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Recognising Humanity
Abstract
abstract Martha Nussbaum's Hiding from Humanity, links the philosophical understanding of emotion with important issues in ethics, law and political philosophy, and engages with empirical material in a manner that provides a model for open and practically oriented moral philosophy. Here I explore four areas in which I believe the discussion now needs to be carried forward. First, the connections between Nussbaum's work and other contributions to recent moral philosophy, principally that of Alasdair MacIntyre in Dependent Rational Animals (1999) but also that of David Wiggins in Ethics (2006). Second, the conceptual understanding of notions of disability, impairment and normal human functioning, and the standards against which these are determined and judged. Third, the nature of mental disorder and the harm done to sufferers by the stigma attaching to it. Fourth, the implications of following Nussbaum's lead in recognising humanity in the vulnerable, as these bear upon ‘ending life’ issues, especially that of abortion. Nussbaum's book serves to orient readers towards a cluster of important philosophical issues and specific policy areas; but it also raises questions that she might now wish to consider further.
... Even if reciprocity provides little additional motivational resources in this context, perceiving distant others as active agents may lead to more robust forms of sentimental identification. This is because a capacity for agency is typically an important feature in the self-understandings of the globally affluent (Haldane 2008), 1 and perceiving distant others as fellow agents, rather than just passive victims, can plausibly provide an additional source of identification. However, fully pursuing this line of argument requires empirical research beyond the scope of the paper; therefore, I will instead offer two reasons why recognising individuals facing global poverty as active agents is especially important for motivating support for political strategies to address global poverty. ...
... Strategies of sentimental education that attempt to increase affective concern for individuals facing global poverty by emphasising their neediness, suffering, and vulnerability, are central to the traditional model of sentimental education, and are a familiar feature of the campaigning literature employed by NGOs working in international poverty relief (Woods 2012, p. 41). However, if individuals facing global poverty primarily appear to persons in affluent countries in this manner, it can undermine perceptions of these individuals as capable agents, a quality which typically features heavily in the self-understandings of individuals in affluent countries (Haldane 2008). To be clear, the claim here is not that 'they' are vulnerable and 'we' are not, or that 'we' are 'capable agents' and they are not. ...
... The centrality of the capacity for agency in the self-understandings of the globally affluent, at least those within the Western liberal tradition, can be seen in the literature on the ethics of care, which aims to provide a corrective to this picture by emphasising our shared dependency and vulnerability to harm(Haldane 2008).Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved. ...
Duties to address global poverty face a motivation gap. We have good reasons for acting yet we do not, at least consistently. A ‘sentimental education’, featuring literature and journalism detailing the lives of distant others has been suggested as a promising means by which to close this gap (Nussbaum in Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, CUP, Cambridge, 2001; Rorty in Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers, vol. 3, CUP, Cambridge, 1998). Although sympathetic to this project, I argue that it is too heavily wed to a charitable model of our duties to address global poverty—understood as requiring we sacrifice a certain portion of our income. However, political action, aimed at altering institutions at both a global and a local level is likely to be necessary in order to provide effective long-term solutions to poverty globally. To rectify this, the article develops an alternative dialogical account of sentimental education, suitable for motivating support for political action to address global poverty.
... Nussbaum's starting point of dignity is central to the way her approach develops, and finds two inter-related expressions (Nussbaum, 2006, pp. 159 -160;2008). The first expression follows on from the claim that everything has an innate dignity. ...
... Even so, it seems impossible to overlook that this capability reveals a tension between existence and non-existence. Indeed, Nussbaum concedes that an implication of this kind is relevant, albeit in light of the question of abortion, a topic she has yet to consider in full (Nussbaum, 2008b;Haldane, 2008). It is, therefore, worth considering how this capability bears on future generations, and how the inclusion of future generations might itself shape it. ...
Nussbaum’s capability approach has failed to engage with future generations.1 This is disappointing for (at least) two reasons. Firstly, the capability approach was developed as a new way of approaching old problems. By leaving future generations to one side, Nussbaum does not map the resources that the capability approach has to deal with one of the most important problems we face. Unique insights and challenges that the approach might bring to this important discussion are left uncharted.2 Secondly, Nussbaum weakens her own capability theory by overlooking the interplay between the cases she considers and future generations. Nussbaum’s Frontiers of Justice provides an important critique of Rawls’ social contract theory, and the most comprehensive capability-based account of global justice to date. According to Nussbaum (2006, 3), issues of disability, nationality, and nonhuman animals remain ‘serious unsolved problems of justice’, and problems that ‘the classical theory of the social contract cannot solve […], even when put in its best form’. She further claims that her ‘capabilities approach’ provides us with a way forward on each of these issues — providing us with a ‘truly global justice’ (Nussbaum 2006, 22). Yet Nussbaum does not consider how future generations bear on each of these issues. No discussion of how our obligations apply over time or of our reproductive choices is provided.
... Nussbaum's starting point of dignity is central to the way her approach develops, and finds two inter-related expressions (Nussbaum, 2006, pp. 159 -160;2008). The first expression follows on from the claim that everything has an innate dignity. ...
... Even so, it seems impossible to overlook that this capability reveals a tension between existence and non-existence. Indeed, Nussbaum concedes that an implication of this kind is relevant, albeit in light of the question of abortion, a topic she has yet to consider in full (Nussbaum, 2008b;Haldane, 2008). It is, therefore, worth considering how this capability bears on future generations, and how the inclusion of future generations might itself shape it. ...
In her Frontiers of Justice, Nussbaum leaves the problem of future generations to one side, on the back of the assertion that Rawls' theory can be extended to give plausible answers to it. Neither a discussion of the merits of Rawls' solution and how it fits in with her theory, nor of how the inclusion of future generations impacts on her own theory is provided. Following an examination of Rawls' solution to future generations, this article contends that it is unclear how (and whether) Nussbaum is able to accept Rawls' (so-called) solution given fundamental differences in their theories. More importantly, this article demonstrates that Nussbaum overlooks the problem of future generations at significant cost. In leaving this problem to one side, Nussbaum underplays the significance of future generations and overlooks the way this problem bears on her theory. This article shows that future generations place pressure on fundamental elements in Nussbaum's capability theory—including, for instance, the capability for bodily integrity, the threshold level of dignity and the (partial) incompleteness. In highlighting these shortfalls, this article concludes with an account of some of the challenges to consider in constructing a capability theory able to deal with future generations.
... "The fact that they are not included in the group of choosers means that they are not included (except derivatively or at a later stage) in the group for whom principles are chosen" (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 16). Rawls himself acknowledges this, albeit in a footnote, as Haldane (2008) notes. ...
Appealing to reason rather than religious belief, this book is the most comprehensive case against the choice of abortion yet published. The Ethics of Abortion critically evaluates all the major grounds for denying fetal personhood, including the views of those who defend not only abortion but also infanticide. It also provides several (non-theological) justifications for the conclusion that all human beings, including those in utero, should be respected as persons. This book also critiques the view that abortion is not wrong even if the human fetus is a person. The Ethics of Abortion examines hard cases for those who are prolife, such as abortion in cases of rape or in order to save the mother’s life, as well as hard cases for defenders of abortion, such as sex selection abortion and the rationale for being “personally opposed” but publically supportive of abortion. It concludes with a discussion of whether artificial wombs might end the abortion debate. Answering the arguments of defenders of abortion, this book provides reasoned justification for the view that all intentional abortions are morally wrong and that doctors and nurses who object to abortion should not be forced to act against their consciences.
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