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All content in this area was uploaded by Gustavo Carlo on Oct 09, 2017
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Moral Identity: What Is It, How Does It Develop, and Is
It Linked to Moral Action?
Sam A. Hardy
1
and Gustavo Carlo
2
1
Brigham Young University and
2
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
ABSTRACT—The study of moral identity may be one of the
more promising new trends in moral psychology. Moral
identity is the degree to which being a moral person is
important to a person’s identity. This article reviews the
various ways in which moral identity is understood, dis-
cusses predictors and processes of moral identity, and pre-
sents evidence regarding links between moral identity and
various moral actions. The article closes with a critical
evaluation of the moral identity concept and a discussion
of future research directions.
KEYWORDS—moral development; moral identity; moral
self; moral action; morality
What is at the root of heroism and lifelong moral commitment?
Philosophers such as Socrates and Plato thought that ‘‘to know
the good is to do the good.’’ Over the past half-century, most
work on morality has been framed by this perspective, especially
Kohlberg’s (1969) cognitive developmental theory, which empha-
sizes moral reasoning. Like Plato, Kohlberg was convinced (at
least initially) that mature moral reasoning would inherently
motivate moral action. But several factors have led to greater
interest in looking beyond moral reasoning. First, moral reason-
ing is only a modest predictor of moral action (Blasi, 1980). Sec-
ond, highly moral people do not necessarily have unusually
sophisticated moral reasoning capacities (Colby & Damon, 1992;
Hart & Fegley, 1995). Hence, scholars such as Blasi (1980,
1983), Rest (1983), and even Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Candee,
1984) saw the need to identify other factors that might help
bridge the ‘‘moral judgment–action gap.’’ We propose that moral
identity may help address this judgment–action gap, provide
greater understanding of moral motivation and commitment, and
be an important component of moral development (Hardy &
Carlo, 2005, in press; Walker, 2004). In this article, we address
the following questions: What is moral identity? How does moral
identity develop? Is moral identity linked to moral action?
WHAT IS MORAL IDENTITY?
Moral identity generally refers to the degree to which being a
moral person is important to an individual’s identity. But there
are a number of perspectives on the structure, mechanisms, and
dynamics of moral identity.
Blasi’s Self-Model
Much of the thinking about moral identity harkens back to Blasi’s
(1983, 2004a) self-model of links between moral judgment and
action (for more discussion of Blasi’s ideas, see Hardy & Carlo,
2005; Walker, 2004). Before leading to moral action, a moral
judgment can pass through a judgment of responsibility such that
an action is seen not only as moral but also as something the indi-
vidual is responsible for doing. The criteria for such judgments
often stem from individual differences in the extent to which
being moral is central or essential to one’s sense of self—that is,
from moral identity. When a person’s identity is centered on
morality, the desire to live in a manner consistent with one’s
sense of self can serve as a key moral motivation. In short, Blasi
postulated that moral judgments might more reliably predict
moral behavior when filtered through responsibility judgments
based on one’s identity and propelled into action via the tendency
toward self-consistency.
Moral Identity as Unity of Morality and Self
Congruent with Blasi’s ideas, Colby and Damon (1992) empha-
sized moral identity as the unity of the moral and self-systems.
We greatly appreciate Ryan Funk for his assistance editing and
improving the clarity of this manuscript.
Gustavo Carlo is now in the Department of Human Development
and Family Studies at the University of Missouri.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Sam A. Hardy, Department of Psychology, 1040 SWKT, Brigham
Young University, Provo, UT 84602; e-mail: sam_hardy@byu.edu.
ª2011 The Authors
Child Development Perspectives ª2011 The Society for Research in Child Development
DOI: 10.1111/j.1750-8606.2011.00189.x
Volume 5, Number 3, 2011, Pages 212–218
CHILD DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES
They argued that what differentiates highly moral people from
others is the degree to which they experience unity between their
sense of morality and their personal goals. In other words, what
moral exemplars want most is also what they see as morally right.
Frimer and Walker (2009) proposed their reconciliation model to
account for this unity. In this model, moral identity entails
motives relevant to agency (i.e., self-interest) and communion
(i.e., other-oriented morality) being synergistic rather than inter-
fering or competing with each other. Such integration of personal
and moral goals can serve as a powerful source of moral motiva-
tion and commitment (Frimer & Walker, 2009).
TheRoleofSchemas
Recently, some have argued that schemas may be at the heart of
moral identity (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009;
Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Monin & Jordan, 2009; Stets & Car-
ter, 2006). Schemas are conceptualized as mental knowledge
structures that represent various aspects of ourselves, our rela-
tionships, and our experiences (Fiske, 2000). Moral identity may
entail having morally relevant schemas readily accessible for
social information processing (Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Narvaez,
Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006). Underlying moral ideals and
characteristics that are explicitly important to a person’s sense of
identity may be a network of chronically accessible moral sche-
mas (Aquino et al., 2009; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). Perhaps
those ideals and characteristics seen as most important are the
ones most cognitively accessible (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; cf.
Bizer & Kroznick, 2001). Additionally, there are individual dif-
ferences in the perceived importance of moral schemas to the
overall sense of self, as well as situational variability in how
accessible moral schemas are for processing social information
and motivating and directing action (Aquino et al., 2009).
There are various ways to think about moral identity in terms
of schemas. For some, moral identity is primarily about one
particular moral schema—a mental image of what it means to
be a moral person (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Stets & Carter,
2006). Thus, moral identity is one social identity among many
that can make up a person’s overall social self-schema. For
others, moral identity more broadly entails having a set of moral
schemas—only one of which might be one’s mental image of a
moral person. Other moral schemas, for example, might be
event representations of one’s self engaged in moral actions
(Reimer, 2003).
Trait and State Moral Identity
Most accounts of moral identity discuss it as something that is
relatively stable across situations—like a personality trait, even
though it develops over time (Blasi, 2004a; Colby & Damon,
1992; Moshman, 2005). Recent social cognitive approaches to
moral identity have sought to address this view. They suggest
that although the importance of morality to a person’s identity
may be rather stable, to some extent the sense of moral identity
may be constructed ‘‘moment to moment’’ (Monin & Jordan,
2009) and may be more or less activated in particular situations
(Aquino et al., 2009; Stets & Carter, 2006).
Deliberative and Automatic Aspects of Moral Identity
Moral identity is also typically described as being primarily
deliberative (Blasi, 2004a; Colby & Damon, 1992; Moshman,
2005). But it is unclear whether deliberative processes (such as
wanting to live in a manner consistent with one’s identity; Blasi,
1993) are the primary mechanisms of moral identity. Part of the
motivation behind current social cognitive approaches to moral
identity is the need to better understand the role of schemas and
other automatic processes in moral identity (Lapsley & Narvaez,
2004).
HOW DOES MORAL IDENTITY DEVELOP?
Most work on moral identity formation is rather speculative in
nature because the empirical research has largely entailed cross-
sectional studies of adolescents and adults. Consequently, we
know little about early precursors of moral identity or develop-
mental trajectories across the lifespan.
The Merging of the Moral and Self-Systems
Most accounts of moral identity formation argue that it likely
involves the merging of moral development and identity
development rather than a unique developmental system (e.g.,
Bergman, 2004; Damon, 1984; Hart, 2005). In fact, it may be
that morality and identity are two facets of the same develop-
mental system (Davidson & Youniss, 1991). The developmental
paths of each are so congruent that some view moral identity
as the goal of both moral and identity development (Blasi,
1993; Damon & Hart, 1992; Moshman, 2005). Although matu-
rity of moral understanding is important in its own right,
integration with identity may yield greater motivation and com-
mitment. Moreover, while identity can be grounded in a variety
of things, it may be ideal (in terms of the well-being of the
individual and those the individual interacts with) for it to be
based on morality.
Thereissomeevidenceforthepresenceofearlyprecursorsof
moral identity in childhood (see Thompson, 2009). For instance,
as children comply with parental demands or rules, they begin to
see themselves as ‘‘good’’ boys or girls (Kochanska, 2002). Pre-
schoolers with this moral component to their sense of self are
more likely to endorse statements describing themselves as indi-
viduals who feel badly about doing the wrong thing, apologize
and try to make amends for their wrongdoing, and are concerned
about others’ wrongdoing. Furthermore, the affective bases of
moral identity (e.g., empathy, guilt, and shame) emerge early in
life (Hoffman, 2000; Kochanska, 2002), and their integration
with moral ideals and with one’s sense of self are fundamental to
moral identity formation. Unfortunately, no work has specifically
linked these early childhood processes to adolescent and adult
moral identity.
Child Development Perspectives, Volume 5, Number 3, 2011, Pages 212–218
Moral Identity Development 213
Throughout childhood and adolescence, developments in
moral understanding and identity pave the way for further inte-
gration of morality and identity. Moral understanding becomes
more interpersonal and ideological (Moshman, 2005). Thus, ado-
lescents are more sensitive than children to the expectations,
attitudes, and needs of others (Carlo, 2006). Additionally, adoles-
cents are more principled, and less focused on external factors
like punishment and reciprocity. In terms of identity, maturation
involves the self’s becoming understood more in terms of social
interactions and ideologies. Many facets of social interaction that
can make up self-understanding at this stage are morally rele-
vant (e.g., being kind), and ideologies can include moral ideals
(Damon & Hart, 1992).
The integration of morality and self during adolescence and
adulthood is also enabled by the growing sense of agency and
responsibility. Although children have a rudimentary under-
standing of right and wrong, they feel less responsible for doing
what is right than do adolescents (Nunner-Winkler, 2007). This
disconnect of morality from the self may reflect a limited grasp
of agency and responsibility. With less of a sense of ownership
or ‘‘mineness’’ over one’s thoughts, emotions, and behaviors,
there is less awareness that one can choose to make certain
things (e.g., moral principles) central to one’s sense of identity,
and one can distance one’s self from other things that are less
desirable (e.g., bad habits; Blasi, 2001). Thus, compared to
adolescents, children feel less accountable, less ownership over
their actions and identity, and less concern for integrity or
self-consistency. This is one reason why children are primarily
externally regulated—driven more by external consequences,
the perceptions of others, and impulses than by internal moral
standards (Grolnick, Deci, & Ryan, 1997).
Predictors of the Integration of Morality and Self
Moral identity formation is associated with certain individual
characteristics, developmental contexts, and opportunities for
moral action (Hart, 2005). In terms of individual characteris-
tics, one study found academic achievement to be a positive pre-
dictor of moral identity 2 years later (as assessed by
participation in community service), whereas internalizing (e.g.,
withdrawing and feeling worthless) was a negative predictor
(Hart, Atkins, & Ford, 1999). Prosocial moral reasoning and
empathy in adolescence are also predictive of indices of pro-
social disposition in adulthood (Eisenberg et al., 2002). Addi-
tionally, in a study of young adult moral exemplars in social
organizations, exemplars were higher than comparison peers on
agreeableness and were more advanced in moral reasoning, faith
development, adult attachment, and identity formation (Matsuba
& Walker, 2004). Similarly, Canadian recipients of awards for
bravery or altruism were found to differ from a comparison group
on a number of aspects of their life narratives, including greater
salience of themes of personal agency (e.g., self-mastery), con-
nection to others (including childhood attachments to caregiv-
ers), positive emotions (e.g., hope and optimism), and
overcoming and learning from adversity (Walker & Frimer,
2007).
In terms of developmental contexts, religious involvement
and effective parenting are predictive of moral identity. Hart
and colleagues found that youth who were involved in commu-
nity service (their moral identity proxy) tended to be more reli-
gious than youth who were not (Hart & Atkins, 2004).
Longitudinally, several factors related to effective parenting,
including parental involvement (Hart et al., 1999), parental
demandingness (Pratt, Hunsberger, Pancer, & Alisat, 2003),
and overall family support (Hart, Atkins, & Ford, 1998), have
been found to be predictive of moral identity. Furthermore,
parental use of inductive discipline, which helps children
appreciate the consequences of their actions to self and others,
appears to be related to the internalization of moral values
(Hoffman, 2000), and parental warmth has been positively
linked to the greater internalization of moral values into the self
(Hardy, Padilla-Walker, & Carlo, 2008).
The integration of morality and identity can also be encour-
aged by providing opportunities for acting on moral princi-
ples—such as community service and other prosocial actions.
Enacting moral principles is one way individuals learn to value
such principles and see themselves as capable of making a dif-
ference in the world (Hart, 2005). For example, Youniss and
Yates’s (1997) ethnographic study of youth volunteering at a
soup kitchen as part of a high school social justice class showed
that such experiences can transform moral identity in youth.
Similarly, studies have shown community involvement (Pratt
et al., 2003) and involvement in clubs and teams (Hart et al.,
1999) to be longitudinally predictive of moral identity.
Moral Identity Formation in Terms of Moral Schema
Accessibility
If moral schemas are a critical part of moral identity, then moral
identity formation should also involve the building of rich
networks of chronically accessible moral schemas (Lapsley &
Narvaez, 2004). Moral schemas include prototypes, such as one’s
mental image of what it means to be a moral person, and action
scripts or event representations for specific morally relevant
behaviors. Compared to adolescents, children likely have fewer
moral schemas, and those they do have may be less elaborate
and less accessible for information processing. Thus, children
arelessabletopromptlyandappropriately respond to moral sit-
uations. In other words, if moral maturity is seen as a form of
expertise (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005), most children are novices.
Little is known about the development of moral prototypes
because most work in this area has focused on adults (e.g.,
Walker & Pitts, 1998). However, a recent study of adolescents
provides some evidence for developmental trends in that older
teens may have conceptions of moral personhood that are more
nuanced and principled than those of younger teens (Hardy,
Walker, Skalski, Olsen, & Basinger,inpress).Workonother
prototypes (e.g., images of adolescents who drink alcohol) has
Child Development Perspectives, Volume 5, Number 3, 2011, Pages 212–218
214 Sam A. Hardy and Gustavo Carlo
demonstrated a potential role for the socialization or modeling of
prototypes, particularly by parents (Gerrard, Gibbons, Zhao,
Russell, & Reis-Bergan, 1999). So, at any given phase of devel-
opment, a person’s mental image of what it means to be a moral
person seems contingent on cognitive maturity (e.g., language
and abstract thought) and social learning.
In addition to individual differences in the content and
structure of moral prototypes (Hardy et al., in press), there is
individual variability in the degree to which prototypes are
important to the self and cognitively accessible (Aquino et al.,
2009). In other words, individuals differ in the extent to which
their image of what it means to be a moral person is an important
social identity for them (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Stets & Carter,
2006), and the degree of importance is related to the cognitive
accessibility of this social identity for information processing
(Bizer & Kroznick, 2001). As with other social cognitions such
as attitudes and values (Grolnick et al., 1997), contexts such as
the family environment can powerfully influence the importance
of moral prototypes to the self (Hardy, Bhattacharjee, Aquino, &
Reed, 2010).
Scripts or event representations of moral actions develop
through social experiences (e.g., helping someone who is hurt or
volunteering at a homeless shelter; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004).
Event representations of enacted or observed moral actions form
behavioral scripts in autobiographical memory that make engag-
ing in those behaviors more automatic, and the self-evaluative
and moral affect linked to these schemas pulls individuals
toward or away from similar behaviors in the future (Reimer,
2003). Additionally, personal reflection and dialog with caregiv-
ers and others about the meaning of social experiences can facil-
itate these processes (Lapsley & Hill, 2009; Lapsley & Narvaez,
2004; Thompson, 2009).
IS MORAL IDENTITY LINKED TO MORAL ACTION?
Moral identity may be an important source of moral motivation;
in fact, some argue that it could be the best predictor of moral
actions and commitments (Damon & Hart, 1992). The exact
mechanisms involved depend on how moral identity is conceptu-
alized and might include self-consistency (e.g., Blasi, 2004a),
goal integration (e.g., Colby & Damon, 1992), moral schemas
(e.g., Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004), and self-narratives (e.g., Rei-
mer, 2003). Although few mechanisms of moral identity have
been systematically examined, research has fairly consistently
found moderately strong links between moral identity and action.
A variety of studies evidence outcomes of moral identity.
Moral exemplar studies demonstrate the extensive integration of
self and moral goals that adult exemplars experience (Colby &
Damon, 1992) and show that adolescent moral exemplars tend to
describe their self-concept using moral terms more than do com-
parison youth (Hart & Fegley, 1995; Reimer, 2003; Reimer,
Dewitt Goudelock, & Walker, 2009). In narrative research (Pratt,
Arnold, & Lawford, 2009) in which life stories were rated for
salience of moral identity (as indicated by things such as concern
for the needs and rights of others), moral identity was linked to
community service involvement and generative concern (a per-
son’s desires, commitments, and actions directed toward making
a difference in the world). Correlational studies using quantita-
tive measures of moral identity show that moral identity is
associated with moral actions (e.g., donating money to charities
and altruistic helping; e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Hardy, 2006),
moral emotions (e.g., guilt following behavior inconsistent with
one’s sense of morality; e.g., Stets & Carter, 2006), and concern
for out-group members (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Hardy et al.,
2010). In one study, explicit moral identity (self-reports of moral
personality characteristics such as honesty) predicted delibera-
tive moral action (responses to moral dilemmas), whereas impli-
cit moral identity (assessed using an implicit associations test
with moral–immoral as the target category and me–others as the
paired category) predicted automatic moral actions (whether or
not individuals returned the ‘‘extra’’ when ‘‘mistakenly’’ overpaid
for their research participation; Perugini & Leone, 2009).
The nature of these links between moral identity and action is
unclear. It could be that moral identity motivates moral action,
or that moral action leads people to see themselves in moral
terms, or that both are involved in some dynamic process. None
of the above studies can establish which is the case. However, a
few experimental studies have demonstrated effects of priming
moral identity (by having participants write brief stories about
themselves using moral trait terms) on moral emotions and
behaviors (Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007; Aquino
et al., 2009). Thus, research is emerging that can better establish
causal connections between moral identity and action.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The purpose of this article was to review theory and research on
conceptualizations of moral identity, moral identity development,
and links between moral identity and moral action. We view the
work on moral identity as one of the more promising current
directions in moral psychology and propose that such work may
help resolve one of the vexing conceptual problems that has
faced morality scholars for decades (or perhaps millennia)—that
of the moral judgment–action gap (Walker, 2004). Even more, if
moral identity is a consistent predictor of moral action, it may
prove useful in moral education and youth development efforts,
leading to deeper and more lasting moral changes in youth than
those associated with other approaches (for an example of how
moral identity might be applied, see Youniss & Yates, 1997).
Critical Evaluation of Moral Identity
Most criticism of moral identity has emerged from social domain
theorists (Nucci, 2004; Turiel, 2002; for a reply, see Bergman,
2004), for whom the discrepancy between a moral judgment and
a moral action is not of critical importance. According to their
view, in a given situation, there are multiple judgments at
Child Development Perspectives, Volume 5, Number 3, 2011, Pages 212–218
Moral Identity Development 215
work—moral (i.e., obligatory notions of justice and rights), con-
ventional (i.e., norm-based, socially prescribed issues), pruden-
tial (i.e., issues of safety), and personal (i.e., arbitrary notions of
one’s preferences). Since most people care about doing the right
thing, it is the coordination of these various judgments that mat-
ters most to these scholars, not a disconnect between knowing
and doing right that must be mediated by personal concern for
morality. Given this centrality of reasoning to moral action, they
are hesitant to include personality variables that may unneces-
sarily complicate moral functioning.
Although we appreciate the attention social domain theorists
grant to the complexities of thought and behavior in real situa-
tions, they do not sufficiently account for individual differences
in labeling certain actions as moral (i.e., Why do people differ in
terms of what they define as moral?). Further, it is unclear what
leads individuals to prioritize a moral judgment over other sorts
of judgments. Perhaps those with a stronger sense of moral iden-
tity are more likely to emphasize congruence with moral judg-
ments over conventional, prudential, and personal judgments.
Hence, although the primary focus of social domain theory is to
understand the parameters of the moral domain of judgments
and actions, moral identity can be viewed as a means to link
moral judgments to moral conduct.
Future Directions
Much work is needed to better articulate and critically evaluate
theoretical models of moral identity. While some see moral iden-
tity as primarily deliberative and traitlike (e.g., Blasi, 1983; Colby
& Damon, 1992), others see it as more automatic and situational
(e.g., Aquino et al., 2009; Narvaez et al., 2006). Efforts have
been made to tie together these aspects of moral identity, suggest-
ing that perhaps schemas and other automatic processes underlie
the deliberative and subjective sense that morality is important to
one’s identity (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Shao, Aquino, & Free-
man, 2008). However, at the heart of different depictions of moral
identity may lie fundamental assumptions about personality and
morality that are potentially incommensurable. For example,
some see the notion of schemas as problematic and unhelpful in
understanding cognition, motivation, and morality (Blasi, 2004b;
Campbell, Christopher, & Bickhard, 2002).
Improvements are also needed in the methodology of moral
identity research. First, measures of moral identity are limited.
The most well-developed self-report measure is that of Aquino
and Reed (2002), which presents respondents with nine moral
traits, asks them to envision a person with those traits, and then
has them respond to five statements regarding the importance of
those traits to who they are as a person and to five statements
regarding the extent to which they try to present themselves as
someone with those traits. The other approach is to have respon-
dents individually rate a set of moral and amoral traits in terms
of how important they are to their sense of self, and then take the
difference between the average moral and amoral ratings (e.g.,
Hardy, 2006). In other studies, moral identity is measured
indirectly, in terms of moral exemplarity (i.e., being identified as
someone who is a good example of a highly moral person; e.g.,
Matsuba & Walker, 2004) or involvement in community service
(e.g., Hart et al., 1999). Surveys may tap only a small part of
what it means to have a moral identity, and they have a number
of psychometric limitations (e.g., social desirability, skewness,
and low reliability in the case of the difference score approach),
whereas indirect approaches assume that people who volunteer
or are morally exemplary have a moral identity. An interview
measure of moral identity that was recently developed by Frimer
and Walker (2009) may provide a richer assessment technique.
Second, most studies are correlational and cross-sectional. This
limits the ability to examine developmental processes and make
causal inferences regarding predictors and outcomes of moral
identity. Hence, more sophisticated designs are needed for
assessing moral identity, the processes by which it develops, and
how it relates to moral action.
Because of the limitedness of prior research, moral identity is
still little understood. In particular, there is scant knowledge
about its neurological bases, the degree to which it is stable
across situations and time, the processes by which it develops,
the mechanisms by which it leads to action, and how it is inter-
connected with and partially constituted by moral cognitions
(e.g., moral reasoning), emotions (e.g., empathy, guilt), and cul-
tural influences. Perhaps most important, little has been done to
compare and contrast, or seek to integrate, the various perspec-
tives on moral identity (for further discussion, see Hardy &
Carlo, in press).
As theory and research on moral identity continue to progress,
we are eager to see what emerges. Although we remain open to
skepticism regarding the role of moral identity in moral function-
ing, we believe that future work in this area may yield innova-
tions that will move the field forward in its understanding of
morality and how it might be fostered. Such innovations could
advance beyond the one-dimensional conceptualization of moral-
ity of the past (e.g., those focused on moral reasoning or empathy
as the primary component of morality) and lead to richer, more
full-bodied depictions of morality that likely map onto how indi-
viduals truly experience the moral domain. In the end, maybe
Socrates and Plato were wrong (at least on this point)—to know
the good is not always to do the good. Something else is needed,
and that something else may be moral identity.
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