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Components of conscious awareness in a long‐term modality effect

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Abstract

The advantage in long-term recognition memory of words vocalized at study over those read silently was investigated by requiring subjects to indicate when recognizing a word whether or not they could consciously recollect its prior occurrence. The advantage for vocalization occurred only for words which subjects indicated were accompanied by recollective experience, and the results were not affected by whether subjects vocalized the test words or read them silently. It is concluded that this modality effect, and possibly other similar ones, originate in episodic memory and not in a procedural or ‘quasimemory’ system. Differences between the present results and those obtained elsewhere using intentional learning instructions are discussed.

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... And Ozubko, Gopie, and MacLeod (2012) demonstrated that production benefits both recollection and familiarity. Distinctiveness, they argued, conferred the recollective advantage on spoken words (see also Gregg & Gardiner, 1991). ...
... We therefore assume that the record of vocalising will be independent of the records of generating or imagining. Previous research using the Remember/ Know paradigm has demonstrated that production (Gregg & Gardiner, 1991;Ozubko, Gopie, et al., 2012), generation (Gardiner, 1988;Gardiner, Java, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1996;Sheridan & Reingold, 2011), and imagery (Dewhurst & Conway, 1994, Expt 5;O'Neill, 2005), all enhance the conscious recollection of words. Thus, in the case of generating aloud, participants essentially have two chances to remember a word: The recollection of either ''I said that'' or ''I generated that'' will lead to successful retrieval. ...
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Words that are read aloud are better remembered than those read silently. Recent research has suggested that, rather than reflecting a benefit for produced items, this production effect may reflect a cost to reading silently in a list containing both aloud and silent items (Bodner, Taikh, & Fawcett, 2013). This cost is argued to occur because silent items are lazily read, receiving less attention than aloud items which require an overt response. We examined the possible role of lazy reading in the production effect by testing whether the effect would be reduced under elaborative encoding, which precludes lazy reading of silent items. Contrary to a lazy reading account, we found that production benefited generated words as much as read words (Experiment 1) and deeply imagined words as much as shallowly imagined words (Experiment 2). We conclude that production stands out as equally distinct-and consequently as equally memorable-regardless of whether it accompanies deep or shallow processing, evidence that is inconsistent with a lazy reading account.
... The production effect is the finding that people have better explicit memory for words that they read aloud relative to words that they read silently (Hourihan & MacLeod, 2008;MacLeod, 2011;MacLeod, Gopie, Hourihan, Neary & Ozubko, 2010;. Although the benefit of vocalization for long-term memory had received periodic research attention (Conway & Gathercole, 1987;Dodson & Schacter, 2001;Gathercole & Conway, 1988;Gregg & Gardiner, 1991;Hopkins & Edwards, 1972;Kurtz & Hovland, 1953;MacDonald & MacLeod, 1998;Rosenbaum, 1962), MacLeod and colleagues have recently brought this phenomenon to the fore. They have reported that "production" is a robust mnemonic that enhances both recognition and recall (Lin & MacLeod, in press; see also Conway & Gathercole, 1987, Exp. 3) and that compares favorably, in terms of its benefits, to established techniques such as generation (Slamecka & Graf, 1978) and enactment (Engelkamp & Krumnacker, 1980). ...
... These experiments suggest that any mode of production that features unique, item-specific responses will result in a distinctive record in episodic memory that can then be retrieved and used during a memory test. Along these lines, Ozubko et al. (2012) showed that the advantage of reading aloud over reading silently occurred for words for which participants had a recollective experience or for words that were simply deemed to be familiar (regarding recollection, see also Gregg & Gardiner, 1991). The finding of a reliable production effect in recall (Conway & Gathercole, 1987, Exp. ...
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Words that are read aloud are more memorable than words that are read silently. The boundaries of this production effect (MacLeod, Gopie, Hourihan, Neary, & Ozubko, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 36, 671-685, 2010) have been found to extend beyond speech. MacLeod and colleagues demonstrated that mouthing also facilitates memory, leading them to speculate that any distinct, item-specific response should result in a production effect. In Experiment 1, we found support for this conjecture: Relative to silent reading, three unique productions-spelling, writing, and typing-all boosted explicit memory. In Experiment 2, we tested the sensitivity of the production effect. Although mouthing, writing, and whispering all improved explicit memory when compared to silent reading, these other production modalities were not as beneficial as speech. We argue that the enhanced distinctiveness of speech relative to other productions-and of other productions relative to silent reading-underlies this pattern of results.
... Systematic dissociations that support this view have been found between recognition accompanied by recollection and recognition based purely on familiarity. For example, recollection, but not familiarity, has been shown to be affected by factors such as levels of processing (Gardiner, 1988), intentionality of learning (Macken & Hampson, 1993), and divided versus undivided attention (Gardiner & Parkin, 1990), whereas factors that one would expect to affect the intraitem, integrative process instead selectively affect recognition accompanied by familiarity (e.g., studytest modality change, Gregg & Gardiner, 1991; maintenance rehearsal, Gardiner, Gawlik, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1994; see Gardiner & Java, 1993, for a review). ...
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Evidence for effects of changed environmental context on recognition has been equivocal. Using 3 experiments, the author investigated the role of environmental context from a dual-processing approach. Experiment 1 showed that testing word recognition in a novel context led to a reliable decrement but only for recognition accompanied by conscious recollection, with familiarity-based recognition judgments being unaffected. This was replicated in Experiment 2 using stimuli that were novel to the participants (nonwords). Experiment 3 showed that the decrement in recollection also occurred when the changed-context condition involved presenting items in a different but familiar context. The results suggest that effects of environmental context will only be found when recognition is accompanied by conscious recollection and that this effect is due to a specific item–context association.
... In a number of studies, Gardiner and his colleagues have presented evidence that the adoption of this introspective approach to memory provides a means of functionally dissociating subjective states of awareness during recognition performance. Independent variables which have been found to influence Remember responses while simultaneously leaving the proportion of Know responses unchanged include, generate versus read encoding instructions (Gardiner, 1988), retention interval (Gardiner & Java, 1991), word frequency (Gardiner & Java, 1990), levels of processing (Gardiner, 1988), and vocalisation versus silent reading at study (Gregg & Gardiner, 1991). The direction of the effect of these factors is consistent with the view that Remember responses reflect explicit (recollective) processes (Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). ...
... Quite a few independent variables have been found to influence' 'remember" responses but not "know" responses. These variables include levels of processing and generate-versus-read study conditions (Gardiner, 1988a), word frequency (Gardiner & Java, 1990), divided-versus-undivided attention (Gardiner & Parkin, 1990), intentional-versus-incidentallearning and number of rehearsals (Macken& Hampson, 1991),presentation mode (Gregg & Gardiner, 1991), and threateningversus-nonthreatening words (Mogg, Gardiner, Stavrou, & Golombok, in press). ...
Article
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Retention interval was manipulated in two recognition-memory experiments in which subjects indicated when recognizing a word whether its recognition was accompanied by some recollective experience ("remember") or whether it was recognized on the basis of familiarity without any recollective experience ("know"). Experiment 1 showed that between 10 min and 1 week, "remember" responses declined sharply from an initially higher level, whereas "know" responses remained relatively unchanged. Experiment 2 showed that between 1 week and 6 months, both kinds of responses declined at a similar, gradual rate and that despite quite low levels of performance after 6 months, both kinds of responses still gave rise to accurate discrimination between target words and lures. These findings are discussed in relationship to current ideas about multiple memory systems and processing accounts of explicit and implicit measures of retention.
Thesis
Die Gedächtnispsychologie beschäftigt sich seit geraumer Zeit mit der Erfassung von Bewusstseinszuständen, die Erinnerungen begleiten (Remember/Know Paradigma). Bewusstsein bei sozialer Informationsverarbeitung wurde bisher jedoch kaum thematisiert. Untersucht wurde der Effekt kategorialer Salienz auf das subjektive Erleben von Erinnerungen an Personeneigenschaften, die in verschiedenen Abstufungen mit dem Altersstereotyp kongruent waren (konsistent, inkonsistent, neutral). Die inzidentelle Enkodierung der Eigenschaften erfolgte mittels einer Beurteilungsaufgabe, bei der entweder die Typizität (hohe kategoriale Salienz) oder die Konkretheit des Wortmaterials (niedrige kategoriale Salienz) zu beurteilen war. Es konnten Einflüsse auf das Erinnerungsbewusstsein durch die Salienz der Altersinformation, des Aufmerksamkeitsfokus sowie durch dispositionale Voreingenommenheiten (implizite Personentheorien, Verarbeitungsstile) nachgewiesen werden. Nur bei hoher kategorialer Salienz des Altersstereotyps (Experiment 1) zeigten sich Unterschiede im Erinnerungsbewusstsein. Überdies legt die Untersuchung nahe, dass die stereotypgeleiteten Erinnerungen nach den Prinzipien der Figur/Hintergrund Trennung im Bewusstsein konstruiert werden und der subjektiven Evaluation des Experimentalkontextes eine vermittelnde Rolle zufällt. So ergaben sich die Bewusstseinszustände in Abhängigkeit der Wortgruppierungen (Experiment 2) sowie der Aufmerksamkeitslage während der Enkodierung (Beurteilung der Typizität vs. Untypizität; Experiment 3). Eindrückliche Unterstützung für die Figur/Hintergrund Hypothese konnte in Experiment 4 durch eine perzeptuelle Aufgabe gewonnen werden. Hier sollten die Eigenschaften schnellstmöglich in einem Wortsuchrätsel identifiziert werden. Hohe kategoriale Salienz erleichterte das Auffinden kongruenter Wörter. Sowohl im Rekognitions- als auch im Cued Recall-Test veränderte das aktivierte Stereotyp primär die Remember-Raten. Die Ergebnisse haben damit nicht nur für den Bereich der Personenwahrnehmung neue Erkenntnisse geliefert, sondern auch das psychologische Verständnis von Bewusstsein erweitert. Im Einzelnen erfuhren der Prozessansatz als auch der Distinctiveness/Fluency-Ansatz Bestätigung. Neu konnte ein attributionaler Ansatz formuliert werden, der die subjektive Evaluation des Experimentalkontextes hervorhebt. Hierbei werden unterschiedliche Informationen aus dem experimentellen Geschehen (z.B. spezifische Kognitionen oder das Empfinden von Abrufleichtigkeit) im Sinne einer Heuristik instrumentalisiert, d.h. für die Beurteilung des Alt/Neu-Status und des Bewusstseinszustands eingesetzt. Mit Hilfe von Inhaltsanalysen konnten erstmalig entsprechende Mediatorvariablen identifiziert werden, die den Salienzeffekt auf das Bewusstsein vermitteln (Experiment 3).
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Some functional approaches to memory postulate that many of memory tasks involve two different processes, one based on familiarity, and another based on a conscious search in memory. The former is thought to be based on the automatic activation of the mental representation of the stimulus, whereas the latter relies on a controlled type of processing requiring cognitive effort and attentional resources. Controlled search processes are assumed to be necessary for retrieving stored information in recall tasks, but only partially responsible for recognition, where familiarity judgments and controlled memory search act jointly at target-item presentation time. These theoretical views have led to the development of three ways to assess separately the two types of processes : The Remember I Knoiv paradigm (Gardiner, 1.988), the process dissociation procedure (PDF) (Jacoby, 1991), and the Recognized-only I Recognized- Recalled procedure (Morton et al., 1993). These theoretical and methodological approaches are discussed ivith regard to experimental results and the interest that they represent for studies of memory functioning.
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Memory is composed of several systems and processes, and recognition can be accompanied by two subjective states of consciousness: autonoetic awareness, which characterizes conscious recollection; and noetic (or semantic) awareness, related to feelings of familiarity. The objective of this study was to describe the adaptation to Portuguese of an experiential procedure for investigation of states of awareness that accompany recognition. Development of the material (word list and instructions permitting manipulation of the level of information processing); translation/adaptation of the original instructions to Portuguese; and application of the procedure in healthy volunteers and patients with schizophrenia. Manipulation of the level of processing consisted in requiring, during the learning phase, that subjects form a phrase or count the number of letters of the words presented. The level of processing, documented in healthy volunteers, should be expressed by greater conscious recollection of words used to form phrases than of words for which letters were counted. In addition, there should be no change in the proportion of recognition based on feelings of familiarity. The procedure was first applied in six healthy volunteers, in whom the processing level effect was clearly reproducible. Subsequently, it was used in patients with schizophrenia, who understood and followed the instructions perfectly. There was also a clear processing level effect in the patient group. The Portuguese version of this method can be used in our milieu, even in patients with schizophrenia, allowing the study of memory alterations accompanying this mental disorder.
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The majority of computationally specified models of recognition memory have been based on a single-process interpretation, claiming that familiarity is the only influence on recognition. There is increasing evidence that recognition is, in fact, based on two processes: recollection and familiarity. This article reviews the current state of the evidence for dual-process models, including the usefulness of the remember/know paradigm, and interprets the relevant results in terms of the source of activation confusion (SAC) model of memory. We argue that the evidence from each of the areas we discuss, when combined, presents a strong case that inclusion of a recollection process is necessary. Given this conclusion, we also argue that the dual-process claim that the recollection process is always available is, in fact, more parsimonious than the single-process claim that the recollection process is used only in certain paradigms. The value of a well-specified process model such as the SAC model is discussed with regard to other types of dual-process models.
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