Content uploaded by Antonio Chirumbolo
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Antonio Chirumbolo on Jan 30, 2018
Content may be subject to copyright.
European Journal of Personality
Eur. J. Pers. 18: 265–278 (2004)
Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/per.518
Effects of Need for Closure on Creativity
in Small Group Interactions
ANTONIO CHIRUMBOLO,
1
* STEFANO LIVI,
1
LUCIA MANNETTI,
1
ANTONIO PIERRO
1
and ARIE W. KRUGLANSKI
2
1
University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’, Italy
2
University of Maryland, USA
Abstract
Three experiments investigated the consequences of the epistemic motivation toward
closure on the emergence of creative interactions in small groups. In the first study, need for
closure was manipulated via time pressure. Results showed that in groups under high need
for closure (i.e. under time pressure) the percentage of creative acts during group
discussion was reduced. The second study replicated this result using an individual
differences operationalization of the need for closure. In the third study, groups composed
of individuals high (versus low) in need for closure performed less creatively, and exhibited
less ideational fluidity during group interaction. Moreover, it was demonstrated that
conformity pressure mediates the negative relationship between dispositional need for
closure and group creativity. Copyright #2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Within the framework of the Lay Epistemic Theory (Kruglanski, 1989), Need for
Cognitive Closure was defined as a desire for a quick firm answer (any answer) to a
question (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1998). From this point of
view, the term ‘need’ is used to indicate a motivational tendency or a inclination, rather
than a material deficit, that is a function of an individual’s analysis of costs and benefits of
cognitive closure (or lack of closure) (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Need for closure can
be situationally induced, and it varies along a continuum ranging from a high need to
obtain closure to a strong need to avoid closure. The antecedents of the epistemic
motivation towards a non-specific closure can be found in those circumstances that
highlight the perceived benefits and de-emphasize the perceived costs of closure. Those
contextual factors are, for instance, time pressure,environmental noise,mental fatigue,
boredom,ordullness of a cognitive task. By contrast, the need to avoid closure may be
instilled in those conditions that stress the costs of closure and the benefits of a lack of
closure (i.e. accountability, fear of invalidity, or evaluation apprehension). Moreover, need
Received 18 September 2003
Copyright #2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accepted 5 December 2003
*Correspondence to: Antonio Chirumbolo, Department of Social and Developmental Psychology, University of
Rome ‘La Sapienza’, Via dei Marsi 78, I-00185 Roma, Italy. E-mail: chirumbolo@uniroma1.it
for closure can also represent a stable individual disposition. Thus, some individuals may
display a systematic proclivity to value closure positively, while others may be
predisposed to avoid closure and prefer openness (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).
Major consequences of need for closure consist of the urgency and permanence
tendencies. The urgency tendency refers to the inclination to quickly seize on closure,
relying on early cues and first answers regardless of their validity. The permanence
tendency reflects the propensity to freeze on existing knowledge in order to preserve past
and future cognition. Need for closure has both cognitive and social consequences, as the
urgency and the permanency tendencies affect a wide range of psychosocial phenomena
mediated by information processing at individual, interpersonal, and group levels (for a
review see Kruglanski, 1996; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1998).
Our main concern in the present paper is the relation between need for closure and
creativity. There are reasons to believe that need for closure is negatively related to
creativity on grounds that are both cognitive and social. Need for closure limits the extent
of information processing and the generation of alternative solutions (Mayseless &
Kruglanski, 1987; Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996). In other words, individuals
under high (versus low) need for closure are expected to express less (versus more)
ideational fluidity, which is usually considered an important component of individual and
group creativity (Diehl & Stroebe, 1994; Guildford, 1950; Paulus, Legget Dugosh,
Dzindolet, Coskun, & Putman, 2002). In additive tasks (such as brainstorming), lower
individual fluidity under high need for closure will result in reduced group productivity as
well as in decreased quality and creativity of group products (Chirumbolo, Mannetti,
Pierro, Areni, & Kruglanski, manuscript submitted for publication). Rocchi (1998) has
shown in two experiments that individuals high on the need for closure engaged in a
creative task produced figures and objects that were judged as less creative by external
observers than those produced by individuals low on the need for closure. Similarly, other
studies demonstrated that outcomes generated by problem-solving groups composed of
high need for closure individuals were evaluated by different sets of independent judges as
less original, innovative, and creative compared with groups composed of individuals low
on the need for closure (Chirumbolo et al., manuscript submitted for publication).
However, these studies did not examine the processes and interactions occuring in group
discussion and their relationship to group creativity.
There is empirical evidence that the need for closure promotes rejection by the group of
opinion deviates (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991), conformity pressures, task orientation,
and the emergence of an autocratic leadership in group discussions (De Grada, Kruglanski,
Mannetti, & Pierro, 1999), as well as the longing for group consensus (Kruglanski,
Webster, & Klem, 1993). Furthermore, although framed within the Time Interaction and
Performance theory (McGrath, 1991; McGrath & Kelly, 1986), Kelly and colleagues also
showed that groups under time pressure (presumed to induce the need for closure) were
less creative and original (Kelly & Karau, 1993; Kelly & McGrath, 1985), focusing more
on task-oriented acts, that facilitate reaching group consensus and task conclusion, and
less on aspects that would otherwise improve the quality of the performance, e.g.
discussing approaches and ideas in depth (Karau & Kelly, 1992).
Researchers of group creativity phenomena have shown that premature consensus and
conformity pressure in groups are negatively associated with productivity and creativity,
since they lead to a process loss (Nijstad & Paulus, 2003). Creativity inevitably entails
processes that are both divergent and convergent (Milliken, Bartel, & Kurtzberg, 2003).
First of all, ideas and solutions must be generated. This is a divergent process in which idea
266 A. Chirumbolo et al.
Copyright #2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 18: 265–278 (2004)
quantity and an open minded approach are helpful and valuable. In this case, premature
consensus may lead the group to close the epistemic process quickly and to rely only on
the few early ideas and later ‘freeze’ on them. After the generation process, however, ideas
and solutions must be evaluated in order to select only the most interesting and promising
among them. This is a convergent process in which a constructive debate among group
members should lead to better decisions (Nijstad & Paulus, 2003). Under a high need for
closure, however, group members are motivated to reach a rapid decision that interrupts
the epistemic process. In this circumstance, it is likely that groups will reject divergent
opinions and approaches that delay decision making; urgently striving to forge a group
consensus. In turn, premature group consensus and conformity pressure may elicit a
‘groupthink’ type of process, leading the group to choose a bad idea or approach (Nijstad
& Paulus, 2003; Paulus, 1998). Other authors have claimed that a normative influence,
including again the request for consensus, approval, and a sense of belonging to the group
(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Kaplan, 1987), has a negative effect on creativity and on the
quality of group decisions (Kaplan & Wilke, 2001). Similarly, it was shown that minority
influence, non-conformity, authentic dissent, opinion diversity, and tolerance of dissent
facilitated divergent processes in groups and promoted higher group originality (Nemeth,
1995; Nemeth & Nemeth-Brown, 2003; Van Dyne & Saavedra, 1996). It is therefore
legitimate to suppose that conformism, emerging in groups under high need for closure,
could function as a mediatiator between need for closure and group creativity.
Overview of the studies and hypotheses
This research investigated the tendency of groups with members high (versus low) on need
for cognitive closure to reduce the number of creative acts (Studies 1 and 2) as well as
group creativity (Study 3).
The first study tested the key hypothesis that need for closure, manipulated via time
pressure, has an impact on creativity expressed in interactions taking place in discussion
groups (see e.g. Kelly, Jackson, & Huston-Comeaux, 1997; Karau & Kelly, 1992; Kelly &
Karau, 1993). It was expected that participants in groups under high (versus low) need for
closure induced by time pressure would perform fewer creative acts within the group, and
hence reduce the quality of the performance.
The second study replicated and clarified the findings of the first one by assessing the
effect of the need for closure, measured as a stable individual disposition, on creativity
within groups. As in the previous study, we hypothesized that a higher dispositional need
for closure would be negatively related to the proportion of creative acts performed in
group discussions.
Finally, the third study tested the negative effect of dispositional need for closure on a more
specific measure of group creativity (i.e. ideational fluidity manifest in group interaction).
The hypothesis that conformity pressure mediates this relationship was also tested.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants
Participants were psychology students at the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’. The
sample included 10 groups of four persons each (N¼40). Six of these were put under time
Need for closure and creativity of group interactions 267
Copyright #2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 18: 265–278 (2004)
pressure and the remaining four were not. All groups were composed of men participating
on a voluntary basis. Their mean age was 22.5 years (SD¼3.14).
Procedure and instruments
Upon arrival, participants were ushered to a room and seated around a table, where an
experimenter gave the instructions for the group task (see also De Grada et al., 1999;
De Grada, Mannetti, & Pierro, 1997; Pierro, Mannetti, De Grada, Livi, & Kruglanski,
2003). Specifically, each participant was asked to role-play a department manager at a
meeting of an awards committee of their company, each representing four different
departments of the company (heads of the sales, marketing, data-processing, and social-
benefits departments). The committee’s task was to consider four subordinates nominated
for a merit-based monetary award in accordance with the company’s policy of rewarding
its workers for special achievements. Each participant was further told that the company’s
limited resources did not allow it to make a substantial award to all the deserving
candidates (only $5000 in award funds were available).
Each participant then received information about the candidate of his department
including a brief resume and a recommendation letter from the candidate’s supervisor
justifying his/her nomination for the award.
During the committee’s discussion, each participant’s task was (i) to present valid
arguments in favour of his candidate and (ii) concomitantly help the committee to arrive at
a best decision concerning the allocation of the available funds.
The time pressure procedure used here was similar to the manipulation employed in
previous studies (i.a. De Grada et al., 1999, 1997). After 30 minutes, for the six groups
assigned to the time-pressure condition, a ‘maintenance person’, role-played by an
experimenter’s confederate, entered the room and in a clearly audible voice announced
that because of a sudden emergency at the department, the room where the study was
taking place was needed for another purpose and had to be cleared as soon as possible. The
experimenter communicated this message to the group members without, however,
placing a specific time-limit upon their deliberations. No similar interruption occurred for
members of the four remaining groups pre-assigned to the no-time-pressure condition.
Groups exposed to time pressure continued their discussion for another 11 minutes
(beyond the initial discussion phase of 30 minutes), whereas those without time pressure
continued for another 45 minutes. This difference was significant (F(1, 8) ¼13.1,
p<0.01), suggesting that our manipulation successfully imposed a degree of time
pressure on the participants.
The room where the group deliberations took place contained a one-way mirror
concealing a video-camera, which recorded the entire group interaction. The purpose of
these recordings was to analyse creativity in social interaction by means of the Bales’
Interaction Process Analysis (IPA; 1970) coding scheme.
Measures
As a measure of creativity expressed in interaction, the second category of the IPA was
employed, referred to as ‘Dramatize’. This category is meant to include non-conforming
acts divergent from the assigned tasks (Mannetti & Pierro, 1998; Pierro & Livi, 2001),
such as spontaneous and original symbolic gestures, and/or fantasy themes related to
interpersonal situations (Bales, 1970). Previous studies have demonstrated, in fact, that
this category is related to creative patterns of interactions (Pierro & Livi, 2001). In
the present research, two observers were trained to apply the 12 IPA categories in
accordance with Bales’ (1970) instructions. Following the training period, these observers,
268 A. Chirumbolo et al.
Copyright #2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 18: 265–278 (2004)
blind to the experimental condition, coded the acts emitted in the interaction including the
second category (Dramatize). Two different variables were created for all subjects: acts
emitted before and after 30 minutes. That means that for groups in the time pressure
condition, acts were coded before and after the introduction of time pressure.
To assess the observers’ reliability, we followed Rosenthal’s (1987, pp. 9–13)
suggestion by correlating the two sets of counts and using the Spearman–Brown prophecy
formula to derive the final reliability index. This reliability coefficient was satisfactory,
with a coefficient of 0.67.
For the subsequent data analysis, the mean percentage of creative acts, identified by the
two independent observers, was employed as an index of the frequencies of creative acts
performed by group members. This measure was obtained by dividing the number of
creative acts by the total number of acts detected by each observer.
Results
Using data collected in group interactions, we controlled the non-independence relation
within groups for each dependent variable (Kenny, Mannetti, Pierro, Livi, & Kashy, 2002). As
suggested by Kenny and Judd (1986), results can be seriously affected by non-independence
because of the mutual influence among participants of interacting groups (see also Kenny,
Kashy, & Bolger, 1998). The simplest strategy to control for these effects is firstly to estimate
the intraclass correlation (IC) on acts emitted both before and after the time pressure, and then
to choose the group as a unit of analysis if the IC is significant or the individual if the IC is not
significant (Kenny et al., 2002). In the present study, for acts emitted both before and after the
time pressure, the IC was 0.33 (p<0.05). This suggests that, within groups, participants were
subjected to a positive mutual influence. That is, regarding the creative acts performed,
persons in the same groups were more similar to one another than persons in different groups.
For this reason, subsequent analyses employed groups as unit of analysis, computing the
mean acts expressed by the participants in each group.
In order to assess the effects of time pressure on creative acts, a repeated measure
MANOVAwas performed, using time pressure (groups under TP versus control groups) as
a between-groups factor, and percentage of creative acts emitted before and after the
introduction of the TP as a within-groups factor. Results showed a significant interaction
between creative acts before and after TP on the one hand and time pressure on the other
hand (F(1, 8) ¼7.87, p<0.05) (cf. Table 1). Moreover, two separate paired t-test analyses
were performed in order to verify whether the within-groups factor was significant in the
time-pressure condition, while being non-significant in the no-time-pressure condition.
Results showed that under TP the difference of creative acts was significant (t(23) ¼6.26,
p<0.000), while in the no-TP condition it was not (t(15) ¼0.60, p¼0.56).
Figure 1, reporting the means, clearly shows that the number of creative acts emitted
before the time pressure is almost the same in the two conditions. After the introduction of
time pressure, creative acts were considerably reduced, while the number of creative acts
slightly increased in the control condition.
Table 1. Summary of the results of the repeated measure MANOVA (N¼40)
Source of variation Fp
2
Acts before and after TP 3.47 0.10 0.30
Time pressure 4.75 0.06 0.37
Acts before and after TP time pressure 7.87 0.02 0.50
Need for closure and creativity of group interactions 269
Copyright #2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 18: 265–278 (2004)
Discussion
In prior research, time pressure has often been used to operationally define the need for
cognitive closure (cf. Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Shah, Kruglanski, & Thompson, 1998;
for reviews see Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1998) based on the
assumption that, under time pressure, the implicit threat of failing to meet a deadline
makes information processing subjectively costly. Time pressure was also employed to
induce need for closure also in the present study.
The results of this study provide empirical support for the claim that, within groups, the
frequency of creative acts is reduced by higher level of need for cognitive closure induced
by time pressure. Groups in the time-pressure condition, as compared to groups in the
control condition, performed significantly fewer creative acts.
Whereas the present results are consistent with the claim that the need for closure
reduces creativity in groups, it is possible that the time pressure employed in this research
exerted a direct effect on creativity without mediation through the need for closure (Karau
& Kelly, 1992; Kelly & Karau, 1993). To obtain further evidence relevant to this issue, our
second study was designed to replicate Study 1 by operationalizing the need for
closure as an individual disposition, assessed via the Need for Closure Scale (Webster &
Kruglanski, 1994).
STUDY 2
Method
Participants
Ninety-six women (mean age ¼20.4, SD ¼1.88) were divided into 10 groups of four
participants each and 8 groups of eight participants each. All participants were psychology
Figure 1. Percentage of acts emitted before and after 30 in groups under time pressure and in control groups.
270 A. Chirumbolo et al.
Copyright #2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 18: 265–278 (2004)
students at the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’ taking part in the research on a voluntary
basis.
Procedure and instruments
As in the previous study, a leaderless discussion task was used. However, in this case, the
task was cooperative (contrasting with the rather competitive task of Study 1). Specifically,
participants were invited to join a consultation meeting in order to provide collective
solutions to two different company problems. Groups composed of four subjects took 33
minutes for their discussion, while in groups of eight discussion lasted for 40 minutes.
Again, all discussions were video-recorded in order to analyse creativity in social
interaction by means of the Bales’ Interaction Process Analysis (IPA) coding scheme
(Bales, 1970).
One to two months prior to the experimental session, participants had filled out a battery
of various instruments including the Italian version of the Need for Closure Scale
(De Grada, Kruglanski, Mannetti, Pierro, & Webster, 1996; Pierro et al., 1995; Mannetti,
Pierro, Kruglanski, Taris, & Bezinovic, 2002; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).
Measures
Creativity of interaction. Following the procedure described in Study 1, two independent
observers analysed the interactions in accordance with Bales’ IPA scheme. The reliability
coefficient for the second category (Dramatize) was again satisfactory with an rof 0.89
(p<0.0001). As in the previous study, the mean percentage of creative acts detected by the
two independent observers was employed as an index of the frequencies of creative acts
performed by group members.
Need for closure scale. This scale consists of 42 items designed to measure five different
facets of need for closure, namely (1) preference for order and structure, (2) intolerance of
ambiguity, (3) need for predictability, (4) close-mindedness and (5) decisiveness (Webster
& Kruglanski, 1994). Participants indicated their agreement/disagreement with the various
items on a seven-point scale with response options ranging from (1) completely disagree to
(7) completely agree.
A total need for closure score was calculated by summing over the items of the scale. In
the present study, we excluded items related to the decisiveness facet that appeared in prior
psychometric work to be less related to the total score than items from the remaining facets
(for discussion see De Grada et al., 1996, 1999; Mannetti et al., 2002). In the present
sample, the overall reliability of the reduced scale was a Cronbach of 0.82.
Results
In the present study, the analysis of non-independence on the creative acts showed a non-
significant value: the intraclass correlation was 0.001 for groups of four subjects, and
0.088 for groups of eight subjects, allowing us to treat individuals as units of analysis
(Kenny et al., 2002).
To assess the influence of Need for Cognitive Closure, controlling for the size of the
group, a multiple regression analysis was performed using these two variables and their
interaction as predictors, and the Dramatize category of IPA
1
as criterion.
1
For a statistical reason the variable ‘group size’ was recoded 1 for groups with four participants and 1 for
groups of eight participants. For the same reason, the Need for Closure composite score was standardized. The
interaction between those two variables is the result of the simple product of the variables.
Need for closure and creativity of group interactions 271
Copyright #2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 18: 265–278 (2004)
Results showed that only need for closure significantly and negatively predicted creative
acts, with a standardized regression coefficient of 0.22 (t¼2.03, p<0.05) (cf. Table 2).
This means that subjects high in the need for closure tended to show fewer creative acts
than those low on the need for closure. Neither group size nor the interaction between
group size and need for closure were significant predictors.
Discussion
The results of this study provided further empirical support for the claim that in a group
interaction setting individuals with higher level of need for closure emitted fewer creative
acts. Moreover, results from the regression model pointed out that need for closure
affected the percentage of creative acts expressed by each participant, controlling for
group size.
Considered collectively, Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated the effect of need for closure on
the creativity of group interactions. However, thus far we have not included in our studies
measures of creative performance, whereas other investigations on group creativity
employed diverse measures of creativity, including ideational fluidity (i.e. the number of
expressed ideas), creativity of the groups’ outcomes (e.g. creativity/quality of products,
solutions, ideas, decisions), or an overall evaluation of groups in terms of creativity (for a
review see Chirumbolo, manuscript under editorial review). Therefore, the following study
was designed to evaluate the effect of need for closure on the creativity of the group
defined in terms of ideational fluidity expressed in group interaction. In addition, as noted
earlier, there are reasons to suppose that the effect of the need for closure on group
creativity is mediated by conformity pressures. Thus, another purpose of our third study
was to test for such a mediation.
STUDY 3
Method
Participants
Eighty-four female majors in psychology at the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’
volunteered to participate in the study. Their average age was 20.7 (SD ¼2.25), and they
were divided into 21 groups of four persons each. Eleven groups consisted of individuals
characterized as low in need for closure, and 10 groups consisted of individuals
characterized as high in the need for closure.
Procedure and instruments
In a mass testing conducted one to two months prior to the present study, participants
completed the Italian version of the need for closure scale by Webster and Kruglanski
Table 2. Results of the multiple regression for Study 2 (N¼96)
Predictors Beta tSig.
Need for closure 0.22 2.03 0.04
Group size 0.13 1.23 0.22
NFC group size 0.09 0.90 0.37
272 A. Chirumbolo et al.
Copyright #2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 18: 265–278 (2004)
(1994; Pierro et al., 1995). Based on an overall need for closure score, participants in the
lower tercile of the distribution (classified as low on need for closure) and those in the
upper tercile (high on need for closure) were contacted by phone and asked to volunteer for
a study of group interaction.
Upon arrival, participants were greeted by the experimenter and accompanied to the
laboratory. The experimenter then presented them with instructions designed to introduce
and explain the group task. The task asked participants to role-play members of a team in
an advertising company engaged in creating slogans to advertise a particular product.
Participants received a booklet containing detailed information about the advertising
company and the product. The company was described as young and innovative, and one
that experienced a fast and important growth, although increasing competition among
advertising companies had slowed down this tendency in the last two years. Therefore, the
forthcoming advertising campaign was presented as extremely important for the company
and its future. The product to be advertised was an ultra-modern lamp manufactured in
Japan able to reproduce the sunlight in 12 000 different gradations of colours. Information
was provided about the design of the product, the rationale behind its production, the
consumer population targeted, the envisaged market position of the product, and the
marketing objectives.
The group task was divided into two parts: the first part consisted of 15 minutes of
individual work where participants went through the materials and attempted to come up
with their own slogans. The second part consisted of 45 minutes of group interaction, in
the course of which participants discussed their individual slogans, created new ones, and
selected four final slogans. At the end of the experiment, all participants were thanked and
debriefed. All group interactions were audio as well as video taped.
Measures
Need for Closure scale. Participants completed the Italian version of the Need for
Cognitive Closure scale (see Study 2; Pierro et al., 1995). In the present sample, the overall
reliability of the scale was a Cronbach of 0.86. The average group score on the Need for
Closure scale was treated as the independent variable.
Conformity pressure. Conformity pressure was measured by the evaluation of an
independent observer who coded the video-taped material. This independent observer was
blind to the aim of the research and to the composition of the groups in terms of the Need
for Closure of its members. The contributions of each group member were ranked on four
items measuring the tendency to conform to group choices and procedures, and the
tendency to be affected by group norms and ideas. The four items were (i) ‘She conforms
to the group choices’; (ii) ‘She is affected by group norms’; (iii) ‘She is affected by the
solution and the ideas proposed by the group’; (iv) ‘She proposes alternative procedures’
(reversed item). The observer ranked these behaviours according to a scale ranging from
‘Never’ (1) to ‘Always’ (5). A principal component analysis performed on these items
yielded a one factor solution that explained 67.2% of the variance with factor loadings
ranging from 0.73 to 0.87. The reliability of the scale was ¼0.83.
Creativity. Creativity was operationalized as ideational fluency during group discussion
and was evaluated by the same independent observer who coded the conformity pressures.
Thus, the behaviour of each group member was ranked on three items measuring the actual
production of new ideas during the group discussion. These items were (i) ‘She proposes
new and alternative slogans’; (ii) ‘She develops new slogans upon others’ ideas’; (iii) ‘She
Need for closure and creativity of group interactions 273
Copyright #2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 18: 265–278 (2004)
produces many ideas/slogans’. The observer ranked these behaviours on a scale ranging
from (1) never to (5) always. A principal component analysis performed on these items
yielded a one factor solution that explained 90.7% of the variance with factor loadings
ranging from 0.93 to 0.96. The reliability of the scale was ¼0.95.
Results
In order to test the hypothesis of this study, a mediational analysis was conducted.
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), in order to prove mediation, coefficients of three
regression equations must be estimated and compared: (i) first, the mediator should
be predicted by the independent variable; (ii) second, the dependent variable should be
predicted by the mediator and by the independent variable; (iii) last, the regression of
dependent variable on the independent variable should become non-significant when
controlling for the mediator. If everything goes in the predicted direction, then a mediation
holds when, controlling for the mediator, the independent variable no longer predicts the
dependent variable. As in the previous two studies, we first checked for the appropriate
unit of analysis using the intraclass correlation (IC) (Kenny et al., 2002). This index
resulted in a significant IC ¼0.69 (p<0.05). Therefore, data analysis was conducted using
the group as the appropriate unit of analysis.
The regression equations outlined above were estimated to test whether the effect of
need for closure on group creativity was mediated by conformity pressure. In the first
equation, need for closure significantly predicted the proposed mediator, conformity
pressure (¼0.56; t¼2.95, p<0.01). In the second equation, the effect of need for
closure on creativity was also significant, and it was negative (¼0.56; t¼3.22,
p<0.01). After controlling for the mediator conformity pressure in the last equation, the
effect of need for closure on creativity was reduced to non-significance, ¼0.28
(t¼1.49, n.s.), while the effect of conformity pressure significantly predicted creativity
(¼0.56; t¼2.99, p<0.01).
Discussion
This study showed that groups composed of individuals with higher (versus lower)
dispositional need for closure tended to be less creative and to be more sensitive to group
norms. In fact, members of high (versus low) need for closure groups were more likely to
be affected by the other members’ choices and solutions, and by the group norms.
Figure 2. Conformity pressure as a mediator of need for closure effects on group creativity. Values are
coefficients. (a) coefficient without conformity pressure. (b) coefficient after controlling for conformity
pressure. **p<0.01.
274 A. Chirumbolo et al.
Copyright #2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 18: 265–278 (2004)
Moreover, members of low (versus high) need for closure groups produced a higher
number of different and novel solutions that stimulated and inspired other members’ ideas.
The tendency to conform and to quickly reach group consensus typically occurs in
groups under high need for closure, promoting a premature close of the epistemic process
(De Grada et al., 1999; Kruglanski et al., 1993). Previous studies have demonstrated that
high (versus low) need for closure groups were less (versus more) productive and their
outcomes were rated as less (versus more) creative (Chirumbolo et al., manuscript
submitted for publication). In the present study, it was shown for the first time that
conformity pressures, in groups with members higher on need for closure, mediates the
negative effect of need for closure on group creativity.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Overall, the evidence presented in this paper confirms the idea that the dynamics of
motivated social cognition may lie behind a number of important group phenomena
(Levine, Resnick, & Higgins, 1993; Kruglanski, 1996). Within the framework of
Kruglanski’s Lay Epistemic Theory (Kruglanski, 1989), the present studies investigated
the relationship between need for cognitive closure and creativity in small groups. Group
creativity was studied as a function of a number of personal and social factors, such as
individual differences in divergent thinking, heterogeneity, and diversity of group
composition, motivation, groupthink, social influence, social comparison, time pressure,
and so on (for a review see Chirumbolo, manuscript under editorial review; Diehl &
Stroebe, 1994; Paulus & Nijstad, 2003; Paulus et al., 2002). The present research
demonstrated that the motivation to prematurely close the epistemic process, namely the
need for closure, had a negative effect on creativity in group interactions.
In particular, Study 1 examined the relationship between time pressure and creativity
of interactive acts. The percentage of creative acts performed in control groups (with no
time pressure) remained substantially the same throughout the entire discussion. In
contrast, in the experimental groups the percentage of creative acts dramatically dropped
after the introduction of time pressure. This result confirms that time pressure has a
negative effect on creativity in group interaction. This effect might be related to the fact
that need for closure increases task-oriented acts in group discussion, as shown in a
previous study (De Grada et al., 1999), and to maintain a narrow focus on the task as
conventionally defined. In order to show that this situational effect is peculiar to the need
for closure, the second study employed a dispositional measure of need for closure using
the Italian version of the Need for Closure scale (Pierro et al., 1995). This study replicated
the negative effect of need for closure, showing that participants with higher dispositional
need for closure performed a smaller number of creative acts during group interaction.
Moreover, this effect was obtained independently of group size. Finally, the third study
showed that the negative effect of need for closure on creativity can be attributed to
conformity pressure observed in groups composed of high (versus low) need for closure
members.
These findings may have important implications for group training, team management,
and personnel selection within organizational contexts. Since most of the innovative work
is developed in groups and teams, group effects of the need for closure should be taken into
account by managers and group leaders in order to maximize the creative performance of
the groups involved. Moreover, need for closure can be considered as a relevant construct
Need for closure and creativity of group interactions 275
Copyright #2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 18: 265–278 (2004)
to differentiate people who vary in information processing skills and in their propensity to
facilitate the creative process in groups to which they may belong.
REFERENCES
Bales, R. F. (1970). Personality and interpersonal behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston.
Baron, R., & Kenny, D. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social–psychological
research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 51, 1173–1182.
Chirumbolo, A. (2003). La creativita
`nei gruppi [Creativity in groups]. Manuscript under editorial
review.
Chirumbolo, A., Mannetti, L., Pierro, A., Areni, A., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2003). Motivated closed
mindedness and creativity in small groups. Manuscript submitted for publication.
De Grada, E., Kruglanski, A. W., Mannetti, L., & Pierro, A. (1999). Motivated cognition and group
interaction: Need for closure affects the contents and the processes of collective negotiations.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35, 346–365.
De Grada, E., Kruglanski, A. W., Mannetti, L., Pierro, A., & Webster, D. (1996). Un’analisi
strutturale comparativa delle versioni USA e Italiana della scala di ‘Bisogno di Chiusura
Cognitiva’ di Webster e Kruglanski [A comparative structural analysis of the US and
Italian versions of the Need for Cognitive Closure scale]. Testing, Psicometria, Metodologia, 3,
5–18.
De Grada, E., Mannetti, L., & Pierro, A. (1997). Motivazioni epistemiche e struttura delle relazioni
interpersonali in piccoli gruppi [Epistemic motivations and the structure of interpersonal relations
in small groups]. Giornale Italiano di Psicologia, 3, 523–552.
Deutsch, M., & Gerard, H. (1955). A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influences upon
Individual Judgment. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51, 629–636.
Diehl, M., & Stroebe, W. (1994). Why groups are less effective than their members: On productivity
loss in idea generating groups. In W. Stroebe, & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European review of social
psychology (Vol. 5, pp. 271–303). Chichester: Wiley.
Guildford, J. P. (1950). Creativity. American Psychologist, 5, 444–454.
Kaplan, M. P. (1987). The influencing process in group decision making. In C. Hendrich (Ed.),
Group processes: Review of personality and social psychology (Vol. 8, pp. 189–212). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Kaplan, M. P., & Wilke, H. (2001). Cognitive and social motivation in group decision making. In J. P.
Forgas, & K. D. Williams (Eds.), The social mind: Cognitive and motivational aspects of
interpersonal behavior (pp. 406–428). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Karau, S. J., & Kelly, J. R. (1992). The effects of time scarcity and time abundance on group
performance and interaction. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 28, 542–571.
Kelly, J. R., Jackson, J., & Huston-Comeaux, S. (1997). The effects of time pressure and task
differences on influence modes and accuracy in decision-making groups. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 23, 10–22.
Kelly, J. R., & Karau, S. J. (1993). Entrainment of creativity in small groups. Small Group Research,
24, 179–198.
Kelly, J. R., & McGrath, J. E. (1985). Effects of time limits and task types on task performance
and interaction of four-person groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49,
395–407.
Kenny, D. A., & Judd, C. M. (1986). Consequences of violating the independence assumption in
analysis of variance. Psychological Bulletin, 99, 422–431.
Kenny, D. A., Kashy, D. A., & Bolger, N. (1998). Data analysis in social psychology. In D. Gilbert,
S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (pp. 233–265). New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Kenny, D. A., Mannetti, L., Pierro, A., Livi, S., & Kashy, D. A. (2002). Statistical analysis of data
from small group. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 126–137.
276 A. Chirumbolo et al.
Copyright #2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 18: 265–278 (2004)
Kruglanski, A. W. (1989). Lay epistemic and human knowledge: Cognitive and motivational bases.
New York: Plenum.
Kruglanski, A. W. (1996). Motivated gatekepeer of our minds: Need for closure effects on
interpersonal phenomena. In E. T. Higgins, & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), The handbook of
motivation and cognition (Vol. 3, pp. 465–496). New York: Guilford Press.
Kruglanski, A. W., & Freund, T. (1983). The freezing and un-freezing of lay inferences: Effects on
impressional primacy, ethnic stereotyping and numerical anchoring. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 19, 448–468.
Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. (1991). Group members’ reactions to opinion deviates and
conformists at varying degrees of proximity to decision deadline and of environmental noise.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 212–225.
Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: Seizing and freezing.
Psychological Review, 103, 263–283.
Kruglanski, A. W., Webster, D., & Klem, A. (1993). Motivated resistance and openness to persuasion
in the presence or absence of prior information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65,
861–876.
Levine, J. M., Resnick, L., & Higgins, E. T. (1993). Social cognition in groups. Annual Review of
Psychology, 44, 585–612.
Mannetti, L., & Pierro, A. (1998). Le tecniche di raccolta dei dati [Techniques of data collection]. In
L. Mannetti (Ed.), Strategie di ricerca in psicologia sociale [Research strategies in social
psychology] (pp. 49–105). Rome: Carocci Editore.
Mannetti, L., Pierro, A., Kruglanski, A. W., Taris, T., & Bezinovic, P. (2002). A cross cultural study
of the need for cognitive closure scale: Comparing its structure in Croatia, Italy, USA and
The Netherlands. British Journal of Social Psychology, 41, 139–156.
Mayseless, O., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1987). What makes you so sure? Effects of epistemic
motivations on judgmental confidence. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process,
39, 162–183.
McGrath, J. E. (1991). Time, interaction and performance (TIP). A theory of groups. Small Group
Research, 22, 147–174.
McGrath, M. E., & Kelly, J. R. (1986). Time and human interaction: Toward a social psychology of
time. New York: Guildford.
Milliken, J. F., Bartel, C. A., & Kurtzberg, T. R. (2003). Diversity and creativity in work groups: A
dynamic perspective on the affective and cognitive processes that link diversity and performance.
In P. B. Paulus, & B. A. Nijstad (Eds.), Group creativity. Innovation through collaboration (pp.
32–62). New York: Oxford University Press.
Nemeth, C. (1995). Dissent as driving cognition, attitudes, and judgments. Social Cognition, 13,
273–291.
Nemeth, C., & Nemeth-Brown, B. (2003). Better than individuals? The potential benefit of dissent
and diversity for group creativity. In P. B. Paulus, & B. A. Nijstad (Eds.), Group creativity.
Innovation through collaboration (pp. 63–84). New York: Oxford University Press.
Nijstad, B. A., & Paulus, P. B. (2003). Group creativity: Common themes and future directions. In
P. B. Paulus, & B. A. Nijstad (Eds.), Group creativity. Innovation through collaboration (pp. 326–
339). New York: Oxford University Press.
Paulus, P. B. (1998). Developing consensus about groupthink after all these years. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73, 362–374.
Paulus, P. B., Leggett Dugosh, K., Dzindolet, M. T., Coskun, H., & Putman, V. L. (2002). Social and
cognitive influences in group brainstorming: Predicting production gains and losses. In W.
Stroebe, & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European review of social psychology (Vol. 12, pp. 299–325).
Chichester: Wiley.
Paulus, P. B., & Nijstad, B. A. (Eds.). (2003). Group creativity. Innovation through collaboration.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Pierro, A., & Livi, S. (2001). Tecniche di osservazione sistematica dei processi di gruppo:
Attendibilita
`e validita
`della Interaction Process Analysis (IPA) e della SYstematic Multiple Level
Observation of Groups (SYMLOG) [Techniques of systematic observation of group processes:
Reliability and validity of IPA and SYMLOG]. Psychofenia, 6, 79–100.
Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., Converso, D., Tarsia, V., Maglietta, A., Ravenna, M., & Rubini, M. (1995).
Caratteristiche strutturali della versione italiana della scala di bisogno di chiusura cognitiva
Need for closure and creativity of group interactions 277
Copyright #2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 18: 265–278 (2004)
(di Webster e Kruglanski) [Structural characteristics of the Italian version of the Need for
Cognitive Closure scale]. Testing, Psicometria, Metodologia, 2, 125–142.
Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., De Grada, E., Livi, S., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2003). Autocracy bias in
informal groups under Need for Closure. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 405–417.
Rocchi, P. (1998). Il bisogno di chiusura cognitiva e la creativita
`[The need for cognitive closure and
creativity]. Giornale Italiano di Psicologia, 25, 153–190.
Rosenthal, R. (1987). Judgment studies: Design, analysis, and meta-analysis. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Shah, J. Y., Kruglanski, A. W., & Thompson, E. P. (1998). Membership has its (epistemic) rewards:
Need for Closure effects on in-group bias. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75,
383–393.
Van Dyne, L., & Saavedra, R. (1996). A naturalistic minority influence experiment: Effects on
divergent thinking, conflict and originality in work-groups. British Journal of Social Psychology,
35, 151–167.
Webster, D., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in Need for Cognitive Closure.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6), 1049–1062.
Webster, D., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1998). Cognitive and social consequences of the Need for
Cognitive Closure. In W. Stroebe, & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European review of social psychology
(Vol. 8, pp. 133–173). Chichester: Wiley.
Webster, D., Richter, L., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1996). On leaping to conclusions when feeling tired:
Mental fatigue effects on impressional primacy. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32,
181–195.
278 A. Chirumbolo et al.
Copyright #2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 18: 265–278 (2004)