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Three Kinds of Anti‐Intellectualism: Rethinking Hofstadter*
Abstract
Hofstadter's landmark analysis of anti-intellectualism in American life is interpreted within the framework of the sociology of knowledge. His analysis suggests three analytically distinct types of anti-intellectualism: religious anti-rationalism, populist anti-elitism, and unreflective instrumentalism. Each type arises from within its own distinctive institutional matrix. Although Hofstadter fails to anticipate the growing cultural impact of mass media institutions, he demonstrates convincingly that anti-intellectualism is not a unitary phenomenon.
... Hofstadter (1963) broadly defined anti-intellectualism as "a resentment and suspicion of the life of the mind and of those who are considered to represent it; and a disposition constantly to minimize the value of that life." (p.7) Hofstadter identified three specific types of antiintellectualism in American cultural history: Anti-rationalism (denial of the value of critical thinking), unreflective instrumentalism (disdain for ideas that do not provide immediate practical value), and anti-elitism (mistrust and dislike of elites) (Rigney, 1991). Each type links to a distinctive social-structural origin: Anti-rationalism originates from religious structures; unreflective instrumentalism relates to the commercial structures in American capitalism; and anti-elitism connects with populist political structures and movements (Rigney, 1991). ...
... (p.7) Hofstadter identified three specific types of antiintellectualism in American cultural history: Anti-rationalism (denial of the value of critical thinking), unreflective instrumentalism (disdain for ideas that do not provide immediate practical value), and anti-elitism (mistrust and dislike of elites) (Rigney, 1991). Each type links to a distinctive social-structural origin: Anti-rationalism originates from religious structures; unreflective instrumentalism relates to the commercial structures in American capitalism; and anti-elitism connects with populist political structures and movements (Rigney, 1991). Our study focuses on the anti-elite form of anti-intellectualism, which expresses resentment, hostility, and mistrust of experts (Merkley, 2020;Motta, 2018). ...
... Experts with superior knowledge, academic training, or credentials in a subject matter are often considered the elite class by anti-intellectuals (Motta, 2018). Experts merely apply intellect to benefit themselves or the upper class (Rigney, 1991). Anti-intellectuals also discredit the knowledge of experts and believe that common sense, personal experience, or intuitions of ordinary people can replace expertise (Hofstadter, 1963). ...
Anti-intellectualism (resentment, hostility, and mistrust of experts) has become a growing concern during the pandemic. Using topic modeling and supervised machine learning, this study examines the elements and sources of anti-Fauci tweets as a case of anti-intellectual discourse on social media. Based on the theoretical framework of science-related populism, we identified three anti-intellectual discursive elements in anti-Fauci tweets: people-scientist antagonism, delegitimizing the motivation of scientists, and delegitimizing the knowledge of scientists. Delegitimizing the motivation of scientists appeared the most in anti-Fauci tweets. Politicians, conservative news media, and non-institutional actors (e.g. individuals and grassroots advocacy organizations) co-constructed the production and circulation of anti-intellectual discourses on Twitter. Anti-intellectual discourses resurged even under Twitter’s content moderation mechanism. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for building public trust in scientists, effective science communication, and content moderation policies on social media.
... In other words, anti-intellectualism involves two interrelated components: hatred and distrust of the intellect and the knowledge it extends and rejection and denial of the intellectuals who represent it and the social elite who represent them [19]. Based on the definition of Hofstadter, subsequent studies have further expanded the definition of anti-intellectualism. Rigney (1991) further categorized it as: (a) religious anti-rationalism, (b) populist anti-elitism that abhors the intellect and (c) unreflective instrumental rationalism [20]. Eigenberger and Sealander (2001) suggested that anti-intellectualism devalues activities that require analytical and critical thinking in favor of those that promote practicality, material trade and efficiency [21]. ...
... In other words, anti-intellectualism involves two interrelated components: hatred and distrust of the intellect and the knowledge it extends and rejection and denial of the intellectuals who represent it and the social elite who represent them [19]. Based on the definition of Hofstadter, subsequent studies have further expanded the definition of anti-intellectualism. Rigney (1991) further categorized it as: (a) religious anti-rationalism, (b) populist anti-elitism that abhors the intellect and (c) unreflective instrumental rationalism [20]. Eigenberger and Sealander (2001) suggested that anti-intellectualism devalues activities that require analytical and critical thinking in favor of those that promote practicality, material trade and efficiency [21]. ...
... Alternatively, citizens may be skeptical of the knowledge gained because they see it as a tool used by the social elite to exploit the masses [36]. Furthermore, in any pro-democracy society, people expect someone to doubt a well-educated member of the elite's quality of knowledge or talent [20]. ...
In the digital media era, new media platforms have become the main channels for transmitting medical and health information in China. However, anti-intellectualism limits the effectiveness of disseminating health information. Therefore, in China, the government and health departments have made efforts to determine how to control anti-intellectualism to effectively disseminate medical and health information, given the situation of a global pandemic and its counter-measures. Against this backdrop, this study applied textual analysis to explore the manifestations of anti-intellectualism in network platforms. The key findings indicate that the irrational behavior of anti-intellectuals is manifested in emotional dominance, abusive behavior, overconfidence and trusting rumors. Based on these results, the authors propose some measures to balance the relationship between anti-intellectualism and health communication. The findings of the study have significant implications for improving the effectiveness of health communication in China.
... In this investigation, we take an initial step toward understanding the variance in epistemic hubris. We examine the explanatory purchase of what people loosely refer to as "intellectualism" and "antiintellectualism"-nebulous concepts that have garnered less social scientific attention than their salience warrants (but see Gauchat 2012;Merkley 2020;Motta 2018;Oliver and Wood 2018; also see Baumgardner 2020;Hofstadter 1963;Rigney 1991;Shogan 2007 for good theoretical and historical accounts). ...
... Likewise, many highly educated and knowledgeable people (i.e., people who may be quite intelligent, diligent, ambitious, and/or fortunate) do not possess an intellectual cognitive disposition (for elaboration on these points, see Hofstadter 1963). establishment (Hofstadter 1963;Lecklider 2013;Rigney 1991;Sowell 2009). It can include (1) constitutional disregard for intellect itself (stemming from either "antirationalism" and/or "unreflective instrumentalism"; Rigney 1991), (2) ideological umbrage based on a perception that professional intellectuals (educators, scientists, journalists, etc.) are liberally biased, and/or (3) populist suspicion and resentment toward intellectual "elites" (including those whom society celebrates as experts and those with high levels of intellectual achievement more generally). ...
... In conclusion, this investigation initiates a new line of inquiry into an important but underanalyzed element of political psychology: epistemic hubris. It not only complements the body of knowledge on the causes and consequences of political ignorance and misinformation but also advances understanding of what appears to be an accelerating partisan realignment surrounding intellectualism and its discontents (see Hofstadter 1963;Merkley 2020;Motta 2018;Oliver and Wood 2018;Rigney 1991). In so doing, it refines scholarly understanding of the so-called "diploma divide," and contributes to the broader canon on the nature of political polarization (e.g., Hetherington and Weiler 2018;Iyengar and Westwood 2015;Johnston, Lavine, and Federico 2017;Klein 2020;Mason 2016;Smidt 2017). ...
Epistemic hubris—the expression of unwarranted factual certitude—is a conspicuous yet understudied democratic hazard. Here, in two nationally representative studies, we examine its features and analyze its variance. We hypothesize, and find, that epistemic hubris is (a) prevalent, (b) bipartisan, and (c) associated with both intellectualism (an identity marked by ruminative habits and learning for its own sake) and anti-intellectualism (negative affect toward intellectuals and the intellectual establishment). Moreover, these correlates of epistemic hubris are distinctly partisan: intellectuals are disproportionately Democratic, whereas anti-intellectuals are disproportionately Republican. By implication, we suggest that both the intellectualism of Blue America and the anti-intellectualism of Red America contribute to the intemperance and intransigence that characterize civil society in the United States.
... Not all scholars agree on how to conceptualize anti-intellectualism. Rigney (1991) identifies three distinct components to anti-intellectualism: 1) Anti-rationalism, or the dismissal of critical thinking as a desirable trait; 2) Unreflexive instrumentalism, or the devaluing of long term payoffs for short term material gain; and 3) anti-elitism, or the disparagement of intellectuals and experts. ...
... Some citizens might perceive expert authority as fundamentally at odds with religious authority that they may privilege. Or, they might not see the value of education and critical thought, particularly if they see it as coming at the expense of practical knowledge and common sense (Rigney 1991). Or, they may be skeptical of acquired knowledge because they see it as a tool of an exploitative societal elite (Brewer 2016) -a point which will be returned to below. ...
... Similarly, anti-intellectualism is not an inevitable by-product of populism. The degree to which intellectuals and experts are identified as part of the ruling elite likely varies at the individual-level and over time (Rigney 1991). For example, populist progressives in the early 20 th century saw expertise and professionalism as a solution to the machine politics they abhorred. ...
Scholars have maintained that public attitudes often diverge from expert consensus due to ideology-driven motivated reasoning. However, this is not a sufficient explanation for less salient and politically charged questions. More attention needs to be given to anti-intellectualism—the generalized mistrust of intellectuals and experts. Using data from the General Social Survey and a survey of 3,600 Americans on Amazon Mechanical Turk, I provide evidence of a strong association between anti-intellectualism and opposition to scientific positions on climate change, nuclear power, GMOs, and water fluoridation, particularly for respondents with higher levels of political interest. Second, a survey experiment shows that anti-intellectualism moderates the acceptance of expert consensus cues such that respondents with high levels of anti-intellectualism actually increase their opposition to these positions in response. Third, evidence shows anti-intellectualism is connected to populism, a worldview that sees political conflict as primarily between ordinary citizens and a privileged societal elite. Exposure to randomly assigned populist rhetoric, even that which does not pertain to experts directly, primes anti-intellectual predispositions among respondents in the processing of expert consensus cues. These findings suggest that rising anti-elite rhetoric may make anti-intellectual sentiment more salient in information processing.
... Not all scholars agree on how to conceptualize anti-intellectualism. Rigney (1991) identifies three distinct components to anti-intellectualism: 1) Anti-rationalism, or the dismissal of critical thinking as a desirable trait; 2) Unreflexive instrumentalism, or the devaluing of long term payoffs for short term material gain; and 3) anti-elitism, or the disparagement of intellectuals and experts. ...
... Some citizens might perceive expert authority as fundamentally at odds with religious authority that they may privilege. Or, they might not see the value of education and critical thought, particularly if they see it as coming at the expense of practical knowledge and common sense (Rigney 1991). Or, they may be skeptical of acquired knowledge because they see it as a tool of an exploitative societal elite (Brewer 2016) -a point which will be returned to below. ...
... Similarly, anti-intellectualism is not an inevitable by-product of populism. The degree to which intellectuals and experts are identified as part of the ruling elite likely varies at the individual-level and over time (Rigney 1991). For example, populist progressives in the early 20 th century saw expertise and professionalism as a solution to the machine politics they abhorred. ...
**Forthcoming in Public Opinion Quarterly**
Scholars have maintained that public attitudes often diverge from expert consensus due to ideology-driven motivated reasoning. However, this is not a sufficient explanation on less salient and politically-charged questions. I argue that more attention needs to be given to anti-intellectualism – the generalized mistrust of intellectuals and experts. I make three main contributions using the General Social Survey and a survey of 3,600 Americans on Amazon Mechanical Turk. First, I provide evidence of a strong association between anti-intellectualism and opposition to scientific positions on climate change, nuclear power, GMOs, and water fluoridation, particularly for respondents with higher levels of political interest. Second, I conduct a survey experiment to show that anti-intellectualism moderates the acceptance expert consensus cues such that respondents with high levels of anti-intellectualism actually increase their opposition to these positions in response. Third, I connect anti-intellectualism to populism – a worldview that sees political conflict as primarily between ordinary citizens and a privileged societal elite. I show that exposure to randomly assigned populist rhetoric – even that which does not pertain to experts directly – primes anti-intellectual predispositions among respondents in the processing of expert consensus cues. These findings suggest that rising anti-elite rhetoric may make anti-intellectual sentiment more salient in information processing.
... The distrust and dislike of scientists, academics, and experts more broadly was a widely noted theme in the 2016 presidential election (e.g., Editorial Board, 2016). Often, this affective aversion to experts is conceptualized as a form of anti-intellectualism (Hofstadter, 1963;Rigney, 1991). Throughout the 2016 presidential campaign, and in the months that followed, Republican nominee Donald Trump, for example, made several notable appeals to antiintellectual sentiments. ...
... At several moments in American history, presidential candidates have attempted to capitalize on the public's distrust of politicians and other elites by employing this type of antiintellectual rhetoric. For example, in reaction to gains in mass educational attainment during the Progressive era, Theodore Roosevelt was successful in distancing his naturalistic and experiential "education" from that of allegedly effeminate male intellectuals (Hofstadter, 1963;Rigney, 1991). Rigney notes that similar tensions existed between John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson, as well as in George Wallace's unsuccessful presidential campaign as an American Independent. ...
... Another question some might raise is whether or not these measures of anti-intellectualism might be standing in for another related construct, such as antiestablishment attitudes or populism more generally. Whereas some conceptualize anti-intellectualism as one of several components of populism (e.g., Oliver & Rahn, 2016), others have noted that academics and other experts have-at times-aligned themselves with populist movements and anti-elite ideals (Rigney, 1991). Thus, there is plenty of room for conceptual debate as to whether or not anti-intellectualism is primarily a facet of populism, a distinct construct, or some mix of the two. ...
Recently, Americans have become increasingly likely to hold anti-intellectual attitudes (i.e., negative affect toward scientists and other experts). However, few have investigated the political implications of anti-intellectualism, and much empirical uncertainty surrounds whether or not these attitudes can be mitigated. Drawing on cross-sectional General Social Survey (GSS) data and a national election panel in 2016, I find that anti-intellectualism is associated with not only the rejection of policy-relevant matters of scientific consensus but support for political movements (e.g., “Brexit”) and politicians (e.g., George Wallace, Donald Trump) who are skeptical of experts. Critically, though, I show that these effects can be mitigated. Verbal intelligence plays a strong role in mitigating anti-intellectual sympathies, compared with previously studied potential mitigators. I conclude by discussing how scholars might build on this research to study the political consequences of anti-intellectualism in the future.
... He proposed that anti-intellectualism is a complex of related propositions with an underlying strain, which is "a resentment and suspicion of the life of the mind and of those who are considered to represent it" or "a disposition constantly to minimize the value of that life" (p. 7). Rigney (1991) further identified three distinct types of anti-intellectualism, namely anti-rationalism, unreflexive instrumentalism, and anti-elitism, in Hofstadter's work. Despite Rigney's (1991) call to lend more significance to this concept, it was not until recently that scholars began to examine the implications of anti-intellectualism for scientific beliefs and risk coping among general populations. ...
... Rigney (1991) further identified three distinct types of anti-intellectualism, namely anti-rationalism, unreflexive instrumentalism, and anti-elitism, in Hofstadter's work. Despite Rigney's (1991) call to lend more significance to this concept, it was not until recently that scholars began to examine the implications of anti-intellectualism for scientific beliefs and risk coping among general populations. ...
While scientific knowledge acquisition is a vital premise for citizens’ self-protection against COVID-19, the impact of anti-intellectualism on scientific information seeking has yet to be fully examined. Based on a cross-sectional survey, this study investigated the association of distrust and stigmatization forms of anti-intellectualism (i.e. AID vs. AIS) with the Planned Risk Information Seeking Model (PRISM) in predicting Chinese netizens’ information seeking about SARS-CoV-2 variants. The statistical results show that AIS is positively associated with seeking-related subjective norms and perceived control, indicating that it may boost a sense of self-empowerment. However, AIS is negatively related to affective risk response and the knowledge-sufficiency threshold, suggesting its possible link to overconfidence and trust in government. AID was found to be negatively associated with seeking-related attitudes and perceived control. Because AIS is far more popular than AID among respondents, its contradictory health implications should be brought into the vision of health communicators.
... While (anti-)intellectualism has become an attractive construct for examination in social sciences (e.g., Marques et al., 2017;Merkley & Loewen, 2021;Ż uk & Ż uk, 2020), measurements scales are lacking. Inspired by Hofstadter's (1963) and Rigney's (1991) work on antiintellectualism, Eigenberger and Sealander (2001) created the Student Anti-intellectualism Scale (SAIS). The scale tapped unreflective instrumentalisma type of anti-intellectualism that reflects a preference for materialistic gains over higher education (Rigney, 1991). ...
... Inspired by Hofstadter's (1963) and Rigney's (1991) work on antiintellectualism, Eigenberger and Sealander (2001) created the Student Anti-intellectualism Scale (SAIS). The scale tapped unreflective instrumentalisma type of anti-intellectualism that reflects a preference for materialistic gains over higher education (Rigney, 1991). Antiintellectualism measured by SAIS showed positive correlations with dogmatism and authoritarianism and negative associations with openness to experience, learning style, and critical thinking. ...
Analytical thinking is a vital part of intellectualism, although their relationship has not been directly examined. Therefore, in a representative Slovak sample (N = 410), we examined a newly developed Intellectualism-Anti-Intellectualism Scale (IAIS) by Marques et al. (2017) and its relationships to two indicators of analytical thinking - cognitive biases and cognitive reflection. Moreover, we focused on the three analytical thinking prerequisites - cognitive ability, numerical mindware, and dispositions to analytical thinking. Our results favor the positive correlation between analytical thinking - i.e., lower bias susceptibility and higher cognitive reflection - and intellectualism. While cognitive ability showed no significant association, subjective measures of analytic thinking and numeracy were the strongest correlates of intellectualism. These results indicated that intellectualism taps mostly (but not only) into the motivation and/or predisposition to think analytically. Finally, education appeared, consistently with previous research, as a significant predictor of intellectualism, which opened up new avenues for further research practical implications.
... In a sense, our work can be construed as suggesting that there is an affective component to anti-intellectualism when it comes to reactions toward scientists and what they say. Anti-intellectualism is the rejection of critical thought as a desirable quality (Motta, 2018;Rigney, 1991). Anti-intellectualism is associated with the rejection of policy-relevant matters of scientific consensus, support for political movements and politicians who are skeptical of experts (Motta, 2018), and opposition to a variety of scientific positions (Merkley, 2020). ...
... Anti-intellectualism is associated with the rejection of policy-relevant matters of scientific consensus, support for political movements and politicians who are skeptical of experts (Motta, 2018), and opposition to a variety of scientific positions (Merkley, 2020). To be sure, some theorists contend that antiintellectualism as a construct is poorly defined (Rigney, 1991). At times, anti-intellectualism is simply measured as trust toward experts, though others have applied the construct more broadly (for examples, see Merkley, 2020;Motta, 2018). ...
Across three studies, we investigated who expresses concern for COVID‐19, or coronavirus, and engages in behaviors that are consistent with slowing the spread of COVID‐19. In Studies 1 and 2 (n = 415, n = 199), those with warmer feelings toward scientists were more concerned and engaged in greater COVID‐preventative behaviors, regardless of partisanship. That is, an anti‐scientists bias was related to lessened concern and toward less preventive behaviors. Furthermore, those who were the most optimistic about hydroxychloroquine, a purported but unproven treatment against the virus, were less likely to engage in behaviors designed to decrease the spread of COVID‐19. In Study 3 (n = 259), asking participants to watch a scientist discuss hydroxychloroquine on Fox News led people to greater endorsement of COVID behaviors. In short, positive feelings toward scientists, rather than political attitudes or knowledge, related to who was concerned and those willing to engage in pandemic reducing behaviors. These behaviors were not immutable and can be changed by scientific out‐reach.
... How, in Hofstadter's view, is anti-intellectualism connected to anti-evolutionism? Daniel Rigney (1991) explains that Hofstadter's book "suggests three analytically distinct types of anti-intellectualism: religious anti-rationalism, populist anti-elitism, and unreflective instrumentalism" (p. 434). ...
... And Hofstadter points the way. Recalling Rigney's (1991) distinction among three types of anti-intellectualism -"religious anti-rationalism, populist anti-elitism, and unreflective instrumentalism" (p. 434) -it is possible to identify three corresponding strategies for countering the damaging influence of anti-intellectualism on science education. ...
The forces of anti-intellectualism in American life, as described by Richard Hofstadter, have been especially prominent in the battle against the teaching of evolution. Glenn Branch discusses the different aspects of anti-intellectualism that are at the root of objections to evolution and explains how creation science, which had a transparently religious motivation, eventually gave way to intelligent design, which was less explicit in its religious aims. In the face of constitutional challenges, these modes of anti-evolutionism have been largely replaced by discourse that misrepresents evolution as “just a theory” and that misleadingly portrays miseducation about evolution as a matter of intellectual freedom. Branch then suggests how, by understanding the anti-intellectual roots of objections to evolution, science educators might teach evolution more effectively.
... The specter of populism during election campaigns constitutes both a threat to reason-based reporting and an opportunity for journalism to manage public attention in ways reminiscent of the pre-digital era. Anti-intellectualism is typically characterized as a diffusive and latent sentiment (Claussen 2004;Rigney 1991), but it is periodically mobilized when populist rhetoric opposes virtues of "the people" against privileges of the ruling elite (Krämer 2014). The sectors of digital and legacy media that produce quality journalism doubtlessly motivate grassroots movements in an oppositional sense (e.g., the Tea Party). ...
... Notwithstanding journalists' resistance to a critique of their work as anti-intellectual, commodified information influences the public's capacity for critical thinking, tolerance for complexity, and receptivity to new ideas (Rigney 1991). Still, anti-intellectualism as overt practice is difficult to conceptualize and to operationalize because it entails opportunities not taken, context not provided, ideas otherwise not engaged. ...
This study considers how punitive populism as a strain of anti-intellectualism is condoned in the ways that US journalists imagine audiences. A disregard for intellect is nevertheless antithetical to journalism’s understanding of its contribution to an informed electorate. This contradiction between the representation of public antipathy and reason-based reporting leads to an appraisal of how journalists critiqued their work in the rise of presidential candidate Donald J. Trump. To identify boundaries of reflexivity, we compare the near-instant commentaries of scholars to the interpretations of journalists following the startling election of 2016. Textual analysis of news and news commentary documents a form of reflexivity in which practice is not so much justified to the public as the public is imagined in ways that justify problematic practice. Scholars viewed the rise of Trump as predictable when considering long-established routines of the press and journalists’ misunderstanding of populism. We suggest that reform of campaign coverage is contingent on the recognition of journalists that their work is shaped by audiences they imagine.
... An initial collection of items was generated using a rational/statistical method. This process consisted of initially producing a series of 20 logically related statements derived from descriptive literature on anti-intellectualism (Eigenberger & Sealander, 2001;Hofstadter, 1963;Rigney, 1991), and then revising them to 10 items. A total score was calculated by averaging responses after reverse scoring negative items on the 5-point Likert scale from 1 = Completely false to 5 = Completely true. ...
... Abstract reasoning or intelligence does not equate with knowledge and a desire for ideas, as people may be highly knowledgeable but may still differ in their desire or attraction to analyzing information consistent with Hofstadter's (1963) distinction between the Mental Technician and the Intellectual. The results of this study support the argument that the IAIS taps into a need for intellectual stimulation and depth of processing, as opposed to the purely pragmatic, superficial concerns described by Rigney (1991) as 'unreflective instrumentalism', and is therefore different from need for cognition which has been validated as positively correlated with intelligence (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). ...
This paper describes the development of a brief scale to measure anti-intellectualism, the degree to which one experiences either positive or negative affect while engaged in epistemic activities such as conceptual integration. Using seven samples, the study examined several psychometric components of the measure, including equivalency across community and student/convenience populations, temporal stability, and indications of different forms of validity. The scale was designed to be a brief, reliable and valid measure of individual differences in the degree to which individuals value affect-reinforced need for intellectual engagement. These results suggest that the Anti-Intellectualism Scale may provide a useful tool for the examination of differences in the desire to engage in intellectually challenging activities, and subsequent outcomes such as vocational interest, academic achievement, and democratic citizenship.
... This discussion builds on a longstanding scholarly tradition in public administration and development studies that critically assesses the diffusion of governance practices across heterogenous contexts; most relevant to this study are world-systems theory (Wallerstein, 1987) and core-periphery dynamics (Tickner, 2013;Gilpin, 1987). Our examination of narrative and epistemic 1 hegemony as a way to understand the diffusion of smart governance ideas takes timely inspiration from currently shifting dynamics around the political legitimacy of policy knowledge, as manifest in the rise of 'post-truth' politics (Lockie, 2017;Suiter, 2016), skepticism of science including climate denialism (Dunlap, 2013;Hoffman, 2011) and pandemic denialism (Lasco, 2020), and populist movements hostile to perceived knowledge elites and intellectuals (Motta, 2018;Rigney, 1991;Hofstadter, 1963). In particular, this study extends discussions about the consequences of social change as epistemic pushbackin an era when the normalization and diffusion of governance practices are coming into conflict with the populist and sometimes regressive politics of isolationism, nativism, and anti-elitism. ...
The chapter discusses the impact of social change on how society views governance quality in the era of complex and interconnected policy problems. This era presents a valuable opportunity to revisit tensions between the deepening technocratic logic of formal policymaking and the social change implied by and reflected in the rise of alternative policy epistemics. The chapter focuses on the technocratic exercise of smart governance, as embodied by the smart cities concept, in considering the confrontation between late-stage technocracy and an emerging anti-technocratic agitation that manifests itself in the 'local knowledge' movement on one hand and in 'anti-science' populism on the other. Recognizing a mature literature critical of the hegemonic narrative posture of governance ideas, we explore the epistemic foundations of governance reform movements to more deeply understand a mechanism of narrative power that deserves renewed attention in the 'smart' era: instrumental rationalism. Smart governance, from an epistemic perspective, marks a progression in a sequence of ideas serving the long-running project to validate and normalize instrumental rationalism in policymaking. To connect this argument to social change, our approach combines the critical perspective of poststructuralism with the political economy perspective of world-systems theory. We postulate that 'good' governance is a vessel into which momentarily salient global norms are loaded, and that each successive iteration (e.g., smart) is considered politically viable only if emerging from existing institutional architecture and bearing the ideational legacy of instrumental rationalism. This process of narrative auto-replication yields seemingly novel ideas that are mere variations on a failed theme. The type of social change that can unseat this epistemic lock-in emerges from a more robust valorization of alternative perspectives, which we conclude this chapter by describing as an epistemic awakening.
... Suspicion of intellect requires cultural support in latent forms and periodic activation in overt episodes to remain endemic, implying a hegemonic role for media in mobilizing resentment. Rigney (1991) distilled three themes in Hofstadter's understanding of what makes intellect unpopular: religious anti-rationalism, populist anti-elitism, and unreflective instrumentalism. Anti-rationalism registers an instinct to protect the moral foundations of sanctity, loyalty, and authority against intellect's relentless critique. ...
... Suspicion of intellect requires cultural support in latent forms and periodic activation in overt episodes to remain endemic, implying a hegemonic role for media in mobilizing resentment. Rigney (1991) distilled three themes in Hofstadter's understanding of what makes intellect unpopular: religious anti-rationalism, populist anti-elitism, and unreflective instrumentalism. Anti-rationalism registers an instinct to protect the moral foundations of sanctity, loyalty, and authority against intellect's relentless critique. ...
Intellect in social theory is often presented as an ideal type—the critical, iconoclastic side of the mind—but it must anticipate an audience in mediated contexts, unlike in the Kantian realm of transcendent reason. The terrain in which academia and media meet, consequently, is ripe for exploration into the fate of intellect when transgressive. This article explicates four features of the academic–media nexus that contribute to social control of intellect: instrumental rationalism of faculty, strategic management of university communication, journalistic appropriation of the “public intellectual” role, and surveillance of academic discourse. The article situates the features in a framework to recognize whether they originate primarily in academia or media, and whether the controlling process occurs through internalized norms or calculated practice. While social control is understood as recursive and reinforcing, reflexivity induced in an inter-field dynamic implies the possibility of reconciling intellect with news work.
... Distrust of government (and trust in other sources such as religious institutions) combines with selfinterest to fuel noncompliance (Kettl 2017;Baum, Jacobson, and Goold 2009;Rakich 2020), ranging from continued social gatherings (most notably at church), the refusal to wear masks, and extreme cases such as the armed protesters occupying the Michigan State Capitol (Deslatte 2020). This difference relates partly to a history of anti-rationalism and anti-elitism that has fueled US citizen distrust of government leaders and institutions (Rigney 1991), and now exacerbated by social media. Citizen distrust is also fueled by the deep polarization of American society: along party lines, with a larger percentage of those identifying themselves as conservative or Republican being distrustful of scientific expert recommendations (Hamilton and Safford 2020); and in relation to race and racism, with African American respondents the least likely to trust (and therefore welcome cooperation with) the president or the police (Kulke 2020). ...
In a crisis, almost-instant choices about who to trust or distrust could make a difference between life and death. Trust is necessary for cooperation, coordination, social order, and to reduce the need for coercive state imposition. During a pandemic, people need to trust experts to help them understand and respond to the problem, governments to coordinate policy instruments and make choices about levels of coercion, and citizens as they cooperate to minimize infection. We compare these general requirements with specific developments in the UK and US, identifying: the variable reliance by elected politicians on scientific experts, worrying levels of distrust in elected leaders, and a shift from a trust-based to more impositional forms of government action (with more variation in responses in the US). While trust is difficult to define and measure, these examples show that people miss it when it is gone.
... In order to understand contemporary political dynamics, it is important to notice that at the same time there are some vivid anti-intelligentsia or anti-expert sentiments and discourse used to distinct from the so-called intellectual ("cultural") elites or its supposed hegemony. Anti-elitist forms of anti-intellectualism (Rigney 1991) are common features among the populist conservatives and far right in Europe, the USA, and elsewhere (see e.g. Motta 2018), although as Motta argues, these forms are not simply "a proxy" for (conservative) "ideology" (Motta 2018, p. 271). ...
The paper presents outcomes of a comparative, qualitative, and quantitative study on coordinators of the Polish Women’s Strike (OSK) and activists of the Warsaw-based feminist Women’s March 8th Alliance (PK8M). The massive countrywide Women's Strike in October 3, 2016, expressing a popular disagreement over attempts to further restrict Polish abortion legislation, was widely recognized as the voice of `the people.´ It was described as a protest of `ordinary women´ (zwykłe kobiety), who within right-wing discourses are contrasted with feminists. Referring to those juxtapositions , we asked actors from both groups under study (`ordinary women´ from OSK and `feminists´ from PK8M) about their understanding of the term `ordinary women,´ their opinions on abortion legislation, and their previous and current sociopolitical activity. Contrary to PK8M, most of OSK activists consider their protests to be those of `ordinary women,´ although their personal understanding of the term does not align with right-wing interpretations. The outcome of this comparison served as a basis to reflect upon the ambivalence of the term `ordinary women´ and `ordinariness´ (zwykłość). We contrasted representations of ordinariness and populist elite-people dichotomies with statistical averages, and applied a center-periphery analysis in order to discuss the ways ordinariness is deployed by various political actors in Poland.
... In order to understand contemporary political dynamics, it is important to notice that at the same time there are some vivid anti-intelligentsia or anti-expert sentiments and discourse used to distinct from the so-called intellectual ("cultural") elites or its supposed hegemony. Anti-elitist forms of anti-intellectualism (Rigney 1991) are common features among the populist conservatives and far right in Europe, the USA, and elsewhere (see e.g. Motta 2018), although as Motta argues, these forms are not simply "a proxy" for (conservative) "ideology" (Motta 2018, p. 271). ...
This book explores the contradictory development of gender roles in Central and Eastern Europe including Russia. In light of the social changes that followed the collapse of communism and the rise of new conservatism in Eastern Europe, it studies new forms of gender relationships and reassesses the status quo of female empowerment. Moreover, leading scholars in gender studies discuss how right-wing populism and conservative movements have affected sociopolitical discourses and concepts related to gender roles, rights, and attitudes, and how Western feminism in the 1990s may have contributed to this conservative turn.
Mainly focusing on power constellations and gender, the book is divided into four parts: the first explores the history of and recent trends in feminist movements in Eastern Europe, while the second highlights the dynamics and conflicts that gained momentum after neoconservative parties gained political power in post-socialist countries. In turn, the third part discusses new empowerment strategies and changes in gender relationships. The final part illustrates the identities, roles, and concepts of masculinity created in the sociocultural and political context of Eastern Europe.
... According to Rigney (1991), anti-intellectualism has three scopes: religious anti-rationalism, populist anti-elitism and unreflective instrumentalism. Although in Turkey, we see almost all three dimensions of anti-intellectualism (i.e. ...
After years of progress in terms of gender and sexual rights, since 2012 Europe is facing a
so-called gender backlash – opposition directed to issues related to reproductive policies and abortion, violence against women, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, and queer (LGBTIQ) rights and gay marriages, gender mainstreaming and sex education at schools as well as anti discrimination policies. In this article, firstly, by taking the anti-gender developments as point of reference, I examine the emergence of anti-gender movement in Europe via the use of what I call troll science. Troll science is based on (distorted) scientific arguments moulded into populist discourse, creating an alternative narrative on the conceptions of gender equality. Similar to troll accounts posting provocative, superfluous and even off-topic messages on social media to start arguments and quarrels aiming to distract, troll science, I argue, creates an alternative narrative opposing the scientific facts and discourses (i.e. climate change, evolution, vaccination and gender theory). Later, I discuss the emerging conservative troll-scientific discourses and the gendered public normative order of Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP; Justice
and Development Party) government, under the New Turkey. I previously argued that New Turkey and the society under the party’s rule perpetuated by a new set of standards create an alternative narrative on the conceptions of gender equality through troll-science narratives. I concluded by showing how such ideological discourses help create emotional echo chambers – enabling its fast distribution and acceptance by the ideologically conservative groups.
... This value system has been attributed to broader historical cultural influences including religions within which hard work is considered virtuous (Weber, 1930(Weber, /2005. These influences also include social reactions to traditional hierarchical class systems, which have spawned anti-elitist attitudes that promote the need for individuals to demonstrate membership of an "everyman" class by being a "man of action" (Rigney, 1991; italics added here). In addition, meritocratic socio-political ideologies (e.g., "the American dream") that stress individual agency and responsibility have fostered notions that "exceptionally lofty goals are … well within reach" for all, striving toward lofty goals is highly valued, goals are obtained via hard work, and failure is temporary and overcome by working harder still (Luthar & Kumar, 2018). ...
This article provides a review of literature on the psychology of rest in athletes with the aim of advancing research and practice in this area. While the concept of rest represents an important component of several key topics in sport psychology, researchers and practitioners have paid relatively little attention to this concept and to psychological aspects of rest in particular. We review literature in three sport psychology topic areas within which the concept of rest in athletes has received theoretical or empirical attention, which are recovery, skill learning, and expertise development. For each area, we describe how rest has received little direct research attention within this literature, identify how this shortcoming limits current theory, research, and practice, and propose directions for future research and practice. We then describe a recent study that has attempted to address the paucity of research on this topic by prioritizing an understanding of the psychology of rest in athletes. We also explore reasons why rest has received little attention in sport psychology with the rationale that an increased awareness of these reasons will help advance research and practice in our field. We conclude by considering implications of our review for best practice.
Lay Summary: Rest is critical to athlete performance and well-being, yet researchers and practitioners have paid little attention to psychological aspects of rest. We review the sport psychology literature to identify directions for research aimed at advancing our understanding of rest and practical guidelines to help athletes obtain the rest they require.
• Implications for Practice
• Practitioners should consider that recovery following training and competitions does not just involve recovering physically; it involves recovering psychologically
• Recovering psychologically depends in part on engagement in high-quality sleep and wakeful resting
• High-quality wakeful resting involves obtaining specific resting experiences such as not thinking about or “psychologically detaching from” one’s sport.
... In order to facilitate that inclusion this paper codifies a system of analysis of press criticism based on the Carey essay, using a technique akin to that employed by sociologist Daniel Rigney (Rigney 1991), who interpreted historian Richard Hofstadter's book-length historical essay on anti-intellectualism in American life. It then applies that system to a case study. ...
In 1974, the media and cultural studies scholar James W. Carey called for the development of a culture of press criticism, engaging with daily journalism at the same level of analysis of language that literary critics use when assessing literature. This paper examines Carey's call in light of both the developments in journalistic criticism since his writing as well as other scholarly attempts to assess press criticism. Finding a lack of humanistic approaches to assessing press criticism, this paper distills Carey's essay into a more readily usable rubric for the assessment of the critical conversations surrounding journalism, identifying six dimensions of analysis by which to judge the criticism, with a focus on the criticism of language and a dialogic relationship between the press and the public. Finally, the paper applies the rubric to a case study of the response to a New York Times profile of a white nationalist. Dozens of works of criticism—public commentary, essays by scholars, satire, and public discussion—were published in response to the piece. This paper concludes that the beginnings of Carey's culture of criticism may finally exist, aided by social media tools that allow a broader public to participate in the critical conversation.
... In 'A Brief History of Anti-Intellectualism in American Media' Claussen (2004) follows Rigney's (1991) theory of American anti-intellectualism identifying three major types: ...
... (pp. 22-23) The sociologist Daniel Rigney (1991) teased out two dimensions in Hofstadter's treatment that implicate mass media in the social control of ideas: anti-rationalism and populist anti-elitism. Anti-rationalism reflects an instinct to protect absolutist belief against empirical inquiry and systemic pursuit of knowledge. ...
This study explores how support for journalistic anti-intellectualism is condoned in the views of emerging adults in the United States as they develop attitudes toward news, audiences, and authority. Anti-rationalism and anti-elitism as cultural expressions of anti-intellectualism correlate as expected with approval of corresponding news practices. Identification with professional roles generally fails to inoculate college students against the endorsement of journalistic anti-rationalism and anti-elitism. With the exception of the adversarial function, role identities appear to justify journalistic anti-intellectualism beyond the influence of cultural anti-intellectualism. While reflexivity is often viewed as conducive to critical thinking, affinity for transparency in news work associates with a populist suspicion of intellectuals and their ideas.
... 27 David Rigney, when revisiting Hofstadter's publication, identifi es three different kinds of anti-intellectualism which can be found in American public life and elsewhere: anti-rationalism, anti-elitism, and unrefl ective instrumentalism. 28 While anti-rationalism characterizes reason as "cold," emotions as "warm," and underlines the danger of intellectual discourse to promote relativism by doubting the foundations of beliefs, anti-elitism defi nes values of the intellect as exclusive and elitist. 29 Finally, unrefl ective "instrumentalism suppresses questions about the ends towards which practical and effi cient means are directed." ...
Community music is a successful concept in the world of music and music education. Based on ethnomusicological research, community music tries to implement the notion of music for all that transforms societies and people. While celebrating informal learning and the musical amateur, community music has never really been philosophically challenged or critically analyzed. This might be surprising because community music is a rather vague concept. This paper critically analyzes some of community music's foundations in terms of epistemological or ethnomusicological issues, Kitsch, the notion of learning, and the relation to higher education. In order to improve musicking internationally, it is crucial to start critically investigating the very foundations of community music and with regard to fostering a collaboration with music education.
... Daniel Rigney (1991) argues that right-wing absolutism and religious absolutism became united with a sharp political edge well before the McCarthy era. In the 1930s there developed a mutual fear of godless communism within the two groups. ...
... What Hofstadter is referring to here is the current general disdain towards all forms of intellectual activity and a tendency to denigrate those who engage in it. Anti-intellectualism could be said to have different manifestations and is, perhaps, best characterised by Rigney (1991) who identifies it with 'religious anti-rationalism', 'populist anti-elitism' and 'unreflective instrumentalism'. Religious anti-rationalism refers to the belief in the superiority of faith over reason and the fear that scientific endeavours will lead to the elimination of religion. ...
The debate as to whether the humanities is in decline is almost over. Statistics on declining enrolments, shrinking job prospects, dwindling funding and growing condescension from society add up to show that all is not well. Humanities scholars have, in the recent past, tried to discover what is wrong as well as do something to demonstrate that the humanities is still relevant to society. In this regard, many have suggested that the humanities should change to accommodate the needs of the marketplace, while others have argued that to do so will change the humanities so drastically as to render it unrecognizable. This article is about the current state of affairs in the humanities and the different views that have been expressed on it. It argues that rather than the humanities, it is actually society that is in decline, and as such changing the humanities to suit the needs of the marketplace would be a disservice to our long humanistic tradition. It acknowledges that humanities scholars need to engage more with society even as they continue in activities that have defined the humanities through the years and argues for humanities therapy as a way for the humanities to engage with a world that is increasingly enamoured with technê.
In this chapter the topics of sleep, recovery and rest will be discussed in the context of sport psychology. While sleep may be considered the most natural and essential recovery strategy in every human being, it is worthwhile to regard waking activities that serve the restoration of physical and psychological resources as equally important for athletes.
The main goal of this chapter is to understand right-wing populism and troll-science discourses on gender under the public normative order of the current AKP (Justice and Development Party) government. For this I focus on articles published in KADEM Kadın Arasṃtırmaları Dergisi (Journal of Women’s Studies), a pro-government, peer-reviewed so-called academic journal that publishes research on gender and women’s studies. The assumption here is that, the right-wing populist ideologies introduced under the New Turkey has created alternative troll-science discourses within academia, supporting the anti-gender development in Turkey. I show how such troll-science that spread fake information are connoted with religious arguments, such as creationism, and emotionally loaded ideologies that facilitate their easy acceptance in certain circles: in this specific case, ideologically conservative ones.KeywordsAKPEmotionsPost-truthRight-wing populismTroll-science
In his prescient book Achieving Our Country , Richard Rorty predicts the rise of a Trump-like strongman built on attacking, among other public figures, “postmodern professors” (1998, p. 90). This speaks to the importance of anti-intellectualism to the populist movement in the US today. Always present in populist appeals, like McCarthy’s placement of “educated elites at the center of his communist conspiracy” (Peck, 2019, p. 129), this approach “seeks to undermine public discourse by attacking and devaluing education, expertise, and language” (Stanley, 2020, p. 36). The result of these attacks is a return to tribalism and power, key facets of populist rhetoric and strategies. With the Covid-19 pandemic dominating the US public discourse since 2020, the populist conservative movement has trained their anti-intellectual rhetoric towards a singular figure: Dr. Anthony Fauci. An anti-fandom community was thus born built around attacking and mocking Fauci, taking place within the larger populist movement. While this anti-Fauci rhetoric takes many forms, one of the most dominant is that of memes. Through an analysis of both formal (DeSantis merchandise and political cartoons) and informal (actual grassroots) anti-Fauci memes, I argue online communities have used anti-Fauci memes as a form of anti-fandom community building utilizing and bolstering anti-intellectual, populist rhetoric due to their ease of transmission, mutability, and personification of intellectualism on a singular figure. In this way, being “anti-Fauci” allows the populist argument to seem like a personal grievance rather than a focused attack on academic thought itself.
This study considers the possibility that students are subversive actors in a hidden curriculum of anti-intellectualism. Mass communication provides the arena in which intellectuals are held up to public judgment, and consequently media education represents a promising context for observing the enculturation of resentment. The hidden curriculum framework incorporates three sources of influence: socio-demographics, student-oriented anti-intellectualism (impatience with education, disliking instructors), and three dimensions of journalism ideology: the consumer-oriented and loyal roles and accountability to the public. Data are drawn from questionnaires distributed to undergraduates at five U.S. colleges with comprehensive programs in journalism and mass communication (JMC). Republican identity, student anti-intellectualism, and journalism ideology predict support for news media exposing faculty as subversive. The study concludes with suggestions for future research on how JMC education, from a comparative perspective, could be vulnerable to anti-intellectual incursions depending on media system and populist climate.
Anti-intellectualism in America not only has a long and established history but has seen an increasing rise in recent years. The figure of the ‘genius’ archetype on popular television has frequently been presented through a lens of anti-intellectualism, leading intellectualism to be read as an illness or disorder. The works of Aaron Sorkin have taken a different position, and, rather than distancing the audience from these geniuses by presenting their differences as traits that need to be corrected, the genius in works such as The Newsroom (2012–14) is held up as the ideal for society at large. Although genius has been predominately presented as a male characteristic, in popular culture there has been an increasing number of female geniuses and Sorkin’s writing foregrounds this as an important revision because the images that we see in popular culture influence the way we view the world around us. In this article, I consider the history and continued relevance of anti-intellectualism as notably examined by Richard Hofstadter, Jack Nachbar and Kevin Lause and Daniel Rigney. I also explore the rise of the genius on-screen, as closely examined in the writing of Ashley Lynn Carlson and David Sidore. I examine the way that Sorkin’s works actively counters anti-intellectualism and through exemplary Sorkin characters such as Sloan Sabbith (Olivia Munn) in The Newsroom and Molly Bloom (Jessica Chastain) in Molly’s Game (2017), wherein he opens up the traditionally masculine space of the genius to his female protagonists.
In this article, we analyze the role of conspiracy theories, especially the spread of QAnon during the COVID-19 pandemics, in the legitimation crisis and epistemic crisis in contemporary democracies. We discuss Habermas’ theory of legitimation crisis and the potential for reactionary movements in times of such crisis, as well as Hofstadter’s description of the paranoid style in political culture. We explain the notion of ‘epistemic crisis’ as theorized by Larry Laudan and discussed recently in relation to social media. We discuss anti-intellectualism in Hofstadter’s terms, and explain its connection with populism. Finally, we explain how all of this comes to bear on the contemporary proliferation of conspiracy theory, using QAnon and the COVID crisis as our point of reference, and examples from the United States and Brazil to illustrate our points. QAnon fueled COVID-19 conspiracy theories, and COVID-19 conspiracy theories rocketed QAnon to a place of major influence.
The Brexit referendum campaign was characterised by blaming of the EU, with blame seemingly inextricable from politics. However, what is not clear from existing research is what blame actually does to the people who read, hear, or otherwise consume it (the ‘audience’). Does blame actually matter? Specifically, in what ways does exogenous blame make villains in politics, as characters who are bad, strong, and active, and whom we feel negatively towards? Such a question is vital in the context of affective polarisation, where it is not simply that we disagree with our opponents—it is it that we experience negative emotions towards them.
This research applies an abductive approach grounded in a critical realist ontology that cycles between theory and empirical data. Feldman Barrett’s Theory of Constructed Emotions is introduced to connect societal ‘feeling structures’ discussed in prior international relations work with the human body that has hitherto been absent, while blame is defined as a discursive practice in which a speaker claims a party is doing, or has done, a harmful thing. A data analysis framework is developed that permits for investigation of the effects of discursive practices, calling for identification of context, performance, effects, and points of resistance and contestation. The empirical chapters address each stage of this framework in sequence.
The Brexit referendum campaign is selected as a case study, and a mixed methods design utilising both qualitative content and statistical analyses emerges in-depth meaning and wider generalisability alike. Data analysed includes pre-referendum materials from Nigel Farage and the Leave campaigns, particularly Leave.EU, as well as the Remain campaign (355); this is compared with three months of articles and public commentary from the ‘Metro’ newspaper (60 issues), providing insight into context, performance, and contestation. In-depth semi-structured focus groups and interviews with Leave voters (18) and a survey-experiment conducted amongst UK voters (1368) enables identification of both contestation and the effects of blame—specifically how blame makes people feel, and how it makes them feel about a party who is blamed.
This research finds that blame makes villains in politics directly where it engenders negative, ‘villain-type feelings’ towards a blamed party, with annoyance predominant; and indirectly where it engenders compassion for victims. Its effects are mediated by the audience who consume the blame and may be mitigated by contestation strategies employed by that audience or others such as alternative campaigns. These include strategies that engage directly with the blame—counter-blaming, rebuttal, naming and shaming blame—as well as indirectly through use of alternate discursive practices such as credit or threat, and by changing the subjects and objects of blame.
This work exceptionally investigates the effects and contestation of ‘exogenous’ third-party blame, contributing to the fields of international relations, political science, and social psychology; shows that it is not what we ‘are’ but rather what we ‘know’ that circumscribes the effects of blame, defraying concerns over psychometric targeting; provides insight into how communication professionals and EU staff may contest blame, beyond avoiding or shifting it; and demonstrates the effectiveness of blame in creating a villain of the EU in the specific case of the Brexit campaign.
This article analyses whether and to what extent the popular TV show The Big Bang Theory conveys anti-intellectual ideas. The starting point of my enquiry is the verbal behaviour of the ‘main nerd’ of this series, Sheldon Cooper, who is noteworthy for his lack of empathy and propriety. I aim to shed light on the kind of inappropriate verbal behaviour Sheldon displays by analysing a speech pattern this character is particularly bad at – ‘white lies’, that is lies made out of consideration for other people’s feelings. By drawing on Immanuel Kant’s thoughts on civility in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), I will detail the social implications of white lies and how Sheldon fails in employing them. Doing so will be helpful in establishing why Sheldon’s comments and behaviour appear as outlandish as they do. This in turn provides important insights into the way the televisual text of The Big Bang Theory relates with its audience and the social implications of this connection. I will conclude with the observation that the portrayal of Sheldon Cooper relies heavily on two kinds of stereotypes: anti-intellectual ones and those associated with the ‘nerd’ identity.
Theoretically, this article investigates the politicisation of migration research in relation to boundary work between different spheres of the Danish public debate about migration, including research, media and politics. Empirically, the article analyses the roles that Danish migration researchers have played in such debates over the last two decades. Besides, the article presents and analyses results from a survey among migration researchers employed in four of Denmark’s six universities. The survey showed that while the majority of respondents did not feel unsafe participating in the public debate about migration, more than two out of five did. Jeopardising one’s professional reputation appeared to be a major concern. The article ends with a discussion of the survey results in relation to academic boundary work and presents suggestions for the road ahead, both for individual researchers and academic institutions.
Books are often the targets of anti-intellectual censorship efforts in schools for two reasons. First, they are integral to the process and practice of reading, which is how people encounter new ideas. Second, the coercive nature of curriculum means that students must read books with controversial ideas. Emily Knox argues that the people who challenge books believe strongly in the power of books, and it is this belief that motivates their actions. To combat these efforts, educators must have in place robust policies and procedures for choosing and defending curriculum materials, directly name anti-intellectualism as a threat to education, and avoid treating any single book as presenting a complete and absolute version of the truth.
In this article I analyze, on the basis of my personal experience, the discontents of contemporary Turkish politics; more specifically, neoliberal conservative hegemony, and its three manifestations: stability of instability; a religio-conservative gender regime; and anti-intellectualism. I illustrate how these manifestations are intertwined in the process of identity construction: how an individual’s identity as a citizen, as a woman, as an academic is being constantly constructed/de-constructed/reconstructed in a manner integral to the social and political context. The contribution of this article is threefold: it shows how personal experiences are a legitimate source of knowledge; it enables an understanding of how political identities are in a constant state of making; it challenges dominant conceptions of politics and the political through challenging binaries such as individual/social, personal/political, and emotional/rational.
Cambridge Core - Organisation Studies - Constructing Crisis - by Bert Spector
This article analyses the rising tides of celebrity politics in Turkey by contextualising it within the changing dynamics of Turkish politics during the last decade. More specifically, it tries to understand the fault lines of celebritisation of politics with reference to the installation and re-installation of the neoliberal conservative hegemony. Celebrity politics in Turkey has acquired a unique character within a political environment where the tides of social opposition are very high and as a trend of de-democratisation has been hanging over the country. This is what makes the content and nature of celebrity politics in Turkey different from the general tendency in the world, as the most widespread form of celebrity politics is the advocacy of policy matters such as philanthropy and raising awareness on sensitive and noble human causes. In Turkey, the existing neoliberal conservative hegemony, since its first installation, has been able to find new and/or different ways of consolidating, revising, shifting, and re-installing itself, and it has done this by finding new ways of creating the collective identities of us versus them. It is the argument of this study that celebrity politics has been one of the latest resorts in that task.
Background Following recent reappraisals of the work of media and communications theorist Marshall McLuhan, this article argues that an overlooked aspect of his appeal and celebrity is not only his famous use of metaphor, but also a countercultural stance suggested by this use of metaphor.
Analysis Applying Michael Warner’s arguments about publics to McLuhan’s rhetorical style, the article focuses partly on 1) the 1967 film This Is Marshall McLuhan: The Medium Is the Massage and how it might have addressed an audience of countercultural youth; and 2) related texts that helped to construct McLuhan’s celebrity.
Conclusions and implications Ultimately, the article historicizes McLuhan’s celebrity to explain both its relatively short heyday in the 1960s and the comeback that can be attributed to the development of his young audience into teachers and reappraisers.
The global rise of ‘neo-populism’, culminating in the election of the populist Republican candidate Donald Trump to the US presidency, has been accompanied by a notable backlash and resistance to what has been categorised as governing/dominating ‘elites’, including HE academic institutions. Populist critiques centre on a perceived climate of censorship on campus in the name of ‘political correctness’. In this paper I examine some of the arguments put forward by proponents and detractors in these debates, utlising some examples from empirical data from a study of online student newspaper posts in 2016 and 2017 from campuses in the US and the UK. In doing so I will be exploring the ways in which the debates are underpinned by distinct gendered, classed and ‘raced’ discourses that are linked not only to differing conceptions of ‘truth’ but also the nature and purpose of learning in the university itself.
The unprecedented geopolitical shift resulting from Brexit reflects deep socio-economic fault lines within and beyond the UK. In many ways foreshadowing the US presidential election of Donald Trump, Brexit brought to the surface and gave a public voice to socio-economic divisions that were deeply embedded, sometimes illogical, but until now had either been ignored or hushed out of ‘respectable’ public debate. This Discussion Forum emanates from a spontaneous seminar organized 2 days after the Brexit vote on June 25, 2016 as part of the SASE conference held in University of California–Berkeley and followed by an open call for papers by Socio-Economic Review. The papers here draw attention to the origins of the Brexit vote in deep-seated socio-economic divisions (O’Reilly), widening differences in economic performance across sectors and regions of the UK (Froud, Sukhdev and Williams) and the growth of poor quality jobs (Warhurst). Meanwhile, the political dynamics of the Brexit vote were also shaped by the fractured nature of UK business elites (Morgan), divisions between locals and cosmopolitans (Grey) and creative but muddled actions of elites that arguably generated consequences they themselves failed to fully anticipate (Wood and Wright). From the perspective of Europe, Brexit reflects a history of dysfunctional economic policy in Europe that prioritized market competition in ways that neglected and ultimately undermined solidarity (Boyer). Here, Brexit reflects a political strategy to both renationalize and recommodify solidarity in the face of fears over migration, and which are likely to have major consequences for social solidarity in Europe more generally (Frerichs and Sankari). However, Brexit is unlikely to provide a durable social and political solution to the wider tensions between globalization and democracy, which also affect all countries throughout Europe (Rona-Tas). Ultimately, the Brexit vote underlines social divisions that combine class inequalities with regional ones, not just in Britain but throughout Europe (Le Galès).
Fictional media representations have presented numerous depictions of higher education over the years. Though research has noted the value of investigating this depiction—because media plays a critical role in shaping viewers’ perceptions, beliefs, and behaviors—it has not been the focus on much scholarly work to date. This chapter provides the rationale for this analysis of the higher education portrait in novels, television, film, comic books, and video games. It also introduces the concepts of anti-intellectualism and cultivation theory, which guided the book’s authors, while offering a glimpse into the content of the upcoming chapters in the volume.
As video games expanded their audience and the scope of their content, higher education became a more frequent feature in those games. This chapter examines portrayals of higher education in 69 video games released between 2004 and 2015. Although exceptions do exist, the chapter’s author argues that anti-intellectual themes commonly seen in American culture (e.g., isolated faculty conducting research that does not benefit society) are visible consistently in video games as well.
Using Rigney’s typology of anti-intellectualism, this chapter explores the portrait of televisual faculty in 12 prime-time series (93 episodes) that aired from 1996 to 2014. Faculty represent anti-elitist, anti-rational, and unreflective instrumental views throughout the selected series. They are depicted as cold and critical of students and colleagues and lacking a moral core. When they actually do conduct research, it has no practical application and is presented as frivolous and unnecessary. Yet tenure protects them from censure or removal regardless of their behavior.
Comparison of the findings from a 1979 sample of faculty members of the honorific academies and a 1977 national survey of American professors indicates that the former are more liberal politically than the latter, including those at the most distinguished institutions. This result is in line with a body of theory which suggests that intellectual creativity is associated with critical social views, and with earlier research which found that scholarly status among faculty generally is correlated with liberal political orientations. The relationship inverts, however, for questions bearing on the self-interest of academic achievers both within and outside of the university.
As our society has become complex and integrated, both the opportunities and the needs to manage the physical and social technologies of society have become more urgent. At the same time tools are developing which permit a more reliable anticipation and assessment of alternative futures. This paper focuses on a number of structural situations in our society which impede the effective management of the future. Among these are the intellectual orientation of the intelligentsia; a general ignorance of both science and technology; a failure to appreciate the strengths, functioning, and relationships of our political system; a lack of awareness of the intrinsic time constants of social change; the substitution of piety for hard study; a pervasive pessimism often grounded in ignorance; a special pleading on the part of many interest groups; a lack of historical perspective; a widespread aversion to social experimentation as well as a fear of new knowledge. A new fallacy common in discussion of social issues is proposed, “the fallacy of the argument from incompetence.”
Recounts the controversy triggered by Senator W. Proxmire's public criticism of the "love research" proposed by E. Berscheid and E. Walster to the National Science Foundation. The controversy is treated as a case study in anti-intellectual behavior and is discussed in relation to other contemporary instances of opposition to scholarly work. It is argued that Proxmire's rhetoric, which preoccupied the public responses of the academic community, served to obscure two more significant sources of opposition: disagreement between intellectuals and the public over the value of knowledge (often called anti-intellectualism) and public misunderstanding of the nature of knowledge—particularly the epistemology of the social sciences. An assessment of the threat currently presented by these sources of opposition is given, and a call for more active involvement of psychologists in improving public understanding of social science is presented. (41 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Contemporary social theorists have been remarkably consistent in advocating an analytically defined ideal-type of the modern intellectual. This ideal-type presents the intellectual as a politically autonomous critic pursuing knowledge for its own sake. I argue that this concept rests on the presupposition of specific empirical and historical conditions concerning the social organization of intellectuals. To the degree that these presuppositions are “falsifiable” by a historically grounded framework of intellectual “action,” one may challenge the “epistemological” claims of modern intellectuals with a “class conscious” sociology of knowledge.
The Split Level Tower
- Daniel J Boorstin
Two for the Seesaw: The Intellectual and the Common Man
- Harold Rosenberg
The Storm Over the University
- John Searle
Ethics, the University and Society
- Allan Bloom