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Patron-Client Relationships in Southern Italy
Abstract
Political clientelism in Southern Italy has shown great persistence and capacity for conditioning the entire Italian political development. Accounting for these characteristics, clientelism is better understood as the product of the incomplete capitalistic rationalization of the Southern economy. Throughout the 19th century in Sicily, the feudo remained the basis of the economic and social structure, while in the continental South the feudal system disintegrated more quickly and widely. The resulting different models of social relationships within the Mezzogiorno, make it meaningful for our purposes to distinguish between two types of clientele, which may be termed clientela mafiosa and Neopolitan clientele.The second part of the article is concerned with the dynamics of the clientelistic system in post-1945 Southern Italy and more generally with the relationship between clientelism and political development. The transition from the clientelism of the notables to political party-directed patronage is studied both at the local level and in the context of the whole South. It is then argued that clientelism is a very poor tool for political development since it has two effects on the social structure and the political process: these effects will be called disorganic integration and exclusivism.
... Given their constrained circumstances, clients strategically accept resources or acknowledge the authority of the patron. A third approach, however, suggests that patrons may resort to coercion when other methods fail (Fox, 1994: 154–5; Graziano, 1977: 377; Hall, 1977; Lemarchand, 1981: 17–19). Coercion may include crude violence, threats of punishment, or the withdrawal of benefi ts that clients currently enjoy (Rhodes, 1984; Scott, 1972b: 99–100). ...
... Second, political clientelism may serve other purposes besides electoral mobilization. It may also be a tool of demobilization, suppressing alternative forms of collective action, for example, class mobilization (Graziano, 1977: 372–3; see also Cammack, 1982; Flynn, 1974; Guasti, 1977 ...
For many years, studies of electoral clientelism regarded clients as the captive votes of patrons. In recent years, this conventional wisdom has come under challenge, as scholars have come to recognize the widespread noncompliance of clients. This article uses the case of the 1993 Taiwan election to offer the first ever systematic data on noncompliance. Documents from the ruling Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) campaign office in one Taiwanese district, combined with district electoral results, demonstrate considerable leakage in this instance of clientelistic mobilization: at least 45 percent of voters who sold their votes to the Kuomintang did not, in fact, vote for the Kuomintang's candidate. This article argues that clientelistic mobilization faced at least four serious obstacles, including (1) broker scarcity, (2) factionalism, (3) embezzlement, and (4) financial limitations. These obstacles prevented the Kuomintang from making full use of its broker organizations, even as it devoted extensive economic and political resources and personnel to the election.
... 31 29 Hall-Soskice 2001. 30 Chandra 2007: 88. 31 Graziano 1973. ...
Oligarchák, patrónusok, kliensek Ez az írás műfaja szerint szakirodalmi tallózás az elitelmélettel határos kutatási területeken. Eliten itt most mindazokat értem, akik érdemi személyes befolyást gyakorolnak a társadalmi reprodukciós folyamatokra: a gazdaság, a kultúra és a politika kiemelkedő szereplőit. Az itt következő áttekintésben egyrészt annak megértéséhez kerestem elméleti támpontokat és empirikus tapasztalatokat, hogy mi történik, ha az elitformálódás egyik dimenziója, a vagyonosodás kiemelkedő jelentőségre tesz szert. Ezen belül az a kérdés érdekelt, hogy milyen formaváltoza-tai vannak az oligarchiának, és milyen társadalmi konzekvenciái az egyes változa-toknak. Másrészt annak vizsgálatához kerestem fogalmi fogódzókat, hogy milyen megoldásai léteznek az elit működésmódjának, hogyan írhatók le a politikai elit tipikus kapcsolattartási formái és cselekvésmintái. Ebben különösen az a kérdés foglalkoztatott, hogy mi jellemzi a patrónus-kliens viszonyokra építő társadalmi berendezkedést, és milyen tapasztalatok halmozódtak fel a klientelisztikus műkö-désmód kutatásában. ELIT, OLIGARCHIA, VAGYON MICHELSTŐL WINTERSIG "Aki szervezetet mond, oligarchiát mond", azaz a szervezetek szükségképpen kitermelik az oligarchikus uralkodó kisebbséget-az oligarchia vastörvényének ez a megfogalmazása Robert Michels politikai pártokról szóló könyvéből való, amely a német és olasz kiadások után 1915-ben jelent meg először angolul, s tette a szerzőt Mosca és Pareto mellett a klasszikus elitelmélet nagy triászának tagjá-vá. 1 Az elitelméletnek erről a hullámáról és problémáiról jó áttekintést nyújtanak Burnham, Mills, Parry és Putnam könyvei. 2 Bár mindhárom klasszikus használta az elit fogalmát, a terminológia és az elmélet csak lassan, mintegy mellékesen formálódott ki. Mosca politikai uralkodó osztályról, Michels-többek között jelentős mértékben Moscára támaszkodva-oligarchiáról beszélt. A klasszikus elitelmélet magva az a tétel, hogy a társadalom egészében, s minden nagy társa-dalmi aggregátumban-szervezetben, pártban, mozgalomban-szükségképpen létrejön egy aszimmetria vezetők és vezetettek között, vagyis mindenkor kialakul egy uralkodó kisebbség. Az okok, melyeket felsorolnak, szerteágazók és sokfélék-technikai, lelki, szervezeti jellegűek, utalnak a tudásban, képességekben, hozzá-1
... The Macro Regions of Italy variable takes the North of the country as its baseline comparison group and indicates that the Centre is associated with a decrease of 148, the South with an increase of 100, and the Islands with a decrease of 116 local public officials with Corruption Indictments. This is in line with a wealth of evidence that the South of the country is especially prone to using patronage practices (Graziano 1973;Golden 2003). ...
One of the reasons for which corruption is so difficult to eradicate is because the actors involved are skilled in adapting their behaviour to changing institutional landscapes. However, surprisingly little is known about how corruption displacement functions across multiple levels of government. Using novel multilevel data on a political scandal in Italy and a Difference-in-Differences estimation strategy, I provide within-country evidence that a sudden increase in accountability for national deputies can impact negatively upon the behaviour of local -level public officials and politicians. In treated districts, where there is an increase in the indictment rate of national deputies, local-level corruption increases significantly as compared to nontreated districts. My results show how, in contexts characterised by systemic corruption, changes intended to enhance accountability can trigger a series of mechanisms within the political machine that exploit different levels of government.
... д-р Јован Близнаковски што повеќе ќе владее самоволно отколку во дослух со ставовите и потребите на населението. Општо е прифатено и дека политичкиот клиентелизам придонесува кон слабеење на демократските институции (види Graziano, 1973и Putnam et al., 1993, каде што овој аргумент е применет на Италија по Втората светска војна), кои, наместо по универзалистички принципи на управување и работа, се вртат кон партикуларистички правила на игра што се дискриминаторски кон оние што се надвор од клиентелистичките мрежи. ...
... Political cultures based on clientelism are associated with Italy, the Mediterranean in general, and parts of Asia. (Graziano 1973, Gellner and Waterbury 1977. ...
Collection of papers from the International Scientific Conference "Political Clientelism in the Western Balkans" (9-11 December 2020)
... La polisemia del término se encuentra también relacionada, sin duda, con la cercanía de los fenómenos a los que alude con uno de los pilares de la normatividad democrática: la "trinidad" un hombre, un voto, una opinión, que se encuentra en el corazón de la "mitología cívica" (Garrigou, 2003;Offerlé, 1983Offerlé, , 2011. ¿Qué podría ser entonces más reprochable que transformar la participación de los ciudadanos -del voto, de la opinión-en un bien intercambiable en relaciones particularistas, desiguales y a veces gobernadas por sentimientos, como aquellos vinculados con el parentesco, la amistad, etc.? (Graziano, 1973;Médard, 1976;Roniger, 2004;Scott, 1972;Briquet, 1997) De este modo, interesarse en el concepto de clientelismo remite, casi directamente, a las querellas morales y normativas sobre las buenas y malas formas de la política, y especialmente de la política democrática. Estas querellas se encuentran histórica y socialmente situadas: no se han centrado siempre en los mismos temas; han experimentado ciclos de interés y desinterés; como dijimos, han viajado desde una disciplina a otra, del campo académico al campo político (Bourdieu, 1981). ...
El clientelismo forma parte de los conceptos que viajan entre disciplinas -en este caso, de la historia a la antropología, de la sociología a la ciencia política- sin por ello perder el interés de alguna de ellas. Estos desplazamientos disciplinarios tienen un costo: la coexistencia de un gran número de definiciones, incluso opuestas, que no siempre refieren a un mismo fenómeno sino a un conjunto de situaciones y relaciones de intercambio tratadas de modo diferente. La polisemia del término se encuentra también relacionada, sin duda, con la cercanía de los fenómenos a los que alude con uno de los pilares de la normatividad democrática: la "trinidad" un hombre, un voto, una opinión, que se encuentra en el corazón de la "mitología cívica". ¿Qué podría ser entonces más reprochable que transformar la participación de los ciudadanos -del voto, de la opinión- en un bien intercambiable en relaciones particularistas, desiguales y a veces gobernadas por sentimientos, como aquellos vinculados con el parentesco, la amistad, etc.?
... La polisemia del término se encuentra también relacionada, sin duda, con la cercanía de los fenómenos a los que alude con uno de los pilares de la normatividad democrática: la "trinidad" un hombre, un voto, una opinión, que se encuentra en el corazón de la "mitología cívica" (Garrigou, 2003;Offerlé, 1983Offerlé, , 2011. ¿Qué podría ser entonces más reprochable que transformar la participación de los ciudadanos -del voto, de la opinión-en un bien intercambiable en relaciones particularistas, desiguales y a veces gobernadas por sentimientos, como aquellos vinculados con el parentesco, la amistad, etc.? (Graziano, 1973;Médard, 1976;Roniger, 2004;Scott, 1972;Briquet, 1997) De este modo, interesarse en el concepto de clientelismo remite, casi directamente, a las querellas morales y normativas sobre las buenas y malas formas de la política, y especialmente de la política democrática. Estas querellas se encuentran histórica y socialmente situadas: no se han centrado siempre en los mismos temas; han experimentado ciclos de interés y desinterés; como dijimos, han viajado desde una disciplina a otra, del campo académico al campo político (Bourdieu, 1981). ...
La política interesa particularmente a las ciencias sociales. Distintas disciplinas, con distintos enfoques, abordan aspectos diversos de esta esfera de actividades humanas. Los distintos trabajos que forman La política en plural contribuyen a difundir perspectivas originales en el ámbito del análisis político, con un fuerte énfasis en los aportes de la sociología, la ciencia política, la antropología y la historia al abordaje del estudio empírico de la política. Ofrecen así herramientas conceptuales y metodológicas que pueden resultar de interés al investigador y el estudiante de grado y posgrado. También puede atraer a quienes, por distintas razones, buscan desandar los discursos abstractos o superficiales sobre la política contemporánea. Hemos elegido utilizar el adjetivo “plural” en el título de la obra para señalar la importancia de tener en cuenta la diversidad de aproximaciones a los hechos políticos que existen en las ciencias sociales. Pero la pluralidad también alcanza a los distintos objetos abordados en los distintos capítulos del libro (actitudes y comportamientos políticos, organizaciones y partidos políticos, instituciones políticas y políticas públicas) y a la insistencia en que ninguno de estos objetos es simple y homogéneo: hay distintos modos de relacionarse con la política, incluyendo las distintas maneras de votar o de protestar; hay distintos modos de ejercer la ciudadanía, incluyendo lo que suele presentarse de manera simplificada como clientelismo; hay distintos modos de hacer política y ejercer funciones gubernamentales, como hay también distintas maneras de llevar adelante una política pública. Las contribuciones aquí reunidas tienen algo para decir sobre cada una de estas cuestiones.
... Clientelism is the scapegoat of modern politics. It is blamed for inhibiting horizontal solidarity (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984); corroding ideal citizenship (Trantidis, 2013); reinforcing oligarchic tendencies (Kaufman, 1974); reversing accountability (Stokes, 2005); directly or indirectly causing violence (Wantchekon, 2003;Wilkinson, 2007); hindering institutional development (Graziano, 1973); blurring public and private sphere distinctions (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002); and leading to economic inefficiency, systematic corruption and populist backlash (Müller, 2006;Singer, 2009). ...
This article reveals how the AKP’s use of clientelism contributes to its electoral dominance. It does so by examining the features and actors as well as the structure of the clientelist network. The arguments are based on fieldwork in one of the poorest and most densely populated districts of Bagcilar, where in the 2015 legislative elections the AKP achieved more votes than in any other district in Istanbul.
... reinforcing oligarchic tendencies (Kaufman, 1974); reversing accountability (Stokes, 2005); directly or indirectly causing violence (Wantchekon, 2003;Wilkinson, 2007); hindering institutional development (Graziano, 1973); blurring public and private sphere distinctions (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002); and leading to economic inefficiency, systematic corruption and populist backlash (Müller, 2006;Singer, 2009). ...
This article reveals how the AKP's use of clientelism contributes to its electoral dominance. It does so by examining the features and actors as well as the structure of the clientelist network. The arguments are based on fieldwork in one of the poorest and most densely populated districts of Bagcılar, where in the 2015 legislative elections the AKP achieved more votes than in any other district in Istanbul.
... According to Roniger (2004, p. 353), "clientelism involves asymmetric but mutually beneficial relationships of power and exchange, a nonuniversalistic quid pro quo between individuals or groups of unequal standing." causing violence (Wantchekon, 2003;Wilkinson, 2007); hindering institutional development (Graziano, 1973); blurring public and private sphere distinctions (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002, p. 189); leading to economic inefficiency, systematic corruption, and populist backlash (Müller, 2006;Singer, 2009); and fostering inequality and reducing policy responsiveness (Ruth, 2011). ...
The aim of this thesis is to develop a number of theoretical ideas about the emergence
of the predominant party system in Turkey under the Justice and Development Party
(AKP) government from 2002 to 2015. A predominant party system emerges when a
party wins at least three elections in a row by more than a 10 percent margin and forms
the government alone. I argue that the expansion of clientelist networks under the AKP
government has twofold ramifications, which in turn have reproduced the cycle of
dominance. First, it strengthened voters’ partisan identification. Second, it changed
voters’ ideology such that they became less resistant to or even supportive of neoliberal
reforms. The conclusions are based on fieldwork in one of the poorest and most
densely populated districts of Istanbul, Bağcılar.
... En primer lugar, se ha sostenido que el clientelismo va en contra de la democratización. Obstruye el desarrollo de las instituciones políticas (Graziano 1973); socavando la consolidación democrática al limitar el ejercicio de la ciudadanía (Fox 1994); también se ha sostenido que se practica mayormente en sistemas de partidos políticos fragmentados y más volátiles (Kitschelt et al. 2010); y que pone en peligro el voto secreto (Stokes 2005;Lyne 2007). En segundo lugar, el clientelismo ha sido asociado a la corrupción (Keefer 2007;Kitschelt et al. 2010;Persson, Tabellini y Trebbi 2003;Singer 2009). ...
... As 'predicted' by Weingrod's (1968) pioneering study, once mass parties compete in an open political system, party clientelism substitutes the interpersonal model. In other words, PASOK during the 1980s did nothing more than what was accomplished by Democrazia Cristiana after the mid-1950s in Italy (Graziano 1973). Therefore, the important point to retain here is that both types of clientelism are characterised by the same familist logic. ...
This article's main argument is that what is really in question behind the present Greek economic crisis is the social model prevailing from the creation of the Greek nation-state up to the present day. The pre-modern institutional logic of the Greek social model can be depicted in terms of the notion of familism which points to the centrality of the nuclear-extended family and its friendship networks as the dominant locus of trust and moral duty. It is argued that the notion of familism sheds light on business and state relations in Greece: first on the dominant business models (mainly state-dependent and rent-seeking 'entrepreneurship'), and on the private sector's calamitous failure to produce the club goods required to enhance its competitiveness. Unsurprisingly, the neoliberal reforms imposed by 'Troika' affected only some symptoms of the familism endemic in Greece. The big question is whether the realisation of a new social contract, combining the positive values of familism with civic culture, is possible in the medium-to-long run.
... As 'predicted' by Weingrod's (1968) pioneering study, once mass parties compete in an open political system, party clientelism substitutes the interpersonal model. In other words, PASOK during the 1980s did nothing more than what was accomplished by Democrazia Cristiana after the mid-1950s in Italy (Graziano 1973). Therefore, the important point to retain here is that both types of clientelism are characterised by the same familist logic. ...
This article's main argument is that what is really in question behind the present Greek economic crisis is the social model prevailing from the creation of the Greek nation-state up to the present day. The pre-modern institutional logic of the Greek social model can be depicted in terms of the notion of familism which points to the centrality of the nuclear-extended family and its friendship networks as the dominant locus of trust and moral duty. It is argued that the notion of familism sheds light on business and state relations in Greece: first on the dominant business models (mainly state-dependent and rent-seeking 'entrepreneurship'), and on the private sector's calamitous failure to produce the club goods required to enhance its competitiveness. Unsurprisingly, the neoliberal reforms imposed by 'Troika' affected only some symptoms of the familism endemic in Greece. The big question is whether the realisation of a new social contract, combining the positive values of familism with civic culture, is possible in the medium-to-long run.
... First, clientelism has been said to run counter to democratization. It obstructs the development of political institutions (Graziano 1973); it undermines democratic consolidation by limiting the exercise of citizenship (Fox 1994); it is mostly practiced in more volatile and fragmented political party systems (Kitschelt et al. 2010); and it jeopardizes the secrecy of the vote (Stokes 2005;Lyne 2007). Second, clientelism has been associated with corruption (Keefer 2007;Kitschelt et al. 2010;Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi 2003;Singer 2009). ...
The Michigan model, named after the institution where it was first articulated, has been used to explain voting behavior in North American and Western European democracies. In Latin American Elections, experts on Latin America join with experts on electoral studies to evaluate the model’s applicability in this region. Analyzing data from the AmericasBarometer, a scientific public opinion survey carried out in 18 Latin American nations from 2008 to 2012, the authors find that, like democratic voters elsewhere, Latin Americans respond to long-term forces, such as social class, political party ties, and political ideology while also paying attention to short-term issues, such as the economy, crime, corruption. Of course, Latin Americans differ from other Americans, and among themselves. Voters who have experienced left-wing populism may favor government curbs on freedom of expression, for example, while voters enduring high levels of economic deprivation or instability tend to vote against the party in power. The authors thus conclude that, to a surprising extent, the Michigan model offers a powerful explanatory model for voting behavior in Latin America. © 2017 by Richard Nadeau, Éric Bélanger, Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Mathieu Turgeon, and François Gélineau. All rights reserved.
... Since the mid-1960s a broad anglophone literature has emerged on the italian political system (see Hennessy 1969;Graziano 1973;Morlino 1984;woods 1992). Yet, in terms of impact on scientific discussions concerning the relationships between trust, civil society and political culture, robert putnam's (1993) study Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy stands out as a landmark. ...
... For a few main references: Marsh and Rhodes (1992), Richardson (2000), Smith (1993); and recently for a literature review: Beyers, Eising, and Maloney (2008). 9. Graziano (1973) also stressed that clientelistic practices at the collective level involved party machines and their control over the allocation of public resources, so they strengthened the parties' influence in policy. 10. ...
... Vote-buying also hampers the development of and trust in the political institutions necessary for democratic development and consolidation (Desposato, 2007;Graziano, 1973;Kitschelt et al., 2010;Lyne, 2007;Stokes, 2005). Finally, vote-buying and other forms of clientelism are associated with larger public deficits and public sector inefficiencies (Hicken and Simmons, 2008;Keefer, 2006Keefer, , 2007, and higher levels of corruption (Kitschelt, 2007;Kitschelt et al., 2010;Keefer, 2007). ...
This dissertation addresses a central question in modern political economy: How do we improve governance in low-income democracies? In the first essay, I employ formal modeling and use natural experiment to examine how politician behavior impact governance. In the last two essays, I use randomized field experiments to evaluate policy interventions that strengthen the ability of voters to hold politicians accountable and attract a more qualified pool of candidates to public office. This collection of works, therefore, advances the frontier of modern political economy, first, by understanding how the behavior of political agents impact governance, and then, by evaluating novel policies that can improve their quality and behavior and, ultimately, governance.
... Além de medir o tamanho relativo do serviço público, parece relevante um esforço na direção de examinar sua composição, considerando em especial a presença de um perfil mais profissionalizado, com funcionários de carreira recrutados por concurso público ou, em oposição, a permanência de formas de recrutamento para postos públicos baseados em patronagem política ou spoil system, quando o preenchimento de cargos está baseado na possibilidade de indicação pelo governante, geralmente em troca de apoios, votos ou lealdade política e/ou pessoal (BOISSEVAIN, 1966;SCOTT, 1977;LANDÉ, 1977;GRAZIANO, 1977). Estudo do Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento (2007), focado em 18 países da América Latina, considerou a presença de quatro tipos de burocracias públicas nas instituições públicas da região, em função: a) do grau de autonomia autonomia autonomia autonomia que dispõe frente a governos e b) de sua capacidade capacidade capacidade capacidade técnica técnica técnica técnica -burocracias meritocráticas (alta autonomia e capacidade), administrativas (alta autonomia, baixa capacidade), clientelista (baixa autonomia e capacidade) e paralelas (baixa autonomia e alta capacidade). ...
The purpose of this study is to identify the main patterns of political competition in Brazilian municipalities. It intends to analyze two questions: first, considering the federative structure of the Brazilian state and the presence of a divided government, it tries to identify the forces that preside the intergovernmental relations between the federal, state and municipal levels; and second, to what extent the increase in electoral competition at the national level has stimulated the local disputes and undermined the traditional bases of politics in more than 5,500 Brazilian municipalities.
... As Medina and Stokes (2007) pointed out 'clientelism is one of those social terms that mean different things to different people'. Indeed, from the point of view of sociologists, ethnographers or anthropologists, clientelism is studied as a form of social interaction (Scott 1972, Graziano 1973, Galt 1974, Gellner and Waterbury 1977, Schmidt et al 1977, Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, Auyero 1999. From this point of view, it is seen as a micro-level, personalized interaction between persons of different social status. ...
This paper addresses the way in which clientelistic exchanges distort the public institutions’ functions and their relationship to the general public. In the first section, a theoretical model of the relationship between clientelistic exchanges and institutions is put forward, based on the existent literature on the subject. The second section of this paper explores the empirical evidence provided by the case study of Romania. The analysis is based on official documents and data covering the incidence of corruption and the discretionary use of public resources.
... Por lo tanto, en un momento dado, trazos de clientelismos diferentes podrían estar conviviendo conjuntamente. Ahora ya no como un estadio de transición (Graziano, 1973;Lemarchand y Legg, 1972) sino como un tipo de clientelismo prolongado en el tiempo con unas características determinadas. ...
El presente artículo presenta una crítica de la división analítica entre clientelismo moderno y tradicional defendida por diferentes autores. Basándose en el estudio en un municipio del sudoeste gallego llevado a cabo entre los años 2002 y 2004 se elabora una propuesta centrada en tres elementos principales: 1) la diferenciación entre recursos expresivos e instrumentales; 2) la subdivisión de la clientela de un mismo patrón en varios tipos en base a los recursos intercambiados; 3) plantear el estudio de las relaciones clientelares a través de la definición de sus prácticas. La combinación de estos tres elementos permite englobar las relaciones clientelares existentes en el caso de estudio del cual se parte.
... An extensive literature studies the patronage and clientelistic orientation of the postwar DC, especially after the mid-1950s (in English, see (Graziano 1977;Cagiagli and Mattina 1979;Chubb 1982)). This literature is buttressed by electoral studies that distinguish voting orientations in Italy along the following lines: (a) votes of exchange, that is, patronage-induced votes; (b) votes of opinion, or policy and programmatically oriented votes; and (c) votes of belonging, or votes based on subcultural affiliation, which in the Italian context refers to the red (communist and socialist) and the white (Catholic) subcultures (Parisi and Pasquino 1980). ...
Abstract This paper analyzes the political determinants of the distribution of infrastructure expenditures by the Italian government to the country’s 92 provinces between 1953 and 1992. Extending implications of formal theories of legislative behavior to the context of open-list proportional representation, we examine whether individually powerful legislators and ruling political parties direct spending to core or marginal electoral districts, and the extent to which opposition parties share resources via a norm of universalism. We show that districts characterized by politically more powerful individual deputies from the governing parties received higher amounts of investments. We interpret this result as indicating that legislators with political resources sought to reward their core voters by investing in public works in their districts. The governing parties, by contrast, were not able to discipline their own members of parliament suciently to target the parties’ areas of core electoral strength. In Italy’s weak party system, the political influence of powerful individual legislators trumped the political imperatives of the ruling parties. Finally, we find no evidence that a norm of universalism operated to direct resources to areas where the main opposition party was strong.
... Although there is little published in terms of comparative studies of South European interest groups, 3 the systems of interest intermediation in the southern member states of the EU have been presented in the literature as being excessively politicised and marked by clientelism. There is little doubt that the historical evolution of clientelism from the individual (patron-client) to the collective level, involving party machines and their control over the allocation of public resources, has strengthened the parties' role and influence in policy ( Graziano 1973). As Spourdalakis (1998: 210) notes, with reference to Greece under PASOK, clientelistic relations lost their personalised character, but resurfaced through the party structure and activity. ...
The article explores the strategic and political parameters influencing the ways in which the main economic interest groups become involved in policy in contemporary Greece. The fact that social dialogue in Greece remains an exercise with a limited scope has been largely due to the fact that there is a difficult match between Greece's ‘disjointed corporatism' and the EU's emerging ‘competitive corporatism'. A number of European trade unions have agreed to a new ‘competitive bargain', which is asymmetrical but which gives them the opportunity to get involved in ‘competitive corporatism'. Greek responses to this trend have been inconclusive: while there are clearly pockets within union leaderships which would welcome the opportunity to approve the basic liberalising goals in exchange for guarantees for established workers and participation in the political framing of their implementation, the structural features of the Greek interest intermediation system work against such a possibility. Whether this leads to an evolving ‘segmented pluralism' or another form remains to be seen – the extent of the synchronicity of developments with other EU states will depend in part on the outcome of this transition. In previous decades, the country's transition from asymmetric state corporatism to disjointed corporatism went through the contours of an embracing strategy of Europeanisation. It is an open question whether an equivalent strategy for the twenty-first century will be able to restructure the socio-political scene.
... 23 Cf. Scott (1977), Silverman (1977) e Graziano (1977) para uma análise da importância do monopólio da distribuição de bens e serviços na construção do poder dos brokers, em particular, e das relações clientelistas, em geral. 24 "A corrupção na Índia esta arraigada -ela é invasiva, organizada e monopolística. ...
Este texto faz uma breve apresentação do sistema político indiano, analisando a gênese e o desenvolvimento do sistema de transferência de funcionários na administração pública da Índia e a interação deste com o sistema social, com a esfera política e com os interesses político-eleitorais dos parlamentares. A seguir, estabelece algumas comparações entre as características da relação entre a esfera política e a administrativa na Índia e as características do sistema de nomeações para cargos de confiança no Brasil, a partir do exemplo do Rio de Janeiro. Argumenta-se que tanto a lógica do sistema de transferências na Índia quanto o sistema de nomeações para cargos de confiança no Brasil mantêm legitimidade porque permitem que idéias associadas à eficácia administrativa e ao combate à corrupção sejam utilizadas para justificar decisões que são, muitas vezes, motivadas por interesses político-econômico-eleitorais. Argumenta-se também que a análise da relação entre política e administração pública em ambos os países deve considerar não apenas o desenho das instituições políticas e eleitorais e o postulado da racionalidade eleitoral, mas também os valores que se desenvolveram ao longo do processo de constituição das instituições políticas e das burocracias públicas.
... Political cultures based on clientelism have traditionally been associated with countries such as Italy (Graziano 1973) and in the Mediterranean generally (Gellner and Waterbury 1977), and parts of Asia (Scott 1972). More recently, however, it has been shown that clientelism is often an integral part of so-called modern democracies and can have positive as well as the negative effects, especially with regards to marginalised groups like immigrants (Roniger and Gunes-Ayata 1994). ...
The discussion of political culture in Australia that exists focuses on the supposedly traditional traits of egalitarianism, utilitarianism, conformism, materialism and so on. While not wishing to deny the British influence on political institutions in Australia, to think that the massive nature of non-British postwar migration has not influenced political culture in Australia is not only naive but incorrect. In not paying attention to the impact of immigrants from NESB, political cultures and practices such as clientelism have not been the subject of Australian political discussion. Where ethnic participation in the political system has been examined, some have argued that it is based on corruption and has led political actors to deviate from national political and cultural norms. This paper argues that clientelism can provide a more useful and positive framework for understanding ethnic politics in Australia. After examining various views on political culture and ethnicity in Australia, this paper summarises some of the key points of recent approaches to clientelism. It suggests that clientelism has a positive face, especially as a form of representation for minority groups such as immigrants from NESB. The second section then describes the key features of clientelism in the Australian 'ethnic electorate'. It has evolved in ethnic electorates because of the process of ethnic community formation, the nature of case-work in ethnic electorates and the ability and willingness of political actors and parties to adapt their style to suit the environment.
... However, a transformation of the nature of these relations has been taking place for some time. As Graziano (1973) describes for Southern Italy, based on the concepts developed by Weingrod (1968), there has been a transition from " clientelism of the notables " to " political party-directed clientelism " (Widlund 2000 points out the relevance of this distinction for India). The most influential patrons used to be high-caste landowners, maintaining clientelist relations with local peasants based on the exchange of insurance and credit for labor and loyalty. ...
Political parties can be vehicles for economic and social development in poor countries. They can also serve as rent seeking instruments. Uncovering how parties function is therefore key to establishing the preconditions for good governance. The paper discusses when and why clientelism on the basis of party affiliation may arise. Operationally, party-based clientelism is defined as a bias of public policy in favour of members of the governing political party. In a sample of local governments in India, party-based clientelism is shown to exist in two out of four states and to be strongly affected by economic inequality.
This research adopts qualitative method and patron–client analysis to underscore the political economy of oil block allocation, development and receipts/remittances in Nigeria. It contests Wilson’s (1961 Wilson, J. Q. 1961. “The Economy of Patronage.” Journal of Political Economy 69 (4): 369–380.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) and Scott’s (1972 Scott, J. C. 1972. “Patron–client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia.” American Political Science Review 66 (1): 91–113.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) claims on the superiority of the patron over clients, and argues that ‘clients’ in Nigeria (indigenous oil block awardees) maintain some degree of control over the patron (ruling elite), enjoy more economic returns/oil rents, and possess some leverage over the patrons’ decision-making power. The ruling elite’s personalisation of oil block allocation/rents results in poor development of the upstream oil sector by ‘clients’, defaults in oil remittances and a consistent decline in oil production. The author recommends that the bidding process for oil block allocation be carried out in a more transparent and competitive manner.
This book examines the content of MPs’ activities through which parliamentarians generate representative claims.
Challenging the idea that studying individual representation is a futile exercise, this book shows that looking at the opinions and behavioural patterns of parliamentarians can shed light on some important questions: What are the interests represented in parliament? How important are electoral incentives in shaping the role of representatives? What is the impact of parliamentarians’ personal characteristics? Focussing on the role played by Italian members of the Chamber of Deputies across a period of more than 20 years, the study applies role analysis to connect the normative debates on political representation to empirical studies and is underpinned by a rich data set of parliamentary activities and surveys on parliamentarians’ attitudes and opinions.
The book will be of key interest to scholars and students of legislative studies, European politics, Italian studies/politics, and more broadly to comparative politics.
Clientelism as a structure of political expectations is relevant for understanding both the development of states and present-day politics in many segments of the world-political system. It is a solution to three general problems that modern political systems face: the affirmation of central authority over a territory, the mobilization of voters in democratic elections, and the need to provide political careers for individuals. The article illustrates these problems and their clientelistic solution by drawing on the examples of Russia, Greece and Japan. In these cases, patron-client ties function as equivalents to solutions on which systems theory has mostly focused when describing modern political systems: autonomous bureaucratic administration, electoral campaigns based on political programs, and party organizations based on formal membership and ideology.
Cambridge Core - Latin American Government, Politics and Policy - Buying Audiences - by Paula Muñoz
Zusammenfassung
Der Aufsatz untersucht, welche Rolle Erwartungen über partikularistische Publikumserwartungen im Verhältnis von politischen Akteuren und Wählern spielen. Er problematisiert die systemtheoretische Annahme, dass Parteien nur mit relativ universalistischen Programmen um Wähler werben können, weil das Verfahren der politischen Wahl in Verbindung mit der öffentlichen Kommunikation über Politik ein unbekanntes Publikum erzeuge. Jenseits eines massenmedial induzierten Universalismus bieten sich Parteien und Politikern Gelegenheiten, Segmente des politischen Publikums voneinander zu unterscheiden und um Wählerstimmen mit der Erfüllung partikularistischer Erwartungen zu werben. Das geschieht nichtöffentlich und insbesondere über klientelistische und/oder wahlkreisbezogene Kopplungen zwischen administrativen Einzelentscheidungen und individuellem Wahlverhalten. Die Befunde stellen die Zentralität des binären Codes Regierung/Opposition für die Ausdifferenzierung des politischen Systems in Frage. Vorgeschlagen wird eine Perspektive, die von der variablen Gewichtung dieser Unterscheidung in Relation zu einer allgemeiner konzipierten Differenz Machtüberlegenheit/Machtunterlegenheit in der politischen Kommunikation ausgeht und unter dieser Prämisse empirisch auffindbare Varianten der Ausdifferenzierung von Politik identifiziert.
As you know, we have an institution called the sexenio when everything changes.
And we're here now for six years. You know how we all come in and get thrown out at the sexenio .
If someone has a chief who is capable and has the prospects for a good future, then that person will probably think, “Perhaps I can go with him at the sexenio”; and it happens in reverse, too, if someone has a chief who is not particularly capable but who has influential friends, some will want to follow him. There are a lot of changes and it affects our program, especially when people stop working to pursue their futures.
Horowitz examines how Argentina's Radical Party rallied popular support in Buenos Aires from 1916 to 1930. He argues that the methods used for popular mobilisation helped to undermine democracy. The popularity of President Hiplito Yrigoyen is explored, as well as the government's relationship with unions.
The aim of this paper is to show the importance of wind energy in the development of Italian rural areas. The frame in which to pursue this objective is twofold: on the one side, there is the literature on regional or local development; on the other, the shift towards more flexible forms of administration. The two perspectives can perhaps be unified into the broad idea of the governance of local development (Bardhan, 2002). This means the inclusion of private and non-profit organisations in the management of public goods like the environment and localities. Wind energy is a suitable test case with which to understand such process. It arises at a time when local development policies have exhausted their main “assets”, such as inter-sector interventions (Van der Ploeg 2009) and place identity promotion (Ray 2002), and when political trends are moving towards the decentralisation and outsourcing of administrative functions (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Thus, wind energy should be a new source of revenue for rural areas, and management of its development should be assigned to local authorities or to mixed agencies. But the ways in which renewable energies are happening in rural areas are various. The theoretical ‘glue’ will be exchange: this category should clarify the more symmetrical relationships that are replacing the command and control principle typical of public administration. Moreover, it would enable better specification of the purported process of the energy colonisation of rural areas.
An emerging literature emphasizes the importance of vote brokers for electoral politics in the developing world. Yet in spite of the great interest in the topic, attempts to assess the impact of vote brokerage on election returns are exceedingly rare. This paper provides the first explicit assessment of the electoral returns to politicians from purchasing the allegiances of brokers. It does so by drawing upon a unique dataset documenting the allocation of off-the-books payments to vote brokers during a gubernatorial reelection campaign in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais. The study finds that in the typical municipality buying off local brokers was associated with a 4-6 percentage point increase in the vote share obtained by the governor. All told, the findings suggest that vote brokerage is a resilient form of political linkage that can shape vote choice even in contexts of vote secrecy and intermediate levels of economic development.
Social structure may historically have been of primary importance in accounting for the attitudes and behaviour of many citizens, but now changes in social structure have diminished the role played by class and religious affiliation, whilst the significance of personality in political leadership has increased. This volume explores, both theoretically and empirically, the increasingly important role played by the personalisation of leadership. Acknowledging the part played by social cleavages, it focuses on the personal relationships and psychological dimension between citizens and political leaders. It begins by examining the changes which have taken place in the relationship among citizens, the parties which they support and the leaders of these parties in a European context. The authors then assess how far the phenomena of 'personalised leadership' differ from country to country, and the forms which these differences take. The book includes comparative case studies on Britain and Northern Ireland, France, Italy, Poland, Japan and Thailand; it concentrates on eleven prominent leaders epitomising personalised political leadership: Thatcher, Blair, Mitterand, Chirac, Le Pen, Berlusconi, Bossi, Walesa, Lepper, Koizumi and Thaksin. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of political science, comparative politics and political leadership. © 2010 Jean Blondel and Jean-Louis Thiébault with Katarzyna Czernicka, Takashi Inoguchi, Ukrist Pathmanand and Fulvio Venturino. All rights reserved.
The land, labor, credit, and trading institutions of Marmara village, in Hausaland, northern Nigeria, are detailed in this study through fieldwork conducted in two national economic cycles - the petroleum-boom prosperity (in 1977-1979), and the macro-economic decline (in 1985, 1996 and 1998). The book unveils a new paradigm of economic change in the West African savannah, demonstrating how rural accumulation in a polygynous society actually limits the extent of inequality while at the same time promoting technical change. A uniquely African non-capitalist trajectory of accumulation subordinates the acquisition of capital to the expansion of polygynous families, clientage networks, and circles of trading friends. The whole trajectory is driven by an indigenous ethics of personal responsibility. This model disputes the validity of both Marxian theories of capitalist transformation in Africa and the New Institutional Economics.
This article explores the puzzle of Confucian “divine humanism” in light of the Weberian scheme of religious rationalization.
Relating the Confucian humanistic orientation to current discussions of the phenomenon of “amoral familism,” I argue that
the Confucian puzzle calls into question the cornerstone of Max Weber's comparative religion, namely his influential contrast
between religious legitimation and theodicy. In particular, the puzzle suggests that in pre-Confucian China, there was no
legitimate cosmic-social world order to which Confucianism managed to adjust, let alone to affirm. As a matter of fact, it
was the Confucian solution to the problem of theodicy that laid the foundation for the legitimacy of the ethical polity. Hence,
inverting what Weber and neo-Weberian theorists have asserted about the religious breakthroughs in the Axial Age, theodicy
constituted the religious prerequisite for political legitimation.
This symposium is focused on the recent changes in party-group relationships in Italy. The analysis looks at the disentanglement of interest groups from parties and the autonomous role of the former in policy making. As in other European countries, since the 1980s, in Italy an accelerating decline of parties has been observed, along with a growing empowerment of interest groups. Furthermore, in the first part of the 1990s, the Italian party system collapsed giving rise to a ‘political transition’ which represented a window of opportunity for substantial turn-over in the political elite, a majoritarian electoral reform, devolution, privatization, and policy reforms in a range of important sectors. The articles in the symposium start from a policy studies perspective and analyse the expected changes in party-group relationships in three different policy areas: agriculture, pensions and transport. On the basis of a brief literature review, this introductory essay presents some general considerations on the issue of party-group relations. It then looks at their evolution and features in the Italian case, focusing on the disentanglement of parties and groups in recent years. Afterwards it outlines the common analytical framework for the subsequent contributions on different policy areas. An interesting but varied picture comes to light about the effective dynamics of party-group relations in the fragmented process of Italian policy making. Firstly we observe specific arrangements related to the number of interest organisations operating within different policy areas. Secondly, common dynamics are registered with regard to the privileged and routine relationships between groups and ministerial bureaucracies. Thirdly, the parties are no longer the gatekeepers for interest groups’ access to decision making; they no longer control the policy-making process. Within the different policy areas the authors have looked at variable configurations of factors (the salience and politicisation of issues, external inputs and Europeanization, the policy legacy) and policy-making actors in order to understand the changing relationships between new political parties and more numerous interest groups.
The article proposes a systems-theoretical approach to political clientelism. It places political clientelism in the theoretical framework of a democratic political system characterized by internal differentiation in government and bureaucracy, party politics and a politically relevant public. Against the background of existing research on the link between democracy and political clientelism, it uses Luhmann’s concept of power and more specifically his model of the formal and the informal power cycle to point out parallels and differences between a political system based on expectations with regard to policies and a political system in which clientelistic expectations prevail. Democratic political systems are based on formal, legally codified power and informal power. Clientelistic power is a special form of informal power affecting this interplay, as the example of democratization in Mexico shows. Political systems with clientelistic expectations differ from those with a policy orientation with regard to the complexity of policies, the generalization of political support, the bases for personalization, the pattern of interest articulation and the most prominent external influences on the system.
Cet article traite des differents usages du concept de clientelisme, tant dans les analyses savantes que dans les querelles morales et normatives sur les bonnes et les mauvaises formes du politique, et notamment de la politique democratique. Partant des constats empiriques qui montrent que le clientelisme fonctionne a la fois comme concept explicatif et comme etiquette normative et morale, ce texte mobilise des materiaux de terrains realises en Argentine et au Mexique afin d’etudier les rapports de clientele en situant les definitions savantes du concept dans le contexte plus vaste des preoccupations politiques et morales dominantes a propos du fonctionnement de la democratie. Ces preoccupations sont historiquement situees et varient, en partie, en fonction des pays. Loin d’etre des obstacles a la comprehension du clientelisme, la circulation du concept sous la forme d’une etiquette stigmatisant des formes deviantes du politique fait partie des elements a prendre en compte pour expliquer ce qui se joue dans la relation de clientele. Cette approche permet ainsi de contribuer a renouveler l’analyse des rapports de clientele en mobilisant des dimensions de l’economie morale des echanges politiques.
Political reality in Latin America raises important questions about the pre-requisites for democratic citizenship. Popular movements often fail to take advantage of institutional openings and encounter obstacles in transforming their mobilizing power into institutional political power. An analysis of political participation in the Colombian department of Sucre shows that the clientelism that is so widespread in Latin American democracies inhibits the potential power of organized popular groups under new political rules and frustrates the promise of institutional change. First, a precarious economic situation forces important sectors of the population to value the immediate benefits of exchanging their votes over the more long-term and abstract benefits of political representation. Second, the long history of these political practices has created informal institutions based on networks of unequal exchange and has prevented the development of local participatory institutions that could serve as the basis of democratic citizenship. Third, politicians and their political machines have displayed a much greater ability to adapt to changes in political rules and institutions than the proponents of institutional political reforms generally anticipated. The main question I ask in this article is why the relatively successful peasant mobilizations in Sucre did not translate into significant electoral power once the political reforms had created the opportunity for the participation of new political forces. I address this question theoretically by analyzing how clientelist relations impose limits on the exercise of the political rights that citizenship entails and why institutional changes are not always enough to overcome these limits.
The main theoretical question confronted in this article concerns the nature and character of the Christian Democratic party (DC) in Catania and in Southern Italy. The Catania DC was transformed in the early fifties from a party of representation led by “notables” to a modern party under the direction of a new class of party professionals. The DC has become a mass party, containing various characteristics attributed to the mass party model in the literature; but it lacks some mass party features and contains others which are extraneous to it. The particular use of the party's mass membership in the intraparty struggle for position and power and the employment of the instrument of clientelism for achieving its goal, is what distinguishes the Southern Italy party. A mass-based structure, clientelism and the use of public resources for distributing benefits are the main characteristics of the mass clientele party. The article examines the structure and the mode of operation of the mass clientele party; the principal sets of social, economic and political conditions necessary for the emergence of such a party; the functions it performs in the regional and national political systems.
Recently, rising immigration rates in Italy have led to xenophobia in the Italian electorate. While Italian center-right parties have therefore adopted xenophobic rhetoric, they have also sponsored moderate immigration policies. In this paper, I provide an overview of the immigration issue in Italy through the use of survey data and media reports, specifically focusing on center-right voters and MPs. I then forward a theoretical framework linking the rhetoric-policy divide with the Italian culture of political patronage, two topics which, to the author's knowledge, have never been analyzed in tandem. I extend the selectorate theory to show how Italian center-right politicians use political patronage to compensate for moderate immigration policy adoption. I argue that this strategy is successful because it creates a collective action problem, specifically a prisoner's dilemma game, for xenophobic voters. Finally, I use multidimensional spatial representations to model the theoretical arguments developed in the paper and further explain why center-right parties choose to moderate their policy but not their rhetoric. This political patronage approach is preferable over alternative theories because it can be generalized to explain other issue-driven rhetoric-policy divides in Italian politics.
In the 1990s, sub-national authoritarian regimes – local-based monopolies of ruling elites – emerged in many of Russia’s regions and cities against the background of spontaneous decentralization of government and competitive electoral politics. In the 2000s, the decline of political competition and recentralization of the Russian state led to incorporation of sub-national authoritarian regimes under federal control and cooptation of local-based actors into the dominant party, United Russia. This paper is devoted to a comparative analysis of sub-national authoritarianism in Russia in light of the experience of local political machines in other countries, ranging from US cities from the 1870s-1930s to Southern Italy from the 1950s-1980s. Unlike the American political machines, which were demolished from below as a by-product of modernization processes, Russia’s sub-national authoritarian regimes were integrated from above into the nation-wide authoritarianism. One might expect further stagnation of sub-national authoritarian regimes in Russia until major regime changes will occur on the national level.
The ethos of “amoral familism,” which was suggested by Banfield as an explanation of political behavior in a Southern Italian community, may be restated as a summary of several significant features of Southern Italian social structure. However, Banfield's argument must be reversed: the ethos is a consequence rather than the basis of these social characteristics; they, in turn, have their foundation in the agricultural system. In order to identify those conditions of agricultural organization and social structure that shape “amoral familism” and related values, two areas of Italy, the Center and the Deep South, are contrasted.
Interest Groups in Italian Politics As defined by La Palombara,parentelainvolves a "relatively close and integral relationship between certain associational interest groups and the politically dominant party
- Joseph
- Ch Palombara
000 hectares of ex-baronial land until then attributed to the communes, only 205,000 ha. had been assigned. For a detailed study of the methods of usurpation and the endless legal disputes originated by the division ofdemanio comunale, see Leopoldo Cassese
- Sereni To
Mosca considered the electoral role of the prefect beneficial Since in his opinion the deputy was imposed at any rate by a small minority, it was better that "such imposition comes from the central authority rather than from a local clique, which often may be composed by a small number ofcamorristi
- Mosca See
administrative act, political platform) may be said to be particularistic "when it advocates treatment for specific subjects that does not fall within the general rules established for the category to which the subjects belong The contrary of particularistic is categorical
- Di Palma
Teorica dei governi e governo parlamentare
- Gaetano
Usury may be called the natural industry of a man inclined to fight against another man, while on the contrary true industry requires a disposition... to trust and cooperate among many
- On Usury
- Turiello Wrote
Governo e governati in Italia
- Pasquale
Apathy and Participation. Mass Politics in Western Societies
- Giuseppe
- Di Palma
The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies
- Eric R.
According to Sereni, in 1860, out of 600,000 hectares of ex-baronial land until then attributed to the communes, only 205,000 ha. had been assigned
- Laveglia Editore
La Sicilia e il socialismo
- Pasquale Villari
Since in his opinion the deputy was imposed at any rate by a small minority, it was better that "such imposition comes from the central authority rather than from a local clique
- Mosca See Also
53Leopoldo Cassese underlines the impact of such a geographical fragmentation of the Salerno province on the mutual estrangement of peasants and city-dwellers
- L Cassese
The latter article focusses on the crisis of the complex social relationship linking mezzadri to landowners during a stage of greater penetration of the national market and growing influence of the state
- T Peter
- Schneider
30For similar attitude of the Orissa peasant in India, see
- F G Bailey
As defined by La Palombara, involves a "relatively close and integral relationship between certain associational interest groups and the politically dominant party
- Palombara Joseph
Patronage is to a very large extent a self-perpetuating system of belief and action grounded in the society's value system