No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
Why do developing country anti-corruption commissions fail to deal with corruption? Understanding the three dilemmas of organisational development, performance expectation, and donor and government cycles
Abstract
The article reviews aspects of the literature on public sector organisational development in developing countries, and on Anti-Corruption Agencies or Commissions (ACC), to set the context for its empirical research into five African countries' ACCs†. This argues that ACCs are as likely to be affected by the same problems as any other public sector institution, but the approaches taken by donors and the consequential expectations on performance fail to recognise this.
The article further argues that, in addition to these two dilemmas relating to the conditions necessary to promote organisational development and performance expectation––organisational continuity––of ACCs, a third dilemma––differing cycles of donor and government activity––also poses problems for that development.
This has practitioner and policy relevance. With multilateral and bilateral donors still continuing to establish ACCs as the lead agency to address corruption there is a need to address the future organisational development of existing ACCs as well as using the lessons from the performance of such ACCs to provide the continuity for new ACCs to be capable of dealing with corruption. Copyright
... Therefore, corruption has no boundaries; it exists in all countries across the globe. Corruption is the main impediment to implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals as it is associated with rule of law, democracy, poverty, bribe, greed, institutional efficiency, proper education and training, unemployment, judiciary systems, law enforcement, political systems, economic freedom, civil society, media, and access to information (Azim and Kluvers 2017;Bussell 2018;Pieroni and d'Agostino 2013;Wellalage et al. 2018;Halter et al. 2009;Mutebi 2008;Shaheer et al. 2017;Doig et al. 2007;Carr 2007). According to the World Bank, reducing corruption is in the heart of SDGs. ...
... Generally, it is evident that developing countries are facing political problems that decrease rule of law, freedom of expression, and institutional freedom, and the ultimate consequence is high corruption. High corruption environment in politics mostly undermines institutional capability because the government tries to control anti-corruption institution and judicial systems of a country (Wellalage et al. 2018;Gadowska 2010;Doig et al. 2007). For example, Bangladesh is a developing country experiencing high corruption because of political unrest and rule of law (Nurunnabi 2018;Azim and Kluvers 2017;Zafarullah and Akhter 2001;Zafarullah and Siddique 2001) although it is expected to join the developing country club by 2024. ...
... During the last couple of years, the country has seen that financial sector of the country is highly corrupted, millions of money is illegally traded outside of the country, and all government banks have the mismanagement in loan disbursement, but ACC failed to take strong action (Nurunnabi 2018). The same situation exists in highly corrupted countries although they have ACC like Bangladesh (Gadowska 2010;Doig et al. 2007). It reminds us that this organization's success depends on the political willing's because the government appoints politically motivated management rather than neutral one (Wellalage et al. 2018;Zafarullah and Akhter 2001;Zafarullah and Siddique 2001;Gadowska 2010;Doig et al. 2007). ...
... However, many scholars argue that ACAs -particularly those in economically poor countries -have failed to achieve their goals in the face of intense political pressure, underresourcing and inadequate mandates (Doig, Watt, and Williams 2007;Gregory 2015). A growing literature has sought to explain why ACAs are established and effective in some contexts and not others (eg . ...
... A growing literature has sought to explain why ACAs are established and effective in some contexts and not others (eg . These explanations focus on three interconnected institutions that shape anti-corruption reforms: international organisations (particularly donors) (Doig, Watt, and Williams 2007;Gregory 2015), the political will of politicians and political institutions (Batory 2012;Quah 2017;Schnell 2018) and the involvement of civil society (Ristei 2010;Sakib 2019). This article argues that explanations that focus on these institutions can be inadequate for understanding the nature of anti-corruption reforms and the reasons for establishing ACAs in developing countries. ...
... ACAs differ from other institutions fighting corruption as they are specifically mandated to address corruption (de Sousa 2010, 5). Despite their popularity , ACAs are increasingly criticised for failing to significantly address corruption (Doig, Watt, and Williams 2007;Gregory 2015). In turn, scholars have sought to explain how and why ACAs are adopted and successful in some contexts and not others. ...
Scholars have sought to explain how and why developing countries establish anti-corruption agencies by examining the strength of national and international institutions, particularly political institutions and actors, international donors and civil society. This article argues that these explanations are inadequate and that explaining the nature of anti-corruption reform in developing countries requires accounting for the transnational technical anti-corruption assemblage. This assemblage comprises individuals, ideas and things that reinforce technical solutions to corruption. This article examines the case of anti-corruption reforms in Solomon Islands during and after the international Regional Assistant Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) intervention (2003–2017). It shows that parliamentarians passed anti-corruption reforms despite declining pressure from donors, relatively weak civil society and wavering political commitment. The article suggests a transnational coalition of national and international actors and objects helped establish and maintain a technical anti-corruption assemblage. Through exclusionary practices, this assemblage helped maintain the technical and apolitical nature of anti-corruption reform. Findings provide insights into the effectiveness of anti-corruption ‘policy transfer’ in Solomon Islands and other developing countries.
... Therefore, corruption has no boundaries; it exists in all countries across the globe. Corruption is the main impediment to implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals as it is associated with rule of law, democracy, poverty, bribe, greed, institutional efficiency, proper education and training, unemployment, judiciary systems, law enforcement, political systems, economic freedom, civil society, media, and access to information (Azim and Kluvers 2017;Bussell 2018;Pieroni and d'Agostino 2013;Wellalage et al. 2018;Halter et al. 2009;Mutebi 2008;Shaheer et al. 2017;Doig et al. 2007;Carr 2007). According to the World Bank, reducing corruption is in the heart of SDGs. ...
... Generally, it is evident that developing countries are facing political problems that decrease rule of law, freedom of expression, and institutional freedom, and the ultimate consequence is high corruption. High corruption environment in politics mostly undermines institutional capability because the government tries to control anti-corruption institution and judicial systems of a country (Wellalage et al. 2018;Gadowska 2010;Doig et al. 2007). For example, Bangladesh is a developing country experiencing high corruption because of political unrest and rule of law (Nurunnabi 2018;Azim and Kluvers 2017;Zafarullah and Akhter 2001;Zafarullah and Siddique 2001) although it is expected to join the developing country club by 2024. ...
... During the last couple of years, the country has seen that financial sector of the country is highly corrupted, millions of money is illegally traded outside of the country, and all government banks have the mismanagement in loan disbursement, but ACC failed to take strong action (Nurunnabi 2018). The same situation exists in highly corrupted countries although they have ACC like Bangladesh (Gadowska 2010;Doig et al. 2007). It reminds us that this organization's success depends on the political willing's because the government appoints politically motivated management rather than neutral one (Wellalage et al. 2018;Zafarullah and Akhter 2001;Zafarullah and Siddique 2001;Gadowska 2010;Doig et al. 2007). ...
Corruption is a major impediment of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Corruption weakens social and economic growth and prosperity that ultimately decrease employment, rule of law, transparency, governance, freedom of speech, the standard of living,
and judiciary systems. All countries in the world are facing the constraints from corruption. Therefore, control of corruption is a big challenge in promoting sustainable development. The anti-corruption mechanism is an effective way to fight against corruption, and many national and international organizations are working together to combat corruption. International networking and cooperation’s among organizations, regions, or countries would be an effective pathfinder in the anti-corruption movement.
... Extant research efforts have sought to understand the causes, and consequences of corruption (Gould & Mukendi, 1989;Treisman, 2000) and anti-corruption measures (Quah, 2013b), thereby leading to multiple approaches to curbing corrupt practices (Hanna, Bishop, Nadel, Scheffler, & Durlacher, 2011). However, attention has been directed towards the establishment of Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) (Meagher, 2005) due to the successes recorded in Asia (Quah, 2009(Quah, , 2015a and their failure in Sub-Saharan Africa (Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2007;Heeks & Mathisen, 2012). The successes and failures of these specialized organizations have been associated with institutional and contingency factors (Quah, 2015b). ...
... These organizations are distinct from other anti-corruption strategies because of the degree of specialization, expertise, autonomy and freedom from corruption (Quah, 2009). However, these features exist in the presence of significant government commitment in the form of sufficient legal powers, adequate human and financial resources and operational autonomy (Doig et al., 2007;Gregory, 2015;Quah, 2015b). Most of these preconditions for effective ACAs appear to be absent in most of the developing countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (Doig et al., 2007;Persson et al., 2013). ...
... However, these features exist in the presence of significant government commitment in the form of sufficient legal powers, adequate human and financial resources and operational autonomy (Doig et al., 2007;Gregory, 2015;Quah, 2015b). Most of these preconditions for effective ACAs appear to be absent in most of the developing countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (Doig et al., 2007;Persson et al., 2013). This affects their performance by influencing the strategy and structural form (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;Okogbule, 2006). ...
The increasing concern over corruption in developing countries has been associated with the inability of Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) to tackle corruption. The ineffectiveness of these ACAs is said to be influenced by several factors including the underutilization of forensic accounting in fraud investigation process. This article focuses on the identification of these factors and their influences on the adoption of forensic accounting by ACAs. This was done through the review of literature and proposing a framework for further in-depth research work. The conceptual framework highlights the antecedent influence of political will on these factors and their influences on the adoption of forensic accounting. The implication is that identifying these factors through further in-depth studies will contribute to the insufficient research work on the adoption of forensic accounting and help policy makers to enhance the performance of these agencies.
... Doig (1995, p. 160) notes that in most developing countries where there is entrenched corruption, strong and effective anti-corruption bodies "appear to offer not just another layer of expensive control but one whose efforts may be negated by corrupt or political influence unless it is established within the necessary climate of political and judicial support". Therefore, anti-corruption initiatives such as the establishment of anti-corruption agencies as a condition for donor support may not stand the test of time (Doig, 1995;Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2007;Schütte, 2012). This, according to Doig et al. (2007), is because such anti-corruption agencies are likely to face the same corrupt problems faced by other public departments. ...
... Therefore, anti-corruption initiatives such as the establishment of anti-corruption agencies as a condition for donor support may not stand the test of time (Doig, 1995;Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2007;Schütte, 2012). This, according to Doig et al. (2007), is because such anti-corruption agencies are likely to face the same corrupt problems faced by other public departments. To this end, Doig, Watt, and Williams (2006, p. 163) propose two hypotheses, relevant for the analysis in this paper, including "is there, paradoxically, an adverse impact on the development of ACCs [anti-corruption agencies] as a consequence of mounting pressure from donors for anti-corruption results"; and "whether better results may be achieved with sequenced or less donor involvement using ACCs"? ...
... At the end of the accountability chain is the passing of judgement where the principal or forum is able to impose sanctions on the "agent as part of the right of authoritative direction that lies at the heart of the accountability relationship" (Mulgan, 2003, p. 9). Such accountability forums must be independent and have the powers to investigate corruption where it lies without political interference (Doig et al., 2007;Gregory, 2015;Meagher, 2005;Pope & Vogl, 2000). In Indonesia for instance, Schütte (2012, p. 38) notes that the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission "has brought previously untouchable high-profile perpetrators to jail, has recovered stolen assets, and enjoys a much higher degree of public trust." ...
Political will” is oft-cited as the major obstacle to government's anti-corruption efforts. Notwithstanding, there is remarkably little systematic analysis of the concept, with some scholars describing it as the “slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon,” whereas others are calling for its empirical relevance. This paper tries to unpack the “black box” of political will by making it an empirically relevant concept drawing on evidence from two Asian countries; Singapore and Bangladesh. Four key indicators based on the works of earlier scholars are used including origin of the initiative; comprehension and extent of analysis; credible sanctions; and resource dedication and sustenance are used. The paper also uses Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, World Bank's World Governance Indicators (Control of Corruption and Government Effectiveness), and Political, Economic and Risk Consultancy's annual survey in Asia, as outcome measures. Based on the empirical evidence from the two countries, the paper shows that political will indeed has a positive influence on government's anti-corruption efforts. Although political will may not be sufficient, it is a necessary condition to fight corruption, and that the difference between the positions of Singapore and Bangladesh on various global corruption league tables may be attributed to political will.
... While some scholars have used concepts from these fields to understand how ACAs operate (e.g., De Sousa, 2012;Batory, 2012;Bautista-Beauchesne, 2021;Di Mascio et al., 2020), we have yet to see professional communities apply these lessons to build a stronger framework for empowering ACAs. This approach might be more effective than simply changing formal institutional structures and frameworks, especially when it comes to addressing the key challenge so far: navigating the political environment that makes the work of ACAs difficult (Meagher, 2005, p. 78;Doig et al., 2007;Doig et al., 2010, p. 264). ...
... Political will is often cited as a key driver for empowering ACAs (Meagher, 2005, p. 78), but, in practice, this political will is frequently absent (Doig et al., 2007;Doig et al., 2010, p. 264). ...
Despite their worldwide proliferation, anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) have often failed to meet expectations because of political obstructions, undermining their effectiveness. This paper suggests that future empowerment efforts for ACAs should go beyond the traditional institutionalist paradigm prevalent in the international community of ACA proponents and instead focus on the social entrepreneurship aspect. This paper outlines measures for upskilling ACA leaders and staff in reputational management to enable them to navigate the challenges of the political environment better. Additionally, it proposes the creation of better systems, such as benchmarking league tables for ACAs' performance, to produce more effective pressure on political actors as well as uncommitted ACA leaders. It is also suggested that systems could be developed by international 'pro-ACA' stakeholders for early identification of reform allies within domestic governments and public administration who would support the capacitation of the local ACA. On a broader point, this paper argues that professional communities working on the future empowerment of ACAs should broaden their disciplinary lenses and, in practice, tap more into insights and frameworks from the fields of public management, public administration, and regulatory governance, going beyond the traditional professional angle of law enforcement and criminal justice.
... We integrate institutional theory (North, 1990) and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), particularly drawing from the literature on the inextricable relationship between institutions, agency, and corporate governance (Amaeshi, Adegbite, and Rajwani, 2016;Nakpodia et al., 2018;Young et al., 2008), to answer the above question within the context of Africa. We argue that due to weak regulatory institutions and the pervasiveness of corruption (Adeyeye, 2017;Doig, Watt, and Williams, 2007;Williams-Elegbe, 2018) and the lack of formal structures or frameworks for CPA in some developing countries (Liedong and Frynas, 2018), firms that engage in CPA are more likely to bribe public officials. ...
... Based on the notion that firms are likely to use bribes in their lobbying when they seek exemptions from regulation (Campos and Giovannoni, 2007;Doh et al., 2003;Harstad and Svensson, 2011), we advance that institutional constraints and voids push firms into engaging in passive CPA aimed at illegally circumventing or undermining rules and policies that were formulated without their inputs. With corruption characterizing institutions in some developing countries, especially in Africa, (Adeyeye, 2017;Doig et al., 2007;Williams-Elegbe, 2018), mimetic and coercive isomorphism bolster firms' willingness to initiate bribe payments or succumb to bribe demands when they engage with government officials. ...
There is significant research on the outcomes of corporate political activity (hereafter CPA). However, despite a few prior studies acknowledging the negative externalities of political activity, little attention has been paid to CPA’s dark side. In this paper, we draw on institutional and corporate governance insights to examine the relationship between CPA and bribery, which is arguably the greatest institutional failure in developing countries. Using pooled data from over 25,000 firms in 41 African countries, we find that lobbying and firm-level bribery are positively related. This relationship is weakened by in-country internet penetration and foreign ownership of firms. Taken together, the results suggest that business-government relations in weak institutional environments help to perpetuate corruption. They also suggest that internet penetration and foreign ownership help to illuminate the dark side of CPA. Leveraging this understanding, we make important contributions to the literature and highlight pertinent practical implications.
... Evaluations of anti-corruption agencies across Africa have highlighted issues that relate to overall governance challenges in developing countries. Some of the reasons cited include ineffective legislative frameworks, implementation gaps, weak governance environment, inadequate staffing, and a multiplicity of agencies resulting in co-ordination-related problems (Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2007;OECD, 2013;Onyema, Roy, Oredola, & Ayinla, 2018;Pillay, 2017;Prateeppornnarong, 2020;Quah, 2009Quah, , 2015. Limited attention has been paid to the possibility that the failing anti-corruption efforts could have a theoretical root. ...
... National anti-corruption strategies are strategic tools and action plans which reveal measures and reforms aimed to fight corruption as a long-term vision (UNDP, 2014;UNODC, 2015). These are often overlaid with assumptions and frameworks that could be linked to theory (Doig et al., 2007). Furthermore, they are often contextual and must be drawn up based on preliminary situation analysis and corruption diagnosis. ...
The anti-corruption industry has grown phenomenally in the last three decades with the proliferation of anti-corruption agencies in developing countries. However, there are limited success stories because corruption remains pervasive despite the establishment of these specialised agencies. This article thematically discuss the mismatch between corruption theories and anti-corruption strategies within an African context. We argue that the failing of anti-corruption efforts is rooted in a theoretical insufficiency which does not provide strong enough intellectual resources to battle corruption. Using qualitative thematic analysis techniques, we carried out an extensive review of anticorruption strategies across selected African countries and also dissected sectoral case studies across 12 sectors. Building on this, the article argues that sectorally demarcated anti-corruption strategies would be a better target for anti-corruption. We argue that sector-based anti-corruption strategies would provide a better reflection of corruption realities and help to reduce the conceptual ambiguities around corruption by bridging its theories and reality gap.
... Previous studies have identified fundamental factors in ensuring the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies including ACAs. These are political will (Brinkerhoff, 2000), political independence (Gregory, 2015) and efficient legal systems (Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2007;Meagher, 2005). Quah (2009) maintained that political will is the most important determinant for ensuring the effectiveness of anticorruption strategy including ACA in a country. ...
... Gregory (2015) argued the effectiveness of ACAs is dependent on political independence and argued that an effective ACAs require independence from political and undue influences such as political interference in the investigation and prosecution of corruption offenses. In general, the independence of ACAs in most developing countries have been doubted (Doig et al., 2007;Persson et al., 2013;Siddiquee, 2010) and consequently, affecting their performance in tackling corrupt practices. ...
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to appraise the Nigerian EFCC of their role in tackling systemic corruptions and to associate how institutional, and organizational factors influence the performance of the EFCC.
Design/methodology/approach
Data were gathered through in-depth interviews, non-participatory observations and documentary analysis.
Findings
The results of the integrative analysis show that the EFCC has apparently been ineffective, and further improvisation of the organization is needed. The poor performance of the EFCC was associated with factors such as lack of commitment; inefficient judiciary; insufficient budgets; and incompetent personnel.
Practical implications
This study recommends further improvements in the form of greater political will, improved legal process and also elevated budgetary funds and recruitment of personnel to the EFCC.
Originality/value
The study adopted a descriptive qualitative case study approach to describe the current state of the EFCC in Nigeria
... Generally speaking, in developing countries, the ACAs, like other institutions, lack various forms of technical capacity. Institutional development is a common problem in the public sector of many developing countries (Doig et al. 2007). Their ACAs therefore lack sufficient manpower, resources, or necessary competence to execute the entrusted duties. ...
... Their ACAs therefore lack sufficient manpower, resources, or necessary competence to execute the entrusted duties. Doig et al. (2007) explain these problems through discussing cases from Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda. Thus the following hypothesis: ...
The comparative analyses of citizens’ trust in Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) in three countries’ (Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) indicate that despite ACA’s low level of effectiveness in curbing corruption, trust level varies. The Nepalese ACA has higher level of trust than Bangladesh and Sri Lanka which is earned by targeting mainly lower level public officials. Though it fails to reduce the level of corruption in Nepal; citizens tend to trust ACA more. This is because of higher visibility of ACA’s activities. Such findings indicate about the methodological challenge to use ‘trust’ as a proxy to measure institutional performance.
... There is often a blame-shifting exercise (Alcañiz and Hellwig, 2011) and bureaucrat-bashing (Schillemans and den Otter, 2014). One may hypothesize that the "expectations gap" in public administrative performance (Flinders, 2012) is often smaller, simply because the public expects that the government will do very little, if anything, for them (Doig et al., 2007). But to merely remark on their shortcomings would belie the public value limitations that constrain public managers in the developing world (see Chohan, 2022a: 117-137). ...
... However, the successful story is few. Instead, many are shown to have unintended consequences (Doig et al., 2007;Mutebi, 2008;Batory, 2012;Lichand et al., 2016;Johnston, 2017;Nishijima et al., 2022). For example, Lichand et al. (2016) and Nishijima et al. (2022) show that the anticorruption audits in Brazil have caused worsened health indicators. ...
The excessive utilization of cesarean section (CS) has become a global concern, given the potential short-term and long-term detrimental effects for mothers and infants. Worldwide, the rate of CS continues to rise, but efforts to curtail unnecessary CS procedures have yielded limited success. By combining data from three resources, this study aims to estimate the effects of anti-corruption campaigns under the Xi administration on CS rates. We focus on Shanxi Province, a major coal-producing province in north-central China, with notoriety for the collusion between local politicians and business elites. Using the data from the China Corruption Investigation Dataset and data from publicly listed firms between 2013 and 2016, we found that anti-corruption campaigns significantly changed the social environment as firms’ business entertainment spending experienced substantial reductions. Using discharge records from 137 public hospitals, we adopted an instrumental variable (IV) approach and found that the anti-corruption campaigns led to significant reductions in unnecessary CS rates. The reductions are bigger among patients with second or later deliveries. We also find that the anti-corruption campaigns changed behaviors of attending and resident physicians. Our results provide insights into strategies to reduce corrupt practices within the healthcare sector and implementing interventions to minimize the occurrence of CS among healthy women and newborns.
... There are two strategies scholars proposed to address ambiguous corruption definitions. Firstly, Doig et al., (2007) expressed that professional skills and ethical training should be provided to employees in construction firms to improve the employees' behaviours in the industry. Secondly, promoting anti-corruption in infrastructure, construction and engineering sectors by industry-led actions can help eliminate corruption (Zinnbauer et al., 2009). ...
The construction industry in Thailand has significant impact upon the nation's economic growth. However, the industry has been threatened by corruption which is a major cause of Thailand's middle-income trap. The aim of this research is to explore the nature of corrupt practices in the Thailand construction industry by examining the causes and strategies for preventing corruption through the lens of the principal-agent framework. The study adopts qualitative research approach through semi-structured interview with 12 professionals from the construction industry. The result of the study shows that corruption in the Thai construction industry is caused by factors such as personal behaviour, red-tape and conflicts of laws, organisational culture etc. Improving organisational system, decentralisation, ethical training, promoting ethical culture etc. are some of the measures that could be used in fighting corruption in the Thai construction industry. The study contributes to a body of knowledge that could help mitigate the detrimental consequences of corruption.
... Structural reforms have limitations, however. Empirical evidence reveals that structural reforms do not consistently improve corrupt conduct, and they do not have a lasting effect (Buscaglia & Dakolias, 1998;Doig et al., 2007;Králiková, 2021;Meier & Holbrook, 1992). ...
International expert groups have identified the largest problems in the world. This address will connect these disparate global problems, showing how corruption either created them or made them much worse. The world has turned to structural reforms to institutions, laws, and policies to control corruption, but success has been uneven, as unethical people continue to exploit both corrupt and non-corrupt environments, aggravating the world’s largest problems and creating new ones. A commitment to ethics education and training can generate more ethical choices and principled responses that would increase individual accountability. It is argued that the largest problems in the world can be reduced in size only through more ethical decisionmaking, which is a precursor to reducing corruption, as the common feature of the world’s largest problems.
... It is however worth noting that Airbus had established robust anticorruption structures, the reason for which they were awarded Anti-corruption certificate in 2012 (SFO, 2020b). Nonetheless, as the scope of operational objective had been narrowly geared toward achieving business goals, their organising practices became infested with unethical conducts (Doig et al., 2007). Thus, Airbus may have drawn some ethical diligence from social reality but left this reality behind them, hence creating the opportunity for corrupt practices to galvanise (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). ...
Drawing on collective myopia as a lens, we explore the infamous Airbus bribery scandal to show how the executives of the global aircraft manufacturer, through their actions and behaviors institutionalized the payment of bribes to secure contracts. Data for the inquiry consist of publicly available court-approved documents, company website and internal emails, and newspaper articles on the scandal. Unpacking the bribery scheme operated by Airbus, we found that bribing of foreign government officials and airline executives to secure contracts was part and parcel of the firm’s organizing strategy. In this regard, the organizing practices of Airbus actively encouraged employees to break its own bribery compliance policies which they employed as smokescreens to cover their illegal activities. Building on our findings, we developed a collective myopic-bribery framework outlining how the collective myopia in organizing, drove the bribery activities at Airbus. The implications of the findings for theory and practice are outlined.
... The constitution has been amended more than 100 times during the first 30 years, but not on these issues, rather, with matters like allowing foreign investment in radio and television stations and changing minimum contribution time for social security (Calgaro 2018). These protections of institutional and legal rights include an abundance of rules and processes for accountability in response to prior repression and corruption by cliques, factions, and cronies, which often continue in late democracies, despite the attempts to create anti-corruption bodies (Doig, Watt, and Williams 2007). Alas, the protections involve heavy rule compliance and oversight, often by many layers of bureaucracy and legal offices; managers have legitimate fears about being accused of rule-breaking and other wrong-doing. ...
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed fundamental flaws in the design of public administration in late democracies. While much writing to date focuses on the initial and vital responses to COVID-19, the magnitude of this event also furthers insights into the risks of incomplete institutional designs and practices, such as the case of Brazil, an example of the administrative flaws in late democracies. This article is not a critique of responses to COVID-19 per se, but an examination of these considering democratization processes that include state-building and the need for another push in administrative and political reforms. Shortcomings in state-building, which existed before COVID-19, inflict heavy costs on society and, if left unaddressed, add to the costs of future disasters and unraveling of support for state and democratic institutions.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
... Lack of co-operation between different agencies, patronage, misappropriation of funds and lack of due diligence leading to undesired discrepancy between expectations and actual results increase the risk factor and also affect the smooth functioning and public image of the government organization. This has been duly derived as a risk by the author of this paper from an analysis of Anti-corruption Acts by (A. Doig, 2007) and (Sousa, 2009). Source: Authors own Compilation (e) Due Diligence-Due diligence is an element of efficient and clean functioning by the government organisation in order to mitigate identified bribery risks, resulting in good governance by the government. ...
The administration and management are responsible to a large extent for ensuring the prevention and detection of fraud in an organisation. It is utmost imperative for the Government sector companies and related organizations to set an appropriate tone at the top by setting personal examples by the top leadership itself, one that is reflective of their commitment towards honest behavior and ethical practices in public and private life. In study we have put an effort to study mechanism of money laundering & forms of bribery. A qualitative analysis was performed with depth literature review based on secondary data available. The study is divided in two phases: 1. Mechanism of Money Laundering and forms of Bribery in Government sector services. 2. Suggesting preventive tools for detection of wrongful practices in the Government sector services. The findings suggest the certain control weaknesses that contribute to fraud include key deficiencies in internal financial controls and managerial oversight, overriding existing controls, poor tone at the higher management level, and lack of competent personnel which can be dealt with some early detection techniques which are discussed in the study. The study would make contribution to Government sector in using this as a manual for training purposes.
... Second, the encouragement from international donors (e.g. the World Bank) to many developing countries to create an ACA came with unrealistic expectations on the part of the donors themselves, that is, as Pope and Vogl (2000: 2) noted, an ACA is expected to be "credible, transparent and fearless." On this point, it is arguable that a balance between the demands of operating performance and an agency's own capacity to accommodate those demands needs to be struck appropriately (Doig et al., 2007). ...
Grounded in 41 semi-structured interviews, this article examines the extent to which the complaints system under regulatory oversight of the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC) in Thailand has been effective for addressing corruption complaints. The present article revisits the theoretical arguments of the structural school and the reputational school over agency independence, deploying such arguments to analyze the way in which de facto independence of the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) operating in a highly politicized environment can be protected. The analysis finds that a high level of legal independence is the best possible way to safeguard de facto independence, enhancing the overall effectiveness of the ACAs working in highly politicized countries. In addition, the empirical findings suggest that a low level of legal independence, a lack of prosecution power, inadequate qualified staffing, and the absence of meaningful public participation are the core factors contributing to the ineffectiveness of the PACC system.
... The increasing support for civil society initiatives should be seen as a movement towards a better governance agenda, with more transparency and more open governments (Fung A, 2010). The main aim of the current citizens' initiatives are having a more transparent and better relationship between the government and its citizens in order to bolster bottom-up initiatives achieving better development results (Doig A, 2007). ...
In examining corruption in European countries, it becomes apparent that corruption is stronger in certain states than in others.
... 1 The ACA of Kosovo, the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption in Slovenia and the ACA of Sierra Leone are cases where corruption has not undergone major changes. Moreover, disciplinary procedures are hampered by overlapping responsibilities, while horizontal accountability limits the independence of agencies to investigate cases (Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2007;. 2 For reasons of space and argumentative clarity, not all the activities of the OAA are presented, only those that we consider relevant to understanding how the strategy has changed over time. ...
In Corruption in Latin America the reader is presented with an alternative starting point for understanding corruption in this key region. The author asserts that corruption is a stable and rational social and organizational mechanism. Seen through this lens, we can begin to understand why it persists, and how to implement strategies to control corruption effectively.
Beginning with an in-depth, nuanced examination of the concept of corruption, the author establishes the theoretical basis for viewing corruption as a social construct. An analysis of the experiences of four countries in the region – Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala and Mexico – provides the reader with concrete data from which they can understand how and why these behaviors are reproduced, validated, and tolerated in everyday settings between governments and citizens, governments and firms, and firms and clients. Once we see corruption as the socially sanctioned norm for getting business done, we can begin to produce and propose effective solutions to reduce corruption in Latin America by designing and implementing instruments that transform this dynamic.
This rigorous and original approach will challenge the reader’s assumptions about corruption, and will appeal to students of corporate governance, international business, public management, and business ethics.
... Most studies related to ACAs are either single case studies or small-n studies, which mostly look at organizational peculiarities but neglect the imperative need for a comparative analysis of performance across ACAs (e.g. Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2007;Engelbert, 2014;Heilbrunn, 2004). In addition, the absence of universal measurement standards hitherto precluded a systematic comparative analysis of ACAs. ...
This article presents a new index of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) covering 53 states between 2006 and 2011. The ACA Index complements research on ACA performance by adding a comparative dimension to the mainly qualitative literature on ACA effectiveness. First, the institutional determinants of ACA effectiveness are defined, comprising the mandate, political independence, resources and powers and accountability mechanisms. A strategy to achieve comparative measures of ACA capacity is then outlined and implemented combining data from the Global Integrity Index with a new dataset on ACA functions. The data shows interesting variations in the functions that together compose ACA mandates and illustrates the uneven distribution of ACAs across different world regions. A brief analysis of the ACA Index suggests the importance of ACA capacity for the perception of a government’s seriousness to reduce corruption while on the other hand their role as the sole decisive institution in a country’s strategy against corruption is relativized.
... Along these lines, studies have argued that creating an independent institution is now one of the most suitable moves to the outbreak of public sector corruption and therefore, suggesting the movement from multi-agency structure to a single agency approach [3], [6], [7]. These functions of these single agency approach include the prevention, investigations, and prosecution of public sector corruption [1], [8]. Consequently, their core objectives are usually stated in terms of prevention, deterrence, and public campaigns. ...
The purpose of this paper is to appraise the effectiveness of Nigerian’s Economic
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) of their role in tackling public sector
corruptions and to associate how institutional as well as organizational factors
influence the effectiveness of the EFCC. Data were obtained using semi-structured
interviews, documentary analysis and non-participatory observations. The result of
the thematic analysis shows the ineffectiveness of EFCC in tackling public sector
corruption, and hence the need for further improvisation of the organization. The
ineffectiveness of the EFCC is associated with perceived lack of political
commitment; inefficient judicial process; insufficient budgetary allocations; and
insufficient professionally qualified personnel. This study thus recommends further
improvements in the form of greater political will, improved legal process and
elevated budgetary funds and recruitment of personnel to the EFCC in order for
the organization to successfully execute its role and functions.
... On the basis of data from 35 less developed countries, Rauch and Evans (2000) show that a rule-based public administration with Weberian institutional attributes, such as fixed rules, impersonal relationships, career stability and meritocratic recruitment, works to curb corruption. Doig et al. (2007) investigate three dilemmas facing ACAs in developing countries in relation to institutional development, performance and delivery, and organisational continuity and correctly point to the imperative for an ACA to develop organisation capacities to cope with prevailing political, social and economic conditions under which it operates. ...
In this study, we seek to identify and explain what factors influence citizens' propensity to confront corruption by reporting suspected corruption cases. From a macro–micro interactive perspective, which we term ‘socially embedded anti-corruption governance’, we make two propositions focusing on intrinsic and extrinsic factors, respectively. We believe, first, that citizens' response to suspected corrupt behaviour is a good indicator of the level of their tolerance for corruption. If corruption is unacceptable to citizens, they would be more likely to report suspected corruption cases. However, a low level of tolerance of corruption alone does not necessarily explain why people report corruption. We further argue that people's willingness to confront corruption is also affected by the extent to which they are satisfied with and have confidence in the government's anti-corruption endeavours. Drawing on data collected from an original survey of 1025 local residents in Hong Kong, we test the two hypotheses. Our findings confirm that the propensity to report suspected corruption results from both a low level of tolerance towards corruption and the positive perception of the quality of anti-corruption governance. The implications of our findings for other regions, especially Mainland China, are explored. Copyright
... In describing the fight against corruption in Poland, Gadowska (2010) argues that externally imposed anticorruption initiatives have little effect if they are not supported by domestic efforts to fight corruption, including top-down political and administrative projects, as well as bottom-up pressure. In discussing anti-corruption commissions in African countries, Doig et al. (2007) have argued that such commissions are often operating in environments dominated by weak governance and incoherent funding policies, while being confronted by entrenched corruption. Similarly, Okogbule (2006) points out that, in Nigeria, a number of statutory enactments were introduced to combat corruption, but which achieved only limited success. ...
Across the world, corruption is endemic, a cause of growing inequality, and an impediment to economic growth. Many countries have attempted to curb corruption at the national level, with little success. Researchers have argued that, instead of initiate controlling corruption at national level, resisting corruption should be actively instigated within organisations. Specifically, Luo (Manag Organ Rev 1(1):119–154, 2005) suggests that corruption becomes entrenched in organisations through the task and institutional environments, and can therefore only be fought through changes in institutional architecture. Modification of Luo’s model, by putting in place anti-corruption systems at the start, shows how anti-corruption behaviours become established and can be resisted. In this paper, we explore the successful management of organisational corruption by the Grameen Bank, a leading microfinance institute that operates in Bangladesh. For many years, this bank has stood out against the generally accepted culture of corruption in Bangladesh. Using the case study method, this research explores the impact of the anti-corruption structures and processes implemented by Grameen Bank, as a unique illustration within Bangladesh of the value of this modified version of the Luo’s model. The bank has actively introduced policies and processes that have made it difficult for corruption to become established.
Whether corruption supports or hampers economic growth is a vexed theme in development research, particularly at the sub-national level where research is scant. This paper uses corruption data from court reports to analyse how corruption affects economic performance at the sub-national level in Indonesia. The regression models use dynamic panel estimation incorporating spatial dependence, and dealing with endogeneity and omitted variables. We find a consistent negative effect of corruption on regional growth across all specifications. Spatial effects reveal the influence of neighbouring districts’ growth, which amplifies the negative impact of corruption. Evaluating potential pathways of corruption indicates government size, poverty, education, and infrastructure do not significantly mediate corruption at the sub-national level. The policy implication is that anti-corruption efforts need not only be targeted but also well-coordinated: merely maintaining the level of government service or provision of infrastructure does not address the negative consequence of corruption on regional economic growth.
Literature on political corruption agrees that in contexts with widespread corruption, curbing it through institutions is insufficient. That is, formal rules like laws and anti-corruption agencies are not always obeyed or enforced because individuals regard corruption as the expected behavior. Therefore, some legal mechanisms remain unenforced. In addition, the conventional perspective suggests that fighting corruption is a problem of collective action and lack of civil society engagement. Nonetheless, scholars have ignored the role of international hybrid agencies in tackling this situation. In this article, I will propose elements to fill this gap and demonstrate that the Commission Against Impunity has proven to be an effective means of fighting political corruption and impunity in Guatemala. Similarly, the Commission’s legacy challenges theoretical mainstream anti-corruption theories. Using case study methodology and pursuing a documentary review, I argue that the Commission was competent in tackling impunity, overcoming the collective action dilemma, and encouraging social participation. These outcomes were possible due to the Commission’s institutional design and, to a lesser extent, cooperation between local and international actors.
To better understand street-level bureaucracy in developing countries, this study focuses on street-level implementation as embedded within systemic corruption, which is well-documented in the developing world. Analysis focuses on a large city in Guanajuato, which exhibits among the highest corruption rates in Mexico. To allow for a broad perspective, the analysis applies a sequential exploratory mixed-method research design and draws on in-depth interviews with varied stakeholders (N = 17) and a representative survey of street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) (N = 594). Findings indicate that organizational corruption (ORG-C) and street-level corruption (SL-C) are two distinct, yet related phenomena. Additionally, SLBs' perceptions about the level of corruption both among superiors and among colleagues are associated with their tolerance towards inappropriate street-level interactions with citizens. By shifting attention to street-level implementation as embedded within a corrupt environment, this study provides new theoretical and practical insights about street-level implementation in developing countries and about the unique challenges of fighting systemic corruption. Policy impact statement: Common anticorruption policies often reflect an assumption that higher-level ORG-C and SL-C are separate, isolated phenomena, thus overlooking the implications of systemic corruption environments for street-level implementation in general, and for SL-C in particular. By uncovering that the willingness for street-level divergence among SLBs is influenced by their perception of corruption established by municipal administration as well as by colleagues, this study emphasizes that fighting corruption should account for the interrelationships between corruption at different organizational levels.
Evidence-based regulation is a term of art that refers to the process of making decisions about regulation based on evidence generated through systematic research. There is increasing pressure to treat evidence-based regulation as a global best practice, including in the area of anti-bribery law. Too little attention has been paid to the fact that under certain conditions evidence-based regulation is likely to be a less appealing method of decision making than the alternative – namely, relying on judgment. Those conditions are: it is difficult to collect data on either interventions or outcomes; accurate causal inferences are difficult to draw; there is little warrant for believing that the same causal relationships will apply in a new context; or the decision makers in question lack the capacity to undertake one of these tasks. These conditions are likely to be present in complex, transnational, decentralized, and dynamic forms of business regulation such as the global anti-bribery regime.
Despite the growing literature on corruption, knowledge on how to control this phenomenon is still limited. Many scholars and policymakers suggest that social accountability (SAcc) initiatives may help to strengthen public accountability and combat corruption. SAcc is understood as citizen-based initiatives, beyond voting, aiming to prevent, detect or expose corruption by holding the State accountable and seeking direct or indirect sanctions by triggering horizontal accountability. In this vein, success depends heavily on the efficiency of control agencies in officially investigating and sanctioning corrupt acts. Furthermore, evidence suggests that outcomes of SAcc initiatives to fight corruption depend heavily on the context in which they are implemented. This thesis aims to build on the knowledge of how SAcc works in controlling corruption in practice. On this basis, this thesis focuses on three core points. First, it analyses the current debates and scholarship on corruption and how this problem has triggered many policy responses, including SAcc. It also discusses both the scholarship and empirical cases on SAcc to reach a broad understanding of its complementary role in controlling corruption. Second, this thesis offers an in-depth study of SAcc’s place in the Ecuadorian anti-corruption institutional framework firmament. Ecuador is an interesting case study due to its innovative and favourable SAcc and anti-corruption institutional framework. However, the way in which SAcc is carried out depends not only on a conducive framework, but also on how it works in practice. In this context, this research also analyses how the institutionalisation of SAcc may undermine SAcc’s main objective, holding the State accountable. Third, our understanding of how SAcc is practised is sharpened with an empirical analysis of two SACC initiatives: a citizen oversight initiative (veeduria in Spanish) in the city of Cuenca and the participatory budget in the province of Tungurahua. Taking these specific cases, this research analyses the interrelationship between citizens, control agencies and the State, at different levels, to understand SAcc’s capacity to sanction corruption in the Ecuadorian context. The findings of the research show that veedurias can be an effective mechanism for detecting corruption, but this outcome may be hampered by horizontal agencies’ inefficiency in investigating signs of corruption. Additionally, the process of participatory budgeting in Tungurahua is mainly based on the actions of local governments and does not offer many opportunities for citizens to control budget expenditure. Furthermore, there are several structural problems in the framework that weaken SAcc’s capacity to hold the State accountable. Without sanctions, there is no accountability. Furthermore, these weaknesses can make SAcc mechanisms vulnerable to being captured by the State and used to legitimise public actions.
Having been introduced in 2015 by the efforts of the elite-backed civil society organization – the Anti-Corruption Organization of Thailand (ACT) – the Integrity Pact (IP) approach, calling for citizen engagement in exacting accountability in the public procurement system, is claimed to have been producing promising results for prevention of corruption in Thailand’s public procurement. This paper critically explores the IP approach adopted in Thailand with a particular emphasis on the role of the Independent Observers (IOs). The objectives are threefold: to examine the arrangements of Thailand’s IP approach and the IOs; to identify the contribution of the IP approach to the prevention of corruption in Thailand’s public procurement; and to investigate fundamental challenges the IP approach and the IOs face. The findings demonstrate that the IP approach is an effective means for ensuring citizen engagement in exacting public accountability and prevention of corruption in public procurement. However, they also highlight the key challenges of effective implementation of the approach including politicization of the IOs, the exclusion of the IOs in the drafting of Terms of Reference (TOR) and the officials’ misconceptions about the IOs.
Corruption—the appropriate of public resources for private purposes—is a modern phenomenon insofar as modern states are founded on the principle of the strict separation of public and private. This was not the case for much of human history, where “patrimonial” rulers regarded the public domain as a species of private property. Corruption needs to be distinguished from both rent-seeking and patronage/clientelism—in the first case, because many rents have perfectly legitimate uses, and in the second because clientelism involves a reciprocal exchange of favors and can be regarded as an early form of democratic participation. Moving from a patronage-based state to a modern-impersonal one is a fundamentally political act, since it involves wresting power away from entrenched elites who use their access to the state for private purposes. This is what happened during the Progressive Era in the US, and also what explains the relative success of anti-corruption bodies like Indonesia’s KPK.
Cambridge Core - European Government, Politics and Policy - Europe's Burden - by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi
The study focuses on an evaluation of the anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana and their relation to Botswana’s development. An evaluation was needed to find out whether the anti-corruption initiatives were effective and whether there was a correlation between the effectiveness of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC) and the level of development in Botswana.
This study showed that the DCEC has succeeded in low corruption in Botswana through its most successful public education mandate and debatable good governance. The DCEC has helped to enhance service delivery in the public sector through the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Units (ACUs) within the Ministries aimed at tackling corruption in-house. Consequently, a significant slight improvement was registered in both public health and education sectors. However, that improvement was still minimal to the extent that it has been hampered by the challenging working conditions of the DCEC attributable to the inadequacy of legislation, lack of manpower, shortage of required skills and slow criminal justice system as well as the debatable independence of the DCEC, evidenced by its reporting and appointing lines. This implies that the impact of the DCEC in the development of Botswana has been minimal, as the country is still devastated by socio-economic disparities, especially in rural areas.
A corrupção no setor público está presente em todos os países do mundo, desde os países desenvolvidos até os mais pobres. Entender como esse fenômeno ocorre em diferentes países é fundamental para o surgimento de mecanismos efetivos de combate à corrupção e o fortalecimento da democracia. Nesse sentido, este estudo buscou responder a seguinte questão: Como o tema da corrupção na Administração Pública vem sendo debatido na literatura internacional? Para isso utilizou-se análise de conteúdo e revisão sistemática da literatura. Ao todo foram analisadas 211 produções internacionais entre artigos teóricos e empíricos que tratam da corrupção em 141 países do mundo. Os resultados apontam para um campo de estudo em crescimento, com uma diversidade de métodos e técnicas de pesquisa divididos entre estudos qualitativos e quantitativos. Os temas em destaque são as reformas contra a corrupção no mundo, as causas e consequências da corrupção e as formas de medir a corrupção. Ao final do artigo é oferecida uma agenda para estudos futuros em relação ao tema.
Corruption creates both social and economic problems, and perhaps as much as any other country, China has faced corruption concerns for decades. Beginning in November 2012, Chinese leader Xi Jinping instituted one of the most widespread anti-corruption campaigns in the country’s history. We investigate its impacts on corporate corruption spending. We use reported Entertainment and Travel Costs as our proxy for corruption spending, and focus on a sample of 107 large Chinese firms with data available over the 2010–2015 time frame. We document significant decreases in our corruption spending proxy over the three-year period following implementation of the anti-corruption campaign relative to the preceding three-year period. We also find that reductions in the spending are significantly more pronounced for firms in industries targeted more directly under the anti-corruption campaign. These results hold when we control for status as a state-owned enterprise and changes in firm profitability. We conclude that, at least in the Chinese setting, governmental pressure was effective at reducing corporate corruption. While we cannot generalise our results to more developed Western economies, our findings would appear to be particularly relevant to developing economies where other forms of social constraints on corruption may be less prevalent.
This chapter discusses the theoretical and empirical implications of the study finding, and outlines their generalisability across other geographical settings. Policy implications are discussed as well. The chapter closes by pointing to potential avenues for further research.
This paper investigates how Anti-Corruption Authorities (ACA) make use of performance measurement in order to improve performance management. The research framework has been developed from Ferreira and Otley (2009). The authors used a qualitative method with multiple case study in order to perform comparative research. Indonesia’s Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi and Swedish National Anti-Corruption Unit were chosen as the sample of the study. The research found that both of the authorities has a greatly different performance management system and performance measurement. It can be seen from the use of key performance indicators and its role in the management control system, as well as the target setting, performance evaluation, and rewards.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to illuminate the hidden process of collusion among power holders in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in an emerging economy, which endures despite comprehensive reforms towards democracy and good governance. Why are mechanisms of checks and balances not functioning in the way they should?
Design/methodology/approach
The analysis is based on in-depth interviews with board members, executives, politicians, bureaucrats and representatives from auditing boards involved in the management of SOEs in Indonesia.
Findings
The findings reveal practices of collective conservatism, reciprocal opportunism and normalisation of corruption. The costs of getting into powerful positions are so high that conglomerate business owners gain control over the management of SOEs. The authors use the terms “wall-building and gatekeeping” to explain such cases.
Research limitations/implications
There is a continuous process of wall building and gatekeeping occurring among business oligarchs, bureaucrats and elected politicians in Indonesia. New entrants into the system are co-opted by the established elite.
Practical implications
This study shows collusion, rent-seeking and corruption among political and business elites as well as top officials in the government hinder good governance reforms in state-owned Indonesian enterprises.
Social implications
Collusion and illicit business practices in SOEs are clearly grounded on wall building and gatekeeping. Tackling this problem is a precondition for good governance and an improved legal and regulatory business environment in Indonesia. The ideal separation of powers and the checks and balances for good governance apparently need more than a democracy to break through. A further strengthening of the free press and critical academics will be one crucial contribution.
Originality/value
There is generally a lack of understanding of the context of corruption, such as the influence of institutional and organisational structures. The topic of corruption is also under-researched due to the difficulty of finding empire evidence. This paper contributes to explaining why new political and organisational structures, such as a democratically elected parliament and a particularly designed corruption eradication commission, are not able to hinder rent-seeking practices and illicit political business in state agencies.
A corrupção no setor público está presente em todos os países do mundo, desde os países desenvolvidos até os mais pobres. Entender como esse fenômeno ocorre em diferentes países é fundamental para o surgimento de mecanismos efetivos de combate à corrupção e o fortalecimento da democracia. Nesse sentido, este estudo buscou responder a seguinte questão: Como o tema da corrupção na Administração Pública vem sendo debatido na literatura internacional? Para isso utilizou-se análise de conteúdo e revisão sistemática da literatura. Ao todo foram analisadas 211 produções internacionais entre artigos teóricos e empíricos que tratam da corrupção em 141 países do mundo. Os resultados apontam para um campo de estudo em crescimento, com uma diversidade de métodos e técnicas de pesquisa divididos entre estudos qualitativos e quantitativos. Os temas em destaque são as reformas contra a corrupção no mundo, as causas e consequências da corrupção e as formas de medir a corrupção. Ao final do artigo é oferecida uma agenda para estudos futuros em relação ao tema.
The article addresses the emerging debate in delegation scholarship over the role of legal independence vs. reputational activism of agency leaders, in shaping de facto independence. The study explores a transitional context, analysing the enforcement styles of Serbian and Macedonian ethics commissions. Through a qualitative analysis of the commissions' enforcement styles, and a quantitative analysis of their rhetorical patterns, the article finds that the commissions' de facto independence was not a function of their legal independence but rather of the reputational craft of their leaders. In new democracies, the role of structural agency insulation is minimized both in containing as well as in fostering de facto independence: informal networks, on the one hand, provide non‐institutional routes for principals to undermine agencies' de facto independence; external conditionality and increased policy salience, on the other hand, provide reputational opportunities for agency leaders to overcome low legal independence.
The ongoing Ebola crisis in Sierra Leone illustrates the ways in which the security/development discourse that has emerged over the past two decades remains embedded in theoretical assumptions that have been shaped by a blend of realist and neoliberal theories. As we will show, the logical outcome of this orthodox security/development discourse is that it leads to a militarisation of what is in reality a complex social problem. The neoliberal policies adopted by governments in Sierra Leone has served to heighten these social problems and in so doing have created the conditions for the generation of the Ebola virus to emerge.
This article offers the first comprehensive review of the interdisciplinary state of knowledge regarding anti-corruption policies, with a particular focus on reducing corruption among civil servants. Drawing on the work of economists, political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists, we examine seven policy categories: (1) rewards and penalties; (2) monitoring; (3) restructuring bureaucracies; (4) screening and recruiting; (5) anti-corruption agencies; (6) educational campaigns; and (7) international agreements. Notably, rigorous empirical evaluation is lacking for the majority of commonly prescribed anti- corruption policies. Nevertheless, we find growing evidence of the effectiveness of policies based on monitoring, including anti-corruption audits and e-governance. In addition, adequate civil service wages seem to be a necessary but insufficient condition for control of corruption. An emerging skepticism regarding the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies also is apparent in the literature. We conclude with broader lessons drawn from our review, such as the recognition that when corruption is a systemic problem, it cannot be treated in the long term with individual-level solutions.
Numerous studies have linked a range of economic, social, and institutional variables with corruption in government. Yet, most of this literature overlooks the management of public officials themselves. This is a relevant omission: almost all corrupt exchanges involve public officials. This article reviews studies – 36 in total – that do address civil service management and anti-corruption. It finds that prior works assess a narrow set of civil service management structures. Meritocratic recruitment and, less robustly, pay levels have been associated with lower corruption. By contrast, robust evidence on how corruption relates to other established public personnel management areas – such as distinct pay structures (rather than levels), promotion, transfer, and job stability practices – is largely unavailable. The article thus calls for research assessing the effects of a broader set of civil service management practices to gain a deeper understanding of corruption, and how to curb it.
Anti-corruption reforms in fragile and conflict-affected states are considered as a policy imperative by international actors engaged in statebuilding. The establishment of anti-corruption agencies is often the preferred implementation strategy. The main rationale is that anti-corruption agencies demonstrate a government’s commitment to fight corruption, and should thus improve state legitimacy within a context of weak governance. In practice, several intervening factors condition the legitimacy effect of anti-corruption agencies, including the types and systems of corruption prevalent in a specific context, the perceptions of corruption towards specific parts of government, and how citizens attribute the successes or failures of these agencies to the state. More broadly, these intervening factors also challenge the predominant assumption of a positive linear relationship between anti-corruption reforms, increased state legitimacy, and greater stability in fragile and conflict-affected states.
Major development projects in many African countries are often financed by development partners through development aid procurement. Development partners implement specific procurement policies aimed at promoting development in countries receiving aid. This article examines the policies of development partners applicable to aid funded procurement. It argues that some development partner policies could limit the policy space available to implement prioritized development goals domestically.
This article offers the first comprehensive review of the interdisciplinary state of knowledge regarding anti-corruption policies, with a particular focus on reducing corruption among civil servants. Drawing on the work of economists, political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists, we examine seven policy categories: (1) rewards and penalties; (2) monitoring; (3) restructuring bureaucracies; (4) screening and recruiting; (5) anti-corruption agencies; (6) educational campaigns; and (7) international agreements. Notably, rigorous empirical evaluation is lacking for the majority of commonly prescribed anti-corruption policies. Nevertheless, we find growing evidence of the effectiveness of policies based on monitoring, including anti-corruption audits and e-governance. In addition, adequate civil service wages seem to be a necessary but insufficient condition for control of corruption. An emerging skepticism regarding the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies also is apparent in the literature. We conclude with broader lessons drawn from our review, such as the recognition that when corruption is a systemic problem, it cannot be treated in the long term with individual-level solutions.
African public sectors went through many changes during the 1960s and 1970s in response to political, economic and social pressures. They expanded in size but remained, at least in design, hierarchical and centralized. Their formal relations to society did not undergo any significant changes either. Generally, the reforms now under way are significantly different from earlier ones. Most are inspired by the new public management (NPM) paradigm. They are also much more radical in their aims, among which are: to reduce the core functions of the state; redraw the boundaries between political and administrative responsibilities; emphasize efficiency; redefine relations between public and private sectors; strengthen accountability; reduce corruption; reorganize organizations and staff; change values and attitudes; and exploit new technologies. This article focuses on a paradox of reform in Tanzania: multiple changes are pursued in the public sector despite fragile domestic political support to the reform package as a whole and despite few service delivery improvements on the ground. It is argued that this is the result of substantial external influences, fragmented domestic policy making, weak links between policy making and implementation, and questionable assumptions about some of the key NPM-inspired reform measures. Moreover, the analyses highlight a number of differences with some of the recent reform literature. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
This article examines Nigeria's experience with civil service reforms after it attained independence from Britain in 1960. It first highlights civil service reform programs attempted by various post-independence Nigerian governments. Within this context the study addresses key issues, challenges, and factors that impeded implementation of previous civil service reform programs. Next. The study explores future policy directions for enhancing the design and implementation of a sustainable civil service reform program. The study concludes by recapitulating the key policy reform measures essential for bringing about a sustainable civil service process and improving the future effectiveness and performance of the civil service.
The Guiding Principles on Civil Service Reform were endorsed by the Special Programme of Assistance for Africa (SPA) as a tool for better co-ordination of donor support. Because of the range of administrative problems, and the economic and political urgency of solving them, African governments need a strategic framework for civil service reform. This should be based on a vision of the role of the state, and take into account leadership, commitment, governance, economic reforms, sequencing, ministerial restructuring, decentralisation, downsizing, pay and incentives, capacity building, service delivery, aid mechanisms, and change management processes. Because of the enormity and political sensitivity of the task, and the severe limitations on capacity to manage reform, such a framework will take 10-20 years to implement fully in most countries. Civil service reform is an art, not a science. Committed reformers within the concerned government know best what they need, and how to get there. The role of donors should be mainly facilitation: identifying committed reformers (or potentially committed ones), and then empowering them to design and carry out needed changes.
Credit default swaps (CDS) which constitute up to 98% of credit derivatives have had a unique, endemic and pernicious role to play in the current financial crisis. However, there are few in depth empirical studies of the financial network interconnections among banks and between banks and nonbanks involved as CDS protection buyers and protection sellers. The ongoing problems related to technical insolvency of US commercial banks is not just confined to the so called legacy/toxic RMBS assets on balance sheets but also because of their credit risk exposures from SPVs (Special Purpose Vehicles) and the CDS markets. The dominance of a few big players in the chains of insurance and reinsurance for CDS credit risk mitigation for banks’ assets has led to the idea of “too interconnected to fail” resulting, as in the case of AIG, of having to maintain the fiction of non-failure in order to avert a credit event that can bring down the CDS pyramid and the financial system. This paper also includes a brief discussion of the complex system Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) approach to financial network modeling for systemic risk assessment. Quantitative analysis is confined to the empirical reconstruction of the US CDS network based on the FDIC Q4 2008 data in order to conduct a series of stress tests that investigate the consequences of the fact that top 5 US banks account for 92% of the US bank activity in the $34 tn global gross notional value of CDS for Q4 2008 (see, BIS and DTCC). The May-Wigner stability condition for networks is considered for the hub like dominance of a few financial entities in the US CDS structures to understand the lack of robustness. We provide a Systemic Risk Ratio and an implementation of concentration risk in CDS settlement for major US banks in terms of the loss of aggregate core capital. We also compare our stress test results with those provided by SCAP (Supervisory Capital Assessment Program). Finally, in the context of the Basel
Does New Zealand's success story have lessons far developing countries contemplating public sector reform? That question usually elicits one of two reactions, both inadvisable in the authors' view. The first reaction is to be impressed with the efficacy of the reforms and conclude that they should be adopted uncritically in other countries. The second reaction is that the special conditions existing in New Zealand are such that none of its reform experience is relevant to others. The authors take a middle position, maintaining that poorer countries can indeed extrapolate from the experience of their higher income neighbor despite the different conditions tinder which they have to operate. New Zealand's comprehensive overhaul of its public sector affords bath general principles and specific elements relevant to countries looking to improve the quality, efficiency, and cost effectiveness of their public service sectors, and a careful analysis of those reforms can ascertain what might be transferable and what principles might apply.
Corruption is a symptom of fundamental economic, political, and institutional causes. Addressing corruption effectively means tackling these underlying causes. The major emphasis must be put on prevention - that is, on reforming economic policies, institutions, and incentives. Efforts to improve enforcement of anticorruption legislation using the police, ethics offices, or special watchdog agencies within government will not bear fruit otherwise. The following are only some of the major economic policy changes that will unambiguously reduce opportunities for corruption: lowering tariffs and other barriers to international trade; unifying market-determined exchange rates and interest rates; eliminating enterprise subsidies; minimizing regulations, licensing requirements, and other barriers to entry for new firms and investors; demonopolizing and privatizing government assets; and transparently enforcing prudential banking regulations and auditing and accounting standards. The reform of government institutions may include civil service reform; improved budgeting, financial management, and tax administration; and strengthened legal and judicial systems. Such reforms should involve changing government structures and procedures, placing greater focus on internal competition and incentives in the public sector, and strengthening internal and external checks and balances. As a complement to these broader reforms, the careful and transparent implementation of enforcement measures, such as prosecuting some prominent corrupt figures, can also have an impact.
Since the early 1990s, Malawi has tried to undertake economic reforms, including the restructuring of the public sector, even as it embraced democratic reforms. Paucity of human and financial resources has made the process difficult and drawn out. However, towards the end of the 1990s, the reforms began to bear fruit. Notably, the efficiency of the civil service improved, while the government continued to emphasise the importance of accountability and established an agency to fight corruption. This chapter analyses the factors, which have influenced public sector reforms in Malawi, with emphasis on the nature of reforms implemented by the government and the incentive structure in the civil service. Not unlike many other African countries, top political support has been important for the successful implementation of public sector reform in Malawi. However, sustainability will only be ensured when support for the programmes is spread among broad sections of the population.
This article is concerned with three issues: the convergence of donors over a shared development agenda, on why dealing with corruption is seen as a key aspect of the agenda, and the means to assess corruption within the context of monitoring development progress. The article reviews the genesis of the agenda, and why corruption is often used as an indicator or measure of progress. It distinguishes between two general approaches—quantitative indicators and qualitative descriptors—for assessing types and levels of corruption before considering methodological and interpretative issues relating to each approach. It suggests that, while each has a role, cognizance should be made of the awareness of the limitations of either for policy- or reform-related issues, particularly in terms of the exercise of political power or the nature and direction of development. The necessary convergence of the use of the two approaches has not been fully achieved to date and, until such time as a convergence is achieved, an over-reliance on one or other approach may not provide an effective basis for reform and aid initiatives, nor for assessing the progress and impact of both in delivering the development agenda.
Donors currently place emphasis on the need to address corruption in an increasingly coordinated fashion as part of their support for the wider development and democratisation agenda. Findings from country study reports which used the National Integrity System (NIS) approach for assessing types and levels of corruption indicate both that corruption persists and that donor coordination is evidenced in developing the resultant anti-corruption strategies within recipient states. This paper adopts a different perspective on the issue of donor coordination, specifically considering the potential for the integration of activities of agencies or institutions from within one specific donor country involved in work overseas in the anti-corruption field. The article uses the UK as the case study, looking at the activities of one transnational agency located in the UK (the Commonwealth Secretariat), at the UK's development agency (the Department for International Development) both as a single donor and as part of a partnership with other development agencies, and at two UK agencies, the National Audit Office and HM Customs & Excise. The article draws two conclusions. First, the individual organisations pursue their own agendas although the specialist agencies are aware of the need for contextual reform to make their work effective. Second, and despite this awareness, there is at present little evidence of a common purpose or approach for offering to recipient countries more integrated forms of assistance agreed between agencies from one donor country.
The aim of this article is to provide an evaluation of Uganda's current strategy to fight corruption. Like many countries on the African continent, Uganda has deemed it necessary to make attempts to reduce and control corruption within the public sector. As awareness of the deleterious and debilitating effects of corruption has grown, so too have both internal political factors and external pressures from aid donors increased in order to push for fundamental change in this respect. In terms of the donors, many have stipulated specific conditions relating to a good governance agenda based upon adherence to public integrity and minimum standards of public conduct. Sensitivity to pressure also stems in part, from a wish by government to be seen to be actively responding to donor concerns. Internal pressures stem from a growing desire by the public to demand accountability from those in government.
This article reports on proposals to implement a form of New Zealand's radical public management reforms in Mongolia, a state in transition from a Russian public administration model. The transferability of New Zealand style financial management reforms in particular is discussed in the context of a comparison of the preconditions and risks of centralized and decentralized financial management. Some observations are also made on the change process in developing or transitional economies contemplating major public management reform.
The growth of global corporations is synonymous with the spread of market capitalism. Market capitalism looks to regulated market economies and stable growth to expand and this in turn assumes states committed to economic liberalisation and the reduction in the barriers to trade. Such preconditions are assumed achievable through the promotion of democratisation—the liberal democratic model of government, now the favoured developmental template of multilateral and bilateral donor agencies. One major challenge to this approach is corruption at state and local level—and a major indicator of its acceptance is addressing corruption. As agencies who espouse a strong ethical stance internationally, corruption has appeared to be a highly visible reform issue for them during the 1990s. In spite of—or because of—such attention, levels of corruption appear to continue to rise and become more entrenched, while donor commitment may be under pressure to adapt, both as a possible consequence of the continued promotion of democratisation. This will force them to face the question of whether corruption may be an integral component of the model and whether they either confront the risks associated with it, or start to ignore corruption in favour of some wider agenda objectives that have less to do with international ethics and more to do with international realities of market capitalism.
New leaders are often assumed to be better able to push for policy and sector reform because they are less tied in by established patronage networks. The article discusses this assumption by examining public sector reform in three East African countries under different leaders. It finds that while neo-patrimonialism is an important reason why public sector reform is often blocked, this paradigm cannot explain why some public sector reforms are actually implemented. New leaders are not always new brooms, and whether they are so depends as much on formal conditions, such as the existence of a political coalition, as on informal neo-patrimonial factors. The article also finds that in some cases, old brooms can sweep too. When succession is institutionalised, as the Tanzanian case shows, even a relatively weak leader can carry out reform effectively in his second term because he does not have to consider re-election.
African public sectors went through many changes during the 1960s and 1970s in response to political, economic and social pressures. They expanded in size but remained, at least in design, hierarchical and centralized. Their formal relations to society did not undergo any significant changes either. Generally, the reforms now under way are significantly different from earlier ones. Most are inspired by the new public management (NPM) paradigm. They are also much more radical in their aims, among which are: to reduce the core functions of the state; redraw the boundaries between political and administrative responsibilities; emphasize efficiency; redefine relations between public and private sectors; strengthen accountability; reduce corruption; reorganize organizations and staff; change values and attitudes; and exploit new technologies. This article focuses on a paradox of reform in Tanzania: multiple changes are pursued in the public sector despite fragile domestic political support to the reform package as a whole and despite few service delivery improvements on the ground. It is argued that this is the result of substantial external influences, fragmented domestic policy making, weak links between policy making and implementation, and questionable assumptions about some of the key NPM-inspired reform measures. Moreover, the analyses highlight a number of differences with some of the recent reform literature.
Against the background of growing convergence amongst countries with regard to the focus on their public service reforms, the forces driving the same and communalities amongst approaches being adopted, the article assesses the various phases of Tanzania's public service reforms over 20 years. It concludes by posing two questions: first, how are the reforms contributing to improvements in poverty reduction and in service delivery? Second, why should ‘reform’ be treated as a priority in the allocation of budgetary resources by development partners? The answer is that direct links between Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) interventions and poverty reduction remains elusive, and the challenge is how best to manage that situation. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
This article addresses how the public service can be reformed to make it relevant to the circumstances and useful to the majority of people living and working in Ghana. In many public administration journals, reforms in sub-Saharan Africa have received scant attention. Using Ghana as a case study, this article first summarizes and evaluates that country's reform efforts and compares them to mainstream Anglo-American reform ideas. The article comments on the conceptualization of reform based on the notion of community, encompassing the unique political, social, and cultural experiences of the people of Ghana. Finally, the article discusses what a composite formulation of the notion of community might imply for a cross-cultural understanding of comparative public administration.
The anti-corruption successes of Singapore and Hong Kong have encouraged the establishment of strong, centralized anti-corruption agencies across the globe. This study charts the emergence of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), and then examines recent experiences with these bodies in developing countries. We propose a set of criteria for assessing and explaining their performance. The analysis applies within strict limits to those countries that have established the minimum political, legal, and socio-economic conditions for effective governance. Where these conditions are in place, success is possible. However, ACAs in poor and badly governed states are generally ineffective, if not actively harmful.
Successive governments in Nigeria have introduced reforms aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the civil service. Still, the service remains inefficient and incapable of reforming itself, let alone the rest of the economy. Corruption has become an endemic feature of public sector activities, with the oil booms and busts distorting the incentive structures of civil servants and other agents in the economy. It is estimated that the 'hidden' economy now comprises the bulk of economic activity. To turn the tide will demand the creation of an efficiency-based incentive scheme that links reward to performance. Political interference in the daily operations of the civil service needs to be minimised if the confidence of the public service is to be restored. Wage incentives are also important in raising morale. An underpaid civil service will not be able to perform its 'patriotic duty'.
During the past decade New Zealand has introduced far-reaching reforms in the structure and operation of government departments
and agencies. This model has attracted interest in developing countries because it promises significant gains in operational
efficiency. But developing countries, which are dominated by informal markets, are risky candidates for applying the New Zealand
model. The author suggests that basic reforms to strengthen rule-based government and pave the way for robust markets should
be undertaken first.
Does New Zealand's success story have lessons for developing countries contemplating public sector reform? That question usually
elicits one of two reactions, both inadvisable in the authors' view. The first reaction is to be impressed with the efficacy
of the reforms and conclude that they should be adopted uncritically in other countries. The second reaction is that the special
conditions existing in New Zealand are such that none of its reform experience is relevant to others. The authors take a middle
position, maintaining that poorer countries can indeed extrapolate from the experience of their higher income neighbor despite
the different conditions under which they have to operate. New Zealand's comprehensive overhaul of its public sector affords
both general principles and specific elements relevant to countries looking to improve the quality, efficiency, and cost effectiveness
of their public service sectors, and a careful analysis of those reforms can ascertain what might be transferable and what
principles might apply.
Reform of the Malawian Public Sector: Incentives, Governance and Accountability. Discussion Paper No United Nations University: World Institute for Development Economics Research. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- D Durevall
Durevall D. 2001. Reform of the Malawian Public Sector: Incentives, Governance and Accountability. Discussion Paper No. 2001/109. United Nations University: World Institute for Development Economics Research. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 1998. Transition Report 1998. London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
DOI: 10.1002/pad DEVELOPING ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSIONS
- Copyright
Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 27, 251–259 (2007) DOI: 10.1002/pad DEVELOPING ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSIONS
The Mozambican Civil Service: Incentives, Reforms and Performance. Discussion Paper No United Nations University: World Institute for Development Economics Research. Therkildsen O. 2000. Public sector reform in a poor, aid-dependant country
- S J Sulemane
Sulemane J, Kayizzi-Mugerwa S. 2001. The Mozambican Civil Service: Incentives, Reforms and Performance. Discussion Paper No. 2001/85. United Nations University: World Institute for Development Economics Research. Therkildsen O. 2000. Public sector reform in a poor, aid-dependant country, Tanzania. Public Administration and Development 20(1): 61–71.
Achieving Success and Avoiding Failure in Anti-corruption Commissions Managing anti-corruption agenciesUsing corruption indicators or descriptors to assess state development: numbers, nuances and moving targets
- A Doig
- Williams
- A Doig
- J Moran
- Watt
Doig A, Williams R. 2007. Achieving Success and Avoiding Failure in Anti-corruption Commissions. U4 Brief. No 1. Doig A, Moran J, Watt D. 2001. Managing anti-corruption agencies. Forum on Crime and Society 1: 1. Doig A, McIvor S, Theobald R. 2006. 'Using corruption indicators or descriptors to assess state development: numbers, nuances and moving targets'. International Review of Administrative Sciences 72(2): 239–252.
Vitalizing Public Administration for Recovery and Development
- G Mutahaba
- R Baguma
- M Halfani
Mutahaba G, Baguma R, Halfani M. 1993. Vitalizing Public Administration for Recovery and Development. Kumarian Press: Connecticut.
Report of the Working Conference on Anti-Corruption. Sponsored by the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs with the collaboration of the World Bank Institute (WBI)
- Maastricht
Maastricht. 2000. Report of the Working Conference on Anti-Corruption. Sponsored by the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs with the collaboration of the World Bank Institute (WBI).
Anti-Corruption Agencies: Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight Corruption?. International Bank for reconstruction and Development/The World Bank
- J R Heilbrunn
Heilbrunn JR. 2004. Anti-Corruption Agencies: Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight Corruption?. International Bank for reconstruction and
Development/The World Bank: Washington.
Lessons of international and African perspectives on public service reform: examples from five African countries
- Mutahaba G
Mutahaba G, Kiragu K. 2002. Lessons of international and African perspectives on public service reform: examples from five African countries.
Africa Development 27(3-4): 48-75.
Governance and Policy in Africa: Recent Experiences. Discussion Paper No
- Hamboka
Hambok A. 2001. Governance and Policy in Africa: Recent Experiences. Discussion Paper No. 2001/126. United Nations University: World
Institute for Development Economics Research.
Incentive Structure, Civil Service Efficiency and the Hidden Economy in Nigeria. Discussion Paper No United Nations University: World Institute for Development Economics Research. Schick A. 1998. Why most developing countries should not try New Zealand reforms. The World Bank Research Observer
- M Salisu
Salisu M. 2001. Incentive Structure, Civil Service Efficiency and the Hidden Economy in Nigeria. Discussion Paper No. 2001/86. United Nations University: World Institute for Development Economics Research. Schick A. 1998. Why most developing countries should not try New Zealand reforms. The World Bank Research Observer 13(1): 123–131.
International donor agency initiatives to combat corruption: future failure or radical re‐think?
- Doig A
Doig A, Marquette H. 2004. International donor agency initiatives to combat corruption: future failure or radical re-think? Futures 37(2-3):
199-214.
Achieving Success and Avoiding Failure in Anti-corruption Commissions. U4 Brief
- A Doig
- R Williams
Doig A, Williams R. 2007. Achieving Success and Avoiding Failure in Anti-corruption Commissions. U4 Brief. No 1.
Reform of the Malawian Public Sector: Incentives
- Durevall
Durevall D. 2001. Reform of the Malawian Public Sector: Incentives, Governance and Accountability. Discussion Paper No. 2001/109. United
Nations University: World Institute for Development Economics Research.
The IMF's Approach to Promoting Good Governance and Combatting Corruption--A Guide
- Imf
IMF. 2005. The IMF's Approach to Promoting Good Governance and Combatting Corruption--A Guide. International Monetary Fund:
Washington.
Anti-Corruption Agencies: A Review of Experience
- P Meagher
Meagher P. 2002. Anti-Corruption Agencies: A Review of Experience. World Bank: Washington.
Making anticorruption agencies more effective
- Pope J
Pope J, Vogl F. 2000. Making anticorruption agencies more effective. Finance and Development: a Quarterly Magazine of the IMF 37(2).
Incentive Structure Civil Service Efficiency and the Hidden Economy in Nigeria
- Salisum
Achieving Success and Avoiding Failure in Anti-corruption Commissions. U4 Brief
- Doiga Williamsr
Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs: A Framework for Evaluation. Policy Research Working Papers
- Hutherj Shaha