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Restraint, renewal, and the Treasury Board Secretariat
Abstract
The Public Service 2000 exercise and the June 1993 government reorganization are reviewed in the context of a decade of centrally driven initiatives to improve the management and productivity of the federal public service. The work of the Treasury Board Secretariat during these initiatives is described and the changes in its modus operandi and structure are outlined. It is suggested that the most important shortcoming in the PS 2000 exercise was the failure to reconcile the renewal theme with the continuing requirement for reductions in operating budgets, and to set out the implications of expenditure restraint for the size and nature of the public service in the 1990s. What is needed for the next stage of public service renewal is not a high-profile, service-wide initiative, but a “realistic management posture” that takes adequate account of continuing fiscal restraint, arbitrariness in expenditure reduction, impact on services, technological change, limited applicability of private sector techniques, efficacy of centrally imposed controls, relationship between employment security and renewal, and finally, compensation determination.
... Comme objets de recherche, les organismes centraux fédéraux se laissent surtout étudier de l'extérieur, par le biais de la documentation officielle et de témoignages d'anciens hauts fonctionnaires (voir notamment Clark, 1994 ;Robertson, 1971). Les chercheurs documentent les structures et les responsabilités de ces organismes, focalisent leur attention sur les rapports de force (Hicks, 1973) ou l'influence politique des élites administratives (Savoie, 1999), et problématisent, à l'aune du Nouveau Management public, le centre comme un dilemme entre flexibilité et contrôle des ministères d'exécution (Clark et Swain, 2005 ;Hart, 2014 ;Veilleux et Savoie, 1988). ...
L’article explore les représentations des analystes évoluant au sein des organismes centraux. De prime abord perçus comme mystérieux, puissants et irréfutables, les organismes centraux apparaissent, par le biais des récits de l’expérience des participants, comme des organisations fédérales uniques, du fait de leur horizontalité et d’un certain contournement de la logique bureaucratique. Contrairement à leurs interlocuteurs dans les ministères d’exécution, les analystes centraux interagissent avec des « clients ministériels » plus expérimentés et hiérarchiquement plus élevés qu’eux. L’influence disproportionnée qu’ils exercent sur ces derniers est paradoxale dans la mesure où ce sont souvent de jeunes analystes, fraîchement recrutés de l’université, qui se retrouvent à exercer les responsabilités importantes qui incombent aux acteurs des organismes centraux. La dimension humaine de l’expérience au centre suggère, dès le recrutement des analystes, des milieux de travail très exigeants, où les injonctions au dépassement de soi et à l’atteinte des résultats à tout prix induisent du stress pour les analystes, qui sont appelés à interagir régulièrement avec les dirigeants et les acteurs politiques clés du gouvernement fédéral. Le recours à la phénoménologie herméneutique et un appareillage méthodologique approprié à la recherche qualitative permettent de poser un regard neuf sur les organismes centraux en mettant l’accent sur l’expérience intersubjective des analystes et de leurs interlocuteurs. En accord avec la perspective de la construction sociale, selon laquelle le monde social, et par extension les organisations, est issu des interactions entre les individus producteurs de sens et de signification, l’expérience des analystes permet de mieux comprendre les organismes centraux en tant que systèmes sociaux spécifiques.
... In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the fiscal position of the Government of Canada was worsening. This, in combination with insufficiently conservative forecasting from the Department of Finance, led to a series of restraint exercises and across-the-board cuts, sometimes several in a year (Clark 1994). These exercises and cuts, along with de-layering and reorganisations, were depicted as removing overheads, duplication and unnecessary spending. ...
... In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the fiscal position of the Government of Canada was worsening. This, in combination with insufficiently conservative forecasting from the Department of Finance, led to a series of restraint exercises and across-the-board cuts, sometimes several in a year (Clark 1994). These exercises and cuts, along with de-layering and reorganisations, were depicted as removing overheads, duplication and unnecessary spending. ...
... Organizational and administrative reforms were not viewed as contributing to political control over the state apparatus. As a consequence, public management reforms and measures to effect expenditure restraint measures have been pursued on parallel tracks (Clark, 1994). Only the latter were perceived by politicalleaders as crucial to governance and public policy; the former were regarded as largely matters of internal 'plumbing' to be left to the bureaucracy itself. ...
Patrick Weller and Herman Bakvis argue in the introductory chapter that governments struggle for coherence in both the aims and the outcomes of their policies. They strive to make the institutions of government work in harmony. They espouse a set of values which stress coordination, consistency and avoiding duplication and overlap. This statecentric view requires the government to control its own tools and to have consistent policies. But governments also want to have an impact on their society. This sociocentric view focuses on the influence of government on society and its ability to shape that society.
... Another criticism of NPM is a requirement to cope with rapid changes introduced by NPM, while living within tight resource constraints (Metcalfe and Richards, 1987:24;Aucoin, 2001). In fact, during the mid-1990s, Canadian reformers were forced to reconcile NPM renewal themes with reductions in operating budgets (Clark, 1994). ...
This chapter addresses: how have contemporary management ideas influenced Departmental Secretaries and their work? Public sector reforms inspired by contemporary management ideas, were widely regarded as unsuitable for the public sector. Some NPM ideas underpinning reforms, when they travelled, appear to have been translated, transferred and transformed, to suit the public actors, their places of work and their activities. Contemporary management ideas and public sector reforms enter the APS through sponsorship by the government of the day and Departmental Secretaries of the top four central departments of the APS. The disposition of such parties and where ideas are deemed to ‘fit’ the existing public sector, will determine acceptance, adoption, promotion or rejection of ideas and reforms.
The chapter examines the multiplicity of contemporary management ideas and public sector reform initiatives and movements at the national level in Westminster polities over the latter part of the twentieth century and the early part of the twenty-first century to determine their impact on, and what might constitute, public administration in the second decade of the twenty-first century. The polities covered are the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, New Zealand (NZ) and Australia. The reforms cover the period from the beginning of the adoption of a new public sector management paradigm in the early 1980s up until 2010.
This research note assesses the influence of Canadian public administration research on the global study of public administration. Citation data from the Web of Science database is used to assess the reach of the Canadian public administration literature outside Canada. The research analyzes citations of the journal Canadian Public Administration by calculating an external citation ratio to explore articles cited heavily domestically and abroad. Scholars around the globe look to Canada for insights on topics including accountability and the performance of various government reforms; but, the global public administration community can benefit from a more careful reading of what Canada can tell us about federalism, capacity for policy analysis, and government reform. Article characteristics including age and foreign authorship are related to the scope of external citations. The inquiry advances our understanding of how scholarship in Canadian public administration is influencing the global dialogue on governance and public management.
As cabinet government is sometimes depicted as the answer to the quest for coherence and control, as a ‘government against sub-governments’ (Rose, 1980b), it is deplorable that it is such an ill-defined topic. The problem does not seem to be that scholars and practitioners of cabinet government have put forth conflicting or widely diverging definitions of the concept, but rather that we lack a definition of cabinet government that is both reasonably precise and suitable for comparisons across political systems.
By 2015 concern had emerged about the trajectory of Canada's Westminster model and the state of democratic governance under successive Harper governments, particularly with respect to transparency and relationships with public servants, which among other things led to the election of the Trudeau government in October 2015. This article compares these developments with the wholesale reform experiences in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. We consider not only the evolving bargains between prime ministers and their ministers, political advisors, top officials, and legislatures, but also between party leaders and political parties, and between governments and civil society. Second, we characterize far-reaching reforms as “dares,” intended to change the trajectory of Westminster systems, which carry political risks. Third, we consider the resilience of Westminster systems in the face of significant change and inaction. The Harper reforms were not nearly as dramatic as those of the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia during the late 1980s but did change the bargain with civil society, foundational to Westminster systems. The essential principles of responsible government have stood up well to the test of experience, and will serve as well tomorrow as they have in the past. However, parliamentary government is an inherently evolutionary form of government. Task Force on Public Service Values and Ethics (2000, 17) The essential principles of responsible government have stood up well to the test of experience, and will serve as well tomorrow as they have in the past. However, parliamentary government is an inherently evolutionary form of government. Task Force on Public Service Values and Ethics (2000, 17)
Thirty years ago, Anglo-American politicians set out to make the public sector look like the private sector. These reforms continue today, ultimately seeking to empower elected officials to shape policies and pushing public servants to manage operations in the same manner as their private-sector counterparts. In Whatever Happened to the Music Teacher?, Donald Savoie provides a nuanced account of how the Canadian federal government makes decisions. Savoie argues that the traditional role of public servants advising governments on policy has been turned on its head, and that evidence-based policy making is no longer valued as it once was. Policy making has become a matter of opinion, Google searches, focus groups, and public opinion surveys, where a well-connected lobbyist can provide any answers politicians wish to hear. As a result, public servants have lost their way and are uncertain about how they should assess management performance, how they should generate policy advice, how they should work with their political leaders, and how they should speak truth to political power - even within their own departments. Savoie demonstrates how recent management reforms in government have caused a steep rise in the overhead cost of government, as well as how the notion that public administration could be made to operate like the private sector has been misguided and costly to taxpayers. Abandoning "textbook" discussions of government and public service, Whatever Happened to the Music Teacher? Is a realistic portrayal of how policy decisions are made and how actors and institutions interact with one another and exposes the complexities, contradictions present in Canadian politics and governance.
This article surveys management improvement initiatives in the federal public service during the 2000s and assesses their progress. It reviews eight key areas: management accountability; expenditure management; financial management; human resource management; grants and contributions management; project management and capital investment; internal audit; and processes to sustain public service values and ethics. Although not all of the initiatives have been equally successful, this article argues that general improvement has been realized. The article also considers factors behind the successes, arguing that improvements typically arise from a combination of political, organizational, cultural and economic factors including public service leadership and support at the political level. Recent budget pressures may affect the sustainability of continuing management improvement, but elements for moving forward are clear. © The Institute of Public Administration of Canada/L'Institut d'administration publique du Canada 2013.
Under the traditions of the Westminster system, prime ministers and ministers give countless public speeches each year, while their loyal public service quietly and anonymously carries out the daily business of public administration. Current practice suggests that this traditional picture no longer holds true. In the 21st century, bureaucratic leaders are prepared to give public speeches on their own authority – adopting a “public face” as contributors to public debate. This article examines the extent to which key bureaucratic leaders in Canada have adopted an independent public face through public speeches, and how the Canadian experience compares to other Westminster jurisdictions. It argues that contemporary Canadian practice has taken a middle road between independent policy advocacy and quiet anonymity. SommaireSelon les traditions du système de gouvernement Westminster, les premiers ministres et les ministres prononcent d'innombrables discours chaque année, tandis que leurs loyaux fonctionnaires s'acquittent discrètement et anonymement des fonctions courantes de l'administration publique. La pratique actuelle laisse entendre que cette image traditionnelle ne reflète plus la réalité. Au XXIe siècle, les responsables de l'administration bureaucratique sont préparés à prononcer des discours publics de leur propre chef – en adoptant un « visage public » en tant que participants au débat public. Cet article examine dans quelle mesure les principaux responsables de l'administration bureaucratique au Canada ont adopté un visage public indépendant par le biais de discours publics, et comment se compare l'expérience canadienne par rapport à celle d'autres régimes de gouvernement britannique. Les auteurs indiquent que le Canada contemporain a adopté une approche intermédiaire entre la défense de politiques indépendantes et un anonymat tranquille.
Canadian and Australian federal government budgets have returned to surplus. Over the past two decades both countries have undertaken financial management and budgetary reforms in an effort to control expenditure growth and public debt. They exchanged ideas, borrowed techniques, and shared reform experiences. Yet during the mid-1980s and early 1990s they displayed markedly different levels of success in expenditure control. This article explains why relatively similar instruments of expenditure control and financial management produced different outcomes in Australia and Canada. The analysis suggests that budgetary techniques will have marginal impact unless they are congruent with broader policy management systems and administrative cultures. The comparative analysis provides important lessons for budget reformers in all jurisdictions.
This paper examines Charles Lindblom's ‘science of muddling through’ and its transport and transformation to budgeting through the work of Aaron Wildavsky by analyzing its impact on budget theory and assessing its continued relevance to the practice of budgeting in the context of the Canadian federal government. We find that: the concept is of fundamental importance and yet considerably elastic to capture key features of political, economic, and organizational life; the criticisms of it have been overstated although, perhaps surprisingly, with the exception of budgeting, little empirical testing of the concept has been undertaken; the impact on budget theory and practice has been considerable especially since much of the initial application was undertaken at a time of relative economic and political stability in government and in budgeting; and yet even today, in a more turbulent world, the concept remains surprisingly relevant, although not complete, for understanding and explaining some of the most central and enduring features of budgetary behaviour. It is a key to our understanding of how budget participants deal with complexity and manage conflict.
The purpose of this paper was to provide background information for discussions at the National Seminar on Decentralization and Power Sharing on 15–17 October 1993 in St. Andrew's, New Brunswick. It emerged out of a concern that the literature has not managed to convey a sense of the extent and nature of administrative reform under way in Canada. Senior public servants working for nine provincial governments were contacted during the summer of 1993 in order to obtain documents and their views on developments in administrative and program reform during the early 1990s.* The information was first presented at the national seminar and was subsequently reviewed by provincial contacts in late 1993, who often suggested additional modifications.
Our reconnaissance moves from west to east, and ends with observations about developments at the federal level. We did not delve into aboriginal and federalprovincial issues since other papers were to take up these subjects, but if officials noted that such issues were part of their administrative reform agenda, then we mentioned them. Officials from New Brunswick emphasized regional initiatives in the eastern provinces and we chose to leave that discussion in that section. Given the limited resources and time available for undertaking this survey of developments, it should not be construed as a definitive history of recent reform within each jurisdiction. Nevertheless, we do think this reconnaissance conveys the current tumult in Canada's public sector; governments at all levels are in the midst of significant restructuring, and this will continue for the foreseeable future.
Sommaire: Afin de créer une base empirique pour le débat qui devait avoir lieu au Colloque national sur la décentralisation et le partage des pouvoirs, les 15–17 octobre 1993, à St. Andrew's, au Nouveau‐Brunswick, nous avons contacté des fonctionnaires supérieurs de neuf provinces afin d'obtenir des documents et des avis sur l'évolution recente des réformes administratives et des révisions de programmes au début des années 1990 (pour l'Ontario, nous nous en sommes remis à un article récent de Lindquist et White). L'article a d'abord été présenté au Colloque national, puis a été analysé par quelques personnes au niveau provincial, qui ont suggéré des modifications supplémentaires. L'article couvre le terrain en partant de l'ouest vers l'est, et conclut par des observations concernant le niveau fédéral. Nous n'avions pas l'intention de nous occuper des questions autochtones et fédérales‐provinciales puisque d'autres articles devaient en traiter, mais nous les avons quand même mentionnées lorsque des fonctionnaires signalaient ces questions comme étant à l'ordre du jour de Ieur réforme administrative. Ces analyses ne constituent pas l'histoire définitive des réformes au sein de chaque juridiction, mais elles reflètent bien les bouleversements qui ont frappé le secteur public au Canada. Les gouvernements canadiens sont aux prises avec une restructuration importante à tous les paliers, et notre survol de la question indique que cette situation se poursuivra.
There is an ongoing debate in western industrialized democracies about the genesis of government policy capacity. This article examines this under-explored issue by looking at the election campaign commitments made by political parties. The author reviews the election policy manifestos of the parties that governed in Canada from 1984 to 2008, some of the proposed policy changes advanced during election campaigns, and the actions taken by governing parties to fulfil those commitments. This research demonstrates that parties were relatively unconstrained in advancing detailed election platforms to the electorate and that they were able to fulfil, or partially fulfil, those commitments at fairly significant levels - particularly incumbent governments, who could draw on their governing experience and the policy advice given by the public service. The author contends that governing parties in Canada possess a high degree of policy-making capacity and that they have the ability both to advance and implement fairly detailed plans for governing. These findings confirm that political parties are an important source of policy-making capacity and that such capacity is enhanced by public-service input.
This paper identifies the main differences between the decision‐making environments of the International Monetary Fund (imf) and Canadian governments, with a view to comparing administrative practices in the imf with those in government policy‐making organizations. Many of the imf's distinguishing features arise from its international character and the need to solve “collaboration problems.” They include a detachment from electoral politics and external agencies, a heavy reliance on rules, universal membership, weighted voting, a specialized and technical subject‐matter with broad doctrinal consensus, a comparative availability of resources and continuity in leadership. The paper then reviews the features of the administrative practices in the imf that tend to distinguish it from policy‐making organizations in the Canadian federal and provincial governments. These include top‐down organizational discipline, numerous and well‐staffed review procedures, elite recruitment, high pay and an internally generated and incremental approach to administrative reform. Conclusions are made about the extent to which the imf's distinguishing administrative features are linked to its particular decision‐making environment and about the lessons that might be drawn for the management of Canadian policy‐making organizations.
Sommaire
L'article examine les principales différences entre le milieu décisionnel du Fonds Monétaire International et celui des gouvernements canadiens afin de comparer les méthodes administratives du FMI à celles des organismes qui établissent des politiques gouvernementales. De nombreux aspects propres au FMI viennent de son caractére international et du besoin de régler des «problémes de collaborations Parmi ces aspects figurent son détachement de la politique électorate et des organismes externes, le fait qu'il s'appuie beaucoup sur des régies, une adhésion universelle, des votes pondérés, des sujets techniques spécialisés exigeant un large consensus doctrinal, des ressources comparativement accessibles ainsi qu'une certaine continuityé de leadership. L'article examine ensuite les pratiques administratives du FMIqui ont tendance à le distinguer des organismes de politiques des gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux au Canada. Parmi ces points importants figurent une discipline organisationnelle hiérarchique, des procédures de réexamen nombreuses et bien dotées en personnel, un recrutement d'élite, des salaires élévtis ainsi qu'une approche progressive conéue par le FMI lui‐mÊme pour la réforme administrative. L'article offre des conclusions quant au degré auquel les caractéristiques administra‐tives propres au FMI sont liées à son milieu décisionnel particulier, et sur les leçons que l'on pourrait tirer pour gérer les organismes canadiens qui formulent des politiques.
This article provides empirical evidence of the autonomy and agenda-setting capabilities of Canada's International Monetary Fund executive director in Washington, D.C., for further theoretical debate. Little is known about this position in the public service. This article seeks to assess the degree of autonomy of Canadian directors from Ottawa, the nature of the IMF's agenda items proposed by Canada's executive directors, and, most importantly, whether these agenda items originate from the Department of Finance and the Bank of Canada or from the directors' office in Washington directly. The author also seeks to better understand the hiring and recruitment of Canada's IMF executive directors.Sommaire : Cet article tente de fournir une évidence empirique sur les capacités d'autonomie et de choix des questions à l'ordre du jour dont jouit l'administrateur du Fonds monétaire international pour le Canada à Washington, D.C., dans le but de favoriser le débat théorique. Ce poste est peu connu dans la fonction publique. L'article cherche àévaluer le degré d'autonomie des administrateurs canadiens par rapport à Ottawa; la nature de certaines questions à l'ordre du jour du FMI proposées par les administrateurs du Canada; et, plus important encore, il cherche à savoir si ces questions proviennent du ministère des Finances et de la Banque du Canada ou bien directement du bureau de l'administrateur à Washington. L'auteur cherche également à mieux comprendre le processus d'embauche et de recrutement des administrateurs du FMI pour le Canada.
How can governments overcome the centrifugal tendencies of modern bureaucracies? One answer is by creating "corporate cultures" that provide a common ground among independent agencies. Jacques Bourgault, Stéphane Dion, and Marc Lemay discuss how the Canadian federal government's performance appraisal system promoted a corporate culture among senior level managers (deputy ministers). Through team-building and the strengthening of professional values, the performance appraisal system generates a sense of collective responsibility. The authors emphasize the role of the corporate culture as a counterbalance to the pull of parochial, departmental interests.
Le but du présent article est de décrire le nouveau Conseil du Trésor et de démystifier son rôle et son fonctionnement en décrivant les changements qui ont été apportés à son mode d'operation.
Le Conseil du Trésor est le comité du cabinet sur le « Budget des dépenses » et sur la « Politique administrative ». En tant que Comité sur le budget des dépenses, le Conseil du Trésor est chargé de proposer un plan de dépenses qui représente à la fois l'expression des politiques et priorités du gouvernement et résulte en une répartition optimale de l'argent des contribuables en termes de rendement obtenu pour chaque dollar dépensé. En s'acquittant de ces responsabilités, le rôle du Conseil n'est plus exclusif: il est devenu partie intégrante d'un réseau élaboré de comité du cabinet. De même la préparation du budget des dépenses n'est plus un exercise purement arbitraire. Le Conseil fonctionne maintenant de façon beaucoup plus ouverte au sein du cabinet. Enfin le processus budgétaire ne se préoccupe plus primordialement des « inputs » administratifs: il se concentre davantage sur les programmes gouvernementaux et sur leur efficacité.
Comme Comité sur la politique administrative, le Conseil du Trésor a la responsabilité de s'assurer que le Conseil des Ministres puisse répondre des mesures administratives de chaque ministère, et de s'assurer également que ces mesures contribuent à l'efficacité de la fonction publique et soient conforme aux standards de probité et de prudence que la population exige du gouvernement.
Diverses méthodes peuvent être utilisées pour s'acquitter de cette responsabilité, allant du leadership à la coordination, aux directives, aux règlements et à la fourniture par le Conseil du Trésor lui-même de certains services administratifs et en matières de personnel. Mais quelle que soit la méthode, le but reste le même: s'assurer que le gouvernement puisse s'acquitter de sa responsabilité collective pour le comportement administratif de tous ses ministères.
Organizational change in the central machinery of government is essentially a function of executive leadership. The major determinants of such change are invariably political and not administrative in character and derive from the leadership paradigms of chief executive officers—their philosophy of government, management style and political objectives. This phenomenon is examined in the recent transformation of the Canadian central executive system from one based upon the Trudeau paradigm of rational management to one structured to fit the Mulroney paradigm of brokerage politics. The organizational instruments of each paradigm are considered and their respective capacities to meet the requirements of executive leadership in our modern administrative state are assessed. It is argued that the two different systems and the changes introduced by them are best explained by the paradigms of these two prime ministers.RésuméLes changements organisationnels dans les rouages centraux de l'état dépendent avant tout du style des dirigeants. Les déterminants principaux de ces changements sont invariablement de nature politique plutôt qu'administrative. Ils résultent des paradigmes des principaux dirigeants: leurs philosophies gouvernementales, leurs styles de gestion. leurs buts politiques. Nous examinons ce phénomène dans le contexte de la transformation récente des organes politiques centraux au Canada, soil à partir d'un système fondé sur le paradigme « Trudeau » de gestion rationnelle vers celui fondé sur le paradigme « Mulroney » de politique de médiation. Nous analysons les instruments organisationnels de chaque paradigme ainsi que leurs capacités à satisfaire aux exigences de la direction d'un état moderne. Les qualités et les styles différents des deux premiers ministres expliquent bien les deux types de système et les changements qu'ils ont introduits.
In the early 1970s, A.W. Johnston likened the Treasury Board to Kafka's Castle. Widespread misconceptions existed, he wrote, about the workings of the Treasury Board and its Secretariat. Since then, the scope of Treasury Board activities has broadened substantially. Both the Board and the Secretariat have assumed new responsibilities in the area of personnel policy, in establishing new administrative policies for government operations and in managing the government's property holdings, for example. Yet little has been written about these new responsibilities and, to an outsider, the Treasury Board must resemble Kafka's Castle now as much as it did in the early 1970s.
This paper describes the various changes introduced over the past fifteen years that have transformed the operations of the Treasury Board and its Secretariat. The paper goes further and locates the Treasury Board between the competing forces of centralized decision‐making on the one hand and “letting the manager manage” on the other. The paper points out that the Treasury Board has been a key actor in the various attempts at “letting the manager manage.” It recently launched a major new initiative ‐ Increased Ministerial Authority and Accountability (IMAA) ‐ which is designed to transfer important decision‐making authority to managers. The paper concludes with a review of IMAA, its origin, its design and its operations.
Sommaire: Au début des années soixante‐dix, A.W. Johnston comparait le Conseil du Trésor au Château de Kafka. Il affirme que les malentendus quant aux activités du Conseil du Trésor et de son secrétariat étaient répandus. Depuis, le Conseil du Trésor a beaucoup élargi le champ de ses activités. Le conseil et son secrétariat ont accepté de nouvelles responsabilités concernant les politiques de gestion du personnel et l'élaboration de politiques de gestion des affaires gouvernementales et de gestion des avoirs fonciers du gouvernement, par exemple. Pourtant, on n'a pas dit grand‐chose de ces nouvelles responsabilités et, pour un observateur étranger, le Conseil du Trésor resemble sans doute autant aujourd'hui au Château de Kafka qu'au début des années soixante‐dix.
Dans cet article, l'auteur expose les changenients qui sont survenus depuis quinze ans et qui ont transformé les activités du Conseil et son secrétariat. L'auteur va plus loin et situe le Conseil du Trésor entre deux pôles, d'une part les forces concurrentielles qui caractérisent des prises de décisions centralisées et, d'autre part, l'attitude qui veut que “les directeurs aient la latitude de diriger”. L'auteur souligne que le Conseil du Trésor a joué un rôle‐clé dans les diverses tentatives visant à laisser “les directeurs diriger”. Le Conseil a récemment lancé un important programme, intitulé Autorité et responsabilité accrues du Ministère (ARAM), lequel vise à donner plus de pouvoir décisionnel aux gestionnaires. En conclusion, l'auteur passe en revue l'origine, la conception et les activités de ce programme.
So he resumed his walk, but the way proved long. For the street he was in, the main street of the village, did not lead up to the Castle hill, it only made towards it and then, as if deliberately, turned aside, and though it did not lead away from the Castle it got no nearer to it either. At every turn K. expected the road to double back to the Castle, and only because of this expectation did he go on. F. Kafka, The Castle
In December 1989 the prime minister launched an initiative of public service reform and renewal called “Public Service 2000.” The initiative is designed to equip the public service of Canada to meet the challenges of an increasingly demanding national and international environment. Based on the premise that the key to management is the motivation of people, the underlying thrust of Public Service 2000 is on changing how public servants are managed and, more broadly, how work is done in government. Building on the established foundations of the modern, professional public service, Public Service 2000 will lead to reforms in mandates, structures and operations and, above all, in the management culture of the public service, its efficiency and its capacity to serve Canadians effectively.
Sommaire: En décembre 1989, le Premier ministre a annoncé un projet de réforme et de renouvellement de la fonction publique intitulé“Fonction publique 2000”. Cette initiative vise à adapter la fonction publique du Canada aux défis de plus en plus exigeants de l'environnement national et international. Fondée sur la prémisse que la motivation du personnel constitue la clef d'une saine gestion, Fonction publique 2000 vise à changer non seulement la façon dont les ressources humaines sont gérées, mais plus généralement, la façon dont le gouvernement accomplit son travail. Venant s'ajouter aux réformes antérieures qui ont instauré une fonction publique professionnelle et moderne, Fonction publique 2000 mènera à la réforme des mandats, des structures, des opérations et, surtout, de la culture de gestion de la fonction publique et de sa capacité d'offrir un service efficace à la population.
The June 1993 reorganization of the Canadian cabinet undertaken by Prime Minister Kim Campbell is the latest manifestation of a theme in vogue: the consolidation of ministerial portfolios in order to reduce the size of cabinet. This paper examines the recent Canadian changes in light of the Australian cabinet reorganization of 1987, which saw twenty-eight cabinet portfolios reduced to sixteen. The Australian experience with a consolidated cabinet is assessed from four perspectives: political control; policy interdependence and coordination; efficiency and cost savings; and budgetary discipline. We argue that in many ways the focus on cabinet size per se is misleading. The significant questions relate to the organization of authority within cabinet and the relationships between individuals assigned executive authority rather than the actual number of ministers. The June 1993 Canadian reorganization emulates the Australian model in most respects, although the issue of effective political control may well depend on an expanded role for parliamentary secretaries in lieu of junior ministers.