Richard H. Ullman, Professor of International Affairs at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, spent the 1982-83 academic year as a visiting member of the Institute for Advanced Study.
1. The Leviathan (1651), Part I, Ch. XIII.
2. There is no better place to begin that discussion than Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chapter 3.
3. This is not to say that there are not recriminations following wars or military crises. Indeed, the governments that lead nations when war is thrust upon them—or when they initiate war themselves—are often subject to pillory. It may be alleged that their complacence allowed their nations' defenses to atrophy to a point where their military forces no longer deterred attack. Or they may be accused of recklessness that brought on a needless and expensive war. But while the war is still in prospect, or while it is actually underway, there are too seldom any questions of leaders' abilities to command the requisite resources from their perceptibly threatened countrymen.
4. The same is true, it should be noted, about some "ordinary" foreign threats. In 1975 a majority of Senators and members of Congress did not believe that the presence of Soviet-supported Cuban troops in Angola posed a significant threat to U.S. security, and legislated limits on potential American involvement. Three years earlier they imposed a cutoff on U.S. bombing of targets in Cambodia and North Vietnam on the supposition that continued bombing would no longer (if it ever did) promote U.S. security. For a discussion of these Congressional curbs on the President's ability to commit American military resources, see Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy By Congress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), esp. pp. 13-23 and 46-57.
5. For a recent authoritative study, see An Assessment of the Consequences and Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake: Findings and Actions Taken (Washington: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1980). For a summary of current estimates, see Richard A. Kerr, "California's Shaking Next Time," Science, Vol. 215 (January 22, 1982), pp. 385-387.
6. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) fiscal year 1983 appropriation for civil defense was $147,407,000; for "comprehensive emergency preparedness planning" for earthquakes it was $3,120,000. California's total budgeted expenditure for earthquake safety for fiscal year 1983 was $13,391,000. For a detailed breakdown, see State of California, Seismic Safety Commission, Annual Report to the Governor and the Legislature for July 1981-June 1982 (Sacramento: August 1982), pp. 16-21.
7. The "classic" appeal for a large U.S. civil defense program, based upon hypothesized comparative U.S. and Soviet recovery rates, is T.K. Jones and W. Scott Thompson, "Central War and Civil Defense," Orbis, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Fall 1978), pp. 681-712. For a more recent discussion, see Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War (New York: Random House, 1982), pp. 104-119.
The enormous cost is one principal argument against a large-scale U.S. civil defense program. But another relates to strategic doctrine. A civil defense program that promises to offer effective protection might in a crisis invite an enemy first-strike attack. The adversary, so this reasoning runs, would read large-scale civil defenses as indicating that we ourselves were prepared to initiate nuclear war. It would therefore strike at the first sign that we were beginning to move our population into shelters, as we surely would during a severe international crisis. Thus we enhance stability by not opting for civil defenses: the other side knows that since our population is exposed, we would not be likely to initiate nuclear war, and the incentives for them to strike preemptively are thereby reduced.
8. The FEMA study cited above (note 5) estimates that the likely damage from the most probable (but far from the most destructive) major earthquake on the San Andreas fault might be $17 billion, but it indicates that the figure might be low by a factor as high as three (p. 22).
9. The most...