ArticlePDF Available

Basic and Applied Issues in Eyewitness Research: A Münsterberg Centennial Retrospective

Authors:

Abstract

Whether memory research should emphasize fundamental psychological theory in well-controlled laboratory settings (i.e. “basic” research) or practical questions in naturalistic settings (i.e. “applied” research) is a recurrent question in the field. The debate became especially prominent with the advent of the “everyday memory movement” in the 1980s (e.g. Banaji & Crowder, 1989; Neisser, 1978, 1991), but it dates back to the origins of experimental psychology itself (i.e. the basic approach espoused by Wundt and Titchener vs. the more applied perspective taken by Külpe, Ebbinghaus, Binet, James and others). The debate is particularly relevant to the subarea of eyewitness memory, which has such obvious implications for the legal system. Hugo Münsterberg, who was one of the earliest researchers on eyewitness memory, is probably the first figure to advocate strongly for a wider reliance by the courts on psychological research (Münsterberg, 1908; others, such as Binet and Freud, made similar, albeit less forceful, recommendations). Münsterberg’s efforts were largely rebuffed (Wigmore, 1909), and since that time, there have been repeated calls for the courts to take eyewitness research (indeed, all social science research) more seriously, accompanied by a range of judicial responses ranging from ready acceptance to outright rejection (Monahan & Walker, 2005). Nor are all psychologists of one mind on this issue. Indeed, even Münsterberg himself, who is widely regarded as one of the founders of applied psychology, at times urged caution in applying psychological research findings to real-world problems (Münsterberg, 1898; see Benjamin, 2006).
Psychology, Department of
Faculty Publications, Department of
Psychology
University of Nebraska - Lincoln Year 
Basic and Applied Issues in Eyewitness
Research: A M¨unsterberg Centennial
Retrospective
Brian H. BornsteinChristian Meissner
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, bbornstein2@unl.edu
University of Texas at El Paso, USA
This paper is posted at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub/337
733
Published in Applied Cognitive Psychology 22 (2008), pp. 733–736; doi 10.1002/acp.1478 Copyright
© 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Used by permission. http://www.interscience.wiley.com
Introduction to a special issue on “Basic and Applied Issues in Eyewitness Research: A Münsterberg
Centennial Retrospective”
Basic and Applied Issues in Eyewitness Research:
A Münsterberg Centennial Retrospective
Brian H. Bornstein* and Christian A. Meissner**
* Corresponding author; Department of Psychology, 238 Burnett Hall, University of
Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588-0308 USA; email bbornstein2@unl.edu
** University of Texas at El Paso, USA
Whether memory research should emphasize fundamental psychological theory in
well-controlled laboratory settings (i.e. “basic” research) or practical questions in natural-
istic settings (i.e. “applied” research) is a recurrent question in the eld. The debate became
especially prominent with the advent of the “everyday memory movement” in the 1980s
(e.g. Banaji & Crowder, 1989; Neisser, 1978, 1991), but it dates back to the origins of experi-
mental psychology itself (i.e. the basic approach espoused by Wundt and Titchener vs. the
more applied perspective taken by Külpe, Ebbinghaus, Binet, James and others). The de-
bate is particularly relevant to the subarea of eyewitness memory, which has such obvious
implications for the legal system.
Hugo Münsterberg, who was one of the earliest researchers on eyewitness memory, is
probably the rst gure to advocate strongly for a wider reliance by the courts on psycho-
logical research (Münsterberg, 1908; others, such as Binet and Freud, made similar, albeit
less forceful, recommendations). Münsterberg’s efforts were largely rebuffed (Wigmore,
1909), and since that time, there have been repeated calls for the courts to take eyewitness
research (indeed, all social science research) more seriously, accompanied by a range of ju-
dicial responses ranging from ready acceptance to outright rejection (Monahan & Walker,
2005). Nor are all psychologists of one mind on this issue. Indeed, even Münsterberg him-
self, who is widely regarded as one of the founders of applied psychology, at times urged
caution in applying psychological research ndings to real-world problems (Münsterberg,
1898; see Benjamin, 2006).
The time is ripe to revisit this issue, for three main reasons. First, 2008 is the centennial
of the publication of Münsterberg’s seminal work, On the Witness Stand. Thus, it is an apt
time to step back and reconsider some of the issues raised by Münsterberg and other early
researchers, and to see how far the eld as a whole has come in the last 100 years. A con-
ference at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in March 2007 (“Off the Witness Stand”) ex-
734 Bornstein & Meissner in Applied Cognitive p syChology 22 (2008)
plicitly raised these issues, and several of the present papers are an outgrowth of the con-
ference and some of the themes—historical, theoretical and methodological—that were
raised there.
Second, although the courts often remain skeptical of eyewitness research, it is gradu-
ally gaining acceptance by the American legal system (Benton, McDonnell, Ross, Thomas,
& Bradshaw, 2007; Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999). In contrast
to the gradual and somewhat halting inltration of eyewitness research in the American
legal system, the British system has moved forward with a variety of reforms and has
developed through more cooperative efforts between law enforcement and researchers
(see Bull, 1999). Despite these contrasting models of progress, there is still disagreement
throughout the research community about the reliability of certain research ndings and
whether they have been sufciently researched to be used in court or to be advocated in
the context of policy reform (e.g. Benton et al., 2007; Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001;
Malpass, 2006; Penrod & Bornstein, 2007). The disagreement often centers on issues of ex-
ternal and ecological validity (Penrod & Bornstein, 2007), which is at the heart of the larger
basic vs. applied debate (Banaji & Crowder, 1989).
Third, the trend for greater acceptance of research ndings by the legal system has, in
the opinions of some observers, created a situation in which there is an overemphasis on
practical questions, accompanied by a lack of theoretical relevance. For example, some
have suggested that research on the use of simultaneous vs. sequential lineups has pro-
gressed from a largely practical perspective (e.g. “diagnostic value”; see Wells & Olson,
2002) and has lacked a full understanding of the psychological mechanisms that may be in-
uenced by the shift in lineup method (Clark, 2003; Clark & Davey, 2005; Gronlund, 2004,
2005; McQuiston-Surrett, Malpass, & Tredoux, 2006; Meissner, Tredoux, Parker, & Ma-
cLin, 2005). In other words, there is evidence that the pendulum is swinging too far in the
applied direction. Although there is a place for psycholegal research that is primarily theo-
retical or primarily applied, the best psycholegal research addresses important legal ques-
tions while simultaneously advancing psychological theory (e.g. Wiener et al., 2002).
On the whole, then, it is a good time to revisit this debate. Applied Cognitive Psychology
is an ideal venue for this endeavor, given the sorts of substantive and methodological is-
sues that the journal typically considers. The articles contained in this special issue take
a historical perspective in addressing the contemporary debate over the use of basic re-
search methods and theory vs. applied approaches in research on eyewitness memory. It
is easier for researchers to know where they are, as a eld, when they have an apprecia-
tion of where they have been. By inserting Münsterberg into this debate, our goal is to ex-
amine what lessons we can draw from the past and to apply those lessons to contempo-
rary issues. These issues concern both basic questions related to theory development (e.g.
episodic memory, face recognition, social inuence) and applied questions with implica-
tions for public policy.
The topics covered in this issue reect the great variety of topics studied under the ru-
bric of eyewitness memory, as well as the diversity of research methodologies and loca-
tions. Indeed, the papers describe research conducted both in and outside the laboratory,
and they are written by scientists from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom,
Germany, South Africa and Australia. Münsterberg might have brought eyewitness re-
search from Germany to the United States, but it has since spread worldwide.
In organizing the contents of the issue, we have used the heuristic of going from the
general to the specic. All of the papers are informed by a historical perspective, in gen-
eral, and Münsterberg’s work in particular; but we begin with two papers that are ex-
Basic and applied issues in eyewitness research: introduction 735
plicitly historical analyses and place On the Witness Stand in its historical context. Sporer
accomplishes this by reminding readers of the wealth of eyewitness research being con-
ducted in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, especially by the German psy-
chologist William Stern; while Bornstein and Penrod do so by contrasting Münsterberg’s
work with that of his virtually unknown contemporary, G. F. Arnold.
The next three papers (Turtle et al.; Lane & Meissner; Malpass et al.) broadly address the
critical issues with which the eld of eyewitness research grapples: should we be doing
basic or applied research? Is it possible to do both at once, and do them well? Does (and
can) research using divergent methodologies yield convergent ndings? How much con-
vergence, and how large a body of ndings, is necessary to promote condent policy rec-
ommendations or to provide responsible and accurate expert testimony? While there are
no easy answers to these questions, these papers will help ensure that we do not lose sight
of these issues in conducting eyewitness research.
The four papers that follow (Clark; Deffenbacher; Brewer & Weber; Memon et al.) con-
tinue this discussion by exploring a number of specic topics in greater detail. The topics
considered in these papers include the application of mathematical models to understand
eyewitness behavior, methodological challenges and concerns, and the inuence of several
estimator (e.g. stress, retention interval, condence, decision latency) and system variables
(e.g. lineup composition, lineup instructions). As with other papers in this issue, they ad-
dress the basic and applied contributions of the research, and they identify areas where the
literature yields fairly consistent ndings, as well as areas where more work is needed.
The special issue concludes with a commentary by Gary Wells. Wells’ own research on
eyewitness memory has produced a number of important theoretical and applied ndings,
so his perspective on these issues is an important one. As a whole, the papers show that
the eld of eyewitness research is healthy, vibrant, occasionally contentious, and growing.
We feel that Münsterberg and other pioneers would be proud of what they began, and we
look forward to the next 100 years.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Jennifer Dysart and the John Jay College of Criminal Justice for orga-
nizing the “Off the Witness Stand” conference in New York City in March 2007, where the
idea for this issue originated; and to Graham Davies, Bob Belli, and Martine Powell, the ed-
itors of Applied Cognitive Psychology, for their encouragement and support.
References
Banaji, M. R., & Crowder, R. G. (1989). The bankruptcy of everyday memory. American Psychologist,
44, 1185-1193.
Benjamin, L. T. (2006). Hugo Münsterberg’s attack on the application of scientic psychology. Jour-
nal of Applied Psychology, 91, 414-425.
Benton, T. R., McDonnell, S., Ross, D. F., Thomas, N., & Bradshaw, E. (2007). Has eyewitness re-
search penetrated the American legal system? In R. C. L. Lindsay, D. F. Ross, J. D. Read, & M.
P. Toglia (Eds.), Handbook of eyewitness psychology, Vol. 2: Memory for people (pp. 453-500). Mah-
wah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Bull, R. (1999). Police investigative interviewing. In A. Memon, & R. Bull (Eds.), Handbook of the psy-
chology of interviewing (pp. 279-292). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
736 Bornstein & Meissner in Applied Cognitive p syChology 22 (2008)
Clark, S. E. (2003). A memory and decision model for eyewitness identication. Applied Cognitive Psy-
chology, 17, 629-654.
Clark, S. E., & Davey, S. L. (2005). The target-to-foils shift if simultaneous and sequential lineups. Law
& Human Behavior, 29, 151-172.
Gronlund, S. D. (2004). Sequential lineups: Shift in criterion or decision strategy? Journal of Applied
Psychology, 89, 362-368.
Gronlund, S. D. (2005). Sequential lineup advantage: Contributions of distinctiveness and recollec-
tion. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 19, 23-37.
Kassin, S. M., Tubb, V. A., Hosch, H. M., & Memon, A. (2001). On the general acceptance of eyewit-
ness testimony research: A new survey of the experts. American Psychologist, 56, 405-416.
Malpass, R. S. (2006). A policy evaluation of simultaneous and sequential lineups. Psychology, Public
Policy, & Law, 12, 394-418.
McQuiston-Surrett, D. E., Malpass, R. S., & Tredoux, C. G. (2006). Sequential vs. simultaneous line-
ups: A review of methods, data, and theory. Psychology, Public Policy & Law, 12, 137-169.
Meissner, C. A., Tredoux, C. G., Parker, J. F., & MacLin, O. H. (2005). Eyewitness decisions in simul-
taneous and sequential lineups: A dual-process signal detection theory analysis. Memory & Cog-
nition, 33, 783-792.
Monahan, J., & Walker, L. (2005). Social science in law (5th ed.). Westbury, NY: Foundation Press.
Münsterberg, H. (1898). The danger from experimental psychology. Atlantic Monthly, 81, 159-167.
Münsterberg, H. (1908). On the witness stand. New York: Doubleday.
Neisser, U. (1978). Memory: What are the important questions? In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris, &
R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of memory (pp. 3-24). London: Academic Press.
Neisser, U. (1991). A case of misplaced nostalgia. American Psychologist, 46, 34-36.
Penrod, S. D., & Bornstein, B. H. (2007). Generalizing eyewitness reliability research. In R. C. L. Lind-
say, D. F. Ross, J. D. Read, & M. P. Toglia (Eds.), Handbook of eyewitness psychology, Vol. 2: Mem-
ory for people (pp. 529-556). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence. (1999). Eyewitness evidence: A guide for law en-
forcement. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.
Wells, G. L., & Olson, E. A. (2002). Eyewitness identication: Information gain from incriminating
and exonerating behaviors. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8, 155-167.
Wiener, R. L., Hackney, A., Kadela, K., Rauch, S., Seib, H., Warren, L., et al. (2002). The t and im-
plementation of sexual harassment law to workplace evaluations. Journal of Applied Psychology,
87, 747-764.
Wigmore, J. H. (1909). Professor Münsterberg and the psychology of evidence. Illinois Law Review,
3, 399-445.
... Other obstacles relate to earlier decisions: conceptualization of the research question, choice of methodological and measurement approaches, and so forth. How researchers deal with both kinds of obstacles reflects the tension between basic and applied research that has been present in psychology and law since the field's origins more than a century ago (Bornstein & Meissner, 2008;Bornstein & Neuschatz, 2020). ...
Chapter
Full-text available
Psycholegal research is, by design, a field devoted to evaluating and addressing issues that directly affect the justice system. At the same time, many scholars in the field have experienced first-hand the frustrations of bridging the divide between research and policy or practice. In this chapter we discuss key issues and challenges involved in bridging this divide by focusing on a number of cardinal questions: Why influence policy? When, where, and how might we do so? How much evidence must there be before adopting a particular policy? And what policies can (or should) we address? We argue that psycholegal research should operate within a translational research framework, and we encourage scholars to communicate their findings to a broader audience, spend time with the professionals for whom their research is intended, introduce students to best practices for conducting policy-relevant research, and reconsider how we evaluate one another’s contributions in the academy.
... The interest of a scientific approach to testimony by researchers and professionals of justice did not carry in France. In the opposite direction of this trend, Munsterberg's work triggered some swirls in the scientific community of America (1908; for a review, see Bornstein & Meissner, 2008). Binet (1904) criticized the unresponsiveness of his French peers about his work on the importance of the interrogation format, the questioning and memory accessibility: "[...] my book about suggestibility did not have in France any echo. ...
Chapter
In order to introduce the current state of the art and procedures in the field of witness interviewing in France, we first discuss the scientific research existing in this field and access by professionals. Then we focus on field practices and training proposed to professionals (police, Gendarmerie Nationale, legal medicine), and highlight the lack of exchange between researchers and professionals. Finally, we briefly describe the interviewing of victims in forensic examinations.
... The interest of a scientific approach to testimony by researchers and professionals of justice did not carry in France. In the opposite direction of this trend, Munsterberg's work triggered some swirls in the scientific community of America (1908; for a review, see Bornstein & Meissner, 2008). Binet (1904) criticized the unresponsiveness of his French peers about his work on the importance of the interrogation format, the questioning and memory accessibility: "[...] my book about suggestibility did not have in France any echo. ...
... Yet, contemporary research on eyewitness testimony may not find its way from laboratory to courtroom (Yuille et al., 2010). And while a special issue of Applied Cognitive Psychology was devoted to a Münsterberg centennial, the editors point out that the field of eyewitness research, while active, is not in accord as to applicability and relevance to real-world issues (Bornstein & Meissner, 2008). ...
Article
Full-text available
This article examines a false start in the application of psychology to the law. While there had been expert testimony from physicians in criminal and civil cases in America since the nineteenth century, forensic psychology first emerged in the early twentieth century. Following European traditions of experimental psychology, Hugo Münsterberg applied the nascent science of memory research to the assessment of witness credibility. A brilliant and popular Harvard professor, Münsterberg touted his technique of word-association to determine truth. Forensic psychology's development was stalled by resistance from within legal authorities, including John Henry Wigmore, the leading expert on evidence. However, Münsterberg was a sensation in popular media. In this article , the authors examine early attempts to import experimental psychology into the courtroom and the arguments against them. Not only were Münsterberg's findings premature, they touched on a forbidden domain for witnesses: fact finding. While sincere, he learned that the determination of truth lay within the province of juries and judges, not psychologists. Thus, the application of psychology to the law was delayed. The authors review the lessons from Münsterberg's false start and comment on developments in the admissibility of scientific testimony.
... Yet, contemporary research on eyewitness testimony may not find its way from laboratory to courtroom (Yuille et al., 2010). And while a special issue of Applied Cognitive Psychology was devoted to a Münsterberg centennial, the editors point out that the field of eyewitness research, while active, is not in accord as to applicability and relevance to real-world issues (Bornstein & Meissner, 2008). ...
... This argument is not new. Hugo Münsterberg, the former Chair of the Psychology Department at Harvard University and one of the founders of applied psychology, faced this same criticism after he published his renowned book On the Witness Stand in 1908 (as cited in Bornstein & Meissner, 2008;Doyle, 2005;Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006). In particular, as Doyle describes, John Henry Wigmore, the former dean of Northwestern University's School of Law and a prominent scholar on trial evidence, argued in 1909 that Münsterberg's scientific experiments simply shed light on whether an eyewitness is more or less likely to be correct, but that none of his experiments definitively guaranteed whether an eyewitness's statement or identification is always incorrect (for a thorough This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. ...
Article
Full-text available
In January 2012, the United States Supreme Court ruled that suggestive identification procedures violate a defendant's rights to due process only if law enforcement officials orchestrated the suggestive procedures. The Court's decision in Perry v. New Hampshire (Perry v. New Hampshire, No. 10–8974, 565 U.S. ___, 2012) dealt a serious blow to scholars who had contributed to the impressive advances of eyewitness memory research in the 34 years since the Court's last major statement on eyewitness testimony. In particular, it seemed as though the Court ignored the intervening years and the myriad scientific studies that had been conducted in that time. How could the Court be so blind? In what follows, we review both the scientific research on eyewitness memory and the Court's constitutional jurisprudence as it relates to eyewitness testimony and evidentiary due-process concerns. Together, we show that, although the Court may have seemingly ignored decades of scientific research, the question presented by Perry required the Court to remain true to existing due-process jurisprudence. We conclude by reviewing the limits of the Perry decision as well as a discussion of what the future may hold for the intersection of eyewitness memory research and constitutional interpretation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved)
... However, there is still a gap between basic and applied research (Deffenbacher, 2008; Lane & Meissner, 2008) with " the pendulum . . . swinging too far in the applied direction " (Bornstein & Meissner, 2008, p. 734). Whereas some researchers suggest a " middle lane approach " (Lane & Meissner, 2008, p. 779), others go as far as stating the " importance (necessity) of computational modeling for eyewitness identification research " (Clark, 2008, p. 803). ...
Article
Full-text available
Eyewitnesses often report details of the witnessed crime incorrectly. However, there is usually more than 1 eyewitness observing a crime scene. If this is the case, one approach to reconstruct the details of a crime more accurately is aggregating across individual reports. Although aggregation likely improves accuracy, the degree of improvement largely depends on the method of aggregation. The most straightforward method is the majority rule. This method ignores individual differences between eyewitnesses and selects the answer shared by most eyewitnesses as being correct. We employ an alternative method based on cultural consensus theory (CCT) that accounts for differences in the eyewitnesses' knowledge. To test the validity of this approach, we showed 30 students 1 of 2 versions of a video depicting a heated quarrel between 2 people. The videos differed in the amount of information pertaining to the critical event. Participants then answered questions about the critical event. Analyses based on CCT rendered highly accurate eyewitness competence estimates that mirrored the amount of information available in the video. Moreover, CCT estimates resulted in a more precise reconstruction of the video content than the majority rule did. This was true for group sizes ranging from 4 to 15 eyewitnesses, with the difference being more pronounced for larger groups. Thus, through simultaneous consideration of multiple witness statements, CCT provides a new approach to the assessment of eyewitness accuracy that outperforms standard methods of information aggregation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
Article
Faulty eyewitness identification is a leading reason that innocent people are convicted and incarcerated. Wells (1978) introduced a distinction between two sets of variables that affect the accuracy of identification decisions: estimator and system variables. Estimator variables are factors like the adverse effects on encoding of stress or the difficulty of cross-race identifications. Little can be done to circumvent these effects. However, system variables are under the control of the criminal justice system and research has been directed at developing procedures to enhance the accuracy of eyewitness identification. The chapter considers four categories of system variable research involving lineups: content, instructions, behavioral influence, and presentation method. The chapter reviews the evidence supporting each and update recommendations made by Wells et al. (1998). Particular attention is directed at sequential versus simultaneous lineup presentation methods because the ostensible advantage of sequential lineups has been the most influential system-variable reform.
Article
Full-text available
In light of recent advances, this study updated a prior survey of eyewitness experts (S. M. Kassin, P. C. Ellsworth, & V. L. Smith, 1989). Sixty-four psychologists were asked about their courtroom experiences and opinions on 30 eyewitness phenomena. By an agreement rate of at least 80%, there was a strong consensus that the following phenomena are sufficiently reliable to present in court: the wording of questions, lineup instructions, confidence malleability, mug-shot-induced bias, postevent information, child witness suggestibility, attitudes and expectations, hypnotic suggestibility, alcoholic intoxication, the cross-race bias, weapon focus, the accuracy–confidence correlation, the forgetting curve, exposure time, presentation format, and unconscious transference. Results also indicate that these experts set high standards before agreeing to testify. Despite limitations, these results should help to shape expert testimony so that it more accurately represents opinions in the scientific community.
Article
Full-text available
A considerable amount of empirical research has been conducted on ways to improve the eyewitness identification process, with emphasis on the use of lineups. Public policy changes are currently underway with respect to lineup procedures: Sequential lineups are being recommended to police as the best practice. This may be premature because the conditions under which sequential lineups are superior to simultaneous lineups are not well understood given the current literature: Many studies are reported with insufficient detail needed to judge the adequacy of the research design, new data show that the sequential superiority effect may vary as a function of study methodology, theoretical assumptions have not been adequately tested, and important comparisons that may rule out the ostensible superiority of the sequential lineup have not been studied. This review summarizes the literature, presents new data, and identifies the need for further empirical work before appropriately grounded recommendations as to the superiority of sequential lineups can be made. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Full-text available
Many states and communities are rewriting their eyewitness identification policies. Some of these jurisdictions are excluding simultaneous lineups altogether, and others are allowing them if double-blind administration of sequential lineups is not possible. The Innocence Project advocates the latter and puts forward blind sequential-lineup administration as the best form of lineup identification. Although sequential lineups are claimed to be superior, no explicit policy analysis has been done. In the present study, the author uses a policy-analysis model based on decision theory to examine the utility of simultaneous and sequential lineups, as well as to examine a range of values placed on identification outcomes and their probabilities. Simultaneous lineups are shown to be superior to sequential lineups under most conditions examined in this analysis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Presents an overview of Social Sciences highlighting the two most important visions, positivism and interpretivism resulting in quantitative and qualitative research. With these ventures into the classic paradigms of law epistemic approaches. Three dimensional conception of law, proposes a constructivist epistemological framework that overcomes the formal look - dualistic to locate the law as an instrument of social change varied creative potential meaning.
Article
A new approach to the study of memory has emerged recently, characterized by a preoccupation with natural settings and with the immediate applicability of research findings. In contrast, the laboratory study of memory relies on experimental techniques for theory testing and is concerned with the discovery of generalizable principles. Although both approaches share the goal of generalizability, they differ sharply in the evaluation of how that goal is best accomplished. In this article, we criticize the everyday memory approach, arguing that ecologically valid methods do not ensure generalizability of findings. We discuss studies high in ecological validity of method but low in generalizability, and others low in ecological validity of method but high in generalizability. We solidly endorse the latter approach, believing that an obsession with ecological validity of method can compromise genuine accomplishments.
Article
We start with the question posed by Wells (1993)--Is there a real eyewitness problem and how large might it be? In this chapter we consider the implications of research on erroneous convictions and DNA exculpations, research on witness errors adduced from police records and, for comparison purposes, the general pattern of errors reported in experimental research. We next consider the "ambiguity" of findings issue raised by some critics (e.g., McCloskey & Egeth; Elliott) about the size and variability in research findings and Yuille's generalizability argument. In this section we concentrate on meta-analytic studies of eyewitness performance-highlighting variables for which there are moderately large numbers of studies that yield robust patterns of results. We give particular attention to analyses that might reveal whether there are methodological features of studies that would limit their generalizability. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)