Article

Toddlers’ Understanding of Ownership: Implications for Self‐Concept Development

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Abstract

Knowledge of self-continuity is proposed as essential to self understanding. However, little research has addressed the development of the extended self in very young children. This study explored ownership understanding as evidence for knowledge of the interpersonal extended self. Toddlers, age 18 months to 28 months, identified items as belonging to themselves or another, and participated in the classic mirror self- recognition task. Mothers completed the Self Development Questionnaire. Results show that the children have a basic understanding of ownership, and that this understanding differentiated children who provided self-descriptions and evaluations from children who did not. Mirror self-recognition was unrelated to ownership understanding or self-descriptions and evaluations. These results suggest that the extended self emerges earlier in development than previously claimed. Implications for integrated self-concept development are discussed.

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... Bazı araştırmacılara göre mülkiyet, sosyal yaşamda önemli etkilere sahip, günlük yaşama dair mantıksal çıkarımlarda bulunmayı gerektiren üst-düzey bir bilişsel beceri (Friedman ve Ross, 2011) olması sebebiyle, insanları diğer türlerden ayıran evrensel özelliklerden biridir (Blake ve Harris, 2011;Boyer, 2015;Nancekivell, Friedman ve Gelman, 2019). Nesneye sahip olan kişi öncelikle bu nesneyi zihninde temsil edebilmeli, daha sonra bu nesne ile kendisi arasındaki ilişkiyi aklında tutabilmeli, sahip olduğu nesneleri belleğinde depolayabilmelidir (Blake ve Harris, 2011;Fasig, 2000). Ki tüm bunları yalnızca sahip olduğu nesneler için değil, aynı zamanda, diğer insanların sahip olduğu nesneler için de yapması gerekebilir. ...
... Bebeklik döneminden itibaren sergilenen bazı mülkiyet davranışlarının erken ve orta çocukluk döneminde gelişmeyi sürdürdüğü düşünülmektedir (Cleroux ve Friedman, 2020;Davoodi, Nelson ve Blake, 2020;Elenbaas, 2019;Gelman, Martinez, Davidson ve Noles, 2018;Li, Shaw ve Olson, 2013 (Fasig, 2000). Mülkiyet kavramının gelişimi üç temel unsur üzerinden değerlendirilebilir. ...
... Benlik ve mülkiyet arasındaki ilişkinin 18-28 aylık bebeklerde incelendiği bir çalışmada, benlik kavramının daha kapsamlı bir boyutu olan benlik sürekliliği (self-continuity) bilgisi ele alınmıştır (Fasig, 2000). Bebek ve çocuklarla yapılan çalışmalarda, benlik farkındalığının çoğunlukla benliğe dair bilgiye sahip olmakla eş tutulduğunu öne süren Fasig (2000); benlik farkındalığının önemli bir boyutu olan benlik sürekliliğinin gözar- (Lagattuta, Wellman ve Flavell 1997). ...
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Article
Ownership is a relation of belonging between a person and an object that is accepted by other people. Knowing to whom an object belongs allows children to differentiate between what is theirs and what is not. This review aims to explore the development processes of ownership during early childhood, the basic dimensions of the concept of ownership, and the relationship of ownership development with language and culture. The multidimensional structure of ownership includes the kinds of objects that are owned, how ownership decisions are made, and how property rights and privileges are transferred. Most two-year-olds can recognize who owns an object and determine ownership, but only after the fifth birthday can children determine an owner not by desire but by transfer rules. In studies reporting developmental differences in ownership, the effect of age is strikingly inconsistent. However, ownership should be addressed in early childhood within the scope of rapidly changing social cognitive processes. A child needs to understand the abstract relationship between an object and an individual and represent that relationship in their mind. Therefore, this review study discusses whether self-development, mental representation, and other cognitive abilities are among the underlying factors of ownership. In addition, the possible effects of language and culture on ownership, both directly and cognitively, are also mentioned. Although ownership is exciting in social structure and in built-upon cognitive skills recognized in the literature, its development and constituent elements have yet to be examined sufficiently. Understanding ownership’s developmental pattern might illuminate meaning attributed to ownership and objects (extended-self hypothesis). Since no research has addressed this concept in a Turkish sample to date, this review aims to introduce the notion of ownership, its developmental characteristics, and its basic structures for researchers in the field. Keywords: Ownership, ownership transfer, ownership rights, early childhood, development, social cognitive processes
... Human toddlers begin to demonstrate clear manifestations of having the concept of possession roughly in a similar period of time to when they begin to show clear signs of mirror self-recognition, i.e. when they are between 18 and 24-month old (Fasig, 2000;Rochat, 2011;Rodgon & Rashman, 1976). At this stage they begin to use possessive pronouns (e.g. ...
... It includes first instances of usage of personal and possessive pronouns ("I", "Me", "mine") and being able to generate self-descriptions. In typically developing humans this usually begins to happen between 18-24 month of life (Bates, 1990;Fasig, 2000;Levine, 1983;Stipek, Gralinski, & Kopp, 1990;Tomasello, 1998). This is the same period of time as when toddlers begin to recognize themselves in a mirror, but also when they begin to show explicit signs of understanding of the concept of possession (Fasig, 2000;Rochat, 2011). ...
... In typically developing humans this usually begins to happen between 18-24 month of life (Bates, 1990;Fasig, 2000;Levine, 1983;Stipek, Gralinski, & Kopp, 1990;Tomasello, 1998). This is the same period of time as when toddlers begin to recognize themselves in a mirror, but also when they begin to show explicit signs of understanding of the concept of possession (Fasig, 2000;Rochat, 2011). It raises the possibility that these three developmental achievements are related. ...
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Preprint
The last two decades have brought several attempts to explain the self as a part of the Bayesian brain, typically within the framework of predictive coding. However, none of these attempts have looked comprehensively at the developmental aspect of self-representation. The goal of this paper is to argue that looking at the developmental trajectory is crucial for understanding the structure of an adult self-representation. The paper argues that the emergence of the self should be understood as an instance of conceptual development, which in the context of a Bayesian brain can be understood as a process of acquisition of new internal models of hidden causes of sensory input. The paper proposes how such models might emerge and develop over the course of human life by looking at different stages of development of bodily and extra-bodily self-representations. It argues that the self arises gradually in a series of discrete steps: from first-person multisensory representations of one’s body to third-person multisensory body representation, and from basic forms of the extended and social selves to progressively more complex forms of abstract self-representation. It discusses how each of them might emerge based on domain-general learning mechanisms, while also taking into account the potential role of innate representations. Finally it suggests how the conceptual structure of self-representation might inform the debate about the structure of self-consciousness.
... Importantly, despite the abstract nature of these concepts, even very young children recognize the major ontological commitments of a naïve theory of ownership. Toddlers differentiate owners from property [39][40][41] and understand that although humans can own objects, the reverse relation does not hold [42]. Toddlers and preschoolers recognize that resources can be owned by groups, such as families and classrooms [28,29], as well as by robots [33]. ...
... These inferences extend beyond familiar scenarios to include novel contexts that children encounter for the first time in the course of a laboratory experiment. The generativity of these inferences conflicts with approaches suggesting that children's understanding of ownership is based on noncausal associations between people and objects [40,45,66]. ...
... We have demonstrated that an understanding of ownership emerges early in children's development, and with surprising sophistication. For example, we noted that toddlers identify the owners of familiar objects [40], track the ownership status of property [71], use first possession to infer ownership [50], and show awareness of their own ownership rights [28,59,69]. We have argued that this understanding constitutes a naïve theory, with distinctive ontology, causal-explanatory reasoning, and invisible entities. ...
Article
Ownership is at the heart of people's daily activities and has been throughout history. People consider ownership when acting on objects, engaging in financial matters, and assessing the acceptability of actions. We propose that people's understanding of ownership depends on an early-emerging, causally powerful, naïve theory of ownership. We draw on research from multiple disciplines to suggest that, from childhood, a naïve theory of ownership includes ontological commitments, causal-explanatory reasoning, and unobservable constructs. These components are unlikely to stem from other core theories or from noncausal representations. We also address why people might have a naïve theory of ownership, how it develops across the lifespan, and whether aspects of this theory may be universal despite variation across cultures and history.
... One factor that has been shown to contribute to this variation is how valuable the needed object is for children, that is, whether they own it, how much they like it, and how costly it would be to give it up (Hay, 2006;House et al., 2013;Moore, 2009). Evidence from a variety of measures indicates that toddlers begin to understand ownership by the end of the second year of life (Blake, Ganea, & Harris, 2012;Blake & Harris, 2009;Fasig, 2000;Friedman & Neary, 2008;Hay, 2006;Ross, Friedman, & Field, 2015). Furthermore, toddlers act in accordance with ownership knowledge, being more likely to give their friend an item belonging to the friend and less likely to have conflict when adhering to ownership rights (Ross, 2013;Ross et al., 2015). ...
... Our secondary hypotheses centered on the prediction that systematic variability in children's experience with ownership and abundance of resources across the societies we examined would predict the development of costly helping. Prior research in Western societies has found that toddlers begin to understand ownership at the end of the second year of life (Blake et al., 2012;Blake & Harris, 2009;Fasig, 2000;Friedman & Neary, 2008;Hay, 2006;Ross et al., 2015). Several other studies conducted in Western societies have shown that the relative abundance of available resources influences the relative cost of giving resources to others and that children are more willing to give resources under conditions of abundance (Brownell et al., 2013;Hay et al., 1991;Paulus et al., 2013). ...
Article
Over the second and third years of life, toddlers begin to engage in helping even when it comes at a personal cost. During this same period, toddlers gain experience of ownership, which may influence their tendency to help at a cost. Whereas costly helping has been studied in Western children, who have ample access to resources, the emergence of costly helping has not been examined in societies where children’s experience with ownership is varied and access to resources is scarce. The current study compared the development of toddlers’ costly and non-costly helping in three societies within Canada, India, and Peru that differ in these aspects of children’s early social experience. In two conditions, 16- to 36-month-olds (N = 100) helped an experimenter by giving either their own items (Costly condition) or the experimenter’s items (Non-costly condition). Children’s tendency to help increased with age in the Non-costly condition across all three societies. In the Costly condition, in Canada children’s tendency to help increased with age, in Peru children’s helping remained stable across age, and in India children’s level of helping decreased with age. Thus, whereas we replicate the findings that non-costly helping appears to develop synchronously across diverse societies, costly helping may depend on children’s early society-specific experiences. We discuss these findings in relation to children’s early ownership experience and access to resources, factors that may account for the divergent patterns in the development of costly helping across these societies.
... Developing mature concepts of ownership and property go far beyond knowing what is "mine" and not "mine." Ownership concepts are thought to be early emerging [1,2,3,4] and experienced across cultures [5,6], which suggests that ownership concepts are a basic part of human cognitive architecture. Most children begin to use possessive language by age two to define property and to defend their possession of objects [7,8,9]. ...
... Furthermore, if their ability to track property is defeated, children will spontaneously search for other evidence (e.g., marks or other physical or visual cues) to assist them in linking people to property [31] Critically, there are important contextual differences between studies and situations where children reason effectively about ownership and where they do not. Specifically, children track and remember to whom property belongs [1,12,32] when they are integrated into the web of interpersonal connections with the property. Put more simply, when they are a first-person observer or participant in manipulations of property and ownership, children's intuitions are not biased in the same manner as when they are presented with third-person vignettes. ...
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Article
Even very young children are adept at linking property to owners (Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012). However, some studies report that children systematically conserve property with the first possessors (Blake & Harris, 2009; Friedman & Neary, 2008). The present study seeks to integrate these two findings by testing for the presence of a first possessor bias in older children (ages 7–10) using a broader array of property transfers, and by investigating how manipulations of context–from third-person to first-person–yield ownership attributions that are more or less biased. Seven- and 8-year-olds, but not older children, exhibited a first possessor bias when property transfers were presented in a third-person context. This finding suggests that the first possessor bias persists longer in childhood than previously suspected. However, the bias was greatly attenuated or absent when property transfers were presented in a first-person context, rather than a third-person context.
... Three-year-old children were included in the current study as Ross et al. (2011) found that 3-year-old children demonstrated an SRE and Mood (1979) found that preschool children were better at comprehending sentences that involved themselves compared to others. Children as young as two demonstrate an understanding of ownership and can distinguish between objects belonging to them and another (Eisenberg-Berg et al., 1981;Ross, 1996;Fasig, 2000). Ross (1996) found that 2-year-old children argue about ownership rights in disputes about toys. ...
... It is likely therefore that the association with the ownership manipulation is also weakened. The SRE ownership manipulation is argued to involve 'self-conservation' where a current representation of oneself is linked with a previous representation of oneself during encoding (Fasig, 2000). It is possible that this link weakened over time. ...
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Article
Adults demonstrate enhanced memory for words encoded as belonging to themselves compared to those belonging to another. Known as the self-reference effect, there is evidence for the effect in children as young as three. Toddlers are efficient in linking novel words to novel objects, but have difficulties retaining multiple word-object associations. The aim here was to investigate the self-reference ownership paradigm on 3-year-old children’s retention of novel words. Following exposure to each of four novel word-object pairings, children were told that objects either belonged to them or another character. Children demonstrated significantly higher immediate retention of self-referenced compared to other-referenced items. Retention was also tested 4 h later and the following morning. Retention for self- and other-referenced words was significantly higher than chance at both delayed time points, but the difference between the self- and other-referenced words was no longer significant. The findings suggest that when it comes to toddlers’ retention of multiple novel words there is an initial memory enhancing effect for self- compared to other-referenced items, but the difference diminishes over time. Children’s looking times during the self-reference presentations were positively associated with retention of self-referenced words 4 h later. Looking times during the other-reference presentations were positively associated with proportional looking at other-referenced items during immediate retention testing. The findings have implications for children’s memory for novel words and future studies could test children’s explicit memories for the ownership manipulation itself and whether the effect is superior to other forms of memory supports such as ostensive naming.
... Although rich in terms of the encoding conditions generated, ownership is also one of the simplest ways to create an association between self and to-beremembered information (Beggan, 1992;Belk, 1988). From as early as 2 years, children use possessive pronouns in spontaneous conversations with their peers (Hay, 2006), and can differentiate between objects on the basis of ownership, even when the item-person association is novel (Fasig, 2000). ...
... Multiple rounds could enhance learning even further by increasing the proportion of items encoded in a specific context of self-ownership. Importantly, since the ability to form ownership associations emerges early (Fasig, 2000;Friedman & Neary, 2008;Hay, 2006), the key manipulation should be accessible to children across age and ability levels, further enhancing the potential applications of ownership paradigms in an educational context. ...
Article
Accepting ownership of an item is an effective way of associating it with self, evoking self-processing biases that enhance memory. This memory advantage occurs even in ownership games, where items are arbitrarily divided between participants to temporarily “own.” The current study tested the educational applications of ownership games across two experiments. In Experiment 1, 7- to 9-year-old children were asked to choose three novel, labeled shapes from an array of nine. The experimenter chose three shapes and three remained “un-owned.” A subsequent free-recall test showed that children reliably learned more self-owned than other-owned or un-owned shapes. Experiment 2 replicated this finding for shapes that were assigned to owners rather than chosen, and showed that ownership enhanced memory more effectively than a control game with no ownership manipulation. Together, these experiments show that ownership games can evoke self-processing biases in children's memory, enhancing learning. Implications for education strategies are discussed.
... Parallel effects have been evidenced in non-human primates and birds, who have been shown to work harder to maintain an item in their possession than to acquire the same item (i.e., loss aversion, and the endowment effect; Brosnan, 2011;Stake, 2004). On a more general note, property has been suggested as one of the earlier forms of abstract thinking, as it can extend beyond current possession (Fasig 2000;Friedman & Neary, 2008). ...
... From an early age children exert ample attention toward property, and as young as two develop heuristics similar to those found in adulthood. Highlighting the early emergence of property notions, Furby (1980) notes that possession is one of the first concepts expressed by toddlers, and already by 18 months some toddlers are able to distinguish ownership from current possession (Fasig, 2000). ...
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Article
Vast similarities in ownership behaviour across species and age ranges have been used to support the notion of an innate basis for ownership reasoning. Using a twin study paradigm, this is the first study to investigate the extent to which genetic and environmental factors contribute to individual differences in ownership reasoning. 65 pairs of adult monozygotic (MZ) twins, and 16 pairs of same-sex dizygotic (DZ) twins completed a 24-item ownership questionnaire, which included items on (1) new ownership and (2) appropriate transfers of ownership. For both of these factors, it was found that MZ correlations were larger than DZ correlations. Univariate model fitting analyses indicated that genetic and non-shared environmental factors could account for all individual variation on the two factors, with shared environmental factors contributing non-significantly; heritabilities ranged from .36-.57 over both factors. The results support the notion that individual differences in ownership reasoning have a significant genetic basis. It is proposed that future research look into the many other facets of ownership reasoning, and to explore their relationship and mediation via genetically influenced traits.
... They recognize owners that are not in possession of the objects (e.g. Fasig, 2000), and can even recognize owners of objects shown on pictures and not for real (e.g. Rodgon & Rashman, 1976). ...
... Objects explicitly stated as linked to self (ÒmineÓ) All kinds of objects -e.g. Rochat, 2011a;Tomasello, 1998;Fasig, 2000-Eisenberg-Berg et al., 19791981 - Blake & Harris, 2009;Kim & Kalish, 2009-Rochat, 2009bRochat, 2011a Table C1-1. Experience of possession/ownership (*1) and recognition of ownership of others (*2; 3) at different ages (mo: months, y: years). ...
Article
Since a very young age, the majority of human social interactions involve objects. In these interactions, children seem to take into account who owns what. The notion of ownership thus does not involve only a person and an object, but is a relationship between several persons with respect to an object. This relationship is organized by a set of rules or property rights. Our work deals with children's understanding of the notion of ownership. At what age do children acquire the understanding of property rights? Before an explicit mastery of the notion of ownership, do children have a more implicit understanding of it? More precisely, we explored the understanding and evaluation of illegitimate and legitimate transfers of property in children from 5 months to 5 years of age. We studied two types of ownership transgressions: illegitimate acquisition of an object (without owner's intention to transfer it), and absence of restitution of an object to its owner. In all our studies, we presented to children property transfers between two characters using non-verbal animated cartoons or movies with puppets as actors, and then measured children's understanding and evaluation of those transfers. The studies in Chapter 2 (Studies 1 and 2) assessed children's evaluation of different modes of acquisition of an object. The two experiments of Study 1 explored 3- and 5-year-olds's understanding and evaluation of illegitimate and legitimate property transfers. Adults were also tested as a control population. This study is the first one to investigate simultaneously children's explicit and implicit understanding of the notion of ownership, by asking questions about property rights, as well as social and moral evaluations of the characters implicated in the transfers, respectively. In Study 1a, participants saw a character acquiring an object either in an illegitimate way (theft condition) or in a legitimate one (gift-reception condition). In Study 1b, an illegitimate action (theft) was compared to a legitimate action (giving). 5-year-old children (as adults) showed both an implicit understanding of ownership through their social/moral evaluation (preferring the legitimate agent (gift recipient or giver) compared to the illegitimate agent (thief)), and an explicit understanding of ownership through their ability to attribute different property rights considering the legitimacy of the transfer. 3-year-old children did not make any distinction between the illegitimate and legitimate conditions in their evaluation, neither in their attribution of property rights. These results suggest that children acquire implicit and explicit understanding of ownership at the same time. In Study 1, no emotional reaction was present. We examined in Study 2 the role of the first possessor's emotions in 3-year-olds' evaluation of object acquisition. The same cue was present in the legitimate and illegitimate conditions: the first possessor being sad after both transfers. In the presence of this emotional cue, 3-year-olds managed to distinguish between the two conditions in their social/moral evaluation. This distinction could not have been based solely on the presence of a negative emotion, as the emotion displayed was the same in both conditions. We suggest that 3-year-old children detected the moral transgression in the theft condition, and used the negative emotion to confirm it. The studies in Chapter 3 (Studies 3 to 5) examined children's evaluations of the restitution of an object to its owner. Young children (2-3-year-old) have a bias to consider that the first possessor of an object is its "owner" and that the object cannot be definitively transferred to someone else. We thus investigated whether 3-year-old children (Studies 3 and 4) implicitly evaluate the absence of restitution as a transgression, and evaluate it negatively compared to the restitution of an object to its first possessor...
... Property ownership, as opposed to physical possession, is a social institution that regulates access to and use of things. Developmental research in Western urbanized cultures has shown that understanding of ownership emerges at around 2-3 years of age, when children begin to make inferences about who owns what, independent of physical possession (Blake & Harris, 2011;Fasig, 2000;Hay, 2006;Tomasello, 1998), and start to value and defend their property (Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012;. Somewhat later, by 3-4 years of age, Western children show an understanding of the social conventions surrounding property (Neary & Friedman, 2014;Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011) and begin to use more sophisticated rules to infer or transfer ownership (Kanngiesser, Gjersoe, & Hood, 2010;Neary, Friedman, & Burnstein, 2009). ...
... However, our evidence suggests that this developmental pattern may not be shared universally and may follow different trajectories depending on the sociocultural environment children grow up in-at least with regard to third-party ownership inferences. It is unclear to date whether other aspects of ownership such as recognizing and learning ownership relationship (Blake & Harris, 2011;Fasig, 2000) or understanding different ownership rights Neary & Friedman, 2014;Rossano et al., 2011) develop in a similar manner cross-culturally. Future studies could particularly focus on comparing the development of ownership concepts in small-scale groups with very distinct property regimes (e.g., by comparing hunter-gatherer groups with sedentary, agricultural groups). ...
Article
Western preschool children often assign ownership based on first possession and some theorists have proposed that this judgment might be an early emerging, innate bias. Five- to 9-year-olds (n = 112) from a small-scale group in Kenya (Kikuyu) watched videotaped interactions of two women passing an object. The object's starting position and the women's gestures were varied. Use of the first possession heuristic increased with age, and 8- to 9-year-olds performed similarly to German 5-year-olds (n = 24). Starting position and gestures had no effect. A control study confirmed that 5-year-old Kikuyus (n = 20) understood the video material. The findings reveal that the first possession heuristic follows different developmental trajectories cross-culturally and stress the role of children's sociocultural environment. © 2015 The Authors. Child Development © 2015 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.
... Functional independence enables children participate actively in activities at home, school, and community and contributes to the development of selfconcept. In addition, functional independence is strongly associated with children's life satisfaction (Bogart, 2014;Fasig, 2000;Posłuszny et al., 2017). In children with spastic CP, functional independence is adversely affected due to neuromuscular factors such as spasticity, hyperactive stretch reflexes, muscle coordination problems, insufficient selective motor control, and muscle weakness (Brogren, Hadders-Algra, and Forssberg, 1998;Rosenbaum et al., 2007). ...
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Article
Purpose To investigate the effects of postural control and upper extremity functional capacity on functional independence and identify whether quality of upper extremity skills mediates the effects of postural control on functional independence in preschool-age children with spastic cerebral palsy (CP). Methods 106 children with CP -mean age 43.4 ± 11.3 (24–71 months)- were included in this cross-sectional study. Postural control, upper extremity functional capacity, and functional independence in activities of daily living were evaluated using the Early Clinical Assessment of Balance (ECAB), Quality of Upper Extremity Skills Test (QUEST), and the Functional Independence Measure of Children (WeeFIM), respectively. A path model was used to evaluate the total, direct, and indirect effects. Results According to the path model, ECAB (direct effect; r = 0.391, p < 0.01, indirect effect; r = 0.398) and QUEST (direct effect; r = 0.493, p < 0.01) had an impact on WeeFIM. In addition, QUEST had mediating effects on the relationship between ECAB and WeeFIM. The path model explained 71% of the variation in functional independence of the participants. Conclusion In the management of CP in preschool-age children, the focus should be on improving not only upper extremity capacity but also postural control to help improve functional independence in activities of daily living.
... Understanding ownership of physical objects emerges early in childhood (see Nancekivell et al., 2019 for a review). For instance, by around age 2, children start to use possessive pronouns (e.g., mine, yours) in peer interactions, demonstrating an early understanding of invisible links between objects and owners (Fasig, 2000;Hay, 2006). Between the ages of 3 and 5, children develop inferences concerning ownership such as a first possession heuristic in which the first individual who possessed an object is its owner (Friedman & Neary, 2008;Friedman et al., 2013). ...
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Article
The current study examined whether, for children and adults, behaviors that are considered violations of property rights in the case of physical property are likewise viewed as violations in the case of digital property. In this preregistered study (N = 156), 5- to 10-year-old children and adults heard a story about a person who downloaded a digital file (e.g., an e-book that she did not own) onto her personal computer (digital) versus a person who put a physical item (e.g., a book that she did not own) into her bag (physical). Participants were asked to evaluate how okay each behavior is. We found that from 5 years of age children evaluated taking a physical object more negatively than downloading a digital file, which was also the pattern observed in adults. Furthermore, by 9 years of age children were equivalent to adults in their evaluation of downloading digital files. The current study has implications for the development of ownership in children.
... Bu bağlamda mülkiyet anlayışı, bir kişinin bir eşya ya da nesnenin o kişiye veya başka bir kişiye "ait" olduğu bilgisine atıfta bulunur. Kişi bu sahiplik ilişkisinde nesneyle olan bir çağrışımı anımsayarak nesnenin "aidiyet" bilgisine ulaşır (Fasig, 2000). Çünkü mülkiyete ilişkin sahiplik bilgileri soyut bir yapıdadır ve bu aitlik bilgilerinin zihinsel temsillerde kodlanması gerekir (Blake ve Harris, 2011). ...
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Chapter
Erken çocukluk döneminde baba-çocuk ilişkisinin önemini açıklayan çalışmalar artsa da bu ilişkiyi feminist bakış açısı ile açıklayanlar çok sınırlı sayıdadır. Özellikle, geleneksel toplumlarda çocuk bakımından yıllar boyunca anne sorumlu tutulmuştur ve bu ilişkinin kalitesinin önemi belirtilmiştir. Kitabın bu bölümünde çocuk bakımı ile ilgili çağdaş bir anlayış olan profeminist babalık üzerinde durulmuştur. Ayrıca kolektivisttik ve bireyselci toplumların arasında yer alan Türk kültüründe çocuk bakımı ve baba-çocuk ilişkisi profeminist bakış açısı ile açıklamıştır. Profeminizm ‘’cinsiyetçilik karşıtı’’ ve/veya erkeğin kadının üzerindeki gücünü göz ardı eden bir anlayıştır. Böylelikle, Türk kültüründe erken çocukluk dönemindeki baba-çocuk ilişkisini bu bakış açısı ile anlamak için toplam 76 erken çocukluk döneminde (iki ve dört yaş) çocuğu olan Türk ve Kıbrıslı Türk babalar ile çevrimiçi görüşme yapılmıştır. Genel olarak, babalar çocuk bakımında profeminist bakış açısı ve eşitlikçi bir anlayışı benimsediklerini belirtseler de ebeveynlik uygulamalarında bu anlayışı sınırlı olarak ortaya koydukları raporlanmıştır. Bir başka deyişle, babalık kültüründe değişimler olsa da babalık icrasında halen ataerkil anlayış benimsediği söylenebilir. Babaların çocuk bakımı hizmetinde profeminist ve toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği perspektifinden sorumluluğu üstlenmesinin teşviki büyük önem taşımaktadır.
... Another important aspect of fairness involves ownership and thus an understanding of what is 'mine' is not 'yours' (Brownell et al., 2013). Semi-and naturalistic observational studies have shown that understanding of ownership develops very early and by 2-yearsold toddlers can identify to whom a particular object belongs, can defend their ownership, and begin to acknowledge the ownership of their friends' during play, albeit, not always spontaneously (Fasig, 2000;Ross et al., 2015). By this age, children are also more likely to claim ownership to retain possession of a toy and to protest a peer or a sibling's attempt to take a toy if they are owners than if they are temporary possessors (Ross, 1996(Ross, , 2013. ...
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Article
The present study examined polyadic family conflicts (i.e., involving three or more active members) comprising moral issues (i.e., fairness, rights, harm) across a 2-year period in early childhood. Moral conflicts were coded for initiating parties, topic, and use of power strategies. Thirty-nine families participated in six 90-min naturalistic observations when children were 2- and 4-years of age at T1 and again two years later (T2). Findings indicated the majority of polyadic family conflict topics concerned three moral issues, specifically, conflicts pertaining to issues of fairness and harm occurred significantly more than conflicts about rights. Disputes about fairness were more common at T1 than T2, whereas those about rights were more common at T2 than T1. Further, children were more likely to initiate disputes over fairness and harm, whereas parents frequently initiated conflicts about rights. Lastly, in terms of power strategies, coercion was used most frequently across moral topics. Findings expand the conflict literature by investigating the family as an integrated unit and examining the involvement of its members in young children’s development of morality.
... TD children use first-person possessive pronouns (e.g. "mine") to disambiguate objects in their environment from 12 months (Saylor et al. 2011) and produce first-person pronouns to denote their ownership of objects by 18 months (Fasig 2000;Hay 2006). By 24 months, TD children use secondperson possessive pronouns when referring to objects (e.g. ...
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This study investigated how autism spectrum disorder (ASD) impacts children’s ability to identify ownership from linguistic cues (proper nouns vs. possessive pronouns) and their awareness of ownership rights. In comparison to typically developing (TD) children matched on receptive language (M age equivalents: 53-56 months), children with ASD were less accurate at tracking owner-object relationships based on possessive pronouns and were less accurate at identifying the property of third parties. We also found that children with ASD were less likely to defend their own and others’ ownership rights. We hypothesise that these results may be attributed to differences in representing the self and propose that ASD may be characterised by reduced concern for ownership and associated concepts.
... The wrongness of physical harm is a reasonably simple concept that children are shown to be attuned to remarkably early in life (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011). Giving away is a morally complex concept punctuated with questions around ownership and autonomy (Blake & Harris, 2009;Fasig, 2000;Levene, Starmans, & Friedman, 2015). At a practical level, ownership of the agents was deliberately left vague when interacting with children; thus, children may have been more likely to assume that robots, being manmade, are owned. ...
Article
This study examined children’s moral concern for robots relative to living and nonliving entities. Children (4–10 years of age, N = 126) watched videos of six different entities having a box placed over them that was subsequently struck by a human hand. Children were subsequently asked to rate the moral worth of each agent relating to physical harm. Children afforded robotic entities less moral concern than living entities but afforded them more moral concern than nonliving entities, and these effects became more pronounced with age. Children’s tendency to ascribe mental life to robotic and nonliving entities (but not living entities) predicted moral concern for these entities. However, when asked to make moral judgments relating to giving the agent away, children did not distinguish between nonliving and robotic agents and no age-related changes were identified. Moreover, the tendency to ascribe mental life was predictive of moral concern only for some agents but not others. Overall, the findings suggest that children consider robotic entities to occupy a middle moral ground between living and nonliving entities and that this effect is partly explained by the tendency to ascribe mental life to such agents. They also demonstrate that moral worth is a complex multifaceted concept that does not demonstrate a clear pattern across different ontological categories.
... As reviewed, previous studies found that 3-year-olds are aware of others' ownership rights but did not find this with 2-year-olds. Toddlers succeed in acknowledging that other people own objects (e.g., Blake, Ganea, & Harris, 2012;Blake & Harris, 2009;Brownell, Iesue, Nichols, & Svetlova, 2013;Fasig, 2000;Friedman & Neary, 2008;Ross et al., 2015). But previous findings suggest that toddlers are unaware of others' ownership rights (Rossano et al., 2011) or provide only ambiguous evidence for this awareness (e.g., Pesowski & Friedman, 2015;Ross et al., 2015). ...
Preprint
In three experiments, we investigated whether 2- and 3-year-olds (N = 240) consider ownership when taking resources for themselves and allocating resources to another agent. When selecting resources for themselves, children generally avoided taking resources that belonged to another agent and instead favored their own resources (Experiments 1 and 2). However, they did not avoid taking the agent’s resources when the only other resources available were described as not belonging to the agent (Experiment 3). Children also selected fewer of the agent’s resources when taking for themselves than when giving to the agent (Experiments 2 and 3). In giving to the agent, children were more likely to select the agent’s resources than resources not belonging to the agent (Experiment 3). These findings show that ownership affects how 2- and 3-year-olds allocate resources. The findings also provide new evidence that 2-year-olds may respect others’ ownership rights, at least to a limited degree, although we also consider an alternative explanation for the findings.
... As reviewed, previous studies found that 3-year-olds are aware of others' ownership rights but did not find this with 2-year-olds. Toddlers succeed in acknowledging that other people own objects (e.g., Blake, Ganea, & Harris, 2012;Blake & Harris, 2009;Brownell, Iesue, Nichols, & Svetlova, 2013;Fasig, 2000;Friedman & Neary, 2008;Ross et al., 2015). But previous findings suggest that toddlers are unaware of others' ownership rights (Rossano et al., 2011) or provide only ambiguous evidence for this awareness (e.g., Pesowski & Friedman, 2015;Ross et al., 2015). ...
Article
In three experiments, we investigated whether 2- and 3-year-olds (N = 240) consider ownership when taking resources for themselves and allocating resources to another agent. When selecting resources for themselves, children generally avoided taking resources that belonged to another agent and instead favored their own resources (Experiments 1 and 2). However, they did not avoid taking the agent’s resources when the only other resources available were described as not belonging to the agent (Experiment 3). Children also selected fewer of the agent’s resources when taking for themselves than when giving to the agent (Experiments 2 and 3). In giving to the agent, children were more likely to select the agent’s resources than resources not belonging to the agent (Experiment 3). These findings show that ownership affects how 2- and 3-year-olds allocate resources. The findings also provide new evidence that 2-year-olds may respect others’ ownership rights, at least to a limited degree, although we also consider an alternative explanation for the findings.
... In humans, understanding of ownership emerges early in ontogeny: Toddlers already infer ownership of their own objects as well as ownership of present and absent owners (Brownell, Iesue, Nichols, & Svetlova, 2013;Fasig, 2000;Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012). They also verbally claim ownership of and win fights over their own toys irrespective of current possession (Ross, 1996(Ross, , 2013Ross, Conant, & Vickar, 2011;Ross, Friedman, & Field, 2015). ...
Article
Access to and control of resources is a major source of costly conflicts. Animals, under some conditions, respect what others control and use (i.e., possession). Humans not only respect possession of resources, they also respect ownership. Ownership can be viewed as a cooperative arrangement, where individuals inhibit their tendency to take others’ property on the condition that those others will do the same. We investigated to what degree great apes follow this principle, as compared to human children. We conducted two experiments, in which dyads of individuals could access the same food resources. The main test of respect for ownership was whether individuals would refrain from taking their partner's resources even when the partner could not immediately access and control them. Captive apes (N = 14 dyads) failed to respect their partner's claim on food resources and frequently monopolized the resources when given the opportunity. Human children (N = 14 dyads), tested with a similar apparatus and procedure, respected their partner's claim and made spontaneous verbal references to ownership. Such respect for the property of others highlights the uniquely cooperative nature of human ownership arrangements. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
... Concepts of ownership play a central role in human social cognitive development, appearing early in development across cultures [1], and possibly forming the foundation for more mature market behaviors in the future. At an early age, children pay attention to property and they are relatively good at identifying owners [2][3][4][5]. However, children exhibit consistent and persistent difficulties when reasoning about property transfers and exchanges [6][7][8]2]. ...
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The current study replicates and expands prior work on children’s ownership intuitions and explores whether variability in theory of mind and linguistic ability predicts patterns in children’s understanding of ownership. We tested children ages 4 to 6 and found age-related differences in ownership intuitions, but those differences were not significantly predicted by variability in theory of mind or linguistic ability. This report is the first to specifically investigate the cognitive competencies that contribute to the development of mature ownership concepts, and to replicate many of the core findings in the literature.
... From as early as 12 months of age, infants can track objects belonging to others when an adult labels them as, for example, "my ball" (Saylor, Ganea, & Vazquez, 2011). By 2 years of age, children use "my" and "mine" to assert and defend their own claims (Hay, 2006;Ross, 1996Ross, , 2013Ross, Friedman, & Field, 2015;Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011) and easily identify individual owners of objects using possessive language (i.e., "Maria's necklace"; Bloom, 1976;Brownell, Iesue, Nichols, & Svetlova, 2013;Fasig, 2000;Tomasello, 1998). By 3 years of age, children demonstrate a more sophisticated ability to track and identify objects owned by themselves and others based on ownership labels (Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012;Gelman, Manczak, Was, & Noles, 2016). ...
Article
Children are capable of viewing object ownership as categorical and exclusive, but ownership claims can also vary by degree. This study investigated how children use these different conceptions of ownership in a giving and a taking task. In two studies, 4‐ to 7‐year olds (N = 105) could give and take craft objects that they or another child had found (weaker claim) and made (stronger claim). In Study 1, no additional ownership information was given, and in Study 2 categorical ownership was stated (“these belong to you”). The results showed that children used categorical ownership for their own objects but used ownership strength for the other child's objects, taking more of the found items.
... This occurs as consciousness loops back upon itself to form secondary reflexive awareness at Point D. The product of the reflexive looping of consciousness back onto itself is the secondary sense of self as an explicit object of awareness (Point 4). Over the course of the second year of life, the development of reflexive self-awareness becomes increasingly apparent in the development of self-conscious emotions like pride and shame (Mascolo & Fischer, 1995), selfrecognition in a mirror (Lewis & Carmody, 2008), use of first-person pronouns (Meissner, 2008), and other abilities (Fasig, 2000). ...
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Is it possible to reconcile the concept of conscious agency with the view that humans are biological creatures subject to material causality? The problem of conscious agency is complicated by the tendency to attribute autonomous powers of control to conscious processes. In this paper, we offer an embodied process model of conscious agency. We begin with the concept of embodied emergence – the idea that psychological processes are higher-order biological processes, albeit ones that exhibit emergent properties. Although consciousness, experience, and representation are emergent properties of higher-order biological organisms, the capacity for hierarchical regulation is a property of all living systems. Thus, while the capacity for consciousness transforms the process of hierarchical regulation, consciousness is not an autonomous center of control. Instead, consciousness functions as a system for coordinating novel representations of the most pressing demands placed on the organism at any given time. While it does not regulate action directly, consciousness orients and activates preconscious control systems that mediate the construction of genuinely novel action. Far from being an epiphenomenon, consciousness plays a central albeit non-autonomous role in psychological functioning.
... In recent years, research has shown that young children have a multifaceted understanding of ownership. Children aged 2 and older infer, recognize, and keep track of who owns what (Blake & Harris, 2009;Fasig, 2000;Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012;Gelman, Manczak, Was, & Noles, 2016;Kanngiesser, Gjersoe, & Hood, 2010;Neary, Friedman, & Burnstein, 2009), and those aged 3 and 4 recognize and uphold ownership rights (Kim & Kalish, 2009;Nancekivell & Friedman, 2014;Neary & Friedman, 2014;Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011;Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2013). In contrast to adults, young children are unlikely to be familiar with the law and legal cases where owners are held responsible for harm caused by their property. ...
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Article
Since ancient times, legal systems have held owners responsible for harm caused by their property. Across 4 experiments, we show that children aged 3–7 (N = 572) also hold owners responsible for such harm. Older children judge that owners should repair harm caused by property (Experiments 1A and 1B), and younger children may do this as well (Experiment 4). Younger and older children judge that owners should apologize for harm (Experiments 2A and 3), even when children do not believe the owners allowed the harm to occur (Experiment 2B). Children are also as likely to hold owners responsible for harm caused by property as for harm caused by the owners themselves (Experiment 3). The present findings contribute to psychological accounts of ownership by showing that ownership not only confers rights to control property, but also responsibility for harm caused by property. The findings also contribute to our understanding of the attribution of responsibility, and challenge accounts claiming that directly causing harm, or allowing it to happen, is a prerequisite for responsibility. The findings provide support for an account claiming that property is an extension of its owner, and likewise reveal that responsibility for harm caused by property is an early developing aspect of the psychology of ownership.
... Before interacting with any object it is essential to have a sense of who owns it. This is a universal human concern (Brown, 1991), and one we address from a young age (Brownell, Iesue, Nichols, & Svetlova, 2013;Fasig, 2000;Ross, 1996;Ross, Tesla, Kenyon, & Lollis, 1990). ...
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Article
Legal systems often rule that people own objects in their territory. We propose that an early-developing ability to make territory-based inferences of ownership helps children address informational demands presented by ownership. Across 6 experiments (N = 504), we show that these inferences develop between ages 3 and 5 and stem from two aspects of the psychology of ownership. First, we find that a basic ability to infer that people own objects in their territory is already present at age 3 (Experiment 1). Children even make these inferences when the territory owner unintentionally acquired the objects and was unaware of them (Experiments 2 and 3). Second, we find that between ages 3 and 5, children come to consider past events in these judgments. They move from solely considering the current location of an object in territory-based inferences, to also considering and possibly inferring where it originated (Experiments 4 to 6). Together, these findings suggest that territory-based inferences of ownership are unlikely to be constructions of the law. Instead, they may reflect basic intuitions about ownership that operate from early in development.
... Возможно, способность к бескорыстной помощи в раннем возрасте, в особенности когда она подразумевает необходимость делиться своим, осложняется и специфическим для детей третьего года жизни пониманием природы своего и собственности, что в этом возрасте требует бóльших усилий в ситуации необходимости отдать свое [Fasig 2000;Hay et al. 1991;Imbens-Bailey, Pan 1998;Fehr et al. 2008;Sloane et al. 2012]. ...
... Knowing that you own an object is contingent on forming and retaining an invisible, socially meaningful, association with the self. This knowledge demands an awareness of the self as continuous in time (in conjunction with the object) and an understanding of ownership as a social construct (Fasig, 2000). However, many children with ASD experience impaired awareness of the psychological self (Frith, 2003;Lind, 2010). ...
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Article
Ownership has a unique and privileged influence on human psychology. Typically developing (TD) children judge their objects to be more desirable and valuable than similar objects belonging to others. This 'ownership effect' is due to processing one's property in relation to 'the self'. Here we explore whether children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) - a population with impaired self-understanding - prefer and over-value property due to ownership. In Experiment 1, we discovered that children with ASD did not favour a randomly endowed toy and frequently traded for a different object. By contrast, TD children showed a clear preference for their randomly endowed toy and traded infrequently. Both populations also demonstrated highly-accurate tracking of owner-object relationships. Experiment 2 showed that both TD children and children with ASD over-value their toys if they are self-selected and different from other-owned toys. Unlike TD children, children with ASD did not over-value their toys in comparison to non-owned identical copies. This finding was replicated in Experiment 3, which also established that mere ownership elicited over-valuation of randomly endowed property in TD children. However, children with ASD did not consistently regard their randomly endowed toys as the most valuable, and evaluated property irrespective of ownership. Our findings show that mere ownership increases preferences and valuations for self-owned property in TD children, but not children with ASD. We propose that deficits in self-understanding may diminish ownership effects in ASD, eliciting a more economically-rational strategy that prioritises material qualities (e.g. what a toy is) rather than whom it belongs to.
... Children's knowledge of actual ownership is not just limited to their own property. When shown a familiar object that belongs to another person (e.g., their mother's comb), toddlers can identify the owner (Brownell, Iesue, Nichols, & Svetlova, 2013;Fasig, 2000;Ross et al., 2015). They can also identify who owns an unfamiliar object after being told whose it is (e.g., Blake, Ganea, & Harris, 2012;Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012; also see Saylor, Ganea, & Vázquez, 2011 for findings from infants). ...
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Chapter
We suggest that the psychology of ownership encompasses much more than feelings of ownership and includes much of “legal” ownership. To make our case, we review ownership in young children. We review findings showing that young children are aware of the ownership status of objects and of people’s ownership rights, which are both parts of “legal ownership” and have little to do with feelings of ownership. We also review findings showing that young children use ownership to understand other people and consider ownership when predicting how others will act, anticipating how they feel, and inferring their preferences. Because these ways of understanding others are basic psychological activities, these findings again suggest that aspects of “legal” ownership are psychological.
... However, we do not believe that this is because 3-to-4-year olds in our sample failed to track the creative history of objects. Previous work has shown that children as young as 2-years aptly track object-ownership, being able to name the owners of common items (Fasig, 2000;Friedman, Neary, Defeyter, & Malcolm, 2011;Nancekivell & Friedman, 2014), and stating preferences for items assigned to them (Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012). Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that creative history of an object is salient in this age group: 2-to-3-year olds selectively protest when someone else claims the child's creations as theirs (Kanngiesser & Hood, 2014) and 3-to-4-year olds will transfer ownership of a newly created object to the creator (Kanngiesser et al., 2010). ...
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We elevate our constructions to a special status in our minds. This 'IKEA' effect leads us to believe that our creations are more valuable than items that are identical, but constructed by another. This series of studies utilises a developmental perspective to explore why this bias exists. Study 1 elucidates the ontogeny of the IKEA effect, demonstrating an emerging bias at age 5, corresponding with key developmental milestones in self-concept formation. Study 2 assesses the role of effort, revealing that the IKEA effect is not moderated by the amount of effort invested in the task in 5-to-6-year olds. Finally, Study 3 examines whether feelings of ownership moderate the IKEA effect, finding that ownership alone cannot explain why children value their creations more. Altogether, results from this study series are incompatible with existing theories of the IKEA bias. Instead, we propose a new framework to examine biases in decision making. Perhaps the IKEA effect reflects a link between our creations and our self-concept, emerging at age 5, leading us to value them more positively than others' creations.
... It has been shown that children 2 years old assert their ownership rights and recognize the rights of others (Pesowski & Friedman, 2015;Ross, Friedman, & Field, 2015). Preschoolers have a basic understanding of ownership of physical objects and appreciate that owners are entitled to greater control over their property than nonowners (Fasig, 2000;Kim & Kalish, 2009;Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011). Children give priority to ownership in judging who should use an object and settling disputes about usage (Neary & Friedman, 2014;Ross et al., 2011). ...
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Article
Whereas much social psychological research has studied the in-group and out-group implications of social categorization and collective identity ("we"), little research has examined the nature and relevance of collective psychological ownership ("ours") for intergroup relations. We make a case for considering collective psychological ownership as an important source of intergroup tensions. We do so by integrating theory and research from various social sciences, and we draw out implications for future social psychological research on intergroup relations. We discuss collective psychological ownership in relation to the psychology of possessions, marking behavior, intergroup threats, outgroup exclusion, and in-group responsibility. We suggest that the social psychological processes discussed apply to a range of ownership objects (territory, buildings, cultural artifacts) and various intergroup settings, including international, national, and local contexts, and in organizations and communities. We conclude by providing directions for future research in different intergroup contexts.
... Interaction with a complex environment necessitates that an important psychological function of the self is to classify objects based on their personal significance (e.g., mine vs. not mine; useful vs. useless; goal-relevant vs. goal-irrelevant, Berlad & Pratt, 1995;Constable, Kritikos, & Bayliss, 2011;Constable, Kritikos, Lipp, & Bayliss, 2014;Fischler, Jin, Boaz, Perry, & Childers, 1987;Folmer & Yingling, 1997;Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004;Miyakoshi, Nomura, & Ohira, 2007;Müller & Kutas, 1996;Turk et al., 2013). One's possessions are an obvious case in point, as evidenced by the fact that even young children understand the concept of ownership and afford it significant social capital (Fasig, 2000;Furby, 1980;Hay, 2006). When the costs of appropriating other people's belongings (e.g., a glass of wine) can be considerable (e.g., an unseemly altercation in the bar), the ability to discriminate items that one owns (even transiently) from items that one does not (i.e., objects owned or assigned to other people) is an invaluable skill (Constable et al., 2011(Constable et al., , 2014. ...
Article
Although ownership is acknowledged to exert a potent influence on various aspects of information processing, the origin of these effects remains largely unknown. Based on the demonstration that self-relevance facilitates perceptual judgments (i.e., the self-prioritization effect), here we explored the possibility that ownership enhances object categorization. The results of 2 experiments supported this prediction. Compared with items owned by a stranger (Expt. 1) or best friend (Expt. 2), those owned by the self were classified most rapidly (i.e., self-ownership effect) in an object-categorization task. To establish the basis of this effect, the processes underlying task performance were interrogated using a hierarchical drift diffusion model (HDDM) approach. Results of these analyses revealed that self-ownership was underpinned by a response bias (i.e., starting point of evidence accumulation). These findings explicate the origin of the ownership effect during object processing. (PsycINFO Database Record
... Continual interaction with a complex and demanding environment necessitate that a fundamental function of the self is to classify objects based on their personal significance and meaning (e.g., mine vs. not mine, goal-relevant vs. goal-irrelevant; Berlad & Pratt, 1995;Constable, Kritilos, & Bayliss, 2011;Constable, Kritikos, Lipp, & Bayliss, 2014;Fischler, Jin, Boaz, Perry, & Childers, 1987;Folmer & Yingling, 1997;Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004;Miyakoshi, Nomura, & Ohira, 2007;Müller & Kutas, 1996). One's possessions are an obvious case in point, as evidenced by the fact that even young children understand the concept of ownership and afford it social significance (Fasig, 2000;Furby, 1980;Hay, 2006). When the perils of misappropriating other people's effects (e.g., pint of beer) can be substantial (e.g., an indecorous altercation in the pub), the ability to discriminate items that one owns from items that one does not is an invaluable skill (Constable et al., 2011;Constable et al., 2014). ...
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Article
Recent research has revealed that self-referential processing enhances perceptual judgments - the so-called self-prioritization effect. The extent and origin of this effect remains unknown, however. Noting the multifaceted nature of the self, here we hypothesized that temporal influences on self-construal (i.e., past/future-self continuity) may serve as an important determinant of stimulus prioritization. Specifically, as representations of the self increase in abstraction as a function of temporal distance (i.e., distance from now), self-prioritization may only emerge when stimuli are associated with the current self. The results of three experiments supported this prediction. Self-relevance only enhanced performance in a standard perceptual-matching task when stimuli (i.e., geometric shapes) were connected with the current self; representations of the self in the future (Expts. 1 & 2) and past (Expt. 3) failed to facilitate decision making. To identify the processes underlying task performance, data were interrogated using a hierarchical drift diffusion model (HDDM) approach. Results of these analyses revealed that self-prioritization was underpinned by a stimulus bias (i.e., rate of information uptake). Collectively, these findings elucidate when and how self-relevance influences decisional processing.
... Most studies of ownership in children have focused on their understanding of individually owned objects (for a recent review see Nancekivell, Van de Vondervoort, & Friedman, 2013). This research shows that young children (including toddlers) are adept at identifying who owns objects (e.g., Brownell, Iesue, Nichols, & Svetlova, 2013;Fasig, 2000), and that young children use diverse cues to infer whether objects are owned (Neary, Van de Vondervoort, & Friedman, 2012;Rossano, Fiedler, & Tomasello, 2015), and who they are owned by (e.g., Blake & Harris, 2009;Kanngiesser & Hood, 2014;Neary, Friedman, & Burnstein, 2009). Young children also have abstract knowledge of ownership rights over individually owned objects (e.g., Kim & Kalish, 2009;Neary & Friedman, 2014;Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011;Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2013). ...
Article
Group ownership is ubiquitous-property is owned by countries, corporations, families, and clubs. However, people cannot understand group ownership by simply relying on their conceptions of ownership by individuals, as group ownership is subject to complexities that do not arise when property is individually owned. We report 6 experiments investigating whether children ages 3 to 6 (N = 540) understand group ownership. In Experiments 1 and 2 children were asked who different objects belong to, and they appropriately judged that certain objects are more likely to belong to a group than to individual people. Experiments 3 and 4 investigated whether children understand the limits of group ownership. Children saw vignettes where agents modified or depleted property. Children ages 3 and older understood that individual members of a group should not deplete group-owned property, and children ages 5 and 6 understood that individual members should not modify group-owned property. Finally, Experiments 5 and 6 investigated whether children understand the benefits of group ownership. Children ages 5 and 6 judged that it is more acceptable for a group member to take group property than for a nonmember to do this, and children ages 4 to 6 judged that group members can take more group resources than can nonmembers. Together, these results are informative about how children conceive of group ownership rights, and about children's conceptions of groups. (PsycINFO Database Record
... According to the literature, association with an object is often used as justification for ownership (Beggan and Brown, 1994). The association between an individual and an object can even act as the defining factor for ownership in circumstances wherein legal ownership is not present or has not been developed (e.g., Fasig, 2000). Psychological ownership emerges only if one can associate himor herself with the object, for which the individual needs to learn and have deep understanding and knowledge of the object's meanings. ...
Article
Customer-owned insurance companies (mutuals) are prominent actors in the insurance industry and have significantly increased in market share in the relatively recent past. However, the discussion related to mutuals lacks a systematic and multidisciplinary literature review providing a comprehensive overview of current scientific knowledge. The purpose for the paper is threefold. It categorises the existing research by year of publication, scientific journal, type of article, and type of insurance considered. Secondly, it identifies approaches and themes that capture the nature and content of the research on mutual insurance companies. Finally, it analyses how the literature has defined mutual insurance. In the process, the work critically evaluates the current status of the research on mutuals and sets out the implications for future research and work by practitioners.
... The understanding that objects can be owned (as opposed to simply being possessed) develops early in life. By 2 years of age, children understand that certain familiar objects are owned by them or close relatives (Fasig, 2000). Also by 2 years of age, children use the first possession heuristic to decide who owns an object (i.e., whoever first possesses an object is judged to be the owner; Friedman & Neary, 2008). ...
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Article
People tend to think that the function intended by an artifact’s designer is its real or proper function. Relatedly, people tend to classify artifacts according to their designer’s intended function (DIF), as opposed to an alternative opportunistic function. This centrality of DIF has been shown in children from 6 years of age and in adults, and it is not restricted to western societies. We review four different explanations for the centrality of DIF, integrating developmental and adult data. Two of these explanations are essentialist accounts (causal and intentional essentialism). Two of them are normative accounts (conventional function and idea ownership). Though essentialist accounts have been very influential, we review evidence that shows their limitations. Normative accounts have been less predominant. We review evidence to support them, and discuss how they account for the data. In particular, we review evidence suggesting that the centrality of DIF can be explained as a case of idea ownership. This theory makes sense of a great deal of the existing data on the subject, reconciles contradictory results, links this line of work to other literatures, and offers an account of the observed developmental trend.
... Initially infants do not exhibit a coherent sense of ownership for material possessions other than the sentimental objects such as blankets and teddy bears that are considered unique and irreplaceable (Hood & Bloom, 2008). In the case of non-sentimental objects, children start to identify owners of familiar objects between 18 and 24 months of age (Fasig, 2000) and soon after begin to use possessive pronouns like ''mine" and ''yours" (Hay, 2006). Young preschoolers already understand different rules of ownership (Friedman & Neary, 2008;Kanngiesser, Gjersoe, & Hood, 2010) and their normative implications (Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011). ...
Article
When an object comes into possession, the owner will typically think that it is worth more than it did before they owned the item in a bias known as the endowment effect. This bias is particularly robust in Western societies with independent self-construals, but has not been observed in children below 5–6years of age. In three studies, we investigated whether endowment effect can be induced in younger children by focusing their attention on themselves. 120 children aged 3–4years evaluated toys before and after a task where they made pictures of themselves, a friend or a neutral farm scene. Over the three studies, children consistently evaluated their own possessions, relative to other identical toys, more positively following the self-priming manipulation. Together these studies support the notion that possessions can form part of an “extended self” from early on in development and that the endowment effect may be due to an attentional self-bias framing.
... While there is a growing body of research investigating young children's understanding of ownership, there have been no studies examining the role of ownership in children's object selection and innovation in problem-solving tasks. At a basic level, an understanding of ownership emerges at around 2-3 years of age [34][35][36][37] and infants can infer ownership based on first possession when not provided with explicit ownership information [38,39]. At around the same age, children also show an understanding about ownership rights. ...
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Article
Research indicates that in experimental settings, young children of 3-7 years old are unlikely to devise a simple tool to solve a problem. This series of exploratory studies done in museums in the US and UK explores how environment and ownership of materials may improve children’s ability and inclination for (i) tool material selection and (ii) innovation. The first study takes place in a children’s museum, an environment where children can use tools and materials freely. We replicated a tool innovation task in this environment and found that while 3-4 year olds showed the predicted low levels of innovation rates, 4-7 year olds showed higher rates of innovation than the younger children and than reported in prior studies. The second study explores the effect of whether the experimental materials are owned by the experimenter or the child on tool selection and innovation. Results showed that 5-6 year olds and 6-7 year olds were more likely to select tool material they owned compared to tool material owned by the experimenter, although ownership had no effect on tool innovation. We argue that learning environments supporting tool exploration and invention and conveying ownership over materials may encourage successful tool innovation at earlier ages. © 2016 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.
... Ownership of objects is a unique relation between people and objects. Children's understanding of ownership emerges during the second year of life when they first show the ability to recognize ownership relations and indicate who owns what (Blake & Harris, 2011; Fasig, 2000; Tomasello, 1998). During this time, children also become increasingly involved in conflicts over possession (Dunn & Herrera, 1997), in which first possessors or original owners are often at an advantage (Ross, Conant, & Vickar, 2011). ...
Article
Young children often treat robots as social agents after they have witnessed interactions that can be interpreted as social. We studied in three experiments whether four-year-olds from three cultures (China, Japan, UK) and adults from two cultures (Japan, UK) will attribute ownership of objects to a robot that engages in social gaze with a human. Participants watched videos of robot-human interactions, in which objects were possessed or new objects were created. Children and adults applied the same ownership rules to humans and robots – irrespective of whether the robot engaged in social gaze or not. However, there was cultural variation in the types of ownership rules used. In Experiment 3, we removed further social cues, finding that just showing a pair of self-propelled robot-arms elicited ownership attributions. The role of social gaze in social attributions to robots and cross-cultural differences in ownership understanding are discussed.
... For example, there is evidence that MSR is followed by photo identification, then self-referent language (Brooks- Gunn & Lewis, 1984), that locating an object from its mirror image is (a) a prerequisite to MSR in that it requires knowledge of the reflective properties of mirrors (e.g., Loveland, 1986), (b) subsequent to MSR (Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978), and (c) independent of MSR (Robinson et al., 1990). Finally, MSR has been reported to precede verbal self-reference (Pipp et al., 1987; Stipek, Gralinski, & Kopp, 1990) and also to be unrelated to self-description (Fasig, 2001). Establishing whether these components of self-recognition emerge coincidentally or sequentially should provide some insight into the manner in which these abilities collectively contribute to mature self-recognition in the second year of life. ...
Article
A study was conducted to evaluate the (1) developmental course and (2) the temporal sequencing of visual (mirror, photo) and verbal (personal pronoun use) measures of self-recognition as well as the ability to locate a toy from its mirror image in relation to the child's own mirror image. A microgenetic approach was adopted to assess 10 toddlers biweekly between 15 and 23 months of age and for comparison, a cross-section of children tested once across the same age range. Longitudinal data indicated that visual self-recognition emerged gradually and showed wide variability in expression prior to becoming stable, a finding masked in the cross-sectional data where performance appeared to improve abruptly. Both cross-sectional and longitudinal data confirmed that mirror self-recognition was the earliest precursor of the indices of self-recognition to emerge followed by the use of personal pronouns and photo identification. Implications for the emergence and integration of the self are discussed.
... A towel thrown over a hotel sun lounger, or a personal item in a study carrel, is usually sufficient to indicate that someone has staked a claim to it (Taylor & Brooks, 1980). Even two-year-old children show understanding of the concept and readily link objects (e.g. a mother's toothbrush, Fasig, 2000) to their owners. ...
Article
Although possession is "nine-tenths of the law," respect for ownership is widespread in the animal kingdom even without third-party enforcement. Thus, the first individuals to find objects are frequently left unchallenged by potential competitors, and tend to win contests when disputes arise. Game theory has shown that respect for ownership ("Bourgeois" behavior) can arise as an arbitrary convention to avoid costly disputes. However, the same theory predicts that a paradoxical respect for lack of ownership ("anti-Bourgeois" behavior) can evolve under the same conditions, and in some cases is the only stable outcome. Despite these predictions, anti-Bourgeois behavior is rare in nature, while respect for ownership is frequently not absolute. Here, we review extensions of the classic models involving repeated interactions, confusion over roles, strategic coordination of behavior ("secret handshakes"), owner-intruder asymmetries and continuous control of fighting investment. Confusion over roles and owner-intruder asymmetries in fighting ability may explain why respect for ownership is often partial. Moreover, while most model extensions facilitate the evolution of Bourgeois-like behavior, secret handshakes and continuous control of fighting investment render the alternative anti-Bourgeois convention unstable. We develop these insights to highlight several key areas for future investigation. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Article
Knowing who owns what is challenging because it is often invisible to direct perception. Yet, the concept of ownership can be instrumental for organizing representations of the world. Here we investigated whether 16-month-olds (N = 64) can already use ownership to mentally organize a scene, binding representations of individual objects into higher order sets to overcome working memory limits. We found that infants failed to remember four identical objects when a single social agent possessed all four (Experiment 1). However, when two distinct agents possessed two identical objects each, infants successfully remembered all four by chunking them into two sets of two (Experiments 2 and 3). Infants were not merely using the agents as perceptual landmarks; they failed to chunk when two objects each were placed in front of distinctive inanimate objects (Experiment 4). Together, these results suggest that infants can harness abstract knowledge of personal ownership to organize the contents of memory.
Article
In all legal systems, possession and property are inextricably linked. Game theory captures this relationship in the Hawk–Dove game: players competing for an asset are better off when the possessor plays Hawk and the intruder plays Dove (the bourgeois strategy) so that property can emerge as a spontaneous convention. This theory has been supported by large experimental evidence with animals. This paper presents a lab experiment where possession is manipulated to study the emergence of the property convention with human subjects. We show that the highest coordination emerges when possession is achieved meritoriously and that possession induces only bourgeois coordination (never antibourgeois).
Article
Ownership is a cornerstone of many human societies and can be understood as a cooperative arrangement, where individuals refrain from taking each other's property. Owners can thus trust others to respect their property even in their absence. We investigated this principle in 5- to 7-year-olds (N = 152) from 4 diverse societies. Children participated in a resource task with a peer-partner, where we established ownership by assigning children to one side or the other of an apparatus and by marking resources with colors to help children keep track of them. When retrieving resources in the partner's presence, the majority of children took their own things and respected what belonged to their partner. A proportion of children in all societies also respected ownership in their partner's absence, although the strength of respect varied considerably across societies. We discuss implications for the development of ownership concepts and possible explanations for societal differences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
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Article
In exploring self-biases in cognition and decision-making, recent research has demonstrated cultural variation in the emergence of the self-ownership effect in memory. Whereas Westerners display enhanced memory for items owned by the self (vs. mother), this effect is reversed among Asian participants. Developing this line of inquiry, here we considered whether cultural influences on ownership extend to other outcomes—specifically, the efficiency of object categorization. In two experiments, Western and Asian participants were required to report if previously assigned items (i.e., pencils and pens) were owned-by-self or owned-by-mother. Results revealed a self-prioritization effect for participants from both cultures, such that responses were faster to self-owned than mother-owned objects. To establish the origin of this effect, the processes underlying task performance were interrogated using a hierarchical drift diffusion model approach. Results of these analyses revealed that the self-ownership effect was underpinned primarily by a pre-decisional bias (i.e., starting point of evidence accumulation). These findings elucidate the extent and origin of the self-ownership effect during object processing.
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Thesis
In this thesis I critique the modern tendency to construct the legal subject upon a sharp distinction between Reason and body and to ground the normative force of law on an ideal conception of Reason. The legal subject is thereby presented as a disembodied cogitans to the neglect of his corporeality. This disregards both the necessarily material aspect of the legal subject and the necessarily embodied aspect of legal action, and results in an inadequate account of how legal normativity is manifested in material reality. This thesis aims to construct a theory of material legal normativity by re-incorporating the body of the subject into legal action and presenting that as the proper locus of law’s normative force. Although I focus on the material body in favour of Reason or rationality as the locus of action, I do not dismiss the possibility of meaningful normative action which is free from determination by material forces. I aim to construct a theory of action which is both material and normative by navigating the opposition between ideal Reason and material determinism. I do this by proposing an alternative conception of normative action which draws together the mechanism of habit and the manner of interaction with the material world. This theory of normative action will then form the basis for an account of normative legal action which gives due weight to the embodied nature of the legal subject as the proper locus for the material manifestation of the normative force of law.
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Article
Individuals perform better when remembering and recognizing items that belong to themselves other than those belong to others, even if the ownership association between objects and subjects is only transient and imaginary. This is called the ownership effect in memory. This effect occurs also in young children and individuals with cognitive deficits. There is also cross-cultural difference in the appearance of this effect between individuals in Eastern and Western culture. Researchers have explored some internal mechanism of this effect, such as semantic organization, attention, self-choice and physical actions. At the time subjects watch items belong to themselves, there is an enhanced P300, which supplies an electrical proof that attention plays an important role in the ownership effect in memory. When subjects are to recognize items that are classified as their own in the prior ownership classification task, some brain regions in cortical midline structure, such as medial prefrontal cortex, cingulate cortex supramarginal gyri and parietal cortex, are activated. Future studies should consider the role of some other processing (such as reward learning) in this effect, and to explain this phenomenon from an evolutionary perspective by conducting studies with primates. Tapping the brain mechanism of individuals with cognitive impairment will be helpful to enrich studies in this field.
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In the current studies, we addressed the development of effort-based object valuation. Four- and 6-year-olds invested either great or little effort in order to obtain attractive or unattractive rewards. Children were allowed to allocate these rewards to an unfamiliar recipient (dictator game). Investing great effort to obtain attractive rewards (a consonant situation) led 6-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, to enhance the value of the rewards and thus distribute fewer of them to others. After investing effort to attain unattractive rewards (a dissonant situation), 6-year-olds cognitively reduced the dissonance between effort and reward quality by reappraising the value of the rewards and thus distributing fewer of them. In contrast, 4-year-olds reduced the dissonance behaviorally by discarding the rewards. These findings provide evidence for the emergence of an effort-value link and underline possible mechanisms underlying the primacy of cognitive versus behavioral solutions to dissonance reduction. © The Author(s) 2015.
Chapter
The early childhood years are a crucial time for the development of self-regulation - an array of complex mental capacities that includes impulse and emotion control, selfguidance of thought and behavior, planning, self-reliance, and socially responsible behavior. Self-regulation is also essential for children to meet the academic and social requirements of school. The human need for complex, flexible regulatory systems that can cope with a wide array of environmental conditions means that the development of self- regulation begins early, takes place over an extended time period, and requires substantial external support. Early childhood is also the "high season" of imaginative play, when make-believe evolves from simple imitative acts into elaborate plots involving complex coordination of roles. This chapter presents wide-ranging evidence that pretenseis pivotal in children's advancing mastery over their own thinking, emotions, and behavior. The data are based on the sociocultural theory of Russian developmental psychologist Lev Vygotsky, who viewed social experiences such as make-believe play as prime catalysts of development.
Article
Four survey experiments provide evidence that children (9–12 years) infer collective land ownership from first arrival. In Experiments 1 and 2, children indicated that a group owns an island relatively more than another group when having been or living on the island first. In the third experiment, it was found that first comers were considered to own the land more independently of whether the second group joined or succeeded them in living on the island. In Experiment 4, the first arrival principle to infer collective ownership was independent of the duration of stay of the first comers before being joined by the second group. Taken together, the findings provide clear evidence of the importance of first arrival for inferring collective place ownership.
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Freedom differentiates human beings from other creatures. It is a state of being that is unique to humankind and a quality th at defines us as humans. The concept of freedom is important to parenting practices. As we raise children to live as hu manly as possible, to be themselves and live their own life, we as parents and educators should have a good understanding of the concept of freedom. Freedom involves attaining laws of nature (mind) and rising above conditions. Laws that regulate natural processes and our lives are also embedded in our minds—they cannot be externally imposed. Therefore, self-will, self- attempts, and self-effort are needed to acquire these laws. The purpose of this study was to examine three parenting styles— indulgent, authoritarian, and authoritative—according to the above-mentioned perspective.
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Psychoanalytic object relations theory and symbolic interactionism both emphasize the mediating role of representations in the socialization process, yet the relationship between the external environment and the constitution of these representations is quite different in the two approaches. The inherent subjectivism of the Freudian tradition is criticized through an examination of the role of personal possessions in the objectification of the self. Valued material possessions, it is argued, act as signs of the self that are essential in theirown right for its continued cultivation, and hence the world of meaning that we create for ourselves, and that creates our selves, extends literally into the objective surroundings.
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The ability of young children to recognize themselves in delayed videotapes and recent photographs was investigated using a delayed analog of the mirror mark test, as well as verbal reports. In Experiment 1, 42 2–4-year-old children were videotaped while playing an unusual game. During the game an experimenter covertly placed a large sticker on the child's head. The videotape was played back 3 min later to the children. Older, but not younger, children reached up to remove the sticker when the tape revealed it being placed on their heads. In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used with 60 3- and 4-year-olds where Polaroid photographs were taken during and after the act of the sticker being placed on the child's head. When allowed to look at the photographs, young 3-year-olds did not reach up to search for the sticker, whereas older 3- and 4-year-olds did. Almost all of the children who did not appear to realize that there was a sticker on their head from the information provided by the photographs did provide a correct verbal label for the image, and reached up to remove the sticker when presented with a mirror. Experiment 3 compared the reaction of 48 21/2–31/2-year-olds to live versus delayed video feedback and indicated an effect of the temporal aspect of the stimulus. The results are discussed in the context of the different forms of self-conception that may underwrite the 2 manifestations of self-recognition.
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Historical and current theories of infantile amnesia are examined. To evaluate the viability of these theories, as well as the phenomenon of infantile amnesia itself, a review of memory development from birth through the preschool years is provided, including an overview of relevant perceptual and neurological maturation. In the context of this review, extant theories of infantile amnesia are shown to falter, and it is concluded that infantile amnesia is a chimera of a previously unexplored relationship between the development of a cognitive sense of self and the personalization of event memory. This hypothesis is examined in detail and discussed in the context of related developments in language and social cognition.
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Article
The ability of young children to recognize themselves in delayed videotapes and recent photographs was investigated using a delayed analog of the mirror mark test, as well as verbal reports. In Experiment 1, 42 2-4-year-old children were videotaped while playing an unusual game. During the game an experimenter covertly placed a large sticker on the child's head. The videotape was played back 3 min later to the children. Older, but not younger, children reached up to remove the sticker when the tape revealed it being placed on their heads. In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used with 60 3- and 4-year-olds where Polaroid photographs were taken during and after the act of the sticker being placed on the child's head. When allowed to look at the photographs, young 3-year-olds did not reach up to search for the sticker, whereas older 3- and 4-year-olds did. Almost all of the children who did not appear to realize that there was a sticker on their head from the information provided by the photographs did provide a correct verbal label for the image, and reached up to remove the sticker when presented with a mirror. Experiment 3 compared the reaction of 48 2 1/2-3 1/2-year-olds to live versus delayed video feedback and indicated an effect of the temporal aspect of the stimulus. The results are discussed in the context of the different forms of self-conception that may underwrite the 2 manifestations of self-recognition.
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Article
Eighty-eight young 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds were scheduled for 2 testing sessions. On Visit 1, the children were videotaped playing a game while an experimenter covertly placed a large sticker on their head and covertly removed it after the game. One week later, the children were videotaped playing a different game. A sticker was again covertly placed on their heads. Half the children in each age group then observed the video from the previous week, whereas the other half observed the tape from 3 min earlier. Less than half of the 3-year-olds in both conditions reached up for the sticker. In contrast, the majority of 4- and 5-year-olds in the briefly delayed condition reached for the sticker, but few in the extremely delayed condition did so. By 4 years of age, children may have developed a causal understanding of the self's endurance through time.
Article
Most statistics textbooks concentrate on theoretical discussions and mathematical proofs of the various concepts presented. . . . The intent of the first and second editions of "Computational Handbook of Statistics" was to reverse this approach and to present statistical concepts and tests as they are applied. This emphasis on application will be continued in the third edition, the major changes being the addition of multivariate analyses, the latest computer applications to statistics, expanded computer programs, and greater treatment of how to write them. Since this text requires little mathematical or formal statistical background, it should prove invaluable to instructors in beginning laboratory courses in which students have completed only the most basic statistics course. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
24 children age 14 to 32 months were shown a series of photographs of familiar and unfamiliar objects and persons in order to determine the frequency of owner naming and other expressions of possession. Only 7 subjects correctly named the owner of a pictured familiar object. Owner naming occurred mainly in response to pictures of the child's parent's possessions. Other indicators of possession were used, but by different children or in different situations. Children who used any indicator of possession were more successful on an object permanence task than were those who did not. Object naming was a much more frequent phenomenon than owner naming, but owner namers tended not to name objects whose owners were unknown to them.
Book
1 The Origins of Self.- Social Cognition.- Duality of Self.- Theoretical Accounts of the Origins of Self.- Self Knowledge and Self Awareness.- Plan of This Volume.- 2 Mirror Representations of Self.- Mirror Study I.- Mirror Study II.- 3 Videotape Representations of Self and Others.- Videotape Study I.- Videotape Study II.- 4 Pictorial Representations of Self and Others.- Picture Study I.- Picture Study II.- 5 Verbal Labeling of Self and Others.- Labeling Study I.- Labeling Study II 150.- 6 Individual Differences in the Expression of Self Recognition.- 7 Self Recognition and Emotional Development.- A Definition of Emotion.- The Ontogenesis of Emotional Experience and Self Knowledge.- 8 The Development of Self Recognition.- Representational Forms of the Self.- Criteria for Self Recognition.- The Ontogeny of Self Recognition.- Individual Differences in the Development of Self Recognition.- 9 Toward a Theory of the Development of Self.- Self Development.- Self, Interaction, and Other: The Onset of Social Cognition.- Three Principles of Social Cognition.- Social Dimensions and the Categorical Self.- 10 The Uses of a Theory of Self.- The Ontogeny of Thought: A Sociobiological Approach.- The Role of Self in Cognition.- The Self-Other Distinction.- Self and Interaction.- References.- Author Index.
Article
Self‐knowledge is based on several different forms of information, so distinct that each one essentially establishes a different ‘self. The ecological self is the self as directly perceived with respect to the immediate physical environment; the interpersonal self, also directly perceived, is established by species‐specific signals of emotional rapport and communication; the extended self is based on memory and anticipation; the private self appears when we discover that our conscious experiences are exclusively our own; the conceptual self or ‘self‐concept’ draws its meaning from a network of socially‐based assumptions and theories about human nature in general and ourselves in particular. Although these selves are rarely experienced as distinct (because they are held together by specific forms of stimulus information), they differ in their developmental histories, in the accuracy with which we can know them, in the pathologies to which they are subject, and generally in what they contribute to human experience.
Article
Tested the hypothesis that as children develop a clearer definition of "I" as distinct from others at age 2 yrs, they will also become more concerned with defining self and nonself in their interactions with a peer. 78 2-yr-old boys were administered 4 measures of self-definition, and 40 were then paired with like-scoring Ss in 2 peer interaction sessions. Ss scoring high in self-definition claimed toys and commented on peers more than did low-scoring Ss. A different pattern of interaction was found for high- and low-scoring Ss. After an initial period of wariness, Ss who showed clearer self-definition defined their territory to a peer by claiming toys. When the claiming of toys subsided, positive verbal interaction continued. Low-scoring Ss increased only their exchanging and showing of toys to a peer over time. Discussion focuses on the importance of claiming toys as a progressive developmental step rather than as a sign of selfishness. (10 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
In Remembering Reconsidered, the new ecologically oriented study of memory makes contact with more traditional approaches. The emerging result may be what several of the authors have begun to call 'functionalism': a concern with the adaptive significance of memory in ordinary life coupled with a careful analysis of the variables on which it depends. In different ways, the chapters reflect this concern. The editors bring together a diverse collection of studies on remembering, using subjects ranging from folk songs to 'crib talk'. Introductory chapters weave these themes together, developing an underlying sense of the project of the volume as a whole. This is the second volume in the Emory Symposia on Cognition. The Emory Cognition Project, directed by Ulric Neisser, emphasizes an ecological approach to problems in theoretical, experimental, and applied cognitive psychology.
Article
Changes in cognitive organization of a relatively circumscribed new environment (small university campus) over a 6-mo period following arrival in the locale were assessed by sketch map representations. Quantitative and qualitative analyses of the maps produced by 40 college freshmen, as well as their responses to a follow-up inquiry, provided evidence that (a) the cognitive organization of the new environment becomes increasingly differentiated and integrated over the course of exposure to the locale, and (b) the process of cognitive organization is based on the use of a personally salient location as an anchor-point in relation to which the other parts of the environment are established and articulated. (French abstract) (30 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Discusses the magical status possessions acquire when they transcend ordinary utilitarian status and suggests some concepts behind this phenomenon. Categories of special possessions include (1) parts of self (cosmetics, jewelry, clothing); (2) extensions of self (home, vehicle, pets); (3) objects of magic, science, and religion (icons, talismans, drugs); (4) memory laden objects (gifts, heirlooms); and (5) rare and mysterious possessions (treasure, relics of famous people). Tests for nonrational relations with objects are outlined. An eclectic set of concepts is presented to sketch theoretical perspectives that account for the mysteries of possessions. The concepts presented include fetishism, singularity and sacredness, self extension, and meaning displacement. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
68 preschoolers 30–60 mo old were told that a toy belonged either to them or to the class or were given no specific instructions. Their subsequent behavior with the toy was observed. Children of all ages defended the toy more in the "yours" condition than in the "class" condition. Girls, but not boys, exhibited more defensive behavior with age. (3 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
This study evaluated the psychological mechanisms underlying imitation of facial actions in young infants. A novel aspect of the study was that it used a nonoral gesture that had not been tested before (head movement), as well as a tongue-protrusion gesture. Results showed imitation of both displays. Imitation was not limited to the intervals during which the experimenter's movements were displayed; Ss also imitated from memory after the display had stopped. The results established that newborn imitation is not constrained to a few privileged oral movements. The findings support Meltzoff and Moore's hypothesis that early imitation is mediated by an active cross-modal matching process. A common representational code may unite the perception and production of basic human acts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Infants' developing understanding of self and mother was assessed in two domains, using four tasks. All four sets of tasks significantly followed the predicted sequences, which suggests that infants followed the same basic developmental progression in understanding themselves as in understanding their mothers. In addition, the temporal priority, or decalage, of acquiring each sequence was tested to determine whether infants acquired the sense of self and mother at the same time or at different times. We hypothesized that in the agency domain infants could act on the self before they could act on their mothers. Conversely, in the feature domain, infants could identify characteristics of their mothers before those of themselves. Before 18 months, decalage fit the predicted pattern for both the agency and feature domains. At later ages, however, the pattern became more complex. After 18 months, there was no consistent decalage for the feature domain. In the agency domain, the predicted pattern of acquiring self-knowledge before knowledge of mother was generally supported, with a suggestion of a change later in the sequence. At about 3 years of age, some children seemed to become defensive about categorizing themselves as a baby. We hypothesized that the changes in decalage after 1½ years reflected the onset of representational abilities. (49 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Sibling property disputes were observed in 40 families, each with a 2- and a 4-year-old child, to study the application of principles of entitlement. Conflict outcomes, parent support, and justifying arguments were each analyzed in disputes involving ownership, possession, sharing, and property damage. Ownership and possession each influenced the conduct and outcomes of disputes, with ownership taking precedence over possession in children's arguments and in dispute outcomes. Parents did not clearly support either principle on its own and were as likely to argue in terms of possession as ownership rights. Parents supported children's sharing and prohibited property damage, but conflict outcomes upheld these principles only when parents intervened. Analyses revealed the strong influence of young children who argued, with increasing differentiation and sophistication, for principles of entitlement that were not strongly endorsed by their parents. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
This study was designed to determine groupings of behaviors associated with self-concept development in toddlers and the sequence in which groups of behaviors appear. Mothers of 123 toddlers of ages 14 to 40 mo reported on the presence of 25 behaviors associated with the self. A factor analysis and a Guttman Scale analysis suggested the following sequence in behaviors: (1) physical self-recognition, (2) self-description (both neutral and evaluative), and (3) emotional responses to wrongdoing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Tiedemann (1787) and Darwin (1877) provided the first systematic notes on infancy / among the issues explored by both was the question of when infants could first recognize themselves in a "looking glass" and begin fashioning a self-concept / both were convinced that by about two years of age infants could recognize themselves and had developed at least a primitive notion of self the principal point I will try to make is that experiments can also be directed toward the initial origins of the notion of self—its foundation and earliest manifestation in the preverbal child / recent studies of imitation and related phenomena in infancy provide new insights that complement the work that has already been done with mirror recognition / moreover, because these studies involve infants younger than those used in the mirror test, they allow a glimpse of an even more embryonic notion of self than is reflected in the mirror studies argue that these recent studies have uncovered aspects of the primordial notion of self from which subsequent development proceeds / by understanding the initial condition of the self during early infancy, we can better understand the subsequent critical developments that occur at eighteen to twenty-four months, when children are acquiring language and finally become able to recognize themselves in a mirror (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Imitation was tested both immediately and after a 24-hr retention interval in 6-week-old infants. The results showed immediate imitation, which replicates past research, and also imitation from memory, which is new. The latter finding implicates recall memory and establishes that 6-week-olds can generate actions on the basis of stored representations. The motor organization involved in imitation was investigated through a microanalysis of the matching response. Results revealed that infants gradually modified their behavior towards more accurate matches over successive trials. It is proposed that early imitation serves a social identity function. Infants are motivated to imitate after a 24-hr delay as a means of clarifying whether the person they see before them is the same one they previously encountered. They use the reenactment of a person's behavior to probe whether this is the same person. In the domain of inanimate objects, infants use physical manipulations (e.g., shaking) to perform this function. Imitation is to understanding people as physical manipulation is to understanding things. Motor imitation, the behavioral reenactment of things people do, is a primitive means of understanding and communicating with people.
Article
The present paper provides a working model for studying the development of autobiographical memory. The model is based on an integration of literatures concerning (1) children′s metacognitive capacities, (2) the social construction of personal narratives, and (3) the development of the self-concept. By age 3, children possess the metacognitive understanding that knowledge of an event depends upon personal experience with that event and an awareness of the mental state of remembering. These representational capacities may allow children to understand that they are remembering an event because they personally experienced it, and thus "tag" memories for potential entry into autobiographical memory. The model outlines ways in which these representational capacities may also contribute to children′s ability to engage in the social construction of personal narratives. Further, the model specifies that the emergence of autobiographical memory requires an organized, psychological self-concept. Factors that affect the autobiographical memory system, but may not be essential for its ontogeny, are (1) the ability to engage in source monitoring and (2) particular parental styles of discussing the past. Thus, the present paper emphasizes the need for an integrated approach for studying the emergence of autobiographical memory.
Article
Despite the recent popularity of the term, the degree to which the "life course" as such is experienced in everyday life is not clear. Explorations of this question have not been very satisfying because they tend to either eliminate biographical time (as in survey research) or assume its presence (as with clinical, biographical, and life historical research) through the methods used. Our exploratory research used the meanings of personal possessions as an indirect measure of the temporal framing of experiences among forty women who had moved into facilities for elderly persons. We found considerable variation in the relative frequency and importance of biographical references in descriptions of those possessions, which challenges the concepts that have been used to relate experiences of temporality to the self and the methods that have been used to explore these experiences.
Article
The conflicts of 24 pairs of previously unacquainted 21-month-old children were examined for social hallmarks at several levels of analysis. Each child was observed with the same partner for 15 min on 3 consecutive days. On the fourth day half the dyads were rearranged such that each child now was paired with a new partner; the remaining children returned to meet their usual partners. Conflicts were defined dyadically as 1 child's protesting, resisting, or retaliating against an act by the peer; 217 were recorded across the 4 days, 84% of which were struggles over toys. The disputes possessed a patterned interactive structure and explicit communicative content, and 75% of the object struggles were preceded or followed by socially pertinent events. The extent of conflict neither increased nor decreased over days, nor were there reliable differences between acquainted peers on the fourth day. However, the outcome of 1 conflict affected the next; a child who lost a dispute was more likely than the winner to initiate the next. Moreover, the findings suggested that dyadic as well as dispositional factors influenced conflictual behavior; the children's tendency to initiate disputes on the fourth day could be predicted from their initiations on the first 3 days for both groups, but prediction of their tendency to yield to the peer's demands for objects was only possible for the group who retained the same partners.
Article
Age and gender differences were examined concerning the nature (types of objects considered special), meaning (person/nonperson, past, present, and future associations), and function (emotional, social, identity development, and play) of cherished possessions. One hundred twenty subjects in six age categories (6, 9, 11, 14, 16, and 18 years), with 10 males and 10 females comprising each age group, were interviewed. Results indicated significant age, gender, and age by gender interactions. For example, younger children were egocentric in the meanings assigned to their cherished possessions, while older children held social relationships meaningful; females favored items to be contemplated while males favored action items; possessions which were meaningful for the "enjoyment" they provided decreased after age 6 years in females, but persisted in males throughout the ages studied. The findings have theoretical implications for cognitive, emotional, and social development from childhood through adolescence.
Article
The complexity of toddlers' self-development was examined in the context of knowing others. Two studies were designed to test whether toddlers' self-knowledge was different from their knowledge of others (e.g., mother and inanimate object) or whether toddlers' knowledge of persons (e.g., self and mother) was different from their knowledge of objects. Knowledge of self, mother, and inanimate object was observed in developmentally sequenced tasks assessing agency and featural knowledge. When the inanimate object was perceptually different from humans, 12-month-old toddlers responded differently to all 3 versions. When the inanimate object was perceptually similar to humans, 24-month-olds distinguished self from other and did not distinguish between the 2 versions of "other:" mother and inanimate object. We concluded that 12-month-old infants were more sensitive to perceptual features of objects than were older toddlers. Data were interpreted according to Neisser's distinction between the ecological self and the interpersonal self.
A self in time The development of a tempo-rally extended self
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