ArticlePDF Available

Abstract

A model is presented to account for the natural selection of what is termed reciprocally altruistic behavior. The model shows how selection can operate against the cheater (non-reciprocator) in the system. Three instances of altruistic behavior are discussed, the evolution of which the model can explain: (1) behavior involved in cleaning symbioses; (2) warning cries in birds; and (3) human reciprocal altruism. Regarding human reciprocal altruism, it is shown that the details of the psychological system that regulates this altruism can be explained by the model. Specifically, friendship, dislike, moralistic aggression, gratitude, sympathy, trust, suspicion, trustworthiness, aspects of guilt, and some forms of dishonesty and hypocrisy can be explained as important adaptations to regulate the altruistic system. Each individual human is seen as possessing altruistic and cheating tendencies, the expression of which is sensitive to developmental variables that were selected to set the tendencies at a balance ap...
... Additionally, psychologists have sometimes advocated for the consideration of the so-called norm of mutual responsiveness (Pruitt 1972;Leventhal 1976) as an additional factor encouraging a needs-based approach to distributive justice. However, this concept does not add anything to what is already captured by the social responsibility norm and reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971). Furthermore, the propensity to act altruistically is also structured by attractiveness, liking and emotional involvement with the recipient (Krebs 1970;Golightly, Huffman, and Byrne 1972;Pandey and Griffitt 1974). ...
... This pair of strategies would lead to an unending series of mutual cooperation. (R. Axelrod 1980, p. 4) While the generalisability of the approach as presented in Axelrod's Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma (1980) has recently been questioned (Amnon Rapoport, Seale, and Colman 2015), the reciprocity norm can still be seen as a dominant strategy that can serve individual interests best in the long run (Trivers 1971;Kreps et al. 1982;Bowles and Gintis 2011). In this vein, political economist Elinor Ostrom has shown how individuals operating under conditions of reciprocity, trust and reputation can achieve 'better than rational' outcomes by not succumbing to short run self-interest (Ostrom 1998, p. 1). ...
... A third strategy, which is often explained in reference to the reciprocity norm, was to say that in the long run, altruistic acts are in an individual's own best self-interest. Those building on considerations from evolutionary biology and assuming a homo reciprocans understanding of human nature have argued in this vein (Ostrom 1998;Gintis 2000;Trivers 1971). However, even without assumptions of reciprocity, from an evolutionary perspective, altruism and self-sacrifice can still be interpreted in terms of self-interest by integrating considerations of inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1963). ...
Book
Full-text available
What is fair? The choice of an allocation norm, whether it be need, merit or equality, can either foster cooperation or conflict. Because of the general irreconcilability of these principles of justice, people are forced to make complex trade-offs when allocating resources. The resulting decisions are shaped by individual factors and context, but also the situation in which an allocation problem arises. Addressing these three levels simultaneously and taking the inherent interdependency of outcomes into consideration, this book adheres to a mechanism-based approach. Its findings support a functionalist perspective on distributive justice, highlighting the inherent relevance of the relational structure for the choice of allocation norms.
... Direct reciprocity (DR) is an analogous approach to TFT in evolutionary settings [46]. Agents in a population can choose either to cooperate or defect based on previous interactions and the probability of future interactions. ...
Preprint
Full-text available
Peer incentivization (PI) is a recent approach, where all agents learn to reward or to penalize each other in a distributed fashion which often leads to emergent cooperation. Current PI mechanisms implicitly assume a flawless communication channel in order to exchange rewards. These rewards are directly integrated into the learning process without any chance to respond with feedback. Furthermore, most PI approaches rely on global information which limits scalability and applicability to real-world scenarios, where only local information is accessible. In this paper, we propose Mutual Acknowledgment Token Exchange (MATE), a PI approach defined by a two-phase communication protocol to mutually exchange acknowledgment tokens to shape individual rewards. Each agent evaluates the monotonic improvement of its individual situation in order to accept or reject acknowledgment requests from other agents. MATE is completely decentralized and only requires local communication and information. We evaluate MATE in three social dilemma domains. Our results show that MATE is able to achieve and maintain significantly higher levels of cooperation than previous PI approaches. In addition, we evaluate the robustness of MATE in more realistic scenarios, where agents can defect from the protocol and where communication failures can occur. We also evaluate the sensitivity of MATE w.r.t. the choice of token values.
Article
Standing in others’ shoes is usually describing the phenomenon that individuals switch their position and think about others’ benefits. This common saying can also stimulate the cooperation behavior, no matter in natural system or human society. In fact, Scholars have conducted abundant of researches to explore human behaviors in evolutionary game theory to discover how to improve cooperation among individualist. Results clearly showed that players can achieve the highest payoff when they choose cooperation strategy. However, selfishness among individuals results in that cooperation is not guaranteed every time, and how to improve cooperative behavior still remains a challenge in literature. Nevertheless, we analyzed the notion of “Standing in others’ shoes” through mathematical method, and analyzed this idea by introducing evolutionary game theory. The results indicate that the cooperation can be promoted significantly when players take opponents’ payoff into account. Here, a parameter of u was introduced into the simulation process representing when different strategies are applied by the focal player x and its neighbor, the focal player x will calculate its own payoff at possibilities u, and with the possibilities of 1−u considering its neighbor yi’s payoff. The Monte Carlo simulation is conducted on spatial-lattice network, BA scale-free network and small-world network respectively. The results reveal that the frequency of cooperation can be improved dramatically when parameter u reached a certain threshold.
Article
One of the most important dimensions along which we evaluate others is their propensity to value our welfare: we like people who are disposed to incur costs for our benefit and who refrain from imposing costs on us to benefit themselves. The evolutionary importance of social valuation in our species suggests that humans have cognitive mechanisms that are able to efficiently extract information about how much another person values them. Here I test the hypothesis that people are spontaneously interested in the kinds of events that have the most potential to reveal such information. In two studies, I presented participants (Ns = 216; 300) with pairs of dilemmas that another individual faced in an economic game; for each pair, I asked them to choose the dilemma for which they would most like to see the decision that the individual had made. On average, people spontaneously selected the choices that had the potential to reveal the most information about the individual’s valuation of the participant, as quantified by a Bayesian ideal search model. This finding suggests that human cooperation is supported by sophisticated cognitive mechanisms for information-gathering.
Article
Full-text available
Although organizational mission is central to social venturing, little is known about the nature and origins of social ventures' missions. In particular, the field lacks a framework for understanding the moral content of nascent ventures' “prosocial” missions that rely on quite different—and potentially conflicting—moral values. We engage in an exploratory study, drawing on moral foundations theory and upper echelons theory to develop framing questions related to the moral discourse in social venture missions and the role of founders' political ideology in relation to this moral discourse. We construct a novel dataset using computer-aided text analysis on the mission statements of over 50,000 nascent nonprofit ventures in the United States, supplemented by voter registration data from 17 states and Washington, D.C. Our findings reveal rich nuance in the moral discourse found in organizations' mission statements. Furthermore, founding teams' political ideologies are strongly associated with the moral discourse in their social ventures' stated missions—and in ways that differ intriguingly from findings in moral psychology at the individual level. We draw on these new insights to develop a roadmap for future research on organizational mission in relation to social venturing, moral markets, mission drift, and political ideology.
Article
Corporate charitable giving (CCG) is increasingly pervasive in the global hospitality industry. Among various subtypes of CCGs, many hospitality companies request donations from customers during the service delivery or payment process to encourage customer engagement and co-created social responsibility. Karma—the implicit belief that the universe rewards good deeds and punishes wrongdoings—resonates with consumers’ prosocial behaviors, yet little is known about how karma beliefs, along with various donation elements, affect donation likelihood. Study 1 demonstrates that karma believers are more likely to donate gifts-in-kind than money, as it signals altruism that engenders karmic rewards. Study 2 shows that consumers with weak (vs. strong) karma beliefs are more likely to donate in a public (vs. private) setting due to greater reputational benefits. This research enriches the literature on hospitality CCG marketing and provides insights to managers regarding how to effectively execute donation programs.
Article
Full-text available
Nudging is a method for eliciting a desired behavior. One approach to nudging involves information provision. When information presented for this purpose is designed from an evolutionary perspective, it may reveal a deeper level of rationality within human decision-making that might otherwise appear to be irrational. Based on insights from the evolution of altruism, we previously designed a message to remind people of the benefits they have received from the actions of relatives to realize industrialization. We then demonstrated that using this message in Japan was effective at moderating extreme risk-averse attitudes toward air pollution resulting from industrialization. However, the universality of the intervention effect, including whether it could be affected by exogenous factors, was not explored. Therefore, in the present study, we conducted a randomized controlled trial based on an online survey carried out in Japan, Canada, and the US. The intervention was shown to be effective in all the three countries, but the effect size varied according to segment. Although women showed more intervention effects than men in Japan and the US, no significant sex difference was observed in Canada. In terms of personality traits, higher agreeableness significantly contributed to the intervention effects. The influence of the COVID-19 pandemic, which necessitated many lifestyle changes, was found to weaken the intervention effect by increasing the message effect in the control group. We propose that this effect was caused by an increased perception of familial support in everyday life. These results suggest that the nudge message was universally effective, although the effect size might have been affected by cultural factors and social events.
Article
Opening Paragraph Because within the area we indicate by shading on the map the !Kung Bushmen intermarry among themselves, by custom and preference, members of the Harvard Peabody Smithsonian Kalahari Expeditions needed a convenient way of referring to that area as a unit and arbitrarily called it the region of Nyae Nyae. Nyae Nyae is a corruption of the !Kung name //Nua!ei. The name Nyae Nyae refers strictly to a group of pans in South West Africa (S.W.A.) centred approximately at Gautscha Pan at about 19° 48′ 30″ S, 20° 34′ 36″ E. We extend the application of the name to an area around the pans of about 10,000 square miles, lying for the most part in S.W.A. but reaching some miles over the border of the Bechuanaland Protectorate (B.P.). There are no strictly conceived boundaries around the area. We can only vaguely define it by saying that it does not include Karakuwise to the west or Chadum to the north. It does not, we think, reach eastward much farther than Kai Kai, or southward much beyond Blaubush Pan (40 or 50 miles south of Gam).
Article
SIMILAR, presumably closely related species, such as those placed in the same genus, are sometimes similarly polymorphic in colour and pattern. Thus the land snails, Cepaea nemoralis (L.) and C. hortensis Müller, have many shell patterns in common, and in many Colias butterflies the females may be either white or yellow. In this communication I wish to describe similar polymorphisms in two unrelated and otherwise dissimilar species: a spittlebug and a land snail. The possible significance of such polymorphisms will then be considered.
Article
Opening Paragraph This paper describes customs, practised by the !Kung Bushmen in the Nyae Nyae region of South Africa, which help them to avoid situations that are likely to arouse ill will and hostility among individuals within the bands and between bands. Two customs which seem to be especially helpful and which I describe in detail are meat-sharing and gift-giving. I mention also the !Kung habits of talking, aspects of their good manners, their borrowing and lending, and their not stealing.
Article
"Altruism," defined operationally by means of mutual ratings of a cohort's general tendency to inhibit his own desires in the light of the desires of others, is found to possess an identity which cannot be equated with estimates of social acceptability, popularity, degree of acquaintance, or sociability. Although extrapolation beyond in-group relationships appears unwarranted, a considerable degree of consensus, discrimination, and reliability is apparent. Its relationship to measures of religiosity, authoritarianism, urbanization, faith, neurotic symptomology, socio-economic status, economic involvement, tolerance of egoism, projection, internalization, and socialization are noted. Factor analysis suggests that altruism is an integral part of a "sacred" configuration, while the latter is a fundamental dimension of social interaction.
Article
When using releasers in phylogenetic study, it is essential to consider whether the compared species are sympatric. If they are allopatric, it is often possible to find relationships between all releasers. If they are sympatric it is essential to know something of the function of the releasers, before their taxonomic value can be assessed. Signals that are in some way involved in reproductive isolation are likely to be highly divergent between closely allied sympatric species. They will therefore be useful as characters for specific diagnosis, but of limited value at higher levels of classification. In birds this group will include the male colours of most sexually dimorphic species, especially those that rely on visual recognition, have a short pair bond, and whose reproductive isolation is not yet complete (SIBLEY in press) : also advertisement, pair formation, courtship and some appeasement displays: songs, when they are loud and play an important part in pair-formation: some courtship and perhaps food and nest calls. Releasers of sympatric species whose function discourages specific distinctiveness, will often converge on common types, for the value either of mutually similar signals, or of signals that are for some extrinsic reason most efficient for the context. They are likely to be of limited taxonomic value, even at the specific level. This group includes colours of Batesian and Mullerian mimics; distraction, alarming and aggressive displays used against predators (LACK 1941), alarm calls and displays (HUXLEY 1938) and some nestling and fledgling calls. Releasers selected for moderate specific distinctiveness, with both intra- and inter-specific functions, diverge at a relatively slow rate. They are therefore of little use in specific diagnosis, but are valuable for classifying genera and families. This group includes cryptic colours, especially of female and young; mobbing, pre-flight and aggressive displays; flight and aggressive calls, and some owl-mobbing calls which have secondary functions. A similar moderate specific distinctiveness is found in close-range signals, again valuable in discerning relationships. This group includes colours of eggs and the nestling palate, and perhaps the eye, beak and face colours of adults; some copulatory, submissive and begging displays; soft calls, such as certain alarm cries, and songs which have no function in reproductive isolation, perhaps especially the songs and calls of densely colonial birds.
Article
TESTED THE HYPOTHESIS THAT INCREASED GUILT LEADS TO INCREASED COMPLIANCE. GUILT WAS MANIPULATED IN EXP. I BY INDUCING S TO TELL A LIE AND IN EXP. II AND III BY INDUCING S TO UPSET CAREFULLY ARRANGED INDEX CARDS. IN ALL 3 EXPERIMENTS GUILTY SS COMPLIED MORE THAN CONTROLS. EXP. II AND III FOUND THAT THIS EFFECT OF GUILT OCCURS PRIMARILY WHEN COMPLIANCE DOES NOT INVOLVE MEETING THE PERSON TOWARD WHOM S FEELS GUILTY. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Results from a pilot experiment unexpectedly showed that individuals receiving a favor reciprocated significantly less than those who had not received a favor. These results and those of other reciprocation studies were interpreted in terms of the recipient's attributions about the donor's motives for initiating the favor. A 2nd study was conducted to demonstrate that manipulating the interpersonal context of a standard interaction, in a manner assumed to effect attributions, would reduce or enhance reciprocation. The predicted effect was obtained. Assessments of the mediating processes were only partially successful. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)