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The Psychology of Time: A View Backward and Forward



We selectively review the progress of research on the psychology of time during the past 125 years, starting with the publication of the first English-language psychological journal, The American Journal of Psychology. A number of important articles on the psychology of time appeared in this journal, including the widely cited early article by Nichols (1891). The psychology of time is a seminal topic of psychological science, and although it entered a phase of decline and even moribund neglect, the past several decades have seen a prominent renaissance of interest. This renewed vigor represents the rebirth of the recognition of the centrality of the psychology of time in human cognition and behavior. Our selective overview highlights a number of strands of progress and how they have helped lead to the present, in which the cognitive neuroscience of time and timing in the brain is one of the most fervent and fertile modern areas of brain research. We also discuss some remaining challenges and potential lines of progress.
American Journal of Psychology
Fall 2012, Vol. 125, No. 3 pp. 267–274 • ©2012 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
125th Anniversary Articles
The Psychology of Time:
A View Backward and Forward
University of Central Florida
Montana State University
We selectively review the progress of research on the psychology of time during the past 125
years, starting with the publication of the first English-language psychological journal,
American Journal of Psychology
. A number of important articles on the psychology of time ap-
peared in this journal, including the widely cited early article by Nichols (1891). The psychology
of time is a seminal topic of psychological science, and although it entered a phase of decline
and even moribund neglect, the past several decades have seen a prominent renaissance of
interest. This renewed vigor represents the rebirth of the recognition of the centrality of the psy-
chology of time in human cognition and behavior. Our selective overview highlights a number
of strands of progress and how they have helped lead to the present, in which the cognitive
neuroscience of time and timing in the brain is one of the most fervent and fertile modern areas
of brain research. We also discuss some remaining challenges and potential lines of progress.
The psychology of time has had a unique history
in psychological research. When the formal disci-
pline of psychology emerged from its philosophical
antecedents in the late 1800s, the study of time and
its relationship to mental phenomena was central to
the nascent enterprise (Nichols, 1891). James (1890)
featured this centrality in the inherent structure of his
classic work, The Principles of Psychology. In it, time
past was a function of attention and memory, topics
that have become perhaps the most explored and
investigated of all psychological phenomena to date.
The previous chapter in James’s book, and thus cen-
tral to both his perspective and theoretical discussion,
was time present. It was in that chapter of the text that
he featured what was then known about the percep-
tion of time. Clearly, James saw this issue as perhaps
the central component of human psychological expe-
rience, and rightfully so. How people understand the
nature of time in passing, and its relationship to time
in prospect and to time in memory, is at the heart of
the human experience. Thus, in James’s view, time
perception stood at a pinnacle.
It was only following this centrality that James
went on to discuss future time, or time in prospect,
AJP 125_3 text.indd 267 7/17/12 4:49 PM
in terms of planning and decision making. Of course,
these latter topics have also burgeoned far beyond the
assembled knowledge on the perception of time. Giv-
en this historical foundation, why did time perception
devolve from its pinnacle of importance to the point at
which Adams (1964) concluded that “time perception
is a venerable, tired topic in psychology that interests
very few active investigators any more because no one
bothered to explore the mechanisms of time percep-
tion and how it might enter into meaningful inter-
action with other mechanisms” (p. 197)? Before we
discuss the reason for this demise, we emphasize that
the enthusiastic pursuit of time perception persisted
during at least the rst decade and a half of the 20th
century, along with studies of the eects of rhythm
(Dunlap, 1911, 1915) and provocative observations on
the dierences between the sexes (MacDougall, 1904;
Yerkes & Urban, 1906), to name but two lines of study.
But the study of subjective time perception largely
died with the ascendancy of behaviorism, at least as
far as psychology in the United States was concerned.
In looking to excise appeals to unobservable phe-
nomena, Watson (1913) and his later acolytes strove
for acknowledgeable respectability from the putative
harder sciences for which the essence was direct, em-
pirical observation. In consequence, the pursuit of
issues that featured primarily subjective experience
(e.g., anxiety, fatigue, or any reference to the crucial
role of internal states) was minimized in importance.
Here we see the graveyard of the youth of time per-
ception, because time is the quintessential nonob-
servable. Unlike all other forms of sensory psycho-
physics, time refers to an evidently intangible quality.
As Hancock (2011b) argued, this is what makes the
psychology of time perception dicult to compre-
hend above all other dimensions of experience. This
observation is true not simply for the psychology of
time but for the study of time in general (e.g., Parker,
Harris, & Steineck, 2010).
Although the North American study of time per-
ception died in the crematorium of behaviorism, the
European community, and especially French and
German psychologists, kept the pursuit alive (Block
& Zakay, 2001). Following the tradition of Vieror-
dt (1868; see Lejeune & Wearden, 2009), Bergson
(1889/1913), and Guyau (1890), a number of Euro-
pean researchers continued to study the apparently
intractable nuances of time. Among these, François
(1927) was perhaps the rst to point up the important
link between body temperature and the perception
of brief temporal intervals, an eect independently
identied by American physiologist Hoagland (1933).
Research on the physiological inuences on time
perception has continued to the present, where it
features very much in the neuroscience-based attack
on this puzzle (Hancock, 1993; Rao, Mayer, & Har-
rington, 2001; Treisman, 1984). The French tradition
persisted with the important work of Fraisse (1963,
1984), and the contemporary resurgence in time per-
ception research has owed much to this European
tradition (cf. Pöppel, 1988; Rammsayer, 1997a).
The Resurrection of Time
Shortly after Adams (1964) announced the death of
the psychology of time, a number of studies began to
appear to initiate its resurrection. Arguably the most
emblematic of these was Ornstein’s (1969) disserta-
tion. Perhaps inspired by Huxley’s (1954) popular
text, Ornstein, among others, explored the nonlin-
earity of temporal experience, which had become
most evident under the inuence of mind-altering
drugs such as LSD (cf. Fischer, Grin, & Liss, 1962).
This lead was taken up by clinical psychologists in-
terested in the relationship between drug inuences
and more commonly occurring forms of mental ill-
ness (Orme, 1969). Time perception became a useful
instrument for such explorations and reintroduced
the perception of brief intervals of duration back into
the mainstream of clinical eorts. However, it was
also at about this time that the evaluation of interval
perception also began to reemerge into the experi-
mental world.
To give the impression that no experimental re-
search had been conducted between the 1920s and
the 1960s would be simply false. In fact, a series of
reviewers surveyed the area at fairly regular inter-
vals during the period from the 1930s (Weber, 1933)
through the late 1940s (Gilliland, Hofeld, & Eck-
strand, 1946) and early 1950s (Woodrow, 1951), and
on into the 1960s (Wallace & Rabin, 1960). Much of
this work was directed at a conundrum that has still
to be satisfactorily resolved, namely, how the content
of a specic interval inuences the perception of the
duration of that interval (e.g., Smith, 1969). Block and
Zakay (2001) wrote an extensive review of that early
and later history.
26 8  • hancock & bloc k
AJP 125_3 text.indd 268 7/17/12 4:49 PM
There are some crucial reasons why the psychol-
ogy of time has proved to be such a dicult problem.
The rst is that in assembling the ongoing literature
across the century, we can see that there was no
principled fashion in which the content “lling” the
interval was ordered. The typical investigation used
a series of convenient activities—counting, crossing
o the letter w on a page of text, listening to text,
doing nothing at all, actively trying to estimate the
interval, and so on—in which there was virtually no
theoretical foundation for the chosen activity or ac-
tivities. Surveying numerous introductions to such
works makes paradoxical reading. Many authors
make this point and then go on to select their own
idiographic selection of tasks. Like Adams’s (1964)
earlier observation on the failure to integrate time
perception with other processes, this principled fail-
ure to establish a theoretical taxonomy as to what
connotes a task (which indeed still remains a con-
temporary challenge) inhibited progress. A second
and very much allied question concerned the role of
attention. In the late 1950s and early 1960s attention
itself experienced a renaissance in the early dawn of
the cognitive revolution (Broadbent, 1958). It was all
very well presenting diering tasks, but how could
one control the amount of attention a person paid to
each respective task? This concern itself emphasizes
the issue of individual dierences and the problems
that such interindividual and intraindividual varia-
tion posed, and still poses, to the whole area of time
perception (Doob, 1971; Tien & Burnes, 2002). It
is a topic we will comment on at the conclusion of
our review. We should also note that chronometric
methods of studying reaction time, which we do not
review here, also became an important part of the
nascent cognitive revolution starting in the late 1950s.
Modern behavioral researchers introduced the
scalar expectancy theory (SET) of time perception in
the 1980s, based largely on studies of animals such as
rats and pigeons (for a review, see Church, 2003, and
others). However, SET theorists largely ignored the
role of attention in their formal models. The issue of
attention was raised most pertinently in a revision of
SET that explicitly included attention, the attentional
gate model (AGM; see, for example, Zakay & Block,
The AGM was proposed partly from what has
become to be known as the prospective–retrospec-
tive comparison. This comparison has been explored
most extensively by Block and Zakay (Block, 1974;
Block & Zakay, 1997; Zakay, 1993). In prospective
conditions, a person is aware that he or she will be
asked about the duration of an interval and therefore
is expected to pay explicit attention to coding that
duration. In contrast, in retrospective judgments,
the person has not been forewarned about the need
to estimate the length of any particular duration and
so, presumably, pays less attention to the passage of
time. In this way, one can seek to generate an explicit
contrast of the eects of diering levels of attention,
without the necessity to make the inferences as to
which lling activities demand more or less attention.
In part, this comparison can therefore also circumvent
the persistent and thorny issue of individual dier-
ences (Woodrow, 1933). Indeed, the results of these
comparisons show important and large eects as to
whether a person does or does not know whether he
or she will be asked to judge the accuracy of a duration
for which there are a number of potential explanations
involving the respective inuence of memory and at-
tention (Block & Zakay, 1997; Zakay & Block, 2004).
The Importance of Time
The present article advances the study of and the
importance of time, not merely in psychological re-
search but throughout science and indeed in all of
human experience (Fraser, Haber, & Muller, 1971;
Hancock & Warm, 1989). However, especially for
experimental psychologists, time is critical because
“psychological time can no longer continue to be ig-
nored by psychologists who propose models of non-
temporal behavior, because nontemporal behavior
does not exist” (Block, 1990, p. xviii). Not only is this
statement important for all of psychological research,
it is especially relevant to the present journal and its
celebration of its longevity of more than a century
and a quarter of its existence. As we have seen, time
perception has been featured in its earliest volumes
(e.g., Nichols, 1891), but if we scan the most cited
works ever to appear in the present journal, we nd
a most interesting outcome. From a Web of Science
search, one of the most cited articles in The Ameri-
can Journal of Psychology concerns time estimation
(Hicks, Miller, & Kinsbourne, 1976). Given the fore-
going discussion, we can see both the paradox and
the importance of the cited work. First, the paradox:
ps ychology of time  •  2 69
AJP 125_3 text.indd 269 7/17/12 4:49 PM
How is it that the oldest continuously published
journal in all of psychology has one of the highest
citation rates for an article in an area we have already
described as neglected and at times moribund? Our
answer derives from the fact that the work of Hicks et
al. was central to the ongoing theme of time percep-
tion and the content of specic intervals that, to a
degree, persisted throughout the 20th century. Thus,
their work struck a chord at the juncture when time
perception was especially beginning to reemerge
onto the psychological scene. In particular, they
asked how prospective and retrospective judgments
of time varied as a function of the amount of informa-
tion processed (e.g., Smith, 1969). Briey, they found
no systematic eects in the retrospective paradigm,
in which the person was not aware of the necessity
to estimate the duration of the interval. However, in
contrast, they found that in the prospective paradigm,
judged time was an inverse linear function of response
uncertainty. This linked attention to the information
content intrinsic to a particular interval in conditions
where someone expected to be asked to estimate the
duration experienced. Thus, Hicks et al. identied
the crux of an ongoing major issue and reported
results that illuminated both the empirical pattern
of outcomes and the theoretical reasons why such a
pattern may be produced. Although the whole area
of time perception has moved on since the 1970s, this
nding has proved an important and inuential one
and is still a central building block in a number of
theories on time perception.
Time Flows On
In the four decades since Hicks et al. (1976) reported
their ndings, the psychological study of time percep-
tion has progressed on numerous fronts (e.g., Fried-
man, 1990). One sequence of investigations looked
to use the opportunities opened up by meta-analytic
techniques to attack the question of the inuence of
individual characteristics on the perception of brief
intervals of time. Block, Zakay, and Hancock (1998)
examined the eects of aging on time perception and
developmental status on the estimation of the same
range of short durations. In general, there were sys-
tematic eects for age and developmental status, as
there were for the sex of the person making the re-
spective estimates (Block, Hancock, & Zakay, 2000;
Hancock, 2011a). More recently, this technique has
been used to address the inuence the nature of the
content of any duration has on its perceived dura-
tion (Block, Hancock, & Zakay, 2010). Again, large
dierences emerged between the prospective and
retrospective ndings. Importantly, as the cognitive
load of the lling activity (cognitive load) increases,
the subjective-to-objective duration judgment ratio
decreases in the prospective paradigm but increases
in the retrospective paradigm. We interpret this as
emphasizing the inuence of attentional allocation
in the prospective paradigm but memory retrieval
in the retrospective paradigm. Both positions argue
for the importance of information coding rate and
its subsequent transfer to, and recall from, memory.
Thus, time in passing (prospective estimation) and
time in recall (retrospective estimation) are distinct
issues. In addition to these quantitative techniques
for summarizing large bodies of experimental data,
the pure psychological exploration of timing and time
perception has itself shown an important renewal in
the last decade or two (cf. Block & Zakay, 2001; Gron-
din, 2008).
What is perhaps most challenging is the genera-
tion of new techniques through which to explore the
sense of time. The traditional and historically most
dominant techniques typically are verbal estimation,
duration production, and duration reproduction
(Bindra & Waksberg, 1956; Clausen, 1950; Guay &
Salmoni, 1988), but each has some drawbacks (Sieg-
man, 1962). For example, reproduction necessarily
emphasizes memory for explorations of time in pass-
ing, but the reproduction method has some limited
exploratory capacities. In contrast, verbal estimation
and production require the person to reference stan-
dard temporal units (e.g., seconds, minutes), and thus
the pure perception of duration is contaminated by
the linguistic and semantic tags associated with tra-
ditional units of measured time (Zakay, 1990). Fur-
thermore, we have often come to see the duration
measured by the clock as the “correct” time, and so
percepts that deviate from this declared target are
necessarily seen as errors of estimation. Although this
provides methodological convenience and a veneer of
scientic respectability, such a perspective can mask
certain important qualitative dimensions of dier-
ing human temporal experience (Hancock, 2011a). A
challenge in sustaining the renewed interest in time
perception will be the development of innovative
27 0  •  h an co ck & bl oc k
AJP 125_3 text.indd 270 7/17/12 4:49 PM
exploratory techniques, especially those that can be
used in association with the time scales involved in
various brain imaging techniques. Indeed, it is the
cognitive neuroscience of temporal perception to
which we now proceed.
Time and the Brain
In many ways, neuroscientists have taken much more
notice of Block’s (1990) imperative about the central-
ity of time than have contemporary psychologists,
although this too is changing. With advances in brain
imaging techniques, it became progressively more
evident that spatial and temporal resolution of the
respective advances traded o such, so improved
spatial resolution was often accompanied by lower
temporal resolution and vice versa. Highly detailed
but static representations of brain configuration
could lead to important insights, but these were
inevitably frustrated by the absence of sucient in-
formation as to the dynamic changes that were oc-
curring on diering time scales. Thus, much interest
in the temporal dimension was engendered purely
by way of the functional limits of the methodologi-
cal techniques through which important discover-
ies were being made. But the focus was not on the
techniques alone. Many neuroscientists began to real-
ize that understanding how the brain deals with the
fundamental dimension of time is important. They
joined with many researchers who had been pioneer-
ing such eorts for a number of years, if not decades
(Buhusi & Meck, 2005). It is now evident that the
brain necessarily deals with time on a number of dif-
fering scales—and in a number of dierent cortical
areas, or modules—in relation to a number of dier-
ing functions (e.g., absolute timing, relative timing,
rhythmic frequencies). Recently, we have argued that
one might consider these diering requirements as
a virtual battle for time in the brain (Hancock, 2010).
These respective advances in understanding the neu-
roanatomy (Coull, Vidal, Nazarian, & Macar, 2004),
neurophysiology, and neuropsychology of temporal
processing represent a signicant and growing litera-
ture (Wittmann & van Wassenhove, 2009).
The Future of Time
To summarize, the most important question to pose
is, What is the future of time? If one believes in the
application of Kondratiev’s (1925/1984) “long wave
cyclesto the pursuit of scientic knowledge, then the
future of time perception research appears to be ex-
ceptionally bright. Having been sadly displaced from
its initial centrality in the psychological sciences and,
for some decades, consigned to the back drawers of
the discipline, time perception has now come roaring
back. The number of people in psychology and the
greater neurosciences working on time perception
issues has perhaps never been greater.
There are a number of persistent issues in the
psychology of time that we see as crucial. Perhaps
the most important concerns individual dierences.
For some researchers, individual differences are
an unmitigated nuisance because they dilute the
strong nomothetic trends that they are seeking out.
For others, these dierences are the source of their
whole life’s study (Cronbach, 1957). What is clear
is that when you ask a group of people for an esti-
mate of even a short duration, you get a remarkably
large distribution compared with a number of other
forms of psychophysical assessment (Doob, 1971;
Rammsayer, 1997b). What remain unspecied are
the exact sources of these large individual dierenc-
es. Although the characteristics identied by Block
and his colleagues account for some of this variation,
there remain sources of variation that have yet to be
identied. It is encouraging to see that such eorts
have begun to burgeon in the past decade (Hancock,
2011a; Pos, 2006; Rammsayer, 2002; Zimbardo &
Boyd, 1999, 2008). As noted earlier, perhaps there
are potential resolutions to be had by rening the
methods of measurement so that the tested person is
not expressing his or her estimate in terms of neces-
sarily learned temporal units (i.e., having to express
their estimates in terms of semantic labels such as
seconds). The next challenge concerns the demands
of integration. Important discoveries are coming from
research in the neurosciences (e.g., Eagleman et al.,
2005; Harrington, Haaland, & Knight, 1998). The
central question is how these insights at the level of
neurophysiology express themselves in various be-
havioral outcomes. It is often the case that behavioral
data are explained through reference to associated,
underlying neural structures and functions. Such
linkages often pass the level of necessity, and some
reach the criterion of suciency, although few have
been conrmed as exclusive relationships (Gibbon
& Malapani, 2002). Understanding and elucidating
ps ychology of time  •  2 71
AJP 125_3 text.indd 271 7/17/12 4:49 PM
these polymorphic, isomorphic, and homeomorphic
linkages between diering levels of description may
be the most vital challenge for neuropsychology in
the coming decades. This challenge is not conned
to timing and time perception, of course, but is one
primary and persistent goal of all such research. To
conclude, research on the psychology of time is on
the upswing (Block & Zakay, 2001; Grondin, 2010).
Perhaps this is a recurring theme in which time ex-
presses its resurgence near the commencement of
each new century. Even if this blithe speculation is
not so, the future of time looks especially bright at
Address correspondence about this article to P. A. Hancock,
Department of Psychology, University of Central Florida, Or-
lando, FL 32816 (e-mail:
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... In the literature, verbal estimation and time production tasks are traditionally accepted and commonly used techniques (Bindra and Waksberg 1956, Guay and Salmoni 1988, Hancock and Block 2012. In the verbal estimation method, after the presentation of the stimulus, participants are asked to provide a numerical estimate of the duration of the stimulus. ...
... The main limitation of the verbal estimation task is that it relies on words, or numbers, and these can create a linguistic limit. Also, time perception will be contaminated by linguistic and semantic labels associated with traditional units of time (Hancock and Block 2012). Indeed, it has been reported that people tend to use rounded numbers in their time estimations . ...
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We experience a flow of time in everyday life. However, according to modern physics, time does not flow. In the psychology and neuroscience literature, different models and explanations have been made to try to answer the question of what time is besides an illusion of flow and to figure out how time is perceived. Different methods have also been used to learn how time is handled and to test how accurate these models are. People process time in two ways: implicitly and explicitly. We are talking about explicit timing when estimating the time interval length. Another distinction, according to the measurement method of time perception paradigms, is between prospective and retrospective time estimations. Although there are theorists who claim that these two methods involve similar cognitive processes, it is thought that different cognitive processes serve to experience and remember a time, depending on whether time perception is measured by the prospective or retrospective time estimation methods. This brings to mind different method-dependent constraints and advantages. As with any other kind of perception study, the method chosen for time perception research should fit the question being asked. This review presents a selective review of time perception studies to make it easier for a researcher planning to study time perception to choose the appropriate method for the study question. The time perception processes and related evidence were examined using prospective and retrospective time estimation measurement methods. But it's important to note that the time perception models and methods talked about in this review are only a small part of a very large field. ÖZ Gündelik hayatta bir zaman akışı tecrübe etmekteyiz. Ancak, modern fiziğe göre zamanın akışı söz konusu değildir. Bir akış yanılsaması dışında zaman nedir sorusuna yanıt bulabilmek ve zaman algısı ile ilişkili süreçleri anlamak için psikoloji ve sinirbilim literatüründe çeşitli modeller ve açıklamalar geliştirilmiştir. Zamansal bilginin nasıl işlediğini anlamak ve bu modellerin doğruluğunu test etmek için de çeşitli prosedürler benimsenmiştir. Iṅsanlar, zamanı örtük (implicit) ve açık (explicit) olmak üzere 2 şekilde işlemektedir. Zaman aralığının uzunluğuna yönelik tahmin yürütüldüğünde acik (explicit) zamanlamadan bahsetmekteyiz. Zaman algısı paradigmalarında ölçüm yöntemine göre digȇr bir ayrımsa ileriye yonelik (prospektif) ve geriye donuk (retrospektif) zaman tahminleridir. Bu iki yöntemin benzer bilişsel süreçleri içerdiğini iddia eden teorisyenler olsa da, zaman algısı ileriye yonelik ve geriye donuk zaman tahmini yöntemlerinden hangisi ile ölçüldüğüne göre farklı bilişsel süreçlerin deneyimlenen ve hatırlanan süreye hizmet ettiği düşünülmektedir. Bu da yöntem bağımlı farklı kısıtlar ve avantajları akla getirmektedir. Diğer tüm algı çalışmalarında olduğu gibi zaman algısı araştırmalarında da prosedürün seçimi araştırmanın sorusuna uygun olmalıdır. Bu derleme zaman algısı üzerine çalışma yapmayı planlayan bir araştırmacının çalışma sorusuna uygun yöntemi seçmesini kolaylaştırmak üzere zaman algısı araştırmalarının seçici bir incelemesini sunmaktadır. Zaman algısının süreçleri ve bunlara ilişkin kanıtlar ileriye yönelik ve geriye dönük zaman tahmini ölçüm yöntemlerine göre gözden geçirilmiştir. Ancak bu incelemede tartışılan zaman algısı modellerinin ve yönteminin alanın yalnızca bir bölümünü temsil ettiğini, alanın oldukça geniş olduğunu belirtmek gerekmektedir. Anahtar sözcükler: Zaman algısı, zaman tahmini paradigmaları, süre tahmini
... Buonomano and Rovelli's (2023) conundrum is that they begin from an assumption of time's reality (formally: ∃x) (Note 4) They rightly point to the incongruities that derive from this unified (n = 1) conceptual dimensionality and, like most other time researchers, then become embroiled in battles that derive from the general human acceptance of time's unidimensional narrative (and see Hancock and Block, 2012). Yet their solution (writ large) is to pursue a dimensional expansion (and see Fig. 1). ...
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Efforts continue to determine how many differing forms of time connote reality. These numbers range from the many to the few. The most common integer is two. Here, one represents a property of externality and the other a property of internality, or more colloquially a characteristic of mind. Attempts to weld this dyad into a “grand unified theory of time” are legion. However, since the essentially unquestioned foundational premise, viz the reality of time, is false, all subsequent theorizing, however well-meaning, proves vacuous. The unacceptable alternative is to embrace the delusion of time. However, this assertion of zero-time theory is so repugnant to the deeply entrenched belief in time by living systems that this answer proves unpalatable at best and rejected forthwith in virtually all instances. Explanations of time predicated upon the premises of duality and reality prove intriguing but eventually fruitless paths to pursue.
... Solutions on how best to manage working time are indications that workers who choose and participate in their own working time decisions tend to increase tolerance for long hours and suffer less with such impositions. (HANCOCK & BLOCK, 2012). ...
Conference Paper
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The function of a language teacher is to develop the ability in his students to use language as a means of social interaction and make them aware of the meaning of certain linguistic forms and variations. The proposed study will look forward to review the sociolinguistic factors especially mother tongue interference in second language acquisition. The study will make the learners understand the function of English as a second language (ESL) so that they can gain proficiency in its use by their intellectual involvement in it. It will provide a theoretical framework within which the findings of sociolinguistics will be related to linguistic terms. The study aims at illustrating communication differences in the users through task-based teaching. It will also do an error analysis and provide data for remedial pedagogy of second language acquisition. The study also intends to suggest ways of making the present syllabus in universities compatible with the various sociolinguistic factors which will lead to enhancement of knowledge of the researchers and trainers to understand the relation between language and society, in terms of global social factors and categories which lead to affect semantic, syntactic and lexical use of ESL. Finally, this study will provide new trends to second language acquisition especially in India. It will concentrate on the learners coming from typical Hindi�medium backgrounds so that they can use English with the same proficiency they use their mother tongue. The work will aspire to transfer the learning of English into acquisition of ESL.
... In short, these systems promise to "get away from us very quickly." It could even be reasonably argued that such a transition could be, from a human perspective, the act of even a single perceptual 'moment' (cf., H. Hancock & Block, 2012;Machin et al., 2014). As to how and whether we could slow such a transition down, in order to make it clearer and more transparent to the human observer; the question remains in abeyance. ...
... Most sports activities are explosive and generally performed within a short period, also, they are related to automatic behavior and triggered by a motor neural circuit in the particular supplementary motor area, primary motor cortex, and cerebellum [15,59]. This evidence reinforces the idea that individual differences need to be considered when it comes to estimating time, including the level of physical activity [60]. Given the above, the findings open the way for the following question: Do physical activity practitioners encode the time through different neural processes? ...
Cortical changes resulting from physical activity and differences in the estimation of the time of practitioners and non-practitioners of physical activity have already been documented. However, there aren't studies that compare the cortical responses of the time estimate between these groups. Therefore, this study aimed to investigate the influence of the level of physical activity in time estimation and beta band activity in frontal regions, specifically in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, and parietal cortex during the task of estimating time in practitioners and non-practitioners of physical activity. After characterizing the sample, the signal was captured using an electroencephalogram during a task to estimate the time of four intervals of supraseconds. The results indicated that the practitioners of physical activity had lower errors in the evaluation of time for the intervals of 1s, 7s, and 9s. The beta band showed less activity among practitioners of physical activity. The correlation between task performance and the absolute power of the beta band proved to be positive in the task of estimating time in the 7s, and 9s intervals. It was concluded that participants involved in the regular practice of physical activity showed underestimation in the temporal judgment and lower absolute power of the beta band during the time estimate.
... Because "non-temporal behavior does not exist" (Block, 1990, p. 18) the study of time is particularly relevant in psychological research. Even though the dimension of time has been an object of study for psychologists since more than a century (Hancock and Block, 2012), further clarification about the underlying mechanisms accounting for the experience of time is still needed (Wittmann and van Wassenhove, 2009). An intriguing aspect on this topic is that time is not akin to a physical object and has no sensory organ supporting its perception. ...
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The experience of the present moment and the bodily self are modulated in altered states of consciousness such as during meditation. Over the last years, research has focused on reporting meditation-related changes on the explicit experience of duration. However, the effects of meditation on the implicit temporal structure of conscious perception pertaining to the present moment experience have not been explored so far. The major aim of this work was to investigate how states of mindfulness meditation change the temporal span of the present moment experience. A further purpose was to explore the effects of heart rate variability (HRV) and breathing rate in order to clarify the role of mind-body interactions on the present moment experience. Finally, individual differences (e.g. mindfulness, time perspective, daydreaming) and emotional states (e.g. arousal, emotional valence, perceived body and space) which may influence the experience of the present moment, were investigated. To this end, the present moment was operationalized using three psychophysical tasks (i.e., the metronome task, the Necker cube, and the sequencing task) for testing two different levels of temporal integration (i.e. functional level and subjective present) across modalities (i.e. visual and auditory). We performed a longitudinal study including two measurement time points (i.e. pre and post interventions) within each of the three study sessions. Participants having meditation experience were recruited and assigned to two matched groups (with n = 47 individuals) corresponding to the two experimental conditions (i.e., interventions). The interventions were either a 10-minute meditation session (meditation) or a 10-minute session of listening to a recorded story (story). Participants’ performance in the psychophysical tasks, conducted on three consecutive days, was compared before and after the interventions. The heart rate and breathing activity were recorded during the intervention and compared to a resting-state condition in order to examine whether physiological changes during meditation would affect a) the temporal integration intervals of metronome beats, b) the dwell times in the Necker cube task, and c) the implicit and explicit detection of asynchronies in the sequencing task. Using mediation analyses, we found that in participants who meditated, meditation-induced states and autonomic physiological changes led to an expanded temporal integration in the metronome task concerning the subjective present in the auditory modality. Furthermore, different components of self-attributed mindfulness (i.e. presence and acceptance) were associated with greater accuracy (i.e., as measured with the explicit sequence-threshold) and ix enhanced implicit time processing (i.e., as measured with the Simon effect) at the functional level. Such effects were not seen for the visual ambiguous figure of the Necker cube (another measure to capture the experienced duration of the present moment) and the detection of sequences of visual stimuli in the millisecond range (capturing the functional moment). The results of the metronome task suggest that mindfulness-meditation states and mindfulness as a trait modulate certain temporal integration mechanisms compatible with the experience of the present moment. These temporal changes seem to be intimately related to autonomic activity providing further understanding of the role of mind-body interactions on the present moment. Additional work will be needed to illuminate the mechanisms underlying the experience of the present moment. The study of meditative states, describable as changes in the present moment experience, remains a promising approach.
... Studi neuropsicologici hanno dimostrato che gli intervalli sotto e sopra un secondo hanno pattern di attivazione cerebrale diversi: gli 'orologi neuronali' hanno livelli multipli di funzionamento e ben diversi sono i meccanismi implicati nella percezione di un intervallo di tempo di pochi millisecondi, o nella programmazione temporale delle attività svolgere nell'arco di una giornata (Hancock & Block 2012). ...
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Non è vero che abbiamo poco tempo: la verità è che ne perdiamo molto. Seneca Non abbiamo tempo per dedicar a noi stessi un po' di tempo. Eugene Ionesco Lo studio psicologico del tempo Le neuroscienze suggeriscono di considerare come abilità tipiche della specie umana quelle di riflettere sulle azioni passate e farsi domande sulle azioni future, e per correggere e migliorare quello che si è fatto. La capa-cità di connettere questioni di ordine temporale e linguaggio narrativo e programmatorio è una delle componenti essenziali della coscienza uma-na. Questa capacità ha fondamenti neurobiologici e aspetti che investono la soggettività di ciascuna persona nel valutare e gestire le diverse durate temporali, cioè i tempi della vita quotidiana, della memoria del passato, della progettazione futura. Sin dai suoi esordi la psicologia ha studiato le differenze fra aspetti fisici del tempo (quello scandito in modo oggettivo dagli orologi e dai calendari) e la percezione di soggettiva durata. Sappiamo tutti che "il tempo vola" e "la felicità è un lampo, e quando ci annoiamo le ore non
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Although disabling tinnitus is a chronic auditory phantom sensation, current knowledge on time perception (i.e., subjective time) in sufferers is limited and unsystematic. This theoretical analysis provides a first approach to this topic, highlighting the heterogeneity of time perception in humans as shown in various research areas. This heterogeneity is inherently related to goal attainment. Our immediate perception of time is restricted to present moment and recent past, whereas our sense of time is mostly future-oriented and represented as our past in a mental time line. The heterogeneity of time translates into a tension between anticipated changes one wants to see happen and full commitment that is required to goal attainment. Tinnitus sufferers are intensely aware of this tension in their self-perception. Their most compelling desire is that they no longer perceive tinnitus, but they get closer to this goal only by avoiding to put all their thoughts into it. Our analysis provides new perspectives on acceptance of tinnitus in relation to this time paradox. Building on the Tolerance model and the role of self-awareness in time perception, we contend that the main way for patients to gain long-term self-confidence is to engage in the present moment. Attention to this attitude is obscured in chronic sufferers by worries and ruminations associated with the ongoing presence of tinnitus. We provide arguments that time perception is a social perception, emphasizing the role of rewarding interactions in helping sufferers to overcome the feeling of being prevented from living in the moment. In the course of improvement towards acceptance, different changes in time perception are hypothesized that promote individuals' disengagement from unattainable goal (i.e., tinnitus suppression). A framework for future research is proposed, which distinguishes individuals' behaviors and associated emotions in relation to the time paradox.
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This paper discusses the duality of metaphorical conceptualizations of time focusing in particular on time as a pursuerand time as an object of pursuit metaphors, which are based the Figure–Ground reversal of each other. Using examples taken from the British National Corpus, it argues that these metaphorical conceptualizations of time are inconsistent with each other. This inconsistency resembles the discrepancy between the moving time and moving observer metaphors, which are, in strict terms, also inconsistent with each other. Looking at such contrasts between metaphorical representations of time from a broader perspective suggests that the concept of time arises from different, both physical and socio-cultural, dimensions of human experience.
All our conceptions of time spring from our brains. However, the brain itself is a structure that has evolved over several millions of years. In the process of evolution, nature often has to erect and integrate newer structures and functionalities on existing systems and capacities. I argue that many fundamental dimensions of human response such as memory, dreaming, and the persistence of the consciousness of self derive from the interplay attendant on the integration of these stages of brain development. I argue that time has played a central role in this progression. From the earliest notion of physiological time as simple duration through the complexities of the spatio-temporal coordination of action to the ability of the frontal cortex to anticipate future conditions a river runs through it and that river is time. Provocatively, I have termed these sequential epochs of evolutionary integration as the 'battle' for time in the brain.
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate the effects of various trial procedures on human time estimation. Four different procedures were used: (1) experimenter-paced intertrial interval/experimenter-paced retention interval, (2) self-paced intertrial interval/experimenterpaced retention interval, (3) experimenter-paced intertrial interval/self-paced retention interval, and (4) self-paced intertrial interval/self-paced retention interval. Auditory time lengths of 1, 4, and 8 sec were estimated by the method of reproduction. Results showed that the two self-paced retention interval conditions produced a typical range effect in that the 1-sec criterion duration was overestimated and the 4- and 8-sec durations were underestimated. In addition, the two homogeneous trial conditions (i.e., procedures 1 and 4 above) produced more accurate time estimation performance than did the two heterogeneous conditions. Variable error increased as the duration of the time to be estimated increased, and subjects were more variable under the two experimenter-paced retention interval conditions than under the two self-paced conditions. We concluded that the self-paced intertrial interval/self-paced retention interval condition seems to be the best procedure to maximize time-estimation performance.
Two experiments investigated the relationship between long-term memory for events occurring during an interval and the experience of duration of the interval in retrospect. In both, Ss attended to a sequence consisting of a standard, an experimental, and a second standard interval. Then unexpected comparative duration and memory judgments were requested. In Experiment I, either 30 or 60 unrelated words occurred during the 180-see experimental interval. When more words had occurred, judgments of duration of the experimental interval, judgments of number of words presented, and number of words recognized all increased, but free recall of words was unaffected. In Experiment II, 80 categorized words occurred during the 160-see experimental interval, with category instances in either blocked or random order. When words were blocked by category, judgments of duration of the experimental interval, free recall, and recognition all increased, but judgments of number of words were unaffected. Results were discussed in terms of Ornstein's (1969) "storage size" hypothesis.
We reviewed 20 experiments comparing duration judgments made by children versus adolescents and adults. All used a prospective paradigm, in which participants knew they would have to make duration judgments. Meta-analyses revealed substantial age-related differences: Compared to older participants, children make larger verbal estimates, comparable productions, and shorter reproductions of duration. Children's duration judgments also show greater interindividual variability. We discuss physiological hypotheses concerning pacemaker rate and temperature or metabolic rate, along with cognitive hypotheses concerning duration units, memory processes, attentional resources, and impatience and waiting. At least two explanations are needed: Children have not yet accurately learned verbal labels for duration experiences, and they are impatient during relatively empty durations. Both can be interpreted in terms of an attentional-gate model.