No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Troubled Theory in the Debate between Hirst and Carr
Abstract
When Paul Hirst and Wilfred Carr squared up to each other a few years ago on the issue of the role of philosophical theory in educational practice, it became clear that theory itself had become a troubled term. The very fact that Wilfred Carr could argue for the end of educational theory recalls Paul Feyerabend's fiery argument for the end of theory in natural science and simply deepened the attack that had already appeared in Carr and Kemmis's book, Becoming Critical (1986). In response, Hirst insisted that theory, and particularly the philosophical theory of education, should be defined as a discrete area of study in itself, governed and structured by the axioms of logic. In this way, he argued, the philosophy of education would be no different from philosophy in general (at least in its analytic formulation). Carr, on the other hand, preferred to consider educational theory as a flexible event that took its shape from the landscape explored, and hence precisely not the kind of study that Hirst supported, but one based in action research and reflective practitioner experience. This debate is as yet unresolved. In this piece I begin by making several remarks about the current context for raising the question Hirst and Carr address, and I go on to consider other possible understandings of theoria in a Greek sense before developing this idea through a reading of Aristotle. I eventually conclude that each of the protagonists in the debate has taken a step too far.
... Carr (2006) attributes their emergence to the dominance in US and UK academia of logical positivism in the mid-20th century, leading education departments to seek legitimacy through new constructions of educational theory, 'abandoning [education's] concern with philosophical theories and reconstructing itself as an applied science' (Carr 2006, 140). Whilst Carr had earlier argued that educational practice itself should provide the rationale for teachers' actions and curricula (Carr/Kemmis 1986;Long 2008), in postmodernist and poststructuralist times, the possibilities of any kind of educational theory have been more directly challenged (e.g., Stronach/MacLure 1997). Yet the notion of foundational disciplines retains some currency, with Hordern et al. (2021) arguing that these disciplines (adding Young's curriculum theory) and Bildung-centred Didaktik can both be opposed to imperatives of contemporary policy as 'methodologies answerable to an idea of educational practice as normative and purposeful' (Hordern et al. 2021, 143). ...
Whilst VET in German-speaking countries and its research base are well-known internationally, its theoretical foundations are not shared in countries where VET emerged later and has undergone more circuitous forms of theorisation. The significance of these different international understandings of the field is explored here through a comparative discussion of the theorisation of VET in English-speaking countries. A critical review of key contributions to this theorisation shows it to draw on a wide range of external disciplines, in a problematic relationship with both a contested liberal education tradition and with neoliberal policy; and within a fragmented field of knowledge production, where it competes with alternative claims to expertise that limit its contribution to the field of policy and practice. It is concluded that, whilst this problematising and problematic theorisation of VET in the Anglosphere has produced significant contributions, their effect on policy and practice has been delayed or distorted, and that significant investment in autonomous research capacity will be necessary for any meaningful renewal of VET.
... Husserl, 2012), der frühen Fundamentalontologie (Heidegger, 1993, S. 72 -76), der geisteswissenschaftlichen Pädagogik oder der Bildungsphilosophie (vgl. Long, 2008): Es sei ein "nicht begrifflich vereinnahmende[r] Umgang mit der Welt (in ihrer Nichtverstehbarkeit)" angemessen (Thomas, 2006, S. 212). Die Praxis erhält das Primat, denn die Formelsprache des unbeteiligten Beobachtens sei mit Bedeutungsentleerung verbunden (Litt, 1959, S. 149). ...
Der Beitrag diskutiert die Bedeutung von Meta-Reflexivität für die Professionalität im Lehrerinnen- und Lehrerberuf. Meta-Reflexivität beruht erstens auf der für die Lehrerbildung konstitutiven Mehrperspektivität, die wiederum auf die vielfältigen an ihr beteiligten Disziplinen und Studienelemente zurückgeht. Zweitens greift der Ansatz Ungewissheit als konstitutives Merkmal der gängigen Professionstheorien zum Lehrerinnen- und Lehrerberuf auf. Ausgehend von einer historisch-systematischen Rekonstruktion wird Meta-Reflexivität als ein Element von Professionalität entfaltet, das auf Grundlage der Durchdringung multipler theoretischer und empirischer Zugänge zu exemplarischen Situationsdeutungen von Schulpraxis führt. Auf diese exemplarischen Situationsdeutungen kann, nicht aber muss beim Treffen angemessener situativer Deutungen im realen Handlungsfeld Schule und Unterricht rekurriert werden. Der Grad an Professionalität bemisst sich dabei an der Qualität und nicht an der Quantität dieses Rekurses. Eine Schärfung von Meta-Reflexivität wird in Abgrenzung zum Konzept der Personal Epistemology vorgenommen. Mögliche Prinzipien meta-reflexiver Lehrerbildung werden vorgeschlagen. Ein Ausblick wird gegeben.
... The team brought a variety of experiences and insights to the research task, and within the overall socio-cultural understanding that framed this study, were able to contribute their specialised knowledge in areas such as teacher learning, inclusion, equality and diversity, literacy, second language teaching, the teaching of mathematics and of science, teacher education policy, socio-cultural perspectives on learning etc. (e.g. Hall, Marchant, & Ghali, 1999;Conway & Clark, 2003;Delargey, 2003;Conway & Sloane, 2006;McKeon, 2007;O'Brien & O'Fathaigh, 2007;Hall, Murphy & Soler, 2008;Long, 2008;Conway, Murphy, Rath & Hall, 2009;Murphy, 2009). The research team itself can be seen in this context as a community of learners, participating together in the task of achieving an understanding of the process of learning to teach. ...
The aim of this research, the Learning to Teach Study (LETS), the first of its kind on the Postgraduate Diploma in Education (PGDE) in Ireland, funded by the Department of Education and Skills (DES), was to develop and implement a study of initial teacher education in the PGDE in post-primary education, in the School of Education, University College Cork. Its aim was to identify the individual and contextual dynamics of how student teachers develop curricular and cross-curricular competences during initial teacher education (ITE). Within an overall framework that explores how student teachers develop their skills, competences and identity as teachers, it focuses on curricular competences in mathematics, science and language teaching, and on the cross-curricular competences of reading and digital literacy and the development of inclusive teaching practices. LETS is the first programme level research on the PGDE, familiarly known to generations of student teachers and teachers as ‘the Dip’ or ‘the HDip’. Drawing on research on teacher education both in Ireland and internationally, the LETS report is divided into six sections encompassing thirteen chapters. Section 1 includes the review of literature and study aims in Chapter 1 and the research methodology in Chapter 2. Adopting an interpretive approach, LETS involved the collaborative development of three interviews protocols and a survey by the research team. Seventeen (n=17) students were interviewed three times over the course of PGDE programme, and one hundred and thirty three students completed a detailed survey on their learning to teach experience (n=133, i.e. response rate of 62.7% of the 212 students in the PGDE 2008/09 cohort). The four chapters in Section 2 focus on professional identity as a central dimension of learning to teach. Among the dimensions of learning to teach addressed in this section are the role of observation and cultural scripts in becoming a teacher, the visibility/invisibility of PGDE students as learners and the relationships between emotions, resilience and commitment to teaching. The three chapters in Section 3 focus on mathematics, modern languages and science respectively in the context of conventional and reform-oriented visions of good teaching. A number of common as well as subject-specific themes emerged in this section in relation to subject matter teaching. Section 4 focuses on PGDE students’ experience of inclusion (chapter 10) and reading literacy (chapter 11) while learning to teach. Section 5 focuses on a key aspect of initial teacher education, namely, the school-university partnership. The final section provides a summary of the findings, identifies seven key issues emerging from these findings, makes ecommendations under four headings (system, teacher education institutions, partnerships in ITE and further research) and discusses some implications for research, policy and practice in initial teacher education. Among the main findings emerging from the study are: (i) schools provide valuable support for PGDE students but this typically does not focus on classroom pedagogy, (ii) PGDE students typically felt that they had to be ‘invisible’ as learners in schools to gain and maintain authority and status, (iii) inherited cultural scripts about what it means to be a ‘good’ subject teacher shaped teacher identity and classroom practice, and (iv) as PGDE students begin to feel competent as teachers of maths, modern languages and science, this feeling of competence typically does not include their capacity to teach for inclusion and reading literacy within their subject teaching. In the context of research on teacher education, many of the findings are not unique to the PGDE or to UCC but reflect perennial dilemmas and emerging challenges in initial teacher education. This fact is important in setting a context for the wider dissemination.
This paper introduces this Special Issue celebrating the writing and professional work of Paul Hirst. The international range of contributors include scholars who knew him and his work in his heyday, as well younger generations of philosophers of education. In this Introduction the editors, in conversation, first introduce the papers on Hirst’s early work on liberal education and the nature of knowledge, and then go on to his later turn to advocacy of an education centred on social practices and his discussions of the nature of educational theory and teacher education. They consider those papers that refer to his work on the place of the arts in education and those involving detailed exploration of his work in moral and religious education. The extensive nature of his high-level administrative work in London and Cambridge, as well as nationally, is also recognised. A paper based on his personal correspondence reveals the lively man behind the work. An Appendix to this Introduction includes two extensive bibliographies, of Hirst’s writings and of critical discussions of his work.
Paul Hirst’s philosophical ‘conversion’ from forms of knowledge to forms of social practices was largely prompted by his radical reappraisal of the philosophical underpinnings that had validated his classic conception of liberal education. The primary motivation for Hirst’s later works was to remedy his own neglect of practical reason, whose sharp distinction from theoretical reason he acknowledged he had failed to appreciate. There is much to commend in his ‘practical’ turn. The main challenge that remains, however, is that the social practices view is something of a ‘foundationalist’ two-part picture, where overwhelming priority is given to practical reason. I appreciate the importance of the two issues Hirst puts on the table, in his debate with Wilfred Carr particularly and in his later works more generally: the issues of cultivating phronesis and of making sense of the practical character of critical-reflective activities. But I argue that addressing these issues fully requires us to recognize that neither theoretical nor practical rationality can be intelligible apart from the other. To press the point home, I review the analogous debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell over whether to accept, and how to understand, the view that rational conceptuality in a relevant sense pervades not only deliberation and propositional thinking but also perception and embodied coping skills. I conclude by briefly considering the prospect that the legacy of Hirst and recent discussions around human nature, practical rationality, and the formation of reason will interactively enrich our philosophical-educational scholarship.
The paper takes off from the debate of Paul Hirst and Wilfred Carr on the position of philosophy of education, whether it could rightly be seen as a practical discipline or it is exclusively theoretical. While taking precautions on a hasty submission, the paper first examined some conceptions on the nature of theory and arrived at a definition of theory as a body of knowledge that is foundational and fulfils the function of describing, explaining and stipulating certain issues or problems. This makes theory comparable to practice, which is overt demonstration of what is known to serve a desired purpose. Practical activity was viewed from deliberate and non-deliberate perspectives and the submission was made that in either way, the practical rests on theoretical foundations. The paper also examined methods of theorising and observed that all the traditional methods of knowledge acquisition hold for theorising. The paper concludes on the submission that philosophy of education in its content and method is theoretical but must form a link with practicalities to be relevant to life.
This article initially provides a brief overview of virtue epistemology; it thereafter considers some possible ramifications of this branch of the theory of knowledge for the philosophy of education. The main features of three different manifestations of virtue epistemology are first explained. Importantly, it is then maintained that developments in virtue epistemology may offer the resources to critique aspects of the debate between Hirst and Carr about how the philosophy of education ought to be carried out and by whom. Wilfred Carr's position—that educational practitioners have privileged access to philosophical knowledge about teaching practice—will in particular be questioned. It will be argued that Carr's view rests on a form of epistemology, internalism, which places unreasonably narrow restrictions upon the range of actors and ways, in which philosophical knowledge of and/or for education might be achieved. In declaring that practical wisdom regarding teaching is ‘entirely dependent’ on practitioner reflection, Carr not only radically deviates from Aristotle's notion of practical wisdom, he also, in effect, renders redundant all philosophical research about education that is not initiated by teachers in this manner. It is concluded that Aristotle's general approach to acquiring information and knowledge about the world might yet still offer a foundation for a more comprehensive philosophy of education; one that makes clear that the professional testimony and reflection of teachers, observation of teaching practice, and already existing educational philosophy, theory and policy can all be perceived as potentially valuable sources of philosophical knowledge of and for education.
The position of the philosophy of education in theoretical or practical philosophy was the main subject of debate between Paul Hirst and Wilfred Carr. In his support for practical philosophy, Carr argues that in order to bridge the theory/practice gap and deconstruct the illusory intactness of philosophy of education from developments in the practical realm, philosophy of education should be assumed as a branch of practical philosophy. Opposed to this argument, Hirst holds that philosophy of education is a second-order activity and a theoretical matter. Even though both viewpoints seem to be reductive, it is argued here that the controversy of Hirst and Carr on theoretical/practical philosophy of education is more a pseudo-problem than a real one. This is because Hirst does not dismiss the reflection on action as a source of philosophical knowledge, nor does Carr in fact avoid a second-order activity in his endeavour in philosophy of education. Nonetheless, it is argued that we should celebrate a moderate dualism in the case of theoretical and practical reason.
This paper considers the idea of a crisis in educational research. Some conventional expressions of that ‘crisis’ are examined in terms of their assumptions about what is ‘proper’ to educational research. The paper then affirms the role of ‘metaphysics’ in educational research as a necessary dimension of method, as opposed to the naïve assertion of the primacy of ‘craft’ or of the simple rights of ‘practice’. What has been referred to, contentiously, as ‘continental philosophy’ is considered as providing occasions and resources for the heterogeneous renewal of research thinking in education – and therefore of research method. The specific positions of the papers gathered here are considered in their various engagements with issues of educational research method. This diverse range of ideas and possibilities is then set against the now familiar expressions of loss of homogeneity, crisis of coherence, value and purpose. An alternative perspective on the idea of a ‘research community’, drawing on some further examples from contemporary ‘continental’ philosophy, is proposed in answer to these laments.
Based on a review of its historical evolution and the contributions of significant writers in the field, this article addresses perennial questions of purpose, content and pedagogy in education in the arts and humanities and, more broadly, liberal education. Taking cognizance of the educational significance of service-learning and practical knowledge, it calls for a revitalization of arts and humanities education by drawing on elements of feminist theory as expounded by Jane Roland Martin and the emphasis on praxis, service and pedagogy in the writings of Paulo Freire, Ira Shor and others in the tradition of critical pedagogy.
If a curriculum in higher education is understood to be an educational vehicle to promote a student's development, and if a curriculum in higher education is also understood to be built in large part around a project of knowledge, then the issue arises as to the links between knowledge and student being and becoming. A distinction is made here between knowing as such and coming to know, with the focus on the latter. It is argued that the process of coming to know can be edifying: through the challenges of engaging over time with disciplines and their embedded standards, worthwhile dispositions and qualities may develop, the worthwhileness arising through the formation of 'epistemic virtues'. Examples of such dispositions and qualities are identified, with differences between dispositions, on the one hand, and qualities, on the other hand, being observed. Educational implications of understanding the nurturing of student being in this way are sketched, with a set of 10 principles offered for curricula and pedagogy. It is suggested, finally, that the clarifying of the relationship between knowing and being is not only a value-laden but also a pressing matter.
Werner Jaeger's classic three-volume work, originally published in 1939, is now available in paperback. Paideia, the shaping of Greek character through a union of civilization, tradition, literature, and philosophy is the basis for Jaeger's evaluation of Hellenic culture. Volume I describes the foundation, growth, and crisis of Greek culture during the archaic and classical epochs, ending with the collapse of the Athenian empire. The second and third volumes of the work deal with the intellectual history of ancient Greece in the Age of Plato, the 4th century B.C.--the age in which Greece lost everything that is valued in this world--state, power, liberty--but still clung to the concept of paideia. As its last great poet, Menander summarized the primary role of this ideal in Greek culture when he said: "The possession which no one can take away from man is paideia."
The interest in moral education has focused largely on the teaching of morality or on nurturing moral qualities and virtues or on the "moral atmosphere" of the school; but little, comparatively speaking, has been written about education itself as essentially a moral practice. Failure, in this respect, has damaging results. First, the practice of education goes adrift from its moral roots — and serves particular ends such as economic well-being or citizenship as conceived by those in power. Secondly, the programmes of moral or personal and social education are isolated from the moral context in which they make sense. These issues are addressed in the lecture.
The concept of border and border crossing has important implications for how we theorize cultural politics, power, ideology, pedagogy and critical intellectual work. This completely revised and updated edition takes these areas and draws new connections between postmodernism, feminism, cultural studies and critical pedagogy. Highly relevant to the times which we currently live, Giroux reflects on the limits and possibilities of border crossings in the twenty-first century and argues that in the post-9/11 world, borders have not been collapsing but vigorously rebuilt. The author identifies the most pressing issues facing critical educators at the turn of the century and discusses topics such as the struggle over the academic canon; the role of popular culture in the curriculum; and the cultural war the New Right has waged on schools. New sections deal with militarization in public spaces, empire building, and the cultural politics of neoliberalism. Those interested in cultural studies, critical race theory, education, sociology and speech communication will find this a valuable source of information.
L'A. s'interesse au postulat religieux que Maurice Blondel utilise en 1893 pour fonder et ecrire son ouvrage philosophique : l'Action. Il s'agit pour lui d'identifier precisement ce postulat afin d'en determiner la nature ou theologique ou philosophique. Les commentaires ulterieurs de cette œuvre sont revelateurs de la problematique presente. Cependant l'A. se refere longuement a l'Action qu'il etudie personnellement pour resoudre le probleme initial
Educational research as an academic field can be understood as a network or group of networks and, therefore, to consist of interconnected nodes that structure the way the field operates and understands its purpose. This paper deals with the nature of the induction of postgraduate students into the network of educational research that takes place through research methods courses, the textual domain, the professional and social practices involved in collaboration, conferences and publication. The consideration of this in the light of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's (1988) writings on smooth and striated space problematises the notion of flows provided by Manuel Castells' (1996) understanding of networks and, by resisting the dualist simplification in terms of which the field is often discussed, offers an alternative account of how the nature of thought and practice governs the route between nodes in the network. This enables consideration of the nature of thought in relation to academic practice in educational research.
This paper is a reflective account of the experience of designing and teaching a philosophy module as part of a research training programme for students studying for research degrees in education. In the course of the discussion, I address various problems and questions to do with the relationship between philosophy and educational research, the nature of philosophy of education and the role of the foundational disciplines in educational research. © 2006 Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.
This paper starts from a brief sketch of the ‘classical’ figure of critical educational theory or science (Kritische Erziehungswissenshaft). ‘Critical educational theory’ presents itself as the privileged guardian of the critical principle of education (Bildung) and its emancipatory promise. It involves the possibility of saying ‘I’ in order to speak and think in one's own name, to be critical, self-reflective and independent, to determine dependence from the present power relations and existing social order. Actual social and educational reality and relations are approached as a limitation, threat, alienation, re/oppression or negation of ultimate human principles or potential. The task of critical educational theory becomes one of enabling an autonomous, critical, self-reflective life. While ‘critique’ and ‘autonomy’ have meanwhile become commonplace, and ‘critique’ and ‘autonomy’ are reclaimed and required from everybody, we should also consider the question of the relation between an institutional or ideological framework as that which claims to question this frame and to constitute its opposite. The trivialisation of critique is taken as occasion to recall Michel Foucault's analysis of power relations and especially his thesis according to which the ‘government of individualisation’ is the actual figure of power. Starting from the framework offered by Foucault, it can be made clear that the autonomous, critical, self-reflective life does not represent an ultimate principle but refers to a very specific form of subjectification operating as a transmission belt for power. The autonomous, critical, self-reflective person appears as an historical model of self-conduct whereby power operates precisely through the intensification of reflectiveness and critique rather than through their repression, alienation or negation. This brings us back then to the question of how to conceive of the task of a critical educational theory at a time in which critique, autonomy and self-determination have become an essential modus operandi of the existing order.
This symposium begins with a critique by Paul Hirst of Wilfred Carr's ‘Philosophy and Education’(Journal of Philosophy of Education, 2004, 38.1), where Carr argues that philosophy of education should be concerned with ‘practical philosophy’ rather than ‘theoretical philosophy’. Hirst argues that the philosophy of education is best understood as a distinctive area of academic philosophy, in which the exercise of theoretical reason contributes critically to the development of rational educational practices and their discourse. While he acknowledges that these practices and their discourse must of their nature be directly developed in the exercise of practical reason, or phronesis, the notion of ‘practical philosophy’ is rejected as ultimately incoherent and illusory. In his reply to Hirst's critique, Carr identifies three central claims in Hirst's argument and takes issue with each of these. He reaffirms the need to draw upon the resources afforded by the Aristotelian tradition of practical philosophy in order to identify inadequacies in our present understanding of how philosophy is related to education. He suggests that it is only through bringing their own ‘prejudices’ into critical confrontation with this tradition that philosophers of education will be able to assess whether practical philosophy is incoherent and illusory, as Hirst claims, or whether it is indispensable to the future development of their discipline. In a rejoinder to Carr, Hirst, defends the claim that philosophy of education is a social practice concerned with developing justifiable propositional accounts of the conceptual relations, justificatory procedures and presuppositions of educational practices. He rejects the argument that this ‘theoretical philosophy’ approach must be replaced by that of a new ‘practical philosophy’.
Focusing on the context of graduate training in educational research in the United States today, this article is organized into two principal parts. The first overviews the state of research training in order to emphasize the preoccupation with, indeed dominance of, study of methodology. This has turned ‘how to do research’ into valuing method as technology for its own sake, and thus into technologization. The second part turns to three critiques of technology that together point to potential totalization in research: technologization that limits research processes and potential results. The writings of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Ellul provide a broad frame; the three specific critiques are found in contributions from Henry Adams, Aldous Huxley, and Donna Haraway. The conclusion calls for a questioning of the current form of graduate training and by implication its hold on current research practice.
This paper suggests that empirical educational research has not, on the whole, been treated well by philosophers of education. A variety of criticisms have been offered, ranging from triviality, conceptual confusion and the impossibility of empirically studying normative processes. Furthermore, many of those who criticise, or dismiss, empirical research do so without subjecting any specific examples to careful scholarly scrutiny. It is suggested that both philosophy of education, and the empirical research enterprise, stand to profit if philosophers pay more attention to real cases—and this attention is especially important at present, when research funding is being based on spurious scientistic criteria such as the use of ‘gold standard’ randomised experimental research designs.
This paper sets out Peter Winch's central ideas about the nature of the social sciences, and reappraises their potential for educational research. It is argued that the dichotomy between ‘reasons’ and ‘causes’ has done much harm, and that the important matter of understanding ‘what is real for us’ has recently been neglected. Winch's philosophy suggests a more adequate framework for educational research: one that embraces a pluralistic interpretive position, accommodating various methods and various kinds of understanding of the social, and that views educational science as involving opportunity for reflection and a degree of distance from the world of practice, yet at the same time as essentially part of the political debate about education.
This paper argues that the anxieties being expressed in the UK and elsewhere about the lack of impact that philosophy now has on education are nothing other than the inevitable manifestation of a fundamental intellectual disorder deeply rooted in our contemporary understanding of the philosophy of education. In trying to substantiate this claim, the paper offers an historically informed philosophical analysis of how philosophy is related to education and education to philosophy that concludes by clarifying how any debates about the current problems and future development of the philosophy of education ought to proceed.
This essay explores the thorny issue of theory and practice, partly in response to the special issue of the Journal of Philosophy of Education (37.2, 2003) but more especially as a way of offering a critique of Joseph Dunne's book, Back to the Rough Ground (1993). It argues that Dunne's notion of phronetic techne risks the reduction of philosophy to the merely instrumental, and, in turn, that this approach threatens the significance of philosophical character.
Building on the concepts of professional competence that he introduced in his classic The Reflective Practitioner, Schon offers an approach for educating professional in all areas that will prepare them to handle the complex and unpredictable problems of actual practice with confidence, skill, and care.
The Starting Point of Philosophical Research Maurice Blondel: The Idealist Illusion and Other Essays
- M Blondel
Blondel, M. (2000) The Starting Point of Philosophical Research, in: F. Long (ed.) Maurice Blondel: The Idealist Illusion and Other Essays (Dordrecht/Boston/London, Kluwer).
The Reconstruction of
- J Dewey
Dewey, J. (1948) The Reconstruction of Philosophy (Boston, Beacon Press).
The RoutledgeFalmer Reader in Philosophy of Education
- W Carr
Carr, W. (Ed.) (2005) The RoutledgeFalmer Reader in Philosophy of Education (London, Routledge).
To Think like God: Pythagoras and Parmenides: the Origins of Philosophy
- A Hermann
Hermann, A. (2004) To Think like God: Pythagoras and Parmenides: the Origins of Philosophy (Las Vegas, NV, Parmenides).
Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Hegel to Marx
- N Lobkowitcz
Lobkowitcz, N. (1986) Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Hegel to Marx (Notre Dame, IA, Notre Dame University Press).
What it Makes Sense to Say
- Smeyers
Smeyers, P. (2006) 'What it Makes Sense to Say': Education, Philosophy and Peter Winch on Social Science, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 40, pp. 463–485.
Platonic Transformations (Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield)
- A T Peperzak
Peperzak, A. T. (1997) Platonic Transformations (Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield), pp. 167–182.
From Technologization to Totalization in Education Research
- Stone