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The Privatization of Violence
Abstract
Norbert Elias's (1939) work on “the civilizing process” highlighted the long-term decline in violence within Western societies. A substantial amount of more recent anthropological and historical evidence suggests that violence has evolved not just quantitatively but qualitatively as well. In particular, the social characteristics of the parties to violence have changed over time. Drawing on Donald Black's (1976, 1993a) theoretical ideas on conflict management, the present paper proposes that as intimate social ties weakened and the state strengthened, collective and nonintimate forms of (nonpolitical) violence declined significantly. Consequently, violence increasingly became less public, more private. Pockets of residual public violence can, however, still be found within modern state societies. Privatization varies, then, across time and social space.
... Similarly, it has also been argued that a privatization of violence has taken place, meaning that violence has become more private and less public in nature (Cooney, 2003). Drawing on ideas of Elias (1939) and Black (1976), Cooney argued that violence in modern societies is considerably more individualized, occurring more often between fewer individuals, as well as more intimate; a higher degree of violent acts occur between people who know each other well in modern societies compared to earlier societies. ...
... Drawing on ideas of Elias (1939) and Black (1976), Cooney argued that violence in modern societies is considerably more individualized, occurring more often between fewer individuals, as well as more intimate; a higher degree of violent acts occur between people who know each other well in modern societies compared to earlier societies. This privatization of violence, related to the modernization of society, has not only increased individualization and intimacy of violence, but also reinforced the link between marginalization and violence (Cooney, 2003), an idea supported by other theorists (Aebi & Linde, 2010;Young, 2007). ...
... This hypothesized shift in general routine behavior is consistent with the change in homicide subtypes in Scotland. Not only that, but as Cooney (2003) argued, violence has become privatized, meaning that violence has become less public, and more intimate. This increased privatization and intimacy of violence is demonstrated in Scotland by the decrease in Rivalry homicides, the lack of decrease in the Stabbing and Bludgeoning homicides, and the relative increase in Domestic homicides. ...
Due to the heterogeneity of homicide, certain subtypes of homicide might have remained stable or even increased over time in the overall context of decline. Adding to the research attempting to identify a standardized classification system of homicide, this study used a novel, sophisticated statistical approach (multilevel latent class analysis [MLCA]) and an inductive theoretical stance to identify subtypes of homicide in Scotland and to examine how these types have changed over time. Using variables relating to the victim, offender, and the incident of homicide, four between-level types with three within-level classes of offenders in each type were identified. The findings showed that while all homicide types demonstrated an absolute decrease, domestic homicides had demonstrated a relative increase over time. Implications for policy, theory, and practice are discussed.
... Mimo, iż metoda ta nie jest oczywiście metodą pozbawioną wad, to w literaturze przedmiotu podkreśla się jej zalety. Zdaniem K. Krajewskiego obowiązek ustalenia przez organ procesowy danych osobopoznawczych, a także odtworzenia przebiegu zdarzenia powoduje, iż właśnie w tym punkcie cele organów prowadzących postępowanie karne i badacza kryminologa są zbieżne 16 . ...
... W konkluzji cytowana Autorka zauważa, że: "(…) siła obyczaju jest nieraz we wspólnotach większa, niż oddziaływanie prawa stanowionego/państwowego. Zatem, pomimo wieloletniej reakcji prawnokarnej, ani państwo radzieckie, ani współczesne definitywnie nie poradziło sobie z tą siłą" 16 . ...
... Najczęściej zaś lincz stanowi "dzieło" tłumu. Inni autorzy 16 Ibidem, s. 333-334. 17 Kryminologiczne implikacje problematyki wykluczenia społecznego coraz częściej stanowią przedmiot badań. ...
Książka opisuje zabójstwo Józefa Ciechanowicza, zaistniałe w dniu 1. 07. 2005 r., często określane w publicystyce jako tzw. lincz we Włodowie. Opis zdarzenia uzupełniono rozważaniami nad takimi fenomenami jak samosąd oraz lincz.
... Humans frequently intervene in other individuals' conflicts to provide coalitional support (Black, 1998;Cooney, 1998Cooney, , 2003Harcourt, 1992;Harcourt & de Waal, 1992;Phillips & Cooney, 2005). When bystander intervention is possible, individuals must defend themselves not only against other individuals but also against collections of individuals. ...
... Thus, third parties suffer the costs of protracted conflict for every dispute. Consistent with this idea, ethnographic research shows that societies are more violent when individuals have a stronger sense of community and loyalty because disputes escalate as individuals' allies get involved (Black, 1998;Chaux, 2005;Cooney, 1998Cooney, , 2003Phillips & Cooney, 2005). So, although the formation of alliances might be an important strategy in a social world where third parties choose sides, commitments to side with preexisting allies carry the costs of third-party discoordination and escalated conflict. ...
... This account of moralistic punishment draws attention beyond the punisher and the perpetrator to the larger social world in which they are embedded. Humans live in a world of alliances in which disputes originating between two individuals can quickly escalate to include family, friends, and groups (Black, 1998;Chaux, 2005;Cooney, 1998Cooney, , 2003Phillips & Cooney, 2005). To minimize the costs of entanglement, third parties need to synchronize their side-taking decisions, and further, they need to unambiguously communicate their alignments to everyone else. ...
We propose that moral condemnation functions to guide bystanders to choose the same side as other bystanders in disputes. Humans interact in dense social networks, and this poses a problem for bystanders when conflicts arise: which side, if any, to support. Choosing sides is a difficult strategic problem because the outcome of a conflict critically depends on which side other bystanders support. One strategy is siding with the higher status disputant, which can allow bystanders to coordinate with one another to take the same side, reducing fighting costs. However, this strategy carries the cost of empowering high-status individuals to exploit others. A second possible strategy is choosing sides based on preexisting relationships. This strategy balances power but carries another cost: Bystanders choose different sides, and this discoordination causes escalated conflicts and high fighting costs. We propose that moral cognition is designed to manage both of these problems by implementing a dynamic coordination strategy in which bystanders coordinate side-taking based on a public signal derived from disputants' actions rather than their identities. By focusing on disputants' actions, bystanders can dynamically change which individuals they support across different disputes, simultaneously solving the problems of coordination and exploitation. We apply these ideas to explain a variety of otherwise mysterious moral phenomena. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
... Another key feature of the game is that the fighting cost C occurs when there is a tie, with equal numbers of supporters on each side. This represents situations in which fighting is prone to escalate when the opponents are evenly matched, which is commonly observed across many different forms of conflict (Arnott and Elwood 2009;Cooney 1998Cooney , 2003Dechenaux et al. 2014). In these cases, a threat from one side is not sufficient to deter the opponent, since it is unclear who is more likely to prevail in a protracted contest. ...
... For instance, two individuals can improve their power by forming an alliance in which they side with each other, instead of choosing sides based on other factors such as popularity, status, or moral rules. Alliance formation is observed in many social contexts from close relationships to national politics to international relations (Cooney 1998(Cooney , 2003DeScioli and Kurzban 2009;Snyder 1984Snyder , 1997. For example, previous research on close friendships found strong correlations between participants' rankings of close friends and their perceptions of friends' ranks of them. ...
We investigate in an economic experiment how people choose sides in disputes. In an eight-player side-taking game, two disputants at a time fight over an indivisible resource and other group members choose sides. The player with more supporters wins the resource, which is worth real money. Conflicts occur spontaneously between any two individuals in the group. Players choose sides by ranking their loyalties to everyone else in the group, and they automatically support the disputant they ranked higher. We manipulate participants’ information about other players’ loyalties and also their ability to communicate with public chat messages. We find that participants spontaneously and quickly formed alliances, and more information about loyalties caused more alliance-building. Without communication, we observe little evidence of bandwagon or egalitarian strategies, but with communication, some groups invented rank rotation schemes to equalize payoffs while choosing the same side to avoid fighting costs.
... Another key feature of the game is that the fighting cost C occurs when there is a tie, with equal numbers of supporters on each side. This represents situations in which fighting is prone to escalate when the opponents are evenly matched, which is commonly observed across many different forms of conflict (Arnott and Elwood 2009;Cooney 1998Cooney , 2003Dechenaux et al. 2014). In these cases, a threat from one side is not sufficient to deter the opponent, since it is unclear who is more likely to prevail in a protracted contest. ...
... For instance, two individuals can improve their power by forming an alliance in which they side with each other, instead of choosing sides based on other factors such as popularity, status, or moral rules. Alliance formation is observed in many social contexts from close relationships to national politics to international relations (Cooney 1998(Cooney , 2003DeScioli and Kurzban 2009;Snyder 1984Snyder , 1997. For example, previous research on close friendships found strong correlations between participants' rankings of close friends and their perceptions of friends' ranks of them. ...
... Les propos et les récits que nous avons rapportés montrent bien qu'il s'agit de situations complexes pour diverses raisons. L'une de ces raisons est que le harcèlement psychologique est une manifestation directe du caractère privé de la violence (Cooney, 2003) qui concerne des individus plutôt que des groupes, et qui s'adresse aux proches et non à des étrangers ou à des opposants lointains. Le conflit prend donc forme, la plupart du temps, entre deux individus et dans des relations de face à face, c'est-à-dire sans la présence de témoin direct. ...
... The phenomenon of psychological harassment is far from being simple; the remarks and the stories that we have related clearly show that these are complex situations for many reasons. One of these reasons is that psychological harassment is a direct manifestation of the private nature of violence (Cooney, 2003) that concerns individuals rather than groups, and is addressed at individuals and in the context of face to face relations, that is to say, without the presence of any direct witnesses. ...
Cet article brosse un portrait des plaintes écrites déposées à la Commission des normes du travail du Québec entre le 1er juin 2004 et le 30 avril 2005. Au total, 236 plaintes de harcèlement psychologique au travail ont constitué le corpus d’analyse. Les principaux résultats montrent que parmi l’ensemble des cas analysés, 63 % des plaignants sont des femmes. Près de 95 % des plaignants ont avancé avoir subi du harcèlement à caractère répétitif. Les cinq premiers motifs de plainte sont les propos et les gestes vexatoires, les atteintes aux conditions de travail, la menace de congédiement, la mise en échec de la personne et l’isolement. Par ailleurs, ce sont généralement les gestionnaires qui sont désignés comme personnes mises en cause. À la lumière de ces résultats, il est important que les organisations se dotent de systèmes de veille pour détecter les cas et d’outils de gestion pour désamorcer les situations qui comportent un potentiel de harcèlement psychologique.
... While acquiring the victim from law enforcement custody did not impact the atrocity of a lynching, it significantly increased the likelihood of a hanging, even after taking into account the Other-Total Ratio, as shown in Table 3. One reason for this effect of law enforcement could be that even though lynch mobs took victims from protective custody, the presence of law enforcement may have emphasized to lynch mob members their role as vigilante justice-keepers, consistent with contemporary research that has identified lynchings as a type of informal social control (Black, 1983;Cooney, 2003). Interacting with law enforcement may have activated law-and-order situational norms. ...
From 1882 to 1926, lynch mobs in Georgia killed 514 victims in 410 separate events. Based on a new comprehensive dataset, this study examined characteristics of the mobs related to the level of the atrocity of the violence in the lynchings. Consistent with prior research, the size of the crowd was a stable predictor of level of atrocity. However, in contrast to two prior studies, results did not uniformly support the self-attention perspective. Instead, the findings were more consistent with the concept that situational norms were the important mechanism behind collective violence, particularly because the violence used in a lynching event reflected the violence used in nearby lynchings. These results suggest that, rather than losing all norms of behavior through a process of deindividuation, lynchers adopted norms they viewed as appropriate for the situation.
... By contrast, in modern societies, with increased availability of the law to all strata, more formalized rules of conduct, and functional democratization, many disputes are more peacefully resolved. As Cooney (2003) also argues, once upper classes are subject to the law, violence becomes less socially acceptable, and when the lower classes have access to the law 'aggressive tactics such as fighting, burning, seizing and killing to resolve conflicts' decrease. Power differentials between different strata decrease while self-restraint in dealings with subordinates replaces an attitude of 'do as you want' (Elias, 1994: 33-4). ...
Violence presents a paradox. There is evidence that violence is universal in all in human societies. However, in writing mostly from the standpoint of relatively peaceful social spaces, violence often appears exceptional, and a product of the breakdown of integrating social institutions and conventions. Norbert Elias persuasively identified growing thresholds of repugnance towards violence with the transition to modernity, although understanding the balance between formalization and informalization poses some critical questions about his thesis. The discussion begins with these as a means of opening a broader discussion of theories of violence which are developed through a critical analysis of Girard's and Gans' theories. It is argued that these may offer a way of addressing the informalization problem in a context of mimetic consumption desires in a context of apparent but false equalization in contemporary societies. Although violence has been addressed by a wide range of social and political theorists including Hobbes, Burke, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Freud, Foucault, Giddens, Girard, Žižek and many others, violence has not, at least until recently perhaps, been a topic of central concern in sociological theory. It has rather been parcelled out into areas such as violent crime and social conflict perhaps because as Delanty (2001) points out, sociology emerged in relatively peaceful times and was animated by a vision of social order within a world of internally pacified nation states. Yet many writers, but particularly anthropologists (e.g., Abbink, 2000: xi) note that violence is a human universal and inter-personal aggression, physical threat, assault, homicide and armed conflict 'seem to have
... Another possible explanation for increase in IPV could be linked to the privatisation of housing space as a result of upgrading informal settlements. Previous research has shown that as violence occurs less in public spaces it will likely become more privatised for the same populations (Cooney, 2003). Privatisation of space has been shown to potentially diminish social cohesion in a manner that leaves communities less able to combat violence through the informal community structures and social networks that existed when the community was still largely informal (Brown-Luthango, 2015;Seekings, Jooste, Muyeba, Coqui, & Russell, 2010). ...
Interpersonal violence is a major contributor to the burden of disease globally, and in South Africa, it is the leading cause of injury. There is an emerging consensus that the development of actionable policy and effective prevention strategies for interpersonal violence requires an understanding of the contextual matters that elevate risk for interpersonal violence. The objective of this study was to explore community perceptions of risks for interpersonal violence in five townships in Cape Town, South Africa, with high rates of violence. Focus group discussions were conducted with community members to identify key factors in that contributed to being either a perpetrator or victim of interpersonal violence. The ecological framework was used to classify the risk factors as occurring at individual, relationship, community or society levels. Some of the risk factors identified included alcohol abuse, poverty, informality of settlements and cultural norms. Differences in how each of these risk factors are expressed and experienced in the five communities are also elucidated. This approach enabled the collection of contextual community-based data that can complement conventional surveillance data in the development of relevant community-level strategies for interpersonal violence prevention.
... Ethnographic research shows the costly consequences of alliances, especially in small-scale societies without strong policing institutions [33][34][35]. Trivial squabbles can quickly expand to hundreds of people brawling as outsiders intervene to support family and friends. People in many cultures are also obligated to avenge an ally's murder by killing their enemies, leading to endless cycles of violence [36,37]. ...
A recent theory proposes that moral judgment is an evolved strategy for choosing sides in conflicts. Evidence from moral psychology undermines previous evolutionary theories of morality focused on cooperation. I show how the side-taking hypothesis explains these otherwise puzzling patterns of moral judgment - especially its focus on actions rather than intended consequences. Moral judgment offers an alternative to choosing sides based on status or relationships by conditioning support on disputants' actions rather than their identities. Observers can use moral judgment to take the same side, avoiding costly fights among themselves, while dynamically changing who they support in different conflicts. Observers can benefit from moral side-taking even when condemnation harms other individuals and society.
... High-intimacy conflicts are, like the high-energy particles of physics, difficult to observe. Intimate conflicts repel third partiesdoutsiders are less likely to know their details, and the more intimate the relationship, the more privatized they become (Black, 1995:835;1998:134e135; see also Cooney, 2003). But determined sociologists may still be able to view these conflicts in more detail. ...
... The state however, has also devolved and dispersed power throughout civil society through partnerships with community agencies. Privatized infrastructures for private policing, private security hardware and systems and insurance technologies are prime examples (Cooney, 2003;Garland, 1992Garland, ,1997. According to Garland, this offers the state a more extended capacity for action and an ability to govern at a distance (2002). ...
Keeping Kids Safe (KKS) is a study that presents an integrated model to demonstrate that the interaction between the predisposition of the youth and the institutional environment acts to promote or deter safety among incarcerated youth. The study illustrates that the peer subculture that produces a spectrum of violence within the institution is dependent on both the extra-custody attributes of the youth that affect his attitudes, beliefs and behaviours and on the critical influence of institutional attributes like program resources, staff/youth interactions and practices of social control. A predisposition that includes child maltreatment and exposure to domestic violence was used as the clarifying example that brought the model to life. Coping strategies used by youth to ameliorate or manage peer aggression in the institutions were examined.
The KKS study utilized a mixed methods triangulation design and through self reports by youth consumers of service, offers valuable insight into the lived experience of youth who were residing in four secure custody facilities in Canada. Two sets of sites were designated Safer and Less Safe based on institutional safety as perceived by the youth. A variation in culture across the two institutional types was evidenced through the description of peer harassment and aggression and the concomitant coping strategies used by youth to manage the milieu. Further analysis of the data according to the youth's involvement in the child welfare and youth justice systems was undertaken.
Key findings that emerged from this study were: The imported risk factors of an adverse family history of child maltreatment and exposure to domestic violence, combined with an early and protracted history of incarceration in the youth justice system set the stage for a continuum of peer aggression within the youth justice institutions studied. This finding confirms the integrated model for understanding violence among incarcerated youth. Furthermore, coping strategies which served to ameliorate or manage the impact of peer aggression were directly aligned with the adaptive responses of youth who struggle with a history of child maltreatment or exposure to domestic violence. Youth imported these entrenched response patterns of internalizing symptomology, externalizing behaviours and relational difficulties into the institutional milieu. Nonetheless, the protective features of the institutional environment and the role played by staff served to mediate the prevalence and impact of peer aggression.
Youth participants reinforced that violence begins in the family and without appropriate recognition and intervention can be perpetuated in societal institutions. Accordingly, recommendations for research, policy and practice are offered.
... By supporting Wilson's argument (1985), some investigators report that murder rates in the United States have increased at a much slower pace than aggravated assault rates. They conclude that improvements in medical services are associated with reductions in homicide rates in the past several decades (Cooney, 2003;Giacopassi and Sparger, 1992;Harris, et al., 2002). ...
Violence is a continuum, and homicide is only one possible consequence. Timely and adequate medical care saves the lives of the victims of violence. Thus, good medical resources are related to low homicide rates in a nation. The current study expands a medical perspective on homicide rates to a cross‐national study. This present study employs a regression analysis by using the data on homicide rates and medical resources for 170 nations. The results of the analysis indicate that high infant mortality rates, low health expenditure per capita, and high death rates from road traffic accidents are associated with high homicide rates. The findings suggest that medical resources partially explain the variation of international homicide rates.A group of scholars attempt to test the connection between medical resources and homicide rates (Cooney, 2003; Doerner, 1983, 1988; Doerner and Speir, 1986; Giacopassi and Sparger, 1992; Harris, et al., 2002, Long‐Onnen and Cheatwood, 1992). However, the preceding investigations, grounded on the medical thesis, receive weak and inconsistent empirical support. Also, those studies are limited to one geographical area of the United States. The variations of both homicide rates and levels of medical resources may be greater among nations than among different geographical areas in a nation. The purpose of the present study is to extend the existing medical care perspective on homicide to explain differential distribution of homicide rates across nations. Thus, the current research is one of the earliest endeavors to apply a medical proposition on homicide to a cross‐national inquiry. Another advantage of this study is its use of a comparatively large homicide data set for 170 nations. In addition, the present analysis includes extensive medical and structural variables. The number of candidate variables initially introduced in the study is nineteen.
... The victims' comments and accounts of events that we have reported clearly demonstrate that PH is a complex situation on many levels. One of these complexities is the fact that psychological harassment is a direct expression of violence of a private nature (Cooney, 2003) which concerns individuals rather than groups, and which is aimed at people known to the perpetrator rather than strangers or distant opponents. The conflict, therefore, usually unfolds between two individuals in face-to-face relationships, that is, not in the presence of direct witnesses. ...
Following in the wake of several European countries, Quebec adopted a bill in December 2002 to modify the Labour Code and other legislative measures by the introduction of measures pertaining to psychological harassment (art. 81.18 to 81.20). These standards, which are accompanied by specific means of legal recourse (art. 123.6 to 123.16) and fall under the responsibility of the Commission des normes du travail (CNT), came into effect on June 1, 2004 (Lippel, 2005). This article presents an overview of the written complaints filed with the Comniission des normes du travail (CNT) between June 1, 2004 and April 30, 2005.
... There is no sustained explanation of why violence varies, not just by type but also across time, space, and social groups. The reader will not find in Violence any testable explanation of such familiar empirical patterns as why some societies have little violence and others a great deal, why European homicide rates have declined sharply over the past eight hundred years, why domestic violence represents a larger proportion of modern than pre-modern violence, or why lower income African American men are more violent than their middle-class white counterparts (see e.g., Eisner 2003;Cooney 2003). ...
A key issue in criminology is to account for variation in rates of violence across time and place. An important variable largely neglected in the literature is individualism. Building on theoretical ideas proposed by Durkheim, Black, and Baumgartner, we illustrate the role of increased individualism with a case study: the decline of homicide in England, 1250–1750. The qualitative historical materials we present reveal the growth of more individualized conflicts evident in less third-party partisan intervention and a reduced concern with honor. More individualized conflicts were, in turn, a product of a more individualized society, one characterized by increased social distance and mobility. As conflicts individualized they became less lethal, resulting in declining aggregate rates of homicide. Although the case study is historical, our argument has implications for understanding contemporary criminal violence.
In 1939, the German sociologist Norbert Elias published his groundbreaking work The Civilizing Process, which has come to be regarded as one of the most influential works of sociology today. In this insightful new study tracing the history of violence in Cambodia, the authors evaluate the extent to which Elias's theories can be applied in a non-western context. Drawing from historical and contemporary archival sources, constabulary statistics, victim surveys and newspaper reports, Broadhurst, Bouhours and Bouhours chart trends and forms of violence throughout Cambodia from the mid-nineteenth century through to the present day. Analysing periods of colonisation, anti-colonial wars, interdependence, civil war, the revolutionary terror of the 1970s and post-conflict development, the authors assess whether violence has decreased and whether such a decline can be attributed to Elias's civilising process, identifying a series of universal factors that have historically reduced violence.
Traffic stops are a staple of law enforcement patrol and provide regular interaction with the community. Previous research has examined many aspects of traffic stop incidents, particularly when officers mortally wound civilians. However, accounts of peace officers feloniously killed during traffic stop incidents have received much less empirical review. The goal of this study was to establish a profile of fatal peace officer traffic stops and felony traffic stop encounters utilizing content analysis of federal, state, and local opensource data. Demographic and incident level characteristics of law enforcement officers feloniously killed during the course of traffic stops revealed an average tenure of 9.59 years, were alone in their patrol vehicle at the time of the fatal incident, and were killed during the ante phase of the stop. Firearms were overwhelmingly used in the incidents, most suspects worked alone, and the majority of incidents involved a non-felony traffic stop. Our study contributes to an already growing body of literature on traffic stop fatalities by being one of the first to establish a profile of United States peace officers feloniously killed during traffic stops.
Chapter 10.1007/978-3-030-31699-0_3 examines the subject of violence in relation to spectators at GAA matches. It outlines how spectator violence has diminished in the context of greater emotional control and differentiation as part of a general civilising process in Ireland. The nature of violent encounters shifted from a collective form based on local solidarity and a reciprocal code of honour, through a transitional collective form based on deferred emotional satisfaction and group pride, towards a more individualised form of spectator violence.
A number of studies have examined the relationship between the ‘code of the street’ and the concept of snitching (that is, informing the police). With some notable exceptions, these studies have generally focused on the pervasiveness of a ‘stop-snitching code’ or ‘code of silence’ among street offenders. In this study we seek to broaden understanding of the stop-snitching code by exploring perceptions of active, former, and non-offenders living in areas considered by residents to embody the street code. We find that informal cultural norms do in fact dissuade both offender and non-offenders from cooperating with police, but also that personal experience with police, proximity to offences and offenders, and types of crimes in question play major roles in the contextual framing of whether or not people choose to cooperate with the police.
The quantitative approachisafundamental aspect ofthe studyof the history of homicide. For the Ancien Régime, the difficultylies inproducingreliable numberedseries. Dependingonthe era, seal law accounts recordmore or less systematicallythe remissions grantedinthe Duchyof Brabant between1501 and 1633, thus makingit possible, witha critical reading, togainanidea of the number of homicides committed during the period being studied.
Die Spannbreite der Erfahrungen und Perspektiven, die sich mit den Begriffen Kriminalität und Delinquenz verbinden, ist enorm. Bankraub gehört ebenso zu dazu wie Insidertrading, körperliche Züchtigung der eigenen Kinder gleichermaßen wie Partnertötung, Ladendiebstahl ebenso wie Anlagebetrug, Schuleschwänzen, Schutzgelderpressung und Haschischkonsum. Kriminalität ist konkrete Erfahrung und mediale Konstruktion, Normalität und Extreme, Wahlkampfthema und Berufsfeld.
It is almost universally accepted among retributivists that revenge and retributive punishment are fundamentally different, the first being immoral but the second moral. Robert Nozick’s influential argument presents numerous features on which they purportedly differ, including the idea that revenge is personal while retribution is impersonal, and that revenge aims at the suffering of the wrongdoer while retribution aims only at justice. However influential this argument, it can easily be seen to be flawed. Revenge and retribution are identical in their essential features: both involve the intention to inflict harm on a person in response to his prior wrongdoing. There is an important distinction between the two: revenge is a privately-administered system of punishment, whereas retribution involves a state-administered public system. This distinction is important, though it implies the essential continuity of the two practices, rather than their difference. Thus it will not do to insist that retribution is justified because it is different from revenge; we need an account that allows for the essential continuity of revenge and retribution.
The story of the Cambodian hemoclysm or bloodbath, its causes and evolution, have been documented and accounted for by a sustained and critical scholarship. We draw on this literature to account for the extreme lethality of the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime led by the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). First, we briefly outline the scale of the violence during DK and then describe the phases, patterns and surges of violence against different ‘classes’ of victims that occurred with the implementation of the DK’s nation building plans, and in doing so offer a sketch of the DK’s short-lived attempt to
create a communist utopia. Then we situate our criminological analysis in terms of the struggle to define mega-crime and mass violence, and the limitations of current criminological theories. Next, we outline the explanatory contribution of both macrolevel and micro-level criminological theories about the causes of extreme violence, and
how these aid us in understanding how individuals and the DK regime were able to implement terror and repeatedly perform acts of murder. We conclude by re-examining the likely causes of this catastrophic surge in mass violence, and argue that although ample precursors of such violence are evident in Cambodia’s history, the convergence of
a multitude of adverse external and internal factors combined with the particular form of radical Maoist policies imbued with indigenous over-confidence produced a perfect storm of violence.
Extract from Chapter 8, "Violence and the Civilising Process in Cambodia", Broadhurst, Bouhours and Bouhours, CUP, Nov. 2015
"Thou shalt not kill" is arguably the most basic moral and legal principle in any society. Yet while some killers are pilloried and punished, others are absolved and acquitted, and still others are lauded and lionized. Why? The traditional answer is that how killers are treated depends on the nature of their killing, whether it was aggressive or defensive, intentional or accidental. But those factors cannot explain the enormous variation in legal officials' and citizens' responses to real-life homicides. Cooney argues that a radically new style of thought--pure sociology--can. Conceived by the sociologist Donald Black, pure sociology makes no reference to psychology, to any single person's intent, or even to individuals as such. Instead, pure sociology explains behavior in terms of its social geometry--its location and direction in a multidimensional social space. Is Killing Wrong? provides the most comprehensive assessment of pure sociology yet attempted. Drawing on data from well over one hundred societies, including the modern day United States, it represents the most thorough account yet of case-level social control, or the response to conduct defined as wrong. In doing so, it demonstrates that the law and morality of homicide are neither universal nor relative but geometrical, as predicted by Black's theory. © 2009 by the Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia. All rights reserved.
Research on drug use often fails to account for drug dealing in most analyses of violence and other systemic risks associated with illegal drugs. The current study examined whether drug dealing, independent of its connection to drug use, increases involvement with delinquent peers, violence, weapons, and other drug-related conflicts. Data were drawn from the first two waves of the Toledo Adolescent Relationships Study (N = 1,148). Hierarchical linear models were used to investigate changes in these behaviors that resulted from the respondents’ involvement in drug dealing and drug use. Results indicate that involvement in drug dealing, controlling for drug use, increases violence and other systemic risks to a level that drug use alone is not likely to achieve. Findings also show, however, that drug use among dealers may reduce violence and limit contact with delinquent peers.
Five important changes can be detected in the homicidal crime of Finland and Sweden. From the mid-seventeenth century to the mid-eighteenth, concurring with the establishing of the modern centralized state, homicide rates dropped significantly. In the long term, the local variation in Swedish homicide rates decreased, probably because of the rise of the centralized state; however, the case was different in Finland, partly because of a less efficient central administration before the twentieth century. During the period 1700–2000, there was a clear social marginalization of lethal violence; this change took place earlier in Sweden than in Finland. There was a relative shift from instrumental (economy-related) to expressive violence. In the twentieth century, concurring with general urbanization, there was a considerable privatization of lethal violence in both countries as homicides moved from public places to private. The social and historical data suggest that homicide participants may have become more deviant from the mainstream society than they used to be. Overall, Nordic homicidal crime has had two major components since the early modern period. The high offending rates of the marginal lowest-stratum male population have been a stable phenomenon for five centuries. Sudden changes in homicide rates have typically been caused by young males with more heterogeneous social backgrounds.
Donald Black's theory of law has been considered an important theory in the sociology of law. However, while the theory views law as a quantity variable, there has been limited empirical support from quantitative studies. This study offers a quantitative test of Black's theory using data from 579 Canadian municipalities. The results show that the quantity of law, in terms of crime clearance rates, varies positively with stratification, morphology, culture, and organization just as Black's theory has predicted. In addition, population size, population density, the property and violent crime rates, and policing resources also affect the clearance rates. These findings support the general notion that there is more law for certain groups and under certain social conditions. Also, most of the findings are consistent with Black's theory, thus supporting its viability as a sociological theory. In addition, two seemingly contradictory explanations, the resource explanation and the need/dependency explanation, are proposed to interpret the findings. These contradictory and yet complementary explanations perhaps reflect the reality of law in society.
When and how will third parties intervene in the conflicts of others? When will third parties further violence, and when will they foster peace? These are questions addressed by Black's theory of the third party. The authors conducted the first systematic test of the theory, drawing on quantitative and qualitative data from in-depth interviews with 100 men imprisoned for assault or homicide. Specifically, they tested Cooney's elaboration of Black's theory, which argues (1) that the social location of a third party, based on ties to the principals, predicts whether he or she will act as a partisan or settlement agent or remain uninvolved, and (2) that the third-party structure of a conflict, based on the general configuration of all the third parties present, predicts whether the conflict will escalate to violence. The study results confirm most of the theoretical predictions regarding both third-party behavior and violence. The discussion also extends the theoretical model, offering new concepts and suggesting how the theory can be applied to a range of subjects, such as international war and the long-term historical decline of interpersonal violence.
This article examines the social composition of homicide offenders and victims in Finland between 1960 and 2000. While many prior analyses have been based on victim-based cause-of-death statistics or aggregated rates of geographical units, the present data allowed the analysis of offender and victim populations at individual level. Both the rates and patterns of homicidal behaviour were analysed from the point of view of participants’ social characteristics. It was discovered that the social anchoring of homicide remained stable in the relative sense that the typical victims and offenders were males from the lowest stratum. However, the absolute societal position of the lowest stratum male transformed as he was made economically redundant, a change that was reflected in homicide populations. The article concludes with a discussion of the paradox between the rise of the welfare state and the expected but unrealized pacification of the lowest stratum male. Four suppressing mechanisms are suggested: alcohol availability, social selection effects, cultural factors and the unintended consequences of social policy measures. The last category refers to changes in social patterns of homicide, which made the reduction of homicide rates more difficult, meaning that the present homicide situation is particularly resistant to efforts of situational crime prevention.
Late nineteenth-century homicides in Ireland had several distinctive characteristics. They took place in every county, were largely a male preserve, and regularly involved elderly victims. Heavy drinking was a factor in many lethal squabbles and workplace disputes sometimes resulted
in impulsive, but savage, attacks. Weapon use was uncommon and the range of penalties imposed by the courts was wide. In the closing decade of the twentieth century the overall level of homicide was lower and had become concentrated in and around the major cities. Victims were younger, shootings
and stabbings were much more prevalent and sentences were significantly more severe. Alcohol continued to play an important role. This paper sets out what can be gleaned from official sources about the circumstances of killing on the island of Ireland during two decades separated by one hundred
years. The emphasis is on the earlier period where, perhaps surprisingly, more complete police records are available. The analysis offers support for the theory of a civilizing process as advanced by Norbert Elias, integral to which is the proposition that spontaneous displays of aggression
become less common over time.
Three theoretical perspectives examine the role of justice as a means of informal social control and as a reactionary process to dynamics of social strain and subcultural demands. This theoretical analysis is then applied to concepts of justice, including retributive, distributive, restorative, and procedural. The derived street justice paradigm incorporates these various forms of justice as they are linked with cultural imperatives associated with street culture and street crime. The linking of these concepts provides a clearer understanding of the motives and means of exacting justice in a state of heightened relative strain that is pronounced by a preference for revenge and violence. Implications for policy, future study, and theoretical expansion are discussed with particular emphasis on the application of the paradigm to non‐street crime and to policies directed toward involving community members in the justice process.
Goldstein's (1985) concept of systemic violence has contributed substantially to criminological thought and research, but its power can be enhanced by connecting it to a broader typology of social life: the resource exchange—social control typology. That typology connects systemic violence logically with two important yet neglected forms of drug market behavior: peaceful resource exchange and peaceful social control. This article, which is based on 50 in-depth interviews with individuals involved actively or recently in drug selling, describes the various forms of violent and nonviolent resource exchange and social control in illicit drug markets, stating them in quantitative terms that are conceptually distinct and empirically observable. We conclude by discussing 1) the implications of peaceful behavior for a fuller understanding of violence and 2) the relevance of the resource exchange-social control typology to criminological theory and research.
Genocide is defined here as organized and unilateral mass killing on the basis of ethnicity. While some have focused on genocide as a type of deviance, most genocide is also social control—a response to behavior itself defined as deviant. As such, it can be explained as a part of a general theory of social control.Black's (1998)theories of social control explain the handling of conflicts with their social geometry—that is, with the social characteristics of those involved in the conflict. Here, Blackian theories of social control are extended to specify the social geometry of genocide as follows: genocide varies directly with immobility, cultural distance, relational distance, functional independence, and inequality; and it is greater in a downward direction than in an upward or lateral direction. This theory of genocide can be applied to numerous genocides throughout history, and it is capable of ordering much of the known variation in genocide—such as when and where it occurs, how severe it is, and who participates.
We demonstrate that fixed- and random-effects models for pooled cross-sectional and time series data, and latent growth curve
models for panel data are special cases of a more general model. We compare the estimates obtained from each type of model
for a data set consisting of homicide rates and a vector of explanatory variables for 400 US counties over a 15-year period.
Most, but not all, estimates are similar in the two models. We identify circumstances under which one approach may be advantageous
to the other.
This article employs Max Weber's ideal-type method to classify genocides based on their degree of mass killing, unilateralism, and ethnic liability. The identification of the elements of genocide draws from a general theory of genocide (Campbell 2009, 2010) and from theories of social control employing Donald Black's (1995, 1998) theoretical approach, known as pure sociology. Because these theories identify the social features associated with each element of genocide, they can explain the form genocides take.
Through recorded history, governments have executed persons, sometimes in groups for the same offense. In the United States, most post trial mass executions, defined as executing four or more persons for the same incident, occurred prior to 1866. This unstudied aspect of capital punishment is interesting for what it tells us about the social climate of the era (colonial days through the end of the American Civil War) in which those executions occurred and the leading fears of the society and/or its leaders. Following the American Civil War, mass executions not only declined in number and rate, but also matched more the trends in capital punishment overall. A detailed list of mass legal executions in America up to 1865 is appended to this article.
The criminality of crime is defined by law, and therefore falls within the jurisdiction of a completely different theory. This chapter discusses the struggle between law and self-help, the deterrence of crime, the processing of self-help by legal officials, and the problem of predicting and explaining self-help. The approach taken in the chapter departs radically from traditional criminology. Indeed, the approach taken is not criminological at all, because it ignores the characteristics of crime as such. Instead, it draws attention to a dimension of many crimes usually viewed as a totally different—even opposite— kind of human behavior, namely, social control. Crime often expresses a grievance. This implies that many crimes belong to the same family as gossip, ridicule, vengeance, punishment, and law. It also implies that to a significant degree one can predict and explain crime with a sociological theory of social control, specifically a theory of self-help. Beyond this, it might be worthwhile to contemplate what else crime has in common with noncriminal conduct.
This chapter discusses the sociological theory of compensation style of social control in which a grievance is handled by a payment to the aggrieved. Compensation falls within the jurisdiction of a field of sociological inquiry ultimately concerned with the prediction and explanation of social control of every kind. It is one of the several major styles in which particular grievances are handled. Each style has its own language and logic, including its own standards, questions, and solutions. The penal style of social control speaks in a language of prohibitions, violations, guilt, and retribution. Illustrated in modern law by criminal justice, it focuses on the conduct and punishes those who violate its prohibitions. The classical point of departure in the theory of compensation is Emile Durkheim's Division of Labor, where he proposes that the compensatory style is directly related to the degree of interdependence in society. Mark Cooney's cross-cultural study of reactions to homicide indicates that compensation is more frequent in relatively developed societies but he discovered no relationship among compensation and the use of metal currency, the structure of the economy, the fixity of residence, the size of local communities, population density, the fluidity of social relations, the degree of occupational specialization, or the homicide rate.
This article explores the homicidal behavior of women against intimate partners, using a modification of Black's self-help perspective. Simpson has called for theoretical perspectives that speak to the interplay of race, gender, and social class. My interpretation of self-help theory incorporates these factors as predictors of low social status. Low social status leads to decreased access to formal social control, which in turn leads some women to resort to lethal violence as a form of criminal conflict resolution in the perceived absence of available legal remedies. Conversely, low social status serves to inhibit homicidal behavior in most women, through greater fear of retribution and involvement in fewer conflicts related to honor. This may account for the wide disparity in the amount of lethal violence committed by men and women.
The present paper examines secular trends of homicide rates by means of a systematic re-analysis of all available quantitative studies on pre-modern homicide. The results confirm, first, that homicide rates have declined in Europe over several centuries. Second, the empirical evidence shows, that unequivocal decline began in the early seventeenth century. Third, the data indicate that the secular decline begins with the pioneers of the modernization process, England and Holland, and slowly encompasses further regions. These findings corroborate much of the civilizing process framework proposed by Norbert Elias. Yet, the diffusion of self-control was sustained not only by compliance to the state monopoly of power but by a variety of disciplining institutional arrangements. This includes, for example, the early expansion of schools, particularly in Northern Europe, the rise of religious reform movements, and the organization of work in manufacturing. Second, while social disciplining certainly is the central feature of the early modern period, it also served to push forward the rise of the specifically modern individualism that Durkheim sees as the cause of the decline of individual-level violence.
A feature common to both macro-and micro-level analyses of homicide is the relationship between victims and offenders. Previous research generally conceptualized this relationship as a dichotomy—either primary and secondary or stranger and nonstranger. Such classifications, however, mask important variation in these subcategories. This paper employs a five-category description of the relationship between victims and offenders: strangers, acquaintances, friends, relatives, and those romantically linked. The relationship between this expanded typology and individual attributes, motives, and event characteristics are examined. Results show that motives and victim-offender relationships are related less strongly than previous research would suggest. Despite this finding, other correlates generally confirm the findings of earlier research.
This study demonstrate that the empirical literature on the structural convariates of homicide rates contains inconsistent findings across different time periods and different geographical units. This apparent variance of findings may be due to statistical or methodological artifacts of particular studies, such as different time periods covered, units of analysis, samples, model specification, and problems of statistical analysis and inference. A baseline regression model using 11 structural covariates is estimated for cities, metropolitan areas, and states in 1960, 1970, and 1980. The empirical estimates of this model exhibit instability because of high levels of collinearity among several regressors. Principal components analysis is applied to simplify the dimensionally of the structural covariate space. Reestimation of the regression model then indicates that the apparent inconsistencies across time and social space are greatly reduced. The theoretical significance of the findings for substantive theor...
A theory of collective violence must explain both why it is collective and why it is violent. Whereas my earlier work addresses the question of why collective violence is violent, here I apply and extend Donald Black's theory of partisanship to the question of why violence collectivizes. I propose in general that the collectivization of violence is a direct function of strong partisanship. Strong partisanship arises when third parties (1) support one side against the other and (2) are solidary among themselves. Such support occurs when third parties are socially close to one side and remote from the other and when one side has more social status than the other. Third parties are solidary when they are intimate, culturally homogeneous, and interdependent. I focus in particular on lynching: Lynching is a joint function of strong partisanship toward the alleged victim and weak partisanship toward the alleged offender. Unequal strong partisanship appears in both classic lynchings (of outsiders) and communal ynchings (of insiders) across societies and history. Where partisanship is weak or strong on both sides, lynching is unlikely to occur. Evidence includes patterns of lynching in various tribal societies, the American South, imperial China, and medieval Europe.
Collective violence is often social control: self-help by a group. It typically defines and responds to conduct as deviant.
When unilateral and nongovernmental, it appears in four major forms—lynching, rioting, vigilantism, and terrorism—each distinguished
by its system of liability (individual or collective) and degree of organization (higher or lower). Following Donald Black's
paradigm of pure sociology, the central assumption is that collective violence varies with its location and direction in social
space—the conflict structure. I offer ten propositions that predict and explain the likelihood and severity of collective
violence in general and the four forms of collective violence in particular. Conflict structures with a high degree of relational
distance, cultural distance, functional independence, and inequality between the adversaries are associated with collective
violence in general. Each of the four forms depends on the degree of social polarization between the parties as well as the
continuity of the deviant behavior to which the violence responds.
The purpose of this chapter is to review and discuss the contributions cross-cultural studies have made or might make to our understanding of family violence. To cover as much territory as possible I have defined cross-cultural studies broadly to include any information collection and analysis approach that involves either the implicit or explicit comparison of two or more cultural groups. Cultural group is defined broadly as well, to include nations, political subdivisions within nations, ethnic groups, small-scale (primitive, nonliterate) societies, peasant societies, and so on. Following the work of Gelles and Straus (1979) family violence is defined as the action of a family member that will very likely cause physical pain to another family member. The term beating, such as wife beating or husband beating, is used throughout the chapter to refer to any violent act ranging from a slap to a beating with a stick to murder with a handgun.
Contrary to common belief, strong communities do not necessarily enjoy low rates of violence. Applying Baumgartner's (1988) thesis that confrontational forms of conflict management tend to be found where social interaction is intense, this paper argues that conflict-related or “moralistic” homicide is associated with several of the defining characteristics of community. Thus, a considerable amount of evidence, modern and pre-modern, suggests that moralistic homicide flourishes under conditions of proximity, sociability, immobility, publicity and loyalty.
The growing research on comparative studies of homicide in the United States reveals significant methodological advances but inconsistent findings. A major goal is to identify sources of inconsistency and accumulate more valid and reliable results. This analysis empirically examines a major problem with most previous comparative studies--the failure to disaggregate the overall homicide rate into more refined and conceptually meaningful categories of homicide. A theoretically integrated model is presented that guides the calculation of disaggregated rates and the derivation of hypothesized relationships. Using data from the Comparative Homicide File (CHF), the analysis shows that indicators of resource deprivation and social disintegration tend to have significant effects across subtypes of homicide, although the magnitude of the effects varies, while indicators of violent cultural orientation are confined to homicides resulting from interpersonal conflicts. The implications of the results for comparative research on homicide are discussed.
This hugely influential work of 1861 is probably the one for which Sir Henry Maine (1822–88) is best remembered. Appointed Regius Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge when he was only twenty-five, Maine then became Reader in Roman law and jurisprudence at the Council of Legal Education, which had been established in London in 1852 by the Inns of Court, and combined this post with research and journalism. He was interested in the relationship between the law and the society that both shaped it and consented to be regulated by it, and drew on historical examples from the culture of many Indo-European societies to further his arguments on the development of law as a vital component of civilisation. Published at a time when the evolution of institutions as well as of species was a topic of widespread interest, this remains a landmark work in the intellectual history of legal studies.
This paper investigates the relationship between some criminological and psychiatric aspects of homicide in Iceland for the period 1900–1979. During this period there were 45 homicide incidents, involving 52 victims and 47 offenders. 16 (34·0 per cent) of the offenders were considered to be psychiatrically ill or subnormal at the time of their offence and a further 17 (36·2 per cent) suffered from personality disorder, alcoholism or drug dependency. A relationship was found between psychiatric abnormality and such variables as day and time of offence, previous criminal record, method of killing, relationship between victim and offender, motive, and action after offence. These findings are generally consistent with previous homicide research.
Opening Paragraph
When a Bedouin kills another in Cyrenaica, one of a number of consequences ensues. According to the Bedouin, the particular consequence is determined by the genealogical positions of the persons or groups concerned. In the first part of this article an analysis of the disturbances in social relationships precipitated by homicide is made, using a lineage model as a framework. In this part of the discussion the arrangement of the information corresponds closely to the view the Bedouin give of their relationships. Additional information is then presented to show that this lineage model neither covers several important areas of social relationships nor enables an accurate prediction of events to be made. This raises the issue: can the comprehensive power of the model be increased by complicating it, or does complexity destroy its utility? The argument advanced is that the lineage model is not a sociological one, but that it is a frame of reference used by a particular people to give them a common-sense kind of understanding of their social relationships. For sociological purposes this means that the lineage model, with its supporting theoretical presuppositions, must perforce be abandoned. In the latter part of this article some of the implications of adopting this position are discussed.
Sociological explanations of group conflict usually presuppose that the various factors that breed hostility between collectivities also generate internal solidarity. Outside of the protest literature, studies of conflict therefore pay little attention to the collective-action problem facing groups in contention, and therefore overestimate the likelihood of group conflict: Intergroup struggle is implicitly regarded as a sufficient condition for group participation in violent conflict. Examination of nineteenth-century court documents from Corsica, a society known for its tradition of collectivist feuding, shows that violent incidents typically did not involve groups. The group character of violence-in the form of collaborative use of lethal force and inclusion of disputants' kin-was conditional on collective contention having occurred before violence began. This and other empirical patterns support the view that collective violence occurs when group action fails to convince an adversary to back down. The failure to prevent escalation calls the group's solidarity into question, compelling members to demonstrate that they are able to overcome their collective-action problem.
Criminological research consistently shows that interpersonal homicide is largely confined to low-status people. Yet, anthropological and historical materials reveal that in earlier and simpler societies homicide was found throughout the status hierarchy. Using theory developed by Donald Black, I argue that a critical factor in the decline of lethal conflict among social elites is the increased availability of legal means of handling conflict. An implication is that since a focus on modern societies and their developed legal systems yields a limited and even distorted empirical picture of lethal violence, criminologists should strive to formulate theories that are cross-cultural and historical in scope.
Does gang-related homicide direr sufficiently from nongang homicide to warrant specialized law enforcement response? Both cross-tabular and discriminant analyses of data from over 700 homicide investigation files reveal substantial differences in ethnicity, age, number of participants, and relationship between participants. Gang homicides are also more likely to involve public areas, automobiles, firearms, and, in one jurisdiction, associated offenses and injury to other victims. Gang incidents present unique problems to investigators, who may well benefit from specialized skills of experienced gang experts.
This analysis of the important components of the rising homicide rates, the changing patterns in means of injury, and the relative increase in the number of victims at older ages indicates that unless present violent behavior is drastically altered, no downturn in the victim rate may be expected until the 1980s.
This paper investigates the relationship between some criminological and psychiatric aspects of homicide in Iceland for the period 1900-1979. During this period there were 45 homicide incidents, involving 52 victims and 47 offenders. 16 (34.0 per cent) of the offenders were considered to be psychiatrically ill or subnormal at the time of their offence and a further 17 (36.2 per cent) suffered from personality disorder, alcoholism or drug dependency. A relationship was found between psychiatric abnormality and such variables as day and time of offence, previous criminal record, method of killing, relationship between victim and offender, motive, and action after offence. These findings are generally consistent with previous homicide research.
Homicides occurring in the Toyama prefecture, Japan, during the past 10 years were reviewed. Between 1985 and 1994, 56 offenders committed 63 homicides. The mean death rate for homicide was 0.55 per 100,000. The ratio of male to female victims was 1:1, while 82% of the assailants were male and 18% were female. The victim and the assailant had a close family relationship in 58.7% of the cases. Dyadic death (homicide followed by suicide) accounted for 27% of all victims. Twenty-nine per cent of the victims were murdered by mentally unstable offenders, and in almost half (44%) of the cases the offender was convicted. Homicides during robbery were rare (only two cases), and there was only one homicide during sexual assault. Death was caused by blunt instrument injury in 38.1% of cases, asphyxia in 31.7%, stabbing in 17.5%, burns in 9.5% and shooting in 3.2% (only two cases). The majority (80%) of homicides occurred at the residence of the victim(s). None of the victims had a history of drug abuse. Social conditions in Toyama prefecture, and their possible relevance to local homicide patterns, are discussed briefly.
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