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From Multilateralism to Bilateralism: The Impact of Free Trade Agreements On Global Trade Policies

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This study intends to analyze the evolution of the world trading system in light of the developments from multilateralism to bilateralism and regionalism. The point of departure is that the expectation of shaping a multilateral trade system based on the WTO rules has become blurred as the Doha Round could not be concluded and has been in a deadlock. Despite the attempts to relieve the world trade from multilateral suspension, a new wave of regionalism emerged in the form of free trade agreements accelerating in the last decade. Though not with the same speed, large trading blocs such as the US, the EU and East Asian countries have responded to this policy shift and have already started to intensely integrate themselves in bilateral trade arrangements with possible trade partners, which brings in the question whether multilateral trade has been approaching an end.
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105
Marmara Üniversitesi
İ.İ.B.F. Dergisi
YIL 2008, CİLT XXIV, SAYI 1
FROM MULTILATERALISM TO BILATERALISM: THE
EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL TRADE POLICIES
Dr. Mahmut TEKÇE*
Sevil ACAR**
Abstract
This study intends to analyze the evolution of the world trading system in light of
the developments from multilateralism to bilateralism and regionalism. The point of
departure is that the expectation of shaping a multilateral trade system based on the WTO
rules has become blurred as the Doha Round could not be concluded and has been in a
deadlock. Despite the attempts to relieve the world trade from multilateral suspension, a
new wave of regionalism emerged in the form of free trade agreements accelerating in the
last decade. Though not with the same speed, large trading blocs such as the US, the EU
and East Asian countries have responded to this policy shift and have already started to
intensely integrate themselves in bilateral trade arrangements with possible trade partners,
which brings in the question whether multilateral trade has been approaching an end.
Keywords: Trade policy, multilateralism, bilateralism, free trade agreements
ÇOK TARAFLILIKTAN İKİ TARAFLILIĞA: KÜRESEL TİCARET
POLİTİKALARININ DÖNÜŞÜMÜ
Özet
Bu çalışma, çok taraflı ticaretten iki taraflı ve bölgesel ticarete doğru olan
gelişmeler ışığında dünya ticaret sisteminin evrimini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır.
Hareket noktamız, Doha Müzakereleri’nin sonuçlandırılamayıp bir çıkmaza girmesiyle
Dünya Ticaret Örgütü kurallarına dayalı bir çok taraflı ticaret sistemi şekillendirme
* Marmara Üniversitesi İİBF, İngilizce İktisat Bölümü, mtekce@marmara.edu.tr
** İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, acarsev@itu.edu.tr
Dr.Mahmut TEKÇE*Sevil ACAR
106
beklentilerinin belirsiz hale gelmiş olmasıdır. Dünya ticaretini bu çıkmazdan kurtarmak
için gösterilen çabalara rağmen, son on yılda sayıları artan serbest ticaret anlaşmalarıyla
yeni bir bölgesellik dalgası ortaya çıkmıştır. Aynı hızda olmasa da, ABD, AB ve Doğu Asya
ülkeleri gibi büyük ticaret blokları, bu politika değişikliğine cevap vermiş ve olası ticaret
ortaklarıyla ikili ticaret anlaşmalarına yoğun olarak entegre olmaya başlamıştır. Böylece,
çok taraflı ticaretin bir sona yaklaşıp yaklaşmadığı sorusu gündeme gelmiştir.
Anahtar kelimeler: Ticaret politikası, çok taraflılık, iki taraflılık, serbest ticaret
anlaşmaları
1. Introduction
The 1990s witnessed the proliferation of preferential trade agreements throughout
the world. The surge of these bilateral or regional agreements accelerated by the sluggish
pace of the Doha round negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and peaked
by the suspension of the Doha Development Agenda in 2006. This "new wave of
regionalism", mostly identified by Free Trade Agreements, has fuelled the discussion about
the relation between multilateralism and bilateralism and the question whether these
regional arrangements will serve as “steeping stones” or “stumbling blocks” to multilateral
trade liberalization has become increasingly important.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the recent trends of bilateralism by focusing on
how the multilateral trade negotiations proceeded since the formation of the WTO but
recently suspended and failed to establish common trade rules, and how regionalism
evolved since 1960s and took a form of new regionalism in the last decade. The first
section provides the essence of the multilateral approach in a historical perspective of the
development of the WTO. The second section offers a brief discussion of the main aspects
of the new regionalism by explicating the evolution of free trade agreements and describing
the current state of play of bilateralism specifically in the EU, the US and East Asia. The
concluding remarks focus on whether the current rise of bilateralism constitutes a threat to
the future of multilateralism.
2. The WTO and Its Development
2.1 GATT, Uruguay Round and the WTO
Towards the end of the World War II, countries started meetings in order to set out
a plan to recover from the negative effects of the war. In 1947, The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed at the end of the Bretton Woods meetings. The main
aim was “reduction in tariffs and other international trade barriers”. As such, together with
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the GATT became one of the
three mechanisms for global economic governance.
1
The GATT continued operating for about fifty years with the purpose of arranging
rules for international trade of goods and especially diminishing tariffs and quotas. It was
not an institution but had a permanent organization that comprised of some rules within a
particular framework. Negotiations within the GATT continued until the Uruguay Round
was completed in 1994. The Uruguay Round also contributed to the package of rules
1
R. Leal-Arcas, 2006, “The Death of the Doha Round. What Next for Services Trade?”, September
15, bepress Legal Series Working Paper, no. 1760.
107
related to trade in services, relevant aspects of intellectual property, dispute settlement, and
trade policy reviews. Around 60 agreements and separate commitments (called schedules)
were covered within the set of Uruguay Round negotiations. On the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round of Trade Talks (1986-1994), the WTO was established on January 1,
1995.
2
What changes or developments led to the establishment of the WTO? First of all,
multilateral trade negotiations within the GATT framework had mainly set the reduction of
tariffs as its central goal. When it was observed that the negotiations succeded in abolishing
such kind of traditional barriers to trade especially in manufactures, the negotiating parties
started to deal with other types of trade barriers. Anti-dumping measures, non-tariff
measures, intellectual property rights and standards emerged on the agenda of new
negotiations.
3
Table 1 shows the evolution of the themes that were handled within the
GATT trade rounds.
Table 1. The GATT trade rounds
Year
Place/ name
Subjects covered
Countries
1947
Geneva
Tariffs
23
1949
Annecy
Tariffs
13
1951
Torquay
Tariffs
38
1956
Geneva
Tariffs
26
19601961
Geneva (Dillon
Round)
Tariffs
26
19641967
Geneva (Kennedy
Round)
Tariffs and anti-dumping
measures
62
19731979
Geneva (Tokyo
Round)
Tariffs, non-tariff measures,
“framework” agreements
102
19861994
Geneva (Uruguay
Round)
Tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules,
services, intellectual property,
dispute settlement, textiles,
agriculture, creation of WTO, etc
123
Source: WTO, 2007b, Understanding the WTO, p. 16, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf
Secondly, by the 1980s, the world had changed a lot and the GATT was no longer
considered as relevant as it was in the 1940s. Many countries had started to take protective
measures in order to secure their economic environment against foreign competition and
against the negative impacts of the economic recessions of the 1970s and early 1980s. For
2
WTO, 2007a, The World Trade Organization In Brief, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/inbr_e.pdf
3
M. F. Jensen and P. Gibbon, 2007, “Africa and the WTO Doha Round: An Overview”, Development
Policy Review, Vol. 25, no. 1, p. 6
Dr.Mahmut TEKÇE*Sevil ACAR
108
instance, such developments drove Western Europe and North America to search for
bilateral grounds to find markets for their products and to raise subsidies in order to
safeguard their trade in some products. Furthermore, the areas covered by the GATT rules
did not include the newly occurring trade in services or other topics that have become
relevant in the era of globalization. Thus, the GATT members were convinced that they
should seek new ways in order to tackle the new problems of the world, which resulted in
the formation of the WTO.
4
WTO emerged as a global trade institution that would arrange the binding rules
expanding beyond trade and would now impose sanctions against countries which do not
rely on those rules. GATT is regarded as the major rule-book of the WTO for trade in
goods. Its functions were defined in various policy documents as follows:
• Administering WTO trade agreements
• Forum for trade negotiations
• Handling trade disputes
• Monitoring national trade policies
• Technical assistance and training for developing countries
• Cooperation with other international organizations
5
Adopting these functions, WTO members agree to execute a non-discriminatory
trading system that spells out their rights and their obligationscovering issues that range
from trade of goods and services to intellectual property, dispute settlement and policy
reviews.
6
Each member is guaranteed to face a fair treatment for its exports in other
members’ markets and guarantees to treat imports equally in its own market. Besides, the
needs of developing countries are recognized and these countries are allowed some
flexibility so that they can rely on their commitments.
If we classify the basic broad areas of the WTO agreements as goods, services and
intellectual property, it is possible to exemplify substantial changes in these as a result of
the WTO agreements. For instance, the tariff cuts of developed countries were substantially
high in the first five years after 1995. There was a 40% cut in their tariffs on industrial
products, which dropped the average rate from 6.3% to 3.8%. In addition,
“…on 26 March 1997, 40 countries accounting for more than 92% of world trade
in information technology products, agreed to eliminate import duties and other charges on
these products by 2000 (by 2005 in a handful of cases). As with other tariff commitments,
each participating country is applying its commitments equally to exports from all WTO
members (i.e. on a most-favoured-nation basis), even from members that did not make
commitments.”
7
4
WTO, 2007b, Understanding the WTO, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf
5
Ibid., p.17
6
WTO, 2007a, Ibid.
7
WTO, 2007b, Ibid., p.25
109
Furthermore, tariffs on all agricultural products are now bound. All services,
including financial services, telecommunications, air transport services and movement of
natural persons, were brought under The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
negotiated during the Uruguay Round, covers the rules connected with international
property such as copyright, trademarks, industrial designs, patents, and undisclosed
information like trade secrets. Non-tariff barriers are also aimed to be eliminated to enhance
free trade. These may be in the form of legal or bureaucratic impediments to trade (such as
rules for valuation of goods at customs, import licensing, etc).
8
2.2 Doha Round and the Deadlock of the WTO
In November 2001, WTO member governments initiated new negotiations at the
Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar and meanwhile, continued working on the
implementation of the present agreements. This new initiative was called the Doha
Development Agenda (DDA). This new round of negotiations became a critical turning
point for the future of the WTO and the global multilateral trade system. It departs from the
Uruguay Round in many aspects, especially in that it brings “development” into the fore.
Especially developing countries found a sphere where they could effectively pursue their
own interests and priorities in this round. They were given a promise that they would be
able to participate in the world trading system so that the world would reach a global
environment that is more just and equal. This intention inherently carried the idea that a
more open and equitable trading system would bring more peace to the world. The success
of the DDA was expected to bring in higher growth and development in the world trading
system. In contrast, the failure of the DDA would assure no growth or development for the
world and hence, would throw the hopes of the least developed countries into the rubbish.
In addition, the failure of the DDA will be regarded as a missed historic
opportunity to eliminate export subsidies, to put an end to trade distortion. Consequently,
all countries of the world trading system will lose, especially developing countries. In this
respect, the biggest gains to development will certainly be in the core areas of goods,
services and agriculture, and so liberalizing trade among developing countries is an
essential part of the Doha exercise. That is why the international community cannot miss
the opportunity offered by the DDA, which can set a vision for the global economy for the
next decades and make a major contribution to development.
9
At the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico, in September 2003, the
issues of trade and investment, competition, transparency in public procurement and trade
facilitation (also named as the “Singapore issues”) were brought onto the table.
10
The
intention was to come to an agreement on these issues so that they would complete the rest
of the negotiations. However, the meeting came to a halt because of the dissonance on
agricultural issues and ended in deadlock on the Singapore issues. Progress on the
Singapore issues and agriculture could only be observed in August 2004. The deadline for
the DDA was January 1, 2005 originally and it was missed. Afterwards, an unofficial target
8
WTO, 2007b, Ibid., pp. 36-41
9
Leal-Arcas, Ibid.
10
WTO, 2007b, Ibid.
Dr.Mahmut TEKÇE*Sevil ACAR
110
date of the end of 2006 was set in order to finish the negotiations, which resulted again
unsuccessful.
At the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, in December 2005, the
following issues were aimed to be debated:
(i) an agreement on the modalities (i.e., detailed negotiating parameters) for
negotiations in agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA);
(ii) an effective negotiating framework for a significant result in services;
(iii) directions to ensure that WTO rules remain effective and in some cases are
strengthened (for example, by adding new disciplines to subsidies to deal with over-
fishing); and
(iv) the outlines of an agreement on trade facilitation.
11
As such, the WTO members hoped to come to a final agreement on these issues.
However, the discussions in the conference were pegged down on the issue of agricultural
subsidies and tariffs. The problem was that the big trading blocs in the WTO (the US,
Brazil, and Australia on one side, and the EC on the other) had been in a serious dispute on
the amounts of subsidy cuts offered by the two sides. Each of them had the opinion that
their cuts were high enough. Besides, the group of 20 developing nations (G-20) was
demanding heavier cuts from both sides. At first, the US offered a cut of 60% in its farming
subsidies whereas the EC offered a reduction of 38% in its tariffs on agricultural goods.
The EC’s offer was considered insufficient by the US and the developing countries. To sum
up, the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference had begun with the hopes of agreeing on the
main points of the agricultural section -tariff cuts and quota easing or elimination,
elimination of export subsidies for farm products by developed countries by 2013
12
;
however a document was added to the Ministerial text that required the elimination of a
substantial portion of the support by 2010, and noted that there should be further reduction
of subsidies in rich countries.
13
Despite these notes and agreements, successive deadlines were missed as we noted
before, and, on July 28, 2006, the General Council of the WTO formally announced the
indefinite suspension of the talks,
14
following the refusal of the United States to make
bigger cuts to its farm subsidies if the EC and emerging developing countries such as India,
China, and Brazil did not reduce their tariffs on agricultural and industrial products
respectively”. The EC and the other major trading members are blaming the US. for the
collapse.
15
There was a last attempt on June 19, 2007, in Potsdam, Germany, to find ways that
will take the Doha Development Round forward. However it again failed. The only
contribution of this meeting was that US finally agreed to put an upper limit of $17 billion a
11
Leal-Arcas, Ibid, p. 53
12
Ibid., p. 56
13
Ibid., p. 57
14
S. Cho, 2007, “Doha’s Development”, Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 25 , issue 2 , p.
165
15
Leal-Arcas, Ibid., p. 67
111
year for its subsidies. Although it seems to be a better proposal compared to its earlier offer
of $ 22,5 billion, Brazil and India, who are considered to represent the poorer countries,
found this amount not low enough and demanded less than $ 15 billion. What is more, no
agreement could be reached in terms of both agricultural and industrial tariff cuts.
It still remains deadlocked and the future of the DDA has already started to be
questioned together with the future of the WTO. There are different views on the issue.
Some argue that there should be some solution to the suspension and otherwise, all partners
of trade will suffer from this. For instance, Faizel Ismail, Head of the South African
Delegation to the World Trade Organization, argues that “the suspension of the Doha
Round, and the almost certain extension of the round beyond 2006, means that the
prospects for the development outcomes of the round to be realized have been postponed
once again” for both the developing countries that have an interest in an ambitious outcome
in the agriculture negotiations; and for those that are the least developed and vulnerable
economies.
16
Some others point out that the EU’s refusal to offer more than the status quo
(in terms of farm tariffs) encourages the US not to change its own offer and keep it at low
levels. Furthermore, there is a possibility that poor countries may become frustrated
because of the unsatisfactory compromises in agriculture that are offered by rich countries
and, one day, may refuse to remain in this “Development Round”.
17
Still, whatever the future of the WTO will be, it is a fact that the sluggishness in
the DDA negotiations, concluded with a deadlock of the multilateralist process, led to
changes in the trade policies all over the world. The new feature of the global trade,
acceleration of the bilateral trade negotiations or the “new regionalism” is explored in the
next section.
3. New Regionalism: Trade Policies in the Last Decade
3.1 The Evolution of Free Trade Agreements
By definition, free trade agreements (FTAs) are legally binding arrangements
between two or more countries, in which these countries give each other preferential
treatment in trade that eliminates trade protection among members but each member keeps
its own tariff structure in trade with third countries.
FTAs have become increasingly prominent in the last decade. Every major trading
nation in the world is actively negotiating free trade agreements, to ensure that their
businesses and workers can compete successfully in a global economy and to secure
strategic commercial, foreign policy and natural resource advantages. According to the
WTO, about 380 Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) have been notified to the
GATT/WTO up to July 2007, where about half of this number has accrued since 2002.
Moreover, if we take into account RTAs which are in force but have not been notified,
those signed but not yet in force, those currently being negotiated, and those in the proposal
stage, we arrive at a figure of close to 400 RTAs which are scheduled to be implemented by
2010, where FTAs and partial scope agreements account for over 90 percent of these
16
F. Ismail, 2006, “From The Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference to the Suspension of the
Negotiations. Developing Countries Re-claim the Development Content of the WTO Doha Round”,
World Economics, Vol. 7, Issue 3, p. 133-136
17
Cho, Ibid., p. 189
Dr.Mahmut TEKÇE*Sevil ACAR
112
RTAs
18
. FTAs have become a regularized component of the international trading system
where almost every country in the world has entered into at least one FTA. Today, more
than half of the world trade occurs through FTAs.
19
Table 2. Intra-regional exports and their share in world exports ($ at current
prices in billions and %)
1990
2000
2004
2006
WORLD
3,382.3
6,382.9
9,130.7
11,935.8
EU 25
1,028.8
1,618.9
2,499.9
2,996.8
NAFTA
226.3
676.1
737.6
902.1
ASEAN
27.4
98.1
141.9
194.3
MERCOSUR
4.1
17.8
17.4
25.8
GCC
6.9
8.0
12.5
20.0
EFTA
0.8
0.8
1.1
1.5
Share (%)
EU 25
30.42
25.36
27.38
25.11
NAFTA
6.69
10.59
8.08
7.56
ASEAN
0.81
1.54
1.55
1.63
MERCOSUR
0.12
0.28
0.19
0.22
GCC
0.20
0.12
0.14
0.17
EFTA
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
Source: UNCTAD, 2007, Handbook of Statistics
Table 2 shows the evolution of intra-regional exports of major RTAs and their
share in world exports. The table does not include trade flows between bilateral free trade
areas, but gives an overview of how regional blocs became significant in the world trade. In
2006, EU-25, NAFTA, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, GCC and EFTA accounted for some 40
percent of the world merchandise trade. In 2006, intraregional exports of the EU-25 alone
accounted for 25 percent of world merchandise exports, while NAFTA intra-exports
represented around 7.5 percent. The recent fall in the shares of EU-25 and NAFTA intra-
trade in world trade mainly reflects the rapid rise of the share of China and India in world
trade.
18
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm
19
M. Mashayekhi et al., 2005, “Multilateralism and Regionalism”, in M. Mashayekhi and T. Ito,
Multilateralism and Regionalism: The New Interface, UNCTAD, New York, p. 3
113
Table 3. Share of intra-regional exports in total exports (%)
1990
1995
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
EU 25
67.41
66.44
62.23
67.20
66.74
67.30
66.67
NAFTA
41.39
46.23
51.68
55.72
56.56
55.87
53.85
ASEAN
18.95
24.52
21.10
22.98
22.66
24.92
24.93
MERCOSUR
8.86
20.28
24.98
20.00
11.47
12.69
13.51
GCC
7.99
6.77
8.04
4.84
5.89
5.02
4.76
EFTA
0.79
0.74
0.90
0.59
0.57
0.54
0.56
Source: UNCTAD, 2007, Handbook of Statistics
Furthermore, intra-RTA trade has become significant for member countries.
NAFTA is a good example for this, where the share of the intra-regional trade between the
US, Canada and Mexico in their total exports rose significantly after the formation of
NAFTA in 1994. In 2006, 54 percent of the total trade of the NAFTA members was intra-
regional. The EU intra-regional trade stayed more or less constant in the last decade, but
constitutes a large percentage of its total trade. In cases of ASEAN and MERCOSUR,
regional trade became increasingly significant. Thus, trade figures show that international
trade flows are increasingly concentrated within regional groupings formed by large trading
nations
20
.
Regionalism through RTAs is a widely discussed topic among trade economists
since 1950s. The pioneering theoretical approach on the subject was Jacob Viner’s static
analysis on preferential trade agreements. Viner introduced the concepts trade creation
and trade diversion and stressed the discriminatory aspects of regional trade
liberalization.
21
In the following years, the formation of European Economic Community
(EEC) in 1957 and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960 gave pace to the
discussion about the objectives of the countries entering a regional integration scheme.
As a tool for achieving the target of global free trade, the other approach has been
multilateral trade liberalisation, depending on the GATT/WTO principles and negotiations.
Until 1980s, RTAs have been mostly limited to Western Europe and regionalism has
mainly been regarded as a European concept. The stance of the USA was being loyal to
multilateralist approach. While Europe was integrating in 1960s and 1970s, the USA was
rejecting proposals for a North Atlantic Free Trade Area
22
. So, as Bhagwati suggests, the
first wave of regionalism that took place in the 1960s failed to spread because the US
20
Mashayekhi et al., Ibid., p. 4
21
J. Viner, 1950, The Customs Union Issue, New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
p. 43
22
A. Panagariya, 1999, “The Regionalism Debate: An Overview”, The World Economy, vol. 22, no.
4, p. 481
Dr.Mahmut TEKÇE*Sevil ACAR
114
supported a multilateral approach
23
. However, following the failure of the GATT
multilateral trade negotiations in November 1982, the US had to change its position and
favoured RTAs. This led to a second wave of regionalism, which brought about a multitude
of such agreements, where the most notable exampled are the enlargement of the EU,
NAFTA and Mercosur
24
.
The first half of the 1990s witnessed a race of regional agreements between the
world’s two largest trade partners, and this race between two giants has led to a renewal of
efforts for FTAs by and among smaller countries in Africa, Latin America, South and
Central Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States.
25
This wave of regionalism
made the question whether regionalism or multilateralism is the most effective strategy for
achieving global free trade one of the most debated issues in international economics in the
1990s.
Starting from the mid 1990s, both the US and the EU turned their attention to
multilateralism. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in
1994, and the establishment of the WTO in 1995 to provide the institutional support to the
multilateral trade agreements, flourished the expectations that a world trading system based
on common rules and multilateral liberalization can be formed. There was an expectation
that exceptions to multilateralism, such as regional trade agreements (...) would either
become less of an alternative policy option for countries or will need to be adapted and
conducted in such a manner as to become outward-oriented, not inward-looking, and thus
constitute building blocks for the new multilateralism ushered in by the WTO.”
26
On the
side of the US and the EU, there was the expectation that the DDA would conclude by the
end of 2004.
The original position of the US was already multilateralism, and pursuing FTAs
was a temporary policy change for them. The US did not sign any regional trading
agreements after NAFTA for a long time, and rejected any proposals. On the other hand,
the EU, who traditionally followed the rationale for regionalism, also shifted its focus to
multilateralism and maintained an effective suspension on the opening of bilateral or
regional negotiations to conclude FTAs. Pascal Lamy, who was the Trade Commissioner of
the European Commission between 1999 and 2004, explained this policy as one
pursu[ing] all existing mandates for regional negotiations with vigour and fairness, but
not to begin any new negotiations
27
Indeed, the EU completed its ongoing FTA
negotiations with Chile, Lebanon and Egypt in 2003 and 2004 and refused all proposals for
new FTAs. Both for the US and the EU, increasing the number of bilateral agreements was
23
J. Bhagwati, 1993, “Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview” in J. de Melo and A.
Panagariya (eds.), New Dimensions in Regional Integration, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
p. 28
24
Ibid., p. 29
25
Panagariya, Ibid., p. 481
26
Mashayekhi et al., Ibid., p.2
27
P. Lamy, 2002, “Stepping Stones or Stumbling Blocks? The EU's Approach Towards the Problem
of Multilateralism vs Regionalism in Trade Policy”, The World Economy, Vol. 25, p. 1412
115
labelled a “spaghetti bowl
28
and these interconnected links were assumed to create
problems in the medium term for the international trading system as a whole.
3.2 New Regionalism in the Post-Asian Crisis Period
Despite the fact that the “two giants” of the world trade stressed their commitment
to the WTO rules of multilateralism, the surge for bilateral trade agreements was spreading
all over the world. Especially East Asian countries, who had maintained a policy stance
emphasizing a multilateral trading system based on the GATT/WTO rules even in times of
“regionalism waves”, changed this position after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. China,
Japan and South Korea started negotiating FTAs in 1999. The region has emerged as the
most dynamic region in terms of the number of FTAs concluded; East Asia was responsible
for nearly thirty percent of FTAs notified to the WTO in the period of 2001-2005.
29
The last
decade experienced significant FTAs in the region; Japan was the first East Asian country
to sign an FTA, with Singapore in 2002, then concluded agreements with Mexico and
Malaysia; China signed FTAs with ASEAN and New Zealand in 2004; and South Korea
signed its first FTA with Chile in 2004, then continued with Singapore and EFTA. On the
other side of the world, in South America, Chile pioneered the wave of FTAs. In a short
period of time, Chile became one of the most open economies in the world in terms of
trade, and signed FTAs with Costa Rica, El Salvador, EU, USA, South Korea and EFTA.
Thus, contrary to the anticipations of the US and the EU, the developments in the
world trade moved towards the opposite direction. The WTO report published in 2004
acknowledged that the principle of non-discrimination characterized by the Most Favoured
Nation (MFN) clause ceased to be the rule of international trading system, and “the
spaghetti bowl of customs unions, common markets, regional and bilateral free trade areas,
preferences and an endless assortment of miscellaneous trade deals has almost reached the
point where MFN treatment is exceptional treatment.”
30
Finally, following the collapse of
the WTO Ministerial in Cancún in September 2003 and several rounds of inconclusive
negotiations, specifically on agricultural market access, agricultural domestic support, and
non-agricultural market access, the DDA negotiations were provisionally suspended in July
2006 as we noted in the previous section.
So, in an international trade environment where, on one hand, the proliferation of
the FTAs have been visible all around the world, and, on the other hand, the expectations of
completing a multilateral trade system based on the WTO rules have become vague, the EU
and the US had to change their strategies on bilateral trade agreements. The US acted
before the EU, and starting from 2002 the Bush administration has pressed ahead with
smaller bilateral FTAs regarding both economic and political interests in the Middle East,
28
The term was first used in J. Bhagwati, 1995, “U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade
Agreements” in J. Bhagwati and A. O. Krueger, The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade
Agreements, AEI Press, Washington DC
29
S. H. Park, 2006, “Increasing FTA Initiatives of East Asia and the World Trading System: Current
State of Play and Policy Options for the 21st Century”, ASIEN: The German Journal on
Contemporary Asia, vol. 100, p. 44
30
WTO, 2004, “The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional challenges in the new millennium”,
WTO, Geneva, p. 19
Dr.Mahmut TEKÇE*Sevil ACAR
116
Pacific and Latin America.
31
European Commission, on the other hand, showed more
resistance to the trend of FTAs than the US; but finally in October 2006, revealed a new
trade policy strategy under which the EU will pursue bilateral FTAs with major economies
in order to secure the market access and competitiveness of European companies in
important markets. The core of the new trade strategy of the EU has been summarised as
rejection of protectionism at home, accompanied by activism in creating open markets and
fair conditions for trade abroad”.
32
Turning back to Bhagwati’s analysis on the waves of regionalism, we can argue
that the second wave of regionalism of 1980s and 1990s, evolved into a “new regionalism”
or a “third wave of regionalism”
33
, which started after the 1997 Asian financial crisis and
reached its climax by the suspension of the DDA and trade policy shift of the EU in 2006.
It is hard to identify a distinct break between these two waves as there has never been a halt
in the FTAs, but the characteristics of the FTAs have changed.
The new regionalism has three important features. First, contrary to the previous
trend of regionalism that is mainly limited to regions (e.g. EFTA, NAFTA, MERCOSUR),
FTAs are not restricted to countries or blocs with geographic proximity (e.g. US-Morocco,
Thailand-Bahrain, EFTA-Korea). This shows that “economic distance” is no longer
perceived as a factor that affects the competitiveness of products originating in distant
trading partners and that impedes trade;
34
thus the term “regionalism” lost its meaning and
became a misnomer. Second, new generation FTAs go beyond merchandise trade
liberalization and also include “deep integration” measures covering standards, sanitary
measures, trade facilitation, liberalization of trade in services, investment and competition
disciplines, intellectual property rights (IPRs), government procurement, and also the
movement of natural persons with a set of related disciplines. They also incorporate policy
areas that were previously a domestic preserve: macroeconomic coordination, policy and
regulatory harmonization, cooperation measures in a variety of fields and infrastructure
integration; and pursue a mix of political, social and economic objectives.
35
Third, because
of the depth of issue coverage, the new FTAs tend to be far smaller in initial membership
(i.e. largely though not solely bilateral) compared to the existing FTAs which had a
preference for shallowness or narrowness in issue coverage but broadness in terms of
membership.
36
Moreover, the members of the agreements can be from different levels of
31
R. McMahon, 2006, The Rise in Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, Council on Foreign Relations,
backgrounder document, June 13, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10890
32
European Commission, 2006, Global Europe: Competing in the World, Commission Staff Working
Document, Directorate General of External Trade
33
Majluf and Bonaface identify the post-Asian crisis period as the third wave of regionalism. See L.
A. Majluf, 2004, Swimming in the Spaghetti Bowl: Challenges for Developing Countries Under the
‘New Regionalism’”, United Nations, Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study
Series No. 27, Geneva; and T. Bonapace, 2005, “Free Trade Areas in the ESCAP Region: Progress,
Challenges, and Prospects” in Asian Economic Cooperation and Integration: Progress, Prospects,
and Challenges, Asian Development Bank, Manila.
34
Mahjuf, Ibid., p. 10
35
Ibid., p. 8
36
R. Rajan and R. Sen, 2005, “The New Wave of FTAs in Asia: Implications for ASEAN, China and
India”, in Asian Economic Cooperation and Integration: Progress, Prospects, and Challenges, Asian
Development Bank, Manila, p.127
117
economic development. According to Mahjuf, from the point of view of the developing
countries, the new regionalism is characterized by attempts by regional or sub-regional
economic groupings to pursue a common external economic policy and to emerge as a
collective entity in the international arena, thus bringing interesting and complex new
challenges for developing countries.”
37
Given the distinctive characteristics of the new generation FTAs, we will
summarise the significant FTAs (either finalised or in negotiation) of this new wave of
regionalism and the stances of the largest traders of the world economy.
3.2.1 FTAs of the European Union
As mentioned above, the European Commission announced in October 2006 that it
adopted a new trade policy that will support efforts to foster economic growth and create
jobs
38
. Based on the concern that European exports have not been successful enough in
some of the most rapidly growing economies in the world, the Commission proposed
shifting the EU trade policy from sole reliance on multilateral trade negotiations to
proposing a new generation of bilateral and regional FTAs.
39
The FTA strategy constitutes a very important part of this trade policy. The EU
already has quite a large number of bilateral deals: the agreements with the EFTA
countries, the customs union with Turkey, the goods agreements with the Mediterranean
countries
40
and the preferential arrangements offered to the sub-Saharan African, Caribbean
and Pacific (ACP) countries. The EU has also signed FTAs with Mexico and South Africa
in 2000 and with Chile in 2003. With the new trade policy the Commission defined
economic criteria, target countries and coverage for future FTAs.
According to the European Commission, the key economic criteria for new FTA
partners should be the market potential and the level of protection (tariffs and non-tariff
barriers) against EU export interests. In this sense, the Commission defined ASEAN, Korea
and Mercosur as FTA partners with priority, and India, Russia and the Gulf Cooperation
Council as countries of direct interest. China, on the other hand, despite meeting many of
the criteria, was not defined as a possible FTA partner, but a country of special attention
because of the opportunities and risks it presents.
41
The European Union is party to more FTAs than any other economy in the global
trading system.
42
In the last decade, especially after it announced its new FTA strategy, the
EU has given pace to its efforts for signing FTAs with several countries. The European
Commission formally started FTA negotiations with ASEAN, India and South Korea in
2007. In addition, the EU accelerated the FTA talks that started before the trade policy shift
37
Mahjuf, Ibid., p. 10
38
European Commission, Ibid.
39
R. J. Ahearn, 2006, Europe’s New Trade Agenda, Congressional Research Service Report No.
RS22547, p. 1
40
Barcelona Declaration signed in November 1995. For further information on Barcelona Process,
see http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/
41
European Commission, Ibid., pp. 11-13
42
Business Roundtable, 2007, We Can’t Stand Still: The Race for International Competitiveness,
Business Roundtable White Paper, Washington DC
Dr.Mahmut TEKÇE*Sevil ACAR
118
but had been stopped because of the EU’s multilateralist position (e.g. FTA negotiations
with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Mercosur). The EU is also seeking to
negotiate FTA agreements with Russia, the Andean and Central American countries and
Pakistan.
3.2.2 FTAs of the United States
As mentioned above, throughout the post-war period the US has championed the
multilateral trading system and its attitude towards bilateral trade agreements was
lukewarm. Thus in the race for FTAs, the US lagged behind the EU for many years.
However, in the “third wave of regionalism”, the US acted before the EU and accelerated
its attempts of forming bilateral trade agreements with strategic trade partners. Before the
year 2002, the US had signed only three FTAs; with Canada, Israel and Mexico, but since
2002, it has concluded FTAs with Australia, Bahrain, Chile, CAFTA,
43
Jordan, Oman,
Morocco, Singapore, Peru and South Korea. According to its economic and political
interests, the US also started FTA talks with Panama, Thailand, New Zealand, Ghana,
Indonesia, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, United Arab Emirates,
Ecuador, SACU
44
and Qatar. Besides these negotiations, a lengthy queue emerged after the
US changed its trade policy and many countries expressed their interest in entering into an
FTA with the US. Some major examples of potential FTA partners for the US are Uruguay,
Egypt, Pakistan, India and Philippines.
In the context of selecting new FTA partners, the US expects from the partner
country to demonstrate its commitment to pursue further liberalization of restrictions to
trade and investment. J. Schott identifies the FTA partner selection criteria of the US under
four broad categories: impact on domestic US politics, economic objectives, level of
commitment of the partner country to trade reform, and foreign policy considerations.
45
Lagging behind the EU for many years, the US evolved into one of the most active
countries in terms of FTAs.
3.2.3 FTAs of East Asian Countries
In the geography of regionalism, East Asia had been “a white spot” for a long
time.
46
However, after the Asian crisis of 1997, Japan, South Korea and China started
pursuing FTAs, and in a short period of time East Asia became the most dynamic region in
terms of FTAs negotiated and concluded.
According to Park
47
, the main reason of the trade policy shift in East Asia in the
post-crisis period was that, at times of the financial crisis no meaningful and effective help
was provided by major countries in other regions and this increased the consciousness of
the value of the regional solidarity. Also, the relatively high degree of market integration in
the Asian region was another motivation for East Asian countries to pursue FTAs. In the
43
Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.
44
Southern Africa Customs Union: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.
45
J. J. Schott, 2004, “Assessing US FTA Policy”, in J. J. Schott (ed.) Free Trade Agreements: US
Strategies and Priorities, Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, p. 365
46
S. H. Park, 2001, “East Asian Economic Integration and Regionalism: Finding a Balance between
Regionalism and Multilateralism”, Korea Review of International Studies, vol. 4, no. 1
47
Park, 2006, Ibid.
119
post-crisis period, East Asian countries have been involved in numerous FTA negotiations
and agreements with countries inside and outside the region.
China has negotiated nine FTAs with 27 countries and regions
48
; implemented the
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) with Hong Kong and Macao, and
concluded FTA negotiations with ASEAN, Chile, New Zealand, Pakistan, Jordan and
Thailand. China is also negotiating or planning bilateral agreements with Australia, India
and the GCC.
South Korea, on the other hand, had maintained a policy stance emphasising a
multilateral trading system based on the GATT/WTO rules. However, similar to other
countries in the region, it began to actively engage in establishing FTAs. So far, South
Korea has concluded FTA negotiations with Chile, Singapore, EFTA, ASEAN
49
and the
US. In the near future, South Korea is preparing to sign FTAs with the EU, China and
Japan.
50
Japan followed a long-standing policy of refusing to negotiate bilateral and
regional trade agreements, but after suffering losses from the FTAs of the trade
competitors, it had to change it trade policy stance. Japan uses the term “Economic
Partnership Agreements” (EPAs) instead of FTAs, but its EPAs have the exact
characteristics with typical FTAs. So far, Japan has concluded FTA talks or reached
agreements in principle with Singapore, Mexico, Chile, Malaysia, Philippines, ASEAN,
Brunei and Thailand. FTA negotiations are ongoing or about to start with South Korea,
Vietnam, Switzerland, Australia, India and the GCC.
51
There are also proposals for US-
Japan and China-Japan FTAs.
4. Conclusion
The last decade witnessed a rapid proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements.
This trend mainly started after the Asian crisis, fuelled by the sluggish pace of the
multilateral trade negotiations of the WTO and finally reached its peak by the temporary
suspension of the DDA in 2006. The optimism of the multilateralists in the 1990s,
especially after the formation of the WTO in 1995, have been replaced by the concerns that
this resurgence of bilateralism or regionalism, which is often referred as “the third wave of
regionalism” or “new regionalism” would complicate the future steps for multilateralism
and create a “spaghetti bowl” in global trade.
Existing research has produced little consensus on how new regionalism would
affect the fate of multilateralism. It has been argued that the overlapping of the FTAs could
threaten to breakdown the world economy into separate regional blocs which materialize a
“deep integration” through several FTAs, but impose trade barriers against third countries.
48
S. Ning and D. Liang, 2006, China’s FTA Policy and Its Recent Developments, King & Wood
China Bulletin, p. 1
49
Thailand is excluded in this agreement.
50
See S. Guerin et al., 2007, A Qualitative Analysis of a Potential Free Trade Agreement between the
EU and South Korea, CEPS-KIEP Project for the European Commission DG Trade,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/december/tradoc_136964.pdf
51
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2007, Japan’s Current Status and Future Prospect of
Economic Partnership Agreement, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/effort.pdf
Dr.Mahmut TEKÇE*Sevil ACAR
120
Here, only a clear commitment to the multilateral WTO principles and obligations would
assure that the economic benefits of regional integration effectively combine with the
multilateral rules and policies, so as to construct a multilevel system of governance.
52
Today, the proposals for giant FTAs between US and China or US and EU, which
would liberalize a very large portion of the world trade but create a significant trade
diversion against developing countries, are very rarely mentioned. Tariff and non-tariff
trade barriers among these countries or blocs still exist, but removal of these barriers are
mainly left to the result of the multilateral WTO negotiations, which is still expected to
revive. However, the recent slowdown in global trade could provoke some industries in
these trade giants to push their governments to take steps that will remove trade barriers
from target trade partners as soon as possible, before the long and cumbersome WTO
negotiations conclude. In this case, hopes to revive multilateralism would fade and trade
liberalisation would remain limited to bilateral FTAs. Under current circumstances, where
the increasing number of FTAs is combined with the slowdown of the global trade, this
scenario does not seem implausible.
52
P. Guerrieri and D. Dimon, 2006, “The Trade Regionalism of the United States and the European
Union: Cooperative or Competitive Strategies?”, The International Trade Journal, vol. 20, no. 2, p.
92
121
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Swimming in the Spaghetti Bowl: Challenges for Developing Countries Under the 'New Regionalism' " , United Nations, Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study Series No. 27, Geneva; and T. Bonapace Free Trade Areas in the ESCAP Region: Progress, Challenges, and Prospects
  • A Majluf
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