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134
Mi d d l e ea s t Po l i c y , Vo l . XVii, No. 3, Fa l l 2010
© 2010, The Author Journal Compilation © 2010, Middle East Policy Council
T
here is a strong possibility that
state authority in Yemen will
considerably erode in the coming
years under the effect of mul-
tiple pressures. This could lead to at least
partial, and possibly complete, failure of
the state, which would have important
regional and international implications.
However, a number of key initiatives, if
implemented by Yemen and the interna-
tional community, could in the best of
cases prevent the gradual deterioration of
the situation or at least limit the speed and
extent of the erosion of state authority.
Importantly, should preventive measures
be unsuccessful, other initiatives could
contain the eventual negative implications
of state failure in Yemen.
In this context, this article asks three
questions:
• What are these multiple pressures that
could lead to the failure of the Yemeni
state?
• What would be the impact of state
failure for regional and international
security?
• What can be done to prevent failure or,
alternatively, to contain the implications
of the erosion of state authority should
preventive measures not succeed?
BACKGROUND
The situation in Yemen has deteriorat-
ed in recent years, as witnessed by a rise in
the number and intensity of street protests,
tribal clashes, kidnappings and terrorist
attacks, and by an insurrection in the North
and growing tension in the South. In this
context, an increasing number of analysts
and senior U.S. government ofcials have
been warning of the risks associated with
the possible failure of the state in Yemen.1
It should be remembered, however, that
central authority in what today corresponds
to Yemen has never been strong, and that
reports of its impending disintegration
have been recurring for decades. Ever since
the birth of the Yemen Arab Republic, or
North Yemen, in 1962 (in the wake of the
overthrow of the Zaidi Imamate, which had
ruled parts of the area since 897) and the
independence of the People’s Democratic
Republic of Yemen (PDRY, South Yemen)
following the departure of the British colo-
nial power in 1967, rst North and South
Yemen and then the unied Republic of
Yemen since 1990 have been weak states
that have never had a monopoly on the
legitimate use of force on their territories.
Power in Yemen is concentrated in
the hands of the few. The president, Ali
Abdallah Saleh, rules by maintaining a
Ye m e n : Pr o s P e c t s f o r st a t e fa i l u r e —
im P l i c a t i o n s a n d re m e d i e s
Thomas Juneau
Mr. Juneau is a doctoral candidate in political science at Carleton
University in Ottawa, Canada. He studied in Sanaa, Yemen, in 2007.
135
Ju N e a u : ye M e N : Pr o s P e c t s F o r st a t e Fa i l u r e — iM P l i c a t i o N s a N d re M e d i e s
precarious balance among a variety of
competing forces, including the military
and the security apparatus, the main tribes,
political parties and factions, and key
clerics. By buying loyalty through patron-
age and ruling through a combination of
cooptation, inclusion and coercion, Saleh
has painstakingly built an “administrative
feudal system”2 that has evolved into a mix
of “kleptocracy and plutocracy.”3 Saleh,
who gained power in North Yemen in 1978
and has ruled Yemen since unication, is
not committed to any ideology beyond a
short-term focus on regime survival.
The central government today is indeed
fragile. But even this is sometimes exagger-
ated in Western media, which often report
that the government has little or no control
beyond Sanaa, the capital. The govern-
ment, in fact, imperfectly controls most
of the country’s towns and cities. It has,
however, nonexistent-to-partial control of
large swathes of rural areas. Even this must
be qualied: Some of the areas Sanaa does
not control are under the partial or complete
authority of tribes with which the govern-
ment maintains a sort of modus vivendi.
There are some factors that help ac-
count for the resilience of the Yemeni state,
though these are weak and few. Yemen is
not fractured by sectarian,4 linguistic or
ethnic cleavages as are other countries in
the Middle East, and in past decades the
idea of Yemeni unity and a sense of com-
mon descent have exerted a considerable
pull on most Yemenis.5 Moreover, tribes
have historically been autonomous, even
when they have had good relations with
central governments. Outside major cities
most Yemenis have low expectations for
what the government should do for them.
This is a consequence of the country’s
tribal culture, but also of its geography;
many of Yemen’s villages are in remote
desert or mountain areas. There is a strong
tradition of self-sufciency.
Three other factors help account for
this resilience. The rst is Saleh’s ability
to build and manage a web of patronage
to sustain his regime. The second has been
the role of the security apparatus, the pri-
mary pillar of Saleh’s power. Finally, tribal
chiefs, senior military ofcers, top bureau-
crats, and members of the president’s inner
circle have a personal stake in the perpetu-
ation of the regime. This has traditionally
pushed them towards compromise for the
sake of the survival of the system from
which they benet.
WHY YEMEN IS AT RISK
If Yemen has put to the lie repeated
forecasts of its impending collapse, why
should the situation be different now?
More so than in the past, today’s Ye-
men faces the convergence of multiple
and intensifying pressures, including
both structural challenges and protracted
conicts. Importantly, these challenges are
intertwined and reinforce each other. The
insurrection in the North further strains
government nances, for example, while a
growing youth bulge worsens water short-
ages and unemployment.
Economy and Natural Resources
Yemen is the poorest country in the
Arab world with a per capita GDP of less
than $900. By many socioeconomic indi-
cators, it ranks alongside the most destitute
countries in sub-Saharan Africa: 45 percent
of the population lives on less than $2 per
day, unemployment hovers around 35-40
percent, and child malnutrition rates are
among the highest in the world.
Yemen’s water crisis may be its most
fatal weakness. Freshwater availability is
less than 200 cubic meters per capita per
136
Mi d d l e ea s t Po l i c y , Vo l . XVii, No. 3, Fa l l 2010
sector, expected to total about $30 billion
through 2030, will not be sufcient to
compensate for declining oil production.
Yemen is already experiencing a scal
crisis; the combination of declining oil
prices and production led the Ministry of
Finance in early 2009 to direct all minis-
tries to cut expenditures by 50 percent.7 As
scal troubles mount, the state’s ability to
distribute rents and patronage and pay civil
service and military salaries, the pillars on
which the balance of the feudal administra-
tive system hinge, will gradually erode.
This will result in mounting tensions as the
state loses its ability to co-opt rivals and
arbitrate disputes.
The qat plant is widely cultivated in Ye-
men and parts of East Africa for the pleas-
ant, mild stimulant effect of its leaves. Qat
plays a huge role in Yemeni life as a recre-
ational drug, but is also a pillar of social life
and the rural economy. Between 50 and 75
percent of adult men and around 30 percent
of women spend hours most days chewing
qat with friends, family and colleagues.
Most spend 10-20 percent, and sometimes
more, of household income on the habit.
Qat is a major drag on water supplies, agri-
cultural efciency, productivity, household
food and economic security, and health in a
country where all these are under strain.
Qat is an important cash crop; it can
be harvested up to four times a year and
pays farmers considerably more than most
foodstuffs.8 Its production occupies more
than a third of Yemen’s scarce arable land,
more than double that of a decade ago. Qat
cultivation is water-intensive, responsible
for one-third of total consumption, exacer-
bating shortages. As the country’s popula-
tion doubles in the next 20 to 30 years,
qat demand will continue to grow, further
straining water tables and reducing the
amount of land available for growing food.
year, ve times below the water-poverty
line and 3 percent of the global average.
Yemen has no major permanent river, and
so relies on rainwater and underground
water tables. But its aquifers are rapidly
depleting, as extraction is about 30 percent
above sustainable yields. Water manage-
ment is inefcient and wasteful, with 40-50
percent of water in piped systems unac-
counted for. This is especially the case
in agriculture, which uses more than 90
percent of the country’s water. The situa-
tion is notably dire in cities and rural areas
high in the western mountain range. Sanaa,
where the population is growing at a rate of
7 percent per year, could run out of water
as soon as 2017, and there is already talk
of having to move it to a lower altitude.
6
As a result, water prices have more than
tripled in some cities since 2005. As water
becomes scarcer and more expensive, agri-
cultural yields suffer, while conict over its
possession and trade will increase.
Yemen has small oil reserves of ap-
proximately 3 billion barrels. The oil
sector represents 30 percent of the coun-
try’s GDP and contributes 75 percent of
the state budget and 90 percent of export
earnings. Yet production has been steadily
declining, from a peak of 440,000 barrels
per day in 2001 to an expected 260,000 in
2010. Oil-export revenues have declined
from $7.8 billion in 2008 to an expected
$4.5 billion in 2010. Barring major new
discoveries — unlikely at this point —
export capacity will be eliminated in
the coming years, and reserves could be
depleted by 2020, perhaps sooner. Yemen
also has 17 trillion cubic feet of natural
gas. There has been considerable invest-
ment in this sector in recent years, a rst
liqueed-natural-gas (LNG) plant going
online in 2009 and a second one expected
in 2011. Revenues from this growing
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Ju N e a u : ye M e N : Pr o s P e c t s F o r st a t e Fa i l u r e — iM P l i c a t i o N s a N d re M e d i e s
stage of government and private-sector ac-
tivity; by some accounts, up to 30 percent
of government revenues are unaccounted
for. For example, a recent report for the
U.S. Agency for International Development
assessed that up to one-third of the army’s
100,000 soldiers exist only on paper, al-
lowing commanders to pocket their salaries
and sell their weapons on the black mar-
ket.
14
Among other consequences, this led
the World Bank in 2005 to reduce a loan
package by a third (from $420 to $280 mil-
lion over three years). As will be discussed
below, corruption, mismanagement and a
lack of technical
expertise make
the implementa-
tion of reforms
and the absorp-
tion of external
assistance very
difcult.
Another major challenge is the extreme
weakness of the non-oil economy. A net
food importer, Yemen was severely affected
by the 2008 food crisis, as a 60 percent
spike in food prices may have pushed an
additional 6 percent of the population below
the poverty line.
15
Manufactured exports
represent less than 5 percent of total ex-
ports. Financial markets are vastly underde-
veloped, while non-oil foreign investment
has averaged less than $25 million per year
recently. The infrastructure is appalling and
not keeping pace with a growing popula-
tion. One of the few natural resources
Yemen possesses beyond hydrocarbons is
sh. Yet even here, the forecast is bleak, as
there are growing signs that stocks are in
decline.
16
The already weak shing industry
has also been damaged by the spike in pi-
racy attacks in the Gulf of Aden, which hurt
Yemen’s maritime trade in general while
also impeding offshore oil exploration.
Qat is also a drag on productivity; a recent
World Bank report estimates that up to
25 percent of potential working hours are
lost to qat-chewing.9 Finally, though few
systematic studies have been conducted,
it is believed that life-long qat-chewing is
associated with a variety of negative health
implications, notably an increased risk
of heart and periodontal disease, various
ailments of the digestive tract, insomnia,
cancer and neonatal health problems.10
The Yemeni economy suffers from
many critical and worsening structural
weaknesses. Though real GDP growth will
reach 5 percent in
2010 thanks to the
new LNG proj-
ect, it will slow
to 2.6 percent in
2011, below the
rate of population
growth. Ina-
tion fell from 19 percent to 4 percent in
2008 and 2009 but is expected to exceed
12 percent in 2010 and 2011. The gradual
decline of the Yemeni riyal against the U.S.
dollar has also hurt the economy. The rate
of exchange fell from 4 to 1 in the early
1980s to about 200 to 1 today. Depreciation
is expected to continue, perhaps reaching
240 to 1 by 2011.
11
Food prices have been
rapidly rising, partly as a result, and are
now among the main catalysts for popular
discontent.
12
Another critical issue is that of
fuel subsidies, which in 2008 cost Sanaa,
according to the World Bank, $3.5 bil-
lion, or 12 percent of GDP. In this context,
the scal decit for 2010 will be above 8
percent of GDP and will probably widen to
more than 10 percent in 2011. Public debt
will grow from $32 billion in 2005 to more
than $50 billion in 2011.
13
Bribery, patronage and other forms of
thievery are pervasive at every level and
Corruption, mismanagement and a
lack of technical expertise make the
implementation of reforms and the
absorption of external assistance
very difcult.
138
Mi d d l e ea s t Po l i c y , Vo l . XVii, No. 3, Fa l l 2010
who were forced into retirement in the
wake of unication. The movement has
snowballed since, with other disgruntled
factions joining the fray. The government
has reacted with growing violence and has
ooded areas of the South with northern
troops. As grievances go unaddressed and
the government increases its use of force to
repress the protests, the situation is likely
to further deteriorate.
Feelings of alienation and resent-
ment are pervasive in the South because
of northern domination of the government
and economy. The South, for example,
produces 80 percent of Yemen’s oil but is
frustrated by the North’s monopolization
of oil revenues. Among the southern elite,
there is widespread resentment at having
been excluded after unication from elite
circles in Sanaa and from access to the
spoils of power. Among the population,
there is growing discontent over the lack of
economic and political opportunities.19
Since unication, many southerners
have sought more devolution of power and
equitable revenue sharing. Even today,
despite growing tension and calls for seces-
sion, most of the general population remains
committed to unity, hoping for greater
autonomy and improved conditions within
a unied Yemen.
20
But Sanaa’s harsh line
contributes to growing tensions by entrench-
ing frustrations and feeding the increasingly
secessionist feelings of many protesters.
The “Southern Movement” has
evolved into a broad, heterogeneous mix
of marginalized PDRY-era elites, tribal
sheikhs, unpaid or underpaid pensioners,
students and poor southerners generally
frustrated by the situation. In 2009, the
movement selected as its leader Ali Salem
al-Baydh, a former president of South Ye-
men now living in exile. But the leadership
is heavily fractured, wracked by personal
Remittances from abroad were central
to the economy in the 1970s and 1980s,
when hundreds of thousands of Yemenis
worked in the Gulf States. In 1980, remit-
tances constituted 40 percent of North
Yemen’s GNP and 44 percent of South Ye-
men’s.17 In a country where unemployment
was rife, the export of excess labour also
served as a safety valve. The expulsion
of most of these workers in 1990, there-
fore, dealt a severe blow to the Yemeni
economy.18 Some have since returned, but
in much lower numbers; remittances today
represent about 5-6 percent of GDP.
Demographic Explosion
The population growth rate averaged
3.6 percent from 1975 to 2005 and now
hovers around 3 percent. Yemen’s popula-
tion is thus set to double in the next 20 to
30 years, from 24 million to an astonishing
50 million by 2040. The population is very
young: more than two-thirds are under 25
and half are under 15. Urban population
has also rapidly increased in both relative
and absolute terms: in 1970, 13 percent of
Yemenis lived in cities, compared to 30
percent today. Sanaa is one of the fastest-
growing capitals in the world, its popula-
tion having skyrocketed from 200,000
in the 1970s to more than two million
today. With government services already
stretched thin, these numbers paint a
daunting picture of the country’s mounting
challenges.
Resentment in the South
Protests have been increasing in
frequency and intensity in the areas previ-
ously corresponding to South Yemen. A
turning point came in 2007, when protest-
ers started demanding higher pensions for
the former ofcers and bureaucrats (more
than 100,000 by some counts) of the South
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Ju N e a u : ye M e N : Pr o s P e c t s F o r st a t e Fa i l u r e — iM P l i c a t i o N s a N d re M e d i e s
ing, media reports have indicated that Saleh
called in support from Sala militias and
the Hashed tribal confederation (rivals to
the Bakeel, to which the Huthis belong).
22
The conict has now also become a region-
al one. In late 2009, Saudi Arabia inter-
vened militarily for the rst time, attacking
rebel positions with artillery re and ghter
aircraft and imposing a naval blockade on
the northwestern coast of Yemen to prevent
weapons from reaching the Huthis.
23
For
Riyadh, the Huthi conict represents not
only instability on its southern border; it
is also a drain on Sanaa’s scarce resources
from the ght against al-Qaeda, which re-
mains the main concern for Saudi Arabia.
24
The conict has important implications
for internal Yemeni dynamics. A small num-
ber of ghters — a few thousand — have
managed to resist repeated onslaughts by
the better-armed Yemeni military. By high-
lighting Sanaa’s inability to tame a small
insurrection, the protracted Huthi conict
emboldens other regime opponents to more
assertively press their demands. Along with
the growing military presence in the South,
the conict has also overstretched the mili-
tary’s limited resources and led to crippling
nancial demands on the government.
Uncertain Presidential Succession
Though Saleh, who was born in 1942,
is reportedly in good health, talk of suc-
cession is simmering. According to the
constitution, his current mandate (2006-13)
should be his last, but rumours are circulat-
ing that a proposed amendment could al-
low him to serve two additional terms. The
possibility of a coup remains unlikely for
the foreseeable future, as no gure in the
regime would arguably be able to mount
such an operation. The possibility of an as-
sassination, though also unlikely, cannot be
dismissed; Saleh’s two predecessors were
rivalries. It has yet to articulate clear goals,
and its membership remains far from a
consensus on ideology and aspirations.
Most of its members still favor the use of
nonviolence, but increasing repression,
the prevalence of weapons and growing
resentment highlight the strong likelihood
for violence to escalate. In the past year,
there have already been mounting reports
of isolated armed clashes.
The Huthi Rebellion
Fighting broke out in 2004 between
government forces and a movement led by
Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi. The rebels,
known as the Huthis and today led by a
brother of their deceased founder, hail
from the area around the northern city
of Saada and adhere to the Zaidi branch
of Shii Islam. Even though some among
the Huthis call for a return to the rule of
the Zaidi Imam and regularly criticize
the Saleh regime for being pro-U.S. and
pro-Israel, the origins of the conict are
primarily tribal and local, not religious.
The Huthis, in particular, call for greater
political inclusion and a more equitable
distribution of resources.21
Fighting has ebbed and owed since
2004, with Sanaa still unable to decisively
defeat the rebels. The latter maintain ac-
cess to a huge weapons market, and they
have bought or captured some equipment
from the Yemeni army. Their knowledge
of the rugged mountainous terrain of the
North also provides them with a signi-
cant advantage. A ceasere in early 2010
stopped the most recent round of ghting,
but thus far there has been little sign that
the Huthis’ grievances are being or will be
addressed. A resumption of ghting in the
near future is therefore highly likely.
What started as a local insurrection has
begun to spread. In recent rounds of ght-
140
Mi d d l e ea s t Po l i c y , Vo l . XVii, No. 3, Fa l l 2010
is attempting to establish himself as his
father’s successor, though he has recently
adopted an increasingly confrontational
posture towards the president.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
Islamists have a long and ambiguous
history of cooperation and confrontation
with the Yemeni state. Sanaa has often sup-
ported and armed Islamist groups to bal-
ance against other
factions, includ-
ing the Huthis
and the Southern
opposition. Saleh
has been able
to do this in the
past because of
his belief that Islamists primarily targeted
the Saudi regime and the United States
and represented a manageable threat to his
regime, certainly one lower than that posed
by the Huthis or the Southern opposition.26
Islamist groups have engaged in
violent acts against the government or
Western interests in Yemen since the early
1990s, most famously against the USS
Cole in 2000. In fact, as of early 2010, Sa-
naa estimated at 61 the number of al-Qae-
da attacks in Yemen since 1992.27 Many of
the rst generation of militants from the
Arabian Peninsula were killed, captured
or reintegrated into society, especially
between 2002 and 2005 in the wake of a
successful Saudi government crackdown,
forcing remaining operatives to ee to
Yemen.28 Worryingly, a new generation of
younger, more hard-line militants has since
emerged. Many have come back from
ghting in Iraq or elsewhere, where they
gained signicant combat experience.29
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) was formed in early 2009 through
the merger of the Yemeni and Saudi branch-
assassinated, in 1977 and 1978. Either
scenario would likely result in a power
struggle and considerable instability.
In the meantime, jostling for position
in anticipation of the post-Saleh era has al-
ready begun and will increasingly threaten
to destabilize the regime. Three names gen-
erally dominate discussions. The frontrun-
ner is often alleged to be the president’s son
Ahmad, who heads the Republican Guard
and the U.S.-
trained Special
Forces, among
the most capable
units in Yemen.
25
The president is
increasingly po-
sitioning Ahmad
as his successor, alienating some among his
power base. Few believe, however, that Ah-
mad has either the charisma or the ability to
play his father’s traditional role as arbiter
among the country’s myriad factions.
Ali Muhsen al-Ahmar, the commander
of the First Armoured Division and a rela-
tive of the president, is one of Yemen’s
most powerful men. He is a key intermedi-
ary between Saleh and Sala groups and
commands signicant loyalty within the
military. Rumors abound of his rivalry
with Ahmad Saleh. Some, however, assess
that he is more likely to play the role of
kingmaker at the time of the next presiden-
tial succession. A third name increasingly
discussed is that of Hameed al-Ahmar
(no relation to Ali Muhsen al-Ahmar), a
son of Sheikh Abdallah bin Husayn al-
Ahmar. The latter, a longstanding ally of
the president, was the founder of the Islah
opposition Islamist party, the speaker of
Parliament, the leader of the Hashed tribal
confederation (Yemen’s largest), and a key
intermediary between tribes and the gov-
ernment until his death in 2007. Hameed
Islamist groups have engaged in
violent acts against the government
or Western interests in Yemen since
the early 1990s, most famously
against the USS Cole in 2000.
141
Ju N e a u : ye M e N : Pr o s P e c t s F o r st a t e Fa i l u r e — iM P l i c a t i o N s a N d re M e d i e s
competition will increase. This matters, as
tribalism acts as a powerful check against
state building, due to the tribes’ strong
resistance, often armed, to centralization
efforts. Resistance to external intervention
also makes state-building assistance that
much more difcult. In January 2010, for
example, 150 clerics issued a fatwa reject-
ing military cooperation with the United
States and calling for jihad in the event of
foreign military intervention.
Small-Arms Proliferation
Yemen is awash with small arms;
they are easily available in both open and
clandestine markets throughout the coun-
try. The oft-heard gure of 50-60 million
is exaggerated; the Small Arms Survey
estimates rather that there are 6-17 million
civilian rearms in circulation. There are
also many heavier weapons such as rocket-
propelled grenades, but their numbers are
unknown.35 Regular government efforts
aimed at curbing proliferation have mostly
been unsuccessful because of corrup-
tion, mismanagement and a tribal culture
in which the bearing of arms is a long-
standing tradition. There have been some
limited successes, for example, with recent
efforts to ban the open carrying and selling
of weapons in large cities and occasional
seizures by security forces.36 The prolifer-
ation of small arms contributes to insecu-
rity by making weapons readily available
to terrorist and criminal organizations. As
state authority further erodes, moreover,
the availability of weapons will contribute
to entrenching the position of tribes or
factions and to making state-building even
more difcult.
IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE
The convergence of multiple and in-
tensifying challenges raises the strong pos-
es of al-Qaeda. AQAP’s leadership is much
less willing than previous generations to fol-
low traditional Yemeni rules of negotiating.
In its statements, the group has criticized
militants who engaged the Yemeni state by
participating in rehabilitation programs or
abiding by a “security covenant” agreed to
in the 1990s, whereby the state would turn
a blind-eye to their activities as long as they
did not strike targets in Yemen.
30
AQAP has demonstrated a growing
ability to recruit and train ghters and con-
duct operations.31 It is unclear how many
ghters it has, but with the return of many
from Saudi Arabia, the alleged relocation
of a few dozen from Iraq, Afghanistan
and Pakistan,32 and with its recruitment
campaign presumed to be active, reason-
able estimates can reliably put the number
between the low and high hundreds.33
For now, AQAP poses a much smaller
threat to the survival of the Yemeni state
than the conicts in the South and North.
For the foreseeable future, there is no risk
that AQAP could take over Yemen, as the
much stronger Taliban did in Afghani-
stan in the 1990s or as various groups are
threatening to do in Somalia. This explains
in part why Sanaa is not acting against
AQAP to the degree desired by Saudi Ara-
bia and the United States, who view AQAP
as their main concern in Yemen.
Tribalism
Feelings of tribal identity are very
strong in Yemen, where intertribal strife
and conict between the central authority
and tribes have been common for centu-
ries.34 Today, disputes are often driven by
competition for scarce resources, whether
water, funds for infrastructure and basic
services, or access to patronage networks.
As tension in the country mounts and as
the economic situation deteriorates, such
142
Mi d d l e ea s t Po l i c y , Vo l . XVii, No. 3, Fa l l 2010
eign interests in Yemen, to having regional
and global ambitions.
At the local level, AQAP has shown
a keen strategic and tactical sense with a
dual strategy of choosing mostly foreign
(embassies and tourists) and government
targets (security services and oil installa-
tions), while avoiding civilian casualties
and improving its relations with tribes
that either host it or could eventually do
so (especially in the southern and central
governorates of Abyan, Marib, Shabwa
and al-Jawf).37 This gradually entrenches
AQAP in Yemen and makes future efforts
to tackle it more difcult, as this would
imply also tak-
ing on its tribal
allies. AQAP has
learned lessons
from al-Qaeda’s
mistakes in Iraq
and Somalia and
its successes in
Pakistan and Af-
ghanistan: terrorist groups are best served
not by Hobbesian anarchy but by making
deals with hosts in areas of tribal self-
government.38 As part of this approach,
AQAP has adopted a narrative integrating
traditional Yemeni grievances against cor-
ruption and poverty.39
Despite recent successes, it is not a
given that AQAP will succeed in estab-
lishing long-term mutually benecial
relationships with tribes. Both do share
some common interests: tribes can offer
AQAP shelter and an operational base,
while AQAP can offer money and ght-
ers. Potential conicts, however, are
numerous. Tribes, above all, prize lo-
cal autonomy, which could conict with
al-Qaeda’s objectives of establishing an
Islamic caliphate and launching operations
against distant enemies. Repeated attacks
sibility that Yemen will continue its slide
towards failure. Under such a scenario, as
the central government’s authority further
erodes, it will exert less and less control
over increasing swaths of the countryside
and smaller cities, and eventually over
larger cities and certain neighborhoods of
cities it will still control. Those areas will
fall under the partial or complete control of
a wide array of well-armed tribes, warlords
and, to a much smaller extent, AQAP.
Terrorism
The possibility of AQAP’s increas-
ingly using its safe haven as a launching
pad for terrorist
operations is the
most worrying
potential implica-
tion of a failed
Yemen. Low and
decreasing gov-
ernment authority
provides a base
for the group to organize itself, recruit and
train operatives, and launch operations.
The country is strategically located, bor-
dering on Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest
oil producer and host of Islam’s two holiest
sites, and in close proximity to Somalia,
a failed state and terrorist haven. Yemen’s
tribal culture, plentiful access to weapons
and criminal networks, and large recruiting
pool of young men also converge to make
it an ideal base.
A key question concerns AQAP’s
ambitions: does the group intend to focus
on Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula, or the
United States? Evidence suggests that,
having consolidated the organization in
2008 and 2009 by merging its Saudi and
Yemeni branches and by establishing a
more durable foundation, AQAP rapidly
leapt from targeting governmental and for-
Tribes, above all, prize local
autonomy, which could conict with
al-Qaeda’s objectives of establishing
an Islamic caliphate and launching
operations against distant enemies.
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past months suggest that more attacks on
U.S. soil or against U.S. interests in Yemen
or the Middle East are likely. One potential
vector for AQAP’s global ambitions could
be the three dozen or so American former
convicts who converted to Islam in U.S.
prisons and reportedly joined extremist
groups in Yemen after their release.42
The possibility of a nexus forming
between AQAP and al-Shabab, an al-
Qaeda-linked group in Somalia, has at-
tracted some attention.43 Though there has
been little evidence so far of cooperation
beyond rhetorical promises of support,44
there is potential for future association on
the basis of proximity (at its narrowest, the
Gulf of Aden is only 150 km wide), exist-
ing personal ties,45 and the strong criminal
and smuggling networks linking the two
countries. AQAP’s growing presence in the
southern governorate of Abyan, giving it
access to the waters of the Gulf of Aden,
could eventually facilitate such contacts.
The large presence of Somali refugees in
Yemen also provides a tool for network-
ing and a potential recruiting basin. There
were, for example, media reports in early
2010 of Yemeni security forces raiding
Somali refugee communities and detaining
al-Shabab loyalists.46
Humanitarian Consequences
State failure in Yemen would have dire
humanitarian consequences. The combina-
tion of insecurity and difcult geography
would render the delivery of assistance to
some regions impossible. The result could
well include a signicant refugee crisis,
with hundreds of thousands trying to cross
the Saudi or (in smaller numbers) Omani
borders. Some might also try to cross the
Red Sea to Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, or
even Egypt. As areas of the country suffer
from insecurity and growing water and
by central forces against AQAP could, on
the one hand, iname local feelings against
Sanaa and drive tribes closer to AQAP. At
the same time, it is not inconceivable that,
as happened in Iraq, some tribes could
eventually assess that they have more to
lose from hosting AQAP. Whether AQAP
succeeds in avoiding the latter scenario
is key to its future in Yemen. It should be
remembered, however, that this has little
or no bearing on the inexorable erosion
of state authority in Yemen, though it will
considerably inuence the implications.
AQAP demonstrated its regional
ambitions with two failed attacks on Saudi
Arabia in 2009, including an aborted
assassination attempt against a deputy
minister of the interior. AQAP, which has
been vociferous in its opposition to the
Saudi regime, is highly likely to continue
targeting the kingdom, chiey its oil
installations and members of the royal
family. That said, though a successful
attack on a member of the royal family
would undoubtedly have an important
psychological impact, it would be unlikely
to cause major instability. There have been
no reported attacks thus far in 2010, but
in March, Riyadh announced the arrest of
over 100 suspected AQAP militants, who
were allegedly planning suicide attacks
on oil installations.
40
Finally, an important
unknown in AQAP’s regional ambitions
is whether it intends to strike other states
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC);
41
though this is plausible, there is no hard
evidence of the group’s plans.
The failed December 25, 2009, attack
against an airliner near Detroit, rapidly
claimed by AQAP, spectacularly brought
to the world’s attention the group’s grow-
ing international ambitions — and the fact
that it has the capabilities and will to act.
The group’s trajectory and statements in
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the possibility of attacks using missiles
or explosive-laden small boats.47 Should
waters around Yemen become too danger-
ous, some oil could be rerouted through
pipelines in Saudi Arabia (from the Persian
Gulf region to the Red Sea), while ships
could take the longer route around the
southern tip of Africa, adding 10,000 km to
the journey. This would lead to consider-
able increases in insurance premiums and
transit times and costs.
Piracy
Maritime piracy off the coast of Soma-
lia has skyrocketed since 2006, with over
150 attempted attacks in 2009 alone. There
is only circumstantial evidence linking
Somali pirates with individuals or groups
in Yemen, but there is potential for further
association. According to the UN group
tasked with monitoring the 1992 arms
embargo on Somalia, ve Yemeni ports
have been used by Somali pirates as resup-
ply stations. The report also argues that
some of the arms and fuel used by Somali
pirates come from Yemen.48 Moreover, in
a failed Yemen, despondent shermen —
partly motivated by declining sh stocks
— could imitate their Somali counterparts
and engage in piracy, increasing the threat
in the Gulf of Aden. Along with the threat
of terrorist attacks, this could further pres-
sure shipping companies to avoid the route
through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of
Aden, pushing them southwards around
the Cape of Good Hope.
Small Arms Proliferation
Yemen is an important source and tran-
sit point for the smuggling of small weap-
ons towards both the Horn of Africa and
the Middle East. This would undoubtedly
intensify in a failed Yemen, making small
weapons (and to a lesser extent heavier
food scarcity and lose what little govern-
ment services they have, hundreds of
thousands and possibly millions are also
at risk of becoming internally displaced.
The current humanitarian situation in the
North, where around 200,000 live in dire
conditions in makeshift camps, could pro-
vide a foretaste of things to come.
Oil and Shipping
Yemen currently accounts for less than
0.5 percent of global oil production, and
this number will decline further, perhaps
to zero, before it becomes a failed state.
Failure, therefore, would have no direct
impact on global oil markets. AQAP could,
nonetheless, target oil or gas installations
in Yemen such as the 320 km pipeline
linking gas elds to the new liquefaction
plant. This would hurt Yemen’s fragile
economy, perhaps accelerating its decline.
More important, Yemen’s neighbours are
the world’s largest oil producers, and in
its statements AQAP regularly and openly
threatens their oil infrastructure. That said,
it should be remembered that the latter
is very well-guarded and thus difcult to
successfully target. Furthermore, though
a terrorist strike on oil installations in
Saudi Arabia or its Gulf neighbours would
certainly result in a rise in oil prices, in all
likelihood, it would only be temporary.
The Bab al-Mandab, the strait link-
ing the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden at
the southwestern corner of Yemen, is one
of the world’s most strategic maritime
chokepoints. It is 30 km wide at its nar-
rowest, and about 3.5 million barrels of oil
transit through it daily (4 percent of global
production). In March 2010, the U.S. Of-
ce of Naval Intelligence released a state-
ment warning that AQAP posed a threat to
vessels in the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab
and the Gulf of Aden, specically raising
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Prevention
A failed Yemen would pose a serious
threat to the Arabian Peninsula, primar-
ily but not exclusively to Saudi Arabia.
Historically, Riyadh has aimed to prevent
the development of a strong, unied Ye-
men, assessing that this would weaken its
dominant position on the peninsula. Today,
Saudi Arabia’s traditional concern has
been reversed as it is increasingly anxious
about the actual and potential implications
of instability in Yemen. Riyadh became
especially nervous in 2009 when AQAP
started targeting it while the Huthi conict
was escalating. This matters. Saudi Arabia
is by far the external actor with the greatest
potential inuence in Yemen. Other GCC
states have yet to initiate more than token
action. An important exception was the
Qatari mediation effort in 2007 between
the Huthis and Sanaa. Though this effort
did show a rare willingness to engage, the
breakdown of the ceasere led to a Qatari
withdrawal. Illustrating the difculties of
future GCC involvement, Riyadh provided
limited support to Doha, as it has tradition-
ally seen Yemen as its own backyard.
Relations between the United States
and Yemen have centred on counterter-
rorism since the USS Cole attack in 2000.
Washington’s pressure to crack down on
terrorist networks forces Yemen to engage
in a perilous balancing act. On the one
hand, perceptions of alignment with the
United States are highly unpopular with
the Yemeni population, putting the govern-
ment at risk of stoking an already volatile
climate. On the other hand, the govern-
ment does wish for greater assistance and
support, especially in capacity-building
for the army and security forces. Yemen’s
difcult relations with Saudi Arabia and
the United States matter. Because mistrust
ones) more available in the Arabian Pen-
insula and the Horn of Africa for terrorist
groups, criminal networks and pirates.
Assault ries used in a 2004 assault on the
U.S. consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for
example, bore serial numbers traced back
to the Yemeni Ministry of Defense.49
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
Yemen is on a dangerous course, and
failure, as seen in the previous section,
carries a number of negative implications
for regional and international security.
That said, it is not too late for Sanaa and
the international community, especially
Saudi Arabia and the United States, to
work together towards the implementa-
tion of a number of initiatives to attempt
to stabilize the country. At a minimum,
specic actions could retard the ongoing
erosion of state authority and mitigate the
negative implications of instability. In the
best of scenarios, a serious and prolonged
commitment could grind to a halt the slow
decay of the situation and eventually work
towards the stabilization of the country.
The creation of the Friends of Yemen
group at a donor conference in London
in January 2010, regrouping GCC states,
the United States, Britain, Germany and a
number of international organizations, is
an important rst step in this direction. If
not enough is done, however, state failure
is the most likely outcome. In this eventu-
ality, another set of initiatives could gradu-
ally be implemented to seek to contain
the implications of a failed Yemen. This
section rst discusses measures that could
be adopted to prevent the further erosion of
state authority in Yemen and, second, other
actions that could be taken to contain both
the current and potential implications of
instability.
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and suspicion of external involvement are
extremely high in Yemen, overt interven-
tion by either the United States or Saudi
Arabia is highly unpopular.
Overall, the international commu-
nity should increase its current efforts to
support Yemen and ensure that existing
and new pledges are respected and bet-
ter coordinated. Those efforts should be
comprehensive: structural economic weak-
nesses, the depletion of natural resources,
and internal conicts are causing the
erosion of state authority in Yemen, not
terrorism. Initiatives seeking to shore up
state authority in Yemen could therefore
focus on ve main areas: development
assistance, institution-building, economic
reform, decentralisation and reconciliation,
and counterterrorism and security.
To begin, Yemen is in crucial need of
more development assistance. The country
has traditionally been low on the priority
list of donors. In 2005, it received $335
million in assistance, which corresponded
to 2.2 percent of GDP or $16 per capita.
The Palestinian Territories by contrast
received $303 per capita.50 In the wake of
the failed December 2009 attack, a number
of countries, including the United States,
announced increases in assistance.51 GCC
states had promised over $4 billion at a
donor conference in 2006, but as of early
2010 had disbursed less than 15 percent of
this sum. They committed again to respect
those pledges in January 2010.
Second, a major effort should be un-
dertaken in the realm of institution-build-
ing, in particular with the development of
a more professional and competent bureau-
cracy better able to deliver services. Much
energy should be geared towards the health
and education sectors, to try to buttress
the legitimacy of the central government.
To achieve this, Yemen would require
both nancial and technical support from
donors. Despite numerous challenges,
donors should take a tough line in the ght
against corruption, while also supporting
the development of civil society.
Economic reform is a third priority
area. In particular, a huge effort could be
undertaken to improve water management
and to reduce consumption, for example
through investments in rainwater collec-
tion and irrigation systems. Programs such
as those by German Technical Coopera-
tion, supporting the decentralization of
water management, could be expanded.52
GCC states could also support investments
in desalination plants. This is a hugely
expensive solution that would not be of
much use for the worst-affected mountain
cities, including Sanaa (to which it would
be prohibitively expensive to pump water).
It could nonetheless alleviate problems in
lower-altitude areas.
Efforts aimed at reducing qat produc-
tion and consumption would undoubtedly
be controversial. Qat is embedded in social
life and provides employment for one in
seven workers. An outright ban is unreal-
istic, but some measures, if implemented,
could mitigate the growing negative impli-
cations associated with qat. Existing pro-
grams encouraging the cultivation of sub-
stitute crops could be increased, while the
ban on qat imports from East Africa could
be lifted, freeing land for food crops. Even
though most Yemenis are aware of the
deleterious effects of qat, more sustained
and comprehensive education campaigns
could help mitigate the implementation
of unpopular measures. Qat consumption
or production could be taxed, providing
the government with new revenues. Sanaa
could also support measures to improve
the efciency of qat production, as inef-
ciencies lead to the wasting of at least 30
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structures. This, in fact, is a longstanding
demand of many opposition groups. Saleh
has supported the idea on a number of oc-
casions, but has rarely followed through.
The international community could press
Yemen to move forward and provide
political, nancial and technical support.
Such efforts could include the convening
of a grand council bringing together the
country’s main power gures.
In a blueprint for a strategy of decen-
tralization and reconciliation, Longley and
al-Iryani call for the election of local of-
cials instead of their appointment by Sanaa,
the devolution of power and resources to
local authorities, a revenue-sharing agree-
ment between the center and the provinces
and municipalities, the strengthening of lo-
cal police and courts, and the establishment
of an upper house of parliament with equal
regional representation.
54
Addressing local
and tribal grievances could, as an addi-
tional benet, contribute to driving wedges
between AQAP and tribes that host it.
As part of a program of devolution, a
number of measures should be specically
geared towards addressing grievances in
the South and North. Authorities in the
South could be empowered to resolve
the land-expropriation disputes that are
perceived as symbols of northern “colo-
nization,” while the different levels of
government could agree to reinstate in the
military and civil service ofcials from
the former PDRY or to provide them with
adequate pensions. In the North, it would
be essential for mediation efforts to ensure
that Zaidi religious rights are respected
and that devolution agreements support
economic development.
Finally, it is crucial to intensify ef-
forts to strengthen Yemen’s counterter-
rorism (CT) capacities. Such support has
already increased since September 2001.
percent of the water used for qat crops; by
some measures, this is equivalent to the
water consumption in Sanaa.
Efforts have been underway for a
number of years to spur non-oil economic
growth, with limited success; much more
could be done, both by Yemen and by
donors. The issue of oil subsidies is also
crucial to any reform effort. When Sanaa
tried to reduce diesel subsidies in 2001 and
2005, it rapidly backed down in the face of
widespread riots. Yet, as oil resources and
government revenues dwindle, the issue
will rapidly gain prominence again. GCC
states could well be called to provide Ye-
men with oil or gasoline to compensate.
Perhaps the single greatest boost to the
Yemeni economy would result if GCC states
increased their intake of Yemeni migrant
workers, something Sanaa has been request-
ing for years. This, however, would have
to overcome the resentment caused by the
feud of 1990 and lingering prejudice in the
Gulf states towards Yemenis. Moreover, the
Yemeni work force suffers from a crippling
lack of skilled and semi-skilled workers.
Saudi Arabia and others have in recent years
launched a number of training programs,
including the nancing of technical-training
institutes.
53
These, along with Sanaa’s cur-
rent efforts to encourage the return of expa-
triates, could be expanded with international
support. Another potential source of income
for the country is the strategic location and
deep-water facilities of the port of Aden.
But irregular and unconvincing promotional
efforts have not succeeded in bringing in
badly needed investments, while insecurity
has deterred maritime trafc and increased
insurance costs.
Fourth, an extensive strategy of
decentralization and reconciliation would
strengthen local authorities while respect-
ing traditional tribal and local power
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from participants that they refrain from at-
tacks on Yemeni soil, and not elsewhere in
the Middle East. Three of its graduates are
thought to have been among the attackers of
the U.S. embassy in Sanaa in 2008.
57
The United States has already pro-
vided considerable support to Yemen’s
underfunded coast guard,58 and should
continue doing so; Yemen’s coast guard
still needs larger vessels, better port
facilities and better weapons, training and
communications equipment. The interna-
tional community could also do more to
support Yemen in protecting its oil and
gas installations, since successful attacks
on them could cripple the government. An
11 km wire fence, for example, has been
built around the new LNG plant and naval
patrols around it have been increased.
T
he United States started funding a
buy-back program for small arms in 2003.
Even though such initiatives inevitably face
problems of implementation and corruption,
some did meet with limited success;
59
more
could be done. In addition, Yemen could
use considerable assistance in reforming
its corrupt and underfunded correctional
services. Its prisons are a breeding ground
for radicalism from which terrorists and
criminals regularly escape. Finally, because
Saleh has created an alphabet soup of agen-
cies competing with each other for political
favour and access to resources, efforts to
improve coordination and cooperation with-
in the security apparatus could be launched.
Containment
All these ongoing and proposed initia-
tives face serious challenges, chief among
them insecurity, a shortage of skilled
personnel, the weak application of the rule
of law, and corruption. The adoption and
implementation of serious reforms, in ad-
dition, would in many cases cause a loss of
Washington has helped train and equip
the Counter-Terrorism Unit, a 150-person
unit within the Central Security Organiza-
tion and one of Yemen’s most efcient
ghting forces. The United States further
announced in early 2010 that its CT sup-
port would increase from $70 million in
2009 to $190 million in 2010. Washington
also recently announced that its special
forces will increase their assistance, which
as of late 2009 was provided by about
200 personnel who provide training while
also relaying U.S. intelligence to support
operations. The same individuals will now
be rotated and deployed for longer tours,
allowing them to build closer relationships.
The United States also recently expanded
the number of surveillance drone ights
over Yemen.55 Such programs should be
sustained and expanded where possible.
While maintaining the smallest foot-
print possible, the United States should
continue targeted killings of AQAP lead-
ers, either directly through drone attacks or
indirectly through intelligence and logis-
tics support to Yemeni forces. This implies
sharing intelligence, building local assets
among tribes, keeping civilian casualties
to an absolute minimum, and continuing
to provide equipment and training. The
Yemeni military is able to execute such
operations, albeit imperfectly. Among
other equipment, it possesses functional
Russian-built MiG-29 ghter bombers and
Mil-24 Hind attack helicopters.56
Riyadh could also support Yemen in
establishing a deradicalization and rehabili-
tation program of the relatively successful
type that Saudi Arabia has been operating
for a number of years. Yemen’s previous
iteration, which ran from 2002 to 2005 and
from which 364 prisoners graduated, suf-
fered from corruption and a chronic short-
age of resources. Furthermore, it only asked
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by any kind of central authority and are
largely self-sufcient.
To prevent the growing links between
Somalia and Yemen from intensifying, the
maritime dimension is an important aspect
of a containment strategy. This should
focus on supporting the navies and coast
guards of neighbouring states, including
Red Sea states. U.S., NATO, EU, and other
counterterrorism and counterpiracy mis-
sions in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian
Ocean should be maintained, and their
mandates broadened to include coun-
tersmuggling and, in general, containment
of a failed Yemen.
The third aspect should be an increase
in the ongoing focus on counterterror-
ism. This could include continued strikes
through drones and special forces, both
to decapitate AQAP’s leadership and to
disrupt its facilities. This would involve
improved intelligence collection, analysis
and sharing. Outreach and engagement
with key actors in a failed Yemen is the
nal aspect of a containment strategy.
This would imply a delicate balancing
act between immediate security needs
and longer-term state-building goals. The
former would involve linking with tribes
or factions in the ght against AQAP and,
in Saudi Arabia’s case, in protecting its
border. The latter would call for refraining
from overly strengthening those actors op-
posed to rebuilding a central authority.
CONCLUSION
For decades, Yemen and its predeces-
sors have been fragile states repeatedly
labeled as candidates for failure. Despite
this decades-long resilience, however, the
convergence of an array of growing pres-
sures, ranging from unrest in the South and
the Huthi conict in the North to the rapid
power for the elite, leading to considerable
internal resistance. This partly explains
why numerous reforms mooted in recent
years did not go beyond the early stages
of implementation.60 Moreover, external
intervention is highly unpopular, while the
long-term commitment of donors remains
to be guaranteed. As such, it is far from
certain that many of the preventive mea-
sures recommended above will be both ad-
opted and implemented successfully. This,
in the context of the cumulative effect of
the multiple and intensifying pressures
discussed above, raises the prospect that
state failure in Yemen — even though it is
not yet unavoidable — is clearly possible.
In this context, it would be wise for
the international community to start laying
the groundwork for containing the implica-
tions of an increasingly fragile and perhaps
soon-to-be failed Yemen. Such policies
and initiatives can be separated into four
categories: border security, maritime
security, counterterrorism, and outreach to
post-collapse actors.
Unlike in Afghanistan, where a porous
and mountainous border with the ungov-
erned areas of Pakistan provides a funnel
to the outside world, Yemen shares land
borders with functioning states. Saudi Ara-
bia has already improved border security
in recent years, yet more could be done.
Riyadh should continue increasing its
ability to guard the border, including with
mobile patrols, UAVs, and other surveil-
lance and enforcement capabilities. It has
also begun building a high-tech electronic
barrier, though it is not clear if it will be
completed. There is much less concern
with the Omani border, as the eastern half
of Yemen is sparsely populated. Moreover,
the tribes in al-Mahra province, which bor-
ders Oman, have hardly ever been touched
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1 U.S. government ofcials who recently sounded the alarm include the director of the CIA, the Director of
National Intelligence and the commander of Central Command; quoted in Jeremy M. Sharp, “Yemen: Back-
ground and U.S. Relations,” CRS Report for Congress RL 34170 (Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress, updated January 13, 2010), p. 14. Recent analyses include Christopher Boucek, “Yemen: Avoid-
ing a Downward Spiral,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Program paper No. 102
(September 2009); Gregory D. Johnsen, “Al-Qaida in Yemen’s 2008 Campaign,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, No. 5,
April 2008, pp. 1-4; “Yemen Politics: A Growing Worry for the West,” The Economist, January 2, 2010.
2 Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 164.
3 Robert D. Burrowes and Catherine M. Kasper, “The Salih Regime and the Need for a Credible Opposition,”
Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 2, Spring 2007, fn. 8.
4 Virtually all Yemenis are Muslim. Roughly 35 percent, mostly in the northwestern highlands, adhere to the
Zaidi branch of Shii Islam, while the rest are Sunnis from the Shai school. With the important exception of
regular clashes between Salas and Zaidis, the Shii-Sunni divide is not currently a major source of tension
in Yemen, as some argue that it is elsewhere in the Middle East. Instead, domestic conict in Yemen is more
often driven by local, usually tribal or economic, factors. See Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen; Stephen
Day, “Barriers to Federal Democracy in Iraq: Lessons from Yemen,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 13, No. 3, Fall
2006, p. 122.
5 F. Gregory Gause III, “The Idea of Yemeni Unity,” Journal of Arab Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 1988, pp.
55-81.
6 “Rapid Urbanization Threatening Capital’s Water Supplies,” Yemen Times, August 20, 2007. Despite such
talk, others argue that such a move is simply unfeasible for political, economic, and social reasons.
7 Robert F. Worth, “Violence in Yemen Shows Growing Power of Insurgency,” The New York Times, May 5,
2009.
8 Leonard Milich and Mohammed Al-Sabbry, “The ‘Rational Peasant’ vs. Sustainable Livelihoods: The Case
of Qat in Yemen,” Development, Vol. 38, No. 3, September 1995, pp. 43-46.
9 “Yemen: Towards Qat Demand Reduction,” World Bank, Report No. 39738-YE, June 2007.
10 J.G. Kennedy, J. Teague, W. Rokaw, and E. Cooney, “A Medical Evaluation of the Use of Qat in North
Yemen,” Social Science and Medicine, Vol. 17, No. 12, June 1983, pp. 783-793.
11 “Country Report: Yemen,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2010.
12 Abdul-Aziz Oudah, “Demonstrations across Yemen Protest Price Increases, Poor Economy,” Yemen Ob-
server, August 18, 2007.
depletion of natural resources and booming
demographics, leads to the assessment that
state failure is highly likely in the coming
years. Such an outcome would have serious
implications for regional and international
security. It could provide AQAP with a
freer hand to use the country as a launching
pad for regional and international opera-
tions, while maritime security around Ye-
men and the regional proliferation of small
arms would be negatively affected.
That said, failure can still be averted.
The international community, led by Wash-
ington and Riyadh, is already working
with Sanaa to prevent the failure of Yemen
from becoming reality. The failed Decem-
ber 2009 terrorist strike on an airliner near
Detroit, however, served as a reminder that
the situation is deteriorating, not improv-
ing. Much more can be done to slow down
and hopefully reverse the gradual ero-
sion of the Yemeni state’s authority, and
therefore mitigate or avoid some of the
consequences of a failed Yemen. If, unfor-
tunately, such measures prove insufcient
or if the will to adopt and implement them
proves to be lacking, another, parallel set
of initiatives would be needed to contain
the instability seeping out of a soon-to-be
failed Yemen.
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13 “Yemen Politics: Neighbourhood Watch,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 21, 2010.
14 Quoted in Jeffrey Fleishman and Haley Sweetland Edwards, “Ruling Yemen Gets Even More Complicat-
ed,” The Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2010.
15 “Yemen Economic Update,” World Bank, Spring 2009.
16 Ibid., p. 6.
17 Gwenn Okruhlik and Patrick Conge, “National Autonomy, Labor Migration and Political Crisis: Yemen and
Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, No. 4, Autumn 1997, p. 556.
18 When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Yemen was the only Arab state on the UN Security Council. For a
variety of reasons, it decided to abstain from condemning the invasion, the only state on the Council to do so.
Angered by this move, Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent other Arab Gulf states expelled about one million
Yemeni migrant workers. The Gulf States also cancelled or decreased their foreign aid, which had totaled
about $200 million per year — all this as North and South Yemen were in the midst of the difcult process of
unication.
19 For background, see “In the Name of Unity: The Yemeni Government’s Brutal Response to Southern
Movement Protests,” Human Rights Watch, December 2009.
20 See for example April Longley and Abdul Ghani al-Iryani, “Fighting Brushres with Batons: An Analysis
of the Political Crisis in South Yemen,” Middle East Institute, Policy Brief No. 7, February 2008.
21 For background, see “Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb,” International Crisis Group, Middle East
Report No. 86, May 27, 2009.
22 “Yemen Politics: Rising Stakes,” Economist Intelligence Unit, November 16, 2009.
23 “Saudi Arabia Politics: Yemen Risk,” Economist Intelligence Unit, November 11, 2009.
24 Yemen has often accused Libya and elements within Iran of supporting the Huthi rebels (Gregory D.
Johnsen, “Yemen Accuses Iran of Meddling in its Internal Affairs,” Terrorism Focus, Vol. 4, No. 2, Febru-
ary 21, 2007). The United States, however, said in late 2009 that it had no proof of such support (“U.S. Says
Has No Evidence Iran Backs Yemen Rebels,” Reuters, December 11, 2009). Whatever the truth, Yemen may
be making such accusations in the hopes of gaining regional — especially Saudi — and U.S. support in its
struggle against the insurgents.
25 Michael Knights, “Jihadist Paradise — Yemen’s Terrorist Threat Re-emerges,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
May 15, 2008.
26 Laurent Bonnefoy, “Varieties of Islamism in Yemen: The Logic of Integration under Pressure,” Middle East
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 2009, pp. 26-36.
27 “Yemen Politics: The World’s Next Failed State?”
28 See Christopher M. Blanchard, “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations,” CRS Report for Congress
RL 33533 (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, updated December 16, 2009).
29 Knights, “Jihadist Paradise.,” op. cit.
30 Ibid.
31 Brian O’Neill, “AQAP a Rising Threat in Yemen,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 4, April 2009, pp. 17-19.
32 Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, “Some in Qaeda Leave Pakistan for Somalia and Yemen,” The New York
Times, June 12, 2009.
33 For varying estimates, see Steven Erlanger, “Yemen’s Chaos Aids the Evolution of a Qaeda Cell,” The New
York Times, January 3, 2010; Sharp, “Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations,” p. 15; Brian Glyn Williams,
“U.S. Urges Yemen to take on Al-Qaeda,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, January 25, 2010.
34 Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen., op. cit.
35 Small Arms Survey (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
36 “Yemen: Small Arms Heaven,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, September 21, 2007; Abdul-Aziz Oudah, “Thou-
sands of Weapons Seized and Destroyed,” Yemen Observer, July 14, 2007; Small Arms Survey, pp. 45-46.
37 AQAP launched a number of attacks in 2009 against government targets; in November, for example, it
killed several security ofcials in Hadhramawt province. AQAP and its predecessors also regularly targeted
oil installations, and recent statements have made clear that these, as well as the more recent gas infrastruc-
ture, remain prime targets; Gregory D. Johnsen, “Attacks on Oil Industry Are First Priority for al-Qaeda in
Yemen,” Terrorism Focus, Vol. 5, No. 15, February 5, 2008. Sharp, “Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations”
includes a list of al-Qaeda attacks inside Yemen.
38 Sarah Phillips and Rodger Shanahan, “Al-Qa’ida, Tribes and Instability in Yemen,” Lowy Institute for
152
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International Policy, November 2009.
39 “Al-Qaeda Hides in Yemen,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, June 30, 2009.
40 “Saudi Arabia Arrests More Than 100 with Suspected Links to Al-Qaeda,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly,
March 25, 2010.
41 The GCC comprises Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman.
42 Scott Shane, “Ex-Convicts from U.S. Said to Join Yemen Radicals,” The New York Times, January 20,
2010.
43 Scott Baldauf, “Is Al Qaeda in Yemen Connected to Al Qaeda in Somalia?” Christian Science Monitor,
January 7, 2010.
44 “Al-Qaeda’s Grip on Yemen,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, January 6, 2009.
45 AQAP’s second-in command, Qaseem al-Raymee, has reportedly fought in Somalia in the past (“Somali-
Yemen Militant Ties in the Spotlight,” Reuters, January 6, 2010). Furthermore, there are longstanding ties
between Somali and Arab jihadists; the ranks of al-Shabab’s foreign battalion reportedly also include many
Yemenis (“Somalia’s Foreign Fighters,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, June 4, 2009).
46 Sudarsan Raghavan, “Somalis Fleeing to Yemen Prompt New Worries in Fight Against Al-Qaeda,” The
Washington Post, January 12, 2010.
47 “U.S. Government Ofce Warns of Possible AQAP Maritime Attacks Off Yemeni Coast,” Jane’s Terrorism
and Insurgency Centre, March 23, 2010.
48 “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia,” S/2010/91, March 10, 2010.
49 “Yemen: Small Arms Heaven,” op. cit.
50 “Arab Human Development Report,” p. 244.
51 To be fair, the Obama Administration singled out Yemen as a country of concern and announced a number
of aid increases upon taking power, for example with a three-year, $120 million stabilization program focus-
ing on jobs and social services. Washington has also been pushing for years for greater involvement from
international organizations, especially the IMF and the World Bank. See Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Sec-
retary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., January 20, 2010.
52 Gerhard Lichtenthaeler, “Water Conict and Cooperation in Yemen,” Middle East Report, Vol. 254, Spring
2010, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer254/lichtenthaeler.html (accessed April 2, 2010).
53 Boucek, “Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral,” p. 11.
54 Longley and al-Iryani, “Fighting Brushres with Batons,” p. 10-11.
55 Yochi J. Dreazen, “Pentagon to Send More Special Forces Troops to Yemen,” The Wall Street Journal,
January 28, 2010.
56 “Yemen,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, March 30, 2010.
57 “Al-Qaeda’s Grip on Yemen,” op. cit.
58 Gordon Lubold, “U.S. Won’t send Troops to Yemen. How Will It Defeat Al Qaeda There?” Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, January 12, 2010.
59 “Yemen: Small Arms Heaven,” op. cit.
60 Examples include plans to ght corruption such as the establishment of the Supreme National Anti-Corrup-
tion Committee, civil-service reforms, governance reforms such as plans to implement the Extractive Industry
Transparency Initiative, and economic reforms. See “Yemen Economic Update,” pp. 11-17.
