the institutionalization outstrips mobilization ... and political
institutions are autonomous but not adaptable. In contrast to the other processes already
enumerated, participation is stifled by institutional development. The process may be
termed overinstitutionalization and the outcome, political constraint.48
Kesselman then goes on to analyse the damaging consequences of
overinstitutionalization.49 Elsewhere I have argued that overinstitutional-
ization (particularly if it stems from too much autonomy) can be the cause
of symptoms of malaise usually attributed to institutionalization, as is the
case with corruption (which comes to be resented when tolerance for the
autonomy of institutions declines).50 Similarly, overinstitutionalization
may simply result from institutions having been built (and strengthened)
prior to socio-economic modernization, yet again bringing about a dis-
47 Kesselman, p. 24. 48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., pp. 24-7, 43-4.
50 Ben-Dor 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
3I8 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
the four may account partially both for the difficulty of developing good
independent variables and for the difficulty in using a coherent composite
index of institutionalization. Perhaps different indexes should be used to
measure the strength of given organizations on the micro level, and the
institutionalization of entire systems on the macro level via researching
procedures rather than organizations: for Huntington's criteria are intended
to measure indeed the strength of institutions rather than procedures,
even though in terms of value and stability of political systems the pro-
cedures of politics (which are after all, one of the two components along
with organizations in Huntington's original definition of institutionaliza-
tion) are no less important than the existence and survival of organizations.
After all, the questions of how political structures function cannot be
simply neglected in favour of the questions as to their ability to survive at
all. Actually, these two are analytically and empirically distinct variables:
different structures and institutions (and in fact, of course, individuals) may
utilize the same procedures, and similar institutions may use altogether
different procedures. It may be necessary to pick independent variables
measuring the strength of procedures, apart from that of organizations.
On the macro level, in general, the theoretical problems of asymmetrical
institutionalization arise. Kesselman in his perceptive essay called attention
to the fact that Huntington envisages only three ratios of institutional-
ization to participation: low participation and low institutionalization
('traditional 'societies), high participation and low institutionalization ('tran-
sitional' or 'modernizing' societies), and high participation and concom-
mitant institutionalization ('developed' societies)47. However, Kesselman
points out that:
In addition to these three cases which Huntington examines, there is a fourth relationship
logically possible between mobilization and development and ... (it) also produces a
distinctive political outcome. In this fourth possibility, which occurs frequently in highly
developed politics, the institutionalization outstrips mobilization ... and political
institutions are autonomous but not adaptable. In contrast to the other processes already
enumerated, participation is stifled by institutional development. The process may be
termed overinstitutionalization and the outcome, political constraint.48
Kesselman then goes on to analyse the damaging consequences of
overinstitutionalization.49 Elsewhere I have argued that overinstitutional-
ization (particularly if it stems from too much autonomy) can be the cause
of symptoms of malaise usually attributed to institutionalization, as is the
case with corruption (which comes to be resented when tolerance for the
autonomy of institutions declines).50 Similarly, overinstitutionalization
may simply result from institutions having been built (and strengthened)
prior to socio-economic modernization, yet again bringing about a dis-
47 Kesselman, p. 24. 48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., pp. 24-7, 43-4.
50 Ben-Dor 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
3I8 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
the four may account partially both for the difficulty of developing good
independent variables and for the difficulty in using a coherent composite
index of institutionalization. Perhaps different indexes should be used to
measure the strength of given organizations on the micro level, and the
institutionalization of entire systems on the macro level via researching
procedures rather than organizations: for Huntington's criteria are intended
to measure indeed the strength of institutions rather than procedures,
even though in terms of value and stability of political systems the pro-
cedures of politics (which are after all, one of the two components along
with organizations in Huntington's original definition of institutionaliza-
tion) are no less important than the existence and survival of organizations.
After all, the questions of how political structures function cannot be
simply neglected in favour of the questions as to their ability to survive at
all. Actually, these two are analytically and empirically distinct variables:
different structures and institutions (and in fact, of course, individuals) may
utilize the same procedures, and similar institutions may use altogether
different procedures. It may be necessary to pick independent variables
measuring the strength of procedures, apart from that of organizations.
On the macro level, in general, the theoretical problems of asymmetrical
institutionalization arise. Kesselman in his perceptive essay called attention
to the fact that Huntington envisages only three ratios of institutional-
ization to participation: low participation and low institutionalization
('traditional 'societies), high participation and low institutionalization ('tran-
sitional' or 'modernizing' societies), and high participation and concom-
mitant institutionalization ('developed' societies)47. However, Kesselman
points out that:
In addition to these three cases which Huntington examines, there is a fourth relationship
logically possible between mobilization and development and ... (it) also produces a
distinctive political outcome. In this fourth possibility, which occurs frequently in highly
developed politics, the institutionalization outstrips mobilization ... and political
institutions are autonomous but not adaptable. In contrast to the other processes already
enumerated, participation is stifled by institutional development. The process may be
termed overinstitutionalization and the outcome, political constraint.48
Kesselman then goes on to analyse the damaging consequences of
overinstitutionalization.49 Elsewhere I have argued that overinstitutional-
ization (particularly if it stems from too much autonomy) can be the cause
of symptoms of malaise usually attributed to institutionalization, as is the
case with corruption (which comes to be resented when tolerance for the
autonomy of institutions declines).50 Similarly, overinstitutionalization
may simply result from institutions having been built (and strengthened)
prior to socio-economic modernization, yet again bringing about a dis-
47 Kesselman, p. 24. 48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., pp. 24-7, 43-4.
50 Ben-Dor 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
3I8 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
the four may account partially both for the difficulty of developing good
independent variables and for the difficulty in using a coherent composite
index of institutionalization. Perhaps different indexes should be used to
measure the strength of given organizations on the micro level, and the
institutionalization of entire systems on the macro level via researching
procedures rather than organizations: for Huntington's criteria are intended
to measure indeed the strength of institutions rather than procedures,
even though in terms of value and stability of political systems the pro-
cedures of politics (which are after all, one of the two components along
with organizations in Huntington's original definition of institutionaliza-
tion) are no less important than the existence and survival of organizations.
After all, the questions of how political structures function cannot be
simply neglected in favour of the questions as to their ability to survive at
all. Actually, these two are analytically and empirically distinct variables:
different structures and institutions (and in fact, of course, individuals) may
utilize the same procedures, and similar institutions may use altogether
different procedures. It may be necessary to pick independent variables
measuring the strength of procedures, apart from that of organizations.
On the macro level, in general, the theoretical problems of asymmetrical
institutionalization arise. Kesselman in his perceptive essay called attention
to the fact that Huntington envisages only three ratios of institutional-
ization to participation: low participation and low institutionalization
('traditional 'societies), high participation and low institutionalization ('tran-
sitional' or 'modernizing' societies), and high participation and concom-
mitant institutionalization ('developed' societies)47. However, Kesselman
points out that:
In addition to these three cases which Huntington examines, there is a fourth relationship
logically possible between mobilization and development and ... (it) also produces a
distinctive political outcome. In this fourth possibility, which occurs frequently in highly
developed politics, the institutionalization outstrips mobilization ... and political
institutions are autonomous but not adaptable. In contrast to the other processes already
enumerated, participation is stifled by institutional development. The process may be
termed overinstitutionalization and the outcome, political constraint.48
Kesselman then goes on to analyse the damaging consequences of
overinstitutionalization.49 Elsewhere I have argued that overinstitutional-
ization (particularly if it stems from too much autonomy) can be the cause
of symptoms of malaise usually attributed to institutionalization, as is the
case with corruption (which comes to be resented when tolerance for the
autonomy of institutions declines).50 Similarly, overinstitutionalization
may simply result from institutions having been built (and strengthened)
prior to socio-economic modernization, yet again bringing about a dis-
47 Kesselman, p. 24. 48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., pp. 24-7, 43-4.
50 Ben-Dor 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
3I8 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
the four may account partially both for the difficulty of developing good
independent variables and for the difficulty in using a coherent composite
index of institutionalization. Perhaps different indexes should be used to
measure the strength of given organizations on the micro level, and the
institutionalization of entire systems on the macro level via researching
procedures rather than organizations: for Huntington's criteria are intended
to measure indeed the strength of institutions rather than procedures,
even though in terms of value and stability of political systems the pro-
cedures of politics (which are after all, one of the two components along
with organizations in Huntington's original definition of institutionaliza-
tion) are no less important than the existence and survival of organizations.
After all, the questions of how political structures function cannot be
simply neglected in favour of the questions as to their ability to survive at
all. Actually, these two are analytically and empirically distinct variables:
different structures and institutions (and in fact, of course, individuals) may
utilize the same procedures, and similar institutions may use altogether
different procedures. It may be necessary to pick independent variables
measuring the strength of procedures, apart from that of organizations.
On the macro level, in general, the theoretical problems of asymmetrical
institutionalization arise. Kesselman in his perceptive essay called attention
to the fact that Huntington envisages only three ratios of institutional-
ization to participation: low participation and low institutionalization
('traditional 'societies), high participation and low institutionalization ('tran-
sitional' or 'modernizing' societies), and high participation and concom-
mitant institutionalization ('developed' societies)47. However, Kesselman
points out that:
In addition to these three cases which Huntington examines, there is a fourth relationship
logically possible between mobilization and development and ... (it) also produces a
distinctive political outcome. In this fourth possibility, which occurs frequently in highly
developed politics, the institutionalization outstrips mobilization ... and political
institutions are autonomous but not adaptable. In contrast to the other processes already
enumerated, participation is stifled by institutional development. The process may be
termed overinstitutionalization and the outcome, political constraint.48
Kesselman then goes on to analyse the damaging consequences of
overinstitutionalization.49 Elsewhere I have argued that overinstitutional-
ization (particularly if it stems from too much autonomy) can be the cause
of symptoms of malaise usually attributed to institutionalization, as is the
case with corruption (which comes to be resented when tolerance for the
autonomy of institutions declines).50 Similarly, overinstitutionalization
may simply result from institutions having been built (and strengthened)
prior to socio-economic modernization, yet again bringing about a dis-
47 Kesselman, p. 24. 48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., pp. 24-7, 43-4.
50 Ben-Dor 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
This content downloaded from 132.74.208.186 on Wed, 06 Nov 2019 04:14:49 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 319
tinctive political system.51 Again, in such cases, institutions are likely to be
'stable' without being 'valued'; and again this does not mean that the
institutions appear to weaken in a perceptible way. As a matter of fact,
overinstitutionalization may bring about a strange asymmetry, whereby
the political system is strong out of all proportion to other social systems,
even though the latter may even be more highly valued. 'While he (Hunting-
ton) notes that, in transitional politics, the society may overwhelm the
state, the possibility is ignored that, in developed polities, the state may
overwhelm the society.'52
Other cases of asymmetrical institutionalization are also likely. Insti-
tutionalization may be strong on the macro and weak on the micro level,
and vice versa. Institutionalization may be strong along one or two of the
four dimensions and weak on the others, and vice versa. Some institutions
(and often the wrong ones) may be strong and others weak, thus leading to
a variation of misinstitutionalization. Semi-institutionalization may occur
when organizations are strong but procedures are weak and vice versa.
Quasi-institutionalization may occur when institutions are 'valued', but
not 'for their own sake', but rather for 'the concrete benefits they deliver'S3
(and again, this may well be impossible to find out until all the concrete
benefits obviously stop flowing, which--if the leaders of the organizations
are astute politicians-may be never). These cases are not at all unlikely or
trivial: they exist in the empirical world of politics, and they point to
major problems of differential institutionalization on the macro-level
(calling attention to possible laws of diminishing returns of institutional-
ization54). Huntington made an important contribution in pointing out that
political decay is as possible as political development55 -but we ought to
recognize that institutionalization also makes possible various (and some-
times outright opposite) political outcomes. Huntington generally attri-
butes the ills of society to weak institutions, and he chooses to ignore ills
that may stem from institutions being too strong. This is not at all unlikely
to happen, especially in what is generally termed as 'relatively developed'
countries, where societies, of course, still change (in a significant sense of
the term, in our age all societies are, in the terms of Huntington's title,
'changing societies'), but their institutional infrastructure is very strong;
51 See, for instance, the case of Israel in: Alan Arian, The Choosing People (Cleveland,
1972), Chap. 8.
52 Kesselman, p. 26. If read in this perspective, many valuable additional insights can be
obtained from J. Peter Nettl, 'The State as a Conceptual Variable', World Politics, XX/41
(July 1968); idem, Political Mobilization, Chaps. 5-6, and Seymour M. Lipset and Stein
Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', in
Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York, 1968).
53 This formulation is taken from Kesselman, p. 25.
54 Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
55 Huntington, 'Political Development and Political Decay'. The opening chapter of his
book (published three years later) based on this article is entitled 'Political Order and Political
Decay'.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 319
tinctive political system.51 Again, in such cases, institutions are likely to be
'stable' without being 'valued'; and again this does not mean that the
institutions appear to weaken in a perceptible way. As a matter of fact,
overinstitutionalization may bring about a strange asymmetry, whereby
the political system is strong out of all proportion to other social systems,
even though the latter may even be more highly valued. 'While he (Hunting-
ton) notes that, in transitional politics, the society may overwhelm the
state, the possibility is ignored that, in developed polities, the state may
overwhelm the society.'52
Other cases of asymmetrical institutionalization are also likely. Insti-
tutionalization may be strong on the macro and weak on the micro level,
and vice versa. Institutionalization may be strong along one or two of the
four dimensions and weak on the others, and vice versa. Some institutions
(and often the wrong ones) may be strong and others weak, thus leading to
a variation of misinstitutionalization. Semi-institutionalization may occur
when organizations are strong but procedures are weak and vice versa.
Quasi-institutionalization may occur when institutions are 'valued', but
not 'for their own sake', but rather for 'the concrete benefits they deliver'S3
(and again, this may well be impossible to find out until all the concrete
benefits obviously stop flowing, which--if the leaders of the organizations
are astute politicians-may be never). These cases are not at all unlikely or
trivial: they exist in the empirical world of politics, and they point to
major problems of differential institutionalization on the macro-level
(calling attention to possible laws of diminishing returns of institutional-
ization54). Huntington made an important contribution in pointing out that
political decay is as possible as political development55 -but we ought to
recognize that institutionalization also makes possible various (and some-
times outright opposite) political outcomes. Huntington generally attri-
butes the ills of society to weak institutions, and he chooses to ignore ills
that may stem from institutions being too strong. This is not at all unlikely
to happen, especially in what is generally termed as 'relatively developed'
countries, where societies, of course, still change (in a significant sense of
the term, in our age all societies are, in the terms of Huntington's title,
'changing societies'), but their institutional infrastructure is very strong;
51 See, for instance, the case of Israel in: Alan Arian, The Choosing People (Cleveland,
1972), Chap. 8.
52 Kesselman, p. 26. If read in this perspective, many valuable additional insights can be
obtained from J. Peter Nettl, 'The State as a Conceptual Variable', World Politics, XX/41
(July 1968); idem, Political Mobilization, Chaps. 5-6, and Seymour M. Lipset and Stein
Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', in
Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York, 1968).
53 This formulation is taken from Kesselman, p. 25.
54 Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
55 Huntington, 'Political Development and Political Decay'. The opening chapter of his
book (published three years later) based on this article is entitled 'Political Order and Political
Decay'.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 319
tinctive political system.51 Again, in such cases, institutions are likely to be
'stable' without being 'valued'; and again this does not mean that the
institutions appear to weaken in a perceptible way. As a matter of fact,
overinstitutionalization may bring about a strange asymmetry, whereby
the political system is strong out of all proportion to other social systems,
even though the latter may even be more highly valued. 'While he (Hunting-
ton) notes that, in transitional politics, the society may overwhelm the
state, the possibility is ignored that, in developed polities, the state may
overwhelm the society.'52
Other cases of asymmetrical institutionalization are also likely. Insti-
tutionalization may be strong on the macro and weak on the micro level,
and vice versa. Institutionalization may be strong along one or two of the
four dimensions and weak on the others, and vice versa. Some institutions
(and often the wrong ones) may be strong and others weak, thus leading to
a variation of misinstitutionalization. Semi-institutionalization may occur
when organizations are strong but procedures are weak and vice versa.
Quasi-institutionalization may occur when institutions are 'valued', but
not 'for their own sake', but rather for 'the concrete benefits they deliver'S3
(and again, this may well be impossible to find out until all the concrete
benefits obviously stop flowing, which--if the leaders of the organizations
are astute politicians-may be never). These cases are not at all unlikely or
trivial: they exist in the empirical world of politics, and they point to
major problems of differential institutionalization on the macro-level
(calling attention to possible laws of diminishing returns of institutional-
ization54). Huntington made an important contribution in pointing out that
political decay is as possible as political development55 -but we ought to
recognize that institutionalization also makes possible various (and some-
times outright opposite) political outcomes. Huntington generally attri-
butes the ills of society to weak institutions, and he chooses to ignore ills
that may stem from institutions being too strong. This is not at all unlikely
to happen, especially in what is generally termed as 'relatively developed'
countries, where societies, of course, still change (in a significant sense of
the term, in our age all societies are, in the terms of Huntington's title,
'changing societies'), but their institutional infrastructure is very strong;
51 See, for instance, the case of Israel in: Alan Arian, The Choosing People (Cleveland,
1972), Chap. 8.
52 Kesselman, p. 26. If read in this perspective, many valuable additional insights can be
obtained from J. Peter Nettl, 'The State as a Conceptual Variable', World Politics, XX/41
(July 1968); idem, Political Mobilization, Chaps. 5-6, and Seymour M. Lipset and Stein
Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', in
Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York, 1968).
53 This formulation is taken from Kesselman, p. 25.
54 Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
55 Huntington, 'Political Development and Political Decay'. The opening chapter of his
book (published three years later) based on this article is entitled 'Political Order and Political
Decay'.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 319
tinctive political system.51 Again, in such cases, institutions are likely to be
'stable' without being 'valued'; and again this does not mean that the
institutions appear to weaken in a perceptible way. As a matter of fact,
overinstitutionalization may bring about a strange asymmetry, whereby
the political system is strong out of all proportion to other social systems,
even though the latter may even be more highly valued. 'While he (Hunting-
ton) notes that, in transitional politics, the society may overwhelm the
state, the possibility is ignored that, in developed polities, the state may
overwhelm the society.'52
Other cases of asymmetrical institutionalization are also likely. Insti-
tutionalization may be strong on the macro and weak on the micro level,
and vice versa. Institutionalization may be strong along one or two of the
four dimensions and weak on the others, and vice versa. Some institutions
(and often the wrong ones) may be strong and others weak, thus leading to
a variation of misinstitutionalization. Semi-institutionalization may occur
when organizations are strong but procedures are weak and vice versa.
Quasi-institutionalization may occur when institutions are 'valued', but
not 'for their own sake', but rather for 'the concrete benefits they deliver'S3
(and again, this may well be impossible to find out until all the concrete
benefits obviously stop flowing, which--if the leaders of the organizations
are astute politicians-may be never). These cases are not at all unlikely or
trivial: they exist in the empirical world of politics, and they point to
major problems of differential institutionalization on the macro-level
(calling attention to possible laws of diminishing returns of institutional-
ization54). Huntington made an important contribution in pointing out that
political decay is as possible as political development55 -but we ought to
recognize that institutionalization also makes possible various (and some-
times outright opposite) political outcomes. Huntington generally attri-
butes the ills of society to weak institutions, and he chooses to ignore ills
that may stem from institutions being too strong. This is not at all unlikely
to happen, especially in what is generally termed as 'relatively developed'
countries, where societies, of course, still change (in a significant sense of
the term, in our age all societies are, in the terms of Huntington's title,
'changing societies'), but their institutional infrastructure is very strong;
51 See, for instance, the case of Israel in: Alan Arian, The Choosing People (Cleveland,
1972), Chap. 8.
52 Kesselman, p. 26. If read in this perspective, many valuable additional insights can be
obtained from J. Peter Nettl, 'The State as a Conceptual Variable', World Politics, XX/41
(July 1968); idem, Political Mobilization, Chaps. 5-6, and Seymour M. Lipset and Stein
Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', in
Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York, 1968).
53 This formulation is taken from Kesselman, p. 25.
54 Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
55 Huntington, 'Political Development and Political Decay'. The opening chapter of his
book (published three years later) based on this article is entitled 'Political Order and Political
Decay'.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 319
tinctive political system.51 Again, in such cases, institutions are likely to be
'stable' without being 'valued'; and again this does not mean that the
institutions appear to weaken in a perceptible way. As a matter of fact,
overinstitutionalization may bring about a strange asymmetry, whereby
the political system is strong out of all proportion to other social systems,
even though the latter may even be more highly valued. 'While he (Hunting-
ton) notes that, in transitional politics, the society may overwhelm the
state, the possibility is ignored that, in developed polities, the state may
overwhelm the society.'52
Other cases of asymmetrical institutionalization are also likely. Insti-
tutionalization may be strong on the macro and weak on the micro level,
and vice versa. Institutionalization may be strong along one or two of the
four dimensions and weak on the others, and vice versa. Some institutions
(and often the wrong ones) may be strong and others weak, thus leading to
a variation of misinstitutionalization. Semi-institutionalization may occur
when organizations are strong but procedures are weak and vice versa.
Quasi-institutionalization may occur when institutions are 'valued', but
not 'for their own sake', but rather for 'the concrete benefits they deliver'S3
(and again, this may well be impossible to find out until all the concrete
benefits obviously stop flowing, which--if the leaders of the organizations
are astute politicians-may be never). These cases are not at all unlikely or
trivial: they exist in the empirical world of politics, and they point to
major problems of differential institutionalization on the macro-level
(calling attention to possible laws of diminishing returns of institutional-
ization54). Huntington made an important contribution in pointing out that
political decay is as possible as political development55 -but we ought to
recognize that institutionalization also makes possible various (and some-
times outright opposite) political outcomes. Huntington generally attri-
butes the ills of society to weak institutions, and he chooses to ignore ills
that may stem from institutions being too strong. This is not at all unlikely
to happen, especially in what is generally termed as 'relatively developed'
countries, where societies, of course, still change (in a significant sense of
the term, in our age all societies are, in the terms of Huntington's title,
'changing societies'), but their institutional infrastructure is very strong;
51 See, for instance, the case of Israel in: Alan Arian, The Choosing People (Cleveland,
1972), Chap. 8.
52 Kesselman, p. 26. If read in this perspective, many valuable additional insights can be
obtained from J. Peter Nettl, 'The State as a Conceptual Variable', World Politics, XX/41
(July 1968); idem, Political Mobilization, Chaps. 5-6, and Seymour M. Lipset and Stein
Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', in
Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York, 1968).
53 This formulation is taken from Kesselman, p. 25.
54 Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
55 Huntington, 'Political Development and Political Decay'. The opening chapter of his
book (published three years later) based on this article is entitled 'Political Order and Political
Decay'.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 319
tinctive political system.51 Again, in such cases, institutions are likely to be
'stable' without being 'valued'; and again this does not mean that the
institutions appear to weaken in a perceptible way. As a matter of fact,
overinstitutionalization may bring about a strange asymmetry, whereby
the political system is strong out of all proportion to other social systems,
even though the latter may even be more highly valued. 'While he (Hunting-
ton) notes that, in transitional politics, the society may overwhelm the
state, the possibility is ignored that, in developed polities, the state may
overwhelm the society.'52
Other cases of asymmetrical institutionalization are also likely. Insti-
tutionalization may be strong on the macro and weak on the micro level,
and vice versa. Institutionalization may be strong along one or two of the
four dimensions and weak on the others, and vice versa. Some institutions
(and often the wrong ones) may be strong and others weak, thus leading to
a variation of misinstitutionalization. Semi-institutionalization may occur
when organizations are strong but procedures are weak and vice versa.
Quasi-institutionalization may occur when institutions are 'valued', but
not 'for their own sake', but rather for 'the concrete benefits they deliver'S3
(and again, this may well be impossible to find out until all the concrete
benefits obviously stop flowing, which--if the leaders of the organizations
are astute politicians-may be never). These cases are not at all unlikely or
trivial: they exist in the empirical world of politics, and they point to
major problems of differential institutionalization on the macro-level
(calling attention to possible laws of diminishing returns of institutional-
ization54). Huntington made an important contribution in pointing out that
political decay is as possible as political development55 -but we ought to
recognize that institutionalization also makes possible various (and some-
times outright opposite) political outcomes. Huntington generally attri-
butes the ills of society to weak institutions, and he chooses to ignore ills
that may stem from institutions being too strong. This is not at all unlikely
to happen, especially in what is generally termed as 'relatively developed'
countries, where societies, of course, still change (in a significant sense of
the term, in our age all societies are, in the terms of Huntington's title,
'changing societies'), but their institutional infrastructure is very strong;
51 See, for instance, the case of Israel in: Alan Arian, The Choosing People (Cleveland,
1972), Chap. 8.
52 Kesselman, p. 26. If read in this perspective, many valuable additional insights can be
obtained from J. Peter Nettl, 'The State as a Conceptual Variable', World Politics, XX/41
(July 1968); idem, Political Mobilization, Chaps. 5-6, and Seymour M. Lipset and Stein
Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', in
Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York, 1968).
53 This formulation is taken from Kesselman, p. 25.
54 Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
55 Huntington, 'Political Development and Political Decay'. The opening chapter of his
book (published three years later) based on this article is entitled 'Political Order and Political
Decay'.
This content downloaded from 132.74.208.186 on Wed, 06 Nov 2019 04:14:49 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

320 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
in fact, the institutions may be counterproductively strong, containing and
subverting change, producing social ills (corruption and violence) attri-
buted by Huntington to weakness of institutions. He seems to regard
institutionalization as a unilinear process, of which the more the better.
This appears to be manifestly untrue; as in other social processes, there are
thresholds of diminishing returns. Overinstitutionalization, therefore, may
become as much of a problem as underinstitutionalization.
The concept of asymmetrical institutionalization indicates rich possi-
bilities of explaining tensions and problems in the polity that exist even
when according to the original formulation the given society is character-
ized by a high level-and possibly, but not always necessarily, wide scope-
of institutionalization, both in relatively developed and rapidly (and there-
fore, frequently unevenly) developing societies. Though not contained in
the original theoretical formulation, the notion of asymmetrical or differ-
ential institutionalization is rather congruent with the properties of the
basic concept of institutionalization, and it clearly helps account for a
variety of relevant interesting and problematic political phenomena that
may be quite unexpected (and perhaps inherently unpredictable as well as
unexplainable) according to Huntington's unilinear conception of insti-
tutionalization.56
In order to account for the difficulties and the ambiguities inherent in
the operationalization of a concept, it is useful and probably necessary to
analyze its origins and its place in the context of the basic model deemed
most relevant by the theoretician. In fact, there is no good reason to accept
as more than arbitrary any series of components and variables related by
the analyst to the concept, unless the conceptualization is anchored in some
fundamental theoretical outlook. It may not make good sense to talk
about advice to policy-makers in developing countries, unless one has a
fairly good idea of what sort of desirable 'development' one is after, taking
into account the limitations of the given political system. What, then, is
the institutionalist model of development, and to what extent does the
institutionalist utilize this model in theory building? Finally, can we
account for major weaknesses of the institutionalist school by looking at
its basic model of development?
A number of what seem implicit value statements in Huntington's work
are expressed in at least one place very explicitly:
In each historical period one type of political system usually seems to its contemporaries
to be particularly relevant to the needs and demands of the age.... Todayin much of
Asia, Africa and Latin America, political systems face simultaneously the needs to
centralize authority, to differentiate structure, and to broaden participation. It is not
surprising that the system which seems most relevant to the achievement of these goals
is a one party system. If Versailles set the standard for one century and Westminster for
56 See Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
320 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
in fact, the institutions may be counterproductively strong, containing and
subverting change, producing social ills (corruption and violence) attri-
buted by Huntington to weakness of institutions. He seems to regard
institutionalization as a unilinear process, of which the more the better.
This appears to be manifestly untrue; as in other social processes, there are
thresholds of diminishing returns. Overinstitutionalization, therefore, may
become as much of a problem as underinstitutionalization.
The concept of asymmetrical institutionalization indicates rich possi-
bilities of explaining tensions and problems in the polity that exist even
when according to the original formulation the given society is character-
ized by a high level-and possibly, but not always necessarily, wide scope-
of institutionalization, both in relatively developed and rapidly (and there-
fore, frequently unevenly) developing societies. Though not contained in
the original theoretical formulation, the notion of asymmetrical or differ-
ential institutionalization is rather congruent with the properties of the
basic concept of institutionalization, and it clearly helps account for a
variety of relevant interesting and problematic political phenomena that
may be quite unexpected (and perhaps inherently unpredictable as well as
unexplainable) according to Huntington's unilinear conception of insti-
tutionalization.56
In order to account for the difficulties and the ambiguities inherent in
the operationalization of a concept, it is useful and probably necessary to
analyze its origins and its place in the context of the basic model deemed
most relevant by the theoretician. In fact, there is no good reason to accept
as more than arbitrary any series of components and variables related by
the analyst to the concept, unless the conceptualization is anchored in some
fundamental theoretical outlook. It may not make good sense to talk
about advice to policy-makers in developing countries, unless one has a
fairly good idea of what sort of desirable 'development' one is after, taking
into account the limitations of the given political system. What, then, is
the institutionalist model of development, and to what extent does the
institutionalist utilize this model in theory building? Finally, can we
account for major weaknesses of the institutionalist school by looking at
its basic model of development?
A number of what seem implicit value statements in Huntington's work
are expressed in at least one place very explicitly:
In each historical period one type of political system usually seems to its contemporaries
to be particularly relevant to the needs and demands of the age.... Todayin much of
Asia, Africa and Latin America, political systems face simultaneously the needs to
centralize authority, to differentiate structure, and to broaden participation. It is not
surprising that the system which seems most relevant to the achievement of these goals
is a one party system. If Versailles set the standard for one century and Westminster for
56 See Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
320 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
in fact, the institutions may be counterproductively strong, containing and
subverting change, producing social ills (corruption and violence) attri-
buted by Huntington to weakness of institutions. He seems to regard
institutionalization as a unilinear process, of which the more the better.
This appears to be manifestly untrue; as in other social processes, there are
thresholds of diminishing returns. Overinstitutionalization, therefore, may
become as much of a problem as underinstitutionalization.
The concept of asymmetrical institutionalization indicates rich possi-
bilities of explaining tensions and problems in the polity that exist even
when according to the original formulation the given society is character-
ized by a high level-and possibly, but not always necessarily, wide scope-
of institutionalization, both in relatively developed and rapidly (and there-
fore, frequently unevenly) developing societies. Though not contained in
the original theoretical formulation, the notion of asymmetrical or differ-
ential institutionalization is rather congruent with the properties of the
basic concept of institutionalization, and it clearly helps account for a
variety of relevant interesting and problematic political phenomena that
may be quite unexpected (and perhaps inherently unpredictable as well as
unexplainable) according to Huntington's unilinear conception of insti-
tutionalization.56
In order to account for the difficulties and the ambiguities inherent in
the operationalization of a concept, it is useful and probably necessary to
analyze its origins and its place in the context of the basic model deemed
most relevant by the theoretician. In fact, there is no good reason to accept
as more than arbitrary any series of components and variables related by
the analyst to the concept, unless the conceptualization is anchored in some
fundamental theoretical outlook. It may not make good sense to talk
about advice to policy-makers in developing countries, unless one has a
fairly good idea of what sort of desirable 'development' one is after, taking
into account the limitations of the given political system. What, then, is
the institutionalist model of development, and to what extent does the
institutionalist utilize this model in theory building? Finally, can we
account for major weaknesses of the institutionalist school by looking at
its basic model of development?
A number of what seem implicit value statements in Huntington's work
are expressed in at least one place very explicitly:
In each historical period one type of political system usually seems to its contemporaries
to be particularly relevant to the needs and demands of the age.... Todayin much of
Asia, Africa and Latin America, political systems face simultaneously the needs to
centralize authority, to differentiate structure, and to broaden participation. It is not
surprising that the system which seems most relevant to the achievement of these goals
is a one party system. If Versailles set the standard for one century and Westminster for
56 See Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
320 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
in fact, the institutions may be counterproductively strong, containing and
subverting change, producing social ills (corruption and violence) attri-
buted by Huntington to weakness of institutions. He seems to regard
institutionalization as a unilinear process, of which the more the better.
This appears to be manifestly untrue; as in other social processes, there are
thresholds of diminishing returns. Overinstitutionalization, therefore, may
become as much of a problem as underinstitutionalization.
The concept of asymmetrical institutionalization indicates rich possi-
bilities of explaining tensions and problems in the polity that exist even
when according to the original formulation the given society is character-
ized by a high level-and possibly, but not always necessarily, wide scope-
of institutionalization, both in relatively developed and rapidly (and there-
fore, frequently unevenly) developing societies. Though not contained in
the original theoretical formulation, the notion of asymmetrical or differ-
ential institutionalization is rather congruent with the properties of the
basic concept of institutionalization, and it clearly helps account for a
variety of relevant interesting and problematic political phenomena that
may be quite unexpected (and perhaps inherently unpredictable as well as
unexplainable) according to Huntington's unilinear conception of insti-
tutionalization.56
In order to account for the difficulties and the ambiguities inherent in
the operationalization of a concept, it is useful and probably necessary to
analyze its origins and its place in the context of the basic model deemed
most relevant by the theoretician. In fact, there is no good reason to accept
as more than arbitrary any series of components and variables related by
the analyst to the concept, unless the conceptualization is anchored in some
fundamental theoretical outlook. It may not make good sense to talk
about advice to policy-makers in developing countries, unless one has a
fairly good idea of what sort of desirable 'development' one is after, taking
into account the limitations of the given political system. What, then, is
the institutionalist model of development, and to what extent does the
institutionalist utilize this model in theory building? Finally, can we
account for major weaknesses of the institutionalist school by looking at
its basic model of development?
A number of what seem implicit value statements in Huntington's work
are expressed in at least one place very explicitly:
In each historical period one type of political system usually seems to its contemporaries
to be particularly relevant to the needs and demands of the age.... Todayin much of
Asia, Africa and Latin America, political systems face simultaneously the needs to
centralize authority, to differentiate structure, and to broaden participation. It is not
surprising that the system which seems most relevant to the achievement of these goals
is a one party system. If Versailles set the standard for one century and Westminster for
56 See Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
320 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
in fact, the institutions may be counterproductively strong, containing and
subverting change, producing social ills (corruption and violence) attri-
buted by Huntington to weakness of institutions. He seems to regard
institutionalization as a unilinear process, of which the more the better.
This appears to be manifestly untrue; as in other social processes, there are
thresholds of diminishing returns. Overinstitutionalization, therefore, may
become as much of a problem as underinstitutionalization.
The concept of asymmetrical institutionalization indicates rich possi-
bilities of explaining tensions and problems in the polity that exist even
when according to the original formulation the given society is character-
ized by a high level-and possibly, but not always necessarily, wide scope-
of institutionalization, both in relatively developed and rapidly (and there-
fore, frequently unevenly) developing societies. Though not contained in
the original theoretical formulation, the notion of asymmetrical or differ-
ential institutionalization is rather congruent with the properties of the
basic concept of institutionalization, and it clearly helps account for a
variety of relevant interesting and problematic political phenomena that
may be quite unexpected (and perhaps inherently unpredictable as well as
unexplainable) according to Huntington's unilinear conception of insti-
tutionalization.56
In order to account for the difficulties and the ambiguities inherent in
the operationalization of a concept, it is useful and probably necessary to
analyze its origins and its place in the context of the basic model deemed
most relevant by the theoretician. In fact, there is no good reason to accept
as more than arbitrary any series of components and variables related by
the analyst to the concept, unless the conceptualization is anchored in some
fundamental theoretical outlook. It may not make good sense to talk
about advice to policy-makers in developing countries, unless one has a
fairly good idea of what sort of desirable 'development' one is after, taking
into account the limitations of the given political system. What, then, is
the institutionalist model of development, and to what extent does the
institutionalist utilize this model in theory building? Finally, can we
account for major weaknesses of the institutionalist school by looking at
its basic model of development?
A number of what seem implicit value statements in Huntington's work
are expressed in at least one place very explicitly:
In each historical period one type of political system usually seems to its contemporaries
to be particularly relevant to the needs and demands of the age.... Todayin much of
Asia, Africa and Latin America, political systems face simultaneously the needs to
centralize authority, to differentiate structure, and to broaden participation. It is not
surprising that the system which seems most relevant to the achievement of these goals
is a one party system. If Versailles set the standard for one century and Westminster for
56 See Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
320 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
in fact, the institutions may be counterproductively strong, containing and
subverting change, producing social ills (corruption and violence) attri-
buted by Huntington to weakness of institutions. He seems to regard
institutionalization as a unilinear process, of which the more the better.
This appears to be manifestly untrue; as in other social processes, there are
thresholds of diminishing returns. Overinstitutionalization, therefore, may
become as much of a problem as underinstitutionalization.
The concept of asymmetrical institutionalization indicates rich possi-
bilities of explaining tensions and problems in the polity that exist even
when according to the original formulation the given society is character-
ized by a high level-and possibly, but not always necessarily, wide scope-
of institutionalization, both in relatively developed and rapidly (and there-
fore, frequently unevenly) developing societies. Though not contained in
the original theoretical formulation, the notion of asymmetrical or differ-
ential institutionalization is rather congruent with the properties of the
basic concept of institutionalization, and it clearly helps account for a
variety of relevant interesting and problematic political phenomena that
may be quite unexpected (and perhaps inherently unpredictable as well as
unexplainable) according to Huntington's unilinear conception of insti-
tutionalization.56
In order to account for the difficulties and the ambiguities inherent in
the operationalization of a concept, it is useful and probably necessary to
analyze its origins and its place in the context of the basic model deemed
most relevant by the theoretician. In fact, there is no good reason to accept
as more than arbitrary any series of components and variables related by
the analyst to the concept, unless the conceptualization is anchored in some
fundamental theoretical outlook. It may not make good sense to talk
about advice to policy-makers in developing countries, unless one has a
fairly good idea of what sort of desirable 'development' one is after, taking
into account the limitations of the given political system. What, then, is
the institutionalist model of development, and to what extent does the
institutionalist utilize this model in theory building? Finally, can we
account for major weaknesses of the institutionalist school by looking at
its basic model of development?
A number of what seem implicit value statements in Huntington's work
are expressed in at least one place very explicitly:
In each historical period one type of political system usually seems to its contemporaries
to be particularly relevant to the needs and demands of the age.... Todayin much of
Asia, Africa and Latin America, political systems face simultaneously the needs to
centralize authority, to differentiate structure, and to broaden participation. It is not
surprising that the system which seems most relevant to the achievement of these goals
is a one party system. If Versailles set the standard for one century and Westminster for
56 See Ben-Dor, 'Corruption, Institutionalization and Political Development'.
This content downloaded from 132.74.208.186 on Wed, 06 Nov 2019 04:14:49 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 321
another, the Kremlin may well be the most relevant model for many modernizing
countries in this century. Just as the heads of minor German principalities aped Louis
XIV, so also the heads of equally small and fragile African states will ape Lenin and
Mao. The primary need their countries face is the accumulation and concentration of
power, not its dispersion, and it is in Moscow and Peking and not in Washington that
this lesson is to be learned .... Like the states of seventeenth-century Europe the
non-Western countries of today can have political modernization or they can have
democratic pluralism, but they cannot normally have both.57
The model, then, is one of a political system which enhances its capacity
to deal with the challenges of modernization via the instrument of a cen-
tralized, tightly organized, strong party in the image of the fighting Leninist
organization, which ensures political order and stability at least as long
as the present stage of history presents the challenges of modernization.
What counts under the difficult circumstances of the developmental
process which is flooded by constant crises is the achievement of order
through the accumulation and utilization of power.
In the light of the fairly explicit model-and indeed, between 1965 and
1968 'political development' became replaced by, and thus identical with,
'political order'58-the sources of the ambiguities and weaknesses of the
concept of institutionalization ought to be easier to understand. While the
model is explicit enough, its theoretical derivation is ambiguous. Some-
where in the process of going from the model to the theory specificity was
lost. If we translate the notion of institutionalization into policy-oriented
advice to the politician in the developing country, it would sound roughly:
'Build a strong party, make it enduring and valued, strive for order and
stability.' From the earlier notions of exporting governmental technology
through foreign aid, we are now dealing with political technology through
social science theory; only our notion of political technology is even less
specific than that of governmental technology (i.e., administration).59
First, as pointed out before, the independent variables offered as an
explanation of the effectiveness of institutions are poor in predictability
and rely too much on ex post facto reasoning. Moreover, the model of the
Leninist party, of course, may have worked under a specific set of con-
ditions such as socio-economic development, international environment,
sheer size, manpower and value systems in national and international
society. In order to operationalize the theory of institutionalization as
development, patterns of institutionalization must be explicitly and
specifically related to clusters of such variables of obviously crucial im-
57 Political Order, pp. 137-8.
58 As mentioned in note 55; Huntington's article originally published in 1965 was entitled
'Political Development and Political Decay' while the book published in 1968 opens with a
more or less identical chapter entitled 'Political Order and Political Decay'.
59 See Richard Butwell (ed.), Foreign Policy and the Developing Nation (Lexington, Ken-
tucky, 1969), and especially Robert A. Packenham 'Political Development Doctrines in the
American Foreign Aid Program', World Politics XVIII (January 1966).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 321
another, the Kremlin may well be the most relevant model for many modernizing
countries in this century. Just as the heads of minor German principalities aped Louis
XIV, so also the heads of equally small and fragile African states will ape Lenin and
Mao. The primary need their countries face is the accumulation and concentration of
power, not its dispersion, and it is in Moscow and Peking and not in Washington that
this lesson is to be learned .... Like the states of seventeenth-century Europe the
non-Western countries of today can have political modernization or they can have
democratic pluralism, but they cannot normally have both.57
The model, then, is one of a political system which enhances its capacity
to deal with the challenges of modernization via the instrument of a cen-
tralized, tightly organized, strong party in the image of the fighting Leninist
organization, which ensures political order and stability at least as long
as the present stage of history presents the challenges of modernization.
What counts under the difficult circumstances of the developmental
process which is flooded by constant crises is the achievement of order
through the accumulation and utilization of power.
In the light of the fairly explicit model-and indeed, between 1965 and
1968 'political development' became replaced by, and thus identical with,
'political order'58-the sources of the ambiguities and weaknesses of the
concept of institutionalization ought to be easier to understand. While the
model is explicit enough, its theoretical derivation is ambiguous. Some-
where in the process of going from the model to the theory specificity was
lost. If we translate the notion of institutionalization into policy-oriented
advice to the politician in the developing country, it would sound roughly:
'Build a strong party, make it enduring and valued, strive for order and
stability.' From the earlier notions of exporting governmental technology
through foreign aid, we are now dealing with political technology through
social science theory; only our notion of political technology is even less
specific than that of governmental technology (i.e., administration).59
First, as pointed out before, the independent variables offered as an
explanation of the effectiveness of institutions are poor in predictability
and rely too much on ex post facto reasoning. Moreover, the model of the
Leninist party, of course, may have worked under a specific set of con-
ditions such as socio-economic development, international environment,
sheer size, manpower and value systems in national and international
society. In order to operationalize the theory of institutionalization as
development, patterns of institutionalization must be explicitly and
specifically related to clusters of such variables of obviously crucial im-
57 Political Order, pp. 137-8.
58 As mentioned in note 55; Huntington's article originally published in 1965 was entitled
'Political Development and Political Decay' while the book published in 1968 opens with a
more or less identical chapter entitled 'Political Order and Political Decay'.
59 See Richard Butwell (ed.), Foreign Policy and the Developing Nation (Lexington, Ken-
tucky, 1969), and especially Robert A. Packenham 'Political Development Doctrines in the
American Foreign Aid Program', World Politics XVIII (January 1966).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 321
another, the Kremlin may well be the most relevant model for many modernizing
countries in this century. Just as the heads of minor German principalities aped Louis
XIV, so also the heads of equally small and fragile African states will ape Lenin and
Mao. The primary need their countries face is the accumulation and concentration of
power, not its dispersion, and it is in Moscow and Peking and not in Washington that
this lesson is to be learned .... Like the states of seventeenth-century Europe the
non-Western countries of today can have political modernization or they can have
democratic pluralism, but they cannot normally have both.57
The model, then, is one of a political system which enhances its capacity
to deal with the challenges of modernization via the instrument of a cen-
tralized, tightly organized, strong party in the image of the fighting Leninist
organization, which ensures political order and stability at least as long
as the present stage of history presents the challenges of modernization.
What counts under the difficult circumstances of the developmental
process which is flooded by constant crises is the achievement of order
through the accumulation and utilization of power.
In the light of the fairly explicit model-and indeed, between 1965 and
1968 'political development' became replaced by, and thus identical with,
'political order'58-the sources of the ambiguities and weaknesses of the
concept of institutionalization ought to be easier to understand. While the
model is explicit enough, its theoretical derivation is ambiguous. Some-
where in the process of going from the model to the theory specificity was
lost. If we translate the notion of institutionalization into policy-oriented
advice to the politician in the developing country, it would sound roughly:
'Build a strong party, make it enduring and valued, strive for order and
stability.' From the earlier notions of exporting governmental technology
through foreign aid, we are now dealing with political technology through
social science theory; only our notion of political technology is even less
specific than that of governmental technology (i.e., administration).59
First, as pointed out before, the independent variables offered as an
explanation of the effectiveness of institutions are poor in predictability
and rely too much on ex post facto reasoning. Moreover, the model of the
Leninist party, of course, may have worked under a specific set of con-
ditions such as socio-economic development, international environment,
sheer size, manpower and value systems in national and international
society. In order to operationalize the theory of institutionalization as
development, patterns of institutionalization must be explicitly and
specifically related to clusters of such variables of obviously crucial im-
57 Political Order, pp. 137-8.
58 As mentioned in note 55; Huntington's article originally published in 1965 was entitled
'Political Development and Political Decay' while the book published in 1968 opens with a
more or less identical chapter entitled 'Political Order and Political Decay'.
59 See Richard Butwell (ed.), Foreign Policy and the Developing Nation (Lexington, Ken-
tucky, 1969), and especially Robert A. Packenham 'Political Development Doctrines in the
American Foreign Aid Program', World Politics XVIII (January 1966).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 321
another, the Kremlin may well be the most relevant model for many modernizing
countries in this century. Just as the heads of minor German principalities aped Louis
XIV, so also the heads of equally small and fragile African states will ape Lenin and
Mao. The primary need their countries face is the accumulation and concentration of
power, not its dispersion, and it is in Moscow and Peking and not in Washington that
this lesson is to be learned .... Like the states of seventeenth-century Europe the
non-Western countries of today can have political modernization or they can have
democratic pluralism, but they cannot normally have both.57
The model, then, is one of a political system which enhances its capacity
to deal with the challenges of modernization via the instrument of a cen-
tralized, tightly organized, strong party in the image of the fighting Leninist
organization, which ensures political order and stability at least as long
as the present stage of history presents the challenges of modernization.
What counts under the difficult circumstances of the developmental
process which is flooded by constant crises is the achievement of order
through the accumulation and utilization of power.
In the light of the fairly explicit model-and indeed, between 1965 and
1968 'political development' became replaced by, and thus identical with,
'political order'58-the sources of the ambiguities and weaknesses of the
concept of institutionalization ought to be easier to understand. While the
model is explicit enough, its theoretical derivation is ambiguous. Some-
where in the process of going from the model to the theory specificity was
lost. If we translate the notion of institutionalization into policy-oriented
advice to the politician in the developing country, it would sound roughly:
'Build a strong party, make it enduring and valued, strive for order and
stability.' From the earlier notions of exporting governmental technology
through foreign aid, we are now dealing with political technology through
social science theory; only our notion of political technology is even less
specific than that of governmental technology (i.e., administration).59
First, as pointed out before, the independent variables offered as an
explanation of the effectiveness of institutions are poor in predictability
and rely too much on ex post facto reasoning. Moreover, the model of the
Leninist party, of course, may have worked under a specific set of con-
ditions such as socio-economic development, international environment,
sheer size, manpower and value systems in national and international
society. In order to operationalize the theory of institutionalization as
development, patterns of institutionalization must be explicitly and
specifically related to clusters of such variables of obviously crucial im-
57 Political Order, pp. 137-8.
58 As mentioned in note 55; Huntington's article originally published in 1965 was entitled
'Political Development and Political Decay' while the book published in 1968 opens with a
more or less identical chapter entitled 'Political Order and Political Decay'.
59 See Richard Butwell (ed.), Foreign Policy and the Developing Nation (Lexington, Ken-
tucky, 1969), and especially Robert A. Packenham 'Political Development Doctrines in the
American Foreign Aid Program', World Politics XVIII (January 1966).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 321
another, the Kremlin may well be the most relevant model for many modernizing
countries in this century. Just as the heads of minor German principalities aped Louis
XIV, so also the heads of equally small and fragile African states will ape Lenin and
Mao. The primary need their countries face is the accumulation and concentration of
power, not its dispersion, and it is in Moscow and Peking and not in Washington that
this lesson is to be learned .... Like the states of seventeenth-century Europe the
non-Western countries of today can have political modernization or they can have
democratic pluralism, but they cannot normally have both.57
The model, then, is one of a political system which enhances its capacity
to deal with the challenges of modernization via the instrument of a cen-
tralized, tightly organized, strong party in the image of the fighting Leninist
organization, which ensures political order and stability at least as long
as the present stage of history presents the challenges of modernization.
What counts under the difficult circumstances of the developmental
process which is flooded by constant crises is the achievement of order
through the accumulation and utilization of power.
In the light of the fairly explicit model-and indeed, between 1965 and
1968 'political development' became replaced by, and thus identical with,
'political order'58-the sources of the ambiguities and weaknesses of the
concept of institutionalization ought to be easier to understand. While the
model is explicit enough, its theoretical derivation is ambiguous. Some-
where in the process of going from the model to the theory specificity was
lost. If we translate the notion of institutionalization into policy-oriented
advice to the politician in the developing country, it would sound roughly:
'Build a strong party, make it enduring and valued, strive for order and
stability.' From the earlier notions of exporting governmental technology
through foreign aid, we are now dealing with political technology through
social science theory; only our notion of political technology is even less
specific than that of governmental technology (i.e., administration).59
First, as pointed out before, the independent variables offered as an
explanation of the effectiveness of institutions are poor in predictability
and rely too much on ex post facto reasoning. Moreover, the model of the
Leninist party, of course, may have worked under a specific set of con-
ditions such as socio-economic development, international environment,
sheer size, manpower and value systems in national and international
society. In order to operationalize the theory of institutionalization as
development, patterns of institutionalization must be explicitly and
specifically related to clusters of such variables of obviously crucial im-
57 Political Order, pp. 137-8.
58 As mentioned in note 55; Huntington's article originally published in 1965 was entitled
'Political Development and Political Decay' while the book published in 1968 opens with a
more or less identical chapter entitled 'Political Order and Political Decay'.
59 See Richard Butwell (ed.), Foreign Policy and the Developing Nation (Lexington, Ken-
tucky, 1969), and especially Robert A. Packenham 'Political Development Doctrines in the
American Foreign Aid Program', World Politics XVIII (January 1966).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 321
another, the Kremlin may well be the most relevant model for many modernizing
countries in this century. Just as the heads of minor German principalities aped Louis
XIV, so also the heads of equally small and fragile African states will ape Lenin and
Mao. The primary need their countries face is the accumulation and concentration of
power, not its dispersion, and it is in Moscow and Peking and not in Washington that
this lesson is to be learned .... Like the states of seventeenth-century Europe the
non-Western countries of today can have political modernization or they can have
democratic pluralism, but they cannot normally have both.57
The model, then, is one of a political system which enhances its capacity
to deal with the challenges of modernization via the instrument of a cen-
tralized, tightly organized, strong party in the image of the fighting Leninist
organization, which ensures political order and stability at least as long
as the present stage of history presents the challenges of modernization.
What counts under the difficult circumstances of the developmental
process which is flooded by constant crises is the achievement of order
through the accumulation and utilization of power.
In the light of the fairly explicit model-and indeed, between 1965 and
1968 'political development' became replaced by, and thus identical with,
'political order'58-the sources of the ambiguities and weaknesses of the
concept of institutionalization ought to be easier to understand. While the
model is explicit enough, its theoretical derivation is ambiguous. Some-
where in the process of going from the model to the theory specificity was
lost. If we translate the notion of institutionalization into policy-oriented
advice to the politician in the developing country, it would sound roughly:
'Build a strong party, make it enduring and valued, strive for order and
stability.' From the earlier notions of exporting governmental technology
through foreign aid, we are now dealing with political technology through
social science theory; only our notion of political technology is even less
specific than that of governmental technology (i.e., administration).59
First, as pointed out before, the independent variables offered as an
explanation of the effectiveness of institutions are poor in predictability
and rely too much on ex post facto reasoning. Moreover, the model of the
Leninist party, of course, may have worked under a specific set of con-
ditions such as socio-economic development, international environment,
sheer size, manpower and value systems in national and international
society. In order to operationalize the theory of institutionalization as
development, patterns of institutionalization must be explicitly and
specifically related to clusters of such variables of obviously crucial im-
57 Political Order, pp. 137-8.
58 As mentioned in note 55; Huntington's article originally published in 1965 was entitled
'Political Development and Political Decay' while the book published in 1968 opens with a
more or less identical chapter entitled 'Political Order and Political Decay'.
59 See Richard Butwell (ed.), Foreign Policy and the Developing Nation (Lexington, Ken-
tucky, 1969), and especially Robert A. Packenham 'Political Development Doctrines in the
American Foreign Aid Program', World Politics XVIII (January 1966).
This content downloaded from 132.74.208.186 on Wed, 06 Nov 2019 04:14:49 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

322 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
portance. For instance, several observers60 suggest that the models of both
the Leninist party and the American-style urban political machine are not
going to work in most developing countries, simply because these, by and
large, lack the resources necessary for building such organizations (ad-
ministrative talent, communications, experienced leadership, cultural
traditions, 'practical ideologies'61). Nor can we ignore the importance
of the fact that the Leninist party is very closely tied to a given value system
and allocates values according to patterns that are obviously affected by
ideological as well as organizational factors and considerations. Moreover,
the very existence, stability and, what Huntington calls 'being valued'
depend on the ability of the institution to respond to (and to shape and
reshape) the value system of the given society. In order to make institutions
valued (and thus to contribute to their stability) it is necessary to deal with
value systems in society (which are often fractured, conflicting and rapidly
changing in the period of modernization). This Huntington manifestly
does not do, and thus he cannot tell us how to make institutions 'valued'.
On the other hand, neither is he specific enough-though he does provide
a good focus, or filter-variable in institutionalization-on the organiza-
tional-political aspects of how to make institutions stable. In order to
operationalize this theory, it seems necessary to separate stability of
institutions from 'being valued', and relate these as distinct variables under
various clusters of specific conditions and circumstances.
The Huntingtonian emphasis on 'order' ensured by power may also
account for some operational weaknesses of his theory. After all, he speaks
of the 'concentration and accumulation of power' (Zolberg speaks about
'creating' political order);62 but in most developing countries power has
to be created, not concentrated, multiplied rather than accumulated. The
overly tough concentration of what little power there is in society (and
power, after all, is not a zero-sum, but a highly relative relational concept63)
may stifle the creation and generation of further power. On this very ancient
question of how to create power where there is too little, Huntington
offers only the correct but all too vague advice of improving the art of
association: perhaps he is not specific enough because he assumes that
power is to be had, not created, which is an altogether different matter
(again, having to do with specifics of social structure, value systems,
political culture and organizational patterns). It is precisely this factor,
namely the lack of adequate power, that may indeed be the tragedy of
politics in the developing countries, but it is not to be solved through the
60 Cf. Henry Bienen, 'What Does Political Development Mean in Africa?', WVorld Politics
XX/1 (October 1967).
61 This term is taken from Clement Henry Moore, 'On Theory and Practice Among Arabs',
World Politics XXIV (October 1971).
62 Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order (Chicago, 1966).
63 Bachrach and Baratz, 'Decisions and Non-Decisions'.
322 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
portance. For instance, several observers60 suggest that the models of both
the Leninist party and the American-style urban political machine are not
going to work in most developing countries, simply because these, by and
large, lack the resources necessary for building such organizations (ad-
ministrative talent, communications, experienced leadership, cultural
traditions, 'practical ideologies'61). Nor can we ignore the importance
of the fact that the Leninist party is very closely tied to a given value system
and allocates values according to patterns that are obviously affected by
ideological as well as organizational factors and considerations. Moreover,
the very existence, stability and, what Huntington calls 'being valued'
depend on the ability of the institution to respond to (and to shape and
reshape) the value system of the given society. In order to make institutions
valued (and thus to contribute to their stability) it is necessary to deal with
value systems in society (which are often fractured, conflicting and rapidly
changing in the period of modernization). This Huntington manifestly
does not do, and thus he cannot tell us how to make institutions 'valued'.
On the other hand, neither is he specific enough-though he does provide
a good focus, or filter-variable in institutionalization-on the organiza-
tional-political aspects of how to make institutions stable. In order to
operationalize this theory, it seems necessary to separate stability of
institutions from 'being valued', and relate these as distinct variables under
various clusters of specific conditions and circumstances.
The Huntingtonian emphasis on 'order' ensured by power may also
account for some operational weaknesses of his theory. After all, he speaks
of the 'concentration and accumulation of power' (Zolberg speaks about
'creating' political order);62 but in most developing countries power has
to be created, not concentrated, multiplied rather than accumulated. The
overly tough concentration of what little power there is in society (and
power, after all, is not a zero-sum, but a highly relative relational concept63)
may stifle the creation and generation of further power. On this very ancient
question of how to create power where there is too little, Huntington
offers only the correct but all too vague advice of improving the art of
association: perhaps he is not specific enough because he assumes that
power is to be had, not created, which is an altogether different matter
(again, having to do with specifics of social structure, value systems,
political culture and organizational patterns). It is precisely this factor,
namely the lack of adequate power, that may indeed be the tragedy of
politics in the developing countries, but it is not to be solved through the
60 Cf. Henry Bienen, 'What Does Political Development Mean in Africa?', WVorld Politics
XX/1 (October 1967).
61 This term is taken from Clement Henry Moore, 'On Theory and Practice Among Arabs',
World Politics XXIV (October 1971).
62 Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order (Chicago, 1966).
63 Bachrach and Baratz, 'Decisions and Non-Decisions'.
322 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
portance. For instance, several observers60 suggest that the models of both
the Leninist party and the American-style urban political machine are not
going to work in most developing countries, simply because these, by and
large, lack the resources necessary for building such organizations (ad-
ministrative talent, communications, experienced leadership, cultural
traditions, 'practical ideologies'61). Nor can we ignore the importance
of the fact that the Leninist party is very closely tied to a given value system
and allocates values according to patterns that are obviously affected by
ideological as well as organizational factors and considerations. Moreover,
the very existence, stability and, what Huntington calls 'being valued'
depend on the ability of the institution to respond to (and to shape and
reshape) the value system of the given society. In order to make institutions
valued (and thus to contribute to their stability) it is necessary to deal with
value systems in society (which are often fractured, conflicting and rapidly
changing in the period of modernization). This Huntington manifestly
does not do, and thus he cannot tell us how to make institutions 'valued'.
On the other hand, neither is he specific enough-though he does provide
a good focus, or filter-variable in institutionalization-on the organiza-
tional-political aspects of how to make institutions stable. In order to
operationalize this theory, it seems necessary to separate stability of
institutions from 'being valued', and relate these as distinct variables under
various clusters of specific conditions and circumstances.
The Huntingtonian emphasis on 'order' ensured by power may also
account for some operational weaknesses of his theory. After all, he speaks
of the 'concentration and accumulation of power' (Zolberg speaks about
'creating' political order);62 but in most developing countries power has
to be created, not concentrated, multiplied rather than accumulated. The
overly tough concentration of what little power there is in society (and
power, after all, is not a zero-sum, but a highly relative relational concept63)
may stifle the creation and generation of further power. On this very ancient
question of how to create power where there is too little, Huntington
offers only the correct but all too vague advice of improving the art of
association: perhaps he is not specific enough because he assumes that
power is to be had, not created, which is an altogether different matter
(again, having to do with specifics of social structure, value systems,
political culture and organizational patterns). It is precisely this factor,
namely the lack of adequate power, that may indeed be the tragedy of
politics in the developing countries, but it is not to be solved through the
60 Cf. Henry Bienen, 'What Does Political Development Mean in Africa?', WVorld Politics
XX/1 (October 1967).
61 This term is taken from Clement Henry Moore, 'On Theory and Practice Among Arabs',
World Politics XXIV (October 1971).
62 Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order (Chicago, 1966).
63 Bachrach and Baratz, 'Decisions and Non-Decisions'.
322 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
portance. For instance, several observers60 suggest that the models of both
the Leninist party and the American-style urban political machine are not
going to work in most developing countries, simply because these, by and
large, lack the resources necessary for building such organizations (ad-
ministrative talent, communications, experienced leadership, cultural
traditions, 'practical ideologies'61). Nor can we ignore the importance
of the fact that the Leninist party is very closely tied to a given value system
and allocates values according to patterns that are obviously affected by
ideological as well as organizational factors and considerations. Moreover,
the very existence, stability and, what Huntington calls 'being valued'
depend on the ability of the institution to respond to (and to shape and
reshape) the value system of the given society. In order to make institutions
valued (and thus to contribute to their stability) it is necessary to deal with
value systems in society (which are often fractured, conflicting and rapidly
changing in the period of modernization). This Huntington manifestly
does not do, and thus he cannot tell us how to make institutions 'valued'.
On the other hand, neither is he specific enough-though he does provide
a good focus, or filter-variable in institutionalization-on the organiza-
tional-political aspects of how to make institutions stable. In order to
operationalize this theory, it seems necessary to separate stability of
institutions from 'being valued', and relate these as distinct variables under
various clusters of specific conditions and circumstances.
The Huntingtonian emphasis on 'order' ensured by power may also
account for some operational weaknesses of his theory. After all, he speaks
of the 'concentration and accumulation of power' (Zolberg speaks about
'creating' political order);62 but in most developing countries power has
to be created, not concentrated, multiplied rather than accumulated. The
overly tough concentration of what little power there is in society (and
power, after all, is not a zero-sum, but a highly relative relational concept63)
may stifle the creation and generation of further power. On this very ancient
question of how to create power where there is too little, Huntington
offers only the correct but all too vague advice of improving the art of
association: perhaps he is not specific enough because he assumes that
power is to be had, not created, which is an altogether different matter
(again, having to do with specifics of social structure, value systems,
political culture and organizational patterns). It is precisely this factor,
namely the lack of adequate power, that may indeed be the tragedy of
politics in the developing countries, but it is not to be solved through the
60 Cf. Henry Bienen, 'What Does Political Development Mean in Africa?', WVorld Politics
XX/1 (October 1967).
61 This term is taken from Clement Henry Moore, 'On Theory and Practice Among Arabs',
World Politics XXIV (October 1971).
62 Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order (Chicago, 1966).
63 Bachrach and Baratz, 'Decisions and Non-Decisions'.
322 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
portance. For instance, several observers60 suggest that the models of both
the Leninist party and the American-style urban political machine are not
going to work in most developing countries, simply because these, by and
large, lack the resources necessary for building such organizations (ad-
ministrative talent, communications, experienced leadership, cultural
traditions, 'practical ideologies'61). Nor can we ignore the importance
of the fact that the Leninist party is very closely tied to a given value system
and allocates values according to patterns that are obviously affected by
ideological as well as organizational factors and considerations. Moreover,
the very existence, stability and, what Huntington calls 'being valued'
depend on the ability of the institution to respond to (and to shape and
reshape) the value system of the given society. In order to make institutions
valued (and thus to contribute to their stability) it is necessary to deal with
value systems in society (which are often fractured, conflicting and rapidly
changing in the period of modernization). This Huntington manifestly
does not do, and thus he cannot tell us how to make institutions 'valued'.
On the other hand, neither is he specific enough-though he does provide
a good focus, or filter-variable in institutionalization-on the organiza-
tional-political aspects of how to make institutions stable. In order to
operationalize this theory, it seems necessary to separate stability of
institutions from 'being valued', and relate these as distinct variables under
various clusters of specific conditions and circumstances.
The Huntingtonian emphasis on 'order' ensured by power may also
account for some operational weaknesses of his theory. After all, he speaks
of the 'concentration and accumulation of power' (Zolberg speaks about
'creating' political order);62 but in most developing countries power has
to be created, not concentrated, multiplied rather than accumulated. The
overly tough concentration of what little power there is in society (and
power, after all, is not a zero-sum, but a highly relative relational concept63)
may stifle the creation and generation of further power. On this very ancient
question of how to create power where there is too little, Huntington
offers only the correct but all too vague advice of improving the art of
association: perhaps he is not specific enough because he assumes that
power is to be had, not created, which is an altogether different matter
(again, having to do with specifics of social structure, value systems,
political culture and organizational patterns). It is precisely this factor,
namely the lack of adequate power, that may indeed be the tragedy of
politics in the developing countries, but it is not to be solved through the
60 Cf. Henry Bienen, 'What Does Political Development Mean in Africa?', WVorld Politics
XX/1 (October 1967).
61 This term is taken from Clement Henry Moore, 'On Theory and Practice Among Arabs',
World Politics XXIV (October 1971).
62 Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order (Chicago, 1966).
63 Bachrach and Baratz, 'Decisions and Non-Decisions'.
322 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
portance. For instance, several observers60 suggest that the models of both
the Leninist party and the American-style urban political machine are not
going to work in most developing countries, simply because these, by and
large, lack the resources necessary for building such organizations (ad-
ministrative talent, communications, experienced leadership, cultural
traditions, 'practical ideologies'61). Nor can we ignore the importance
of the fact that the Leninist party is very closely tied to a given value system
and allocates values according to patterns that are obviously affected by
ideological as well as organizational factors and considerations. Moreover,
the very existence, stability and, what Huntington calls 'being valued'
depend on the ability of the institution to respond to (and to shape and
reshape) the value system of the given society. In order to make institutions
valued (and thus to contribute to their stability) it is necessary to deal with
value systems in society (which are often fractured, conflicting and rapidly
changing in the period of modernization). This Huntington manifestly
does not do, and thus he cannot tell us how to make institutions 'valued'.
On the other hand, neither is he specific enough-though he does provide
a good focus, or filter-variable in institutionalization-on the organiza-
tional-political aspects of how to make institutions stable. In order to
operationalize this theory, it seems necessary to separate stability of
institutions from 'being valued', and relate these as distinct variables under
various clusters of specific conditions and circumstances.
The Huntingtonian emphasis on 'order' ensured by power may also
account for some operational weaknesses of his theory. After all, he speaks
of the 'concentration and accumulation of power' (Zolberg speaks about
'creating' political order);62 but in most developing countries power has
to be created, not concentrated, multiplied rather than accumulated. The
overly tough concentration of what little power there is in society (and
power, after all, is not a zero-sum, but a highly relative relational concept63)
may stifle the creation and generation of further power. On this very ancient
question of how to create power where there is too little, Huntington
offers only the correct but all too vague advice of improving the art of
association: perhaps he is not specific enough because he assumes that
power is to be had, not created, which is an altogether different matter
(again, having to do with specifics of social structure, value systems,
political culture and organizational patterns). It is precisely this factor,
namely the lack of adequate power, that may indeed be the tragedy of
politics in the developing countries, but it is not to be solved through the
60 Cf. Henry Bienen, 'What Does Political Development Mean in Africa?', WVorld Politics
XX/1 (October 1967).
61 This term is taken from Clement Henry Moore, 'On Theory and Practice Among Arabs',
World Politics XXIV (October 1971).
62 Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order (Chicago, 1966).
63 Bachrach and Baratz, 'Decisions and Non-Decisions'.
This content downloaded from 132.74.208.186 on Wed, 06 Nov 2019 04:14:49 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 323
accumulation and concentration of what little power there is, but rather
by creating more power through creativity, innovation, cultural trans-
formation and indeed the art of organizing and associating. Moreover,
the Leninist model of the tightly centralized 'political order' may not be
very helpful in tackling this fundamental difficulty. Nor is it very surprising
that the notion of how to build institutions that may enjoy stability and
legitimacy is vague; for such institutions may or may not have to be
'complex',64 but in all likelihood, they have to be innovative (not 'adapt-
able' ex post facto but behaviorally and structurally built to generate and
absorb innovations), creative, functional, responsive to the public and
abundant in leadership.
Characteristically, because the Leninist model is the best he can think
of for the 'developing' countries, Huntington deals neither with the
possibilities of institutional breakdown, nor with overinstitutionalization.
The Leninist party may become dysfunctional to any sort of development
other than a very narrow definition of 'order'; it may be overly autonomous
and thus absorbed in itself, losing touch with the environment and pro-
ducing corruption; it may be so complex that coordination and coherence
within it may become well-nigh impossible; and it may be so 'adaptable'
that it will refuse to die when no longer functional. It may, on the other
hand, break down when not responsive or flexible enough (in societies and
circumstances different from those of the Soviet Union). It may well be
that Huntington's fascination with the power and determination of the
Leninist party leads him to suppose that this model more or less has to
work, if followed in some general vague sense of 'organizing' and building
'strong' institutions. This, in turn, may have led him to neglect to deal
with the possible thresholds of dysfunctionality ('laws of diminishing
returns of institutionalization'), and even more fundamentally, to have
treated the subject with the lack of specificity that also neglects the develop-
ment of good, truly independent variables.
It may be that in order to make the theory of institutionalization opera-
tional it will be necessary to start with the recognition of the rich possibili-
ties inherent in both institutions and their environment that are visible
once one 'liberates' himself from the Leninist model. Then, the variables
may be larger in number and perhaps more complex in nature, but in
principle predictable and logical in their interrelationship. The choice of
empirical indicators, measurable dimensions and crucial thresholds will
have to aim at specificity and greater internal logic; the linkage of depend-
ent and independent variables may help solve the structural-behavioral
and macro-micro cleavages: for instance, it may be more helpful to relate
64 Mary B. Welfling, Political Institutionalization: Comparative Analyses of African Party
Systems (Sage Professional Paper in Comparative Politics, No. 01-041, Beverly Hills, 1973),
p. 13.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 323
accumulation and concentration of what little power there is, but rather
by creating more power through creativity, innovation, cultural trans-
formation and indeed the art of organizing and associating. Moreover,
the Leninist model of the tightly centralized 'political order' may not be
very helpful in tackling this fundamental difficulty. Nor is it very surprising
that the notion of how to build institutions that may enjoy stability and
legitimacy is vague; for such institutions may or may not have to be
'complex',64 but in all likelihood, they have to be innovative (not 'adapt-
able' ex post facto but behaviorally and structurally built to generate and
absorb innovations), creative, functional, responsive to the public and
abundant in leadership.
Characteristically, because the Leninist model is the best he can think
of for the 'developing' countries, Huntington deals neither with the
possibilities of institutional breakdown, nor with overinstitutionalization.
The Leninist party may become dysfunctional to any sort of development
other than a very narrow definition of 'order'; it may be overly autonomous
and thus absorbed in itself, losing touch with the environment and pro-
ducing corruption; it may be so complex that coordination and coherence
within it may become well-nigh impossible; and it may be so 'adaptable'
that it will refuse to die when no longer functional. It may, on the other
hand, break down when not responsive or flexible enough (in societies and
circumstances different from those of the Soviet Union). It may well be
that Huntington's fascination with the power and determination of the
Leninist party leads him to suppose that this model more or less has to
work, if followed in some general vague sense of 'organizing' and building
'strong' institutions. This, in turn, may have led him to neglect to deal
with the possible thresholds of dysfunctionality ('laws of diminishing
returns of institutionalization'), and even more fundamentally, to have
treated the subject with the lack of specificity that also neglects the develop-
ment of good, truly independent variables.
It may be that in order to make the theory of institutionalization opera-
tional it will be necessary to start with the recognition of the rich possibili-
ties inherent in both institutions and their environment that are visible
once one 'liberates' himself from the Leninist model. Then, the variables
may be larger in number and perhaps more complex in nature, but in
principle predictable and logical in their interrelationship. The choice of
empirical indicators, measurable dimensions and crucial thresholds will
have to aim at specificity and greater internal logic; the linkage of depend-
ent and independent variables may help solve the structural-behavioral
and macro-micro cleavages: for instance, it may be more helpful to relate
64 Mary B. Welfling, Political Institutionalization: Comparative Analyses of African Party
Systems (Sage Professional Paper in Comparative Politics, No. 01-041, Beverly Hills, 1973),
p. 13.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 323
accumulation and concentration of what little power there is, but rather
by creating more power through creativity, innovation, cultural trans-
formation and indeed the art of organizing and associating. Moreover,
the Leninist model of the tightly centralized 'political order' may not be
very helpful in tackling this fundamental difficulty. Nor is it very surprising
that the notion of how to build institutions that may enjoy stability and
legitimacy is vague; for such institutions may or may not have to be
'complex',64 but in all likelihood, they have to be innovative (not 'adapt-
able' ex post facto but behaviorally and structurally built to generate and
absorb innovations), creative, functional, responsive to the public and
abundant in leadership.
Characteristically, because the Leninist model is the best he can think
of for the 'developing' countries, Huntington deals neither with the
possibilities of institutional breakdown, nor with overinstitutionalization.
The Leninist party may become dysfunctional to any sort of development
other than a very narrow definition of 'order'; it may be overly autonomous
and thus absorbed in itself, losing touch with the environment and pro-
ducing corruption; it may be so complex that coordination and coherence
within it may become well-nigh impossible; and it may be so 'adaptable'
that it will refuse to die when no longer functional. It may, on the other
hand, break down when not responsive or flexible enough (in societies and
circumstances different from those of the Soviet Union). It may well be
that Huntington's fascination with the power and determination of the
Leninist party leads him to suppose that this model more or less has to
work, if followed in some general vague sense of 'organizing' and building
'strong' institutions. This, in turn, may have led him to neglect to deal
with the possible thresholds of dysfunctionality ('laws of diminishing
returns of institutionalization'), and even more fundamentally, to have
treated the subject with the lack of specificity that also neglects the develop-
ment of good, truly independent variables.
It may be that in order to make the theory of institutionalization opera-
tional it will be necessary to start with the recognition of the rich possibili-
ties inherent in both institutions and their environment that are visible
once one 'liberates' himself from the Leninist model. Then, the variables
may be larger in number and perhaps more complex in nature, but in
principle predictable and logical in their interrelationship. The choice of
empirical indicators, measurable dimensions and crucial thresholds will
have to aim at specificity and greater internal logic; the linkage of depend-
ent and independent variables may help solve the structural-behavioral
and macro-micro cleavages: for instance, it may be more helpful to relate
64 Mary B. Welfling, Political Institutionalization: Comparative Analyses of African Party
Systems (Sage Professional Paper in Comparative Politics, No. 01-041, Beverly Hills, 1973),
p. 13.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 323
accumulation and concentration of what little power there is, but rather
by creating more power through creativity, innovation, cultural trans-
formation and indeed the art of organizing and associating. Moreover,
the Leninist model of the tightly centralized 'political order' may not be
very helpful in tackling this fundamental difficulty. Nor is it very surprising
that the notion of how to build institutions that may enjoy stability and
legitimacy is vague; for such institutions may or may not have to be
'complex',64 but in all likelihood, they have to be innovative (not 'adapt-
able' ex post facto but behaviorally and structurally built to generate and
absorb innovations), creative, functional, responsive to the public and
abundant in leadership.
Characteristically, because the Leninist model is the best he can think
of for the 'developing' countries, Huntington deals neither with the
possibilities of institutional breakdown, nor with overinstitutionalization.
The Leninist party may become dysfunctional to any sort of development
other than a very narrow definition of 'order'; it may be overly autonomous
and thus absorbed in itself, losing touch with the environment and pro-
ducing corruption; it may be so complex that coordination and coherence
within it may become well-nigh impossible; and it may be so 'adaptable'
that it will refuse to die when no longer functional. It may, on the other
hand, break down when not responsive or flexible enough (in societies and
circumstances different from those of the Soviet Union). It may well be
that Huntington's fascination with the power and determination of the
Leninist party leads him to suppose that this model more or less has to
work, if followed in some general vague sense of 'organizing' and building
'strong' institutions. This, in turn, may have led him to neglect to deal
with the possible thresholds of dysfunctionality ('laws of diminishing
returns of institutionalization'), and even more fundamentally, to have
treated the subject with the lack of specificity that also neglects the develop-
ment of good, truly independent variables.
It may be that in order to make the theory of institutionalization opera-
tional it will be necessary to start with the recognition of the rich possibili-
ties inherent in both institutions and their environment that are visible
once one 'liberates' himself from the Leninist model. Then, the variables
may be larger in number and perhaps more complex in nature, but in
principle predictable and logical in their interrelationship. The choice of
empirical indicators, measurable dimensions and crucial thresholds will
have to aim at specificity and greater internal logic; the linkage of depend-
ent and independent variables may help solve the structural-behavioral
and macro-micro cleavages: for instance, it may be more helpful to relate
64 Mary B. Welfling, Political Institutionalization: Comparative Analyses of African Party
Systems (Sage Professional Paper in Comparative Politics, No. 01-041, Beverly Hills, 1973),
p. 13.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 323
accumulation and concentration of what little power there is, but rather
by creating more power through creativity, innovation, cultural trans-
formation and indeed the art of organizing and associating. Moreover,
the Leninist model of the tightly centralized 'political order' may not be
very helpful in tackling this fundamental difficulty. Nor is it very surprising
that the notion of how to build institutions that may enjoy stability and
legitimacy is vague; for such institutions may or may not have to be
'complex',64 but in all likelihood, they have to be innovative (not 'adapt-
able' ex post facto but behaviorally and structurally built to generate and
absorb innovations), creative, functional, responsive to the public and
abundant in leadership.
Characteristically, because the Leninist model is the best he can think
of for the 'developing' countries, Huntington deals neither with the
possibilities of institutional breakdown, nor with overinstitutionalization.
The Leninist party may become dysfunctional to any sort of development
other than a very narrow definition of 'order'; it may be overly autonomous
and thus absorbed in itself, losing touch with the environment and pro-
ducing corruption; it may be so complex that coordination and coherence
within it may become well-nigh impossible; and it may be so 'adaptable'
that it will refuse to die when no longer functional. It may, on the other
hand, break down when not responsive or flexible enough (in societies and
circumstances different from those of the Soviet Union). It may well be
that Huntington's fascination with the power and determination of the
Leninist party leads him to suppose that this model more or less has to
work, if followed in some general vague sense of 'organizing' and building
'strong' institutions. This, in turn, may have led him to neglect to deal
with the possible thresholds of dysfunctionality ('laws of diminishing
returns of institutionalization'), and even more fundamentally, to have
treated the subject with the lack of specificity that also neglects the develop-
ment of good, truly independent variables.
It may be that in order to make the theory of institutionalization opera-
tional it will be necessary to start with the recognition of the rich possibili-
ties inherent in both institutions and their environment that are visible
once one 'liberates' himself from the Leninist model. Then, the variables
may be larger in number and perhaps more complex in nature, but in
principle predictable and logical in their interrelationship. The choice of
empirical indicators, measurable dimensions and crucial thresholds will
have to aim at specificity and greater internal logic; the linkage of depend-
ent and independent variables may help solve the structural-behavioral
and macro-micro cleavages: for instance, it may be more helpful to relate
64 Mary B. Welfling, Political Institutionalization: Comparative Analyses of African Party
Systems (Sage Professional Paper in Comparative Politics, No. 01-041, Beverly Hills, 1973),
p. 13.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 323
accumulation and concentration of what little power there is, but rather
by creating more power through creativity, innovation, cultural trans-
formation and indeed the art of organizing and associating. Moreover,
the Leninist model of the tightly centralized 'political order' may not be
very helpful in tackling this fundamental difficulty. Nor is it very surprising
that the notion of how to build institutions that may enjoy stability and
legitimacy is vague; for such institutions may or may not have to be
'complex',64 but in all likelihood, they have to be innovative (not 'adapt-
able' ex post facto but behaviorally and structurally built to generate and
absorb innovations), creative, functional, responsive to the public and
abundant in leadership.
Characteristically, because the Leninist model is the best he can think
of for the 'developing' countries, Huntington deals neither with the
possibilities of institutional breakdown, nor with overinstitutionalization.
The Leninist party may become dysfunctional to any sort of development
other than a very narrow definition of 'order'; it may be overly autonomous
and thus absorbed in itself, losing touch with the environment and pro-
ducing corruption; it may be so complex that coordination and coherence
within it may become well-nigh impossible; and it may be so 'adaptable'
that it will refuse to die when no longer functional. It may, on the other
hand, break down when not responsive or flexible enough (in societies and
circumstances different from those of the Soviet Union). It may well be
that Huntington's fascination with the power and determination of the
Leninist party leads him to suppose that this model more or less has to
work, if followed in some general vague sense of 'organizing' and building
'strong' institutions. This, in turn, may have led him to neglect to deal
with the possible thresholds of dysfunctionality ('laws of diminishing
returns of institutionalization'), and even more fundamentally, to have
treated the subject with the lack of specificity that also neglects the develop-
ment of good, truly independent variables.
It may be that in order to make the theory of institutionalization opera-
tional it will be necessary to start with the recognition of the rich possibili-
ties inherent in both institutions and their environment that are visible
once one 'liberates' himself from the Leninist model. Then, the variables
may be larger in number and perhaps more complex in nature, but in
principle predictable and logical in their interrelationship. The choice of
empirical indicators, measurable dimensions and crucial thresholds will
have to aim at specificity and greater internal logic; the linkage of depend-
ent and independent variables may help solve the structural-behavioral
and macro-micro cleavages: for instance, it may be more helpful to relate
64 Mary B. Welfling, Political Institutionalization: Comparative Analyses of African Party
Systems (Sage Professional Paper in Comparative Politics, No. 01-041, Beverly Hills, 1973),
p. 13.
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324 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
stability and legitimacy ('being valued') of institutions as two distinct
variables, it may be that it is more fruitful to study organizations on the
micro and procedures on the macro level (and link these as distinct vari-
ables); above all, the basic formulation of the concept of institutionaliza-
tion will have to be less ambiguous and more precise.
In order to accomplish all these goals having to do with the operation-
alization of the theory of institutionalization, it is indispensable that more
scholars struggle with its conceptual, theoretical and methodological
problems. In comparative politics in general and in the study of political
development in particular, all too many theories are thrown in the air and
left there, so to speak, and all too few scholars are willing to work within
the framework of'someone else's' paradigm65 or theory. Yet it is impossible
to achieve a generally known, widely applicable and useful set of theories
unless more scholars are willing to help re-shape, conceptualize, develop,
refine and operationalize theories in common with others in a fruitful,
creative intercourse. The theory of institutionalization has provided a
clear focus for the study of political development, and it has captured many
scholars' imagination in its forcefully argued, neatly expressed thesis. It
certainly deserves a good deal more attention in terms of developing it
further in both conceptual and theoretical terms.
The conceptual and theoretical difficulties of the notion of institution-
alization, as we have seen, are rather numerous and serious. This probably
accounts for the fact that notwithstanding earlier hopes, the theory of
institutionalization is unfortunately on the way to becoming yet another
one of those theories in comparative politics that are often mentioned,
cited and referred to, but rarely utilized in empirical research.66 This is
most lamentable, for the concept and theory of institutionalization seem
well worth salvaging. The theory of institutionalization is obviously
relevant to the pressing issues of everyday politics; it is congruent with the
mainstream of traditional political theory; and it makes a valiant attempt
to bring together under the roof of one key variable which creates a
developmental typology such obviously important factors in political
development as trust and legitimacy on the one (behavioral) hand, and the
autonomous existence of differentiated political organizations on the other
(structural). Furthermore, few scholars have disputed Huntington's main
thesis, namely that the key to political development lies in improving the
capacity to build effective (as well as valued, and thus legitimate) political
institutions.67 The conceptual and theoretical problems inherent in insti-
tutionalization arise forcefully 'only' on the operational level.
65 In the sense defined and used in Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
(Chicago, 1962).
66 Cf. LaPalombara, 'Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics'.
67 Nettl offers an interesting explanation of stability and instability in developing countries,
somewhat parallel to Huntington's approach, although he utilizes 'state' and 'legitimacy'
324 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
stability and legitimacy ('being valued') of institutions as two distinct
variables, it may be that it is more fruitful to study organizations on the
micro and procedures on the macro level (and link these as distinct vari-
ables); above all, the basic formulation of the concept of institutionaliza-
tion will have to be less ambiguous and more precise.
In order to accomplish all these goals having to do with the operation-
alization of the theory of institutionalization, it is indispensable that more
scholars struggle with its conceptual, theoretical and methodological
problems. In comparative politics in general and in the study of political
development in particular, all too many theories are thrown in the air and
left there, so to speak, and all too few scholars are willing to work within
the framework of'someone else's' paradigm65 or theory. Yet it is impossible
to achieve a generally known, widely applicable and useful set of theories
unless more scholars are willing to help re-shape, conceptualize, develop,
refine and operationalize theories in common with others in a fruitful,
creative intercourse. The theory of institutionalization has provided a
clear focus for the study of political development, and it has captured many
scholars' imagination in its forcefully argued, neatly expressed thesis. It
certainly deserves a good deal more attention in terms of developing it
further in both conceptual and theoretical terms.
The conceptual and theoretical difficulties of the notion of institution-
alization, as we have seen, are rather numerous and serious. This probably
accounts for the fact that notwithstanding earlier hopes, the theory of
institutionalization is unfortunately on the way to becoming yet another
one of those theories in comparative politics that are often mentioned,
cited and referred to, but rarely utilized in empirical research.66 This is
most lamentable, for the concept and theory of institutionalization seem
well worth salvaging. The theory of institutionalization is obviously
relevant to the pressing issues of everyday politics; it is congruent with the
mainstream of traditional political theory; and it makes a valiant attempt
to bring together under the roof of one key variable which creates a
developmental typology such obviously important factors in political
development as trust and legitimacy on the one (behavioral) hand, and the
autonomous existence of differentiated political organizations on the other
(structural). Furthermore, few scholars have disputed Huntington's main
thesis, namely that the key to political development lies in improving the
capacity to build effective (as well as valued, and thus legitimate) political
institutions.67 The conceptual and theoretical problems inherent in insti-
tutionalization arise forcefully 'only' on the operational level.
65 In the sense defined and used in Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
(Chicago, 1962).
66 Cf. LaPalombara, 'Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics'.
67 Nettl offers an interesting explanation of stability and instability in developing countries,
somewhat parallel to Huntington's approach, although he utilizes 'state' and 'legitimacy'
324 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
stability and legitimacy ('being valued') of institutions as two distinct
variables, it may be that it is more fruitful to study organizations on the
micro and procedures on the macro level (and link these as distinct vari-
ables); above all, the basic formulation of the concept of institutionaliza-
tion will have to be less ambiguous and more precise.
In order to accomplish all these goals having to do with the operation-
alization of the theory of institutionalization, it is indispensable that more
scholars struggle with its conceptual, theoretical and methodological
problems. In comparative politics in general and in the study of political
development in particular, all too many theories are thrown in the air and
left there, so to speak, and all too few scholars are willing to work within
the framework of'someone else's' paradigm65 or theory. Yet it is impossible
to achieve a generally known, widely applicable and useful set of theories
unless more scholars are willing to help re-shape, conceptualize, develop,
refine and operationalize theories in common with others in a fruitful,
creative intercourse. The theory of institutionalization has provided a
clear focus for the study of political development, and it has captured many
scholars' imagination in its forcefully argued, neatly expressed thesis. It
certainly deserves a good deal more attention in terms of developing it
further in both conceptual and theoretical terms.
The conceptual and theoretical difficulties of the notion of institution-
alization, as we have seen, are rather numerous and serious. This probably
accounts for the fact that notwithstanding earlier hopes, the theory of
institutionalization is unfortunately on the way to becoming yet another
one of those theories in comparative politics that are often mentioned,
cited and referred to, but rarely utilized in empirical research.66 This is
most lamentable, for the concept and theory of institutionalization seem
well worth salvaging. The theory of institutionalization is obviously
relevant to the pressing issues of everyday politics; it is congruent with the
mainstream of traditional political theory; and it makes a valiant attempt
to bring together under the roof of one key variable which creates a
developmental typology such obviously important factors in political
development as trust and legitimacy on the one (behavioral) hand, and the
autonomous existence of differentiated political organizations on the other
(structural). Furthermore, few scholars have disputed Huntington's main
thesis, namely that the key to political development lies in improving the
capacity to build effective (as well as valued, and thus legitimate) political
institutions.67 The conceptual and theoretical problems inherent in insti-
tutionalization arise forcefully 'only' on the operational level.
65 In the sense defined and used in Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
(Chicago, 1962).
66 Cf. LaPalombara, 'Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics'.
67 Nettl offers an interesting explanation of stability and instability in developing countries,
somewhat parallel to Huntington's approach, although he utilizes 'state' and 'legitimacy'
324 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
stability and legitimacy ('being valued') of institutions as two distinct
variables, it may be that it is more fruitful to study organizations on the
micro and procedures on the macro level (and link these as distinct vari-
ables); above all, the basic formulation of the concept of institutionaliza-
tion will have to be less ambiguous and more precise.
In order to accomplish all these goals having to do with the operation-
alization of the theory of institutionalization, it is indispensable that more
scholars struggle with its conceptual, theoretical and methodological
problems. In comparative politics in general and in the study of political
development in particular, all too many theories are thrown in the air and
left there, so to speak, and all too few scholars are willing to work within
the framework of'someone else's' paradigm65 or theory. Yet it is impossible
to achieve a generally known, widely applicable and useful set of theories
unless more scholars are willing to help re-shape, conceptualize, develop,
refine and operationalize theories in common with others in a fruitful,
creative intercourse. The theory of institutionalization has provided a
clear focus for the study of political development, and it has captured many
scholars' imagination in its forcefully argued, neatly expressed thesis. It
certainly deserves a good deal more attention in terms of developing it
further in both conceptual and theoretical terms.
The conceptual and theoretical difficulties of the notion of institution-
alization, as we have seen, are rather numerous and serious. This probably
accounts for the fact that notwithstanding earlier hopes, the theory of
institutionalization is unfortunately on the way to becoming yet another
one of those theories in comparative politics that are often mentioned,
cited and referred to, but rarely utilized in empirical research.66 This is
most lamentable, for the concept and theory of institutionalization seem
well worth salvaging. The theory of institutionalization is obviously
relevant to the pressing issues of everyday politics; it is congruent with the
mainstream of traditional political theory; and it makes a valiant attempt
to bring together under the roof of one key variable which creates a
developmental typology such obviously important factors in political
development as trust and legitimacy on the one (behavioral) hand, and the
autonomous existence of differentiated political organizations on the other
(structural). Furthermore, few scholars have disputed Huntington's main
thesis, namely that the key to political development lies in improving the
capacity to build effective (as well as valued, and thus legitimate) political
institutions.67 The conceptual and theoretical problems inherent in insti-
tutionalization arise forcefully 'only' on the operational level.
65 In the sense defined and used in Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
(Chicago, 1962).
66 Cf. LaPalombara, 'Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics'.
67 Nettl offers an interesting explanation of stability and instability in developing countries,
somewhat parallel to Huntington's approach, although he utilizes 'state' and 'legitimacy'
324 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
stability and legitimacy ('being valued') of institutions as two distinct
variables, it may be that it is more fruitful to study organizations on the
micro and procedures on the macro level (and link these as distinct vari-
ables); above all, the basic formulation of the concept of institutionaliza-
tion will have to be less ambiguous and more precise.
In order to accomplish all these goals having to do with the operation-
alization of the theory of institutionalization, it is indispensable that more
scholars struggle with its conceptual, theoretical and methodological
problems. In comparative politics in general and in the study of political
development in particular, all too many theories are thrown in the air and
left there, so to speak, and all too few scholars are willing to work within
the framework of'someone else's' paradigm65 or theory. Yet it is impossible
to achieve a generally known, widely applicable and useful set of theories
unless more scholars are willing to help re-shape, conceptualize, develop,
refine and operationalize theories in common with others in a fruitful,
creative intercourse. The theory of institutionalization has provided a
clear focus for the study of political development, and it has captured many
scholars' imagination in its forcefully argued, neatly expressed thesis. It
certainly deserves a good deal more attention in terms of developing it
further in both conceptual and theoretical terms.
The conceptual and theoretical difficulties of the notion of institution-
alization, as we have seen, are rather numerous and serious. This probably
accounts for the fact that notwithstanding earlier hopes, the theory of
institutionalization is unfortunately on the way to becoming yet another
one of those theories in comparative politics that are often mentioned,
cited and referred to, but rarely utilized in empirical research.66 This is
most lamentable, for the concept and theory of institutionalization seem
well worth salvaging. The theory of institutionalization is obviously
relevant to the pressing issues of everyday politics; it is congruent with the
mainstream of traditional political theory; and it makes a valiant attempt
to bring together under the roof of one key variable which creates a
developmental typology such obviously important factors in political
development as trust and legitimacy on the one (behavioral) hand, and the
autonomous existence of differentiated political organizations on the other
(structural). Furthermore, few scholars have disputed Huntington's main
thesis, namely that the key to political development lies in improving the
capacity to build effective (as well as valued, and thus legitimate) political
institutions.67 The conceptual and theoretical problems inherent in insti-
tutionalization arise forcefully 'only' on the operational level.
65 In the sense defined and used in Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
(Chicago, 1962).
66 Cf. LaPalombara, 'Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics'.
67 Nettl offers an interesting explanation of stability and instability in developing countries,
somewhat parallel to Huntington's approach, although he utilizes 'state' and 'legitimacy'
324 GABRIEL BEN-DOR
stability and legitimacy ('being valued') of institutions as two distinct
variables, it may be that it is more fruitful to study organizations on the
micro and procedures on the macro level (and link these as distinct vari-
ables); above all, the basic formulation of the concept of institutionaliza-
tion will have to be less ambiguous and more precise.
In order to accomplish all these goals having to do with the operation-
alization of the theory of institutionalization, it is indispensable that more
scholars struggle with its conceptual, theoretical and methodological
problems. In comparative politics in general and in the study of political
development in particular, all too many theories are thrown in the air and
left there, so to speak, and all too few scholars are willing to work within
the framework of'someone else's' paradigm65 or theory. Yet it is impossible
to achieve a generally known, widely applicable and useful set of theories
unless more scholars are willing to help re-shape, conceptualize, develop,
refine and operationalize theories in common with others in a fruitful,
creative intercourse. The theory of institutionalization has provided a
clear focus for the study of political development, and it has captured many
scholars' imagination in its forcefully argued, neatly expressed thesis. It
certainly deserves a good deal more attention in terms of developing it
further in both conceptual and theoretical terms.
The conceptual and theoretical difficulties of the notion of institution-
alization, as we have seen, are rather numerous and serious. This probably
accounts for the fact that notwithstanding earlier hopes, the theory of
institutionalization is unfortunately on the way to becoming yet another
one of those theories in comparative politics that are often mentioned,
cited and referred to, but rarely utilized in empirical research.66 This is
most lamentable, for the concept and theory of institutionalization seem
well worth salvaging. The theory of institutionalization is obviously
relevant to the pressing issues of everyday politics; it is congruent with the
mainstream of traditional political theory; and it makes a valiant attempt
to bring together under the roof of one key variable which creates a
developmental typology such obviously important factors in political
development as trust and legitimacy on the one (behavioral) hand, and the
autonomous existence of differentiated political organizations on the other
(structural). Furthermore, few scholars have disputed Huntington's main
thesis, namely that the key to political development lies in improving the
capacity to build effective (as well as valued, and thus legitimate) political
institutions.67 The conceptual and theoretical problems inherent in insti-
tutionalization arise forcefully 'only' on the operational level.
65 In the sense defined and used in Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
(Chicago, 1962).
66 Cf. LaPalombara, 'Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics'.
67 Nettl offers an interesting explanation of stability and instability in developing countries,
somewhat parallel to Huntington's approach, although he utilizes 'state' and 'legitimacy'
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INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 325
Recognizing that it is easier to criticize than to improve (let alone em-
pirically apply) theories, it seems that the theory of institutionalization
articulated by Huntington is still one of the most potent and richest
theoretical approaches in the study of comparative politics in general and
political development in particular. Therefore, it should (and probably
can) be salvaged for empirical research and policy-making, provided that
the six major problems here analysed are adequately dealt with. These
problems include making adequate distinctions (and logical connections)
between the micro and macro levels,68 the behavioral and structural
dimensions, the definitional characteristics ('value and stability') and the
four criteria of assessing the strength of institutionalization and developing
better independent variables for measurement and comparison. Though
presently disturbing, in principle none of the six problems seems insoluble:
some of them (the theoretically oriented ones) even bear tribute to the rich
possibilities inherent in the original formulation.
instead of 'institution' and 'being valued' on the macro level: 'The very instability of govern-
ments in developing countries suggests that the competition for norms is very strong. A State
could, therefore, develop only if a politically supported regime remains in power for a con-
siderable time and is able to transpose its own norms across the high threshold of time and
internalization of legitimacy into a situation of stateness, within which interests can eventually
be articulated and institutionalized by cleavage structures. All the current evidence from the
third world is to the contrary; the political area of normlessness is large and evident, and
hence the possibility of developing states of the European type in today's new nations seems
remote.' ('The State as a Conceptual Variable', p. 589).
68 Needless to say, this does not mean that these two levels ought to be far apart. To the
contrary, adequate linkages between them are crucially important and they remain one of the
most important challenges of theorizing in comparative politics. (See La Palombara, 'Macro-
theories and Microapplications') as well as in the study of international relations. (On this
see, for instance, J. David Singer, 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations',
in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), The International System: Theoretical Essays
(Princeton, 1961)).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 325
Recognizing that it is easier to criticize than to improve (let alone em-
pirically apply) theories, it seems that the theory of institutionalization
articulated by Huntington is still one of the most potent and richest
theoretical approaches in the study of comparative politics in general and
political development in particular. Therefore, it should (and probably
can) be salvaged for empirical research and policy-making, provided that
the six major problems here analysed are adequately dealt with. These
problems include making adequate distinctions (and logical connections)
between the micro and macro levels,68 the behavioral and structural
dimensions, the definitional characteristics ('value and stability') and the
four criteria of assessing the strength of institutionalization and developing
better independent variables for measurement and comparison. Though
presently disturbing, in principle none of the six problems seems insoluble:
some of them (the theoretically oriented ones) even bear tribute to the rich
possibilities inherent in the original formulation.
instead of 'institution' and 'being valued' on the macro level: 'The very instability of govern-
ments in developing countries suggests that the competition for norms is very strong. A State
could, therefore, develop only if a politically supported regime remains in power for a con-
siderable time and is able to transpose its own norms across the high threshold of time and
internalization of legitimacy into a situation of stateness, within which interests can eventually
be articulated and institutionalized by cleavage structures. All the current evidence from the
third world is to the contrary; the political area of normlessness is large and evident, and
hence the possibility of developing states of the European type in today's new nations seems
remote.' ('The State as a Conceptual Variable', p. 589).
68 Needless to say, this does not mean that these two levels ought to be far apart. To the
contrary, adequate linkages between them are crucially important and they remain one of the
most important challenges of theorizing in comparative politics. (See La Palombara, 'Macro-
theories and Microapplications') as well as in the study of international relations. (On this
see, for instance, J. David Singer, 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations',
in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), The International System: Theoretical Essays
(Princeton, 1961)).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 325
Recognizing that it is easier to criticize than to improve (let alone em-
pirically apply) theories, it seems that the theory of institutionalization
articulated by Huntington is still one of the most potent and richest
theoretical approaches in the study of comparative politics in general and
political development in particular. Therefore, it should (and probably
can) be salvaged for empirical research and policy-making, provided that
the six major problems here analysed are adequately dealt with. These
problems include making adequate distinctions (and logical connections)
between the micro and macro levels,68 the behavioral and structural
dimensions, the definitional characteristics ('value and stability') and the
four criteria of assessing the strength of institutionalization and developing
better independent variables for measurement and comparison. Though
presently disturbing, in principle none of the six problems seems insoluble:
some of them (the theoretically oriented ones) even bear tribute to the rich
possibilities inherent in the original formulation.
instead of 'institution' and 'being valued' on the macro level: 'The very instability of govern-
ments in developing countries suggests that the competition for norms is very strong. A State
could, therefore, develop only if a politically supported regime remains in power for a con-
siderable time and is able to transpose its own norms across the high threshold of time and
internalization of legitimacy into a situation of stateness, within which interests can eventually
be articulated and institutionalized by cleavage structures. All the current evidence from the
third world is to the contrary; the political area of normlessness is large and evident, and
hence the possibility of developing states of the European type in today's new nations seems
remote.' ('The State as a Conceptual Variable', p. 589).
68 Needless to say, this does not mean that these two levels ought to be far apart. To the
contrary, adequate linkages between them are crucially important and they remain one of the
most important challenges of theorizing in comparative politics. (See La Palombara, 'Macro-
theories and Microapplications') as well as in the study of international relations. (On this
see, for instance, J. David Singer, 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations',
in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), The International System: Theoretical Essays
(Princeton, 1961)).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 325
Recognizing that it is easier to criticize than to improve (let alone em-
pirically apply) theories, it seems that the theory of institutionalization
articulated by Huntington is still one of the most potent and richest
theoretical approaches in the study of comparative politics in general and
political development in particular. Therefore, it should (and probably
can) be salvaged for empirical research and policy-making, provided that
the six major problems here analysed are adequately dealt with. These
problems include making adequate distinctions (and logical connections)
between the micro and macro levels,68 the behavioral and structural
dimensions, the definitional characteristics ('value and stability') and the
four criteria of assessing the strength of institutionalization and developing
better independent variables for measurement and comparison. Though
presently disturbing, in principle none of the six problems seems insoluble:
some of them (the theoretically oriented ones) even bear tribute to the rich
possibilities inherent in the original formulation.
instead of 'institution' and 'being valued' on the macro level: 'The very instability of govern-
ments in developing countries suggests that the competition for norms is very strong. A State
could, therefore, develop only if a politically supported regime remains in power for a con-
siderable time and is able to transpose its own norms across the high threshold of time and
internalization of legitimacy into a situation of stateness, within which interests can eventually
be articulated and institutionalized by cleavage structures. All the current evidence from the
third world is to the contrary; the political area of normlessness is large and evident, and
hence the possibility of developing states of the European type in today's new nations seems
remote.' ('The State as a Conceptual Variable', p. 589).
68 Needless to say, this does not mean that these two levels ought to be far apart. To the
contrary, adequate linkages between them are crucially important and they remain one of the
most important challenges of theorizing in comparative politics. (See La Palombara, 'Macro-
theories and Microapplications') as well as in the study of international relations. (On this
see, for instance, J. David Singer, 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations',
in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), The International System: Theoretical Essays
(Princeton, 1961)).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 325
Recognizing that it is easier to criticize than to improve (let alone em-
pirically apply) theories, it seems that the theory of institutionalization
articulated by Huntington is still one of the most potent and richest
theoretical approaches in the study of comparative politics in general and
political development in particular. Therefore, it should (and probably
can) be salvaged for empirical research and policy-making, provided that
the six major problems here analysed are adequately dealt with. These
problems include making adequate distinctions (and logical connections)
between the micro and macro levels,68 the behavioral and structural
dimensions, the definitional characteristics ('value and stability') and the
four criteria of assessing the strength of institutionalization and developing
better independent variables for measurement and comparison. Though
presently disturbing, in principle none of the six problems seems insoluble:
some of them (the theoretically oriented ones) even bear tribute to the rich
possibilities inherent in the original formulation.
instead of 'institution' and 'being valued' on the macro level: 'The very instability of govern-
ments in developing countries suggests that the competition for norms is very strong. A State
could, therefore, develop only if a politically supported regime remains in power for a con-
siderable time and is able to transpose its own norms across the high threshold of time and
internalization of legitimacy into a situation of stateness, within which interests can eventually
be articulated and institutionalized by cleavage structures. All the current evidence from the
third world is to the contrary; the political area of normlessness is large and evident, and
hence the possibility of developing states of the European type in today's new nations seems
remote.' ('The State as a Conceptual Variable', p. 589).
68 Needless to say, this does not mean that these two levels ought to be far apart. To the
contrary, adequate linkages between them are crucially important and they remain one of the
most important challenges of theorizing in comparative politics. (See La Palombara, 'Macro-
theories and Microapplications') as well as in the study of international relations. (On this
see, for instance, J. David Singer, 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations',
in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), The International System: Theoretical Essays
(Princeton, 1961)).
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 325
Recognizing that it is easier to criticize than to improve (let alone em-
pirically apply) theories, it seems that the theory of institutionalization
articulated by Huntington is still one of the most potent and richest
theoretical approaches in the study of comparative politics in general and
political development in particular. Therefore, it should (and probably
can) be salvaged for empirical research and policy-making, provided that
the six major problems here analysed are adequately dealt with. These
problems include making adequate distinctions (and logical connections)
between the micro and macro levels,68 the behavioral and structural
dimensions, the definitional characteristics ('value and stability') and the
four criteria of assessing the strength of institutionalization and developing
better independent variables for measurement and comparison. Though
presently disturbing, in principle none of the six problems seems insoluble:
some of them (the theoretically oriented ones) even bear tribute to the rich
possibilities inherent in the original formulation.
instead of 'institution' and 'being valued' on the macro level: 'The very instability of govern-
ments in developing countries suggests that the competition for norms is very strong. A State
could, therefore, develop only if a politically supported regime remains in power for a con-
siderable time and is able to transpose its own norms across the high threshold of time and
internalization of legitimacy into a situation of stateness, within which interests can eventually
be articulated and institutionalized by cleavage structures. All the current evidence from the
third world is to the contrary; the political area of normlessness is large and evident, and
hence the possibility of developing states of the European type in today's new nations seems
remote.' ('The State as a Conceptual Variable', p. 589).
68 Needless to say, this does not mean that these two levels ought to be far apart. To the
contrary, adequate linkages between them are crucially important and they remain one of the
most important challenges of theorizing in comparative politics. (See La Palombara, 'Macro-
theories and Microapplications') as well as in the study of international relations. (On this
see, for instance, J. David Singer, 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations',
in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), The International System: Theoretical Essays
(Princeton, 1961)).
This content downloaded from 132.74.208.186 on Wed, 06 Nov 2019 04:14:49 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms