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ApaperforsubmissiontothePhilosophyofEducationSocietyofGreatBritain
Conference2008:
Title:TheEducationalImportanceofSelfEsteem
Author:
MattFerkany
VisitingAssistantProfessor
DepartmentofPhilosophy
506S.KedzieHall
MichiganStateUniversity
EastLansing,MI48824
Email:ferkany@msu.edu
Wordcount:5821
1.
Should school teachers and administrators worry themselves much about the esteem
children have for themselves as persons, i.e. their 'global' selfesteem (henceforth, just
'selfesteem')? In recent work on the subject, two authors have advanced an array of
argumentsmaintainingthattheyneednotatall(Kristjánsson,2007)ornotmuch(Smith,
2002,2006).Someareconsequentialist—effortstofosterselfesteemintheclassroom,it
is argued, conflict with the pursuit of other more important educational aims, such as
academic achievement or character education (Smith, 2002). Others are more
deontological—itisclaimedthatlowselfesteempersonsarenotall'headcases'afterall,
inneedofbeingcured;rather,theycanbelovableandperfectlysuccessful(Smith,2006).
Anotherargumentisconceptual:Selfesteemissupposedlynotconnectedconceptuallyto
the con fidence , and thus the motivation, ch ildren n eed in order to be good learne rs or
behave well (Kristjánsso n,2007 ).A related ,emp irical argument claims that selfestee m
is not connec ted to it causall y either (ibid). Were these arguments pe rsuasive, it wou ld
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seem educators could largely igno rechildren's selfesteem without failing them in any
educationallyimportantway.
Idonotthinkthisisso.Whilethereis acommonaccountofselfesteemandits
educational significance that is somewhat vulnerable to the arguments of Kristjánsson
and Smith, I will argue that their arguments are unsound or do not apply to an
appropriat ely sophisticated acco unt, which I call th e attachment account. Accordin g to
that account, selfesteem is importantly connected to the confidence and motivation
childrenneedinordertoengageinandachieveeducationalgoalsandcan andshouldbe
fosteredsocially,i.e.notjust,orevenprimarily,throughtheinteractionsbetweenteacher
and student,butbetweenstudent andthesocialenvironmentofthe schoolitself.This is
especially the case, I will argue, in certain domains of instruction such as physical
education and the arts. Consequ ently, school educators shou ld concern themse lvesw ith
theselfesteemofchildren,especiallyinthesedomainsofinstruction.
The argu ment proceeds as follo ws. Section 2 outlines a simp le account of sel f
esteem and its educational significance and discusses its vulnerability to Smith and
Kristjánsson's arguments. Section 3 introduces the attach ment account and responds to
Kristjánsson's conceptual and empirical arguments. Section 4 then elaborates the
significanceofselfesteemforeducationinlightoftheattachmentaccountandresponds
to Smith’s consequentialist argument. Section 5 responds to Smith's deontological
argumentandconcludes.
2.
The current literature features various accounts of selfesteem and its educational
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significance,e.g.RuthCigman's 'situatedselfesteem'(2004) or Kristjánsson's'justified'
conception(2007).HereIoutlinea standardaccount ofwhichsomeoftheseotherscan
be seen as variations. I use this account in what follows for two reasons. One, while
Smith and Kristjánsson do not explicitly treat it as the target of their critiques, it
illustrateswelltheforceoftheirarguments.Second,itisalsoaverycommon accountin
bothprofessionalliteratureandordinarytalkaboutselfesteem.
According to the standard account, selfesteem is how a person feels about
herself,goodorbad,andasmanifested inavarietyofways,e.g.inprideorshame,but
especial lyin selfconfidence (U.S. Dep t. of Health and Hu man Services (U.S. DHHS),
n.d.). Bec ause people c anfee l more or less well about the mselves and be more or les s
selfconfident, the standard account asserts that selfesteem can be high, low, and
somewhere in between. However, high selfesteem is claimed to have a variety of
behavioral benefits. These include independence, responsibility taking, toleration of
frustration, resistancetopeerpressure, willingness toattemptnewtasksandchallenges,
ability to handle positive and negative e motions, and willingness to o ffer assi stance to
others(ibid).
Obviously,thesebehaviorsareverydesirableeducationally.Peopleabletohandle
frustration, take risks, and work independently make good learners. Were high self
esteem also rel ated to responsibility taking, imp erviousness to peer pressure ,e motional
stability, and altruism, it would appear to be crucial to good moral character as well.
Scholars of education and public policy makers have not overlooked these supposed
benefits. The California Task Force to Promote SelfEsteem and Personal and Social
Responsibilityendorsesvirtuallyallofthem(Mecca,1990).Morerecently,RuthCigman
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maintains that selfesteem is a crucial component of the confidence, and so the
motivat ion,th at children need in orde rto su cceed academically and as persons (2004).
Callthisthemotivationalclaim.
While decidedly controversial, the reasoning behind the motivational claim is
both intuitive and supported by introspection. Relative to achieving a difficult or
challengingtask,apersonwhoispreoccupiedwithselfdoubtcannotjustgetonwithitor
focus on it to the degree that doing it well demands. Moreover, nervous selfdoubt
impairs the functioning of th e faculties ne eded to execute e ffective ly, for in stance, the
ability to think clearly and critically. It is also intuitive and seemingly confirmed by
introspection that the confidence manifesting high selfesteem is important to good
character. On the one hand, people who doubt their worth or competence can be
maddeningly difficult to deal with, shuttered to the bright side and susceptible to envy
and jealousy.Ontheotherhand, aperson who isconfidentofherworth can respond to
threats without anxious concern to defend herself or simply shrug them off as they
deserve.
Thestandard accountofselfesteem and itseducationalsignificanceis,however,
vulnerable to Smith and Kristjánsson's arguments to some extent. Consider the
consequentialist argument. It says, contra the motivational claim, that efforts to foster
selfesteem in the classroom hinder the pursuit of o ther high priority aims, including
those forwhichthestandardaccountclaimsselfesteemisanecessaryprecondition,e.g.
a high degree of acade mic accomplishment . The argument gets traction in light of the
supposed pedagogical requirements of fostering selfesteem. The authors of 'Building
SelfEsteem in Children', for instance, instruct parents to “be generous with praise”,
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“teach po sitive selfstatements ,” and “avoid criticism tha t takes the form o f ridicu le or
shame” (U.S. DHHS). Presumably, teachers should follow suit, and apparently many
have. Smith cites the Cantors who instruct teachers to swap talk of punishment for
misbehavior with talk of 'consequences' (2002, p. 93). But academic and behavioral
instructioninherentlyrequirecriticismwhichisliabletoengendernegativefeelingsabout
theself,which, onthestandard account,isjustwhat low selfesteemcomesto.Thus,it
appears that teachers cannot both instruct children academically and behaviorally and
fostertheirselfesteematthesametime.
Theapparentconflictbetweenfosteringselfesteemandacademicandbehavioral
instruction is a central p roblem for those who favor mak ing selfeste em an educational
priority.Yetevenwereitresolvable,SmithandKristjánsson’sotherargumentsconstitute
theirowncase againstworryingmuchaboutschoolchildren'sselfesteem.Theempirical
argument,forinstance,maintains thatexperimentalsupportforthemotivationalclaimis
too weak. As Kristjánsson has noted, many studies find only what most psychologists
consider a weak correlation, about .20, between low selfesteem and undesirable
educational outcomes such as academic underperformance (2007). Furthermore, many
studiesfindasmuchevidencethatachievementcausesselfesteemastheopposite.Ifthe
empirical argument is cogent, whether the consequentialist one is sound is beside the
point—evenifteacherscouldbothfosterselfesteemandappropriatelycritiquechildren's
workandpunishtheirbadbehavioratthesametime,thepayoffwouldbeinsignificant.
Empiric ale vidence aside, K ristjánsso no bjects that the standard accoun t of self
esteem anditssignificanceismistakentoconnectselfesteem andselfconfidenceinthe
waythatthemotivationalclaimrequires.Themotivationalclaimconnectsselfesteemto
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achievement by connecting it to selfconfidence, wh ich has fairly ob vious educational
advantage s. But, as Kristján sson argues, selfest eem and selfconfid ence seem to be in
some sense distinct, neither being sufficient for the other. For example, consider a
“student(...movingcountries)whose schoolbasedselfesteem inherhomecountrywas
low,butwhorelishesthechance ofmovingtoanewplacewhereshethinksshewillbe
abletodobetter”(2007,p.260).Hereconfidenceappears tobeunaffectedbylowself
esteem.Butthen,ifitisconfidencethatiscrucialtomotivation,educatorsoughttofocus
notonselfesteembutselfconfidence.AccordingtoKristjánsson,thisviewissupported
byempirical research finding a“muchstrongerlinkbetweenselfconfidenceandschool
performancethanbetweenselfesteemandschoolperformance”(ibid).
Finally,Smithmaintainsthatthereisaseriousquestionconcerningthecoherence
ofourbeliefs aboutlowselfesteem'sstatusasacharacterdefect.Thestandardaccount
seems toassume thatourbeliefshere areunifiedand whollynegative—lowselfesteem
isadefectandshouldbe“managed”or“cured”throughthetechniquesofselfhelp,Circe
Time,assertivenesstraining,or'personalizedlearning'(inwhicheverytaskistailoredto
the capacities of the child) (Smith, 2006, p. 56). But when we investigate our beliefs
carefully, Smith claims, we also find admiration and love for diffidence and low self
esteem. Citing examples of diffident sorts, such as Fanny in Austen's Mansfield Park,
Smith argues against Hume's claim that we love the diffident person because of her
capacitytodevelopintothemodestoneandmaintainsthat,“Welovethediffidentperson
because o f her very diffidence and not because , by being 'improved', she will become
otherwise”(ibid,p.54).Smithconcludesthatthereisthus“somethingchilling”aboutthe
deploymentofinstructionaltechniquesinthe service ofraising selfesteem,asifpeople
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likeFanny“wouldbeimprovedbybeingcuredof”theirdiffidence(ibid,p.56).
On the basis of arguments like these, Kristjánsson and Smith conclude that
educators ought not worry themselves at all (Kristjánsson) or much (Smith) about
children 's selfest eem. Though the arguments are differen t and their final positions not
quite the same, the shared upshot is that educators would not fail children in any
importantwayiftheyputconcernforselfesteemlargelyaside.
3.
The argumen tso f Kristján sson and Smith fail, I will argue , to show that educato rs can
safely put aside concern for children's selfesteem. Some of the arguments on critical
scrutiny are simply not very strong. On the other hand, thinking about selfesteem’s
educational significance in terms of the attachment account reveals responses to the
others.
Tobegin with the attachmentaccount,itisbestintroducedbycontrasttowhatI
willcall a cognitiveJamesian account ,bec ause of its origins in the though tof William
James(1950).Jamesmaintained thattheesteemapersonhasforherselfisafunctionof
the ratio o f her a spirations to acknowledged succes ses. Th ati s, the more that a perso n
believessheissuccessfulaccordingtoherownstandards,themoreesteemshewillhave
for hersel f. The cognitiveJam esian account is thus 'cogn itive' because it main tains that
selfesteemisstructuredbyourbeliefs.
TheroleassignedtobeliefinthecognitiveJamesianaccountisattheheartofthe
difference between it and the attachment account. Like the standard account, which
identifies selfesteem with feelings, the attachment account denies that selfesteem is
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structuredatitsfoundationbybeliefs.However,unlikethestandardaccount,itmaintains
that the most fundamental determinant of selfesteem is not any feeling itself, but a
relativel y stable dispo sition to be liefs and feelin gs expressing pos itive or negative self
regard,e.g.prideorshameorconfidenceor selfdoubt.Onthisview,thesedispositions
tend to precede and determine which beliefs about our merits we will accept. The
attachmentaccountthusviewsselfesteemasarelativelystablecharactertraitconstituted
byanarrayofcognitiveandaffectivedispositions,namelyallthoseexpressingapositive,
negative,orotherattitudetowardtheself.
The attachment account is ‘attachment theoretic’ because it maintains that
whetherwearedisposedtolargelypositive,negative,ormoreneutralbeliefsandfeelings
is primarily a function of the quality of our childhood attachment to our parents.
1 All
children expect that their parents will be readily available to pay attention to them,
especial lyin times o f distress. But repeate d frustration of this expec tation is though tto
ramify into a habit of selfdoub t for the child about he r worthiness of that atten tion, or
indeedoftheattentionofanyoneatall.Inotherwords,intolowselfesteem.
As a general theory of selfesteem, the attachment account has significant
advantages over the cognitiveJamesian account. As a matter of introspection, the
experience of selfesteem seems more affectively charged than a mere belief in one’s
success,worthiness,orlackthereof.Furthermore,thecognitiveJamesianaccountmakes
socialacceptanceorapprovala matterofselfesteemonlyinsofarasweaspiretoit, but
this seems mistaken. Probably the majority of people, including selfprofessed rugged
individualists, desire social acceptance and are weighed down by its absence. For
another,itisoddtothinkofhighselfesteemasabelief,asifhighselfesteempeoplego
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aroundconstantlythinkingtothemselves,“I’mgreat”andlowselfesteemone'sthinking,
“I'maloser.”Ontheotherhand,itiscomparativelynaturaltothinkofitasadisposition
to assent to some such belief when prompted. However, even this disposition is
insufficient to explain selfesteem, since many persons have it, yet we would not be
willing to say that they are high selfesteem persons. What is missing is a basic
disposition to experience the self as somehow good or bad unmediated by accepted
beliefs. Imagine an academic who is high achieving, beloved by her intimates and
associates, and knows it. She has and acknowledges every reason to believe in her
success andworthinessofthe love,respect,andesteemofothers.Imaginehoweverthat,
well into tenure, she anxiously doubts and interrogates herself in the face o f ordinary
tasks, such as writing or presenting a new paper, asking an associate for a relatively
minorfavor,orconfronting atroublestudent.Onsuchoccasions,she encountersherself
asaproblemthatmustbeovercomebeforeanythingelsecanhappen.AmIgoodenough
to work on this prob lem? Do I really belon g in academia? And when ever things do go
wrong,shethinks,“I'manidiot,howcouldIbesostupid?”Iseenoreasontothinksuch
peopledonotexist,yettheylacktheconfidentsenseofcompetenceandworthinessthat
belongstonormalhighselfesteem.
Sotherearemanyreasonsforunderstandingselfesteemattachmenttheoretically.
NotehoweverthattheattachmentaccountrejectsKristjánsson'sconceptualargument,for
it maintains that some threshold level of dispositional selfconfidence is necessary for
high selfesteem. But in light of its advantages, this seems correct. Moreover, it is
perfectlycompatiblewith Kristjánsson'sclaim.Ofcoursenoteveryoccasiononwhicha
person judges herself to be inadequate must she lack selfconfidence about her
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possibilities of future success. Perhaps there's something different about the imagined
future that, to her mind, justifies the optimism. But ongoing patterns of anxious self
doubt stillmanifestlow selfesteem.Therelevant questioninthecase ofKristjánsson's
schoolgirl is, what happens when she begins to confront genuine challenges to her
abilitiesinhernewcircumstances?
In reconnecting selfesteem to qualities in turn connected to a person's
motivationalcapacities,theattachmentaccount alsothusrejectsKristjánsson'sempirical
argument. It is noteworthy that this argument's strength is in any case not obviously
overwhelming, for it is (or should be) controversial how weak the socalled weak
correlationsKristjánssoncitesare.Whilea.20correlationiscommonlyregardedasweak
in psycho logical science, in med ical science, a correlation of this magnitude be tween,
say,smokingandcancer,wouldseemtobeamplereasontoquitsmoking,foritsuggests
that 1 /5 of smokers will develop a commonly fatal disease. Th is is significan t inde ed.
Similarly, if 1/5 of low selfesteem students do much worse than others, this would
appeartobeamplereasonforconcern.
But suppose I am wrong about that. Nevertheless, as just argued, habits of
nervous selfdoubt and selfrecrimination are conceptually tied to lower selfesteem,
habitsofbasicselfconfidencetohigherselfesteem.Nowmanystudies,as Kristjánsson
notes, connect selfconfidence to achievement more strongly than to selfesteem. So
educators shouldfosterselfconfidence. But in lightoftheattachment account,thiswill
oftennotbepossiblewithoutalsoaddressingtheirselfesteem,sinceforlowselfesteem
persons,therootcauseofhabitsofselfdoubtisadeeplyingrainedsenseofunworthiness
stemming from experiences of rejection. Furthermore, some newly emerging research
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finds th ats ecure parental attachme nt is positively associ ated with a cademic motivation
(DuchesneandLarose,2007) andperformance(Cotterell,1992).Otherresearch,though
moregeneralinscope,hasobviouseducationalimplications.SueGerhardt,forinstance,
reviews in detail research connecting poor infantp arent attachment to low selfesteem
and unde rdevelopment of parts of the brain respo nsible for regul ating emotions (2004 ,
PartI).Inturn,sheconnectsbothtoeducationallydamagingbehavioraltendencies,such
as an inability to inhibit inappropriate behaviors or seek relief from intense emotions
throughstrategiesofselfdistractionorinthe supportofothers(ibid,PartII).Butwhile
thedamageGerhardtoutlinesisnotnecessarilypermanent, because attachment andself
esteemaretiedtogether,aprimaryavenuetoitsrepairrunsthoughselfesteem(ibid,Part
III, Ch. 9). Hence, in the educational domain, addressing selfesteem may be a
requirement of resolving confidence or attachment problems that affect academic
motivationandperformance.
I conclude that the empirical record is at worst ambiguous on the educational
significance of selfesteem and possibly very supportive. From this claim, it does not
follow that fosteringselfesteemshould jumpto the top of the list of educationalgoals.
However,itdoesmeanthatinthinkingabout selfesteem'seducational significance,we
must, for no w, fall ba ckon reason more than Kristjánsson h as. As I will argue belo w,
there are many good reasons for believing that low selfesteem is an important
impedimenttoachievement or the willtobehavewell,especiallyincertaindomainsof
instruction.
4.
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Understandingselfesteem attachmenttheoretically,Iwillargue,shows that selfesteem
is important to the confidence that children need in order to engage and succeed in
educationalpursuits,especially in certaindomainsofinstruction,butalsothatitcanbe
fosteredwithouthindering the pursuitofotherimportant educationalaims.Thedefense
ofthisclaimwilltaketheremainderofthissection.Butinlightofit,Imaintainthat(a)
fostering selfesteem, at least indirectly, is generally an important educational priority
and that (b) relative tocertaindomainsofinstruction,especiallyphysicaleducationand
the arts, school educators should make concern for selfesteem among their highest
priorities.
To begin with an obvious objection, there is a definite sense in which
understand ing selfesteem attachme nt theoretically makes it vulnerable to the prob lems
raisedbytheconsequentialistargument.Becausechildrenaredependentmostheavilyon
theirparents fortheirselfesteem,teacherscanhaverelativelylittledirectimpact.Their
relationship to their students is simply not that important. In fact, some theorists have
suggested that children's relationship to their peers is more important (Harter, 1999).
Consequently,teacherscertainlyshouldnotattempttotakeonsucharole.Anyeffortsto
foster selfesteem reaching this level must indeed interfere with the pursuit of higher
priority educational aims, since it must quite literally take the place of care giving or
friendship.
However,itdoesnotfollowthattherearenotveryimportantthingseducatorscan
and ought to do th atw ill foster se lfesteem without hindering the pursuit of oth erh igh
priorityaims,e.g.achallengingcurriculum.Toshowwhy,Ineedtotakeafairlylengthy
detour through political philosophy via a corollary of the attachment account of self
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esteem.
ThecorollaryIhaveinmindclaimsthatselfesteemisinawaysocialinnature.
Because the fundamental element of selfesteem is the extent to which a person takes
herself to be worthy of the love, respect, or esteem of others, the attachment account
implies thatexperiencing the self as sociallyexcluded or rejectedisespecially liableto
trigger feelings of shame or humiliation, and therefore, reinforce habits of self
recriminationortendenciestobeliefsandfeelingsofunworthiness.Sopeoplearetosome
extentdependentupontheacceptanceofothersfortheirselfesteem.
To elaborate this, imagine that your social world is like this. You have some
associatesthatyougetalongwith,butyoudonotgenerallyfeelthatyoufitinverywell
withanyofthem.Infact,itseemstoyouthatyoualwayshavetomakequiteaneffortto
fit in. Thus, you try at first to do things that they clearly value and for which they will
thereforerespectyou.Buttoyourshameyoufindthatyouarenotverygoodatthemand
beingbadatthemseemstomakemattersworse.Whereasbeforeitwasmerelysuspected
thatyouwereincompetent,youhavenowremovedalldoubt.Asaconsequence,youstop
trying these things unless you are forced to or else find yourself in that rare situation
wheresuccessisguaranteed.Thoughthisleavesyousomethingofanoutsider,atleastas
invisible youarenotsovulnerabletoshameorhumiliation.Ontheotherhand,thereare
somethingsthatyoudoratherwell,butyouhavenotfoundmanyforumsfortheirpursuit
and it has been your expe rience that you r talents are not very highl y valued by others .
Indeed many others find your excellences comical or ridiculous and have on occasion
tauntedyouforthem.Someofthemhaveeventhreatenedyouphysically.
The situation in thisstoryisafamiliarworry in politicalphilosophy.Thereitis
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widelybelieved thatthesocialnatureofselfesteemgroundsadutyofjustice toarrange
social ins titutions in ways conducive to people acquiring and maintaining selfesteem.
There is disagreement about precisely which arrangements of institutions satisfy this
duty, but wide agreement on the general criteria. Just arrangements do not shame or
humili ate anyone, at least not undese rvingly, and they make it possible for eve ryone to
find and participateinanassociationwheretheyandtheirtalents and accomplishments
canbeesteemedbylikemindedothers (calltheseesteemgroups).BorrowingfromJohn
Rawls (1971),callfreedom from undeservedshameandhumiliationandesteemgroups
thesocialbasesofselfesteem.Forthepersoninthestoryabove,thesocialbasesofself
esteemaresorelylacking.
Not eve ry theorist agrees to precisely the se criteria for the social bases o f self
esteem,someadvancingstrongerrequirements.
2 Itisalsocontroversialhowstringentthe
requireme nt to supply the social bases o f selfes teem is or how central it is to justi ce.
However,itispowerfullyintuitivethatthereissomesuchrequirementandthatitcarries
significant weight. Imagine that, by virtue of the design of social institutions, specific
segments of society (women, say) are disproportionately vulnerable to the shame and
outsiderstatus justdescribed.Thevulnerabilityisa significantburden and disadvantage
and,insofarasitisowingtothedesignofchangeablesocialinstitutions,thearrangement
isprimafacieunjust.
Nowschools aresocialworldswiththeirownbasicsocialstructure,onethatcan
bemoreorlesssupportiveofselfesteem.Assuming that thesocialbasesofselfesteem
for school children are the same as those for adults, schools support and foster self
esteem just when they do not shame or humiliate children undeservedly and make it
15
possibleforallto enjoy anappropriateesteemgroup.Unfortunately,itseemsthatmany
school en vironments, like the soc ial world described above, are not very s upportive of
selfesteem.Insomeways,thisseemsobvious.Childrenthemselves tendtomakethings
difficult by forming esteem groups that are incredibly exclusive and hostile toward
outsiders. Fo rch ildren who find themselves on the outside , the experience c an be very
painful. Insofar as this is the case, however, it points to two important general ways
educatorscanseektofosterselfesteem.
First, they can make efforts to ameliorate the 'popularity contest' between
children. This presumably is what advocates of strategies like Circle Time have been
trying to do d irectly. I think they are right to, though it is no teworthy that, on the one
hand,notalldirectstrategiesneed tohavethischaracter,andsuchstrategiesmaynotbe
the best anyway. Take the first claim first. It seems to me, for instance, that normal
practices of punishing children who behave cruelly to others are at least as important,
though thismayseem tothreatentheselfesteemoftheculprit.However,asIwillargue
below, the threat to selfesteem of punishment is exaggerated. Second, because the
problem of fostering selfesteem socially is a systematic one, one deriving from the
design of social institutions, it needs a systematic solution. Consequently, the best
strategies may well be indirect ones setting up a school and classroom environment
minimiz ing occasion s for shame/humiliation and motivating children to work together
collegially. This is more easily said than done, but that does not imply that teachers
should not try. Nordo esi tnecess arily imply, for example, that allc ompetition between
children must be avoided, for whether a loss is humiliating, say, depends on the
collegialityofthesocialenvironment.Hence,ifcollegialityistaught,aneffortismadeto
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fosterselfesteeminawaythatneednotconflictwithinstructionrequiringcompetition.
Second, the organization of welladvertised and funded extracurricular clubs,
beyond traditionaloneslikedebateclub, isanindependentwaytoworktowardaschool
environmentsupplyingthesocialbasesofselfesteem.Suchclubswouldprovideforums
in whichchildrenofdiversetalentscould findthemselves and theiraspirations affirmed
by those whose op inion rea lly matters, namel y those who sh are their interests. Wh at is
importantfromthestandpointofsupplyingthesocialbasesofselfesteem isthatthereis
adiversitysuchassociations,fromcomputerclubforthecomputernerdstoGayStraight
Alliancesforhomosexualchildren.
The social nature of selfesteem, however, I believe has even more specific
implicationsfor certaindomainsofinstruction.Takephysicaleducation.Becauseof the
publicnature ofperformancein thisdomain,achild'sdegreeofexcellence init,orlack
thereof, is t ypically widel y availab le publicl y, not l east, to her pee rs. Consequently, in
thisdomainmanychildren—especiallytheunathletic—arehighlyvulnerabletoshameor
humiliation, for it is precisely public exposure as inadequate or powerless that trigger
those feelings. Furthermore, the vulnerability here is particularly acute given the value
commonly placed on athletic excellence among both adults and children. As a
consequence,manychildrenareliabletowithdrawfromathleticparticipationfirstchance
theyget.
Isubmitthatthismove,thoughinonewayprotectiveforthechild,canbedeeply
damaging educ ationally. For one thing, the child ha sno wlo stth e will top articipate in
athletics, which is a, if not the, primary avenue to lifelong fitness and health. Since
inculcatinginchildrenalifelongrelationshiptofitnessispresumablyaveryhighpriority
17
educationalaim,especiallygiventheemergingepidemicofobesity,schoolenvironments
havingthiseffectarefailuresonanimportantlevel.Second,itiswidelyagreedthatthere
areimportantreciprocal selfesteembenefitsfromsportparticipationthatbear againon
thechild'srelationshiptofitnessandgeneralselfconfidence.Thegeneralselfesteemand
confidence of those who participate benefits, while those receiving the benefits are
further motivated to participate. Children who withdraw thus cut themselves out of a
crucial avenueto fitness andahigherdegreeofwellbeing.Third,because sport figures
so large in children's social s tatus, those who do not participate are liable to withd raw
more generally from social life, particularly if they also do not excel in other socially
valued ways. But children in this situation are vulnerable, as the motivational claim
maintains, to lose the sort of basic confidence needed to take risks and confront
challengessmoothly.Thisisadisadvantageforthemaslearnersandasmoralpersons.
In many American schools, this situation seems needlessly exacerbated by the
institution of school sponsored intermural sport. Despite some progress, boy's sports
appear to remaindisproportionatly favored in the social worldof schools to both girl's
sports and no nathletic activities such as the arts.
3 But as a symbolic expression of the
relativelygreaterimportanceofmaleathleticism,thisisitselfanaffronttotheselfworth
ofgirlsandtheunathletic.Atthesametime,itservestoreproducetheculturalobsession
with male sport, which as I have just argued, is problematic with regard to children's
physicaleducationand,throughitsselfesteemrelatedeffects,potentiallytheireducation
generally.
Now the consequentialist argument maintains that efforts to foster selfesteem
impede the pursuitofotherhighpriorityaims,such as ahighlychallengingcurriculum.
18
However, relative to domains of instruction like physical education and the arts,
instruction that inculcates a lifelong desire for involvement is more important than
instructionsecuringahighdegreeofachievement.Thus,theconsiderationsthatdrivethe
consequentialistargumentarenotoperativehere.Moreover,inthesedomainsthereisan
important co incidence between ins truction that wi lli nculcate a life of involvemen t and
that fostering selfesteem. Physical education instructors, for instance, will likely best
achieve the aim of inculc ating a lifelong desi re for in volvement by pursuin g strategies
that minimize sh ame and humiliation and maximize inclusiveness , in other words, that
willfoster selfesteem.Furthermore, insofar as schoolinstitutions surroundingsportare
problematic in the way I have described, some aspects of the institution could be
modified to better support selfesteem with relative ease. No doubt performance in
physicaleducationwill always bepublic,thus rendering childrenparticularlyvulnerable
to shame/humiliation. Yet participation and hoopla surrounding sport could be made
more equal between boy's sports, girl's sports, and other nonacademic domains of
instructionsuchasthearts.Sportsandartsparticipation(where‘art’includesvisualarts,
music,theater,dance,creativewriting,etc)couldalsobemademandatoryforallstudents
andexclusivelyintramural.Suchchangeswouldpotentiallyhavetheeffectofunraveling
thebias toward sportin theschoolpopularitycontestandsoraising the probabilitythat
all chi ldren will st ay engaged in both athletics and the a rts. In turn , it is reason able to
thinkthatthiswouldensurethatmorechildrenstayengagedsocially,findanappropriate
esteemgroup,andsocontinuetoadjustsocially.
Hence, in at least some domains of instruction, selfesteem is motivationally
important and susceptible to instruction without undue cost to the pursuit of other
19
importantaims.However,Iwould also like toargue that, in light ofthe social basesof
selfesteem, the requirements of instruction in academics and behavior also need not
radicallyconflictwithimportanteffortstofosterselfesteem.
Firstconsideracademics.Thesocialbasesofselfesteeminclude esteem groups.
Relative to the classroomcontext, this implies that teachersarefosteringselfesteem so
long astheymakeeffortstoensurethatallchildrenfeelwelcome,safe,andcanfind an
esteem group. Again, this aim may be achieved directly through activities like Circle
Time,butasdiscussedabovesuchstrategiesarenotintrinsicallynecessary.Whatmatters
isthattheteachersfindways togetchildrentocooperatewithone anotherandengender
anenvironmentmakingcompetition safe. Second, critiquingstudents' workneednot be
particularly shame or humiliation producing. While criticism is often frustrating or
disappointing,onlyparticularlytactlessorimpolitecriticismcouldbeexpectedtohurtso
much as sh ame or humiliation. Mo reover, sha mean d humiliation tend to be rou sed by
publicexposure asinadequateorpowerless.Butacademicevaluationstendtobelargely
private, marks on a piece of paper easily concealed from others. Moreover, unlike
athletics,childrentendnottoevaluateoneanothersomuchongroundsofacademics,so
even exposure as inadequate here is not so much of a threat. Hence, contra the
consequentialist argument, instructing students academically and fostering selfesteem
neednotradicallyconflict.
Second, consider behavioral instruction. It is true, of course, that punishment
renders childrenhighly vulnerabletopublicexposure asinadequate andconsequentlyto
shameorhumiliation.Ofnecessity,punishmentstendtobepublicaffairs. However,and
first, as a matter of ordinary decency, teachers can and should avoid carrying out
20
punishmen ts that children are li kely to experience as humili ating. But where this is not
possible,deservedpunishmentscausingshameorhumiliationtendtobedeservedshames
orhumiliations.Sincethereisnosocialresponsibilityto avoidthese,teachersinflicting
them cannot be charged with failing to foster selfesteem. Second, while systematic,
arbitrary experiences of shame or humiliation can lower selfesteem, presumably
punishments will not amount to systematic, arbitrary public shames/humiliations, but
deserved and temporary retributions for wrongs. Hence, the threat to selfesteem of
ordinarypracticesofpunishmentisexaggerated.
5.
Ihavearguedthatselfesteemisimportanttothemotivationchildrenneedinordertobe
successful in school, especially in certain domains of instruction such as physical
education,andthateducators canseektoprovideits socialbaseswithouthinderingthe
pursuit of other high priority aims such as academic achievement. If so, facilitating
children’sselfesteeminschoolsmayafterallbeaveryimportanteducationalaim.This
is not to su ggest that se lfesteem is a unifying aim of education or the highest prio rity
aim. Othe r aims play crucial roles and some, such as achievement, are presumably of
higher priorityinatleastsomecontexts,forinstance, theacademicone.Neitherisitto
imply that selfesteem facilitating education is a complete moral education, for good
charactercallsformanyqualities,someofwhichmayevencompetewithselfesteem.On
someaccounts,selfrespectforinstance,isanimportantbutdistinctcharactertraitcalling
foradegreeofmodestyoraccuracyofselfregard.
4 Nevertheless,facilitatingselfesteem
isanimportanteducationalpriority,andthisistosaythatomittingitisagenuinewayof
21
failingchildreneducationally.
There is a last objection that I have not addressed, namely Smith’s character
argument.Thisargumentclaimsthat we find low selfesteem personsperfectlylovable,
thus, we cannot coherently think that low selfesteem is something to be cured. I
wholeheartedlyagree.Nevertheless,itdoesnotfollowthatconcernforselfesteemisnot
an important educationalvalue.First, much hangsonwhetherourresponseto low self
esteempersonsismereloveorsomething morerobustlikeadmirationoresteem.Tosay
thatwelovethembecauseoftheirdiffidenceisnottosaywefindthemvirtuousbecause
ofit,butonlythatbecausetheyareendearing,wefindtheirfaultsforgivable.Butifthat
isso,educatingforselfesteemisaperfectlylegitimateaimofmoraleducation.Second,
iflowselfesteemisindeed animpedimenttoachievement,as Ihaveargued,itcertainly
issomethingtobeovercomeifnotcured.Ifso,Iseenoreasonwhyeducatorsshouldnot
do what they can to help low selfesteem children through the process. If I am right,
doing this in anycase primarily requiresthatwedosomethingweought todoanyway,
namelystrivetocreateaschoolenvironmentinwhichthesocialbasesofselfesteemare
readilyavailabletoallchildren.
NOTES
1 For more extensive elaboration of attachment and its role in the development of self
esteem, see Sue Gerhardt's
Why Love Matters: How affection shapes a baby's brain
(2004,
Part 2).
2 See, for example, James Tully's particularly strong requirements for social esteem in
Strange multiplicity: constitutionalism in an age of diversity
(1995, pp. 189191).
3 That male athletes have traditionally been favored in the school popularity contest is old
news investigated at length by James S. Coleman
et al
in
The adolescent society: The
social life of the teenager and its impact on education
(1961).
4 See, for example, Kristjánsson (2007, p. 13) and chapter 2 of my dissertation
The
Nature and Importance of SelfRespect
(2006).
22
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