Executive Summary
1. Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in their traditional form (fenced-in industrial
parks where export-oriented investors enjoy free port status) emerged in the period
1950-75 and first became widely adopted between 1975-85. Currently there are
more than 3,500 EPZs in 130 countries. EPZs have been mainly but not exclusively
targeted at attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) in labour-intensive manufacturing;
however, an increasing number of EPZs are targeted at capital-intensive
manufacturing or services, and/or are also open to domestic investor participation.
Some newer EPZs also depart from the traditional model by embracing wider
regions.
2. Most of the first EPZs were established in Asia, and Asian EPZs have also
witnessed the highest level of innovation in respect of sectoral focus, geographical
flexibility and openness to domestic enterprise. A number of the Asian countries
adopting EPZs in the early stages later became the so-called Newly Industrialised
Countries (NICs).
3. The World Bank and some bilateral donors provided extensive support to EPZs
in the 1980s and early 1990s, with the aim not only of promoting developing
country export growth but also of creating what was seen as a bridgehead to more
liberal trade regimes. Since around 2000, as trade liberalisation has become widely
accepted as a norm, multilateral donors have become more cautious in their
approach to EPZs, recognising that these may be promoted by some developing
countries as an alternative to wider trade and business environment reforms.
Furthermore, it appears that a majority of World Bank-supported EPZs have been
unsuccessful in their own terms.
4. The potential impacts of EPZs can be grouped under the headings of static and
dynamic effects. Static effects may include increasing and diversifying exports,
increasing FDI and increasing employment. Dynamic effects may include promoting
technology, skill transfers and backward linkages with the host economy. The
second group of impacts is difficult to quantify. A more serious problem however is
that it is difficult to distinguish the effects of EPZs from those of other factors
influencing the same variables. This problem is compounded by the fact that EPZs
differ considerably amongst themselves. Finally, there is a general lack of good timeseries
data on impacts, even in respect of static effects, apart from for a few EPZs
mainly in larger Asian countries. All these factors are reflected in a literature that is
overwhelmingly dominated by case studies.
5. Having said this, the record of EPZs in attracting FDI is highly uneven. A sample
of 17 countries with EPZs shows huge variations in levels of investment attracted
by EPZs, and includes five countries where the EPZ investment stock is $300 million
or less. There are similar variations in terms of export performance and
employment, as well as a large number of cases where investment and employment
in, and exports from EPZs have been extremely low. In general, EPZs in Asia and
some other countries with large populations appear to have had larger impacts than
those elsewhere, especially in relation to those in Africa.
6. Evidence on EPZs’ dynamic effects is too patchy to draw strong conclusions,
although there is a suggestion that dynamic effects are probably low for traditional
EPZs. This is especially the case if they are dominated by foreign-owned labour
intensive manufacturing in globalised sectors, and/or where EPZs operate as
enclaves in countries with otherwise low levels of industrialisation. Instances of
dynamic effects appear to be more frequent where EPZs are found in middleincome
countries and where the competitiveness of EPZ enterprises does not
depend upon the incentive package and cheap labour costs alone.
7. Meanwhile, an extensive literature has developed concerning labour conditions in
EPZ. While a majority of this literature is critical of EPZ labour conditions, there is
little evidence that these are any worse than in their host countries more generally.
Some aspects of labour conditions, notably wage rates, may be actually higher than
in host economies. On the other hand, there does appear to be evidence that labour
organisations are frequently repressed in EPZs.
8. One of the reasons for the apparent decline in the static effects of creating
additional EPZs in their traditional form has been referred to already. This is the
widening adoption of trade liberalisation by developing countries, which reduces the
advantages to operators of schemes in which remission of import duty on imported
inputs and raw materials play a large role. For developing countries as a group,
average tariff levels have declined by more than half since the first large wave of
EPZs in the 1980s, and in most cases their economies have experienced
liberalisation along other dimensions too.
9. A second reason for the declining effectiveness of traditional EPZs relates to
parallel changes in the quality of developing country infrastructure and the efficiency
of customs clearance procedures. In respect of infrastructure, per capita consumption
of electric power and connection to telecoms systems have improved, often
dramatically, in all the sample of 17 developing countries referred to earlier for
which time series data is available since 1980. Over the same period, improvements
have occurred in the productivity of rail freight systems for six of the 10 members
of the sample for which time series data is available. There was also an improvement
for all countries in the sample for which time series data was available but one in the
quality of highway provision. As for customs efficiency, time series data on an
indirect measure suggests significant improvements since 1980 in Asia and Latin
America (though not Africa).
10. This is by no means to cast doubt on export growth and diversification as a
developing country growth strategy, subject to certain qualifications. Growth in
exports of manufactures directly contributes to GDP growth, though not necessarily
at unity. Furthermore, the growing tendency for manufacturing industries to be
organised in global value chains in which production is outsourced to developing
countries, means that developing country manufacturing exports should continue to
grow even if demand in developed countries slows down. This is as a result of
production in developing countries replacing that in developed ones.
11. The qualifications to these trends that may be noted do not concern obstacles to
growth of developing country exports. Rather they concern declining terms of trade
for a range of labour-intensive manufactures that developing countries specialise in.
This decline is most evident in relation to clothing, although indirect evidence suggests
that it applies also to consumer electronics components and finished goods.
This points toward the importance of new competitiveness factors in developing
country manufacturing, in relation to which the traditional EPZ incentive package is
largely irrelevant.
12. While it is sometimes argued that a number of the incentives offered to EPZ
investors are incompatible with WTO rules, both most of the measures incorporated
in traditional EPZs and those that form part of later generations of export
growth and diversification policy are actually permitted under these rules.
Furthermore, a total of 65 developing countries members of WTO may legally
provide any type of export incentive, including these that are otherwise illegal under
WTO rules, until 2015.
13. Recognition of the decreasing effectiveness of traditional EPZs, as well as of the
emergence of new challenges to developing country exporters, poses with some
acuteness the question of alternatives to EPZs. It is inappropriate to seek a general
answer to this question. Rather, the answers given should take into account the
nature of the main economic development problems facing a given country. These
may be poor governance, or macro-economic instability and associated high costs of
finance, or inadequate human capital formation, or (in the case of land-locked
countries) inadequate infrastructure in the wider region – or some combination of
these. Additionally, even in countries where problems of this kind have been largely
overcome, domestic factor prices may not favour export competitiveness. If issues
of this kind are not addressed first then, while a traditional EPZ may yield some
static gains these will be difficult to sustain. Hence, support to such arrangements
will almost certainly be a second-best option.
14. In those situations where all these problems are being addressed, then the issue
is rather adjusting export growth and diversification policies to meeting the new
competitive challenges. Here, answers are harder to come by. They probably include
interventions targeted at specific aspects of competitiveness, including inducing
firm-level adaptation and innovation. Such interventions moreover make more
sense if targeted at all operators in a given sector or host economy, rather than
foreign investors alone. They may include, for example, government support to
exchange rate competitiveness, interventions on credit and interventions on
technology. A cautious approach is advisable in these areas however, in order to
avoid free riding.
15. Most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa fall into the category where the main
economic development problems are far from resolved. Simultaneously, it is widely
recognised that they are falling more and more behind Asia as far as trade competitiveness
is concerned. This has led some recent commentators, notably Collier
(2007), to argue that it is worth providing some support to an improvement in this
competitiveness even when giving overall priority to resolving problems such as
governance or macro-economic instability. Rather than proposing additional
measures such as EPZs for Sub-Saharan African countries to adopt to this end,
Collier suggests instead that developed countries should develop a new system of
preferential market access earmarked for Africa. This suggestion reflects a broader
trend amongst economists for a renewed of interest in the potential of trade
preferences, dating from the widening recognition around 2004-05 that the WTO
Doha Round (even if completed) is unlikely to provide Africa with meaningful
welfare gains. The precise make-up of such a new generation of preferences remains
to be elaborated.