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Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the ‘New Europe’



This article examines the dynamics and implications of practices of socialization enacted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe. With particular emphasis on the Czech Republic and Romania, I argue that NATO relied extensively on mechanisms of teaching and persuasion to project a particular set of liberal-democratic norms of security into the former Eastern bloc. Several interrelated conditions affected NATO's ability to teach new norms to Central and East European actors: the parties' mutual recognition of their respective roles as “teachers” and “students”; the socializees' identification with the Western security community that NATO claimed to embody; and systematic interactions between teachers and students. In teaching new liberal-democratic norms, NATO exercised significant power: the power to shape its socializees' interpretations of the world and ideas about proper ways of acting in that world. The shared ideational framework established via teaching also empowered subsequent persuasive appeals launched in the name of liberal-democratic norms. NATO conducted a socialization process that targeted—and often affected—not simply the behavior of Central and East European socializees, but also their definitions of national identity and interests. a
Security Institutions as Agents
of Socialization? NATO and
the ‘New Europe’
Alexandra Gheciu
Abstract This article examines the dynamics and implications of practices of
socialization enacted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ~NATO!in post–
Cold War Central and Eastern Europe+With particular emphasis on the Czech Repub-
lic and Romania,I argue that NATO relied extensively on mechanisms of teaching
and persuasion to project a particular set of liberal-democratic norms of security into
the former Eastern bloc+Several interrelated conditions affected NATO’s ability to
teach new norms to Central and East European actors:the parties’ mutual recogni-
tion of their respective roles as “teachers” and “students”;the socializees’ identifi-
cation with the Western security community that NATO claimed to embody;and
systematic interactions between teachers and students+In teaching new liberal-
democratic norms,NATO exercised significant power:the power to shape its social-
izees’ interpretations of the world and ideas about proper ways of acting in that world+
The shared ideational framework established via teaching also empowered sub-
sequent persuasive appeals launched in the name of liberal-democratic norms+NATO
conducted a socialization process that targeted—and often affected—not simply the
behavior of Central and East European socializees,but also their definitions of national
identity and interests+
In recent years,the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
~NATO!and the former communist countries of Europe has been the focus of
numerous analyses in the field of international relations+This article seeks to con-
tribute to those analyses by arguing that,following the end of the Cold War,NATO
became systematically engaged in the projection of a particular set of Western-
based norms into Central and Eastern Europe+Conventional wisdom about inter-
national security portrays NATO as a military alliance,irrelevant to processes of
constructing or reproducing domestic norms and institutions+Contrary to that view,
I show that NATO played an important role in the reconstitution of postcommu-
For extremely helpful comments on previous incarnations of this article,I am grateful to the editors
of International Organization,two anonymous reviewers,Jeffrey Checkel,Michael Zürn,Alastair Iain
Johnston,Michael C+Williams,and all the participants in the IDNET workshops+
International Organization 59,Fall 2005,pp+973–1012
© 2005 by The IO Foundation+DOI:10+10170S0020818305050332
nist polities+The alliance relied especially on mechanisms of teaching and persua-
sion in an effort to socialize Central and East European actors into a particular,
liberal-democratic vision of correct norms of governance+
NATO was especially heavily involved in the eastern projection of liberal-
democratic norms in the field of security+These include accountability and trans-
parency in the formulation of defense policies and budgets,the division of powers
within the state in the area of security,government oversight of the military through
civilian defense ministries,and accountability for the armed forces+In addition,
NATO has sought to project into Central and East European countries Western-
defined liberal norms and rules of international behavior,in particular involving
peaceful settlement of disputes,multilateralism,and democracy and human rights
promotion in the international arena+
This article examines the dynamics and implications of socialization conducted
by NATO between 1994 and 2000,in interactions with actors from the Czech
Republic and Romania+
The comparison between the Czech Republic and Roma-
nia is useful because,in the period covered in this study,only the former received
the reward of NATO membership+Moreover,in light of the lessons learned in the
process of incorporating the first wave of newcomers,NATO changed its policy
vis-à-vis second-wave candidates+In the case of the three countries admitted in
1999,the promise of membership preceded the completion of many of the reforms
prescribed by the alliance+Subsequently,the allies established the Membership
Action Plan,aimed at promoting change and assessing the candidates’ records prior
to inviting them to join NATO+Consequently,second-wave countries faced the
dilemma of having to carry out comprehensive reforms,and having to adopt a
series of costly courses of action ~for example,support for NATO wars abroad!,
without any guarantee that they would receive the reward of membership+Never-
theless,NATO carried out similar socialization practices in the Czech Republic
and Romania and,despite the differences in the structure of rewards,those prac-
tices did have a powerful impact on both countries+
The analysis proceeds as follows+In the next section,I briefly place my argu-
ment within a broader theoretical framework+In the second section,I provide an
explanation of relevant mechanisms of socialization and anticipated scope condi-
tions+I then turn,in the third section,to the empirical story—NATO’s socializa-
tion of Czech and Romanian actors+Here I examine examples of teaching and
persuasion that occurred in different contexts and targeted diverse sets of social-
izees+The fourth section analyzes the effects of socialization;and the fifth sec-
tion revisits the question of scope conditions in light of the preceding empirical
1+1994 marked the beginning of more systematic interactions between NATO and former commu-
nist states,particularly through the establishment of the Partnership for Peace+The end point of 2000
was chosen to cover the 1999 enlargement and the Kosovo conflict+
974 International Organization
Theoretical Framework
In recent years,several analysts have argued that NATO is more than just a mili-
tary alliance+For instance,neoliberal institutionalists—most famously,Keohane
and Wallander—have argued that there is a difference between alliances ~defined
as exclusive coalitions that respond to threats!and security management institu-
tions ~which are designed to address a variety of risks!+
From this perspective,
NATO is a security management institution,which has always sought to deal not
only with external threats,but also with problems of mistrust and misunderstand-
ings among its members+The institutionalist argument is that,in the context of the
post-1989 shift in security priorities away from the containment of the Soviet threat,
NATO was able to transfer risk management practices developed during the Cold
War to the new situation+Institutionalists argue that,in the instability characteris-
tic of the early post–Cold War environment,NATO’s experience in cooperation,
trust building,and integration among members was extended into Central and East-
ern Europe via the process of NATO enlargement+
Institutionalists are right to
argue that post–Cold War NATO has sought to address instability,but they do not
explain the processes through which the alliance has acted to shape state identities
around norms perceived as a source of peace and progress+
In analyzing NATO as a self-defined institutional expression of the Western
liberal-democratic community,it is useful to start from Risse’s account of the col-
lective identity on which the alliance is founded+
As Risse has argued,by virtue
of the norms and sense of collective identity it embodied,NATO did not disappear
following the end of the Cold War+Indeed,@t#he end of the Cold War +++ not
only does not terminate the Western community of values;it extends that commu-
nity into Eastern Europe and,potentially,even into the successor states of the Soviet
Union,creating a “pacific federation” of liberal democracies from Vladivostock to
Berlin,San Francisco and Tokyo+
This article seeks to build on Risse’s argu-
ment by examining the dynamics of change promoted by the organization in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe;in other words,by placing greater emphasis on the actual
politics involved in the eastern projection of liberal-democratic norms+
More recently,a series of analysts have tried to establish,empirically,whether
NATO spreads liberal-democratic norms in Central and Eastern Europe+Particu-
larly influential has been Reiter’s critique:according to him,to the extent that
democratization occurs in certain ex-communist countries,this is the result of
domestic,rather than international,factors+
In response,critics such as Waterman
and Zagorcheva,among others,have argued that,through the Partnership for Peace,
the Membership Action Plan,and various other programs,NATO has “co-opted”
2+See Wallander and Keohane 1999;and Wallander 2000+
3+Wallander 2000,720–21+
4+See Risse-Kappen 1995 and 1996+
5+Risse-Kappen 1996,396+
6+Reiter 2001+
NATO and Post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 975
Central and East European actors into activities that are likely to affect the ways
in which the latter think and behave+In other words,NATO has been involved in
“socializing” Central and Eastern Europeans into the “Western ways+
The intro-
duction of the concept of socialization is a significant step forward in explaining
the relationship between NATO and Central and Eastern Europeans,but analyses
such as those provided by Waterman and Zagorcheva need to be taken even fur-
ther,to include an examination of the specific mechanisms used to socialize Cen-
tral and Eastern Europeans into the Western ways of thinking and acting+That is
precisely what this article seeks to achieve+
Following Checkel’s definition,socialization is understood here as a process of
inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community+
To account for
the complexity of NATO’s involvement in Central and Eastern Europe,I adopt a
constructivist approach,conceptualizing socialization as a process in which the
socializer ~NATO!has targeted—and sometimes affected—changes in the defini-
tions of identity and interests held by the socializees+From a constructivist per-
spective,successful socialization results in the internalization of the prescribed
norms and rules+The new norms come to be taken for granted—accepted because
they are seen as normal,given “who we are+
In other words,successful social-
ization results in a situation in which compliance with the new norms occurs via a
logic of appropriateness+
It is interesting to examine NATO’s involvement in Central and Eastern Europe
within the framework of rationalist0constructivist debates about socialization+
might be tempting to portray this case as a simple example of rationalist ~self-!
socialization of instrumental actors engaged in the pursuit of predefined interests+
By this logic,in the post–Cold War context of asymmetric distribution of power
between the West and the former Eastern bloc,the Central and Eastern Europeans
adopted the norms prescribed by the Western world in order to reap the material ben-
efits that the latter could provide+For instance,it could be that the Central and East-
ern Europeans sought membership to obtain the alliance’s protection from a potential
military resurgence of Russia+Linked to this,it could be argued that NATO was
important to Central and Eastern Europeans because it represented the key forum
for organizing their relations to the only remaining superpower,the United States+
7+Waterman,Zagorcheva,and Reiter 2002+
8+See Checkel,this volume;and Lauer and Handel 1977+Also relevant are Berger and Luckmann
1967;and,within the field of international relations,especially Wendt 1999+
9+Checkel,this volume+
10+For analyses of different logics operating in international politics,see,for example,Katzen-
stein,Keohane,and Krasner 1998;March and Olsen 1998;and Ruggie 1998+Also relevant are March
and Olsen 1989;and Powell and DiMaggio 1991+
11+For useful analyses,see Checkel and Moravcsik 2001;Checkel 2001 and 2003;and Schim-
melfennig 2003+
12+I would like to thank the IO editors for bringing to my attention the importance of discussing
the role of the United States within NATO in the context of interactions between the alliance and
Central and Eastern Europeans+
976 International Organization
From this perspective,for the decision makers of former communist states,the
question was simply one of strategically altering their behavior to join NATO and
thus advance their objective,pregiven interest:security+Farrell succinctly cap-
tured this perspective when he argued that “@p#ower and interests,in the form of
coercion and inducement,can play a particularly important role in international
norm diffusion+A contemporary example of this is the adoption of Western norms
of military professionalism by postcommunist states desperate to join the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization+
On this logic,the role of NATO as “socializer”
was minimal,involving the use of instrumental incentives to preconstituted
actors,and the provision of information regarding the conditions attached to those
I argue in this article that the logic of socialization of Central and Eastern Euro-
peans into the norms prescribed by NATO departed in important ways from the
rationalist logic of socialization+
Two dimensions of this process are relevant to
this study:~1!the dynamics of the process ~that is,the types of practices or mech-
anisms employed by NATO in the international diffusion of new norms,and the
conditions that facilitated or inhibited the operation of these mechanisms!;and ~2!
the outcome of the process of socialization ~the internalization of new norms!+
Drawing on Jepperson,Wendt,and Katzenstein,I take state identities to mean the
prevailing intersubjective ideas of collective distinctiveness and purpose+
By defin-
ing the key characteristics of a given polity,these ideas shape both its domestic
politics ~as they are tied to a particular set of norms of governance recognized as
consistent with “who we are”!,and its foreign policy ~through an identification of
national distinctiveness in relation to other states,definitions of state identity posi-
tion the national self in the international arena and enable decision makers to iden-
tify friends and enemies!+Useful indicators of change in the definition of national
identity include the emergence of new intersubjective ideas about the key charac-
teristics of the given polity ~a new understanding of the collective self,and of the
nature of correct or appropriate norms of governance!,and a new conception of
the relationship between the national self and the outside world ~such as a reartic-
ulation of the self’s particular position—identification with,similarity to,or dif-
ference from,even opposition to—various international others,and the purpose of
the self in the context of interactions with those different others!+
The rationalist argument that NATO was able to use the issue of membership as
an efficient carrot and stick fails to take into account the constraints within which
13+Farrell 2002,70–71+
14+My argument here is similar to Adler’s critique of neoliberal institutionalist analyses of the role
of Western institutions in the former communist bloc+With particular reference to the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe ~OSCE!,Adler has demonstrated that international institutions
have played an important role in former communist countries,not necessarily by increasing interstate
coordination and reducing transaction costs,but by engaging in community-building socialization prac-
tices that have had the effect of changing intersubjective knowledge through which identities and inter-
ests are defined+See,in particular,Adler 1998+
15+Jepperson,Wendt,and Katzenstein 1996,59+
NATO and Post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 977
the alliance was operating in pursuing enlargement+For example,vis-à-vis the Czech
Republic,NATO’s ability to use membership as an effective carrot was under-
mined by the fact that,by the time the accession talks began,the carrot had already
been promised+Already in 1997 there was a widespread belief both among allied
decision makers and in Prague’s political circles that,if they wished,the Czechs
would be included in the first wave of enlargement+
Subsequently,although NATO
representatives sometimes expressed concern and even dissatisfaction regarding
particular Czech policies,there is no evidence that they linked those concerns to
threats to withdraw the membership invitation+Conversely,Romania was excluded
from the first wave of enlargement and the allies refused to promise NATO mem-
bership in the foreseeable future,even in the case of complete Romanian compli-
ance with Western prescriptions+This placed Romanian decision makers in a
difficult position in the domestic arena:they were running the risk of paying the
domestic costs of reform and pro-NATO foreign policy ~for example,supporting
the controversial war in Kosovo!without even having the guarantee of a signifi-
cant international reward for their efforts+
Under these circumstances,to understand the influence exercised by NATO in
the ex-communist bloc,one needs to move beyond a narrow focus on material
resources+Key here is a move away from an individualist perspective to an inter-
subjective understanding of power as competence+According to the competence
model,status and the power to act are not inherently attributed to the resources
possessed by a given entity,but depend on their recognition in a given set of inter-
national interactions+
Here,intersubjective power refers to the ability of NATO
to act as an authoritative agent providing “correct” interpretations of the world,
including definitions of the self and others,and identifying reasonable actions in
that world+At the same time,that social role entailed duties for NATO,and placed
limitations on what the organization could legitimately do in Central and Eastern
Europe ~for example,it ruled out the use of force against democratically elected
governments in the name of promoting reforms!+
Of course,the post–Cold War world has been marked by substantial asymme-
tries in resources between East and West+It is also true that at least the centrist,
proliberal political elites from the Czech Republic and Romania were,from the
early 1990s,keen to see their countries integrated into the Euro-Atlantic struc-
tures,including NATO+But what was key to this relationship was not simply the
material power yielded by the allies—either collectively,or by the United States
16+Author’s interviews with senior NATO officials from the Political Affairs division,12 October
1999 and 28 April 2000,Brussels;and with Czech foreign affairs officials,10 April 2000,Prague+See
also the Czech News Agency ~CTK!press release on “NATO Membership,” 10 October 1997+For a
broader empirical analysis of NATO’s post–Cold War enlargement,see,for example,Asmus 2002+
17+On the competence model of power,see Guzzini 2000;Williams 1997;and Williams and Neu-
mann 2000+Also relevant are Adler 1997;Adler and Barnett 1998;and Barnett and Finnemore 1999+
For a recent analysis of the role of power in social relations of constitution,see also Barnett and Duvall
978 International Organization
within the framework of the alliance+Rather,key here was the Czechs’ and Roman-
ians’ identification with the Western community,and,hence,their trust in NATO—as
the main security institution of that community+This identification made the Czechs
and Romanians regard the allied material capabilities as friendly,rather than a
source of threat+Or,the material strength of NATO allies ~particularly the United
States!is not always seen as benign;indeed,many actors in the world assign a
different interpretation to the Western community and to the United States as a
perceived leader of that community,and,on this basis,regard the strength of this
community as a source of threat+To appreciate the multitude of possible meanings
that states can attach to the material capabilities of NATO allies,one need only
consider the meaning that,say,some Middle Eastern countries would attach to
NATO offers of guidance in the reform process,the presence of allied troops on
their territory,or requests to participate in the wars waged by the alliance+By
contrast,Romanian reformers continued to pursue their country’s integration into
NATO,to act as a de facto allied state ~particularly in the Kosovo crisis!,and to
carry out the liberal-democratic reforms prescribed by the allies,even when it
became clear that it was more likely for Romanian troops to die fighting NATO’s
wars abroad than it was for NATO troops to die defending Bucharest against an
invasion by an enemy state ~for example,Russia!+After all,in Kosovo and Bos-
nia,and later in Afghanistan and Iraq,Romanian troops participated alongside the
allies in wars that had nothing to do with the territorial defense of their country+
Mechanisms of Socialization
In interactions with Czech and Romanian actors,NATO relied heavily on teaching
and persuasion+Recent constructivist analyses have shown that persuasion is more
successful when the parties involved act within the framework of a Habermasian
“common lifeworld,” consisting of collective interpretations of the world and a
common system of rules perceived as legitimate+
This is an important argument+
But,particularly in situations when “novices” are involved,it is useful to start
analyses of international socialization at an earlier stage—in which socializees
are brought into a given cultural framework—and to examine the power that might
be involved in this process+Teaching,from this perspective,can be seen as an
attempt to project into Central and Eastern Europe the common lifeworld of the
Euro-Atlantic community,consisting of shared liberal ideas and norms+
A signif-
icant,although subtle,form of power is involved in this because,if the pedagogic
work is effective,it effectively shapes subjects,leading them to regard the schemes
18+Risse 2000,10–11+
19+See Risse 2000,15;and Adler and Barnett 1998+
NATO and Post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 979
of thought and action disseminated by the socializing agent not as a contingent
cultural product,but as the normal way of thinking and doing things+
Here,it is useful to draw on analyses provided by sociologists,anthropologists,
and social psychologists who have argued that the establishment of shared inter-
subjective interpretations of the world,and definitions of proper modes of behav-
ior vis-à-vis particular subjects0objects in the world,is the result of socialization
processes involving the dissemination of a particular set of conceptual categories
and behavioral dispositions ~in Bourdieu’s terminology,a habitus!,which shape
the ways in which people think about—and act in—the world+
These meanings
enable socializees to define subjects and objects that populate the world,and iden-
tify “normal” relations and attitudes vis-à-vis them+Such pedagogic processes are
usually carried out by state-authorized agencies in the domestic arena+In our case,
however,NATO was able to perform a similar pedagogic role by virtue of the
authority it enjoyed qua the key security institution of the Western community
with which Czech and Romanian pro-reform elites identified+
Again,it is useful to place this discussion within the framework of rationalist0
constructivist debates about socialization+Rationalists have argued that,in dissem-
inating new norms into the former communist bloc,NATO sought to minimize its
involvement in the socialization of Central and East European states+
In their
view,NATO interacted only with decision makers from targeted states,and even
then it adopted a reactive stance,relying,effectively,on “self-socialization” by
those actors+In turn,Central and East European socializees engaged in attempts at
manipulation ~for example,rhetorical action!,so as to secure the rewards pro-
vided by NATO with a minimum of domestic adaptation+
It is reasonable to expect
that,if Central and East European socializees acted according to this rationalist
logic,they would try to increase their ability to engage in rhetorical action by
limiting the information that NATO had regarding the domestic situation of the
reform process+Furthermore,actors defined by characteristics of methodological
individualism would not redefine preferences0identity through social interaction+
By contrast,the type of sociological teaching outlined above—involving the
dissemination of new conceptual categories and new dispositions—would involve
a deeper engagement by NATO in Central and Eastern Europe+How can one estab-
lish whether NATO has actually conducted this kind of teaching? If one were to
find that,rather than simply informing Czech and Romanian decision makers about
the conditions attached to NATO membership,NATO actually engaged in system-
20+See Bourdieu and Passeron 1977,31–39;and Douglas 1975 and 1986+For analyses of inter-
national institutions as teachers of norms,see Adler and Barnett 1998,particularly 39– 41;and Barnett
and Finnemore 1999,699–732+For an earlier account of international socialization via institutions,see
Finnemore 1996+
21+See Bourdieu and Passeron 1977;and Bourdieu 1990 and 1991+
22+Schimmelfennig 2000,125–27+
23+Ibid+, 129+
24+Checkel and Moravcsik 2001+
980 International Organization
atic efforts to teach diverse sections of Czech and Romanian societies,even actors
with no decision-making power,and to teach them a whole “lifeworld,~a set of
new meanings and dispositions for making sense of ~and acting in!the world!,
then it would be reasonable to argue that this process of socialization conformed
to the constructivist logic of teaching+
From a constructivist perspective,one would expect to find consistency in the
activities carried out by various NATO representatives in diverse settings+Consis-
tency refers to efforts to spread the same sets of norms in systematic interactions,
to different sets of students,and even in situations that are not expected to gener-
ate specific changes in policies in targeted states+If,however,one were to find that
different NATO representatives spread different norms,or that they changed their
normative prescriptions depending on the context of interactions with Central and
Eastern Europeans ~for example,public versus private settings!,then one could argue
that NATO made rhetorical reference to norms to enhance its public image,but was
not involved in the kind of deep sociological teaching outlined above+The con-
structivist position would be strengthened if one were to find that Czech and Roman-
ian socializees relied on NATO for guidance in the process of identifying the goals
of democratic reform in areas that involved significant ceding of sovereign power+
In addition to teaching,NATO also relied heavily on persuasion in the social-
ization of Central and Eastern Europeans+Persuasion typically occurs in social
interactions between actors who have drawn different conclusions regarding the
nature,merits,and0or implications of X action or policy,and in which one or
more of those parties attempt,through arguments,to get their interlocutors to rethink
their conclusions+
In the case of persuasion,socializees need not,and indeed
often do not,accept their role as students in the process of learning,from an author-
itative teacher,broad schemes for making sense of the world+They must,how-
ever,recognize the other parties as legitimate partners in a process of ~international!
As in the case of teaching,there are interesting differences between construc-
tivist and rationalist accounts of persuasion+From a rationalist perspective,per-
suasion is closely related to the provision of instrumental incentives+For instance,
rationalists suggest that the persuader is more likely to be successful when it can
provide significant carrots or sticks to the persuadees+
This,then,would lead
one to expect that NATO had an especially weak influence on the Czech Republic,
and particularly after 1997,given that Czechs had reached the conclusion that they
would be included in the first wave of enlargement+Moreover,attempts at persua-
sion would revolve around reminders of the sticks and carrots in NATO’s arsenal
~particularly the power to withhold or grant membership!,and would involve estab-
25+I relied particularly on Cialdini 1993;Terry and Hogg 2000;and Zimbardo and Leippe 1991+
See also,for political scientists’ accounts,Checkel 2001;Gibson 1998;Johnston 2001;Mutz et al+
1996;Payne 2001;and Risse 2000+
26+See Schimmelfennig,this volume;and Schimmelfennig 2003+
NATO and Post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 981
lishing linkages between reforms and the likelihood of securing membership in
From a constructivist perspective,interactions governed by the logic of persua-
sion involve different dynamics+Actors that engage in persuasion do not mobilize
coercion vis-à-vis their interlocutors+Similarly,they do not rely on the promise of
direct instrumental benefits as a way of getting subjects to enact prescribed reforms+
Rather,actors engaged in persuasion try to present a given course of action as
“the right thing to do,” even in the absence of direct international rewards for
taking that action+
The lack of coercion,however,does not mean that no power
is involved in interactions governed by the logic of persuasion+As I mentioned
above,such interactions take place within a socially constructed framework of
ideas,which reflect the power of particular actors to define the “common life-
world” within which certain arguments are regarded as legitimate,while others
~which violate the established collective interpretations of the world!are not+
Successful socialization would lead the socializees to internalize the new ideas
about the nature and purpose of their polity+This internalization would,I suggest,
be revealed by a series of indicators:the socializees would be consistent in their
~re!definition of identity0interest in accordance with the new ideas,and they would
uphold the new definitions vis-à-vis different audiences and in different circum-
stances ~rather than invoke different definitions to different audiences,in an attempt
to enhance their international gains and minimize domestic costs!+In the case of
political elites with decision-making power in the process of postcommunist recon-
struction,it is also reasonable to expect that they would try to protect and promote
the definitions they now take for granted,for instance by seeking to embed them
in the institutions,legislation,and practices of their polity+
Anticipated Scope Conditions
Drawing on work developed by social psychologists and sociologists,I suggest
that several interrelated conditions facilitated efforts by NATO to teach new sets
of meanings to Central and Eastern Europeans+To begin with,a pedagogic agent
is more likely to be successful when the parties involved recognize their respec-
tive roles as “teacher” and “students+” Two subconditions are relevant in my case+
Regarding the socializer,this involves NATO’s definition of Central and Eastern
Europeans as changeable and responsible—and thus teachable subjects+
ing would most likely not be a reasonable option vis-à-vis those actors if they
were seen as,say,inherently nationalistic subjects with no significant capacity for
change+At the same time,one can expect teaching to be facilitated by Central and
Eastern Europeans’ self-definition as “students” ~or novices!engaged in the pro-
27+See Risse 2000;Checkel 2001;and Checkel and Moravcsik 2001+Also relevant is Jupille,Capo-
raso,and Checkel 2003+
28+I owe this point to Michael C+Williams+
982 International Organization
cess of learning new norms of governance+The novice factor should be even more
important when socializees recognize a given international socializer as represen-
tative of a given social group,or community,with which they identify+
Another condition affecting international teaching involves systematic inter-
actions with targeted subjects+As anthropologists and sociologists of culture have
argued,to succeed in constructing the “common sense” of targeted subjects,edu-
cational practices must be carried out consistently,over a relatively long period of
Therefore,I suggest that NATO is likely to be particularly successful in
teaching actors who are intensely and extensively exposed to the ideas promoted
by the organization+An examination of educational practices using analytical tools
developed by sociologists such as Bourdieu and Passeron enables one to nuance
the time0contact hypothesis,which maintains that socialization is more likely to
be effective if socializers and socializees meet repeatedly over a long period of
I expect to find that the extensive use of teaching made a difference,par-
ticularly when the nature of social interactions met certain additional conditions— in
this case,mutual recognition of their social roles as teacher or students+In other
words,what mattered was not just the amount of socialization that occurred,but
also its characteristics+
In my view,persuasion can be facilitated by successful educational practices+
The logic behind this is that,if the socializees were to adopt the worldview taught
by the pedagogic institution,further social communication would occur within a
shared normative framework+In this article’s case,the emergence of such a shared
normative framework would enable NATO to formulate arguments within a set
of—Western-defined—interpretations of the world that its Czech and Romanian
interlocutors also accept as correct+
Furthermore,that group of socializees would
have already recognized NATO as a legitimate normative guide in the process of
reconstruction of their polities+As a consequence,NATO representatives engaged
in attempts at persuasion would probably be more easily recognized as trustwor-
thy,knowledgeable participants in debates regarding the desirability of particular
reforms0courses of action+
However,one should not assume that prior teaching guarantees the success of
particular attempts at persuasion+For instance,Czech and Romanian socializees
might adopt the norms taught by NATO regarding transparency,accountability,
and civil society empowerment in the area of defense and security+Yet they might
also challenge NATO’s specific prescriptions,arguing for a different interpretation
29+On identity in social communications,see Checkel 2001;and Checkel and Moravcsik 2001+
30+Bourdieu and Passeron 1977,31–39+
31+On the contact hypothesis,see also Beyers,this volume;and Lewis,this volume+
32+Risse 2000,10–11,14 –16+
33+A series of social psychologists have conducted extensive studies demonstrating that arguments
put forward by actors recognized as members of the reference group ~versus “other-group” messages!
are far more likely to be persuasive+See,for example,Terry and Hogg 2000;see also Checkel’s con-
tribution to the debate with Moravcsik in Checkel and Moravcsik 2001+
NATO and Post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 983
regarding the correct application of the new norms in a particular case+I suggest
that persuasion is especially likely to fail when persuadees perceive an inconsis-
tency in the logic of their persuader’s arguments ~for example,in cases of appar-
ent tension between the liberal-democratic norms to which NATO is explicitly
committed,and particular courses of action prescribed by the alliance!+More
broadly,persuasion is likely to fail in cases of breakdown of trust:in our case,
when either NATO per se,or particular representatives of the alliance,are not—or
are no longer—regarded as trustworthy participants in debates about domestic
reform+A breakdown of trust can occur,for instance,if a given NATO represen-
tative ~or team of representatives!appears insufficiently knowledgeable about the
issue at stake,appears to pursue a hidden agenda,and0or departs from the norms
of arguing ~for example,if they dictate a course of action,rather than seek to
convince their interlocutors of the merits of the prescribed solution!+
Data Sources and Methods
Given time and space constraints,this article relies on a limited set of cases of
socialization carried out by NATO+To try and compensate for that limitation,I
have selected my examples in such a way as to include variation on the parties
involved,both within the socializer category ~for example,different NATO repre-
sentatives!and among the socializees,ranging from decision makers involved in
individual accession dialogues,to “next-generation elites” involved in Partnership
for Peace ~PfP!programs+Regarding the category of socializees,because it was
impossible to interview more than a handful of people out of the thousands being
trained in the various NATO0PfP educational programs,I sought to compensate
for this weakness in the data by also obtaining evidence from actors who had numer-
ous opportunities to work with Czech and Romanian socializees,both before and
after their socialization by NATO ~for example,officials affiliated with the Czech
and Romanian ministries of defense—both locals and Western advisers,as well as
members of the armed forces who command PfP graduates!+To minimize the prob-
lem of methodological biases,I adopted a strategy of triangulation,involving:
in-depth,semi-structured interviews with NATO representatives and Czech and
Romanian socializees;participant-observation in three different NATO0PfP edu-
cational activities ~courses and workshops!;and discourse analysis of relevant pub-
lic and semi-confidential documents+
Discourse analysis was important in my
study,as it helped to reveal background intersubjective assumptions regarding the
nature of the world,the identity of subjects inhabiting that world,and relations
among them+
34+On arguing as opposed to dictating,see Joergensen,Kock,and Roerbech 1998+On the impor-
tance of expertise,see Terry and Hogg 2000+
35+See Checkel 2001;and Lewis,this volume+
36+Milliken 1999+
984 International Organization
NATO and International Socialization:
An Empirical Analysis
Following the collapse of communism,the old norms that had governed Central
and East European states lost their legitimacy,communist definitions of state iden-
tity and interests were rejected,and the people from the former Eastern bloc began
the process of reconstituting their polities and rearticulating their relationships with
the outside world+From the point of view of many Central and Eastern Europe-
ans,including many Czechs and Romanians,the West ceased to be seen as the
enemy and became the generalized other by reference to which the new identity
of their countries was to be defined+Thus the changes that occurred in Central and
Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s made possible a new kind of
engagement with Western institutions,including NATO+Subsequently,through com-
plex socialization practices,NATO came to play an important role in the reconsti-
tution of former communist countries such as the Czech Republic and Romania+
Given their political prominence in the Czech Republic and even Romania during
the greater part of the period covered in this study,proliberal elites tended to rep-
resent both countries in interactions with NATO+
Those elites identified with the
Western community,and,hence,recognized it as a source of expertise on—and
key forum for recognition of—those new identities+
Following the electoral suc-
cess of the pro-West coalition,the Democratic Convention,in Romania,Prime
Minister Victor Ciorbea argued that,“historically and culturally,@Romania#belongs
in the West+
Accordingly,by this logic,it was the duty of the new government
to lead Romania in the process of ~re!building a modern democracy and “return-
ing to Europe+” In private,the pro-West elites that had just been projected to power
tended to recognize their position as actors who,in the process of rebuilding their
polity,needed to learn from—and secure the recognition of—Western institutions,
including NATO+In the words of a Romanian Foreign Affairs official,“as a peo-
ple who grew up with the communist ideology,we needed to travel on a long
37+Between 1993–98,the Czech Republic was governed by center-right political forces,grouped
in coalitions that included the Civic Democratic Alliance ~ODA!,the Civic Democratic Party ~ODS!,
the Christian Democratic Union,and the Freedom Union+The 1998 elections led to the formation of
the Opposition Agreement between the Social Democrats and the Civic Democrats+In Romania,between
1990–96,the most power ful political actors were of nationalist and socialist orientation+The ruling
party between 1992–96 was the Party of Social Democracy of Romania ~PDSR!,which was seen by
NATO as too communist to be socializable into Western ideas+Hence,vis-à-vis that party,NATO engaged
in little teaching or persuasion+Gheciu 2005+But that situation changed following the 1996 elections,
which brought to power a pro-West coalition centered around the Democratic Convention+
38+This was acknowledged by several Czech and Romanian foreign affairs and defense officials,as
well as NGO representatives in interviews with the author,March–April 2000,Bucharest and Prague+
39+Prime Minister Ciorbea,in an interview given shortly after President Bill Clinton’s visit to Bucha-
rest+The interview was reproduced,in part,in the Washington Post,12 July 1997,A1+
NATO and Post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 985
journey of learning,” and needed “help from the West” to successfully complete
that journey+
In a similar vein,in the Czech Republic shortly after the Velvet Revolution,
Manfred Wörner,then Secretary General of NATO,reportedly asked President
Vaclav Havel what was the most urgent problem of the postrevolutionary period+
Havel allegedly replied:“I don’t know how we are going to run this country+We
have two options:we can rely on communists who do have some useful experi-
ence but are not politically reliable;or we can put former dissidents in key posi-
tions;these are reliable,but lack the knowledge necessary to run the country+If
we opt for the second solution,we are going to need a lot of advice from Western
As with their Romanian counterparts,Czech reformers regarded NATO
as a key institutional expression of the Western community with which they iden-
tified+Thus,as Havel repeatedly explained to various Czech audiences,NATO
should not be regarded just as a defensive alliance,but,more broadly,as the
expression—and protector—of a “certain civilization circle with its cultural tradi-
tion and responsibility+
Revealingly,after the second round of accession dia-
logues with NATO,Deputy Defense Minister Jiri Payne acknowledged the Czechs’
position as novices in the area of security,as he pointed out that they still had a
lot to learn in the area of planning,programming,and budgeting for security+As
Payne explained,“planning security is something we never really did+It used to
be made in Moscow and we only received instructions+
It is true that in the early 1990s Prague initiated a series of reforms in the area
of defense+However,in important ways those reforms were inconsistent with the
norms of liberal democracy,as defined by NATO+
At the start of the accession
dialogues,the vision of state-society relations held by Czech and,later,Romanian
reformers revolved around a rigid,highly hierarchical model+
From NATO’s point
of view,that was not what liberal democracy was all about+The prevailing idea in
Prague and Bucharest was that the military ought to be governed in a top-down
style,which left little if any room for transparency and democratic accountability
of civilian leaders+For their part,not only were the armies of former communist
countries top-heavy and inefficient;they were also indoctrinated with communist
ideas+For instance,particularly in Romania,there was virtually no understanding
of the concept of soldiers as citizens in uniform,entitled to basic rights and bound
by a set of duties concerning the protection of the rights of citizens even in times
of crisis+
40+Author’s interview,6 April 2000,Bucharest+This view was echoed by two members of the
Romanian Delegation to NATO,28 April 2000,Brussels+
41+Author’s interview with a senior NATO official,international staff,12 October 1999+Brussels+
42+Havel,quoted by Hybner 2001,50–52+This was confirmed by a senior member of the Czech
Delegation to NATO,11 April 2000+
43+Payne,quoted by Simon 2004,56+
44+Author’s interviews with NATO officials,including senior officials from the Political Affairs
division,October–November 1999,Brussels+
45+See also Sava 2002;Simon 2000;and Donnelly 1997a and 1997b+
986 International Organization
From NATO’s point of view,the prevailing Central and East European visions
of a democratic polity were flawed,as they were based on a fundamental miscon-
ception of the proper relationship between the state and civil society,a misunder-
standing of the proper roles of different branches of the state in the area of defense,
and a lack of awareness of the domestic and international duties associated with
the liberal-democratic identity+
In the words of a high-ranking NATO official:
“after the end of the Cold War,we realized that while @Central and East European
reformers#were anti-communist,they were not liberal democrats +++their views
of normal state-society relations @in the area of defense#were very different from
those held by NATO members+
In response to that situation,NATO took on the role of educator+On several
occasions,senior NATO officials pointed to the education of Central and Eastern
Europeans as a key process in the transformation of the former Eastern bloc,and
the preparation of partner countries for greater integration into the Euro-Atlantic
community+A key priority vis-à-vis relations with these countries was the trans-
formation of the ideational framework within which the political elites and the
armed forces,as well as the general publics,thought about the world,and—more
specifically—about national and international security issues+The prevailing view
within NATO was that only such an ideational change could ensure the evolution
of former communist countries into stable,“like-minded” democracies+As Chris
Donnelly,then Special Adviser to NATO’s Secretary General,put it,what was
particularly important to NATO was:“changing the way in which the armed forces
@and their civilian leaders#think+
Shortly before he was appointed Secretary
General of NATO,then British Defense Secretary George Robertson referred to
the Czech Army as still having to do a lot of work to completely transcend old
habits and communist attitudes+
According to a senior NATO official,the chal-
lenge was to turn people who had “lived under a highly repressive and rigidly
hierarchical system into members of an alliance of free states,based on consen-
sus,shared values and the norms of consultation+
Evidence obtained through interviews confirmed the information contained
in public records regarding the view that ideational change in Central and East-
ern Europe was key to the process of reform in those countries+According to
three NATO officials,the shared understanding within the alliance was that they
would have to lead the latter “by the hand” in the process of building liberal-
democratic polities+The idea was that NATO would have to teach people from
46+Author’s interviews with NATO officials,including senior officials from the Political Affairs
division and the Office of the Secretary General,October–November 1999,Brussels+
47+Author’s interviews with a senior NATO official,international staff,28 April 2000,Brussels+
48+Chris Donnelly,quoted by Dragsdahl 1998,available at ^http:00www+basicint+org 0pubs0Papers 0
BP28+htm&+Accessed 21 June 2005+
49+See “NATO Membership:Will There Be a Language Barrier?” Radio Praha,11 March 1999+
Available at ^http:00archiv+radio+cz0nato 0english5+html&+Accessed 21 June 2005+
50+Author’s interview with a senior NATO official,Brussels,24 April 2000+
NATO and Post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 987
the former Eastern bloc the proper relationships between state and society,par-
ticularly in the area of defense,to help change their communist mentalities and
get them to understand that “it was not acceptable for civilian leaders to make
decisions in isolation from,and without the knowledge of,their society+
was also an effort to teach the Central and Eastern Europeans the “duties” of
peaceful settlement of disputes and international promotion of human rights and
NATO’s acceptance of this position of teacher was also reflected in the
organization’s actions—particularly the effort to organize hundreds of workshops
and seminars,as well as formal and informal consultations targeting Central and
Eastern Europeans+NATO teams that conducted collective briefings and individ-
ual accession dialogues,NATO experts who led workshops in Brussels,
Prague,and Bucharest,and—since March 1999—Western advisers based at the
Romanian Ministry of Defense,have all stressed the importance of educating pro-
reform political elites to think about democracy within Western-defined catego-
ries+In other words,the condition of mutual recognition of the actors’ roles as
teachers and students was largely met in interactions between NATO and pro-
reform Czech and Romanian elites+
In the discourse articulated by NATO officials during collective briefings and
accession dialogues,the alliance was depicted as an essentially Western institu-
tion,which had always worked to defend the values of freedom,democracy,the
rule of law,and liberal individual rights+The West and its institutional expressions
were portrayed in a relation of opposition to the authoritarian ~“repressive,” “rig-
idly hierarchical,” and “fear-based”!communist system created by the Soviet Union+
In other words,through the use of particular predicates ~verbs and adjectives
attached to nouns,such as “freedom-loving” versus “repressive”;and “based on
consensus and the norms of consultation” versus “fear-based” and “rigidly hierar-
chical”!,the NATO discourse defined a coherent subject,the West,defined by supe-
rior attributes of freedom,stability,and progress+
The idea was that “differences
and national variations” occurred against the background of “common Western
values,” and were set against the inferior other—the communist world+
It was in
its capacity as embodiment of a—presumably superior—community of values that
NATO could now become engaged in teaching the correct norms of liberal democ-
racy to the Central and Eastern Europeans+
In the course of interactions with NATO representatives,Czech actors were told
that,while they had enacted important reforms,they had failed to learn a key
principle of liberal democracy:it was unacceptable to isolate society from debates
51+Author’s interview with a member of the Defense Planning and Operations Division,confirmed
by senior EAPC officials,6 February 2000,Brussels+
52+On predicate analysis,see Milliken 1999,231–33+
53+This idea of diversity within a fundamental Western unity was expressed by all the NATO offi-
cials that I interviewed in Brussels and Prague+
988 International Organization
and decision-making processes in the field of security+
NATO advisers insisted
that the hierarchical-defense institutional arrangements being built in the Czech
Republic represented a deviation from the liberal-democratic model of gover-
nance+That is,in the NATO discourse,the Czech Republic appeared in a position
of becoming vis-à-vis the superior West:while it was more advanced than other
former communist countries,it had not yet reached the end of its journey of tran-
sition to democracy+The concern to lead socializees away from allegedly flawed
definitions of liberal democracy was even more pronounced in the case of Roma-
nia+In interactions with reformers from Bucharest,NATO representatives sought
to delegitimize Romanian understandings of appropriate norms of civil-military
relations,by portraying them as undemocratic+
Teaching occurred within indi-
vidual accession dialogues,within consultations with foreign and defense offi-
cials,and—since 1999—within Membership Action Plan ~MAP!programs+
creation of the MAP was informed by a perceived need for a more comprehensive
system of monitoring and providing feedback to aspirant countries in their jour-
ney to potential NATO membership+
Even as they were told by NATO advisers that many reforms were still needed,
Czech actors received assurances of their significant progress+By contrast,the
Romanians were told that they were in a more precarious position+Given their
particularly difficult communist legacy,the danger was that,unless Romanian
reformers learned true democracy and moved quickly to reconstruct their country
accordingly,the chance to transcend the past could be endangered+AsaNATO
official put it,“Romania is at an important crossroads+After seven years of stag-
nation,it finally has the chance to do what @others#did a long time ago:fully
embrace change+But if Romanians waste this chance,they might not recover for a
very long time+
In other words,similar to the narrative presented to Czech
reformers,the discourse articulated by NATO representatives to the Romanian elites
depicted a universally valid model of state-society relations—involving transpar-
ency and democratic accountability,including in the sensitive area of defense—a
model presumably known and promoted by the alliance+
In relation to that model,
Romania appeared in an ambivalent position;moreover,a position that was infe-
rior to other transition states of Central and Eastern Europe+
54+According to my interviewees,including NATO representatives and Czech officials involved in
the accession dialogue,this issue was stressed by NATO both prior to,and after,the July 1997 NATO
55+Author interviews with senior Romanian officials from the ministries of Foreign Affairs and
Defense,30 March–5 April 2000,Bucharest;and with senior NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Coun-
cil ~EAPC!advisers,24 April 2000,Brussels+
56+MAP also provides for the establishment of a clearinghouse for coordinating security assis-
tance,and enhanced defense planning that establishes and reviews agreed-upon planned targets+
57+Author’s interview with a NATO official from the Political Affairs division,28 April 2000+
58+British Advisers’ Report ~formulated at the request of the Romanian Government!:A Strategic
Analysis of the Evolution of Romanian Politics of Security,Romanian Ministry of National Defense,
NATO and Post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 989
In addition to teaching elites,NATO was systematically engaged in socializing
younger Czechs and Romanians,in civilian as well as military circles+The assump-
tion underlying these activities was that the education of a new generation of lib-
eral elites was necessary if the norms of liberal democracy were to be ~re!produced
in the future+
Since the end of the Cold War,countless courses,seminars,and
workshops for young civilians and military officers were organized at the Partner-
ship Training Centers,NATO’s Defense College,the Geneva Center for Security
Policy,the Marshall Center,the Partnership Coordination Cell,and various defense
academies in Western countries+The explicit goal of these educational programs
was not simply to provide military training,but,more broadly,to expose military
personnel and civilians from NATO’s partner countries to the values and norms of
Western-defined democracy,human rights,and the rule of law,
and to teach them
to define national identity and interests within the framework of those norms+The
Marshall Center’s mission statement reflects a prevailing belief in NATO’s decision-
making circles:that “the current @post–Cold War#environment provides a unique
opportunity to fashion a world for the 21st century truly different from the centu-
ries of conflict that characterized the nation-state system since its inception+The
Marshall Center exists to help educate those leaders from the Atlantic to Eurasia
who will forge a brighter future for all our nations+
Developed as a branch of the Marshall Center,the College of International and
Security Studies targets both senior military and civilian defense officials and youn-
ger people,and explicitly seeks to produce graduates expected to use their knowl-
edge and expertise,as gained through the College’s courses on democratic defense,
to manage security issues in their countries in accordance with liberal-democratic
norms and procedures+
Also centered at the Marshall Center,but as an indepen-
dent organization,the PfP Consortium is “dedicated to strengthening defense and
military education and research through enhanced institutional and national coop-
There are currently more than 260 defense academies,institutes,think
tanks,universities,and research centers located in allied countries and in partner
states+Established in 1998 as part of a U+S+-German initiative,the Consortium
has grown into a massive forum for education in the liberal-democratic “spirit of
the PfP+” Most of the institutions that are part of the Consortium offer a variety of
courses targeting military personnel and civilian defense experts at various levels
of seniority,and seek to turn them into actors who have understood and internal-
ized NATO’s ways of thinking and attitudes about security,broadly defined,and
who can be relied on to take these teachings back home+Those courses depict
59+This was confirmed by NATO officials from SHAPE and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council,
as well as PfP teachers who led courses targeting young Central and East European civilians and mil-
itary officers+Author’s interviews,November 1999–April 2000,Brussels,Mons,and Vienna+
60+Sava 2002,49–56+
61+Mission Statement quoted in ibid+, 52+See also Kennedy 1998+
63+See the PfP Consortium Web site at ^http:00 www+pfpconsortium+org&+Accessed 21 June 2005+
990 International Organization
Western liberal-democratic norms in the area of security as the correct foundation
of a modern democratic polity,in contrast to alternative ~communist and nation-
alist!norms,seen as an obstacle to progress and a threat to domestic and inter-
national freedom and security+
In addition,with NATO’s financial support—and
often with the participation of security experts from NATO’s member states—
several branches of the PfP Consortium have been established in Central and East-
ern Europe+The new programs established in Eastern Europe target both civilians
and military personnel and are aimed at disseminating a Western-style democratic
culture on security issues,to replace the Soviet-style culture on national security+
For its part,NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly ~PA !has conducted more than a
hundred seminars and workshops,with the aim of diffusing knowledge about the
normal functions of parliamentary defense and security committees,and,more gen-
erally,principles of democratic control of the military+For instance,the Rose-
Roth program of cooperation with the parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe
was initiated in 1990 with the explicit aim of strengthening the development of
parliamentary democracy in the former communist countries+The Rose-Roth Ini-
tiative consists of a series of seminars designed to:“promote the development of
appropriate civil-military relations,including the democratic control of the armed
forces”;to “familiarize legislators with key security and defense issues”;to “share
expertise and experience in parliamentary practice”;and “to help the development
of a parliamentary staff structure in CEE parliaments” and thus provide Central
and East European parliamentarians with administrative assistance comparable to
their western counterparts+
More broadly,as Flockhart has shown,social learn-
ing takes place through the PA’s seminar presentations and committee work,in
which the Assembly presents a common Euro-Atlantic interpretation of key for-
eign and security issues,teaching Central and East European actors to interpret
situations,identify problems,and formulate solutions within the framework of Euro-
Atlantic norms,rules,and procedures+
Thus,like the PfP Consortium,the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly has been involved in the diffusion of a new,Western-
based habitus,teaching the Central and Eastern Europeans new ways of thinking
and acting in the field of security+In other words,the condition of systematic edu-
cation that I mentioned above was met in the socialization of Czech and Roman-
ian reformers and potential next-generation leaders by NATO representatives+
The dynamics of the educational activities carried out by NATO came closer to
the constructivist—rather than the rationalist—logic+Those activities were explic-
itly aimed at teaching students to regard Western-defined norms as the correct foun-
dation of a progressive society;they did not simply provide information about the
conditions attached to NATO membership+Equally importantly,the NATO0PfP
64+For a more detailed analysis,see chaps+4 and 5 in Gheciu 2005+
65+See the Rose-Roth Mission Statement+Available at ^http:00www+nato-pa+int 0default+asp&+Accessed
21 June 2005+
66+Flockhart 2004+
NATO and Post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 991
educational activities targeted diverse groups,rather than being directed only at
Central and East European actors with decision-making power+Within the frame-
work of the NATO0PfP educational programs,Central and East European partici-
pants occupied the role of students being exposed to a new culture—to new ways
of understanding the world and thinking about building postcommunist polities+
As indicated in the mission statements of these programs,as well as in the state-
ments issued by some of their organizers,the interactions between NATO repre-
sentatives and Czech and Romanian socializees were aimed at disseminating new
ideas and presenting them as the correct way of making sense of the world,iden-
tifying problems,and finding solutions to those problems+The seminars and work-
shops organized within the PfP Consortium,at the Marshall Center,at the NATO
Defense College,or by the NATO Assembly,were not about promising instrumen-
tal rewards to Central and East European socializees in exchange for their com-
pliance with NATO-prescribed rules and norms+In fact,it is difficult to see how a
system of incentives might have operated within the framework of those pro-
grams+For instance,it is unclear why—or how—the allies might have offered to
reward those Central and East European socializees for learning new norms,when
many of them did not have decision-making power ~hence,were in no position,at
that time,to introduce changes in the actions and policies of their countries!+
In addition to,and often against the background of,systematic teachings,NATO
representatives engaged in specific instances of persuasion+Among the techniques
of persuasion ~or types of persuasive appeals!used by NATO actors,especially
important were consistency,authority,and social proof+Consistency involves link-
ing prescribed reforms to norms that are accepted by socializees as unproblem-
Linked to this,also frequently used were authority appeals,involving efforts
at persuading actors to adopt specific reforms by pointing to the special expertise
of NATO on a given question,or0and invoking the moral reliability of an institu-
tion that embodied the liberal-democratic community+Finally,NATO officials some-
times resorted to social proof,seeking to convince Czechs or Romanians to promote
a series of legal and institutional changes by pointing to examples of established
and even emerging democracies who had set up similar institutions+This argu-
ment posits that if everyone followed a similar course of action,then it must be
the right thing to do,because everyone else could not be wrong+
While teaching and persuasion were sometimes used in tandem,in other cases
these two mechanisms of socialization were mobilized separately+For instance,
vis-à-vis younger students involved in PfP-related courses or in educational pro-
grams at Western institutions,the focus appears to have been especially on teach-
ing them new ways of conceptualizing the world and new dispositions for acting
67+See,for example,Cialdini 1993;and Searing 1995+
992 International Organization
in that world+
In interactions with proliberal actors,however,NATO’s attempts
at persuasion often represented a way of taking socialization a step further:in
addition to teaching them Western-defined norms,NATO representatives also tried
to convince those actors to subscribe to a particular interpretation of how those
norms were to be translated into practice in particular situations+They sought to
persuade Czech and Romanian reformers of the importance of a series of institu-
tional and legislative changes—reforms that were,nevertheless,still being ignored
or even resisted in Prague and Bucharest+The argument put forward by NATO
was that those prescribed changes represented the correct way to implement liberal-
democratic norms+
In the period leading up to,but also following,the Madrid Summit,NATO advis-
ers who participated in accession dialogues and informal consultations in Prague
sought to persuade Czech decision makers to pursue key legislative reforms in the
areas of national emergency and conscription—which were still governed by com-
munist laws+
NATO representatives reportedly relied on consistency appeals:
Czech decision makers were told that the lack of legislative change generated ambi-
guity in the definition of mandates of different governmental branches+That cre-
ated problems of accountability and transparency:within the existing legislative
framework,it was not clear which branch of government had the right to do what
in situations deemed to constitute “national emergencies+” In addition to the obvi-
ous problem of lack of transparency and accountability,the uncertainty associated
with that situation also entailed the danger of abusive suspension of basic individ-
ual rights in the name of an alleged national emergency+Or,according to NATO
representatives,such threats to the basic freedoms of citizens were inconsistent
with the norms of liberalism—hence,they had to be resolved by an emerging
liberal-democratic polity+
Authority appeals were also important in that context:
it was often pointed out that Czech decision makers should trust the advice being
provided by NATO officials,as the latter had,in their countries,acquired signifi-
cant expertise in balancing requirements of legislation that ensured effective mil-
itary responses to crises,with the need to protect individual rights+
As in the Czech case,NATO also sought to persuade Romanian policymakers
to pursue specific reforms to change state-society relations in the area of defense+
There,too,persuasion occurred against the background of teaching:having taught
Romanians the “correct” norms of liberal democracy,NATO representatives tried
to convince them to accept a particular interpretation of the application of those
norms+In the case of Romania—regarded as a “laggard” compared to the Central
68+Author’s interviews with teachers0graduates of the Marshall Center,the Geneva Center for Secu-
rity Policy,and NATO’s Defense College;as well as with three SHAPE officers involved in PfP courses,
November 1999–February 2000,Geneva,Brussels and Vienna+
69+Author’s interviews with two senior NATO officials,international staff ~Political Affairs divi-
sion!,29 November 1999,Brussels+
70+Author’s interviews with a senior NATO official,international staff,28 April 2000,Brussels;
and with a member of the Czech Senate Committee for Defense,19 April 2000,Prague+
NATO and Post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 993
Europeans—attempts at persuasion were even more frequent,and sought to affect
more issues than in the Czech Republic+NATO’s evolution into a more compre-
hensive agent of socialization was facilitated by two institutional innovations:the
Membership Action Plan,and the appointment of permanent Western advisers to
Romanian,and other East European,defense ministries+These innovations enhanced
NATO’s ability to closely monitor—and guide—the reform process in candidate
In 1997–98 consultations with Romanian members of parliament and defense
and foreign affairs officials,NATO recommended the formulation of new legisla-
tion on the state of emergency,as well as legislation governing defense plan-
Western advisers mobilized the consistency technique,pointing to a basic
tension between the norms of liberal democracy accepted by Romanian reformers,
and the lack of a legislative framework aimed at limiting the power of the Presi-
dent to suspend basic individual rights in an emergency+Social proof appeals also
appear to have been used,the argument being that established democracies had
long accepted the importance of societal scrutiny of defense-related decision mak-
ing+The idea was,if other states sharing the same values had taken this step,then
it must be the right thing to do+
Western advisers working within the framework of the MAP also sought to pro-
mote several institutional reforms,particularly targeting the restructuring of the
Defense Ministry,the institutionalization of channels of communication with soci-
ety,and the reform of the Interior Ministry+For instance,NATO officials argued
that a militarized Ministry of Interior was a serious obstacle to the Romanian reform
process,especially because that ministry had been a key instrument of repression
under communism+
Through consistency appeals,NATO advisers insisted that it
was imperative that Romanian politicians restructure the Interior Ministry in accor-
dance with liberal-democratic principles+
Beyond Elite-Level Socialization: Educating the Public
In some instances,NATO sought to educate Central and East European publics
into accepting a particular definition of national identity and of reasonable politi-
cal goals+A case in point was the public relations campaign designed to enhance
Czech support for membership in NATO+In the Czech Republic,as late as 1997,
the level of public support for membership was low ~under 50 percent!+
reflected disagreements among political parties regarding the desirable future tra-
71+Author’s interviews with Romanian defense officials and security-related NGO member,March
30–April 5,2000,Bucharest;and with an adviser from NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council,24
April 2000,Brussels+
72+Author’s interview with an adviser from NATO’s Political Affairs division,24 April 2000,
73+Author’s interviews with Romanian delegates to NATO,17 February 2000,Brussels+
74+Sarvas 1999,18+
994 International Organization
jectory for their country+While 90 percent of the supporters of the liberal Civic
Democratic Alliance were in favor of NATO,the level of support was around 45
percent among Social Democrats’ supporters,and remained predictably low among
those associated with the Communist Party and the nationalist Republican Party
~respectively,7 percent and 10 percent!+
These divisions were founded on different conceptions of Czech national iden-
tity+For the liberal coalition,NATO membership was tied to the idea of “return”
to the Euro-Atlantic world+From that perspective,common historical roots and
shared values made integration into Western institutions seem normal+
By con-
trast,communist and nationalist groups stressed the importance of cultivating the
uniqueness of Czech society+For them,the key international others with whom
the Czech Republic had historical and cultural affinities were not Western states,
but Slavic nations+For communists and nationalists,entry into NATO would entail
an unacceptable loss of sovereignty+
Between those extreme poles,the Social
Democratic Party proposed a partial integration into Western structures,in a way
that would not endanger the “unique Czech national character+” The Social Dem-
ocrats’ vision translated into proposals for a Scandinavian status,aimed at limit-
ing the loss of sovereignty+In concrete terms,that entailed the submission of the
question of NATO membership to a referendum+In essence,as late as 1997 pro-
Western actors in the Czech Republic were facing widespread domestic skepti-
cism about the desirability of joining NATO,and a strong public view that it was
not in the country’s interest to take on the obligations associated with NATO mem-
bership ~for example,sending Czech soldiers to defend other states,accepting allied
troops in the Czech Republic,and,potentially,enhancing the military budget in
the context of a perceived lack of military threats to the country!+
Given that Czech leaders attributed that public opinion climate to long-term com-
munist propaganda,NATO advised an informational campaign to educate the pub-
lic in understanding the appropriate relationship between their country and the
Atlantic organization+
NATO’s Media Office then worked with Czech policymak-
ers and media representatives,and with domestic nongovernmental organizations
~NGOs!linked to NATO,to organize various educational activities+
This resulted
in an intensive media campaign,which ran from the end of 1997 until March 1998,
and included TV and radio programs,public seminars,and newspaper articles+
The campaign sought to promote a particular interpretation of national identity,
to lead the Czech public to accept if as the natural,common-sense definition of
76+Ibid+, 7–8+
78+For a useful analysis,see Sarvas 1999,32+
79+Author’s interviews with Czech foreign affairs and Ministry of Defense officials,11 April 2000,
80+Author’s interview with an official from NATO’s Press Office,29 November 1999,Brussels;
and with a media officer from the Czech Ministry of Defense,20 April 2000,Prague+
NATO and Post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 995
their identity,and,on this basis,to persuade them that NATO membership was not
only desirable,but also,quite simply,“normal+” During the course of several
months,Czechs were exposed to daily messages stressing the idea of a natural
belonging of their country in the West,and challenging the alternative interpreta-
tion of the Czech Republic as occupying a special position between the East and
the West,as well as the interpretation stressing a special identification with the
other Slavic nations+In other words,one particular condition of education ~sys-
tematic interaction between teachers and students!was met in that case,as there
was an intense media campaign involving newspapers,the radio,and television
Some Czechs did not regard NATO as a legitimate teacher of norms,and some
of them—particularly nationalist and socialist groups—associated the organiza-
tion with Western imperialism,and with an American conspiracy to master the
Reformers in Prague transcended this problem of legitimacy by having
charismatic domestic politicians ~for example,President Havel!convey the mes-
sage to ordinary Czechs+Also,during the public relations campaign,popular Czech
actors and musicians provided “flashy” pro-NATO testimonials,arguing that “NATO
will boost our independence and help us gain international respect+
It was through
the establishment of the transnational network that the condition of recognition of
the authority of teachers was fulfilled in the case of this public relations cam-
paign+Several pro-NATO television infomercials featured a chessboard with the
Czech Republic as a pawn,subject to a long history of international aggression,
great-power manipulation,and domestic oppression under Soviet-sponsored com-
munism+Against this background of historical tragedies,voice-overs presented
NATO as a trustworthy source of stability,progress,and security+This was achieved
by telling NATO’s history—presented as a story of strength against communism,
cooperation,and respect among the allies united around shared values and suc-
cessful protection of the Western civilization against a multitude of threats+
The discourse put forward by the pro-NATO campaign invoked a natural affin-
ity with the Western world,depicted as a “messianic” figure which “will help us
achieve political stability+
The Czech Republic’s return to that messianic entity
was justified by reference to history and basic shared values+President Havel’s
statements remain particularly powerful expressions of this view of Czech iden-
tity as inextricably linked to the West,and an integral part of Europe+In his words,
“NATO entry meant the acceptance of principles of human rights,parliamentary
democracy,and free market economy+
In response to the widespread public
reluctance to take on the obligations entailed by the Washington Treaty,President
81+See Culik 1999;and Sarvas 1999,30–33+
82+Dasa Obereigner,“Czech Republic:Focus on EU,NATO ,” Central Europe Online,March 1998+
Available at ^http:00archive+tol+cz 0transitions0archmar1+html&+Accessed 21 June 2005+
83+Ibid+See also Pecina 1999;and Zajicova 2000+
84+Zajicova 2000+
85+Stroehlein 1999+
996 International Organization
Havel sought to present those obligations as duties associated with the identity of
the Czech Republic as a member of the Western civilization+In his words,in a
situation in which NATO is “an alliance which protects a certain civilization cir-
cle with its cultural tradition and responsibility,
acceptance of the duties of
membership represents nothing less than the Republic’s “determination to meet its
share of responsibility for the freedom of nations,human rights,democratic val-
ues and peace in Europe+
In other words,the pro-NATO campaign sought to
redefine the issue of NATO membership as not simply a choice to join a defensive
alliance,but also as a defining moment in Czech history—the moment at which
the Czech people had the responsibility to affirm their belonging in the West,and
to take on the duties associated with that identity+
Effects of NATO’s Socialization Practices
NATO’s teaching and persuasion had a significant impact on Czech and Romanian
actors+In several instances,following interactions with NATO representatives,
Czech and Romanian socializees redefined their views regarding the correct norms
for governing their polities and the basic purpose of key domestic institutions,
repositioned the national self in the international arena,and reconceptualized the
kinds of domestic and international goals and practices seen as consistent with the
liberal-democratic identity+How does one know that this was not simply the result
of actions by domestic forces,or by other international actors? As I have shown,
in the early 1990s there was a tension between definitions of liberal democracy
held by Czech and Romanian reformers,and definitions that prevailed within NATO+
In the area of security,it was in the aftermath of the socialization carried out by
NATO—broadly recognized by both parties as a process of learning—that Czech
and Romanian actors adopted the Western-defined vision of liberal democracy+As
far as international actors are concerned,in the period covered by this study,NATO
was by far the institution most deeply involved in defense-related Czech and
Romanian reforms+
Following interactions with NATO representatives,there was a significant shift
in the Czech reformers’ views of liberal democracy,in particular involving a redef-
inition of correct norms and institutions in the field of security+The new view was
reflected both in the public discourse articulated by proliberal reformers in Prague,
and in more private comments,with the new norms now being presented as natu-
ral,common-sense aspects of a liberal-democratic polity+The new discourse on
86+Havel,quoted by Hybner 2001,52+
87+Havel,quoted by Jolyon Naegele,“NATO:Havel Backs Continued RFE0RL Broadcasts
from Prague,” 26 February 1999+Available at ^http:00www+r ferl+org0features 019990020F+RU+
990226134718+html&+Accessed 21 June 2005+
88+See also Sava 2002+
NATO and Post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 997
defense was articulated vis-à-vis different audiences and in diverse forums+These
ranged from official declarations on the reform of the armed forces ~in which the
NATO-prescribed model of democratic control of the military and the integration
of the armed forces into society was portrayed as the only reasonable way of gov-
erning this area of society!,to statements issued in the course of workshops and
seminars aimed at teaching schoolchildren,university students,and the public at
large the new norms of defense+
In a similar vein,in interviews conducted by
the author in April 2000,defense and foreign affairs officials all argued that trans-
parency,accountability,and societal involvement were a “normal” and “neces-
sary” aspect of institutional arrangements governing defense in a democratic
The new view regarding desirable state-society relations also informed a series
of legislative changes,most of which were enacted in 1998 ~especially a new Con-
stitutional Act on National Security!,and throughout 1999 ~a package of defense-
related laws to complement the Constitutional Act!+In other words,rather than
engaging in purely rhetorical action,Czech reformers took a series of steps aimed
at embedding the new norms of security into the institutional and legislative fab-
ric of their society—and continued that process even after the carrot of NATO
membership had been promised and subsequently granted+The actions taken by
the Czech policymakers are important because they indicate an effort to promote
the society-wide internalization of new norms+Thus,new laws and institutions
have the effect of ~re!drawing the boundaries of normal arrangements and prac-
tices in a society+
The new legislative package was designed to redress problems
that had been identified by NATO advisers in the course of individual accession
dialogues and related informal consultations+For instance,the new legislation reg-
ulates the conditions under which military and security forces operate in times of
crisis,seeking to limit the threat of abusive suspension of the right to property or
freedom of movement through the declaration of a national emergency state+
Another important area of change concerns the role of societal actors in the
formulation of defense policies+At the end of 1997,the Defense Ministry approved
the Conception of Relations and Communication of the Defense Department with
the Public,which led to the creation of a public relations department in the min-
89+For details on the principles of reform of the armed forces,see the Czech Defense Ministry’s
Web site at ^http:00www0army+cz0reforma0english 0docs0reforma+htm&+Accessed 21 June 2005+The
workshops,seminars,and briefing tours on defense issues in the context of Czech integration into
NATO are often organized by the Public Relations Dept+of the Czech Ministry of Defense in cooper-
ation with the Public Information Office of SHAPE,or by Czech NGOs working in cooperation with
various branches of NATO or the Atlantic Treaty Association+For more information on these activi-
ties,see Hybner 2001,35– 40,and the Czech Ministry of Defense Web site at ^http:00www+army+cz0
scripts0detail+php?id823&+Accessed 21 June 2005+
90+Author’s interviews with foreign affairs officials,12 and 19 April 2000;with officials from the
Ministry of Defense,20 April 2000;and with a former assistant to top foreign affairs officials,18
April 2000,Prague+
91+On this,see Cortell and Davis 2000+
92+Hoskova 1999,8+
998 International Organization
istry,and institutionalized consultations with Czech NGOs+Finally,in 1999 the
ministries of defense and foreign affairs embraced the Western-suggested goal of
institutionalizing a defense community,consisting of societal actors who would
cooperate with governmental agencies in formulating and monitoring defense-
related reforms+
In essence,Czech reformers moved away from their initial model
of postcommunist polity,involving top-down civil-military relations and the vir-
tual exclusion of civil society from debates and decision-making processes con-
cerning defense issues,to a model consistent with NATO’s prescriptions of correct
norms in the area of defense+This is significant,for it reveals a change in the
prevailing definition of key characteristics of the Czech polity ~involving relations
between state and civil society,and the attributes and purpose of key postcommu-
nist institutions!+
The legislative and institutional reforms aimed at implementing liberal-democratic
norms in the field of security—some of them seeking to redress the specific prob-
lems identified by NATO—continued after the Czech Republic had acceded to the
alliance+For example,at its session on 29 August 2001,the Czech government
approved documents on the preparation of the reform of the armed forces,and
stated that the key governing principle of the armed forces will continue to be
civilian management and democratic control+Thus,“the integration of the Armed
Forces into the democratic society will go on and become more profound+
Among other things,the reform documents provide for further improvements in
the communication and consultation with the public,continuation of the process
of civilianization of the Ministry of Defense,the establishment of a more efficient
and transparent ~liberal!economic management of the defense sector,and the adop-
tion of more legislative acts to reflect the new ~liberal-democratic!identity of the
Czech Republic and its new role as a NATO member+
In some instances,pro-reform Czech decision makers requested NATO’s aid in
overcoming domestic obstacles encountered in the process of reform+The relation-
ships involved in such situations can be usefully conceptualized as trans-
national networks,in which Central and East European political actors and
Western officials acted on the basis of shared understandings regarding “correct”
Scholars interested in transnational coalitions have documented the ways
in which,through participation in such coalitions,domestic actors are sometimes
able to put pressure on ~norm-violating!governments to enact change+In my
research,what was especially interesting was that transnational networks often
93+According to Jaroslav Janda,the Deputy Director of the Czech Institute of International Rela-
tions,the goal of the security community was:“to contribute to the development of the civic and
social consciousness of the responsibility for safety,defense and protection of both the citizen and the
state,and to spread the knowledge on how to improve the defense system of the Czech Republic+
Quoted by Hybner 2001,42+
94+See “Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic:Objectives and Principles+” Available
at ^http:00www+army+cz0reforma0english 0docs0reforma+htm&+Accessed 15 January 2004+
95+On transnational coalitions,see Evangelista 1999;Keck and Sikkink 1998;and Risse,Ropp,
and Sikkink 1998+
NATO and Post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 999
involved reformers within the policymaking apparatus in the Czech Republic and
In the Czech case,an interesting instance of transnational networking occurred,
as I have shown,during the 1997–98 educational campaign organized by NATO
representatives and Czech reformers+Following that,the level of public support
for membership in NATO rose to between 55 and 65 percent in March 1998+
a situation in which the choice to join NATO was presented,in domestic debates,
as a choice about the nature and desirable future of the Czech Republic,that shift
represented a significant moment in the postcommunist definition of national iden-
tity+Specifically,it marked an important victory for the view of the Czech Repub-
lic as belonging—completely and naturally— in the Western community over the
view of the country as occupying a unique position between East and West ~and,
therefore,requiring a special,“Scandinavian” status!,and over the view of a pri-
mary identification with Slavic nations+As noted above,joining NATO would have
been an unacceptable course of action within the worldview that defined the West
as the imperialist world,bent on exploiting the Czech Republic+
NATO’s socialization practices had similarly important effects in Romania+Fol-
lowing consultations,collective briefings,workshops,and individual accession dia-
logues,Romanian reformers redefined their vision of a liberal-democratic society,
and reconceptualized their goals regarding the kinds of domestic institutions that
should be established+The change was not confined to their discourse,but came
to be inscribed in key documents adopted by the Romanian government,includ-
ing the 1999 National Security Strategy and the White Book of the Government on
Romania and NATO+Contrary to their initial position,in 1999 Romanian policy-
makers argued that it was essential to enact reforms that would give a stronger
voice to civil society,because this was a normal dimension of building liberal
democracy+According to them,“in a modern democracy,defense should be the
business of the entire society+
Romanian reformers also took a series of steps aimed at embedding the new
vision in the legal and institutional fabric of their society+Through governmental
decrees issued in 1999,new laws on the organization and functioning of the Min-
istry of Defense,as well as on the state of emergency,came into effect+They both
served to bring about changes advised by NATO+For instance,in January 1999 a
special executive ordinance defined limited mandates for different government
branches in a national state of emergency,established Western-style procedures
for the declaration,continuation,and end of the state of emergency,and limited
the right of the authorities to suspend individual freedoms even in that special
96+Author’s interview with an official from the Office of the Media,Ministry of Defense,20 April
2000,Prague+While some polls indicated 65 percent support for NATO membership,others reported a
lower level of support—around 55 percent+On this,see also Sarvas 1999b,18+
97+Romanian Government 1999,129+
1000 International Organization
In addition,another ordinance issued in August 1999 sought to address
the problem of Defense Ministry’s isolation from society+The ordinance required
the ministry to inform and cooperate on a permanent basis with other ministries
and departments,as well as with NGOs+
In addition to these legislative measures,Romanian policymakers carried out a
series of institutional reforms,including further restructuring of the Defense Min-
istry ~for example,via the creation of the function of Ombudsman and the estab-
lishment of a Western-based system of personnel management,aimed at limiting
the practice of political appointments and nepotism and establishing selection,train-
ing,and promotion criteria for career management in accordance with NATO prac-
tices and standards!+At the same time,a series of steps were finally taken in the
direction of reforming the Ministry of Interior,and turning it into a more transpar-
ent institution+The 1999 Romanian Annual National Plan in the area of defense
provided for the restructuring of the police and the gendarmerie,and the retrain-
ing of its members,in an attempt to make these institutions compatible with their
Western counterparts+
Like their Czech counterparts,Romanian reformers sometimes acted within trans-
national networks,seeking NATO’s aid in overcoming domestic opposition to
Western-prescribed courses of action+An interesting case of this involves the
Romanian participation in the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999+The
Romanian government accepted NATO’s definition of the Kosovo crisis as a con-
flict between the progressive,modern values of liberal democracy and the barbar-
ity embodied in the Milosˇevic´ regime+According to NATO’s representation of the
situation,only a country that was not truly committed to the norms of liberal democ-
racy could fail to support the Western military intervention+In a similar vein,against
overwhelming domestic opposition and in spite of significant economic costs that
Romania could ill afford at that time,the Romanian government defined its country’s
participation in the allied operation as the only course of action that was consis-
tent with its emerging liberal-democratic identity+
In other words,in that case
the Romanians acted in conformity to the logic of appropriate action:in spite of
obvious and immediate costs,the option of not supporting NATO was not seri-
ously considered by the Romanian decision makers+Participants in the govern-
mental discussions on the Kosovo crisis noted that the consensus was that support
98+Romanian Government,“Ordonanta de Urgenta 1021+01+1999 privind regimul starii de asediu
si regimul de urgenta ~Emergency Ordinance Regarding the Regimes Governing the State of Siege and
the State of Emergency!,” printed in Monitorul Official al Romaniei,22,1999,1–10+
99+Romanian Government,“Ordonanta 41011+08+1999 privind organizarea si functionarea Minis-
terului Apararii Nationale ~Ordinance Regarding the Organization and Functioning of the Ministry of
National Defense!,” printed in Monitorul Oficial al Romaniei,388,Art+2+
100+Planul National Anual ~Annual National Plan!,48– 49+
101+On the costs associated with that participation,see Gousseff 2000+
NATO and Post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 1001
for the Western intervention was the only reasonable course of action for an emerg-
ing liberal democracy+
In justifying their unqualified support for NATO intervention in parliament,
Romanian decision makers framed their response precisely in the terms of value-
based confrontation depicted in the Western discourse+
When the Romanian lead-
ers explained in parliament why they wanted to grant NATO unrestricted access to
the Romanian airspace,and do so for an unlimited period of time,they pointed
out that,“the Kosovo crisis represents a conflict between democracy and barbar-
ism+Failure to cooperate with NATO might lead the West to place us in the camp
of non-civilized people,for only they would not be opposed to what Milosˇevic´is
doing to Kosovar Albanians+
Both their official discourse and the more confi-
dential statements indicate that in that instance,Romanian decision makers adopted
the logic of appropriate action:it was inconceivable for a country that claimed to
be a modern democracy to do anything other than support the allied efforts to
protect Kosovars+
As it was becoming increasingly clear that the Romanian government and pro-
West societal actors were encountering significant domestic opposition,allied offi-
cials stepped in to help them+NATO allies resorted to a strategy of shaming the
critics of war,by presenting opposition to the Kosovo campaign as an indication
of support of “barbarity+” For instance,Prime Minister Tony Blair pointed out in
his address to the Romanian Parliament on 4 May 1999 that the only appropriate
course of action for an emerging democracy was to take a firm stand against the
actions of the Milosˇevic´ regime+In his words, This is a test for countries like
Romania,on the front-line++++ this is a time for democracies,old and new,to
stand up and be counted+
In addition,allied officials sought to project the image
of a link between compliance with NATO’s expectations and instrumental rewards+
Thus,in that same speech to the Romanian Parliament,Blair promised that the
United Kingdom would support the start of the accession dialogues between the
EU and Bucharest+
A critic might argue that NATO’s pedagogic practices reflect no more than a
case of instrumental learning on the basis of pregiven identity:Czech and Roman-
ian pro-reform elites had decided they wanted to build liberalism,so it was a sen-
sible thing for them to learn how to be “good liberals” from the institutions of the
102+Author’s interviews with senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,7 April 2000,
103+Gousseff 2002,12+
104+Speech by liberal deputy minister for foreign affairs,22 April 1999,Bucharest;printed in Ade-
varul,23 April 1999+
105+Author’s interviews with senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,7 April 2000,
106+Romania Libera,5 May 1999,7+
1002 International Organization
Western world+
But this argument tends to misrepresent the dynamics of the
process of learning that was involved in this case,the competition between differ-
ent interpretations of the correct model of democracy,and the role of identity-
based trust and authority involved in the selection of a particular model+Initially,
as I have shown,the Czech and Romanian reformers’ conception of liberal democ-
racy conflicted,in important ways,with the NATO-prescribed norms of liberal-
democratic governance+The change in the definition of the true meaning of liberal
democracy was not automatic;it was the result of social communications in which
the teachers—recognized as such and trusted by virtue of their identity—played a
key role+In a broader perspective,the importance of identity-based trust was
reflected in the problems encountered by NATO in interactions with Czech and
Romanian groups ~for example,communists or nationalists!who did not recog-
nize it as the reference group,and hence as a legitimate teacher of norms+Accord-
ingly,those actors articulated a different vision of the “good” polity,and advocated
norms and policies that did not conform to NATO’s prescriptions+
Second,the rationalist vision of instrumental learning overlooks the extent of
NATO’s involvement in reshaping the orientation of Czech and Romanian soci-
eties+Thus,in the course of pedagogic activities targeting publics and future elites,
NATO promoted a particular vision of national identity and portrayed the acces-
sion to NATO as a normal—indeed,necessary—course of action given that iden-
tity+In essence,in cooperation with Czech and Romanian reformers,NATO was
involved in efforts to cultivate a particular type of rationality in those countries,
so that certain conceptions of national identity and certain definitions of interest
would come to be widely recognized as correct+In PfP courses and educational
campaigns targeting the public,NATO sought to delegitimize nationalist and com-
munist worldviews—which involved different definitions of the distinctiveness of
the Czech Republic and Romania,and presented the integration into NATO as a
threat to sovereignty—as an irrational course of action+
Scope Conditions and Socialization
The education of Czechs and Romanians by NATO was facilitated by a particular
set of social relations,in which the parties’ mutual recognition of their respective
roles as teachers and students was essential+There was a prevailing collective under-
standing within NATO that Central and East European actors could learn “cor-
rect” liberal democracy,and that,given its identity and expertise,the alliance could
act as teacher in such a process of learning+
In addition,there was a shared
allied view that the establishment of liberal democracy in Central and Eastern
108+See Zürn and Checkel,this volume+
109+See also Williams 2001+
NATO and Post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 1003
Europe would be a key factor of European stability+
Regarding Central and East
European socializees,the political elites that represented the Czech Republic and
Romania in interactions with the organization,as well as most of the younger stu-
dents involved in PfP and other educational programs,accepted their role as “stu-
dents” in the process of learning from Western institutions how to build a new
kind of state+By virtue of its identity,NATO was recognized as an organization
that embodied significant knowledge about liberal-democratic norms in the field
of security,and that could be trusted not to use its significant material resources in
pursuit of a hidden agenda of domination in Central and Eastern Europe+
By contrast,in the Czech case,it was much more difficult for NATO to teach
new ideas and norms to communist or nationalist groups+From the perspective of
those actors,what was needed was not the complete ~re!construction of Czech
society on a Western model+Rather,the process was one of reasserting unique
elements of Czech national character+Nationalists and communists repeatedly
argued that integration into Euro-Atlantic structures threatened to bring the Czech
Republic under the exploitative influence of the West+From that perspective,the
West appeared as a potential threat to the Czech identity,rather than an authorita-
tive guide in the process of postcommunist reconstruction of the Czech polity+
Similarly,in the Romanian case,several political parties and movements—
particularly the socialists and the nationalists—did not see Westernization as the
right way of ~re!constructing the identity of their country+
For instance,the Party
of Romanian National Unity’s ~PUNR!vision of the future relied on a particular
~nationalist!reading of the Romanian past as a blueprint for the future+Accord-
ingly,the idea that Western agencies might shape new domestic institutions was
A related scope condition involved NATO’s ability to secure recognition in the
eyes of its socializees as an institutional expression of the West+As President Havel
insisted,NATO represented “a key democratic structure” of the West+
It was
the acceptance of that identity of the alliance that enhanced its legitimacy as an
educator,and led Czech policymakers to repeatedly appeal to NATO for advice
and invite it to help shape the process of reform of defense policies and institu-
tions+As noted above,this continued after the issue of an invitation to the Czech
Republic,and even following its accession to NATO+
In the Romanian case,as I have shown,a similar acceptance by liberal decision
makers that NATO was an institutional expression of the Western world led them
to recognize the organization as a legitimate educator+This led these Romanian
decision makers to invite NATO to play complex roles in the identification of
110+See Risse-Kappen 1996;Williams and Neumann 2000;and Gheciu 2005+
111+See the political platforms of the PUNR and the Greater Romania Party,available at ^http:00
www+romare+ro0partid0doctrina&+Accessed 21 June 2005+
112+Cited in Ulrich 2000,79+This view was confirmed by senior Czech liberal politicians+
1004 International Organization
national defense goals and reform priorities ~for example,NATO advisers became
directly involved in writing the 1999 Annual National Plan,and the White Book
of the Government on Romania and NATO!+
Such actions simply cannot be
regarded as trivial gestures of compliance with Western expectations+On the con-
trary,they involve an unusual act of ceding sovereign decision-making power
through the reliance on NATO to identify goals and priorities in an area ~national
defense!traditionally regarded as essential to the survival and freedom of the state+
The alliance was able to participate in the postcommunist reconstruction of the
Romanian polity even in a situation in which it did not promise NATO member-
ship in exchange for Romanian adoption of Western norms of good governance+
An additional condition that facilitated the education of Czech and Romanian
actors was the ongoing,systematic interaction between socializers and socializees+
Recent institutional innovations created numerous forums within which NATO had
ample opportunity to interact with,and shape the understandings of,Central and
East European actors+Western advisers who worked with Czech and Romanian offi-
cials argue that,even within the category of pro-reformers,there is a significant
difference between those who were systematically educated into Western ideas,and
those who only participated in a few short sessions of socialization+The former
tend to subscribe to norms taught by NATO,and to define problems and identify
solutions within the framework of those norms,to a greater degree than the lat-
In the case of younger students ~“next-generation elites”!,there is,report-
edly,a similar difference between those who graduated from long-term educational
programs,and those who only attended a couple of seminars and workshops+
Vis-à-vis Czech and Romanian actors who had come to subscribe to the norma-
tive framework taught by NATO,it was easier for the organization to conduct
successful persuasion+In those situations,NATO had the advantage of a shared
normative framework within which duties could be invoked,and reasonable
actions—by reference to collective understandings—could be defined+Indeed,
NATO succeeded,in several cases,in convincing Czech and Romanian reformers
to change their attitudes vis-à-vis a series of reforms+
Yet there were also cases in which,although socializees had adopted norms taught
by NATO,they were not persuaded that the correct interpretation of norms appli-
cable to a given situation was that prescribed by NATO+One relevant case was the
difficulty encountered by a British NATO adviser in convincing Czech officials to
113+Author’s interviews with members of the Romanian Mission to NATO,and with an official
from the Romanian Ministry of Defense,February–April 2000,Brussels and Bucharest+
114+Confirmed by NATO advisers who participated in accession dialogues and consultations at the
ministries of defense in Prague and Bucharest,and military officers who work with PfP graduates+
Author’s interviews,5 April 2000,Bucharest+For the Czech Republic,relevant also were author’s
interviews with NATO0PfP teachers attending a PfP workshop in Vienna,18 November 1999+
115+One problem with the evidence on systematic interactions is that it does not enable one to
assess the importance of intensive—relative to extensive—exposure to socialization,because instances
of intensive socialization also tended to be extensive in duration+
NATO and Post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 1005
set up an integrated emergency security system,thus ending a situation of exces-
sive decentralization of various security services+The Czechs argued that,while a
centralized system might be a good solution in established liberal democracies,it
was inappropriate in the specific case of their country+Given the particular history
and persisting communist mentalities in those institutions,they argued,recentral-
ization would recreate some of the authoritarian bureaucratic tendencies of the
In that case,the problem was one of breakdown of authority,in a situation
in which the persuadees perceived a tension between the liberal norms to which
NATO was formally committed,and the particular solution prescribed in response
to a given problem—a solution that appeared to the Czech reformers as involving
a return to communist-style arrangements+Accordingly,the Czechs argued for an
application of norms of liberal democracy that differed from NATO’s interpreta-
tion of the same norms+The British adviser was unable to persuade them that
centralization in that particular area was needed,and his attempt at persuasion
failed+Interestingly,in the end the Czechs did come to recognize the need for
greater centralization in this area+However,this change occurred as a result of a
domestic process of learning by doing:the 1997 floods made it painfully clear
that the lack of a coordinated approach—more broadly,the lack of clear definition
of duties and powers of state bodies—was undermining the country’s ability to
respond effectively to crises+Following the floods,the government finally estab-
lished a Security Council ~BRS!to improve coordination in the area of security,
broadly defined+
In a broader perspective,it is also important to keep in mind that even when
NATO succeeded in ~re!shaping the views held by Czech and Romanian actors
regarding desirable institutions and correct norms of liberal-democratic gover-
nance,this did not always translate into direct change in the prevailing national
discourse on security,or in the institutions and policies of their countries+In sev-
eral instances,and in various ways,domestic politics complicated the international
process of norm projection+Thus,NATO-socialized Czech and Romanian reform-
ers encountered several domestic obstacles in their attempt to embed the new norms
in the fabrics of their polities+At least two aspects of this problem were especially
significant+Perhaps the most visible problem involved the marginalization of pro-
reform actors socialized by NATO+This problem occurred at the level of political
elites,particularly in the Romanian case,where many of the reformers associated
with the proliberal coalition that governed the country in 1996–2000 were margin-
alized following the return to power of the socialists,led by President Iliescu+The
same problem affected many young Romanian—but also Czech—civilian experts
and military officers who graduated from Western defense academies and PfP
116+Mentioned by several Czech foreign affairs and defense officials;author’s interviews,19–20
April 2000,Prague+
117+See Simon 2004,59+
1006 International Organization
courses,but who,upon their return home,were marginalized by older,more con-
servative superiors who perceived the younger,Westernized experts as a threat+
In addition,attempts at ~re!shaping Czech and Romanian polities in accordance
with NATO-prescribed norms were also complicated by problems of implementa-
tion of the new norms+In several instances,significant tensions persisted between,
on the one hand,new laws and institutional arrangements,and,on the other hand,
actual practices in the area of defense-related decision making+In the case of the
Czech Republic,one relevant example concerns the relationship between the Min-
istry of Defense,Parliament,and the defense establishment+Following NATO’s
guidance,Czech decision makers initiated reforms aimed at enhancing consulta-
tion and cooperation among these different bodies+In so doing,they created the
institutional basis for ending the past practice of isolation and secrecy shrouding
defense policies+However,as late as spring 2000,the practice of interinstitutional
cooperation in this area continued to be difficult,particularly below top-level con-
tacts,where officials have been less exposed to Western-style socialization regard-
ing the democratic control of the military+There,cooperation was hindered by
persisting communist mentalities and practices,and a culture of mistrust on the
part of civilians vis-à-vis military officers and vice versa+
Similar problems occurred in Romania,where a culture of mutual civil-military
mistrust,not unlike the Czech one,created obstacles in the reform process+In the
eyes of many observers,the Romanian reform process was bound to be adversely
affected by the socialists’ return to power following the 2000 national elections+
Yet it is interesting to note that the reforms carried out between 1996–2000,to a
significant extent as a result of NATO’s involvement,continued to have a positive
impact on Romania even under the socialist government+The pro-West,pro-
NATO discourse formulated by the 1996–2000 government,a discourse widely
disseminated through the media and embedded in new strategic documents and
defense-related legislation,portrayed Romania’s liberalization,“return to Europe,
and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures as the only course of action consis-
tent with the true identity of the country+
That discourse shaped subsequent domestic political debates,making it difficult
even for socialist political elites to advocate a different kind of future for Roma-
nia without appearing to favor a relapse into an anti-democratic past+The pro-
West,pro-NATO discourse formulated by the 1996–2000 government,now
embedded in key pieces of legislation,has redefined the boundaries of acceptable
practices and institutional arrangements in a modern democracy+The Iliescu admin-
istration publicly subscribed to the Western-based liberal-democratic norms and
118+See also Ulrich 2000,87+This is similar to the problem of “cultural mismatch” identified by
Checkel 1997+Keck and Sikkink 1998 reach a similar conclusion with respect to the ability of trans-
national networks to promote norm compliance+For a broader analysis of problems of norm imple-
mentation in the area of defense in the Czech Republic,see Simon 2004,especially Part II+
NATO and Post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 1007
principles of reform,including in the area of defense,and adopted and actively
pursued the goal of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures+There was,then,an
interesting shift away from the attitude characteristic of his first mandate,in which
President Iliescu was adamant that Romania should strengthen ties with Russia
and build a sui generis democracy,involving Euro-Atlantic integration only to the
extent that it did not undermine that particular model of democratic polity+
In practice,the socialist government that came to power in 2000 was widely
criticized for its corruption and for failing to take decisive action to carry out a
series of reforms,and it is certainly true that corruption was a problem and the
implementation of liberal-democratic norms was often quite slow+
less,the Adrian Nastase government repeatedly reiterated its commitment to the
completion of the reform process and the integration of Romania into Western
institutional structures+In the field of security,it is interesting to note that a series
of goals formulated in 1996–2000 were actually achieved after the socialists’ return
to power+
In its foreign policy,Romania also continued to support the allies in
their reconstruction efforts in the former Yugoslavia,and has contributed to the
military campaigns and postwar missions in Afghanistan and,more recently,Iraq+
The Romanians were rewarded for their reform efforts and their contribution to
the wars in the Balkans and—more recently—the “war on terror” in November
2002,at the Prague Summit,at which the allies announced their intention to launch
a second wave of enlargement,and included Romania on the list of countries
expected to join as part of that second wave+In 2004,Romania finally achieved
its goal of becoming a full member of NATO+
Some analysts have argued that NATO was successful in promoting liberal-
democratic norms in those two countries because it prescribed things that Czech
and Romanian reformist elites wanted to do anyway+
But this argument tends to
overlook the fact that,initially,Czech and Romanian reformers did not share the
vision of liberal democracy put forward by NATO+If one adopts the view of the
Czech Republic and Romania as “liberal-minded states” that wanted to carry out
NATO-prescribed liberal-democratic reforms in the first place,one loses sight of
119+For a more detailed analysis,see Gheciu 2005,chap+5+
120+For an interesting analysis,see Barany 2003,chap+4+
121+In the presidential elections of 2004,the leader of the Democratic Party,Traian Basescu,defeated
Adrian Nastase ~the president of the ruling Social-Democratic Party!and subsequently managed to
form a government around his Truth and Justice Alliance by appointing Prime Minister Calin Popescu-
Tariceanu+The Alliance formed a government with the Humanist Party ~now the Conservative Party!,
and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania+
122+I am grateful to Judith Kelley,Frank Schimmelfennig,and Michael Zürn for this point+
1008 International Organization
the systematic practices of teaching and persuasion through which NATO sought
to—and often succeeded to—lead Central and East European elites to redefine
their conceptions of liberal-democratic identity and interests+One also loses sight
of NATO’s deep involvement in a process conventionally attributed to sovereign
authorities:that of shaping public opinion,and educating future generations of
political and military elites into a particular definition of national identity+
Finally,let me briefly point to an important normative issue+In my analysis,I
suspended the question of whether this process—which is carried out in the name
of democracy promotion—is justified+Without trying to answer this here,it is
worthwhile to point to a paradox of democracy promotion involved in NATO’s
activities+The implementation of NATO-prescribed norms did,I believe,lead to
more transparent and inclusive arrangements in the former communist countries+
At the same time,however,the process whereby these reforms were carried out
was,in many ways,quite elitist+NATO conducted systematic socialization of polit-
ical actors and military officers from target states and simultaneously sought to
educate a new generation of elites into norms of Western-style liberal democracy+
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Europe+What seemed to be involved in these activities was a version of develop-
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... The socialization model as applied to former communist states and Western institutions implies that by virtue of membership in the institutions and the interaction with the institutions and their older members, the former Soviet bloc countries undergo transformation. Through the adaptation and institutionalization of Western norms they become Western states [Checkel 2001;Gheciu 2005b;Sedelmeier & Schimmelfennig 2004]. ...
... These beliefs are then institutionalized and internalized by the subject. Socialization understood as internalization of norms is linked to identity change [Gheciu 2005b;Hooghe 2005]. In the process of socialization, the subject's identity undergoes transformation as the subject beings to identify with the norms and interests of the socializer. ...
Full-text available
International relations literature of the last decade has characterised the post-Cold War order in Europe as the dissemination of Western norms and institutions eastward. In this process, Western international institutions, in particular NATO and the EU, have been regarded as socialisers and educators who transform former Soviet bloc states into Western-style liberal democracies through 'teaching and persuasion'. This paper analyses the implications of the socialisation model as a discourse on the relations between NATO, the EU and former Soviet bloc states. It argues that, even a decade after many of these states have 'joined the West'as NATO and EU members, the socialisation narrative has perpetuated a distinction between the 'West'as an epistemological-civilisational concept and Central and Eastern Europe as a complementary 'other'. The distinction between socialisers and the socialisees as passive receptors of Western norms has been codified as a 'West vs East'narrative in the literature and public discourse. This paper argues that the preoccupation with a one-way direction of influence in IR literature has not only maintained a false dichotomy, but also overlooked Eastern European agency and the role of these new member states in shaping the Western institutions.(original abstract)
This chapter presents the Cold War balance of power between the United States and its NATO allies, and the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies until the fall of the Iron Curtain. It commences from the objectives of the 1949 NATO Alliance to contain the Soviet Union and its expansionism with standardised norms, which were anti-communist and promoting human rights and democracy, which many inferior nations bandwagoned with. In particular, the North Atlantic Treaty is considered a collective defence organisation that operates outside to provide defence against an external enemy attack with an erga omnes approach by all European and North American signatories vowing to consult threats, defence and aggression against one constituting against all (North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 United Nations Treaty Series 243, Washington, DC, Article 5). However, not all states signed due to primary fears of the Soviet Union and for its containment. Later, many states signed to bandwagon with the United States for military aid and support to enhance Western European defence forces and equipment. This form of regime theory was counterbalanced by the Warsaw Pact. However, the economic and political (liberalised) problems of the Soviet Union are explained that resulted in its dissolution, giving NATO a further opportunity to attain former Soviet satellite states into its membership.KeywordsNATOWarsaw PactCold WarSoviet UnionUnited StatesRussia
The ambition of this chapter is twofold: The first and most important ambition is to theorize conditions for autonomy of bureaucratic organizations. The chapter argues that the autonomy of bureaucratic organizations is supplied endogenously within these organizations and not merely conditioned by exogenous factors such as member states’ cost-benefit analyses (Lipsky, 1980; Wilson, 1989), domestic politicization (Hooghe et al., 2019), or socialization processes outside bureaucracy (e.g., Hooghe, 2007), to mention a few. One secondary ambition is to offer some empirical illustrations or footnotes on the autonomy among office holders in international bureaucracies.
Domestic political forces play important roles shaping the American foreign policy agenda toward NATO and Europe. The evolution of American foreign policy preferences and behavior is arguably as influential as the structure and distribution of power in the international system. This is especially true for American public support for NATO and the how foreign policy elites govern America’s leadership role in the transatlantic alliance. Interestingly, American public support for NATO is as high today as it was during the Cold War. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has added political complexities to those views with partisanship as the most important factor shaping American public views of NATO and U.S. security assistance to Ukraine. This chapter highlights empirical research and theory on the domestic politics of foreign policymaking and dives into the most influential domestic political forces shaping U.S. security commitments to NATO, especially public opinion.
'The Politics of the Eurogroup' provides an intriguing look inside the euro crisis and the secretive forum of finance ministers that came to dominate it. The history of the European Union is a history of crises and the leaps of integration they triggered. As the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and global power competition are clouding the prospects of the European economies, the member states are looking for solutions. Yet they find their options highly constrained by the economic and political realities created in the decade of the euro crisis. This book fuses a critical political economy perspective on structural relations within the Economic and Monetary Union with a power-based approach to its institutions. It explains why a political project of European austerity emerged from the Eurogroup and side-lined alternative policies, with repercussions still felt today. The author introduces a series of interviews with key decision-makers – ministers, central bankers, and EU officials – as well as leaked audio recordings from Eurogroup meetings to give an authentic report of the power struggles between finance ministers. The book retraces how the Eurogroup rose to prominence in the crisis and how a few northern countries – led by the German and Dutch finance ministries – were able to exploit the group’s informal processes to shape the Economic and Monetary Union to their advantage. With its interdisciplinary and investigative approach, this book will be of great interest for scholars and students concerned with European integration, international political economy, economics, institutionalism, and governance. It will also be of value for policy makers in the fields of European politics and economic governance.
The current binary understanding of membership in international organizations (IOs), especially regional organizations (ROs), creates blind spots and biases in our understanding of who matters in IOs, as well as why and how they matter. Existing scholarship primarily looks at full member-states or non-state actors to capture who influences such organizations. Associated states are often portrayed as passive receivers of IO rules instead of active contributors. We address this blind spot and resulting analytical bias by exploring what types of association relationships exist and how they impact IOs. We propose a novel conceptualization of membership that we call member ness. On the level of IOs, memberness is based on the relative openness of organizational boundaries and stratified access via material and ideational contributions. On the level of states, memberness captures associated states’ individual choices to contribute materially and/or ideationally to an IO. Memberness moves away from a purely rights-based understanding of membership (or who you are in an IO) to include a capacity-based understanding (or what you do in an IO). This shift in focus uncovers new channels of influence on IOs. Associated states’ material and ideational contributions to IOs constitute three memberness types: payroller, sponsor, and advisor. We argue that these memberness types impact IOs’ vitality, design, and performance in previously unrecognized ways. We illustrate these types with empirical examples from ROs across the globe and discuss the implications of memberness for IO research programs.
Based on the illustrative case study of Japan-China development cooperation, this chapter offers two novel insights into norm diffusion theory and foreign aid practices. Theoretically, it challenges conventional models of norm diffusion and proposes an alternative, bottom-up diffusion model based on policy learning. Empirically, it challenges the common view that China’s “predatory” aid policy is an outgrowth of its domestic authoritarianism. Instead, this chapter suggests that China’s contemporary aid policy can be better understood as a diffused version of Japan’s aid policy which emphasizes the norms of mutual benefits, self-reliance, and sovereign rights. As an emerging donor, China replicates its own experience of development cooperation with Japan. This chapter advances such an argument in five parts. Following the introduction, the second section articulates the core norms of Japan’s development cooperation policy, which has played a key role in China’s meteoric rise since the 1980s. The third section highlights the congruence between development cooperation policies conducted by Japan and China. Building on these insights, the fourth section discusses how the Japanese model of state-led development assistance has diffused to China, and how this diffusion process has (re)shaped Beijing’s contemporary aid practices. The final section concludes with suggestions for further research.
In the 1990s and 2000s, as NATO enlargement became a reality, scholars commented on the socializing influence of NATO, predicting a transformation of security identities. Was NATO successful in institutionalizing self-restraint and cooperative security among its new members and partners? We contend that it was successful so long as threats to transatlantic security remained low. When states perceive that the threat is increasing, however, more traditional conceptions of national identity displace the cooperative security model. While a great deal of institutional learning happened through the process of NATO accession and partnership-building in the past two decades, the socialization process stopped short of transforming new members’ security mindsets.
DemocracyDemocracy is more central to NATO’s identity now than ever. President Joseph BidenBiden, Joseph R. Jr. has referred to the war in UkraineUkraine as part of ‘a battle between democracy and autocracy’.
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Focusing on relations between NATO and Russia surrounding the Alliance's decision to enlarge, this paper develops a theory of symbolic power that highlights the relationship between identities, narrative structures, institutions, and legitimate action in the construction of security policy. We demonstrate that such a theory provides a significant contribution to analysing the role of NATO in post-Cold War security, to understanding the evolution of NATO-Russia relations, to assessing the 'promise' of international institutions as a means of structuring security relations, as well as highlighting forms of power at work in the social construction of 'security communities'.
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This article summarizes a study of 37 televised debates on political issues in Denmark, conducted live before representative audiences, with polls on the issues before and after each debate. These debates are of interest to research because they were authentic, and they supply data indicating persuasive effects. Various rhetorical features were observed and related to debaters success in attracting votes. In a qualitative interpretation of the observations, we suggest that debates such as these are likely to be won by debaters whose argumentation is fair and thoughtful. Audiences may respond differently depending on whether they are voters or merely viewers. The debate format may enhance such a response, for the benefit of the democratic process.
I construct in this essay a social psychological explanation of a causal mechanism that is common in political life, particularly in the political life of politicians. The explanation consists of an interrelated set of rules about authority relationships between leaders and followers. These rules, which create a structure for political learning through persuasion and manipulation, are explicated with interview data on whips and backbenchers in the British House of Commons and explained by integrating rational with normative models of action.
Theory: In this paper, I present a new way of thinking about the responses Russians give to survey questions. Rather than accepting initial replies as reflecting an obdurate attitude, I treat respondents' first answers as an "opening bid." I then proceed to determine whether these expressed attitudes can be manipulated through the presentation of counterarguments. Focusing on the problem of political tolerance, I have, in essence, required the respondents to give the matter of extending civil liberties to their political enemies a "sober second thought." Relying on theories of persuasibility, I test several hypotheses about the sort of person and attitudes susceptible to persuasion. Methods: My analysis is based on a 1996 survey of the Russian mass public. I used an experimental research design embedded within the survey, with random assignment of respondents to treatments. I test the hypotheses using OLS. Results: This experiment in persuasion was quite effective at converting the initial responses. But following some earlier research, political tolerance was more pliable than intolerance. As expected, perceptions of group threat not only produce intolerance, but they also render the intolerant resistant to persuasion, while making the tolerant susceptible to persuasion. Unanticipated results include the finding that strong tolerant attitudes are more susceptible to persuasion, in part due to their connection to other democratic values that "trump" tolerance, and that dogmatism facilitates persuasion, most likely because the dogmatic give cursory initial responses to our questions. Ultimately, the configuration of attitudes-both the levels of tolerance and their manipulability-supports pessimistic conclusions about the ability of the Russian mass public to develop the political tolerance essential for the consolidation of the democratic transformation. Survey researchers must be mindful of the plasticity of Russian attitudes and values and pursue research strategies that fully acknowledge the dynamics of cultural change within transitional polities.
Constructivist theorists view norms as shared understandings that reflect `legitimate social purpose'. Because the focus is on the ideational building blocks that undergird a community's shared understandings, rather than material forces, persuasive communication is considered fundamentally important to norm-building. In practice, this means that frames are crafted by norm entrepreneurs so as to resonate with audiences. However, the constructivist empirical literature illustrates the central importance of material levers in achieving normative change. Those who promote specific norms also manipulate frames strategically to achieve their ends and do not necessarily convince others to alter their preferences. The global debate over `core labor standards' is highlighted to illustrate the various means by which frames can be distorted by communicators acting strategically, perhaps even to secure their own instrumental interests or to maintain their powerful status. Norms that do not reflect a genuinely voluntary consensus can be seen as illegitimate.
The theory that democratic states do not go to war with one another depends upon the claim that such states can recognize each other as democracies and act pacifically in accordance with this recognition. This article argues that analyses of the democratic peace and security communities can benefit from a fuller and more critical engagement with the thinking of Immanuel Kant. Kantian liberalism involves subtle yet powerful processes of identity construction, and the processes of mutual recognition with which these identities are intertwined play essential constitutive and disciplining roles in the development of political relations. These processes of recognition are not merely sociological puzzles, but rather overtly political practices that both entail and enable the exercise of considerable power. The social construction of democratic security communities builds upon these liberal structures of identity and discipline, a situation demonstrated in the case of NATO.