The effect of job offer timing on offer acceptance, performance, and turnover

Abstract

Employers often enjoy some discretion in how quickly they extend job offers following candidate interviews. Applicant reactions research suggests that quicker offers are more likely to be accepted. This paper reports an archival study investigating the effect of offer timing on offer acceptance and employment outcomes with field data (N = 3,012) from 1 large company, including both student (N = 906) and experienced (N = 2,106) candidates. The 2 groups differed markedly in their recruiting processes, but job seekers of both types were more likely to accept earlier offers. Further, we found no differences for either performance ratings or turnover among employees hired after quicker offers and those who accepted later offers. It therefore appears that employers may benefit from accelerating their postinterview job offer processes, improving their acceptance rates, and reducing vacancy times without incurring either performance or turnover penalties.

Full text

PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY
2010, 63, 223–241
THE EFFECT OF JOB OFFER TIMING ON OFFER
ACCEPTANCE, PERFORMANCE, AND TURNOVER
WILLIAM J. BECKER
Texas Christian University
TERRY CONNOLLY
University of Arizona
JEREL E. SLAUGHTER
University of Arizona
Employers often enjoy some discretion in how quickly they extend job
offers following candidate interviews. Applicant reactions research sug-
gests that quicker offers are more likely to be accepted. This paper
reports an archival study investigating the effect of offer timing on offer
acceptance and employment outcomes with field data (N=3,012) from
1 large company, including both student (N=906) and experienced
(N=2,106) candidates. The 2 groups differed markedly in their re-
cruiting processes, but job seekers of both types were more likely to
accept earlier offers. Further, we found no differences for either perfor-
mance ratings or turnover among employees hired after quicker offers
and those who accepted later offers. It therefore appears that employers
may benefit from accelerating their postinterview job offer processes,
improving their acceptance rates, and reducing vacancy times without
incurring either performance or turnover penalties.
The Effect of Job Offer Timing on Job Acceptance, Performance,
and Turnover
In a recent survey, 85% of human resources executives indicated that
the single greatest challenge in workforce management was creating or
maintaining their companies’ ability to compete for talent (Lockwood,
2006). Demographic and cyclical labor market pressures are likely to
increase demand for skilled employees in the near future, driving organi-
zations to improve their recruitment, selection, and retention capabilities
(Cappelli, 2005). Improvements in job offer acceptance efficiency could
help them to reach this goal, significantly reducing overall hiring costs and
freeing up resources to bolster new employee assimilation, development,
and retention programs.
Correspondence and requests for reprints should be addressed to W. J. Becker, Depart-
ment of Management, Neeley School of Business, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth,
TX 76129; w.becker@tcu.edu.
C2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
223

224 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY
Existing research suggests that speed and timeliness are important
during the hiring process. For example, Arvey, Gordon, Massengill, and
Mussio (1975) found that delays between application and initial inter-
view led economically disadvantaged candidates to self-select out of the
process. Rynes, Bretz, and Gerhart (1991) and Chapman and Webster
(2006) found that postinterview delays in communicating with candi-
dates led to negative perceptions of the organization. Moreover, although
positive interview experiences raise immediate acceptance intentions, the
effect seems to be short lived (Powell, 1991; Turban, Campion, & Eyring,
1995). Further, there is evidence that job seekers entertain relatively few
offers before making their choices, so employers making slow offers may
lose their preferred candidates (Moynihan, Roehling, LePine, & Boswell,
2003; Rynes et al., 1991).1Results of a recent meta-analysis showed that
timely employer response is positively related to self-reported applicant
attraction (Chapman, Uggerslev, Carroll, Piasentin, & Jones, 2005). Sev-
eral authors (e.g., Breaugh & Starke, 2000; Rynes & Cable, 2003) have
identified the entire range of time-related processes and cycle times in the
recruitment and selection process as a priority research area. Neverthe-
less, the Chapman et al. (2005) meta-analysis did not include any studies
that reported results relating offer timing by the organization to accep-
tance intentions or offer acceptance. The purpose of this investigation was
to fill this gap in the literature. We utilized archival hiring data from a
large organization to investigate whether offer timing was related to offer
acceptance, job performance, and turnover.
Hypotheses and Research Questions
The organizational justice literature provides one theoretical perspec-
tive that suggests a mechanism by which job offer timing influences
subsequent offer acceptance. Within this perspective, offer timing can af-
fect offer acceptance through its affect on fairness perceptions. Gilliland
(1993) proposed that job applicants will be less likely to accept a job
offer if they perceive the selection process or their treatment in it to be
unfair. He further suggested that perceived fairness may influence accep-
tance decisions directly, through affective reactions, or indirectly, through
attributions about the organization. Timeliness of selection events and
information is often cited as an important factor in the formation of inter-
actional and procedural justice perceptions by applicants (Folger & Bies,
1989; Tyler & Bies, 1990). Chapman et al.’s (2005) meta-analysis found
that justice perceptions played an important role in acceptance attentions.
1For evidence of similar search restriction in consumer choice, see Iyangar and Lepper
(2000) and Carmon, Wertenbroch, and Zeelenberg (2003).

WILLIAM J. BECKER ET AL. 225
More specifically, timely response by the organization was included as a
subcategory of justice perceptions, and longer delays were found to have
a negative effect on organizational attraction.
A second theoretical perspective that can be used to inform hypothe-
ses concerning applicant reactions to selection process events is attribu-
tion theory. Several studies have found that selection process delays lead
applicants to make negative attributions regarding the organization and
their own chances of being offered a job (Boswell, Roehling, LePine, &
Moynihan, 2003; Rynes et al., 1991). Open-ended applicant responses
from these studies suggest that these negative attributions decrease ap-
plicant intentions to continue in the selection process and accept offers.
According to Applicant Attribution-Reaction Theory (AART; Ployhart &
Harold, 2004), applicants form largely unconscious and automatic attri-
butions in response to selection process milestones (e.g., receiving a job
offer) or when their expectations are violated (e.g., perceiving excessive
delays in notification of a selection decision). AART proposes that nega-
tive attributions lead to unfairness perceptions and even behavioral conse-
quences, such as withdrawal from the selection process and the rejection of
offers.
At the conclusion of their meta-analysis of applicant reactions to se-
lection procedures, Hausknecht, Day, and Thomas (2004) proposed a
theoretical model in which they considered both the organizational justice
perspective and attribution theory. The authors stated that it was unclear
whether applicants viewed the selection process through a justice or attri-
butional lens. They concluded that fairness perceptions, attributions about
the organizations, or both may influence applicants’ reactions in any sit-
uation in which a long delay is present. For example, some applicants
experiencing lengthy delays may dislike the process and form negative
attributions of the organization without viewing the process as unfair.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the effects
of attributions and fairness perceptions in response to longer delays would
be in conflict. Both perspectives suggest that longer delays between se-
lection stages would lead to unfavorable candidate reactions and reduce
the likelihood of offers being accepted.
In this study, we investigate the relationship between offer timing, the
time between a candidate’s final interview and a job offer being made,
and offer acceptance, whether or not the candidate accepted the offer. In
this situation, both justice and attribution theories predict the same effect
for offer timing. Therefore, we expect that longer time lags in offer timing
are more likely to violate candidate expectations and to contribute to both
perceptions of unfairness and less favorable attributions of the offer and
the organization, thereby reducing the probability that later offers will be
accepted. Therefore, we predict:

226 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY
Hypothesis 1: Job offer timing is negatively related to the probability
of offer acceptance such that later offers are less likely
to be accepted.
Previous research also provides a number of insights into how offer
timing may impact the amount of time required for candidates to reach a
decision. Rynes et al. (1991) suggested that quicker offers may be inter-
preted by the candidate as a signal of the hiring manager’s enthusiasm and
positive assessment of the candidate. They also found evidence that delays
spurred candidates to perform more elaborate information processing and
to scrutinize information about the organization more closely. Boswell
et al. (2003) interviewed job seekers who were recent college graduates
and found evidence of self-imposed decision deadlines that indicated a
desire to make an expeditious decision once an offer was received. Many
of these job seekers reported imposing decision deadlines upon them-
selves, regardless of whether the organization imposed one. Reciprocity
norms provide a plausible reason for why applicants who receive quicker
offers from the organization would feel pressure to respond with quicker
decisions (Fehr, Fischbacher, & G¨
achter, 2002).
Of course, it is also possible that quicker offers might raise the candi-
date’s estimate of his or her value and therefore promote further job search
and longer decision time. Higher self-esteem and job search self-efficacy
have been linked to more assertive job seeking behavior (Saks & Ash-
forth, 1999). There is no clear theoretical basis to predict how offer timing
will affect candidate decision time. Nevertheless, it will be informative to
explore this issue, as it has not been previously investigated in the field.
Therefore, we explored as a research question the relationship between
offer timing and decision time, which we defined as the time between a
candidate receiving an offer and his or her decision to accept or reject it.
Research Question 1: Is job offer timing related to decision time?
A number of authors have suggested that applicant reactions during
the selection process may spill over into the employment relationship.
Vandenberg and Seo (1992) proposed a model of organizational entry,
in which they suggested that the final job choice plays a significant role
in shaping initial work-related attitudes and behaviors. Specifically, they
proposed that intrinsic satisfaction with the final choice leads to greater
organizational commitment, job performance, and employment stability.
Gilliland (1993) proposed that fairness perceptions formed during the
selection process could have an impact on posthire outcomes such as
work performance and job satisfaction. Two laboratory studies have pro-
vided some support for a positive relationship between applicant fairness

WILLIAM J. BECKER ET AL. 227
perceptions and subsequent job performance (Gilliland, 1994; Ployhart &
Ryan, 1998).
The spillover effect for negative applicant reactions on turnover has not
been stated as explicitly as the case for performance. Fairness heuristic
theory suggests that initial fairness perceptions contribute to new em-
ployee decisions regarding long term investment in the organization and
subsequent turnover (Lind, 2001). Only one empirical study has investi-
gated the relationship between selection process fairness perceptions and
turnover (Truxillo, Bauer, Campion, & Paronto, 2002). In this longitu-
dinal study of police trainees, the relation between fairness information
provided during the selection process and subsequent turnover was not
significant. Another practical perspective suggests that relatively quicker
offers may be hastier and may be made without due deliberation and con-
sideration of a full range of alternative candidates. Hiring managers may
often prefer to conduct a more deliberate search (losing some promis-
ing candidates during the process but raising their confidence that the
final hire will be a good one). Nevertheless, again, we did not feel that
previous theory and research provided a sound basis for predicting that
relatively quicker final selection decisions lead to more positive or more
negative posthire outcomes. Therefore, we present this possibility as a set
of research questions.
Research Question 2a: Is job offer timing related to job performance?
Research Question 2b: Is job offer timing related to turnover?
Method
Participants
We analyzed the hiring records for one division of a Fortune 500
engineering technology company from 2004 to 2006. Candidates were
drawn from all areas of the United States and were recruited by job post-
ings, active sourcing, and on-campus recruiting. Internal candidates were
excluded from the analysis for this study. The records were limited to
exempt positions that were filled externally through the recruitment and
selection of students and experienced candidates. Archival data were ob-
tained for 3,012 candidates (906 student candidates and 2,106 experienced
candidates) who received job offers. Because this study focuses on offer
acceptance and posthire outcomes, candidates who did not receive an offer
were not included.
At the time of the study, the company was growing rapidly and was
hiring new employees to fill engineering and administrative positions at
all organizational levels. The company used traditional recruiting and

228 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY
selection practices for hiring students and experienced candidates, in-
cluding campus visits and external search firms. In general, recruiters
reviewed resum´
es and conducted campus or phone screenings. Then, the
most promising candidates were invited for structured on-site interviews
with hiring managers and human resources personnel. Student recruit-
ment targeted more prestigious colleges and universities in the fall and
continued throughout the academic year until hiring targets were reached.
Experienced candidates were interviewed for specific vacancies until the
position was filled. Hiring managers indicated that during this period the
organization’s hiring cycle time was shorter than the sector-wide average.
Measures
Job offer timing was measured as the time lag in calendar days between
a candidate’s final interview and the organization extending a formal offer
of employment. Job acceptance indicated whether or not the candidate ac-
cepted or rejected the offer. Decision time was measured in days between
the date the organization extended a formal job offer and the date the
candidate notified the organization of his or her decision. Candidate type
was classified as either students (recent or pending graduates of under-
graduate or graduate programs, hired through campus recruiting efforts)
or experienced (professional candidates who were hired through external
recruiting efforts or contracted search firms.)
Performance. For 1,445 of the hired employees, we obtained super-
visor performance ratings for the period of the study. The organization
employs a performance evaluation system that considers multiple aspects
of employee performance, results, and goal attainment. The supervisors
evaluate employees on each dimension and assign an overall performance
rating on a 4-point scale: 1 =needs improvement,2=meets expectations,
3=exceeds expectations,or4=far exceeds expectations. In this orga-
nization, the overall rating was not mathematically derived from the sub-
dimension evaluations. These subdimension evaluations were narrative in
nature and used formally for employee development. Only an overall per-
formance rating was recorded in the personnel records. The organization
invested a great deal of time and resources in performance evaluation, and
these overall ratings factor prominently in subsequent compensation and
promotion decisions. Applicants who accepted offers earlier in the study
period received multiple performance evaluations, whereas those hired
toward the end of the study had not yet received an evaluation. Mean
performance and Year 1 performance were calculated for employees who
received at least one performance rating.
Turnover. Termination date was recorded for each new employee who
left the company before the end date of the study. The data provided by the

WILLIAM J. BECKER ET AL. 229
organization included a self-reported reason for employment resignation
or termination.
Control variables. Several demographic variables that were of no
direct theoretical interest to this study were coded as potential control
variables. These included gender, ethnicity, whether or not relocation
would have been required, and job level. Job levels define ranges of
employee experience, responsibilities, and compensation associated with
a position. A recent meta-analysis of the applicant reactions literature
found little evidence that gender (ρ=.05), ethnicity (ρ=.04), or age
(ρ=−.04) influence candidate justice perceptions (Hausknecht, et al.,
2004). A complementary meta-analysis of the applicant attraction liter-
ature found a modest positive relationship between pay and job choice
(ρ=.12), but not between location and job choice (ρ=.06; Chapman
et al., 2005). Chapman et al. also found that neither gender nor race mod-
erated the relation between justice perceptions and acceptance intentions
or job choice. Therefore, we did not include gender, ethnicity, or reloca-
tion as controls. Nevertheless, as job level is expected to be moderately
correlated with age, experience, and pay, we did include job level as a
control in the reported analyses.
We subsequently repeated each of the study analyses described below,
with all available control variables. Of these, only relocation requirement
was significantly related to offer acceptance for both student candidates
(B=−1.08, p<.05) and experienced candidates (B=−.76, p<.05).
Gender was significantly related to offer acceptance for student candidates
only (B=.32, p<.05). Further, including these variables as controls did
not impact any of the study findings. The analyses related to Hypothesis 1
and Research Questions 1 and 2, which include all control variables, are
available from the first author upon request.
Results
Preliminary analysis (see Table 1) suggests that the hiring processes for
student and experienced candidates were markedly different. Experienced
candidates competed for higher job levels (M=3.77, SD =1.63) than
student candidates (M=1.16, SD =.37, d=2.21, 95% CI =2.51, 2.72).
Student candidates accepted 67.2% of the offers made to them, whereas
experienced candidates accepted 88.2% (χ2(1, N=3,012) =187.48,
p<.01). Students’ offers came an average of 23.1 (SD =22.60) days
after interview, versus 14.7 (SD =18.11) days for experienced candidates
(d=.37, 95% CI =9.91, 6.86), and their responses to offers took an
average of 21.0 (SD =41.36) days, compared to only 3.1 (SD =12.75)
days for experienced candidates (d=.58, 95% CI =19.83, 15.93). The
student candidates, in short, competed for entry level positions, received

230 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Student and Experienced Candidates
1 23456789
Experienced M14.75 3.13 .88 3.77 .78 .20 .25 2.32 .14
Student MSD18.12 12.75 .32 1.63 .42 .40 .44 .54 .35
1. Offer time lag 23.14 22.60 −.04 −.12 .04 .01 .00 .00 .02 −.01
2. Decision time 21.01 41.36 −.10 −.22 .08 .03 .00 .06 −.01 .01
3. Acceptance .67 .47 −.15 −.37 −.03 .02 −.03 −.12 – –
4. Job level 1.16 .37 .01 .07 −.04 .16 −.10 .05 .02 .03
5. Gender .71 .49 .16 −.07 .07 .09 −.02 .06 −.05 .01
6. Ethnicity .35 .48 .02 .06 −.04 .03 −.13 −.09 −.05 .00
7. Relocation .59 .49 .04 .07 −.24 .06 −.02 .10 .00 .05
8. Performance 2.37 .54 −.07 .05 – .25 −.07 .01 .10 −.12
9. Turnover .12 .32 −.02 .03 – −.01 .04 .03 −.07 −.02
Note. Student candidates are presented below the diagonal and experienced candidates
above. Acceptance was coded 1 for candidates who accepted offers and 0 for candidates
who rejected offers. N=906 for student variables 1–7 (r>.06 is significant at p<0.05).
N=351 and 364 for student variables 8 and 9, respectively (r>.10 is significant at p<
0.05). N=2,106 for experienced variables 1–7 (r>.05 is significant at p<0.05). N=
1,094 and 1,216 for experienced variables 8 and 9 (r>.05 is significant at p<0.05).
much slower offers, responded much more slowly, and accepted offers
less often. This is consistent with a picture of students putting themselves
on the job market in the last year of their programs of study and exploring
a number of job possibilities under no great time pressure. Experienced
applicants, in contrast, presumably know much more about the job market
and their relative position in it, applying for a particular job opening as a
single alternative to their current jobs. Given the substantial differences
between the two hiring processes, we decided to analyze the two samples
separately.2
The results bearing on Hypothesis 1 show that for both candidate
groups, accepted offers were associated with quicker offers than were re-
jected offers. For experienced candidates, accepted offers were received
after a mean time lag of 13.96 (SD =17.44) days, versus 20.63 (SD =
21.64) days for rejected offers (d=.37, 95% CI =−9.06, −4.03). For
student candidates, the corresponding offer time lag means were 20.72
(SD =21.16) for accepted offers and 28.10 (SD =24.59) days for re-
jected offers (d=.33, 95% CI =−10.49, −4.28). Hypothesis 1 therefore
2We also performed the logistic regression analysis for all candidates simultaneously
and dummy coded for experienced versus student candidates. Consistent with the separate
analyses, we did not find a significant interaction between student/experienced candidates
offer timing for offer acceptance. However, we did find that candidate experience moderated
the effect of offer timing on decision time. This effect was not predicted but is considered
further in the results and discussion.

WILLIAM J. BECKER ET AL. 231
TABLE 2
Summary of Logistic Regression for Offer Acceptance
Var i a b l e BSEOdds ratio Wald R2
Student candidates
Step 1:
Job level −.06 .07 .94 .93 .00
Step 2:
Offer time lag −.02 .01 .98 13.60 .04
Experienced candidates
Step 1:
Job level .28 .03 1.32 70.70 .06
Step 2:
Offer time lag −.02 .00 .98 48.00 .03
Note. Pseudo R2reported using Nagelkerke method. N=906 for student candidates.
N=2,106 for experienced candidates. All coefficients with a Wald statistic greater than
1.96 are significant at the .05 level.
received relatively strong support: Quicker offers were associated with a
higher probability of offer acceptance in both the student and experienced
candidate groups. Binary logistic regression, shown in Table 2, confirmed
the effect of offer timing on the probability of acceptance for student
candidates (B=−.01, p<.05) and experienced candidates (B=−.02,
p<.05) controlling for job level in both groups.
Research Question 1 was aimed at understanding the relation between
offer timing and decision time. For the experienced candidates, offer tim-
ing was not significantly related to decision time. For the student sample
there was a significant negative relationship between offer timing and de-
cision time (r=−.10, p<.05), indicating that later offers were associated
with quicker decisions. Hierarchical, moderated logistic regression anal-
ysis confirmed the difference in these relationships across the samples,
indicating that there was a significant interaction between offer timing
and candidate experience influencing decision time (B=−.36, p<.05).
Although neither outcome suggested evidence of reciprocity norms, it is
possible that quicker offers might have increased student applicant confi-
dence and led them to search for other jobs, thereby creating longer deci-
sion times. In summary, there is a weak affirmative response to Research
Question 1, indicating that quicker offer timing led to longer decision
times but only in the student sample. We explore additional relationships
between decision time and offer timing in the post-hoc analyses below.
Research Questions 2a and 2b were aimed at understanding whether
offer timing would be related to two posthire outcomes: job perfor-
mance and turnover. We were able to match recruiting and performance
data for 1,445 applicants (1,094 experienced candidates and 351 student

232 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY
candidates) who accepted offers during the study period and for whom at
least one performance review was available.3We should note that there
were some modest differences between the makeup of the matched and
unmatched records. The employees for whom recruitment and job perfor-
mance variables could be matched had a longer mean offer time lag (d=
.12) and a higher percentage of experienced candidates (d=.09) and men
(d=.16). There was no indication in the data or from discussions with
the organization to suggest systematic differences between the matched
and unmatched records. For those employees with recruitment and job
performance data, offer timing was not significantly related to initial su-
pervisory performance ratings at the end of the first year of employment
for either student candidates or experienced candidates.4Therefore, the
results suggested a negative response to Research Question 2a.
We were also able to match recruitment variables and current em-
ployment status for 1,580 individuals (1,216 experienced candidates and
364 student candidates). Of these, 210 (161 experienced candidates and
43 student candidates) had left the organization as of July 2007. Only
three of these employees were involuntarily terminated, which precluded
an investigation of possible differences between voluntary and involun-
tary turnover. Mean offer time lag was not significantly different for new
employees who quit and those who stayed during the period of the study
for either student or experienced candidates.
We also examined the mean offer time lag for recently hired student
and experienced employees who terminated within 3, 6, 9, and 12 months
of their hiring date. We did so in order to explore whether offer timing
might be related to turnover for those who left soon after being hired
but not for those who left later. We did not find any significant differ-
ences (all p>.05). These results suggest a negative response to Research
Question 2b.
In summary, the results did not suggest any evidence of a relation-
ship between offer timing and posthire outcomes. Offer timing was not
related to either performance ratings or turnover among those candidates
hired.
3The organization maintained separate databases for their recruiting and personnel
records with different unique identifiers. There was a policy in place for manually up-
dating the recruiting database, but we were unable to link the records of 872 applicants who
accepted offers (36%) because of missing identifiers between the recruiting and personnel
databases. An additional 138 new employees (6%) had not yet received a performance
evaluation due to their short tenure.
4Separate analyses of individual initial and annual performance ratings were also ana-
lyzed with and without the full range of available control variables. These models yielded
the same overall results and did not account for any incremental variance above the analysis
presented.

WILLIAM J. BECKER ET AL. 233
Post-Hoc Analyses
In the course of analyzing the data, we also encountered several find-
ings that did not relate directly to our hypothesis or research questions but
that may help explain our null or weak findings, inform future research,
or have practical application. We did not find the positive relationship
between offer timing and decision time predicted by reciprocity norms.
On the contrary, student candidates demonstrated a significant negative
relationship between offer timing and decision time. Nevertheless, we
also found that decision time was associated with whether or not the can-
didate ultimately accepted the offer. Experienced and student applicants
accepted job offers more quickly than they rejected job offers. For expe-
rienced candidates, the mean decision time was significantly shorter for
accepted offers (M=2.08, SD =9.82) than for rejected offers (M=
10.95, SD =24.28), d=.48, 95% CI =−10.51, −7.22. For student
candidates, the corresponding means were 10.32 (SD =22.52) and 42.93
(SD =58.92) days (d=.73, 95% CI =−37.94, −27.26), respectively.
We further explored the relationship between offer timing and deci-
sion time in students. The negative relationship between offer timing and
decision time indicated that, on average, students made their decisions
more quickly when they received later offers. After an offer time lag of
greater than 15 days, 66% made decisions within 2 days. For an offer time
lag of 15 days or less, only 38% of student candidates made decisions
within 2 days. We regressed decision time on offer timing in a polynomial
regression, in order to test the potential for a curvilinear relationship, but
the quadratic term in this regression equation was not significant. Instead,
we found that there was a significant interaction between offer timing
and offer acceptance in predicting decision time (R2=.17, F(3,902) =
64.83, p<.05). Offer rejections generally followed long decision times
when offers were made more quickly but came after much shorter deci-
sion times for slower offers. Decision times for candidates who accepted
offers were relatively unaffected by offer timing. Therefore, the results
suggested that faster offers to student candidates led to either relatively
quick acceptances or long decision times that were more likely to end in
offer rejection.
We did not find a relationship between offer timing and turnover.
Nevertheless, of the employees who left the organization, experienced
candidates were more likely to leave sooner than student candidates. The
mean tenure of experienced new employees who left the organization
during the period of the study (M=408.57, SD =16.56) was significantly
shorter than that of student new employees who left (M=513.12, SD =
205.31; d=−.72, 95% CI =−176.13, −32.97). In addition, we found
a difference in performance ratings when comparing leavers and stayers

234 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY
within the group of experienced hires. For experienced hires, the mean
performance of those who left was 2.13 (SD =.56) versus 2.34 (SD =
.54) for those who remained (d=−.38, t(1,092) =3.98, p<.05).
Therefore, within this group, lower performers were more likely to leave
the organization than were higher performers.
Discussion
This study makes several important contributions to the selection and
applicant reactions literatures. First, it investigated actual applicants for
salaried positions that are typically associated with long-term careers.
Second, this study investigated the influence of offer timing on offer
acceptance and posthire organizational outcomes. Timeliness of offers
represents one of the few selection process variables that can be modified
by organizations relatively easily. Third, this study included experienced
job candidates and therefore responded to calls for research including this
population (Breaugh & Starke, 2000; Rynes & Cable, 2003). Finally, it is
the only study of which we are aware that tests the relationship between
a specific characteristic of the selection process and actual job choice
decisions and posthire organizational outcomes.
Offer Acceptance
The central finding of this study is that both student and experienced
candidates were more likely to accept job offers that were received sooner
rather than later following the final selection interview. This finding is
consistent with the predictions of applicant reaction models based on the
organizational justice perspective and attribution theory (Gilliland, 1993;
Hausknecht et al., 2004; Ployhart & Harold, 2004). This finding also
extends previous research in selection and other fields by linking a specific
and controllable characteristic of the selection process to actual applicant
decisions (Boswell et al., 2003; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Rynes et al.,
1991, Soelberg, 1967). The modest effect sizes for offer timing shown
in Table 2 are in fact practically important. Increased acceptance rates,
reduced search costs, and lower vacancy times can provide substantial
overall cost savings. Human resources managers conservatively estimated
that each site interview costs approximately $1,200 (including travel and
lodging) and vacant positions cost an average of $1,000 per day in lost
productivity. Moreover, cost savings associated with quicker offers appear
not to result in any detectable increase in the rate of unsuccessful hires,
as evidenced by lower performance or higher turnover.
Organizational justice and attribution theories suggest that system-
atic differences in applicant reactions and behavior may be due to the

WILLIAM J. BECKER ET AL. 235
effect of salient and available information from selection events (Gilliland,
1993; Ployhart & Harold, 2004). All of the applicants included in this
study received favorable selection decisions, yet the results suggest that
offer timing had a significant impact on applicant acceptance decisions.
Later offers are more likely to violate applicant expectations and produce
less favorable reactions to the offer and the organization. Applicants may
conclude that the organization is not very interested in them, inefficient,
and/or unfair and therefore not a very attractive employer. Timely offers
also likely influence candidates in several other important ways. For one,
extending an offer eliminates uncertainty from the candidate’s evaluation
of the job. Uncertainty imparts a salient and negative aspect to a choice
option that makes it much less attractive than a certain option (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979). In addition, prompt offers may be interpreted by can-
didates as a signal of greater interest on the organization’s part (Rynes
et al., 1991) and make the offer more attractive to the candidate.
This is the first study to examine simultaneously offer acceptance
and employment outcomes of both student and experienced candidates,
allowing a comparison that has been of concern to several researchers
(Chapman et al., 2005; Rynes, Orlitzky, & Bretz, 1997). Gilliland (1993)
proposed that previous experience with selection processes would lead to
more accurate schemas and expectations for this selection process. We
found a number of significant between-group differences. On average,
experienced candidates received quicker offers, made faster decisions,
and were more likely to accept offers than were student candidates. De-
spite these differences, we did not find evidence that applicant experience
moderated the effect of offer timing on offer acceptance.
Candidate Decision Times
In exploring our first research question, we did not find support for
reciprocity norms in candidate decision times. Nevertheless, post-hoc
analysis provided evidence that candidate experience moderated the ef-
fect of offer timing on candidate decision time. We did not predict this
finding a priori. In terms of the time needed to make decisions, experienced
candidates were relatively insensitive to offer timing. In contrast, student
candidates responded to quicker offers with either quick acceptance de-
cisions or longer delayed decisions, which were more likely to produce
offer rejections. Unfortunately, the data did not offer further insight into
this seemingly contradictory finding. Human resources managers within
the organization indicated that the organizational procedures for student
and experienced recruitment and selection were quite different. The orga-
nization used separate recruitment personnel for student and experienced

236 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY
candidates, and the selection process was more flexible for experienced
candidates.
The organization under study did not impose candidate decision dead-
lines. This may have contributed to the conflicting decision time findings.
We did not find evidence of consistent candidate self-imposed decision
deadlines suggested by the Boswell et al. (2003) qualitative study of stu-
dent job seekers. The negative relationship between decision time and
offer timing for student candidates suggests that quicker offers are more
likely to result in offer acceptance but may also produce some longer
candidate decision times that end in offer rejection. These results would
be consistent with the findings that a small portion of student candidates
who received quicker offers pursued further search, whereas those who re-
ceived later offers made relatively quicker decisions and were more likely
to reject the organization’s offer. Experienced candidates, on the other
hand, may often use job search to test the waters or to attempt to improve
their bargaining power with their current employer (Bretz, Boudreau, &
Judge, 1994). They are also more likely to have reached their decisions to
accept or reject a potential offer prior to the final interview. Furthermore,
lengthy offer time lags may cause them to drop an organization from con-
sideration. Our findings suggest that experienced candidates tend to be
more decisive and return relatively quicker decisions, regardless of offer
timing or their decision to accept or reject the offer.
Posthire Outcomes
In exploring our posthire research questions, we did not find evi-
dence that offer timing had spillover effects on subsequent performance
or turnover. Individuals who received slower offers performed no worse
on the job than those who received relatively quicker offers and were no
more likely to exit the organization during the first years of employment.
This result did not support the predictions of models of applicant reac-
tions that longer delays contribute to unfairness perceptions and negative
attributions that negatively influence posthire outcomes (Gilliland, 1993;
Hausknecht et al., 2004). It also contradicts the conventional belief we
encountered among human resources personnel and hiring managers that
organizations primarily extend quick offers to the most outstanding candi-
dates, who later become higher performing employees. The results suggest
that making quicker final selection and offer decisions likely will not have
a positive or negative influence on performance or turnover. This is con-
sistent with the findings that candidate reactions to selection processes are
relatively fleeting (Powell, 1991). The evidence suggests that although
fairness judgments and affective reactions regarding the recruitment and

WILLIAM J. BECKER ET AL. 237
selection process played an important role in offer acceptance, they likely
had little impact on longer term employment outcomes.
Alternative Explanations
The primary strength of archival studies is the application of real
world data to reduce the number of viable explanations for observed
phenomena. Archival studies also have inherent weaknesses. The data in
this study were collected by the organization for their own purposes, and
we therefore had no control over what variables were collected. Therefore,
important variables such as justice perceptions, attributions, applicant
quality, alternative offers, and the organization’s reasons for offer timing
were not available. This created an unmeasured variables problem that
limits our ability to make direct conclusions regarding the effect of offer
timing on justice perceptions and attributions. It also does not allow us
to rule out alternative hypotheses related to the unmeasured variables
(James, 1991). Therefore, in addition to pointing out where the results are
consistent with the predictions of justice and attribution theories, we also
address a number of alternative explanations and provide any additional
relevant information that could be obtained from the available data to
weaken the alternative explanations.
Conventional wisdom suggests that organizations might extend prompt
and attractive offers to highly rated candidates to forestall alternative of-
fers. This alternative explanation is also consistent with our archival data.
Nevertheless, interviews with human resources managers and generalists
in the organization indicated that the organization preferred to make strong
initial offers regardless of offer timing. Moreover, the financial terms of
offers extended to student candidates were almost entirely formulaic and
were based on degree and grade point average. Therefore, highly rated
experienced candidates may have received quicker and more lucrative
offers, but highly rated student candidates would have received quicker
but not richer offers. If the financial terms of faster offers were the pri-
mary driver behind offer acceptance, experienced candidates, rather than
students, should have shown a greater preference for earlier offers. Our re-
sults suggested that the relation between offer timing and offer acceptance
for these two groups was not significantly different.
Another alternative explanation for our results is that longer time lags
between interviews and offers could provide candidates additional time
to pursue and accept alternative offers from other organizations. The data
included each candidate’s reported reason for declining an offer. In a
post-hoc analysis, we found 224 offers that were declined in favor of an
alternative offer. We did not find a significant relation between offer timing
and candidates declining in favor of an alternative offer for either student

238 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY
candidates or experienced candidates. Logistic regression confirmed that
longer offer time lags did not significantly increase the likelihood that
an offer would be rejected in favor of an alternative for experienced or
student candidates. Although we acknowledge the relative weakness of
this self-reported measure of job alternatives, these results do provide
some evidence that the observed effect was not simply the result of longer
time lags leading to the generation of alternative offers.
Limitations
A limitation of this study was its restriction to a single organization—
one that was also a very attractive employer, as judged by its industry
status and high offer acceptance rate. This organization was a high-skill,
high-wage employer, and generalizability to nontechnical employers is
uncertain. The relative attractiveness of the organization, indicated by its
high overall offer acceptance rate, would have weakened our ability to
detect the predicted relationship between offer timing and offer accep-
tance. This would make our results conservative. There may also be some
concern over the potential effects of range restriction because only the
better qualified applicants received interviews and a relatively small per-
centage of candidates who interviewed received offers. During the study,
the organization extended offers to 32% of candidates interviewed (30%
of experienced candidates and 36% of student candidates). We were pri-
marily concerned with actual offer decisions, and the nature of the study
prevented us from observing the job choices of candidates who did not
receive offers. It is possible that less highly qualified candidates could be
more influenced by offer timing than those in this study. These candidates
would enjoy fewer alternative offers and would, presumably, seize oppor-
tunities more eagerly. Therefore, we expect our results to be a conservative
estimate of the broader impact of quicker job offers.
The single-item supervisory performance rating suffers from a number
of shortcomings that may have contributed to the null findings. Nonethe-
less, this performance measure is generally accepted as an adequate mea-
sure of performance in field settings (Arvey & Murphy, 1998; Judge &
Ferris, 1993). Given the relatively large sample sizes, we should have had
sufficient power to detect relatively small effects, even with the poten-
tial reliability concerns with this performance measure. The low turnover
rate within the first year and apparent lack of involuntary turnover may
have limited our ability to detect a relationship between offer timing and
turnover. The available measures also did not provide insight into the
actual reasons behind observed offer timing (e.g., perceived candidate
quality, organizational inefficiency, or manager indecision).

WILLIAM J. BECKER ET AL. 239
Implications
These limitations suggest a number of potentially fruitful avenues for
future research. A similar analysis of the archival records of an organiza-
tion from a low or medium wage industry could answer questions about
how the effects observed in this study vary with job type and candidate ed-
ucation and aptitude. Such organizations generally have lower acceptance
rates and higher turnover (Jones & Skarlicki, 2003). Given the difficulty
of measuring candidate fairness perceptions and attributions in the field
(Ployhart & Harold, 2004), a laboratory experiment of simulated job offer
decisions could explore the effects of offer timing with candidates who
exhibit more variance on aptitude-related variables. An experiment would
also allow for conclusions regarding causal relationships concerning the
effect of offer timing on fairness perceptions, attributions, and offer ac-
ceptance. It is possible that longer offer lag times could lead candidates
to believe that they are not the organization’s first choice. Perceptions of
second-choice status could have unique effects on acceptance decisions.
Finally, a longitudinal study of active job seekers throughout the interview
and job choice process could explore the actual attributions formed by job
seekers in response to selection process timing across multiple ongoing
job opportunities. This would allow researchers to better understand the
actual job choice process and directly test the predictions of justice and
attribution theory.
With regard to practice, this study demonstrates that organizations may
be able to improve offer acceptance rates by reducing lag times between
final interviews and the extension of job offers. This increased efficiency
can likely be obtained with minimal changes to existing selection proce-
dures. Further, the changes would require little financial cost to implement
and could produce substantial long term savings for the organization in
terms of time and money spent recruiting and selecting new employees.
Our results also provide additional support for the utility to the organi-
zation of imposing candidate decision deadlines. Student applicants who
took longer to announce their decision were more likely to reject the offer.
Conclusion
This study extends our understanding of how timing in the final phases
of selection impacts offer acceptance and employment outcomes. It sug-
gests that organizations may benefit from extending early offers to all
candidates who have successfully passed through a preliminary selec-
tion process and who perform well in final selection interviews. Candi-
dates in this study who received earlier offers were more likely to accept
them. Those who received delayed offers—whether due to hiring manager

240 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY
indecision or other reasons—ultimately performed as well on average as
candidates who received earlier offers. Longer offer time lags ultimately
cost the company in terms of longer vacancy times and decreased likeli-
hood of offer acceptance, without improving the average performance of
new employees.
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