Content uploaded by Jeffrey D Wolt
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Jeffrey D Wolt on Apr 16, 2021
Content may be subject to copyright.
RESEARCH
PAPER New
Biotechnology Volume
30,
Number
2January
2013
Africa’s
inevitable
walk
to
genetically
modified
(GM)
crops:
opportunities
and
challenges
for
commercialization
James
A.
Okeno
1
,
Jeffrey
D.
Wolt
1
,
Manjit
K.
Misra
1
and
Lulu
Rodriguez
2
1
Biosafety
Institute
for
Genetically
Modified
Agricultural
Products
(BIGMAP),
Iowa
State
University,
Ames,
IA
50011-3228,
USA
2
Greenlee
School
of
Journalism
and
Communication,
Iowa
State
University,
Ames,
IA
50011-1180,
USA
High
relative
poverty
levels
in
Africa
are
attributed
to
the
continent’s
under
performing
agriculture.
Drought,
low-yielding
crop
varieties,
pests
and
diseases,
poor
soils,
low
fertilizer
use,
limited
irrigation
and
lack
of
modern
technologies
are
among
the
problems
that
plague
African
agriculture.
Genetically
modified
(GM)
crops
may
possess
attributes
that
can
help
overcome
some
of
these
constraints,
but
have
yet
to
be
fully
embraced
in
the
mix
of
technology
solutions
for
African
agriculture.
Cognizant
of
this,
South
Africa,
Burkina
Faso
and
Egypt
are
steadily
growing
GM
crops
on
a
commercial
scale.
Countries
like
Kenya,
Nigeria,
and
Uganda
are
increasingly
field-testing
these
crops
with
the
view
to
commercialize
them.
These
countries
show
strong
government
support
for
GM
technology.
Progress
by
these
first
adopter
nations
provides
an
insight
as
to
how
GM
crops
are
increasingly
being
viewed
as
one
of
the
ways
in
which
the
continent
can
invigorate
the
agriculture
sector
and
achieve
food
security.
Contents
Background
and
introduction
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
125
Government
commitment
and
political
will
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
126
Development
of
legislative
and
regulatory
frameworks.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
126
GMO
legislation
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
126
GMO
regulations
and
guidelines
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
126
National
biotechnology
strategy/policy
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
127
Support
for
GM
technology.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
127
Public
awareness
for
informed
decision-making
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
127
Capacity
to
handle
approval
processes.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
128
South
Africa
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
128
Egypt
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
128
Kenya.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
128
Uganda
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
128
Challenges
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
128
Inadequate
public
investment
in
biotech
R&D
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
128
Cartagena
protocol
on
biosafety
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
129
Socio-economic
concerns
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
129
Mandatory
labeling
of
GMOs
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
129
Review
Corresponding
author:
Okeno,
J.A.
(jaketch@iastate.edu,
james.okeno@nepadbiosafety.net)
124
www.elsevier.com/locate/nbt
1871-6784/$
-
see
front
matter
ß
2012
Elsevier
B.V.
All
rights
reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.nbt.2012.09.001
Provisions
for
public
participation
in
approval
process
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
129
Conclusions
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
129
Acknowledgements
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
129
References.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
130
Background
and
introduction
Sub-Saharan
Africa
(hereafter,
Africa)
entered
the
21st
century
grappling
with
starvation
and
food
insecurity.
Currently,
it
is
experiencing
unprecedented
levels
of
poverty,
famine
and
mal-
nutrition.
Actually,
it
registered
the
world’s
highest
proportion
of
undernourished
people
(30%)
in
2010
[1].
The
growth
in
poverty
and
hunger
in
this
region
is
linked
to
under
performing
agricul-
tural
sector
[2],
and
conversely,
a
vigorous
agricultural
sector
is
necessary
to
reduce
poverty,
improve
nutrition
and
upgrade
income
of
the
poorest
members
of
the
society
–
particularly
in
agriculture-based
African
economies
[3,4].
The
threat
of
Africa’s
low
agricultural
productivity
could
be
addressed
by
innovative
science
[5].
In
the
continent,
cereal
production
remains
conspicu-
ously
low
compared
to
the
rest
of
the
world
as
shown
in
Table
1
[6],
yet
most
African
farmers
have
land
assets
that
are
adequate
to
provide
food
security
and
to
rise
above
subsistence.
To
do
so,
they
need
to
sustainably
intensify
production
by
combining
genetic
and
agro-ecological
technologies
that
require
only
small
amounts
of
additional
labor
and
capital
[7].
The
application
of
genetically
modified
organisms
(GMOs)
has
been
proposed
within
the
technology
mix
to
improve
Africa’s
agricultural
productivity
[8,9].
But
Africa
took
a
long
time
to
embrace
GM
technology,
primarily
due
to
lack
of
political
support
or
‘political
will’,
lack
of
access
to
proprietary
technologies,
scien-
tific
uncertainties
and
anti-GMO
activism.
However,
increasing
food
insecurity,
rapid
scientific
and
technological
advances
and
increasing
commercialization
of
GM
crops
elsewhere
have
led
to
a
paradigm
shift,
moving
the
debate
on
GMOs
from
the
confines
of
scientific
and
environmental
groups
to
the
center
of
public
policy
and
politics
in
Africa
[10].
But
GM
technology
is
not
a
silver
bullet
and
needs
to
be
applied
alongside
the
conventional
crop
improve-
ment
approaches.
The
benefits
that
can
be
derived
from
GM
crops
are
now
becoming
evident
in
Africa.
In
South
Africa,
cumulative
farm
income
benefits
were
$643.4
million
from
insect
resistant
(IR)
maize
(2000–2009),
$23.1
million
from
IR
cotton
(1998–2009),
$4.5
million
from
herbicide
tolerant
(HT)
soybeans
(2001–2009)
and
$2.5
million
from
HT
maize
(2003–2009)
[11].
For
Burkina
Faso,
the
total
aggregate
farm
income
gain
in
2009
was
$14.7
million
and
$15.6
million
over
two-year
period
(2008–2009)
[11].
Some
ex
ante
economic
impact
analyses
in
Africa
also
indicate
benefits
from
growing
GM
crops.
In
West
Africa,
growing
Bt
cotton
can
earn
net
benefits
per
year
of
$7–67
million
for
Mali,
$5–52
million
for
Benin,
$4–41
million
for
Burkina
Faso,
$4–38
million
for
Cote
d’Ivoire
and
$1–7
million
for
Senegal
[12].
If
Benin
were
to
grow
Bt
cowpea,
the
net
benefits
would
be
$11–50
million
per
year
[13].
Ghana
would
reap
net
returns
of
$920/ha
if
it
grows
GM
tomato
that
is
resistant
to
tomato
yellow
leaf
curl
virus,
$1542/ha
from
GM
cabbage
that
is
resistant
to
Diamondback
moth
and
$784/ha
from
GM
African
eggplant
that
is
resistant
to
shoot
and
fruit
borer
[14].
By
delaying
the
approval
of
GM
banana,
Uganda
foregoes
potential
annual
benefits
ranging
from
about
$179
mil-
lion
to
$365
million
per
year
[15].
Cognizant
of
these
benefits,
some
African
countries
have
placed
more
energy
in
field-testing
and
the
commercial
production
of
GM
crops.
The
area
devoted
to
GM
crops
in
South
Africa
has
expanded
considerably
since
1998
so
that
by
2010,
it
stood
at
2.2
million
hectares
[16].
Burkina
Faso
first
commercially
planted
IR
cotton
in
2008
on
8500
ha
[17].
That
acreage
has
increased
to
115,000
ha
by
2009
[18]
and
260,000
ha
by
2010,
indicating
a
126%
growth
rate
and
an
adoption
rate
of
65%
[16].
Egypt
first
commercially
planted
IR
maize
in
2008
on
700
ha
[17],
an
area
that
has
widened
to
about
1000
ha
in
2009
[18].
In
2010,
the
area
devoted
to
IR
maize
has
remained
the
same,
due
to
Egypt’s
inability
to
secure
a
license
for
the
supply
of
seeds
[19].
Kenya,
Uganda
and
Nigeria
are
now
field-
testing
more
GM
crops
in
wider
swaths
of
land.
Without
a
‘political
will’
and
government
support,
a
country
bears
the
brunt
of
non-functional
legislative
and
regulatory
frame-
works,
negligible
investment
in
biotech
R&D,
low
public
aware-
ness
[19–22]
and
inability
to
handle
approval
processes.
The
political
dimension
of
GMOs
was
(and
still
is)
the
outstanding
problem
on
GMO-regulation
worldwide
[23].
In
Africa,
the
lack
of
‘political
will’
for
GM
technology
widely
observed
in
most
coun-
tries
is
mainly
attributed
to
Africa’s
policy-making
elites
who
often
were
educated
in
Europe,
send
their
children
to
European
schools/
colleges,
and
travel
frequently
to
Europe
both
on
official
and
New
Biotechnology Volume
30,
Number
2January
2013
REVIEW
TABLE
1
Yield
estimates
of
selected
cereals
in
Africa
compared
with
the
rest
of
the
world
Crop
Yield
(kg/ha)
Africa
Asia
South
America
North
America
Europe
World
Maize
1942.2
4378.8
3842.1
10,271.6
6061.4
5161.9
Rice,
paddy
2612.3
4390.4
4793.5
7941.3
6137.7
4328.7
Wheat
2543.8
2957.3
2028.6
2923.0
3741.3
3038.8
Barley
1665.2
1912.3
2333.4
3463.1
3448.1
2814.0
Sorghum
904.1
1096.3
2873.0
4354.8
4451.4
1403.5
Millet
722.6
883.9
1724.3
1886.8
1191.7
792.5
Source:
FAOSTAT
[6].
www.elsevier.com/locate/nbt
125
Review
unofficial
business.
These
elites
prefer
highly
precautionary
Eur-
opean-style
regulations
for
GMOs,
despite
the
fact
that
Africa’s
needs
and
circumstances
are
so
different
from
those
of
Europe
[24].
This
paper
reviews
the
extent
to
which
the
governments
of
South
Africa,
Burkina
Faso,
Egypt,
Kenya,
Uganda
and
Nigeria
–
the
six
first
adopter
nations
are
committed
to
GM
technology.
It
describes
the
state
of
affairs
in
GM
R&D
and
outlines
the
challenges
these
nations
face
in
integrating
GM
technology
into
their
food
produc-
tion
systems.
Progress
on
adoption
of
GM
crops
despite
challenges
that
have
been
faced
by
these
countries
provides
a
roadmap
for
eventual
wider
adoption
of
GM
crops
throughout
Africa.
Government
commitment
and
political
will
A
government
commitment
to
GMOs
is
evidenced
by
the
estab-
lishment
of
clear
and
transparent
regulatory
frameworks,
support
for
GMOs,
public
awareness
strategy
and
increased
capacity
in
approval
process.
These
elements
are
discussed
separately
in
detail
in
the
following
sections.
Development
of
legislative
and
regulatory
frameworks
GMO
legislation
Legislations
and
policies
must
be
in
place
to
build
a
country’s
competence
to
handle
biotech
R&D
and
commercialization
(Table
2).
Elements
of
biosafety
frameworks
to
regulate
GM
pro-
ducts
are
statutes
passed
by
parliament
and
specific
GMO
regula-
tions
linked
to
these
statutes
that
are
implemented
and
administered
by
a
designated
department
or
ministry.
Whereas
developed
countries
throughout
the
world
have
long-standing
regulatory
regimes
extending
as
far
back
as
outcomes
of
the
Asilomar
Conference
[25],
African
nations
are
late
to
the
table
in
terms
of
both
their
technical
and
procedural
knowledge
of
how
products
derived
from
DNA
technologies
should
be
regulated.
The
promulgation
of
new
laws
and
implementing
regulations
and
guidelines
to
deal
with
GMOs
has,
therefore,
represented
a
very
steep
learning
curve
for
Africa.
South
Africa
was
the
first
country
in
Africa
to
take
this
step
in
the
GMO
Act
No.
15
of
1997
and
its
amendments
(GMO
Act
No.
23,
2006).
Egypt
has,
since
2006,
reviewed
successive
drafts
of
a
proposed,
comprehensive
biosafety
bill,
while
currently
using
Ministerial
Decree
No.
1648
(1998)
as
the
legal
foundation
for
commercialization
[26].
Burkina
Faso
passed
a
GMO
Act
in
2006,
whereas
Kenya
enacted
its
biosafety
law
in
2009.
Nigeria’s
biosafety
act
was
endorsed
by
the
House
and
Senate
in
2011,
and
currently
awaits
Presidential
assent.
Uganda’s
Draft
Biosafety
Bill
is
still
pending.
These
legal
frameworks
share
important
aspects
that
allow
for
GMO
development
to
move
forward
and
do
not
specify
strict
liability
and
redress
as
well
as
not
advocating
for
stringent
precautionary
measures
before
approval.
By
contrast,
for
example,
Zambia’s
Biosafety
Law
advo-
cates
taking
preventive
measures
even
where
there
is
lack
of
scientific
evidence
on
the
threats
of
any
damage
of
GMOs
to
socio-economic
conditions,
human
and
animal
health,
non-
genetically
modified
crops,
biological
diversity
or
the
environ-
ment.
Furthermore,
it
requires
a
person
who
cultivates
any
geneti-
cally
modified
crop
to
prevent
any
contamination
or
commingling
of
the
genetically
modified
crop
with
any
non-genetically
mod-
ified
crop,
failure
to
which
he/she
commits
an
offence
and
is
liable
upon
conviction
to
a
fine
not
exceeding
five
hundred
thousand
penalty
units
or
to
imprisonment
for
a
term
not
exceeding
ten
years,
or
both.
In
addition,
Zambia’s
Biosafety
Law
advocates
a
strict
liability
for
any
harm
caused
by
the
genetically
modified
organism
or
its
product
and
compensation
to
any
person
to
whom
the
harm
is
caused.
These
standards
for
approval
of
GM
crops
in
Zambia
have
been
described
as
‘prohibitively
high’
[27],
favoring
greater
protection
against
perceived
risks.
Countries
adopting
this
stance
would
like
to
see
benefits
without
significant
risk
and
adverse
socio-economic
impact.
Zero
risk
is
neither
practically
achievable
nor
scientifically
defensible,
and
so
these
statutes
essentially
close
the
door
to
GM
crops
in
countries
where
they
have
been
adopted.
GMO
regulations
and
guidelines
A
GM-enabling
environment
is
anchored
on
regulations
and
guidelines
that
specify
the
conditions
for
research,
field
trials,
and
commercialization.
South
Africa,
Burkina
Faso,
Egypt
and
Kenya
already
regulate
the
commercialization
of
GM
products.
Nigeria
aims
to
move
activities
from
CFTs
to
the
commercializa-
tion
phase,
whereas
Uganda
must
first
enact
its
Biosafety
Bill
before
commercialization
can
occur.
Egypt
empowered
its
Minis-
try
of
Agriculture
and
Land
Reclamation
(MALR)
to
issue
three
enabling
decrees:
Ministerial
Decree
No.
85
(January
25,
1995),
which
established
the
National
Biosafety
Committee
(NBC);
Min-
isterial
Decree
No.
136
(February
7,
1995),
which
promulgated
biosafety
regulations
and
guidelines
for
GMO
research
and
field
trials;
and
Ministerial
Decree
No.
1648
(1998),
which
governs
GMO
commercialization
[26].
South
Africa
published
its
initial
GMO
regulation
in
1999
and
has
amended
it
several
times,
REVIEW
New
Biotechnology Volume
30,
Number
2January
2013
TABLE
2
Enabling
legislative
and
regulatory
frameworks
for
approval
of
biotech
crops
in
1st
six
biotech
adopter
nations
in
Africa
Country
Regulatory
framework
Biosafety
act/bill
Biosafety
regulations/guidelines
Biotech
policy/strategy
South
Africa
Biosafety
Act
No.
2
1997
GMO
Regulations
1999
Draft
GMO
Regulations
2008
National
Biotechnology
Strategy
2001
Burkina
Faso
Biosafety
Act
2006
GMO
Regulations
and
Guidelines
2004
No
stand-alone
Biotech
Policy
Egypt
Draft
Biosafety
Bill
2006
Ministerial
Decree
No.
136
of
1995
Ministerial
Decree
No
1648
of
1998
No
stand-alone
Biotech
Policy
Kenya
Biosafety
Act
No.
2
2009
Biosafety
Regulations
2011
National
Biotechnology
Policy
2006
Uganda
Draft
National
Biotechnology
Safety
Bill
2008
CFT
Guidelines
2006
National
Biotechnology
and
Biosafety
Policy
2008
Nigeria
Biosafety
Act
2011
Biosafety
Guidelines
2001
National
Biosafety
Policy
2006
126
www.elsevier.com/locate/nbt
Review
culminating
in
a
new
draft
regulation
in
2008.
Burkina
Faso
developed
and
adopted
its
GMO
regulations
and
guidelines
by
government
decree
in
June
2004
[28].
Kenya
developed
and
approved
provisional
biosafety
regulations
in
1998
and
2006
for
import,
contained
trials
and
small
scale
CFTs.
With
the
enactment
of
the
biosafety
legislation
(the
Biosafety
Act
of
2009),
Kenya
published
its
GMO
regulation
in
2011.
Nigeria
uses
biosafety
guidelines
approved
in
2001,
whereas
Uganda
has
guidelines
for
CFT
(2006)
and
the
containment
of
GMOs
and
microbes
(2007)
under
existing
legislation.
National
biotechnology
strategy/policy
The
first
adopter
biotech
countries
that
recognized
modern
biotechnology
as
an
engine
for
economic
growth
have
strong
national
biotech
strategies
and
policies.
South
Africa
approved
its
National
Biotechnology
Strategy
in
2001
[29],
which
addresses
human
resource
development,
funding,
regulatory
and
legal
issues
and
support
to
close
the
gap
between
R&D
and
commercialization
[30].
Kenya
approved
its
National
Bio-
technology
Development
Policy
in
2006,
emphasizing
the
gov-
ernment’s
commitment
to
put
in
motion
an
appropriate
and
adequate
legal
regulatory
framework
and
foster
an
environment
that
will
attract
investors.
The
country
also
took
actions
to
accelerate
the
development
of
its
biotechnology
programs
[31].
Nigeria
and
Uganda
also
have
approved
national
biotech-
nology
policies.
Egypt
and
Burkina
Faso
have
no
stand-alone
biotechnology
policies
but
use
various
government
policies
on
biotech
and
biosafety
issues
[32].
Support
for
GM
technology
The
overt
support
from
political
leaders
is
crucial
in
advancing
GM
acceptance
in
Africa.
In
early
March
2011,
South
Africa’s
Deputy
Agriculture
Minister
Pieter
Mulder
said
‘If
we
are
really
serious
about
food
security
in
Africa,
emotional
propaganda
regarding
GM
will
never
get
us
anywhere’
[33].
This
echoes
the
sentiments
of
Burkina
Faso’s
President
Blaise
Compaore
who
underscored
in
2004
that
‘It’s
imperative
for
Africa.
.
.
to
resolutely
focus
on
an
agriculture
policy
that
works
by
adapting
scientific
research
and
new
technologies
to
the
needs
of
the
rural
populations’
[34].
In
Kenya,
former
President
Daniel
arap
Moi
wrote
a
letter
in
2000
to
then
US
President
Bill
Clinton
requesting
assistance
in
modern
biotechnology
[35].
Moi’s
successor
Mwai
Kibaki
also
strongly
supports
modern
biotechnology.
Inaugurating
a
level
II
biosafety
greenhouse
in
2004,
Kibaki
said
that
‘There
is
evidence
that
countries
that
have
embraced
modern
agricultural
technologies
have
improved
economic
performance,
reduced
poverty
and
ensured
greater
food
security
for
their
people’
[36].
Apart
from
the
above
political
statements,
governments
of
pioneer
biotech
countries
have
provided
resources
for
the
support
of
biotechnology
R&D.
For
example,
the
government
of
Kenya
continues
to
fund
Kenya
Agricultural
Research
Institute
(KARI),
a
major
research
institute
involved
in
GMO
research
[37].
KARI,
with
funds
obtained
through
public–private
partnerships
(PPPs),
has
a
state-of-the-art
level
2
greenhouse
and
laboratories
equipped
with
modern
facilities
to
handle
GMO
development
and
evaluation.
In
Uganda,
the
government
in
partnership
with
other
donors
since
2000
has
spearheaded
the
development
of
biotechnology
infrastructure
(greenhouses,
laboratories)
and
human
capacity
in
molecular
biology
and
GMO
transformation
techniques
in
the
Uganda
National
Agricultural
Research
Orga-
nization
(NARO)
[38].
These
twin
capabilities
have
enabled
NARO
to
take
a
lead
in
the
development
and
field-testing
of
many
transgenic
events
involving
different
staple
crops
as
shown
in
Table
3.
Public
awareness
for
informed
decision-making
The
cynicism
surrounding
GMOs
in
some
western
European
countries
has
negatively
influenced
GM
debates
in
Africa
and
reinforced
the
need
for
a
transparent
process
of
engaging
the
public
in
decision-making.
The
first
adopters
of
biotech
in
the
continent
also
lead
the
way
in
formalizing
strategies
to
promote
public
awareness,
education
and
participation.
For
example,
the
South
African
Agency
of
Science
and
Technology
Advancement
launched
the
program
for
Public
Understanding
of
Biotechnology
(PUB)
in
early
2003,
targeting
all
segments
of
society,
but
with
special
focus
on
consumers,
educators
and
learners
[39].
The
PUB
program
aims
to
promote
public
awareness
and
understanding
of
modern
biotechnology
and
to
stimulate
dialogue
on
its
current
and
potential
future
applications.
In
2008,
Kenya
implemented
a
national
biotechnology
awareness
strategy
(BioAWARE-Kenya),
a
six-year
(2008–2013)
strategy
meant
to
enhance
public
under-
standing
and
awareness
through
the
dissemination
of
accurate,
New
Biotechnology Volume
30,
Number
2January
2013
REVIEW
TABLE
3
GM
crops
in
commercial
production
and
field
trial
stages
in
Africa
Country
Crops
&
Trait
Category
A:
GM
crops
in
commercial
production
South
Africa
HT
soybean,
IR
cotton,
HT
cotton,
stacked
IR/HT
cotton,
IR
maize,
HT
maize,
stacked
IR/HT
maize
Burkina
Faso
IR
cotton
Egypt
IR
maize
Category
B:
GM
crops
concluded
or
on-going
in
confined
field
trials
(CFTs)
South
Africa
IR
cotton,
IR
maize,
HT
soybean,
HT
maize,
IR
potatoes,
antimicrobial
sugarcane,
DT
maize,
HT
wheat
Burkina
Faso
IR
cotton,
IR
cowpea
Egypt
IR
and
ST
cotton,
IR
potato,
VIR
potato,
VIR
cucumber,
VIR
melon,
DT
and
ST
wheat
Uganda
Black
sigatoka
(fungal)
and
nematode
resistant
banana,
bio-fortified
banana,
bacterial
(Xanthomonas)
resistant
banana,
IR/HT
cotton,
VIR
cassava,
DT
maize
Kenya
VIR
sweet
potato,
IR
cotton,
IR
maize,
DT
maize,
bio-fortified
sorghum
Nigeria
IR
cowpea,
bio-fortified
cassava,
bio-fortified
sorghum
HT
=
herbicide
tolerant;
IR
=
insect
resistant;
DT
=
drought
tolerant;
VIR
=
virus
resistant;
ST
=
stress
(salinity)
tolerant.
www.elsevier.com/locate/nbt
127
Review
timely
and
balanced
information
to
catalyze
informed
decision-
making
[40].
A
partial
impetus
was
the
baseline
survey
done
in
2002,
which
indicated
that
only
12.7%
of
farmer-respondents
in
Kenya
were
aware
of
biotechnology
[41].
Burkina
Faso
enhanced
awareness
in
2010
by
translating
the
biosafety
law
into
the
three
languages
(Moore
´,
Jula
and
Gulmacema)
most
commonly
spoken
by
cotton
growers
[19].
These
national
efforts
are
strengthened
by
platforms
initiated
by
pro-biotech
non-governmental
organizations
(NGOs).
One
such
platform
is
the
Open
Forum
on
Agricultural
Biotechnology
in
Africa
(OFAB),
now
operational
in
Kenya,
Uganda,
Tanzania,
Nigeria
and
Ghana.
The
OFAB
enables
interactions
between
and
among
scientists,
journalists,
the
civil
society,
indus-
trialists,
policy
makers,
and
farmer
groups
and
consumer
associa-
tions,
which
explore
avenues
of
bringing
the
benefits
of
biotechnology
to
the
grassroots
level
(http://www.ofabafrica.org).
Capacity
to
handle
approval
processes
Scientific
and
technical
capacity
to
conduct
risk
assessment
and
evaluating
scientific
data
of
GMOs
has
been
limited
in
Africa
[20].
The
first
adopter
nations
initially
involved
expertise
outside
the
government
to
perform
these
functions.
However,
after
years
of
handling
GMO
applications,
these
nations
have
appreciable
level
of
expertise
for
risk
assessment
and
regulatory
decision-making
as
evidenced
by
the
number
of
GMOs
approved
for
commercializa-
tion
and/or
CFTs
(Table
3).
Details
how
South
Africa,
Egypt,
Kenya
and
Uganda
have
gained
such
experiences
are
herein
following.
South
Africa
South
Africa
perhaps
represents
one
of
the
most
successful
cases
of
agricultural
biotechnology
transfer
in
the
world.
Its
regulatory
framework
is
most
well-developed
in
the
continent.
Before
the
implementation
of
the
GMO
act
(Act
No.
15
of
1997)
in
December
1999,
the
South
African
Committee
for
Genetic
Experimentation
(SAGENE)
was
established
to
advise
the
government,
industry
and
the
public
on
safety
issues
[42].
The
GMO
Act
of
1997
is
adminis-
tered
through
the
Directorate
for
Genetic
Resources
Management.
It
provides
for
a
Registrar
who
issues
the
approval,
two
regulatory
bodies
(the
Advisory
Committee
and
the
Executive
Council)
and
a
battery
of
inspectors.
South
Africa
has
commercialized
several
transgenic
crops
that
include
six
cotton
events,
of
which
two
are
herbicide
tolerant,
two
are
insect
resistant
and
two
are
stacked
events,
three
maize
events
(two
insect
resistant,
one
herbicide
tolerant
and
one
stacked
event)
as
well
as
a
single
herbicide
tolerant
soybean
event
(G.M.
Marx,
Monitoring
of
genetically
modified
food
products
in
South
Africa.
PhD
Dissertation.
Depart-
ment
of
Haematology,
Faculty
of
Health
Sciences,
University
of
the
Free
State,
2010;
http://etd.uovs.ac.za/ETD-db/theses/
available/etd-10042011-094627/unrestricted/MarxGM.pdf
(accessed
15
May
2012)).
Egypt
Egypt’s
efforts
to
address
environmental
responsibility
for
pro-
ducts
of
biotechnology
began
in
1992
with
the
collaborative
work
between
the
Agricultural
Genetic
Engineering
Research
Institute
(AGERI)
and
the
Agricultural
Biotechnology
Support
Project
(ABSP),
based
at
Michigan
State
University
with
support
from
the
US
Agency
for
International
Development
(USAID)
[26].
During
the
period
1993–99,
the
ABSP-AGERI
project
conducted
a
series
of
internships,
consultations
and
workshops
to
bolster
public
awareness.
A
bio-containment
greenhouse
facility
was
built
and
biosafety
guidelines
for
laboratory,
greenhouse
and
field
experiments
were
completed
in
1995,
paving
the
way
for
three
ministerial
decrees
that
gave
the
momentum
for
biotech
R&D
and
commercialization.
Under
this
regulatory
framework,
Egypt
commercialized
IR
maize
in
2008
and
has
field-tested
numerous
crops
as
shown
in
Table
3.
Kenya
Before
the
implementation
of
Biosafety
Act
of
2009,
which
estab-
lished
the
National
Biosafety
Authority
(NBA),
Kenya
regulated
GMOs
using
the
Science
and
Technology
Act
of
1980.
This
act
established
the
National
Biosafety
Committee
(NBC),
a
decision-
making
organ
that
approves
GM
applications
and
coordinated
by
the
National
Council
of
Science
and
Technology
(NCST)
[43].
In
2000,
Kenya
Agricultural
Research
Institute
(KARI)
planted
the
first
CFT
of
transgenic
sweet
potato
that
is
resistant
to
sweet
potato
feathery
mottle
virus
(SPFMV)
after
nearly
three
years
of
stringent
approval
process
[44].
This
process
moved
Kenya
along
a
learning
curve
to
enable
a
more
rapid
pace
in
handling
subsequent
applica-
tions.
Since
then
CFTs
have
been
conducted
with
IR
maize,
IR
cotton,
transgenic
drought
tolerant
(DT)
maize
and
bio-fortified
sorghum.
The
inaugural
commercialization
of
IR
cotton
is
sched-
uled
for
2014
[45].
Uganda
GM
activities
in
Uganda
are
regulated
under
existing
legislation
by
the
Uganda
National
Council
for
Science
and
Technology
(UNCST),
which
hosts
the
secretariat
of
the
National
Biosafety
Committee
(NBC).
The
NBC
is
the
technical
arm
of
UNCST
and
is
responsible
for
scrutinizing
and
approving
GM
applications
[46].
In
2005,
the
National
Agricultural
Research
Organization
(NARO)
in
collaboration
with
other
partners
launched
a
project
to
geneti-
cally
engineer
East
African
highland
bananas
(Musa
spp.)
resistant
to
black
sigatoka
and
nematode.
The
approval
process
lasted
nearly
two
years,
culminating
with
the
first
CFT
in
2007
[47].
This
exercise
was
a
significant
capacity
building
for
NARO,
in
that
five
more
transgenic
events
involving
four
crops
(two
of
banana,
one
of
cassava,
one
stacked
event
of
cotton
and
one
of
maize)
have
since
undergone
CFTs.
Challenges
Although
first
adopter
nations
have
warmed
up
to
GM
technology,
a
few
hurdles
remain.
These
include
inadequate
public
investment
in
biotech
R&D,
the
impediments
from
a
conservative
view
of
the
Cartagena
Protocol
on
Biosafety,
socio-economic
concerns,
man-
datory
GMO
labeling
policies
and
provisions
for
public
participa-
tion
in
the
approval
process.
Inadequate
public
investment
in
biotech
R&D
Leading
African
biotech
countries
have
funded
the
establishment
of
centers
of
excellence
in
existing
or
new
institutions
to
bring
together
multidisciplinary
research
teams
in
coordinated
biotech
R&D
with
the
goal
of
commercialization
but
so
far
the
investment
has
proven
inadequate.
These
institutions
(national
agricultural
research
institutes,
science
councils
and
life
sciences
faculties
of
the
major
universities)
have
laboratories
and
greenhouses
REVIEW
New
Biotechnology Volume
30,
Number
2January
2013
128
www.elsevier.com/locate/nbt
Review
equipped
with
modern
state-of-the-art
facilities
that
can
support
large-scale
commercialization
of
biotech
products.
Although,
pub-
lic
funding
to
realize
this
goal
has
been
limited,
these
investments
by
the
pioneering
countries
for
biotechnology
do
represent
a
strategic
investment
in
biotechnology
R&D.
For
example,
South
Africa,
a
leader
in
Africa
in
biotechnology
research,
had
total
business
expenditure
on
biotechnology
in
2005/6
of
US$
53.5
million
[30].
Egypt’s
National
Strategy
for
Genetic
Engineering
and
Biotechnology
only
approved
about
US$
4
million
for
biotech
R&D
in
2003
[48].
Although
rather
old,
data
available
for
Kenya
as
of
1996,
indicate
a
meager
US$1.18
million
government
spending
on
all
forms
of
agricultural
biotechnology
research
[49].
Unfortu-
nately,
no
comparable
data
are
available
for
Burkina
Faso,
Nigeria
and
Uganda.
These
countries
have
created
an
enabling
regulatory
framework
that
has
acted
as
a
catalyst
for
attracting
a
range
of
financial
support
from
international
organizations
and
private
foundations
for
public–private
partnerships
(PPPs)
in
biotech
R&D
programs.
In
that
way,
government
resources
have
largely
been
spent
in
training
scientists
and
strengthening
the
plant
breeding
and
testing
programs
necessary
to
integrate
the
GM
traits
into
popular
locally
adapted
farmer-preferred
varieties.
Cartagena
protocol
on
biosafety
Adhering
to
internationally
binding
agreements
is
useful,
but
may
be
an
obstacle
to
science-based
decision-making.
The
Cartagena
Protocol’s
‘precautionary’
principle
of
articles
10,
11
and
26
have
lead
some
nations
to
put
more
emphasis
on
the
potential
risks
of
GMOs
to
biological
diversity,
human
health
and
socio-economic
status
of
the
indigenous
and
local
communities,
even
if
there
is
no
scientific
certainty
to
that
effect.
The
politics
surrounding
the
way
these
provisions
are
interpreted
and
implemented
has
significant
repercussions
regarding
research
and
commercialization
of
geneti-
cally
engineered
indigenous
crops/landraces,
which
form
the
bulk
of
rural
staples
in
Africa.
Paarlberg
argued
‘groups
opposed
to
the
technology
used
the
Cartagena
Protocol
as
a
vehicle
to
persuade
governments
in
Africa
to
set
in
place
European-style
domestic
regulatory
systems
regarding
the
approval
of
GMOs’
[50].
These
groups
worry
about
the
possible
loss
of
native
crop
varieties
that
may
reduce
the
flexibility
and
resilience
of
farming
systems,
and
increase
communities’
vulnerability
to
famine
[51].
The
way
in
which
this
concern
is
addressed
significantly
effects
opportunities
for
GM
crop
development
in
Africa.
Socio-economic
concerns
In
line
with
the
Cartagena
Protocol
on
Biosafety’s
Article
26,
the
GMO
acts
of
Kenya
and
Nigeria
and
the
GMO
draft
Bill
of
Uganda
emphasize
the
need,
before
application
approval,
for
determining
socio-economic
impacts
arising
from
GMOs
on
the
conservation
and
sustainable
use
of
biological
diversity,
as
regard
to
indigenous
and
local
communities.
But
it
is
not
well
elaborated
in
these
acts
how
socio-economic
impacts
will
be
measured
and
analyzed,
and
factored
into
biosafety
decision-making
process
[52].
Mandatory
labeling
of
GMOs
Currently
there
is
controversy
surrounding
mandatory
labeling
of
GMOs.
A
central
argument
for
labeling
is
that
it
enables
consumer
choice
in
consuming
or
avoiding
GMOs,
whereas
a
primary
argument
against
labeling
is
that
there
are
no
proven
health
risks
with
GM
foods
and
labeling
would
seem
to
imply
reason
for
concern.
Even
at
the
international
level
there
is
disagree-
ment
on
this
issue,
where
no
guidelines
have
been
developed
as
yet
regarding
mandatory
labeling
of
GMOs.
In
May
2011,
the
international
Codex
Committee
on
Food
Labeling
(CCFL)
dis-
continued
its
work
to
define
the
terms
and
rules
regarding
the
labeling
of
foods
derived
from
biotechnology
due
to
lack
of
consensus
[53].
The
GMO
acts
of
Kenya
and
Nigeria
and
the
Biosafety
Bill
of
Uganda
have
provisions
for
mandatory
labeling.
South
Africa,
by
contrast,
does
not
require
the
labeling
of
GM
products
except
when
these
products
are
substantially
different
in
nutritional
profiles
from
their
conventional
counterparts.
Mandatory
labeling
may
be
problematic
in
African
countries
where
most
consumers’
understanding
of
the
nature
of
GM
foods,
the
debate
surrounding
them
and
the
alleged
risks
asso-
ciated
with
their
use
remain
nebulous
and
contentious
[54].
In
addition
to
limited
consumer
understanding,
another
challenge
is
the
prominence
of
open
markets
and
informal
trade
in
many
African
economies.
Policy
makers
and
regulators
have
not
taken
these
into
consideration
when
developing
regulations
on
labeling.
Provisions
for
public
participation
in
approval
process
The
GMO
acts
of
the
first
adopter
nations
have
provisions
intended
to
promote
public
awareness,
education
and
participa-
tion
in
decision-making.
South
Africa
invites
public
comments
before
the
Executive
Council
can
evaluate
and
decide
on
an
application.
But
it
is
unclear
how
other
countries
plan
to
involve
the
public
in
decisions
about
the
course
of
action
to
take
regarding
GMOs.
Soliciting
public
opinion
in
open
dialogues
can
be
expen-
sive
and
complex.
Experts
also
question
the
validity
of